Exhibit No. 319P

OPC – Exhibit 319P Angela Schaben Direct Testimony File Nos. ER-2022-0129 & ER-2022-0130 Exhibit No.:Issue(s):The MEEIA Uplight Contract/Incentive
Compensation/Storm Reserve/Property Tax TrackerWitness/Type of Exhibit:Schaben/DirectSponsoring Party:Public CounselCase No.:ER-2022-0129 and ER-2022-0130

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

ANGELA SCHABEN

Submitted on Behalf of the Office of the Public Counsel

EVERGY METRO, INC. D/B/A EVERGY MISSOURI METRO

AND EVERGY MISSOURI WEST, INC. D/B/A EVERGY MISSOURI WEST

CASE NOS. ER-2022-0129 AND ER-2022-0130

** ** Denotes Confidential information that has been redacted

June 8, 2022

PUBLIC

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of Evergy Metro, Inc. d/b/a Evergy)Missouri Metro's Request for Authority to)Implement a General Rate Increase for Electric)Service)

Case No. ER-2022-0129

In the Matter of Evergy Missouri West, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri West's Request for Authority to Implement a General Rate Increase for Electric Service

Case No. ER-2022-0130

AFFIDAVIT OF ANGELA SCHABEN

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STATE OF MISSOURI)	
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COUNTY OF COLE)	

Angela Schaben, of lawful age and being first duly sworn, deposes and states:

1. My name is Angela Schaben. I am a Utility Regulatory Auditor for the Office of the Public Counsel.

2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my direct testimony.

3. I hereby swear and affirm that my statements contained in the attached testimony are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Angela Schaben Utility Regulatory Auditor

Subscribed and sworn to me this 8th day of June 2022.



TIFFANY HILDEBRAND My Commission Expires August 8, 2023 Cole County Commission #15637121

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Tiffany Hildebrand Notary Public

My Commission expires August 8, 2023.

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DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

ANGELA SCHABEN

EVERGY MISSOURI WEST, INC. D/B/A EVERGY MISSOURI WEST AND EVERGY METRO, INC. D/B/A EVERGY MISSOURI METRO

CASE NOS. ER-2022-0129 AND ER-2022-0130

1	INTRODUCTION			
2	Q.	Please state your name, title, and business address.		
3	A.	Angela Schaben, Utility Regulatory Auditor, Office of the Public Counsel ("OPC" or "Public		
4		Counsel"), P.O. Box 2230, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102.		
5	Q.	What are your qualifications and experience?		
6	A.	Please refer to the Schedule ADS-D-1 attached hereto.		
7	Q.	Have you testified previously before the Missouri Public Service Commission?		
8	А.	I have prepared and submitted pre-filed testimony, but I have not yet been called to testify		
9		before the Commission. Please refer to the Schedule ADS-D-2 attached hereto for a list of		
10		all cases wherein I have submitted pre-filed testimony.		
11	Q.	What is the purpose of your testimony?		
12	A.	The purpose of my testimony is to address four issues:		
13		(1) The MEEIA Uplight contract,		
14		(2) Incentive Compensation,		
15		(3) Storm Reserve, and		
16		(4) Property Tax Tracker		
17	Q.	Please summarize your recommendations as presented in the subsequent testimony.		
18	A.	I recommend disallowing the MEEIA Uplight contract from plant in service due to concerns		
19		regarding affiliate transaction issues, prudence issues, and allocation issues. I also recommend		
20		disallowing the \$3,552,782 of incentive compensation Evergy Missouri West ("Missouri		
21		West") seeks to include in rates and the \$10,008,354 of incentive compensation Evergy		
22		Missouri Metro ("Missouri Metro") seeks to include in rates due to reasons explained in greater		
23		detail later in this testimony. In regard to the storm reserve, I recommend against creating		
24		storm reserves for both Missouri Metro and Missouri West (collectively "Evergy" or "the		

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Company"), funded through liabilities incurred by each company and owed to ratepayers, and recommend instead that those liabilities be refunded to customers. Finally, even though Missouri legislation was recently introduced in favor of property tax trackers, I will provide details on why said trackers are unnecessary.

THE MEEIA UPLIGHT CONTRACT

Q. What is the MEEIA Uplight software?

Uplight is a software as a service ("SaaS") platform whose statement of work ("SOW") with Α. Evergy Services, Inc. runs effectively through December 31, 2027. SaaS generally applies to 8 cloud-based applications licensed on a subscription basis. According to Uplight's website, Uplight is a "unified platform to engage, activate, and orchestrate your customers and their energy usage."¹ Uplight's technology solutions reportedly mitigate the issues where "most utilities are working with a mess of inaccessible and siloed data, resulting in more manual 12 13 coordination, fragmented customer experiences, and lower customer participation in critical programs."² 14

What are your issues regarding the MEEIA Uplight software purchase? 15 Q.

My first issue involves the circumstance under which the MEEIA Uplight software contract A. 16 was procured. My second issue is the fact that the upfront MEEIA Uplight software costs were 17 allocated solely to Evergy Metro's Plant in Service totals. 18

19 Q. What issues do you have regarding the circumstance under which the MEEIA Uplight software contract was procured? 20

I have concerns regarding potential affiliate transaction issues and general prudence issues A. related to **_

¹ https://uplight.com/solutions/

² https://uplight.com/technology/

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
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Q. Why would the MEEIA Uplight software purchase present potential affiliate transaction issues?

A. Both Missouri Metro and Missouri West are owned by Evergy, Inc. which also owns Evergy Ventures, Inc. ("Evergy Ventures"). Evergy Ventures held ownership in Uplight, Inc. through its investment portfolio when the master service agreement for the MEEIA Uplight software purchase between Evergy Services, Inc. and Uplight, Inc. went into effect. The Company therefore had a vested interest in Uplight's success due to investment ownership through their shared parent company, Evergy, Inc. Please refer to Evergy, Inc.'s organization structure displayed below:



1 Q. What was required of Evergy given the relationship you just described?

A. Per affiliate transaction rules under 20 CSR 4240-20.015(2)(A), a utility shall not provide a financial advantage to an affiliated entity. At face value it appears Evergy provided its affiliate Evergy Ventures a financial advantage by giving preferred treatment to a vendor in whom it owned equity.

6 Q. Why do you believe Evergy provided its affiliate Evergy Ventures a financial advantage?

As reported by Built in Colorado on March 3, 2021, an investment deal with Schneider 8 A. Electric, Huck Capital, and AES, resulted in Uplight, Inc. achieving valuation of \$1.5 9 billion, which vaulted Uplight, Inc. into unicorn status.³ Evergy Ventures, Inc. did not exit 10 its investment position in Uplight until ** _____ ** at which point Uplight was 11 purportedly still valued at \$1.5 billion.⁴ During this timeframe, Evergy assisted in 12 contributing to Uplight's value by entering into a contractual agreement with Uplight for 13 goods and services. Evergy Ventures, Inc. is an Evergy, Inc. affiliate, therefore both Evergy 14 Ventures and the Evergy conglomerate as a whole benefited from the purchase of goods and 15 services from one particularly lucrative vendor for which Evergy Venture retained equity 16 ownership through investment. 17

18 Q. To what does the term 'unicorn' allude in the world of venture capitalism?

A. "Unicorn" is a term used in the venture capital industry to describe a privately held startup
 company with a value of over \$1 billion.⁵

Q. What level of compensation will Uplight, Inc. receive as a result of the SOW with Evergy Services, Inc.?

A. Evergy Services, Inc. shall pay Uplight, Inc. an amount not to exceed ** _______ ** for unlimited software as a service (SaaS) fees, implementation fees, variable costs, and professional service fees. Of the ** ______ ** maximum contracted amount, **

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³ https://www.builtincolorado.com/2021/03/03/Uplight-funding-1b-valuation-hiring


⁴ https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210728006113/en/Rubicon-Technology-Partners-Completes-Sale-of-Majority-Stake-in-Uplight-at-1.5-Billion-Valuation

⁵ https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unicorn.asp

	** for one time platform connection, application, and professional service fees were due upfront upon the SOW effective date.
0	
Q.	Is this potential affiliate transaction issue the only problem you have with the MEEIA
	Uplight software contract?
A.	No. I also have issues with the means by which Evergy procured the software. In particular
	I think that it was imprudent for Evergy to **
	** related to the software.
Q.	**
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⁶ ADS 7 **	-D-3 **

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Why is a competitive bid process important?
A competitive bid process establishes market price and ensures that captive rate payers aren'
ultimately on the hook for paying inflated prices for goods and services. **
** The Company expects to capitalize this amount through plant in service and
earn a rate of return. **
**
That's quite a lot of information to process. Can you summarize?
Absolutely. A summary table of dates and events is available below.
Absolutery. A summary table of dates and events is available below.



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14	Q.	Why does the Company seek to capitalize the entire Uplight contract under Missouri
15		Metro plant in service?
16	A.	That's a great question. Unfortunately, I do not know the answer. The MEEIA Uplight
17		contract is 100% allocated for capitalization under Evergy Metro's plant in service.
18		However, according to the Company's response to Staff DR 0181, **
19		**
20	Q.	Why is this noteworthy?
21	A.	Evergy utilizes various allocation factors to determine billed services between its affiliates.
22		The practice of only capitalizing a large item under Missouri Metro, who then determines
23		how additional monthly O&M is shared between affiliates according to predetermined
24		allocators that consider plant in service, appears to provide bias against Missouri Metro.
25	Q.	Are there other concerns relating to Evergy's allocation factors?
26	A.	Yes. However, those concerns will be addressed in the testimony submitted by other OPC
27		witnesses.
		9

Q. What is your position regarding the MEEIA Uplight software?

- A. For all the reasons I have provided, I recommend disallowing the ** ______ ** for 'MEEIA Uplight' from rates.
- 4 INCENTIVE COMPENSATION

Q. What is your issue regarding incentive compensation?

A. Ratepayers should not pay for excessive incentive compensation in their rates. A
proficiently designed incentive compensation plan will ultimately pay for itself by reducing
operations and maintenance expenses (O&M).

9 Q. What amount of incentive compensation is currently included in Evergy's case?

 A. Evergy calculated three year incentive compensation averages for both Missouri West and Missouri Metro. The Company then deducted test year incentive compensation for each utility to include in rates. Missouri Metro's three-year incentive compensation average was \$10,008,354 and test year incentive compensation was \$14,092,776. Therefore, the Company made an adjustment of (\$4,084,422) and seeks the three-year average of \$10,008,354 for inclusion in rates.

Missouri West's three-year incentive compensation average is \$3,552,782 and the test year incentive compensation was \$3,789,218. Therefore, the Company made an adjustment of (\$236,436) and seeks the three-year average of \$3,552,782 for inclusion in rates.

19 Q. How have AIP incentive compensation plan scorecards changed since 2019?

20 A.

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Q. To what extent would the incentive compensation and the reduction in operations and maintenance expenses be reflected in the Company's revenue moving forward if incentive compensation is included in Evergy's rates?

A. Assessment of present and future efficiencies, along with the correlating incentive
compensation related to these efficiencies, are only accurately reflected in a future rate case
when customers should see benefits through a revenue requirement reduction. Between rate
cases, any efficiency benefits derived on behalf of the customer will be absorbed by the
company as revenue.

9 Q. Can you elaborate using a hypothetical example?

10 A. Absolutely. Let's consider ABC Utility Company. Years prior to a rate case filed in 2022, ABC Utility Company devised a plan to improve operational efficiencies. The Company 11 then developed strategies to identify inefficiencies and solutions for improvement. A 12 corresponding incentive compensation plan to reward employees for achieving these new 13 efficiency goals was also implemented. As a result, ABC Utility Company has paid out an 14 average of \$10,000,000 in incentive compensation annually for each of the past three years 15 leading up to the Company's new rates being set at the end of the 2022 rate case. ABC 16 Utility Company made these incentive compensation payments to reward employees for 17 achieving an average of \$12,000,000 in O&M savings annually in each year prior to the 18 incentive compensation payments being made. Based on these dollar amounts, the 19 Commission orders new rates that allow ABC Utility Company to collect \$10,000,000 from 20 ratepayers annually to cover incentive compensation payouts on the assumption that the 21 company will continue to generate an average of \$12,000,000 in O&M savings annually. 22 23 The result of this order is outlined in the table below:

Direct Testimony of Angela Schaben File Nos. ER-2022-0129 and ER-2022-0130

	Year				
	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025 & onward
	Historic Rate Case Test Year	Rate Case Year	Between Rate Cases	Between Rate Cases	Between Rate Cases
Incentive					
Compensation					
Payout based on					
prior year					
efficiencies	(10,000,000)	(10,000,000)	(10,000,000)	(10,000,000)	(10,000,000)
Amount collected					
by Utility in rates					
to cover Incentive					
Compensation	/				
Payouts	N/a	10,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000
O&M Savings	12,000,000	12,000,000	12,000,000	12,000,000	12,000,000
Reduction in					
Utility's revenue					
requirement					
resulting from					
O&M savings in					
the prior year	N/a	(12,000,000)	0	0	0
Net revenue					
gained by Utility	N/a	0	12,000,000	12,000,000	12,000,000

As you can see from the table above, ABC Utility Company only saw a reduction in its revenue requirement corresponding to the O&M savings that occurred in the prior year for the first year after the new rates went into effect. These reductions correspond to the O&M savings that were achieved during the test year on which the new rates were set. For each subsequent year, the revenue requirement remains unchanged because rates are not being reset. As a result, the O&M savings (*i.e.* efficiency benefits) are absorbed by the Company as revenue due to positive regulatory lag. Moreover, because the net O&M savings are larger than the amount being paid out in incentive compensation, the plan is more than paying for itself.

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Q. How do employee incentive compensation plans generally operate within a nonregulated competitive corporate environment?

A. Within a non-regulated competitive corporate environment, "companies must implement robust risk management processes to ensure proper alignment of incentive compensation with both strategic objectives and company risk appetite"¹² Basically, a company must determine the level of risk it's willing to tolerate when developing an incentive compensation plan. An effectively designed plan should at least pay for itself while also contribute beneficially to the bottom line.

9 Q. How could risk tolerance differ between a non-regulated competitive corporation vs. 10 a regulated utility company?

A. One variable a competitive corporation should consider when crafting incentive compensation packages is the reception of key consumers and shareholders. An abundance of public company data exists for research purposes¹³ and specific data relating to executive compensation must be reported to the SEC. Dissatisfied consumers and shareholders who find the executive compensation excessive can choose to support a competitor. Losing customers and shareholders lead to potential declining value of the company and increases risk. Regulated utilities do not share this risk.

Q. Why would regulated utilities not worry about losing customers due to excessive incentive compensation?

A. Regulated utilities serve captive ratepayers who do not have an option of switching
providers, even if they are dissatisfied and their service is lacking.

Q. What is your opinion on incentive compensation plans?

A. The implementation of incentive compensation plans is standard practice within corporate
 environments. Strategically crafted incentive compensation plans should essentially pay for
 themselves through cost benefits and operational efficiencies. Regulated utilities have an


 ¹² As quoted from <u>https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/compensation/pages/incentiverisks.aspx</u>
 ¹³ <u>https://hbr.org/2021/01/compensation-packages-that-actually-drive-performance</u>

advantage over other publicly traded corporations. Non-regulatory corporations cannot count on potential additional revenue resulting from regulatory lag.

Q. Please elaborate.

Organizations should develop incentive compensation plans from a risk management perspective in order to maximize organizational benefits received in return for the compensation paid out. If an organization is not reaping rewards, it will not issue rewards. One method for mitigating risk includes placing a cap on the maximum incentive compensation plan payout¹⁴. This is how competitive corporations remain competitive. A competitive corporation will not pay out incentive compensation at the expense of its bottom line if it gains no value in return. In contrast, regulated utilities have options to recover incentive compensation program costs from captive ratepayers, regardless of gained efficiencies or if the programs already paid for themselves through said efficiencies. The risk management methodology is unnecessary since regulated utilities expect to recover incentive compensation costs regardless.

Q. Is there any other issue relating to incentive compensation that you believe the Commission should consider?



14 https://www.resolver.com/blog/incentive-compensation-risk-management/

Direct Testimony of
Angela Schaben
File Nos. ER-2022-0129 and ER-2022-0130

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¹⁵ Uplight SaaS SOW Pursuant to MSA by and Between Evergy Services, Inc. and Uplight, Inc., page 5, section 8(1) 15

Q. What is your ultimate recommendation relating to incentive compensation?

A. The Commission should remove the \$10,008,354 of incentive compensation for Missouri Metro and remove the \$3,552,782 of incentive compensation for Missouri West. Captive ratepayers should not be on the hook for high dollar payouts for incentive compensation plans that ought to be designed to pay for themselves through efficiencies and cost savings. If customers of non-regulated competitive companies are unsatisfied with goods and services, they have the option to switch providers. Captive ratepayers do not have that option. In addition, ratepayers should also not be required to pay for both a contract with Executive outcomes related to executive outcomes that are also outlined in the incentive compensation plan.

**

STORM RESERVE

Q. Please summarize the proposed Storm Reserved sought by both Evergy Metro and Evergy West.

A. The companies propose creating storm reserves based on the three-year average of storm costs (2018, 2019, and 2020) where the non-labor costs related to individual storms were greater than \$200,000. They propose that the initial storm reserve balance shall be funded by a portion of the regulatory liabilities (CS-113) from Missouri Metro and the excess major maintenance reserve (CS-43) from Missouri West.

Q. What are your concerns with this proposal?

A. Storm costs are categorized under a utility's cost of doing business. For significant and extraordinary storms impacting operations, the company could still request an Accounting Authority Order (AAO). Per Evergy witness Klote's testimony, "The implementation of this reserve will be used to cover intermediate to large storms by using a \$200,000 minimum storm level, but in the event a storm is very significant and impactful to Company operations

1		this request does not preclude the company from requesting an Accounting Authority Order
2		if the magnitude of the storm warrants the reserve as has been done historically." ¹⁶
3	Q.	What dollar amounts are the companies seeking to establish the storm reserves?
4	А.	Evergy Missouri Metro is seeking a storm reserve with \$3,700,152 from the \$32,971,236
5		total regulatory liabilities currently accumulated (adjustment CS-113). Evergy Missouri
6		West is seeking a storm reserve with \$1,779,432 from the excess major maintenance
7		reserve.
8	Q.	Why has the company established \$200,000 as the baseline to determine if a major storm
9		has occurred?
10	А.	Setting baseline storm costs at \$200,000 before the use of a storm reserve was arbitrarily set
11		by the Company. In Kansas, the storm reserve baseline is set at \$250,000. Since the
12		baseline for Missouri storm reserves was arbitrarily set to \$200,000, the number really could
13		be \$300,000 or \$400,000 or even \$500,000. If a storm reserve was established, and few
14		significantly large storm events occurred, the remaining storm reserve balance will just
15		exist, without actually providing customer benefits.
16	Q.	What is your recommendation regarding the storm reserve?
17	А.	I recommend disallowing the storm reserve and refunding all of the \$32,971,236 in Missouri
18		Metro regulatory liabilities to the customers. I also recommend refunding the \$1,779,432
19		in the Missouri West major maintenance reserve to the customers.
20	Q.	Why do you recommend disallowing the storm reserve?
21	А.	There is simply no need for this reserve to exist. The establishment of a storm reserve is just
22		an attempt by the Company to keep money currently booked to regulatory liabilities from
23		being refunded to the customers. Therefore, all of the regulatory liabilities currently on the
24		books should be refunded.

¹⁶ ER-2022-0129 Direct Testimony of Ronald A. Klote, Page 39

Q. Would a storm reserve benefit customers in any way? 1 2 No. It would actually result in higher customer bills. A storm reserve only benefits Evergy. А. Potential storm cost liabilities are a natural cost of utility company operations, for which it 3 earns a rate of return. For extraordinary storms exceeding reasonable costs that cannot be 4 absorbed within regular operations, the Company could request an AAO. Implementing a 5 storm reserve essentially removes an additional layer of operational risk, for which the 6 Company is already allowed a rate of return, at the expense of its customers. 7 PROPERTY TAX TRACKER 8 Please describe the Company's proposed property tax ratemaking mechanism. 9 О. A. The Company proposes a property tax tracking mechanism in order to remedy the under-10 recovery of property taxes paid.¹⁷ 11 Did the Company propose a similar mechanism for property taxes in prior cases? Q. 12 Yes. The Company also proposed mechanisms relating to property tax tracking in rate cases 13 A. ER-2016-0285 and ER-2014-0370. 14 15 Q. Did the Commission approve the property tax tracking mechanisms in these prior rate cases? 16 A. No. In its Report and Order in Case No. ER-2014-0370, the Commission stated: 17 KCPL has requested that the Commission approval the same type of deferral 18 mechanism for property tax expenses that it requested for transmission fee 19 expenses. For that reason, the Commission incorporates herein the analysis 20 contained in the conclusions of law and decision section from the transmission 21 fee expense issue discussed above. The Commission concludes that KCPL has 22 not met its burden of proof to demonstrate that projected property tax increases 23 are extraordinary, so its request for a property tax tracker will be denied.¹⁸ 24

¹⁷ Direct Testimony of Melissa Hardesty, page 14

¹⁸ File No. ER-2014-0370, Report and Order issued September 2, 2015, page 56.

О. Are annual changes in property taxes substantial enough to have a material impact 1 upon revenue requirements and the financial performance of Evergy between rate 2 cases? 3 No. 4 A. Were the historical levels of Evergy Metro's and Evergy West's property taxes volatile 5 Q. 6 from year to year? No. Between the 2018 and 2021 tax years, Evergy Metro's property taxes increased \$10.79 7 А. million overall and Evergy West's property taxes increased only \$3.9 million overall. In 8 fact, Evergy Metro's property taxes decreased by \$1,567,951 from 2018 to 2019, while 9 Evergy West's property taxes decreased by \$341,347 from 2018 to 2019. 10 Do you have any other thoughts regarding Evergy's request for a property tax 11 О. tracker? 12 Yes. A paper published by NRRI entitled "How Should Regulators View Cost Trackers?" 13 A. points out that cost trackers potentially diminish efficient management of regulatory 14 activities: 15 Cost trackers can reduce utility efficiency. "Just and reasonable" rates require 16 that customers do not pay for costs the utility could have avoided with efficient 17 Regulation attempts to protect customer from or prudent management. 18 excessive utility costs by scrutinizing a utility's costs in a rate case, conducting 19 a retrospective review of costs, applying performance based incentives, and 20 instituting regulatory lag. Cost trackers diminish one or more of these 21 regulatory activities. In some cases, they diminish all of them. The 22 consequence is the increased likelihood that customers will pay for excessive 23 utility costs.¹⁹ 24 25 Utility companies are not subjected to the whims of property tax assessors. The Company 26 personnel work with State Assessors regarding property tax valuations and review logic and 27 28 methods used by State Assessors to validate the appraisals are sound. If the Company is

¹⁹ NRRI How Should Regulators View Cost Trackers, page 16

1 2 aware of property tax assessing methodology, it can plan for prudent management of said

property.

3 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?

4 A. Yes.