

EX-51

MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL  
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

STATE CONTROL NO.: 05 362 024 075  
REPORTING OFFICER: SERGEANT T. L. BREEN 0297  
OCC TYPE: TAUM SAUK RESERVOIR BREACH  
COUNTY: REYNOLDS  
DATE/TIME: DECEMBER 14, 2005  
OFFENSE STATUS: INVESTIGATION CONTINUING  
LOCATION: LESTERVILLE  
REPORT DATE: 04/04/07  
TROOP OF OCCURRENCE: G  
SCENE PROCESSED: N  
DDCC AT SCENE: N

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

INTERVIEW OF JEFFREY T. SCOTT

~~State~~ Exhibit No. 51

Date 2-14-07 Case No. ES-2007-

Reporter KE 0477

1. On April 4, 2007, Sergeant Mark Dochterman and myself interviewed Jeffrey Scott, an Ameren employee, regarding the breach of the upper reservoir of the Taum Sauk facility.

2. On April 4, 2007, Jeff Scott was interviewed regarding the upper reservoir breach at Taum Sauk, at a private office in the Ameren Headquarters building, St. Louis, Missouri. Also present for the interview was Ameren attorney Lisa Pake. ~~He is a resident of St. Louis, Missouri, and has been employed by Ameren since 1991. He is a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the Missouri Society of Professional Engineers (MSPE).~~

3. Scott has been employed by Ameren for six years. He is an electrical engineer. At the time of the breach, he was the supervisor of Power and Production & Engineering for Taum Sauk. He is currently assigned to their ~~Labadie~~ Meramec Power Plant as a Career Engineer.

4. Scott was presented with several copies of emails previously provided by Ameren, where he was either the author of the email or was a receipt of the email, related to the Taum Sauk facility. The emails were identified by a number assigned by Ameren and are referred to by that unique number (e.g. SHP 0000).

5. He first viewed email number SHP 733, from Chris Hawkins, dated December 8, 2005, related to some upgrades by Hawkins. He stated he was copied for his information; and in his opinion, these upgrades had nothing to do with the upper reservoir levels.

6. He viewed email number SHP 1599, dated November 14, 2005, related to the Spring outage from Rick Cooper, wherein he was copied. He stated he had no involvement in the level gauge piping issues. He knew it was a priority project to replace. He noted he had no involvement in the "re-wiring" of the probes from series to parallel, but admitted he knew how to do it, but would have had to clear it with several people including Rick Cooper. He didn't recall assisting anyone with changing the probe wiring.

7. He viewed email number SHP 1928, from Chris Hawkins and noted it did not have anything to do with the breach.

8. He viewed email number SHP 4113, dated October 7, 2005, from Terry Croft, regarding new instruments and the second level of the upgrade. He stated that instrumentation was not yet active.

9. He viewed email number SHP 4125, dated October 7, 2005, from Tom Pierie, regarding the upper reservoir problems. He stated he did not know how the upper reservoir probes were set, related to the hi and the hi-hi probes. He knew the wall was different heights all the way around the reservoir. He stated he never moved the Warrick probes and did not know if they had ever been moved from their original set points.

10. He viewed email number SHP 4126 and 4127, dated October 7, 2005, where he was copied and the author was Rick Cooper, related to the gauge piping issues. He noted it was for his information only.

11. He viewed email number SHP 4156 and 4157, dated November 4, 2005, from Rick Cooper to him regarding the upgrade project and Tom Pierie being taken off the project. He recalled Cooper's frustration and nothing further.

12. He viewed email number SHP 4183, dated December 9, 2005, from Chris Hawkins, wherein he was copied, regarding PLC switches and upgrades. He stated it was doubtful he had anything to do with this topic.

13. He viewed email number SHP 5359, dated October 9, 2005, from Cooper wherein he was copied, regarding a diver and gauge piping issues. He stated it was for his information only and had no involvement related to this topic.

14. He viewed email number SHP 5360-5362, dated October 25, 2005, from Rick Cooper to him related to the gauge piping model for replacement. This was for his information only.

15. He viewed email number SHP 6738-6740, dated December 8, 2005, from James Patrick, regarding outages and scheduling. He received this email for his information only.

16. He viewed email number SHP 6749-6750, dated December 12, 2005, from Mike Wehry to him regarding teleconference meeting notes on the Phase 2 upgrades. He noted because of the breach, they never got to this project.

17. He viewed email number SHP 6755-6760, dated December 14, 2005, from Chris Hawkins, wherein he was copied, regarding the upper reservoir levels and pump information. He noted it was for his information only.

18. He viewed email SHP number 6759, from Chris Hawkins, regarding trends at the upper reservoir, but he did not recall this email.

19. He viewed email number SHP 7263-7264, dated September 28, 2005, from Tom Pierie, regarding wind-created wave action at the upper reservoir. He noted he was not working the date this occurred and was notified of the wave action. He did not recall being tasked with anything specific related to the wave action. He did note that Cooper and him looked at the trends from the time period of the wave action.

They both decided that one probe was off by about one foot, so they took that one out of the equation and made the water level look .4 higher than it was actually. He was the person that programmed that change into the system. He stated lowering the stop point by two feet was an operator adjustment, and he did not recall when that happened or the chronology, but anyone else could have done that change. He stated as far as he knew it stayed that way until the breach.

20. He viewed email number SHP 8821, dated September 28, 2005, from Tom Pierie to him related to whether the hi and hi-hi probes picked up the wave action during the hurricane winds. He stated he did not know if they did and did not recall this email. He noted he was sure that it did not go without being responded to.

21. Scott closed by noting plant safety considerations were related to the so-called .4 fudge factor and lowering the water level and taking out the one transmitter that was off by a foot.

T. L. Breen, Sergeant  
Division of Drug and Crime Control

TLB:lmn