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**MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**FILE NO.**

**GR-2019-0077**

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**DARRYL T. SAGEL**

**ON**

**BEHALF OF**

**UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**d/b/a AMEREN MISSOURI**

**\*\*DENOTES CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION\*\***

St. Louis, Missouri  
June, 2019

Ameren Exhibit No 5-P  
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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY .....	1
III.	RESPONSE TO STAFF WITNESS JEFFREY SMITH'S DIRECT TESTIMONY RECOMMENDATION.....	2
IV.	AMEREN MISSOURI'S STRUCTURE IS INDEPENDENTLY MANAGED AND EXCLUSIVELY FINANCES AMEREN MISSOURI RATE BASE.....	4
V.	AMEREN'S MORE LEVERAGED CAPITAL STRUCTURE RELATIVE TO AMEREN MISSOURI HAS NOT NEGATIVELY IMPACTED AMEREN MISSOURI'S FINANCIAL AND CREDIT POSITION .....	8
VI.	THE USE OF A HYPOTHETICAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE FOR AMEREN MISSOURI IN THIS PROCEEDING IS NOT JUSTIFIED .....	15
VII.	AMEREN MISSOURI'S PROPOSED COMMON EQUITY RATIO IS CONSISTENT WITH UTILITY INDUSTRY PEERS AND SUPPORTS STRONG AND STABLE CREDIT RATINGS .....	20
VIII.	CONCLUSION .....	28

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**DARRYL T. SAGEL**

**FILE NO. GR-2019-0077**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1  
2 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

3 A. My name is Darryl T. Sagel. My business address is One Ameren Plaza,  
4 1901 Chouteau Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri 63103.

5 **Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

6 A. I am employed by Ameren Services Company ("Ameren Services"), a  
7 wholly-owned subsidiary of Ameren Corporation ("Ameren"), as Vice President and  
8 Treasurer. I also serve as Vice President and Treasurer of Union Electric Company d/b/a  
9 Ameren Missouri ("Ameren Missouri" or "Company"). Ameren Services provides various  
10 corporate support services to Ameren's subsidiaries, including Ameren Missouri, such as  
11 accounting, legal, financial, and treasury services.

12 **Q. Please describe your educational background and employment**  
13 **experience.**

14 A. See my Statement of Qualifications attached as Appendix A to my rebuttal  
15 testimony.

16 **II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY**

17 **Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony in this proceeding?**

18 A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to the Missouri Public  
19 Service Commission Staff ("Staff") Cost of Service Report ("Staff Report") submitted in

1 this proceeding by the Missouri Public Service Commission (the "Commission"), as it  
2 relates to Staff's recommended capital structure for the Company presented by Staff  
3 witness Jeffrey Smith.

4 **Q. Are you sponsoring any schedules in connection with your testimony?**

5 A. Yes, I am sponsoring, and have attached to my rebuttal testimony, the  
6 following schedules, which have been prepared under my direction:

- 7 • Schedule DTS-R1 – Historical Ameren Consolidated Capital Structure
- 8 • Schedule DTS-R2 – Ameren Holding Company Historical Debt Balances  
9 (2013-2018)
- 10 • Schedule DTS-R3 – Peer Utility Regulatory Capital Structures

11 **III. RESPONSE TO STAFF WITNESS JEFFREY SMITH'S DIRECT**  
12 **TESTIMONY RECOMMENDATION**

13 **Q. In the Staff Report, Mr. Smith intimates that Ameren Missouri's**  
14 **capital structure is not appropriate for ratemaking purposes in this proceeding due**  
15 **to Ameren's increased holding company leverage, and that rates should instead be**  
16 **based on a recommended 50% ceiling on Ameren Missouri's common equity ratio.**  
17 **Do you agree?**

18 A. I strongly disagree with Mr. Smith's position. Ameren Missouri's actual  
19 capital structure is appropriate and reasonable for purposes of setting rates in this  
20 proceeding for the following reasons, each of which I will specifically address later in my  
21 rebuttal testimony:

- 22 • Ameren Missouri's financial profile, including its capital structure, is  
23 independently evaluated, developed and managed over time in a manner

1           that appropriately considers its stand-alone financial health and risk profile,  
2           while ensuring timely access to both equity and debt capital at reasonable  
3           costs.

- 4           • Ameren Missouri's capital structure specifically and exclusively finances  
5           Ameren Missouri rate base, with parent company common equity infusions  
6           sourced from actual third-party common equity raised by Ameren, and  
7           long-term debt issued by Ameren Missouri and secured by Ameren  
8           Missouri's assets.
- 9           • The primary drivers of Ameren's more leveraged capital structure relative  
10          to Ameren Missouri's, including the divestiture of Ameren's merchant  
11          energy business and Ameren's investment support of electric transmission  
12          projects under the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory  
13          Commission's ("FERC's") low-risk ratemaking framework within Ameren  
14          Illinois and Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois ("ATXI"), have  
15          actually improved Ameren's consolidated credit profile and have not  
16          resulted in any negative impact on Ameren Missouri's stand-alone credit  
17          profile.
- 18          • Ameren Missouri's proposed common equity ratio for ratemaking purposes  
19          of 51.84% projected as of May 31, 2019, is consistent with common equity  
20          ratios maintained by its utility peers and consistent with common equity  
21          ratios the Company has actually achieved over the past several years.
- 22          • Ameren Missouri's capital structure supports strong and stable investment  
23          grade credit ratings, allowing the Company to access debt capital at a

1 competitive cost through various market cycles, to the benefit of Ameren  
2 Missouri's customers. The arbitrary use of a "hypothetical" capital structure  
3 that incorporates an equity ratio below Ameren Missouri's actual equity  
4 ratio would weaken the Company's credit profile, including cash flows and  
5 key credit metrics, thereby increasing the likelihood of Ameren Missouri  
6 suffering a ratings downgrade and Ameren experiencing stock price  
7 pressure, both of which would increase the Company's cost of capital and  
8 potentially result in higher customer rates.

9 **Q. What rationale does Mr. Smith provide for disregarding Ameren**  
10 **Missouri's actual capital structure?**

11 A. Mr. Smith's only justification is the fact that Ameren and Ameren Missouri's  
12 capital structures have diverged in the recent past. He neither demonstrates that this  
13 difference has caused, nor even proposes that this difference will cause, any type of risk to  
14 Ameren Missouri customers. In fact, the one paragraph on this matter in the Staff Report  
15 provides no explanation for why this particular fact in this particular circumstance justifies  
16 using a hypothetical capital structure.

17 **IV. AMEREN MISSOURI'S STRUCTURE IS INDEPENDENTLY MANAGED**  
18 **AND EXCLUSIVELY FINANCES AMEREN MISSOURI RATE BASE**

19 **Q. Is Ameren Missouri's financial position and credit profile**  
20 **independently evaluated and managed?**

21 A. Yes. Ameren Missouri's financial position and credit profile, including its  
22 capital structure, is independently managed in a manner that supports maintaining the  
23 Company's financial strength and integrity at a reasonable cost to its customers. Ameren

1 Missouri finances itself through its own public issuances, maintains its own credit ratings  
2 and produces separate filings for the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").  
3 Evaluation and management of a suitable Ameren Missouri capital structure over time  
4 involves sensible consideration of Ameren Missouri-specific business and financial risks,  
5 including key rating agency-defined credit metrics required to support our strong and stable  
6 investment grade credit ratings. Despite Ameren owning and financing other regulated  
7 businesses not directly related to Ameren Missouri, Ameren Missouri's capital structure is  
8 specifically managed over time to ensure continued financial strength, as well as to  
9 maintain a credit profile that provides the Company timely access to required capital to  
10 fund Ameren Missouri operations at a competitive cost for the benefit of Ameren Missouri  
11 customers.

12 **Q. Why is the actual capital financing of Ameren Missouri's rate base**  
13 **relevant?**

14 A. Ameren Missouri's actual capital structure is relevant and appropriate for  
15 ratemaking purposes because it is the only capital that is financing Ameren Missouri's  
16 jurisdictional rate base to which the overall rate of return set in this proceeding will be  
17 applied. In contrast, the hypothetical capital structure proposed by Mr. Smith contains  
18 capital that does not finance Ameren Missouri's jurisdictional rate base and is not available  
19 for investment in Ameren Missouri by Ameren. Thus, Ameren Missouri should be  
20 evaluated as a stand-alone entity, including with regard to its capital structure. To do  
21 otherwise violates the basic financial principle that the use of funds invested gives rise to  
22 the risk of the investment. It is fundamental that individual investors expect a return to  
23 commensurate with the risk associated with where their capital is invested. In this

1 proceeding, that capital is both provided by and invested in Ameren Missouri. Therefore,  
2 Ameren Missouri must be viewed on its own merits, including the actual capital structure  
3 financing its rate base.

4 **Q. Can you specifically identify the sources of Ameren Missouri's**  
5 **independently-managed capital?**

6 A. Ameren Missouri's capital structure represents the actual dollars that are  
7 financing the jurisdictional rate base to which the rate of return authorized in this  
8 proceeding will be applied. In contrast, the hypothetical capital structure proposed by Mr.  
9 Smith contains capital that does not finance Ameren Missouri's jurisdictional rate base.

10 Ameren Missouri's entire long-term debt balance consists of long-term debt  
11 marketed and issued by Ameren Missouri to third-party investors, and those third-party  
12 investors pay an interest rate reflective of the business risks and capital structure specific  
13 to Ameren Missouri. Ameren Missouri's long-term debt is secured exclusively by its own  
14 assets and not the assets of Ameren or the other Ameren utility subsidiaries, Ameren  
15 Illinois and ATXI. In addition, Ameren Missouri's assets do not guarantee Ameren's,  
16 Ameren Illinois', or ATXI's long-term debt. Moreover, whenever Ameren Missouri seeks  
17 to raise long-term external capital, it must navigate a lengthy process to achieve financing  
18 authority from the Commission, whereby the Company must demonstrate that such  
19 financing is being utilized to fund long-term assets and the regulated operations of the  
20 business.

21 Similarly, Ameren Missouri's entire preferred stock balance consists of preferred  
22 stock marketed and issued by Ameren Missouri to third-party investors. Ameren  
23 Missouri's common equity balance consists of common equity contributions from Ameren



1 and retained Ameren Missouri earnings. Ameren's common equity infusions have been  
2 specifically financed with common equity raised by Ameren from third-party investors.

3 Furthermore, all of Ameren Missouri's capital supports Ameren Missouri's rate base  
4 and no portion of the Company's rate base is supported by capital outside of Ameren  
5 Missouri.

6 **Q. Have any Ameren common equity infusions into Ameren Missouri ever**  
7 **been funded with proceeds of Ameren short-term or long-term debt issuances?**

8 A. No. As indicated above, all Ameren common equity infusions have been  
9 specifically funded by Ameren common equity issuances to third-party investors. The  
10 most recent infusion of common equity into Ameren Missouri by Ameren, in September  
11 2009 in the amount of \$436 million, was sourced directly from an external Ameren  
12 common stock offering in September 2009. The only other cash transfers from Ameren to  
13 Ameren Missouri since that September 2009 infusion have been modest non-discretionary  
14 tax-related contributions. These equity contributions are a function of a consolidating tax-  
15 sharing agreement among Ameren and its subsidiaries, and the contributions are typically  
16 promptly returned by Ameren Missouri to Ameren in the form of a dividend, such that  
17 there is no net impact on Ameren Missouri's equity balance.

18 **Q. Are any of Ameren Missouri's assets pledged to support obligations of**  
19 **Ameren or any of its subsidiaries?**

20 A. As discussed above, Ameren Missouri's assets are not used in any way to  
21 provide support or guarantee for obligations of Ameren, Ameren Illinois, or ATXI.

22 **Q. Does Ameren Missouri rely on Ameren to support any Ameren**  
23 **Missouri long-term debt obligations?**

- 1           A.     No. To summarize the discussion thus far:
- 2                     • Ameren Missouri's capital structure is independently managed;
- 3                     • Ameren Missouri issues its own long-term debt that is priced independently
- 4                     in the market and secured by Ameren Missouri assets and the Company
- 5                     maintains its own credit ratings;
- 6                     • Ameren Missouri produces separate regulatory filings with the Securities
- 7                     and Exchange Commission;
- 8                     • Equity infusions from Ameren are sourced from Ameren market equity
- 9                     issuances to third-party equity investors (and not debt);
- 10                    • Ameren Missouri's capital structure finances all of, and only, Ameren
- 11                    Missouri assets;
- 12                    • Ameren Missouri assets do not support Ameren obligations; and
- 13                    • Ameren Missouri does not rely on Ameren to support its long-term debt
- 14                    obligations.

15           Each of these factors support the use of Ameren Missouri's actual capital structure

16 for the purpose of setting rates in this proceeding.

17     **V.    AMEREN'S MORE LEVERAGED CAPITAL STRUCTURE RELATIVE TO**

18     **AMEREN MISSOURI HAS NOT NEGATIVELY IMPACTED AMEREN**

19     **MISSOURI'S FINANCIAL AND CREDIT POSITION**

20           **Q.    In the Staff Report, Mr. Smith suggests a diverging trend over the past**

21 **several years between the equity ratios at Ameren as compared to those at Ameren**

22 **Missouri as the key concern supporting the 50% ceiling on Ameren Missouri's**

23 **common equity ratio in this proceeding. Schedule JS-6-2 in the Staff Report**

1 **compares Ameren's consolidated common equity ratio to that of Ameren Missouri**  
2 **over the period 2014-2018. Why does Ameren Missouri's capital structure contain**  
3 **more equity than Ameren's?**

4 A. As I noted above, Ameren Missouri's capital structure is independently  
5 managed, based on consideration of Ameren Missouri-specific business and financial risks,  
6 to support continued Company financial health and integrity at a reasonable capital cost.  
7 In addition to Ameren Missouri, Ameren also owns and operates other regulated  
8 businesses, principally Ameren Illinois and ATXI, and Ameren's consolidated capital  
9 structure is meaningfully influenced by the respective capital structures of each of  
10 Ameren's regulated subsidiaries. Like Ameren Missouri's capital structure, the capital  
11 structures of Ameren, Ameren Illinois and ATXI, respectively, are managed independently  
12 based on relevant business and financial risks applicable to the parent company and those  
13 other subsidiaries. Given the higher-risk nature of Ameren Missouri's vertically-integrated  
14 business relative to the risk of Ameren's other primary subsidiaries (Ameren Illinois  
15 operates electric transmission and distribution businesses and natural gas delivery  
16 businesses, while ATXI operates exclusively electric transmission businesses), it stands to  
17 reason that Ameren Missouri would maintain a common equity ratio that is higher than  
18 Ameren's consolidated equity ratio.

19 **Q. What are the primary drivers of the difference between Ameren**  
20 **Missouri's capital structure and Ameren's consolidated capital structure?**

21 A. There are five primary drivers:

22 First, Ameren Illinois maintains a common equity ratio of approximately 50%,  
23 which is lower than Ameren Missouri's common equity ratio and consistent with the

1 amount of equity content allowed for ratemaking purposes by the Illinois Commerce  
2 Commission ("ICC") as determined in recent regulatory proceedings addressing the rate  
3 structure of this division for both electric operations and gas operations, respectively.<sup>1</sup> The  
4 current lower common equity ratio relative to Ameren Missouri's common equity ratio  
5 reflects Ameren Illinois' lower-risk, diversified regulated electric transmission and delivery  
6 and gas delivery businesses and a regulatory framework that includes formula ratemaking,  
7 forward test years, revenue decoupling and other adjustment mechanisms. Like the  
8 Company's capital structure, Ameren Illinois' capital structure is independently managed,  
9 evaluated and supported.

10 Second, the equity ratio difference also reflects the impact of the 2013 divestiture  
11 of Ameren's merchant energy business, Ameren Energy Resources Company ("Ameren  
12 Energy Resources"), upon Ameren. In connection with the divestiture, Ameren recognized  
13 a \$2.6 billion pre-tax loss, which reduced Ameren's consolidated common equity balance  
14 by an equivalent tax-effected amount. In addition, \$425 million of Ameren holding  
15 company long-term debt, which historically supported Ameren Energy Resources  
16 activities, was retained and subsequently refinanced by Ameren. Despite the significant  
17 loss and the retention of a modest amount of holding company debt, the divestiture resulted  
18 in an immediate improvement in Ameren's consolidated credit profile and triggered credit  
19 rating upgrades by both Standard and Poor's Ratings Services ("S&P") and Moody's  
20 Investor Services ("Moody's").

21 Third, Ameren's lower consolidated common equity ratio also reflects the use of  
22 long-term debt to fund investment in electric transmission projects within the ATXI

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<sup>1</sup> Illinois Commerce Commission Dockets 18-0463 and 18-0807.

1 subsidiary. Ameren's equity investment in ATXI (capital infusions funded with Ameren  
2 short-term and long-term debt, as well as ATXI retained earnings) is approximately \$660  
3 million as of December 2018, which represents approximately 9% of Ameren consolidated  
4 common equity as of such date. By comparison, at year-end 2014, Ameren's equity  
5 investment in ATXI was \$124 million, representing approximately 2% of Ameren's  
6 consolidated common equity at that time. This investment by Ameren into ATXI, and the  
7 lack of dividend distribution from ATXI to Ameren in recent years, have been meaningful  
8 drivers of increased Ameren debt (both short-term and long-term) over the past several  
9 years.

10 Fourth, Ameren's consolidated equity ratios as calculated in Schedule JS-6-2 in the  
11 Staff Report reflect \$411 million of goodwill held on Ameren's and Ameren Illinois'  
12 balance sheet in each of the years 2014 through 2018. The goodwill represents the excess  
13 of the purchase price of Illinois regulated utility acquisitions Ameren completed in 2003  
14 (CILCORP) and 2004 (Illinois Power Company) versus the fair market value of the net  
15 assets acquired. During the 2014-2018 timeframe covered by Schedule JS-6-2, Ameren  
16 Missouri held no goodwill on its balance sheet. Ameren and Ameren Illinois perform an  
17 annual qualitative assessment for their goodwill impairment test and, to date, the results of  
18 such assessments indicate that it is more likely than not that the fair value of Ameren  
19 Illinois and its reporting units significantly exceed their carrying values, resulting in no  
20 impairment of Ameren's or Ameren Illinois' goodwill over time. As Ameren Illinois is not  
21 currently recovering goodwill through rates charged to customers, any future impairment,  
22 despite being highly unlikely based on recent impairment tests, would have no impact on  
23 the financial health and integrity of Ameren Illinois and Ameren, and certainly would have

1 no bearing on the financial health and integrity of Ameren Missouri. In addition, Ameren  
2 financed the \$3.7 billion of acquisitions using a combination of debt and equity. Therefore,  
3 it is inappropriate to exclude goodwill as an assumed 100% equity component when the  
4 underlying transactions were funded with a mix of both debt and equity and the rate base  
5 of Ameren Illinois was not increased to reflect the goodwill. Per Schedule DTS-R1, if  
6 goodwill were not adjusted from the calculation of Ameren consolidated equity, the five-  
7 year (2014-2018) average equity ratio would be 48.6%, higher than the 47.6% suggested  
8 by Mr. Smith's analysis.

9 Finally, Ameren's consolidated equity ratios as calculated in Schedule JS-6-2 in the  
10 Staff Report are based on financials included in Ameren's SEC filings, and therefore are  
11 not consistent with the methodology utilized to determine Ameren Missouri's regulatory  
12 capital structure, which typically applies various adjustments to SEC-reported financial  
13 statements. For instance, Ameren Missouri's regulatory capital structure excludes capital  
14 lease obligations. In addition, Ameren's consolidated equity ratios as calculated in  
15 schedule JS-6-2 fail to include consolidated preferred stock, which I believe is appropriate  
16 to factor into the capitalization analysis. If these typical regulatory capital structure  
17 adjustments for Ameren Missouri and Ameren Illinois were also applied to Ameren's  
18 consolidated capital structure, as we have shown in Schedule DTS-R1, Ameren's five-year  
19 (2014-2018) average equity ratio would be 50%, incrementally higher than the 47.6%  
20 implied in Mr. Smith's analysis in Schedule JS-6-2.

21 **Q. Mr. Smith suggests that recent use of Ameren holding company debt**  
22 **has caused Ameren to be more leveraged, referencing in Schedule JS-6-2 the growing**

1 **divergence between the Ameren holding company equity ratio and the Ameren**  
2 **Missouri equity ratio between 2014 and 2018. Do you agree with this statement?**

3 A. No. I do concur that Ameren's consolidated equity ratio (adjusted for  
4 goodwill) has declined over the 2014-2018 period, as suggested by the calculations in  
5 Schedule JS-6-2, though as noted previously, I question Mr. Smith's approach to exclude  
6 goodwill as an assumed 100% equity-financed component and his failure to include  
7 consolidated preferred stock and other adjustments typically used to calculate the  
8 regulatory capital structure. However, the use of Ameren holding company long-term debt  
9 is only one of many drivers of the decline and cannot be characterized as the primary driver.

10 Per Schedule DTS-R2, Ameren's holding company long-term debt has increased  
11 from \$0 at year-end 2014 to \$700 million at year-end 2018, with the increase entirely due  
12 to the \$700 million November 2015 financing, whose proceeds were used to repay Ameren  
13 commercial paper (short-term debt) borrowings that funded the maturity of Ameren's \$425  
14 million note in May 2014 and ongoing investment by Ameren in ATXI.

15 It is noteworthy that the increase in Ameren holding company long-term debt was  
16 more modest if one looked at the period with year-end 2013 as the starting date. Between  
17 year-end 2013 and year-end 2018, Ameren's holding company long-term debt increased  
18 less significantly from \$425 million to \$700 million. During that same period, Ameren's  
19 consolidated long-term debt has increased from \$6,038 million at year-end 2013 to \$8,439  
20 million at year-end 2018. As a percentage of consolidated long-term debt, Ameren holding  
21 company long-term debt has not increased significantly, representing 7.0% of consolidated  
22 long-term debt at year-end 2013 and 8.3% of consolidated long-term debt at year-end 2018.  
23 Given this moderate proportionate increase in Ameren's holding company long-term debt,

1 I would not characterize the recent use of Ameren holding company debt as the primary  
2 driver of the declining equity ratio at Ameren over the past several years.

3 **Q. Please explain the drivers of the declining equity ratio at Ameren**  
4 **during the 2014-2018 timeframe.**

5 A. I would point to several key factors that have contributed to the recent  
6 decline in Ameren's equity ratio:

- 7 1) Non-cash charges, taken primarily at the parent company, for the  
8 revaluation of deferred taxes resulting from a December 2017 change in  
9 federal law that decreased the federal corporate income tax rate (the benefit  
10 of which was proportionately passed through to Ameren Missouri  
11 customers), which reduced retained earnings by \$154 million in 2017 and  
12 an additional \$13 million in 2018.
- 13 2) Ameren declaring and paying dividends to its common shareholders over  
14 the past several years at levels that are well in excess of dividend  
15 distributions received from its regulated subsidiaries, including Ameren  
16 Missouri. This is a function of Ameren Missouri, and other regulated  
17 subsidiaries, reinvesting significant operating cash flow and retained  
18 earnings into their long-term regulated assets.
- 19 3) As discussed previously, Ameren funding increasing investment to support  
20 ATXI equity needs.



1           **VI. THE USE OF A HYPOTHETICAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE FOR**  
2           **AMEREN MISSOURI IN THIS PROCEEDING IS NOT JUSTIFIED**

3           **Q. Are there ever situations when it would be appropriate to use a parent**  
4 **company/hypothetical capital structure to set rates for a regulated subsidiary?**

5           A. There may be situations under which it would be more appropriate to use a  
6 parent/hypothetical capital structure, but this case is not one of those situations.

7           **Q. What factors should typically be considered when determining whether**  
8 **to use a regulated subsidiary's or parent company/hypothetical capital structure for**  
9 **ratemaking purposes for the regulated subsidiary?**

10          A. The factors typically considered in determining whether to use a regulated  
11 subsidiary's actual capital structure or a parent company's capital structure for ratemaking  
12 are provided by David C. Parcell in The Cost of Capital – A Practitioner's Guide ("CRRA  
13 Guide") prepared for the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts ("SURFA")  
14 and provided as the study guide to candidates for SURFA's Certified Rate of Return  
15 Certification Examination. The CRRA Guide notes that these factors will "help determine  
16 whether the utility vs. parent capital structure is appropriate."<sup>2</sup> They are:

- 17           1) Whether the subsidiary utility obtains all of its capital from its parent, or  
18           issues its own debt and preferred stock;  
19           2) Whether the parent guarantees any of the securities issued by the subsidiary;

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<sup>2</sup> David C. Parcell, The Cost of Capital – A Practitioner's Guide. Prepared for the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts, 2010 Edition.

- 1           3) Whether the subsidiary's capital structure is independent of its parent (i.e.,  
2           existence of double leverage, absence of proper relationship between risk  
3           and leverage of utility and non-utility subsidiaries); and  
4           4) Whether the parent (or consolidated enterprise) is diversified into non-  
5           utility operations.

6           While Mr. Smith does not recommend using Ameren parent company's capital  
7           structure, he does suggest using a hypothetical capital structure that meaningfully departs  
8           from Ameren Missouri's actual capital structure. Consequently, I believe that the CRR  
9           Guide factors are still relevant for consideration here.

10           **Q. Does the application of these factors to Ameren Missouri support the**  
11           **use of Ameren Missouri's actual capital structure for ratemaking purposes?**

12           A. Yes. Application of the factors highlighted in the CRR Guide listed above  
13           to Ameren Missouri supports the use of Ameren Missouri's actual capital structure for  
14           ratemaking purposes. As previously discussed, Ameren Missouri does not obtain any long-  
15           term debt or preferred stock from Ameren, but rather issues its own long-term debt and  
16           preferred stock to outside investors. In addition, Ameren Missouri's long-term debt is  
17           secured by its own assets and not the assets of Ameren. Double leverage cannot be said to  
18           exist since no proceeds of Ameren long-term debt issuances, including the most recent  
19           \$700 million November 2015 Ameren long-term debt financing, have been used to support  
20           Ameren Missouri operations or were used as an equity infusion. Finally, Ameren is not  
21           meaningfully diversified into non-utility operations.

22           In view of the foregoing, Ameren Missouri has an independently determined capital  
23           structure. Therefore, the only conclusion to be drawn is that Ameren Missouri's stand-

1 alone capital structure at the true-up date, May 31, 2019, is appropriate for ratemaking  
2 purposes.

3 **Q. In the Staff Report, Mr. Smith suggests that a 50% ceiling on Ameren**  
4 **Missouri's common equity ratio would be reasonable for setting rates for Ameren**  
5 **Missouri as it resembles an agreement Ameren Illinois has with the Illinois Commerce**  
6 **Commission to limit the amount of equity to 50% in rate of return calculations for its**  
7 **gas and electric operations. How do you respond?**

8 A. Staff's recommended common equity ratio ceiling is not appropriate for  
9 Ameren Missouri. By using a hypothetical capital structure and justifying such a capital  
10 structure by pointing to its application in other jurisdictions (i.e., Illinois), Mr. Smith  
11 suggests setting rates at Ameren Missouri based on the aggregate impact of financing  
12 decisions, capital requirements, operational decisions and regulatory practices undertaken  
13 in multiple jurisdictions through other business entities with different business activities  
14 and risks. As a result, Mr. Smith's approach would set rates based not on what the  
15 Commission has determined to be the discrete financing needs and requirements of the  
16 Company, but based on what utilities and/or their regulators in other jurisdictions have  
17 decided should be done to meet the financial requirements of their distinct operations. This  
18 approach is an ineffective manner of protecting or insulating Ameren Missouri from the  
19 activities of its parent company and other affiliates, and is certainly not consistent with the  
20 Commission's obligation to make decisions for its own utilities rather than delegating the  
21 task out to other regulators.

22 As previously discussed, the respective capital structures for Ameren Missouri and  
23 Ameren Illinois are managed independently, based on, among many factors, relative

1 business risk. In the case of Ameren Illinois, maintenance of a lower common equity ratio  
2 is currently reasonable based on a number of factors, including, notably, the lower inherent  
3 business risk associated with Ameren Illinois' transmission and delivery only business  
4 model and the lower financial risk associated with the more predictable and credit  
5 supportive frameworks for Ameren Illinois' electric delivery business (formulaic  
6 ratemaking, with a revenue decoupling mechanism), electric transmission business  
7 (formulaic ratemaking) and gas delivery business (forward test year, with a decoupling  
8 mechanism and an interim rate adjustment mechanism for qualifying rate base additions).  
9 In contrast, Ameren Missouri's ownership and operation of generating assets, including a  
10 single-unit nuclear plant, results in a higher degree of operating risk. In addition, the  
11 Missouri ratemaking framework, while demonstrating improvement following the passage  
12 in 2018 of Senate Bill 564 and the related implementation of partial plant-in-service  
13 accounting, still utilizes a historic test year approach, exposing Ameren Missouri to  
14 regulatory lag, thereby resulting in a higher degree of financial risk.

15 The lower overall risk profile of Ameren Illinois relative to Ameren Missouri is  
16 also evident in Ameren Illinois' stronger issuer rating at Moody's, which rates Ameren  
17 Illinois A3 and Ameren Missouri Baa1. Moody's ratings for each of Ameren Illinois and  
18 Ameren Missouri are independently developed based on their discrete credit profiles.

19 Mr. Smith also mischaracterizes the agreement that Ameren Illinois has entered  
20 into with the ICC. Ameren Illinois actually does not have a formal agreement with the  
21 ICC's Staff as it pertains to the equity ratio that should be utilized as part of the gas  
22 ratemaking process or the electric annual formula ratemaking process. Rather, as part of  
23 Ameren Illinois' recent gas rate review proceeding before the ICC and Ameren Illinois'

1 required annual electric formula ratemaking filings with the ICC, Ameren Illinois has  
2 entered into an agreement with the ICC Staff and the Illinois Industrial Energy Consumers  
3 which stipulates that a common equity ratio up to and including 50% is reasonable. Such  
4 a stipulation emanated from the passage of the Future Energy Jobs Act ("FEJA") by the  
5 Illinois Legislature in 2016 and effective June 1, 2017. The FEJA included an amendment  
6 to the 2011 Illinois Energy Infrastructure Modernization Act that provided:

7           To enable the financing of the incremental capital expenditures, including  
8           regulatory assets, for electric utilities that serve less than 3,000,000 retail  
9           customers but more than 500,000 retail customers in the State, the utility's  
10          actual year-end capital structure that includes a common equity ratio,  
11          excluding goodwill, of up to and including 50% of the total capital structure  
12          shall be deemed reasonable and used to set rates.<sup>3</sup>

13 So, while the Illinois legislation establishes, and key constituencies agree, that an equity  
14 ratio up to and including 50% will be deemed reasonable and therefore not litigated in the  
15 proceeding, that 50% equity ratio is not a ceiling as Mr. Smith suggests. Rather, the  
16 legislation does not preclude Ameren Illinois from filing for a capital structure that uses an  
17 equity ratio greater than 50% if Ameren Illinois were able to justify such a capital structure  
18 (i.e., if its risk profile increased). I would also note that the legislation clearly directs the  
19 ICC to use the utility's actual capital structure in its proceedings, thus prohibiting the use  
20 of hypothetical capital structures.

21           **Q. Is there any evidence that the rating agencies view the Missouri**  
22 **regulatory environment as less supportive than the regulatory environment of**  
23 **Illinois?**

---

<sup>3</sup> 220 ILCS 5/8-103B(d)(1).

1           A.     Yes, in its most recent March 29, 2019 credit opinion on Ameren Missouri,  
2 Moody's notes the following:

3                   \*\* \_\_\_\_\_  
4                   \_\_\_\_\_  
5                   \_\_\_\_\_  
6                   \_\_\_\_\_  
7                   \_\_\_\_\_  
8                   \_\_\_\_\_  
9                   \_\_\_\_\_  
10                  \_\_\_\_\_  
11                  \_\_\_\_\_  
12                  \_\_\_\_\_\*\*

13                In contrast, in a Moody's credit opinion on Ameren Illinois issued the same day  
14 \*\* \_\_\_\_\_

15 \_\_\_\_\_\*\* These regulatory considerations in part influence Moody's to rate Ameren  
16 Illinois stronger (A3 rating) than Ameren Missouri (Baa1).

17                   **VII. AMEREN MISSOURI'S PROPOSED COMMON EQUITY**  
18                   **RATIO IS CONSISTENT WITH UTILITY INDUSTRY PEERS**  
19                   **AND SUPPORTS STRONG AND STABLE CREDIT RATINGS**

20                **Q.     How does Ameren Missouri's projected common equity ratio as of May**  
21 **31, 2019, of 51.84% compare to the common equity ratios maintained by comparable**  
22 **utilities?**

23                A.     Ameren Missouri's projected May 31, 2019, common equity ratio is  
24 consistent with those maintained, on average, by the regulated operating subsidiaries of  
25 publicly-traded utilities in an identified peer group. As highlighted in Schedule DTS-R3,  
26 the common equity ratios, based upon permanent capital (excluding short-term debt), of  
27 the regulated operating subsidiaries of the identified peer group companies based on their  
28 most recent rate cases, averaged 53.19%, with a median of 52.57%. Ameren Missouri's

1 projected common equity ratio of 51.84% falls in the 30th percentile of these regulated  
2 operating company common equity ratios.

3 **Q. Does this consistency support the reasonableness of Ameren Missouri's**  
4 **proposed capital structure for purposes of setting rates in this proceeding?**

5 A. Yes. I'd call specific attention to a citation from Charles Phillip's The  
6 Regulation of Public Utilities – Theory and Practice,<sup>4</sup> which suggests "a hypothetical  
7 capital structure is used only where a utility's actual capitalization is clearly out of line with  
8 those of other utilities in its industry or where a utility is diversified." Ameren Missouri  
9 meets neither of these criteria: it is not meaningfully diversified into non-regulated  
10 activities or businesses, and its capital structure is in line with those of its peers.

11 **Q. How does Ameren Missouri's common equity ratio projected as of May**  
12 **31, 2019, compare with the common equity ratio most recently approved by the**  
13 **Commission in File No. ER-2016-0179?**

14 A. Ameren Missouri's projected common equity ratio as of May 31, 2019, of  
15 51.84% is consistent with the 51.8% common equity ratio authorized by the Commission  
16 in File No. ER-2016-0179. The consistency of the Company's equity ratios over the past  
17 several years reflects the fact that there have been no significant change to the Company's  
18 risk profile over that time. As such, Ameren Missouri continues to target and manage to a  
19 long-term common equity ratio in the area of 51.8%.

20 **Q. What are Ameren Missouri's current issuer credit ratings?**

---

<sup>4</sup> Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Regulation of Public Utilities – Theory and Practice, 1993, Public Utility Reports, Inc., Arlington VA, at 391.

1           A.     Currently, Ameren Missouri's issuer credit ratings at Moody's and S&P are  
2 Baa1 and BBB+, respectively. Both credit ratings agencies report stable outlooks for  
3 Ameren Missouri's credit ratings.

4           **Q.     What are Ameren's current issuer credit ratings?**

5           A.     Currently, Ameren's issuer credit ratings at Moody's and S&P are Baa1 and  
6 BBB+, respectively. Both credit ratings agencies report stable outlooks for Ameren's credit  
7 ratings.

8           **Q.     Why do credit ratings matter?**

9           A.     Credit ratings have a significant effect on a company's ability to attract debt  
10 capital, and in extreme cases, whether the company can access debt capital at all. Credit  
11 ratings also impact the pricing and contractual terms at which a company may issue debt  
12 securities. This affects the cost of capital and, in Ameren Missouri's case, the rates  
13 customers must pay for utility service. In general, a stronger credit rating typically enables  
14 a utility to obtain debt capital at a lower cost, to the benefit of customers.

15           **Q.     How have Ameren Missouri's issuer credit ratings changed since year-**  
16 **end 2012?**

17           A.     On January 31, 2014, Moody's upgraded the issuer rating of Ameren  
18 Missouri to Baa1 from Baa2, citing \*\*\_\_\_\_\_

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 \_\_\_\_\_

21 \_\_\_\_\_\*\* Since January 31, 2014 to date, Moody's has  
22 affirmed Ameren Missouri's issuer rating of Baa1. On March 14, 2013, S&P upgraded the  
23 issuer rating of Ameren Missouri to BBB from BBB-, tied to its simultaneous upgrade of  
Ameren upon Ameren's announced definitive agreement to sell its remaining merchant



1 assets. Note that S&P employs a family rating methodology to assign ratings to Ameren  
2 and its utility subsidiaries, including Ameren Missouri. Subsequently, on December 4,  
3 2013, S&P further upgraded the issuer rating of Ameren Missouri to BBB+, highlighting  
4 \*\* \_\_\_\_\_  
5 \_\_\_\_\_\*\* From December 4, 2013 to date, S&P has affirmed Ameren  
6 Missouri's issuer rating of BBB+.

7 It is notable that during the 2014-2018 period of time that Mr. Smith cites as  
8 demonstrating a diverging trend between the equity ratios at Ameren consolidated and  
9 Ameren Missouri, Ameren Missouri's credit ratings have been affirmed by both agencies,  
10 allowing the Company to access debt capital at competitive costs to the benefit of the  
11 Company's customers.

12 **Q. How have Ameren's issuer credit ratings changed since year-end 2012?**

13 A. On January 31, 2014, Moody's upgraded the issuer rating of Ameren to  
14 Baa2 from Baa3, calling out Ameren's \*\* \_\_\_\_\_  
15 \_\_\_\_\_  
16 \_\_\_\_\_  
17 \_\_\_\_\_\*\* Subsequently, on April 7, 2015, Moody's further  
18 upgraded Ameren to Baa1, primarily driven by the upgrade of utility subsidiary Ameren  
19 Illinois, but also citing \*\* \_\_\_\_\_  
20 \_\_\_\_\_  
21 \_\_\_\_\_\*\* Since that date, Moody's has affirmed Ameren's issuer rating of Baa1. On  
22 March 14, 2013, S&P upgraded the issuer rating of Ameren to BBB from BBB-, referring  
23 to \*\* \_\_\_\_\_

1

2 \_\_\_\_\_\*\* Subsequently, on December 4, 2013, S&P upgraded the issuer rating

3 of Ameren to BBB+, mentioning the company's \*\*\_\_\_\_\_

4 \_\_\_\_\_\*\* Since December 4, 2013 to date, S&P has affirmed Ameren's issuer

5 rating of BBB+.

6 It is notable that during the 2014-2018 period of time that Mr. Smith cites as  
7 demonstrating a diverging trend between the equity ratios at Ameren consolidated and  
8 Ameren Missouri, Ameren's credit ratings have been upgraded by Moody's and affirmed  
9 by S&P, demonstrating that Ameren has retained, and arguably enhanced, its strong credit  
10 profile and financial health over the past several years.

11 **Q. Are you aware of any evidence in rating agency reports suggesting that**  
12 **Ameren Corporation's unrelated financing activities have any negative impact on**  
13 **Ameren Missouri's credit ratings?**

14 A. No. Neither rating agency that rates Ameren Missouri's stand-alone credit  
15 profile, S&P and Moody's, has expressed any concerns about the impact of Ameren  
16 financing activities on Ameren Missouri's credit profile. This is likely the case because  
17 Ameren financing activities over the past several years have supported the divestiture of  
18 Ameren Energy Resources and the investment in ATXI electric transmission projects, both  
19 activities that the rating agencies have highlighted as improving Ameren's consolidated  
20 credit profile. Neither S&P's nor Moody's most recent credit opinions on Ameren Missouri  
21 (February 14, 2019 and March 29, 2019, respectively) specifically make any mention of  
22 Ameren's holding company leverage. However, in its March 29, 2019, credit opinion on

1 Ameren, Moody's highlighted as a credit strength the \*\* \_\_\_\_\_  
2 \_\_\_\_\_ \*\*

3 **Q. What would be the consequence on Ameren Missouri's credit profile**  
4 **and credit ratings of using a hypothetical equity ratio for ratemaking purposes below**  
5 **Ameren Missouri's actual equity ratio, as suggested by Mr. Smith?**

6 A. Using a hypothetical common equity ratio below Ameren Missouri's actual  
7 common equity ratio to establish rates in this proceeding would weaken the Company's  
8 credit metrics, including key metrics evaluated by the rating agencies for purposes of  
9 assigning credit ratings. While it is difficult to predict the ultimate impact of weaker credit  
10 metrics on the Company's credit ratings, as such ratings are a function of a number of  
11 qualitative and quantitative factors, it is without a doubt that weaker credit metrics would  
12 contribute to increased financial risk and higher likelihood of a ratings downgrade.  
13 Additionally, rejection by the Commission of Ameren Missouri's proposed ratemaking  
14 capital structure, absent compelling evidence that the proposed capital structure is  
15 inappropriate or unreasonable, could deepen rating agency concerns regarding the  
16 supportiveness of the Missouri regulatory environment, which would pressure Ameren  
17 Missouri's credit ratings. To the extent that Ameren Missouri's credit ratings were  
18 downgraded, Ameren Missouri's access to required debt capital to finance its operations  
19 could become more challenging and likely more expensive, which would be harmful to  
20 Ameren Missouri customers.

21 **Q. Do you have any evidence that the rating agencies would view**  
22 **Commission acceptance and approval of a hypothetical capital structure for**  
23 **ratemaking purposes as a credit negative outcome?**

1           A.     Yes. I would specifically highlight a credit opinion written by Moody's on  
2 February 5, 2018, shortly after the Commission conducted an initial discussion in the  
3 Laclede Gas and Missouri Gas Energy (collectively, "Spire Missouri") rate proceedings  
4 (Case Nos. GR-2017-0215 and GR-2017-0216) suggesting that parent company Spire  
5 Inc.'s ("Spire's") equity ratio should be used for ratemaking purposes rather than the actual  
6 equity ratio of Spire Missouri. \*\* \_\_\_\_\_  
7 \_\_\_\_\_  
8 \_\_\_\_\_  
9 \_\_\_\_\_

10 \_\_\_\_\_ \*\*

11           \*\* \_\_\_\_\_  
12 \_\_\_\_\_  
13 \_\_\_\_\_  
14 \_\_\_\_\_  
15 \_\_\_\_\_

16 \_\_\_\_\_ \*\*

17           Furthermore, following the February 21, 2018 order in the Spire Missouri rate  
18 cases, in which the Commission ultimately approved the use of Spire Missouri's actual  
19 capital structure rather than Spire's capital structure, Moody's, in a March 1, 2018 credit  
20 opinion, stated that:

21           \*\* \_\_\_\_\_  
22           \_\_\_\_\_

23           \_\_\_\_\_

24           \_\_\_\_\_ \*\*

1           Moody's negative reaction to both the initial discussion and the positive reaction to  
2 the final Commission order in Spire Missouri's rate cases demonstrates that ratings  
3 agencies would likely view Commission approval of a hypothetical equity ratio below  
4 Ameren Missouri's actual equity ratio as a credit negative outcome.

5           **Q.     What would be the consequence on Ameren's stock price and inherent**  
6 **cost of equity of using a hypothetical equity ratio for ratemaking purposes that is**  
7 **below Ameren Missouri's actual equity ratio, as suggested by Mr. Smith?**

8           A.     Using a hypothetical common equity ratio that is below Ameren Missouri's  
9 actual common equity ratio to establish rates in this proceeding would likely place pressure  
10 on Ameren's share price. A lower relative share price makes it more challenging and  
11 expensive for Ameren to deploy equity capital to fund operations at Ameren Missouri and  
12 may support a corporate decision to reduce capital spending in the jurisdiction.

13           **Q.     Do you have any evidence that Ameren's stock price would face**  
14 **pressure if the Commission approved a hypothetical equity ratio below Ameren**  
15 **Missouri's actual equity ratio?**

16           A.     Yes. On January 31, 2018, the date that the Commission initially discussed  
17 the Spire Missouri rate cases, suggesting that parent company Spire's equity ratio should  
18 be used for ratemaking purposes rather than the actual equity ratios of Spire Missouri,  
19 Spire's share price declined 3.3% as compared to a 1.0% increase in the PHLX Utility  
20 Sector Index (the "UTY"). On the following day, February 1, 2018, Spire's stock price  
21 declined an additional 5.0% as compared to a 1.6% decline in the UTY.

22           The stock price decline during that period was in part a response to commentary  
23 published by several prominent Wall Street equity analysts that was negative in tone. For

1 instance, Wells Fargo analysts Sarah Akers and Neil Kalton stated in a report published on  
2 February 1, 2018, that

3 we view this stance by the Commission as somewhat punitive considering  
4 customers are benefitting from deal-related cost savings, which may not  
5 have been possible absent Spire's ability to use leverage to make the  
6 acquisitions economically viable.

7 Another equity analyst from Guggenheim Securities, Shahriar Pourreza, wrote on February  
8 1, 2018:

9 MoPSC's deliberations on pending rate case sent a concerning message.  
10 Investors likely expected management to send a stronger message to  
11 MoPSC that they would not hesitate to direct capital elsewhere if they are  
12 not afforded the mechanisms to necessitate adequate recovery of that  
13 capital.

14 The negative share price reaction to the initial Commission discussion in Spire  
15 Missouri's rate cases demonstrates that Ameren's stock price could face similar pressure if  
16 the Commission approves a hypothetical equity ratio below Ameren Missouri's actual  
17 equity ratio. The effect of a lower relative share price is a more challenging and expensive  
18 outlook for Ameren to deploy equity capital to fund operations at Ameren Missouri and  
19 may result in lower capital deployment in the state.

## 20 VIII. CONCLUSION

21 **Q. Please summarize why the use of Ameren Missouri's capital structure,**  
22 **rather than a hypothetical capital structure that incorporates less equity content, is**  
23 **appropriate and reasonable for setting rates in this proceeding?**

24 A. As I have noted several times throughout this testimony, Ameren Missouri's  
25 capital structure is independently managed, while supported and sourced from third-party  
26 investors. Its capital structure supports strong investment grade credit ratings that afford

1 Ameren Missouri ongoing access to required debt capital at a competitive cost. The  
2 primary drivers of Ameren's slightly more leveraged capital structure relative to Ameren  
3 Missouri's over the past several years, including the divestiture of its merchant energy  
4 businesses and significant investment in electric transmission assets under FERC's lower-  
5 risk ratemaking framework, have actually improved Ameren's consolidated credit profile.  
6 Meanwhile, Ameren Missouri's credit ratings remain strong and have been affirmed in  
7 recent years in spite of Ameren's slightly more leveraged capital structure relative to  
8 Ameren Missouri. Finally, the reasonableness of Ameren Missouri's proposed capital  
9 structure is affirmed by the consistency of its common equity ratio with those of its utility  
10 peers and the Ameren Missouri common equity ratio most recently approved by the  
11 Commission in File No. ER-2016-0179.

12 **Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

13 **A. Yes, it does.**

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**


In the Matter of Union Electric Company                    )  
d/b/a Ameren Missouri's Tariffs to Increase Its        )  
Revenues for Natural Gas Service.                    )        File No. GR-2019-0077

**AFFIDAVIT OF DARRYL T. SAGEL**

**STATE OF MISSOURI**        )  
  ) ss  
**CITY OF ST. LOUIS**        )

Darryl T. Sagel, being first duly sworn on his oath, states:

1. My name is Darryl T. Sagel. I work in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, and I am employed by Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri as Vice President and Treasurer.
2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my Rebuttal Testimony on behalf of Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri consisting of \_\_\_\_ pages and Schedule(s) DTS-R1 through DTS-R3 & Appendix A, all of which have been prepared in written form for introduction into evidence in the above-referenced docket.
3. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded are true and correct.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Darryl T. Sagel

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2019.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public

My commission expires:





**APPENDIX A**  
**STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS**

**DARRYL T. SAGEL**

My name is Darryl T. Sagel. My business address is One Ameren Plaza, 1901 Chouteau Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri, 63103. I am employed by Ameren Services Company as Vice President and Treasurer. As Treasurer, I am responsible for all areas of the treasury functional area of Ameren Corporation and its subsidiaries, including corporate finance, cash and investment management, insurance, credit risk management, investor services and corporate development. Within the areas of corporate finance, I am responsible for, among other things, managing Ameren Corporation's and its subsidiaries' capital raising initiatives and capital structure, including their short-term and long-term financing activities, such as debt and equity issuances and credit facility arrangements. I am also responsible for monitoring and managing Ameren's and its subsidiaries' liquidity positions, key credit metrics, and debt agreement compliance, overseeing relationships with credit rating agencies and banks, and monitoring capital markets for key developments, emerging risks, and opportunities, among other corporate finance-related activities.

I received my Bachelor of Arts degree in Quantitative Economics in 1994 from Stanford University.

I have more than 25 years of experience in various finance and strategy roles. Upon graduating from college in 1994, I joined the Investment Research Department at Goldman Sachs, & Co. based in New York City, where I aided in the research coverage of approximately 100 domestic and international electric and gas utility companies. In 1996,

I transferred to Goldman Sachs' Investment Banking Division, within which I advised energy and utility clients in the U.S. and internationally in raising capital and structuring merger and acquisition ("M&A") transactions. In 2000, I took a position at Morgan Stanley & Co., working within the company's Mergers & Acquisitions group and focusing predominantly on assisting global power and utilities clients on M&A-related matters. After over three years on the Morgan Stanley investment banking platform, in 2003, I moved to Lazard Freres & Co. ("Lazard"), where I continued to originate and execute financial advisory assignments for a broad range of domestic and international power and utility companies and alternative energy companies. For several years during my tenure, I was a partner and co-head of Lazard's North American Power & Utilities practice. In 2010, I left Lazard to join Rothschild Inc. to head its North American Power & Utilities group. In total, I amassed over 18 years of experience as an investment banker covering the broad power & utilities sector, working on a wide array of transformative and incremental M&A transactions, corporate restructurings and capital raising initiatives. In mid-2012, I joined Ameren Services as Director of Corporate Development, overseeing the company's M&A functional area, as well as originating and executing direct investment and corporate partnership opportunities. I was promoted to Assistant Vice President, Corporate Development in 2016 and again promoted to Vice President, Corporate Development in 2017. In July 2018, I inherited oversight of all of Ameren's treasury functions and my title changed to Vice President and Treasurer.

## Historical Consolidated Capital Structure

\$ in millions

### Ameren GAAP Capital Structure (Consolidated)

per 10-K

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Average 2014-2018
Short-term debt	714	301	558	484	597	
Long-term debt	6,205	7,275	7,276	7,935	8,439	
Preferred stock	142	142	142	142	142	
Common equity (no goodwill adjustment)	6,713	6,946	7,103	7,184	7,631	
Total capitalization	13,774	14,664	15,079	15,745	16,809	
% of equity	48.7%	47.4%	47.1%	45.6%	45.4%	
% of equity (excluding ST debt)	51.4%	48.4%	48.9%	47.1%	47.1%	48.6%

### Ameren Regulatory Capital Structure (Consolidated)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Average 2014-2018
Short-term debt	714	301	558	484	597	
Long-term debt - GAAP	6,205	7,275	7,276	7,935	8,439	
<u>Regulatory adjustments</u>						
MO: Capital leases	(294)	(288)	(282)	(276)	(270)	
IL: Bonds held by Ameren	(18)	(18)	(18)	(18)	(18)	
Unamortized loss on reacquired debt	(152)	(138)	(124)	(111)	(98)	
Long-term debt - Regulatory	5,741	6,831	6,853	7,531	8,053	
Preferred stock	142	142	142	142	142	
Common equity	6,713	6,946	7,102	7,184	7,631	
Total capitalization	13,310	14,220	14,655	15,341	16,423	
% of equity	50.4%	48.8%	48.5%	46.8%	46.5%	
% of equity (excluding ST debt)	53.3%	49.9%	50.4%	48.4%	48.2%	50.0%

### Schedule JS-6-2 Ameren Equity Ratio

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Average 2014-2018
As specified	50.4%	47.3%	47.9%	46.0%	46.1%	47.6%
No goodwill adjustment	52.0%	48.8%	49.4%	47.5%	47.5%	49.0%
No goodwill adjustment / including preferred stock	51.4%	48.4%	48.9%	47.1%	47.1%	48.6%

### Ameren Holding Company Historical Debt Balances

*\$ in millions*

	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>
Ameren Corp. 2.70% Senior unsecured notes due 2020	\$0	\$0	\$350	\$350	\$350	\$350
Ameren Corp. 3.65% Senior unsecured notes due 2026	-	-	350	350	350	350
Ameren Corp. 8.875% Senior unsecured notes due 2014	425	-	-	-	-	-
Total Parent long-term debt	\$425	\$0	\$700	\$700	\$700	\$700
Consolidated long-term debt (per Schedule DTS-R1)	\$6,038	\$6,205	\$7,275	\$7,276	\$7,935	\$8,439
<b>Parent as % of long-term debt</b>	<b>7.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>9.6%</b>	<b>9.6%</b>	<b>8.8%</b>	<b>8.3%</b>

**Peer Utility Regulatory Capital Structures**  
Most Recently Approved Equity Ratio

Company	State	Docket	Date	Decision Type	Common Equity to Total Capital (%)
Atmos Energy Corp.	Colorado	D-13AL-0496G	03/16/2014	Settled	52.57%
Atmos Energy Corp.	Georgia	D-30442	03/31/2010	Fully Litigated	47.70%
Atmos Energy Corp.	Kansas	D-16-ATMG-079-RTS	03/17/2016	Settled	NA [2]
Atmos Energy Corp.	Kansas	D-14-ATMG-320-RTS	09/04/2014	Settled	53.00% [3]
Atmos Energy Corp.	Kentucky	C-2018-00281	05/07/2019	Fully Litigated	58.06%
Atmos Energy Corp.	Tennessee	D-18-00067	12/04/2018	Fully Litigated	51.40%
Atmos Energy Corp.	Texas	D-GUD-10359 (Mid-Tex Division)	07/28/2015	Settled	NA [2]
Atmos Energy Corp.	Texas	D-GUD-10170 (Mid-Tex)	12/04/2012	Fully Litigated	51.69% [3]
Atmos Energy Corp.	Texas	D-GUD 10174 (West Texas)	10/02/2012	Settled	NA [1]
Chesapeake Utilities Corp.	Delaware	D-18-0934	08/02/2018	Fully Litigated	NA [1]
New Jersey Natural Gas Co.	New Jersey	D-GR-15111304	09/23/2016	Settled	52.50%
Northwest Natural Gas Co.	Oregon	D-UG-344	10/26/2018	Settled	50.00%
Kansas Gas Service Co.	Kansas	D-18-KGSG-560-RTS	02/05/2019	Settled	NA [1]
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co	Oklahoma	Ca-PUD201800028	01/08/2019	Settled	NA [2]
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co	Oklahoma	Ca-PUD201700079	08/09/2017	Settled	NA [2]
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co	Oklahoma	Ca-PUD201500213	01/06/2016	Settled	60.50% [3]
Texas Gas Service Co.	Texas	D-GUD-10526	11/15/2016	Settled	NA [2]
Texas Gas Service Co.	Texas	D-GUD-10506	09/27/2016	Fully Litigated	60.10% [3]
Elizabethtown Gas Co.	New Jersey	D-GR-16090826	06/30/2017	Settled	46.00%
South Jersey Gas Co.	New Jersey	D-GR-17010071	10/20/2017	Settled	52.50%
Missouri Gas Energy	Missouri	C-GR-2017-0216	02/21/2018	Fully Litigated	54.16%
Spire Missouri Inc.	Missouri	C-GR-2017-0215	02/21/2018	Fully Litigated	54.16%
Southwest Gas Corp.	Arizona	D-G-01551A-16-0107	04/11/2017	Settled	51.70%
Southwest Gas Corp.	California	A-12-12-024 (SoCal)	06/12/2014	Fully Litigated	55.00%
Southwest Gas Corp.	California	A-12-12-024 (NoCal)	06/12/2014	Fully Litigated	55.00%
Southwest Gas Corp.	California	A-12-12-024 (LkTah)	06/12/2014	Fully Litigated	55.00%
Southwest Gas Corp.	Nevada	D-18-05031 (Southern)	12/24/2018	Fully Litigated	49.66%

Average	53.19%
Median	52.57%

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence

[1] No equity ratio disclosed since at least 2010

[2] Most recent case(s) did not disclose equity ratio

[3] Most recent case which disclosed equity ratio