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1	STATE OF MISSOURI
	PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
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	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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5	Evidentiary Hearing
6	
7	October 5, 2012
	Jefferson City, Missouri
8	Volume 26
9	
10	In the Matter of Union Electric)File No.
	Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri's)ER-2012-0166
11	Tariffs to Increase Its Annual)
	Revenues for Electric Service)
12	
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14	MORRIS WOODRUFF, Presiding
	CHIEF REGULATORY LAW JUDGE
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Page 1483 PROCEEDINGS 1 2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Welcome back to 3 another day of the Ameren rate case hearing. And let me ask the parties -- I understand we'll be doing the return 4 5 on equity and -- issues today. Were we going to take up another witness before we started that? 6 7 MR. THOMPSON: We're going to take up Lisa 8 Ferguson out of order, but not at the beginning 9 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Not at the beginning. 10 MR. THOMPSON: We're going to take her up, I think, after lunch is my understanding. 11 12 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. That would be fine. So 13 we will start on the return on common equity issue, and we'll start with mini openings, beginning with Ameren. 14 15 Openings for Ameren? 16 MR. BYRNE: Oh, sure. 17 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Thank you. 18 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. 19 MS. BAKER: Thank you. 20 MS. ILES: Thank you, Tom. 21 MR. BYRNE: May it please the Commission. 22 OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. BYRNE: 23 24 MR. BYRNE: We are here today to discuss return on equity, which is the largest dollar value issue in this 25

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1	case. All three of the ROE witnesses in this case agree
2	that the legal principles that govern the determination of
3	the appropriate return to be authorized for Ameren
4	Missouri in this case are set forth in Federal Power
5	Commission versus Hope Natural Gas Company and Bluefield
6	Water Works and Improvement Company versus Public Service
7	Commission of West Virginia, two United States Supreme
8	Court decisions that have long set the standard in this
9	area.
10	As Ameren Missouri witness Robert Hevert
11	explains in his direct testimony, the Hope and Bluefield
12	decisions require that the Commission provide the company
13	with an opportunity to earn an ROE that is, No. 1,
14	adequate to attract capital at reasonable terms, thereby
15	enabling it to provide safe and continuing reliable
16	electric service.
17	No. 2, sufficient to ensure the facility's
18	financial integrity. No. 3, commensurate with returns on
19	investments in enterprises having corresponding risk.
20	Only one of the three ROE witness'
21	recommendations satisfies this standard. Ameren Missouri
22	witness Robert Hevert is recommending a return on equity
23	range of 10.2 percent to 11 percent with a specific ROE
24	recommendation of 10.5 percent based primarily on his
25	multi-stage discounted cash flow or DCF analysis, an

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1	analysis that this Commission has relied on in many
2	previous cases.
3	Mr. Hevert has also supported his recommendation
4	with other analyses that are commonly relied upon in
5	setting an ROE, including different forms of the DCF
6	model, the capital asset pricing model and risk premium
7	analyses.
8	Mr. Hevert's recommendation is in line with ROEs
9	this Commission has approved in recent cases, and it is in
10	line with recently authorized returns from Commissions in
11	other jurisdictions.
12	The recommendations of the other return on
13	equity witnesses filing testimony in this case are so low
14	that they are completely unreasonable and would be
15	extremely damaging to Ameren Missouri if they are adopted.
16	They do not meet the standards in Hope and
17	Bluefield. If adopted, they will not permit Ameren
18	Missouri to attract capital at reasonable terms to invest
19	in its system, and they are certainly not commensurate
20	with returns on investment in enterprises having
21	corresponding risks because they are far below the
22	authorized returns for other similar utilities across the
23	country.
24	Staff witness David Murray's recommendation,
25	which is a range of 8 percent to 9 percent, is a full 120

to 220 basis points below the ROE authorized by this
 Commission for Ameren Missouri just over a year ago for
 rates that took effect in July of 2011.

4 It is unimaginable that the cost of equity could 5 have fallen so far in such a short time. Mr. Murray's 6 recommendation is even further below the national average 7 for authorized returns that is currently hovering just 8 above 10.2 percent.

9 Even more significant, Mr. Murray acknowledges 10 that his recommended range is not supported by any of the 11 unconventional, and in some cases, illegitimate rate of 12 return analyses that he performed.

His analyses would support a recommendation 13 below 8 percent, but he arbitrarily raised his 14 15 recommendation to 9 percent because he knows that this Commission could never even consider adopting a 16 17 recommendation that low. In fact, some of his analyses were explicitly rejected by the Commission just over a 18 year ago, but he is back with them again in this case. 19 20 The evidence will show that Mr. Murray has no 21 expectation that this Commission will adopt his 22 recommendation. Nor should he. His analysis is extremely unconventional. His recommended return is unsupported by 23 even that analysis, and he remains far outside the 24 mainstream in his approach to estimating the cost of 25

1 capital.

2	Public Counsel's not sponsoring a witness on
3	this issue, but they have latched on to the low end of the
4	ROE range recommended by Mr. Murray. Even Mr. Murray
5	won't support such an extremely low ROE, and there's
6	certainly no valid reason for this Commission to do so.
7	The MIEC has presented the testimony of witness
8	Mr. Gorman. Mr. Gorman is a well-respected ROE expert who
9	performs conventional and legitimate return on equity
10	analyses. But in this case, Mr. Gorman has selected
11	inputs for his analyses and exercises judgment in
12	selecting which results he will rely on that make his
13	recommendation almost as unreasonable as Mr. Murray's.
14	Specifically, Mr. Gorman's 9.3 percent return on
15	equity is 90 basis points below the ROE authorized by this
16	Commission just over a year ago for Ameren Missouri and a
17	little over 90 basis points below the national average of
18	authorized ROEs, which, again, is hovering just a little
19	above 10.2 percent.
20	His recommendation is much further from the
21	mainstream than it has been in some previous cases where
22	this Commission has relied on Mr. Gorman's analyses as a
23	starting point for determining an ROE for Ameren Missouri.
24	At a minimum, Mr. Gorman's analyses must be

selection of results before they could be properly 1 2 considered in setting Ameren Missouri's return on equity. 3 In some past cases, this Commission has used a zone of reasonableness to help it evaluate competing ROE 4 5 recommendations. The zone of reasonableness has been a hundred basis points around the national average. So if 6 7 the national average was 10.2 or so, it would -- the zone of reasonableness would be 9.2 or so to 11.2 or so. 8 9 There are two reasons that the zone of reasonableness has been considered useful by this 10 Commission. First, it ties to the standards from the Hope 11 12 and the Bluefield decisions. Other integrated electric 13 utilities or enterprises having corresponding risk to Ameren Missouri and their authorized returns are 14 15 unquestionably relevant to the return that Ameren Missouri 16 should be authorized. 17 Second, considering the ROEs authorized in other jurisdictions is valuable because it helps to put the 18 subjective recommendations of a few witnesses presenting 19 testimony today into a more objective context. 20 21 As I said before, estimating ROE is a surprisingly subjective undertaking. Even though lots of 22 the experts use the same type of analyses, their results 23 24 depend on inputs that they subjectively decide to put in the models and subjective decisions they make about which 25

1	results to use in making their recommendation.
2	And the problem is that their subjective
3	decisions are often buried in the math. They're in
4	schedules attached to their testimony or in work papers.
5	We'll get into some of those issues today. But the fact
6	is it's difficult to measure exactly how the subjective
7	assumptions of an expert are influencing his results.
8	Looking at how Commissions in the other 49
9	states are dealing with this issue provides a somewhat
10	more objective context in which to view the subjective
11	recommendations in this case, a somewhat more objective
12	context in which to review the subjective recommendations
13	in this case.
14	I don't know if the Commission will use the zone
15	of reasonableness in this case like it has in the past.
16	But if it does, Public Counsel's recommendation is too low
17	to be considered. Staff's recommendation is too low to be
18	considered.
19	Mr. Gorman's recommendation is barely within the
20	zone of reasonableness, at the low end of the zone. He's
21	at 10.3 in the zone. The very bottom of the zone would be
22	10 point I'm sorry. He's at 9.3, and the very bottom
23	of the zone would be 9.2 something.
24	In some ways, return on equity is a very boring
25	issue. It revolves around extremely detailed and

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1	complicated analyses, and it's easy for anyone to get lost
2	in those analyses. I plan to get into some of those
3	details in cross-examination with the witnesses, but I
4	don't want to do that in my opening statement.
5	So let me leave with you this simple message.
6	If you're confused by this issue, if you don't know what
7	to believe on this issue, if you remember nothing else
8	from my opening statement after you hear five other
9	opening statements, or six, please keep this chart in
10	mind.
11	And I passed it out on paper, but it's on the
12	on the easel. The chart was included in Mr. Hevert's
13	surrebuttal testimony, and it shows the national average
14	ROE authorized by Public Utility Commissions across the
15	country. And is shows where the recommendations of each
16	of the witnesses filing testimony in this case fall with
17	respect to that average.
18	Mr. Hevert's range starts just above the
19	national average. The national average here is 10.2
20	percent, maybe just a little above. His range starts at
21	10.5 or 10.25 and his point recommendation is right
22	here at 10.5 percent, which is just a little above the
23	average.
24	Mr. Hevert believes that this is justifiable
25	based not only on the results of his analyses, but also

because the regulatory framework in Missouri, which we discussed, you know, in spite of this Commission's steps to improve it remains less credit supportive than average around the country.

5 On the other hand, Mr. Gorman's recommendation of 9.3 percent is far below the tenth percentile of 6 7 authorized returns on equity. The -- I -- the dark blue line is the 25th percentile -- or the dark blue area is 8 9 the 25th percentile, and the light blue line is the 10th percentile, which goes down to about -- maybe a little 10 below 10 percent. Mr. Gorman's recommendation is far 11 12 below the 10th percentile. OPC's recommendation is almost 13 literally off the chart, and Staff's in between.

14 I would encourage the Commission to adopt an ROE in this case commensurate with Mr. Hevert's 15 recommendation, one that is in the mainstream of 16 17 authorized ROEs across the country, one that is based on conventional analyses and reasonable inputs, one that will 18 allow us to attract the investments that we need to invest 19 20 in our system, maintain our access to capital on 21 reasonable returns and provide the company with a return commensurate with enterprises having similar risk as is 22 required by Hope and Bluefield. Thank you. 23 24 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. Any questions? Thank you, Mr. Byrne. 25

Page 1492 1 MR. BYRNE: Okay. 2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Opening for Staff? 3 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Judge. Why don't you 4 leave that up, Tom? 5 MR. BYRNE: Sure. 6 MR. THOMPSON: It's pretty. I like it. 7 OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. THOMPSON: 8 MR. THOMPSON: May it please the Commission. 9 In addition to being the largest dollar issue that you're 10 going to face in this case, it is also one of the most 11 12 complex, detailed and frustrating. 13 As Mr. Byrne told you, rate of return recommendations and rate of return analyses are 14 15 surprisingly subjective. We bring in experts and we listen to them. And we have to understand and always 16 17 remember that there's a lot of art in what they're telling 18 us. 19 It's not science. It's not a generating plant. It's not something where the constraints of the physical 20 21 world, cause and effect operate or at least operate as clearly as lay people can see it in a generating plant. 22 23 This is a rarified area, an area of expert 24 knowledge, expert analysis, expert opinion. And it's easy for lay people to lose their way when dealing with so 25

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Page 1493 esoteric a subject. 1 2 Now, Mr. Byrne spoke of a mainstream, mainly to 3 say that all the recommendations besides Mr. Hevert's were well outside of it. And I asked him to leave this chart 4 5 up because, boy, that looks like a stream, doesn't it, meandering through a valley? 6 7 And I assume -- he never told us in his opening 8 statement what the mainstream was. But I assume the mainstream to which he refers is, in fact, this line, this 9 average of ROE awards by Commissions across the nation 10 11 over a recent period of time. 12 And you put that on a chart, and it's pretty, 13 and it looks authoritative. And there it is. It's a thing. You can't deny it. It even looks scientific, 14 right? Scientists choose graphs all the time. 15 But this particular graph is misleading because 16 17 there is a serious, serious, serious flaw in looking to the decisions of other Commissions as your primary 18 starting point for awarding an ROE. 19 20 What is that flaw? It's circular reasoning. That's the flaw. That's the flaw. If you look at the 21 report of ROE decisions by RRA, Regulatory Research 22 Associates, which is where these numbers come from, you 23 24 will see that they tend to cluster around the average. 25 And, in fact, for the statisticians among you,

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1	you understand that the term average or mean is a measure
2	of central tendency. It's a measure of central tendency.
3	If you take a data set, the average will tell you what's
4	the mid point? Not mid point between the extremes, but
5	the weighted mid point of that data set. Okay? It is one
6	way to talk about a data set. But it's far from the only
7	way.
8	Now, Mr. Byrne told you that the recommendations
9	made by Mr. Murray here and his low end adopted by OPC
10	here and even the recommendation of Mr. Gorman here are so
11	out so far outside the mainstream as to be
12	unreasonable. He even said they are so far outside that
13	mainstream that if you were to adopt any of those numbers,
14	it would violate the Constitutional prerequisites set out
15	in the Hope and Bluefield decisions.
16	But I wonder if the Constitution wouldn't be
17	better satisfied by comparing what you award Ameren not to
18	other awarded ROEs, but how about to earned ROEs? After
19	all, the return the investor receives has nothing to do
20	with what the Commission awards. It has to do with the
21	performance of the company in the world. It has to do
22	with market forces.
23	It is, in fact, the earned actual achieved
24	return on equity, not the Commission-awarded return on
25	equity. Think about that first.

And as you have already seen in this case from 1 2 your examination of Mr. Baxter's bar charts and Staff's 3 Exhibit 237 and the prolonged testimony we've had on how those were developed and how they could be reconciled, 4 5 you've already seen that, No. 1, regulated electric utility companies earn under their awarded ROE much of the 6 7 time. Not always, but much of the time. At least that 8 seems to be the case with this company.

9 The other thing you've learned is that this ROE 10 thing, it's slippery. It's like a fish. It wiggles. 11 It's hard to get a hold of. You can calculate it in any 12 number of different ways depending on the point you're 13 trying to make. And that's something I want you to keep 14 in mind as you listen to this expert testimony today and 15 as you evaluate this testimony in making your decision.

16 It's math, yes. And Mr. Byrne was absolutely 17 truthful when he told you that the art is hidden in the 18 numbers. We all know that any equation will produce a 19 result dependent on the inputs. Depends on the inputs.

I can select inputs for any equation to produce the output is that I want. That's the skill. That's the art of these experts. You are, in a sense, trusting them to have selected the right inputs to give you the answers you need for this case. That's what you're depending on their skill and their integrity to bring to you.

The actual equations are fairly simple. And 1 2 they all use variations of the same three. There's the --3 the discounted cash flow model. There's the capital asset pricing model. There's the risk premium analysis. 4 5 They're all ways of measuring risk. And they're all equations used by investors to decide what's the right 6 7 price to pay for an investment? That's what they are used for. That's why they were invented. 8 9 We have a very, very robust investment market in this nation, and you are all aware of that. You can 10

11 invest in bonds, stocks. You can invest in all kinds of 12 things, depending on whether you're risk adverse or 13 whether you're seeking a high return. And these formuli 14 are used by investors and their advisors in deciding what 15 to invest in, in deciding what's the right amount to pay 16 for the expected return.

17 These formuli were not invented to do what we're using them for, which is to figure out what the cost of 18 capital is for a regulated electrical utility company. 19 20 But, theoretically, they can be adapted to that purpose. 21 And all over this nation, they are used for that purpose. That is the mainstream in doing this work. 22 Now, I want to talk about this zone of 23 24 reasonableness. And I talked about this in my general opening, and you heard Mr. Byrne talk about it. 25 There is,

indeed, a zone of reasonableness created by the United
 States Supreme Court and referred to by that Court, and it
 is different from the zone of reasonableness this
 Commission has used. And I mention it because I think
 it's important and I believe the Commission should use the
 Supreme Court's method rather than the one you have been
 using.

8 Why is that? Because as I started out telling 9 you, the one you're using that keys onto the average has that flaw of circular reasoning. If you're going to be 10 looking at what all the other Commissions are doing in 11 12 setting a rate, then the rate you set is going to depend on the judgment of those Commissions and not on the 13 judgment of the evidence in front of you. So that's the 14 15 flaw, the logical flaw in zone of reasonableness tool that 16 you have used in the past.

I suggest you use the Supreme Court tool. That tool is based on the Constitutional requirements. You know that a -- a signed return or allowed return that is too low is confiscatory and is unconstitutional, is unlawful.
After all, these are private companies owned by

23 private persons. You can't take their property without 24 compensation. But how much compensation? That's the 25 Constitutional question, right? How much compensation is

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1	enough? Whereas the Supreme Court has put it, what is the
2	lowest reasonable rate? They don't say you have to set
3	the ROE at the lowest reasonable rate. No. That's a
4	further step. They just say you've got to figure out
5	where it is. That is the proper point to key your
6	analysis from.
7	And then you go from there to set the ROE where
8	it will accomplish the appropriate regulatory purposes as
9	you have identified. Two steps. I suggest to you that
10	the lowest reasonable rate has to be has to be the
11	actual cost of common equity.
12	After all, if you're giving the company if
13	you're assigning an ROE that will cover its actual cost of
14	capital, then there is no confiscation. They're getting
15	enough money to pay for what they're doing. So the lowest
16	reasonable rate is the cost of equity, COE the experts
17	refer to it.
18	The actual cost of common equity is the lowest
19	reasonable rate. But the return on equity that you assign
20	is not necessarily the same number. In fact, that's your
21	discretion. That's your discretion. You decide where to
22	set the return on equity. And I suggest that you key that
23	off the cost of common equity because you cannot go lower.
24	It would be unlawful.
25	And I suggest to you further there's also a

Page 1499 rate-making ceiling. It is also confiscation if you set 1 2 the return on equity so high that customers are paying an 3 outlandish and unreasonable amount for the service they're 4 receiving. 5 There is some point that is so high, it is also unconstitutional. Where is that point? I don't know. 6 7 But it is between those points that the zone of reasonableness described by the United States Supreme 8 Court can be found. That's the zone of reasonableness. 9 10 In this case, I suggest to you that Mr. Murray, with his recommendation of 8 to 9, has brought you the 11 12 actual cost of common equity. That is what it is costing Ameren Missouri for equity capital. 13 Is that where you should set the rate? Well, we 14 say at the top of that range. And other parties go even 15 higher. I think you can set it wherever you want within 16 17 that range as long as you state a rational, regulatory purpose for going higher, construction risk, small company 18 risk, financial -- whatever it might be. It's your 19 discretion. 20 21 And you know and I know the Courts are not going to inquire deeply into any ROE that you set within a zone 22 of reasonableness. That's your discretion in this case. 23 But, please, key off of the right number, which is the 24 25 actual cost of common equity.

Page 1500 Does that mean you can't look at what the other 1 2 Commissions are doing? Absolutely not. That's a relevant 3 factor. But I don't think it's the appropriate starting point. It's something to consider. 4 5 And when you're making this decision and you're setting the return on equity for this company, you have a 6 7 myriad of things to consider, a myriad of things that have been brought to you by the policy witnesses we heard at 8 the outset of this case. 9 Among them are the continued sluggish economy 10 11 and its effects on the ratepayers, the company's earning 12 history, which has been described to you by the company 13 witnesses, the possible effects of various levels of ROE that you might assign, which there is also testimony on. 14 15 It is Staff's position that 9 percent -- 9 percent is an appropriate ROE award. It is well above the 16 17 zone of confiscation. Not much above it. In fact, at the top of it. But it satisfies the Constitutional 18 19 requirements. Thank you. 20 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Questions? COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Just one. 21 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Go ahead. 22 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Thanks, Mr. Thompson. Did 23 24 I hear you correctly that you concede the fact that Ameren is -- has earned beneath its allowed ROE? 25

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1	MR. THOMPSON: I think more often than not, it
2	has.
3	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay. All right. Thank
4	you.
5	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you, Mr. Thompson. For
6	Public Counsel?
7	MS. BAKER: Thank you.
8	OPENING STATEMENT
9	BY MS. BAKER:
10	May it please the Commission. Public Counsel
11	has not sponsored a witness on ROE in this particular
12	case. But the Commission has before it four experts
13	basing their opinion on what they feel are the proper
14	market-based and economical-based indicators to make their
15	particular range of reasonable ROE statements toward the
16	Commission.
17	As you've heard already, the reasonable ROE that
18	the U.S. Supreme Court has stated is one for Ameren that
19	is adequate to attract capital at reasonable terms,
20	thereby allowing Ameren Missouri to provide safe and
21	reliable electric service that is sufficient to ensure
22	Ameren Missouri's financial integrity and is commensurate
23	with the return on investments in enterprises having
24	corresponding risks.
25	So this is the statement of what is a reasonable

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Page 1502 ROE. And everyone has agreed to that, that this is the 1 2 statement of a reasonable ROE. And a reasonable ROE is 3 one that is not detrimental to the utility. And it is also one that is not detrimental to the -- to the 4 5 customer. 6 The Commission's charge is to set just and 7 reasonable rates. And part of that determination is to set affordable rates that are not detrimental to the 8 9 utility. Nearly 45 percent of the revenue requirement of Ameren in this case is based on the issue of return on 10 11 equity. 12 Customers have gone directly to the 13 Commissioners with their concerns regarding affordable rates in this economy and with the number of rate cases 14 that they are facing in multiple types of utilities. 15 Public Counsel asks that once the Commission 16 17 sets a reasonable range for the ROE that the Commission implement the low end of that reasonable range to promote 18 affordability for Ameren's customers. Thank you. 19 20 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. For MIEC? 21 OPENING STATEMENT BY MS. ILES: 22 MS. ILES: Good morning. May it please the 23 Commission. My name is Carole Iles. I'm here on behalf 24 of the Missouri Industrial Energy Consumers. We will 25

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Page 1503 introduce the testimony of Mike Gorman. The other 1 2 attorneys have already mentioned that he is our expert. 3 And in his testimony, Mr. Gorman recommends that the Commission authorize an ROE for Ameren Missouri in a 4 range of 9.2 to 9.4 percent. And, specifically, he 5 recommends that the Commission adopt an ROE of 9.3 6 7 percent, the mid point of his range. 8 And I'm going to point out something about 9 Mr. Byrne's chart here. I just want it to be clear that this apparently shows, based on what he has written here, 10 the allowed ROE calculated as a 12-month rolling average. 11 12 So when you look at this number here for July of 13 2012, that's telling you the -- that's looking at the average, I guess, from the beginning of the year. Or it's 14 15 a rolling, so it goes back to July of --16 MR. BYRNE: Twelve months. Twelve months. 17 MS. ILES: Twelve months. Sorry. So at any rate, an interesting fact that we'll introduce in our 18 testimony is that actually if you look at the second 19 20 quarter of 2012 and the average authorized ROEs for 21 electric utilities in this country, it is below 10 22 percent. It's 9.92 percent. 23 So there's a lot of different ways you can look at numbers. But when you talk about an ROE below ten 24 being just completely unreasonable, well, if you look at 25

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1	the average for the second quarter of 2012 for electric
2	utilities, and we'll introduce evidence on that issue, it
3	is below 10 percent, even though this chart doesn't
4	reflect that because it the average is still above
5	there at this point in the year.
6	And it's significant that the evidence in this
7	case, not just Mr. Gorman's testimony, but the testimony
8	of Mr. Hevert and Mr. Murray all show that the cost of
9	equity has significantly declined since Ameren Missouri's
10	last rate case. And the current trend is for it to
11	continue to decline.
12	Bond yields have declined, both utility bonds
13	and Treasury bonds. And the cost of common equity has
14	declined whether you look at regardless of the method
15	of estimating what that cost is, whether you look at a
16	risk premium analysis, which takes into account those bond
17	yields, or if you're looking at a DCF model that simply
18	looks at dividends and capital appreciation, stock
19	appreciation. Either way you look at it, there has been a
20	significant decline in the cost of capital since the last
21	rate case.
22	Mr. Gorman's testimony will also explain why the
23	ROE recommended by Ameren Missouri's witness, Mr. Hevert,
24	should be rejected. As Mr. Byrne explained, Mr. Hevert
25	recommends an ROE in the range of 10.25 to 11. And his

Page 1505 specific recommendation is 10.5. And that's significant. 1 2 What he's asking you to do, what the company's 3 asking you to do is to increase its authorized ROE over the last rate case despite clear evidence that the cost of 4 5 equity has declined since the last rate case. 6 In sum, the evidence presented to the Commission 7 in this case will show that the appropriate return on 8 equity for Ameren Missouri at this time is, as Mr. Gorman 9 recommends, in the range of 9.2 to 9.4 percent. 10 We recommend that the Commission adopt an ROE of 9.3 percent in this case. I also want to note that 11 12 Mr. Gorman was listed as a witness for the first day of 13 testimony in this case on policy issues. And his testimony does include a discussion of those issues. And 14 15 so he is certainly available to answer the Commission's questions on that topic as well this morning. 16 17 We appreciate the Commission accommodating us and taking him out of time on that issue. Thank you. 18 19 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. All right. I believe that's all the openings. Mr. Byrne? 20 21 MR. BYRNE: Judge, there is a short issue on --22 I believe on capital structure or cost of debt. We have Mr. Ryan Martin here to testify. And I think MIEC has 23 24 some questions for him. We were hoping we could take him 25 first because it's a -- I think it will be not as long as

Page 1506 the rest of it. 1 2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: That's fine. All right. Call 3 Mr. Martin then. If you'll please right your right hand, and I'll swear you in. 4 5 RYAN MARTIN, being first duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole 6 7 truth, and nothing but the truth, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION 8 BY MS. TATRO: 9 10 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. You may inquire. 11 (By Ms. Tatro) Would you state your name and Q 12 business address for the Commission, please? 13 А My name is Ryan Martin, One Ameren Plaza, 1901 Chouteau Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri, 63103. 14 15 And are you the same Ryan J. Martin who prefiled Q direct testimony in this case? 16 17 А I am. 18 Q Do you have any additions or corrections to make 19 to your testimony? 20 I do not. А 21 And if I were to ask you the same questions that Q 22 are listed in your prefiled written testimony, would your 23 answers be the same? 24 А Yes. 25 MS. TATRO: I move for admission of Exhibit 23

Page 1507 and tender the witness for cross-examination. 1 2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Exhibit 23 has been 3 offered. Any objections to its he receipt? Hearing none, it will be received. 4 5 (Exhibit 23 was offered and received into 6 evidence.) 7 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Cross-examination, we'll begin with MIEC. 8 9 MS. ILES: Thank you, your Honor. Is my microphone working? 10 JUDGE WOODRUFF: I think so. 11 12 MS. ILES: Okay. Thank you. CROSS-EXAMINATION 13 14 BY MS. ILES: 15 Mr. Martin, good morning. Q 16 А Good morning. 17 Q My name is Carole Iles. I'm going to ask you just a few questions. At page 5 of your direct testimony, 18 you're sponsoring the company's proposed capital structure 19 20 in this case, correct? 21 А Correct. 22 Q And the common equity ratio you're recommending 23 in this case is 53 percent, correct? 24 I believe on page 5 refers to the -- the А recommended capital structure as of September 30th, 2001. 25

Page 1508 1 Okay. Q 2 А The structure recommended in the case as of the 3 true-up date of July 31st is on page 7. 4 Q All right. And what's the common equity ratio 5 you're recommending on page 7? 6 А 52.1 percent. 7 Okay. So a little bit lower. 52.1 percent. Q 8 All right. You're the Assistant Treasurer and Manager of 9 Corporate Finance for Ameren Services Company; is that correct? 10 А I am. 11 12 And as a part of your duties as Assistant Q 13 Treasurer and Manager of Corporate Finance, you perform 14 studies to estimate ways to maintain the company's 15 financial integrity but minimize its overall cost of capital, correct? 16 17 Α Correct. 18 So has the company done any studies that examine Q 19 whether or not it can reduce its cost of capital while 20 maintaining its current investment grade bond rating? 21 А We are -- we are always evaluating market opportunities. One example would be, recently, we 22 23 contemplated a transaction to refinance existing higher 24 rate bonds at a lower rate pursuant to a tender offer. That transaction was completed in the third quarter of 25

Page 1509 this year. 1 2 Look -- sorry -- so -- I'm sorry. Let's talk a 0 3 little bit about that refinance of the bonds at this 4 point. 5 А Uh-huh. When did that happen? 6 Q 7 А The -- the bonds themselves were issued on September 6th, but the -- the transaction was actually 8 9 initiated on August 20th pursuant to a tender offer. It was actually -- there were two parts to the transaction. 10 One, the intent of the first part was to 11 12 refinance a portion of higher rate debt at a lower rate given current market conditions. And the second part was 13 to refinance a bond maturity that was coming due in 14 15 September for Ameren Missouri. And as a result of doing that, you were able to 16 Q 17 borrow at significantly lower interest rates; is that 18 correct? 19 А We borrowed at a lower rate. The new bonds, 485 million, was issued at a coupon of 3.9 percent. 20 21 Do you know what the anticipated annual savings 0 22 from this transaction is? 23 We estimate that at -- in terms of the entire А 24 transaction should generate annual savings of up to 25 \$5 million.

Page 1510 MS. ILES: Okay. I have an exhibit that I need 1 2 to have marked. 3 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. Your next number is 528. MS. TATRO: I'm sorry. What number was that, 4 5 Judge? 6 JUDGE WOODRUFF: 528. 7 MS. ILES: Do you need to mark it before I go 8 forward, or can I mark it and -- I should hand this out to 9 everyone. This will be 528. 10 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. And what number is 11 this going to be? 12 MS. ILES: 528. 13 0 (By Ms. Iles) I'm handing you what's been marked 14 as Exhibit 528. What is that? Do you know what it is? 15 It's a Data Request from MIEC and our response. А 16 Q All right. And what information did this Data 17 Request ask for? Well, it says, Please provide the anticipated 18 Α revenue requirement savings produced by Ameren Missouri's 19 recent bond offer is the question. 20 21 And how did the company respond? 0 Company responded, Ameren Missouri's recent debt 22 А issuance occurred after the true-up cutoff date in this 23 24 case. Consequently, the debt issue has had no impact on the revenue requirement in this case. 25

Page 1511 1 Q All right. And that's the same transaction that 2 we were just talking about --3 А Correct. 4 Q -- that you stated will -- you estimate will 5 cost -- will save the company approximately \$5 million? 6 А Correct. 7 Annually, but it will not be included in the --Q 8 it wasn't included in the test year or the true-up period 9 of this case, correct? 10 The transaction was completed after the true-up А date in this case. That's correct. 11 12 Q Okay. Thank you. MS. ILES: I'd like to move for admission of 13 14 Exhibit 528. JUDGE WOODRUFF: 528 has been offered. Any 15 objections to its receipt? Hearing none, it will be 16 17 received. 18 (Exhibit 528 was offered and received into 19 evidence.) 20 (By Ms. Iles) All right. Let's go back to be Q 21 what we were talking about at the outset. And that was 22 the capital structure of the company. 23 А Uh-huh. 24 And that's when we got into this idea -- or the 0 25 discussion we just pursued about the refinance of the

	Page 1512
1	bonds. what about the capital structure of the company in
2	itself? Do you ever do any kind of studies to determine
3	whether you need more debt versus common equity, that kind
4	of thing?
5	A Yeah. We're constantly or consistently on a
6	regular basis evaluating capital structure in a variety of
7	ways. We evaluate the company's average average
8	weighted cost of debt, the average tenor. We look at key
9	credit metrics that impact credit ratings, try to
10	interpret those to make sure that we have the optimal mix
11	of debt and equity.
12	Again, this is more of an art than a science.
13	The intent here is to balance to come up with a
14	reasonable cost of capital and also maintain financial
15	strength and stability that will allow the company to
16	access capital markets as a reasonable cost on a regular
17	basis.
18	Q And which is more expensive, debt or equity?
19	A Well, traditionally I guess it could vary,
20	but, traditionally, equity is more expensive than debt.
21	Q And that's true at this time, correct?
22	A That is true.
23	Q Do you know or can you tell me the revenue
24	requirement cost of customers of common equity capital
25	assuming the Commission approves, for example, just for

	Page 1513
1	example purposes, a return on equity of say, 10 percent?
2	What would the cost to the customers be?
3	A You're asking me what the revenue requirement
4	impact of that is?
5	Q Correct.
6	A I I do not have that information.
7	Q Okay. Would you agree when you take a 10
8	percent return on equity and you're determining what the
9	impact is going to be on the revenue requirement, you have
10	to gross up the income taxes, correct, to figure out that?
11	A Correct.
12	Q And would be it be reasonable to conclude that
13	it the revenue requirement cost would go from 10
14	percent to around 16 percent because of that tax
15	difference? Is that about right?
16	A You know, without doing the specific
17	calculation, I'm not really in a position to confirm or
18	Q All right. But it's going to be more than 10
19	percent because of the tax effect?
20	A Correct. It's going to be more because of the
21	tax. Directionally, yes, it would be higher.
22	Q Okay. And what would the cost to customers be
23	if, say, your marginal cost of debt was 5 percent? It
24	would just be 5 percent, correct? You don't do a gross up
25	on the tax on those number?

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1	A You know, I'm not responsible for preparing the
2	revenue requirement calculation, so you're asking me
3	questions that I am not directly involved with.
4	Q Okay. All right. I appreciate that. Thank
5	you. I guess what I was trying get at is there is it's
6	more than just there's more to comparing the numbers
7	than just the straight ROE amount. It's when we're
8	determining the cost of common equity, there's more to it
9	than that, correct?
10	A More to what? I'm sorry.
11	Q To determining what the revenue requirement cost
12	is for that common equity.
13	A I again, you know, my responsibility in the
14	Treasury Department is to maintain a reasonable capital
15	structure, reasonable mix between debt and equity,
16	factoring in all the costs and benefits of each type of
17	of financing or capital. I am not responsible for
18	calculating the impact on the revenue requirement to the
19	customers.
20	Q Okay. All right. Well, let's talk about
21	something else, then. How about book value for the
22	company's shareholders? All right. Would you agree that
23	when you build up the common equity ratio, as the common
24	equity ratio increases and you increase your rates to
25	support the greater amount of common equity ratio, that's

Page 1515 1 a way of expanding book value for the company's 2 shareholders? 3 А You're saying if we increase common equity and that results in an increased revenue requirement, does 4 5 that increase the book value of the company? 0 Correct. 6 7 А You know, one of the ways the equity value is 8 increased is through retained earnings. So to the extent 9 retained earnings are higher or lower, it would impact the book value of the company. 10 11 Does expanding the book value of the company 0 12 increase the dollar earnings per share of stock if the 13 return on equity doesn't change? It could or could not. An increase in the book 14 А vale of the company does not necessarily translate into an 15 increase in earnings per share. 16 17 Q When you're making capital structure decisions at your company, do you primarily focus on enhancing your 18 19 shareholders' earnings and minimizing your cost of capital 20 while preserving your financial status? 21 А It's -- in determining the optimal capital structure, again, it's a subtle balance. It's a bit of an 22 art. On one hand, you have the cost of capital. 23 Obviously, you'd want to keep that as low as possible. 24 25 On the other hand, you have financial strength

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1	and stability. As you've as you've mentioned, debt is
2	typically a lower cost form of capital. But to the extent
3	that you have an over-reliance upon debt, you increase
4	your cost of financial distress, you weaken your financial
5	strength. That, in turn, could result in an increase in
6	your cost of capital.
7	So there's a subtle balance to look at how much
8	what balance is appropriate to give you that reasonable
9	cost of capital and allow you to obtain I'm sorry to
10	maintain financial strength and security necessary to
11	access markets and access capital when you need it.
12	Q Thank you. Mr. Martin, as Assistant Treasurer
13	and Manager of Finance, do you ever meet with credit
14	rating agencies concerning the bond rating of Ameren
15	Missouri or Ameren Illinois?
16	A I do.
17	Q And in your meetings with these bond rating
18	agencies, do your discussions include management's
19	perspective on regulatory risk and regulatory mechanisms
20	in the jurisdictions where you operate?
21	A When we meet with them, we generally give them
22	updates on regulatory proceedings. In terms of our
23	perceptions of the risk, we don't that is not really
24	the focus. The focus is more on what our experience has
25	been. On their own, the agencies come up with their own

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1	perceptions of of regulatory risk. For example,
2	Moody's specifically rates the their perception of the
3	supportiveness of the regulatory environment in the
4	different jurisdictions.
5	Q Well, do you know whether they rely on the
6	information that you provide them about that?
7	A Do they rely upon the information that we
8	provide them on rate case proceedings?
9	Q Regulatory environment.
10	A We provide them information and they have their
11	own process for how they process that and how it
12	translates into their rating.
13	Q But it is something you provide to them?
14	A We provide them with updates, yes.
15	Q Okay.
16	A They may they may call and ask for an update.
17	They may we have regular annual meetings. We go out
18	and provide them with an update on significant company
19	issues. They take that information. They evaluate it
20	independently, and they come up with their credit ratings
21	and positions.
22	Q When you're in those discussions, I mean, you're
23	saying that they that they evaluate them independently.
24	Do you ever get any push-back on the information that you
25	provide them? Is there anything that they do in those

Page 1518 1 meetings that indicates to you they don't accept what 2 you're telling them? 3 А No. They rely upon us for factual information. And they take that information and they interpret it as 4 5 they may, you know, based on how they see it. 6 Q Okay. 7 MS. ILES: I have no further questions. JUDGE WOODRUFF: For Public Counsel? 8 9 MS. BAKER: Thank you. Just a couple. 10 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. BAKER: 11 12 You only filed direct testimony in this case; is 0 13 that correct? 14 А That's correct. And your direct testimony was filed in February 15 Q of 2012? 16 17 А That is correct. And your direct testimony on common equity cost 18 Q 19 was based on a reasonable range of ROE for Ameren between 20 10.5 and 11.00; is that correct? 21 А Correct. 22 Q And you are aware that Ameren has now lowered 23 its reasonable range for ROE for Ameren to be anywhere between 10.25 and 11.00? 24 25 А Correct.

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1	MS. BAKER: No further questions.
2	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. For Staff?
3	CROSS-EXAMINATION
4	BY MR. THOMPSON:
5	Q Good morning, sir.
6	A Good morning.
7	Q I wonder if you could tell me what Ameren
8	Missouri's imbedded cost of debts is?
9	A Are you asking for it as of a particular date?
10	As of the cutoff date, September I'm sorry July
11	31st, 2012, it was 5.87.
12	Q How about as of September 30th, if you know?
13	A September 30th, 2011, or are you talking
14	about
15	Q Of this year.
16	A Of this year. I I do not have that specific
17	calculation. Based on our recent our transaction in
18	September, it would be slightly lower. I would estimate
19	maybe maybe 15, 20 basis points lower.
20	Q Okay. I think in your testimony you state that
21	if the company receives an ROE award that allows it to
22	earn its weighted average cost of capital that is an
23	adequate ROE award?
24	A I think in my testimony I comment that I believe
25	the interest of the company and its ratepayers would be

Page 1520 balanced if it is allowed to earn a return equivalent to 1 2 its weighted average cost of capital. That's in my 3 testimony. 4 Q Okay. Thank you. MR. THOMPSON: No further questions. 5 6 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Come up for 7 questions from the Bench. Mr. Chairman? 8 CHAIRMAN GUNN: I don't have anything. JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Jarrett? 9 10 CROSS-EXAMINATION 11 12 BY COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Good morning. I just have a couple. 13 Q 14 Good morning. А 15 You remember Ms. Iles was asking you some Q questions about meetings with credit agencies -- agencies? 16 17 А Correct. 18 And you indicated that you attended those Q meetings regularly; is that correct? 19 20 Uh-huh. Correct. Uh-huh. А 21 And there's various information that you share 0 22 with those rating agencies. Would you characterize that 23 information as facts or opinion? Fact. I would say it's definitely facts. 24 А 25 Okay. Q

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1	A It's similar to what we might we give we
2	give more information to rating agencies than we would
3	necessarily, say, the investment community at times
4	because they are considered insiders. So we do provide
5	them with with company specific data, again, that we
6	believe would help them form a, you know, appropriate
7	opinion of the company, give them all the information they
8	need to draw reasonable conclusions.
9	Q Okay. So
10	A But I'm sorry. They may ask questions, and
11	we respond to their questions, but they are, I would say,
12	overwhelmingly fact-based type inquiries.
13	Q Well, for example, do you give them information
14	about rate cases that you have
15	A Yes.
16	Q of Ameren's?
17	A Yes. But it would be that information would
18	be presented to as a either an update on existing
19	proceedings or a summary of proceedings that have just
20	been completed.
21	Q All right. Let's talk a little bit about
22	summaries that have been completed.
23	A Uh-huh.
24	Q What do those summaries consist of? What kind
25	of

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Page 1522 They would consist of -- for example, they would 1 Α 2 be a summary of the company's position and the position of 3 the Intervenors when you're talking about, you know, for example, the -- the ROE differences in terms of what was 4 5 put forth as appropriate, the different issues that were being negotiated, you know, certain changes of things we 6 7 were asking for in terms of, you know, trackers or 8 different mechanisms like that. Just, basically, the 9 specifics of the actual proceeding. 10 Q Okay. Do you ever get asked questions about, 11 you know, what's your opinion on the regulatory climate in 12 Missouri? 13 А No. I think once in a while, there will be a question as how we would characterize the relationship 14 with -- with the Commission. And we kind of -- I mean, 15 generally, in those responses, we talk about what we are 16 17 working with the Commissions on in terms of what may be constructive changes that would benefit ratepayers and the 18 company. We're asked those types of questions 19 20 occasionally. 21 0 Okay. But I guess at this -- what I'm getting at is that --22 23 А I'm sorry. 24 0 You know, there's been -- I'll have to look back 25 in the record, but there's either been testimony or

Page 1523 1 argument that Missouri is less than average when it comes 2 to a regulatory climate. 3 А Okay. 4 0 I guess what I'm asking is, you know, does 5 Ameren ever go in and characterize these rating agencies and say, you know, We got -- we got the shaft in this rate 6 7 case from the Commission? No. No. I think we provide the facts and we 8 Δ 9 give updates on maybe certain mechanisms we have been pushing for or requesting that either have been approved 10 or denied. That factors into their decision. 11 12 And you talk about unsupportive. They -- they 13 do specifically Moody's. They rate, you know, the jurisdictions on their kind of traditional scale. And 14 15 Missouri is having a lower rating, a less supportive rating, not unsupportive, but less supportive because I 16 17 think they compare it to other states and other utilities that could have maybe a more beneficial cost recovery 18 19 mechanism, for example. 20 And they rate it based on that. I think they 21 have their own processes internally where they look at all 22 the options available to the company. Some companies have them. Some don't. And they kind of look at that 23 relatively speaking, and that's how they rate in 24 environment. So we look at their information on -- and, 25

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1	actually, a lot of it is public as well, so we allow them
2	to form their own conclusions. But we don't we don't
3	add color to it. We basically give them the facts of, you
4	know, what we're asking for, how the outcome of a
5	proceeding was.
6	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Thank you. That's all I
7	have.
8	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Kenney?
9	CROSS-EXAMINATION
10	BY COMMISSIONER KENNEY:
11	Q Good morning.
12	A Good morning.
13	Q I have some similar questions in a similar vein
14	regarding the credit rating agencies and their analysis.
15	You said that you provide them factual information, and
16	they evaluate it independently. Do you know whether they
17	conduct any independent research and gather facts separate
18	and apart from what Ameren would provide to them?
19	A I think they do their own market research. And
20	on occasion, they will prepare a piece that expends beyond
21	maybe just an Ameren concern that maybe talks about the
22	whole utility industry, and they will they will ask us
23	for information that may contribute to that. But, again,
24	it would be fact fact-based information.
25	Q So they may seek out additional research

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1	regarding the the regulatory environment generally?
2	A Or the industry.
3	Q Right.
4	A Right.
5	Q Or the industry?
6	A Right.
7	Q Do you know whether they conduct any independent
8	research and gather additional factual information about
9	Ameren specifically?
10	A From another source?
11	Q Yes.
12	A I don't know that.
13	Q Okay. You don't know whether they do or don't?
14	A I don't know if they do or do not.
15	Q And which credit rating agencies does Ameren
16	have its relationship with?
17	A We have Standard & Poor's, Moody's and Fitch.
18	Q So all three?
19	A All three. Uh-huh.
20	Q Okay. You indicated that you will prepare or
21	that Ameren will prepare summaries of a rate proceeding to
22	provide to them, and there's no colorized factual
23	illustration?
24	A Right.
25	Q Who would prepare that?

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1	A It would be prepared within my group.
2	Generally, I would lead that effort. To give you an
3	example, in October, generally October of each year, we go
4	up to New York, and we provide them with an overall
5	company update.
6	In advance of that, we provide them with a slide
7	deck presentation. I think that was provided in this
8	case, an example or the actual document that we presented
9	to them last year. So we'll be going going through
10	that process again in the next few weeks in anticipation
11	of our trip up there in the next few months.
12	That's really the most formal communication we
13	have with them. Otherwise, it would be phone calls with
14	with just general questions they may have.
15	Q And as a part of that slide deck presentation,
16	do you provide any of the documents or the pleadings that
17	are actually in the case, supporting information from
18	which you've prepared your summary?
19	A We don't. We don't provide the actual
20	proceedings. I believe most of those are publicly
21	available. We may I think I have seen some
22	presentations where we have links to the different
23	resources where they could get that information. But we
24	don't provide them directly.
25	Q And the rating agencies in analyzing the credit

Page 1527 1 supportive nature of a regulatory environment are 2 primarily concerned with Ameren's ability to recover it's 3 costs through rates, correct? Correct. Their average cost to earn a 4 Α 5 reasonable return, yes. 6 They don't take into account the reasonableness Q 7 and prudence of Ameren's expenses, just whether those can 8 be recovered through rates, correct? 9 А It's hard to speak as to what they specifically look at. But I would think, yeah, they were more 10 concerned with the mechanisms in place within the State 11 12 for a utility to recover its, you know, in theory, prudent 13 and incurred costs. 14 0 But they're not --15 They're not evaluating Ameren. Α 16 They're not undertaking an independent analysis Q 17 to determine whether those costs were prudently incurred, just whether they can get them back in rate base? 18 19 А I do not believe so. Without -- without speaking for them, I believe their evaluation would be 20 21 based on our specifics costs, the nature of them. 22 0 Okay. Credit metrics was a phrase that you used 23 before. Uh-huh. Uh-huh. 2.4 А 25 These credit metrics, what exactly does that 0

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1 phrase refer to?

2	A You know, it refers to key measures of either
3	the company's, you know, liquidity, cash flows, their
4	ability to service their debt, their financial strength.
5	For example, you get one of the one of the key ratios
6	is kind of a covered ratio that looks at the funds
7	available to service debt relative to the interest cost.
8	So the higher your ratio in that specific case,
9	the more comfort you would have that the company will be
10	able to service its obligations and not fault on its debt.
11	Another one would be the leverage ratio. We
12	look at the amounts of debt relative to total
13	capitalization. And some rating agencies are a little bit
14	more specific than others in providing guidance as to what
15	type of ratios they would expect for certain rating
16	levels.
17	Q So the credit metrics are metrics that the
18	credit rating agencies use to determine the financial
19	health and then ultimately to assign their ratings?
20	A It's one part of it. For again, some of the
21	agencies are a little bit more transparent than others. I
22	would say Moody's is very transparent. They basically
23	give you a report card. They tell you what factors are
24	involved. They tell you what the weight is assigned to
25	each factor.

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1	For example, I believe the credit metrics in the
2	Moody's or factored into the Moody's rating account for 30
3	percent of the ratings. And that, for example, is
4	supportive in the regulatory environment accounts for 25
5	percent. Cost recovery mechanisms count for 25 percent.
6	Right there, you have 50 percent that's somewhat
7	subjective based on kind of the overall regulatory
8	environment. Relative 30 percent is assigned to the
9	credit metrics.
10	Q 50 percent of their overall rating would be
11	A Well, 25 percent is supportive of the regulatory
12	environment. 25 percent is kind of evaluation of cost of
13	recovery mechanisms.
14	Q Regulatory mechanisms?
15	A Regulatory mechanisms. Right.
16	Q And you characterized that 50 percent as
17	subjective?
18	A Well, it's their subjective evaluation relative
19	to credit metrics, which are very, you know, returnable.
20	Q Can be they can be easily determined through
21	some objective measures?
22	A Right. And they have they have a formula.
23	We apply the formula. We can measure our actual metrics
24	relative to their guidance for certain ratings.
25	Q But the other 50 percent is a subjective

Page 1530 1 analysis based upon the regulatory environment which we've 2 already established isn't a result of reasonable and 3 prudence, just your ability to recover your cost of rates? А I believe so. 4 5 All right. And then Moody's is relatively Q transparent. What about S&P and Fitch? 6 7 Α They're a -- S&P is a little bit less 8 transparent. They assign, you know, business risk and 9 financial rate. In terms of actual weightings, they don't provide that. But it's the same type of mix between the 10 business environment and your financial risk. 11 12 But their formula is more proprietary. They Q 13 don't tell you what it is? 14 Α Right. Okay. Which of those three, would you say, 15 Q 16 carries the most weight? 17 Α Again, it's hard to say. Just from my -- from my position and experience, it seems like S&P and Moody's 18 carry more weight than Fitch. 19 20 And as between Moody's and S&P? Q 21 А That's hard to tell between the two. I would say they seem fairly on equal ground. 22 23 0 So if Moody's credit metrics determinations are 24 transparent, another analyst could come up with its own 25 measure of what an appropriate ROE is and using Moody's

Page 1531 1 formula to figure out 2 Α Uh-huh. Well --3 -- how credit-worthy Ameren would be based upon Q their representation of an ROE. Would you agree with 4 5 that? 6 What they could do is they could evaluate that А 7 specific part of the equation, which the leverage ratio that we talked about that -- or I guess RO -- I'm sorry --8 9 ROE would factor probably more into the regulatory 10 environment, I would think, is the score that would go there. 11 12 So, again, that would be -- you'd have to make a subjective determination of how you believe they would 13 rate a certain ROE. And, again, this is one part of the 14 overall valuation, I would believe. 15 Okay. And -- and how does -- how does it work 16 Q 17 with Moody's, S&P and Fitch providing the ratings to companies in general? How is that -- what's the 18 19 relationship between the company that's requesting the 20 rating and the company providing it? Is it -- is it a 21 client? 22 Oh, we -- well, I believe they --А 23 Do you pay for it? Q 2.4 We do pay for it. Α 25 All right. 0

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1	A We pay for the service. But I believe in some
2	cases, the rating agencies will rate that even if they're
3	not being paid. I think it's more rare, but in these
4	cases, yeah, we do pay for the service.
5	Q Okay. All right.
6	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: That's all the questions I
7	have. Thank you.
8	A Thank you.
9	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Stoll?
10	COMMISSIONER STOLL: I have no questions at this
11	time, your Honor. Thank you.
12	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Recross on questions from the
13	Bench, then, beginning with MIEC?
14	MS. ILES: None, your Honor.
15	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Public Counsel?
16	MS. BAKER: None. Thank you.
17	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Staff?
18	MR. THOMPSON: None. Thank you.
19	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Redirect?
20	MS. TATRO: Thank you.
21	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
22	BY MS. TATRO:
23	Q Mr. Martin, do you recall when Ms. Iles handed
24	you DR Request MIEC 243?
25	A I do.

	Page 1533
1	Q Do you still have that in front of you?
2	A I do.
3	Q And that Data Request answer indicated that the
4	refinancing occurred outside of the true-up period?
5	A Correct.
6	Q Can you explain why that occurred after the
7	true-up period rather than before?
8	A Sure. There were, I would say, three main
9	factors that kind of curve the timing of that of that
10	transaction. None of them related to specific none of
11	them related to the true-up date.
12	The first was really the timing of the approval
13	for the transaction. I believe we started speaking to
14	Staff about the the concept of the transaction in May
15	of this year. We filed our application in late June. And
16	we received approval on August 1st, which was, of course,
17	the day after the true-up period. So shortly after that
18	approval on August 1st. We lost the transaction on August
19	20th.
20	Another factor would have been the timing of
21	Ameren's second quarter end, which was on June 30th. It's
22	generally our practice and we believe it's prudent not to
23	access the market or try to sell bonds when the company is
24	in possession of material non-public information.
25	So during that month of July after our June 30th

	Page 1534
1	closing date for the quarter, we were in the process of
2	putting together financial statements, putting together
3	disclosures that go into our Form 10-Q, which was filed in
4	this case, I believe, on August 8th.
5	So while the company is in material and
6	preparing those I'm sorry in possession of material
7	non-public information and preparing disclosures that will
8	go into that 10-Q, we avoid kind of access to the market,
9	and, you know, we consider it somewhat of a quiet period.
10	So that really would have ruled out any kind of
11	transaction during that month of July.
12	And then, lastly, you know, the timing of the
13	transaction was, you know, somewhat it was meant
14	somewhat to coincide with the September maturity that I
15	spoke of earlier. Ameren Missouri had \$173 million of
16	bonds maturing in September. So a portion of the proceeds
17	from this new offered transaction of 485 million was used
18	to refinance the \$173 million maturity.
19	Had we done this transaction earlier, say, you
20	know, in June, we would have had to carry that extra debt
21	for a couple months and pay additional interest in advance
22	of using the proceeds to pay off that 173 million.
23	So those were really the three three basic
24	reasons for the transaction being timed the way it was.
25	Q Thank you. And then in response to some

	Page 1535
1	questions from Ms. Iles and also from a couple of
2	Commissioners, you talked about the communications that
3	you've had with the credit rating agencies.
4	A Uh-huh.
5	Q Do you remember that line of questioning?
6	A Yes.
7	Q And you had indicated that the these agencies
8	use other sources besides just the information they get
9	from a company. What other sources might that be?
10	A Again, I can I don't mean to speak for the
11	agencies, but my my assumption is they're doing their
12	own market research as they are preparing industry pieces.
13	You know, they'll ask us questions, but, you know, my
14	belief is that they are also using other sources and
15	information outside of company specific data to put
16	together their broader industry analysis.
17	Q And do you suppose that they'd be looking at
18	other utilities in the state of Missouri?
19	A I believe depending on what the focus of
20	their of their study or piece was, they could, yeah.
21	Q Specifically, whether they talk about I guess
22	it's Moody's that talks about the regulatory climate
23	A Yes.
24	Q whether it's supportive or less supportive?
25	A Right.

	Page 1536
1	Q So when they come up with that, would they look
2	at Commission orders for KCPL?
3	A I believe so. I believe you would reasonably
4	expect utilities in the same state to have the same
5	regulatory supportive ranking from Moody's. I haven't
6	confirmed that or looked at that, but that would seem
7	reasonable.
8	Q Do they and I think you said they compare
9	that to results in other states, and that's kind of how
10	they come up with this ranking?
11	A Well, yeah. The ranking isn't necessarily
12	whether a state is supportive or not supportive. It's
13	I think the way they characterize it, it could be more
14	supportive to most supportive, more supportive, less
15	supportive, least supportive. So, yeah, they do make
16	they do make evaluations between the jurisdictions.
17	Q Okay. Commissioner Kenney asked you the
18	question about whether or not the credit agencies look at
19	prudence of an expenditure. Do you remember that
20	conversation?
21	A Uh-huh.
22	Q And you indicated that they really do not, but
23	that they look at the results or the structures?
24	A Uh-huh.
25	Q So you what types of structures do these

Page 1537 1 agencies, in your opinion, believe is the most important? 2 Well, I think they are looking -- when they look А 3 at kind of our cost structure and our cash flows, they're looking at out metrics, I would say. And they want to 4 5 make sure we have strong metrics that suggests an ability to finance our debt, that generates sufficient cash flows, 6 7 to maintain financial strength and stability. 8 I think the prudence is evaluated probably more 9 in that perspective in terms of looking at specific costs that maybe go into those different inputs into the -- into 10 the metrics themselves. 11 12 So do cost recovery mechanisms play a role? 0 13 Α Well, cost recovery mechanisms would -- I mean, it would certainly play a role in their evaluation of the 14 environment. They would certainly play a role in the 15 strength of the credit metrics. 16 17 So a utility that has different -- more or --Q more easily accessible cost recovery mechanisms, is that 18 19 considered more supportive or less supportive? 20 А Yes. That would be -- yeah. That would 21 probably help the rating in a couple of different ways, both in the evaluation -- a subjective evaluation of the 22 23 regulatory supportiveness and also would show up in the 24 strength of their credit metrics. 25 MS. TATRO: Thank you. I have no further

Page 1538 1 questions. 2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Then Mr. Martin, 3 you can step down. 4 MR. MARTIN: Thank you. 5 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Let's take a break now before we go on to the next witness. We'll come back at 10:00. 6 7 (Break in proceedings.) JUDGE WOODRUFF: Let's come to order, please. 8 And we're back from our break. And Mr. Hevert is taking 9 10 the stage -- or the stand. 11 MR. THOMPSON: Same thing. 12 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Yeah. Please raise your right 13 hand. 14 ROBERT HEVERT, being first duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole 15 truth, and nothing but the truth, testified as follows: 16 17 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BYRNE: 18 19 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. You may inquire. 20 MR. BYRNE: Thank you, your Honor. 21 (By Mr. Byrne) Can you please state your name Q for the record? 22 23 А My name is Robert Hevert. Last name is spelled H-e-v, as in Victor, -e-r-t. 24 25 Q And that's Robert Hevert, not Hevert?

Page 1539 JUDGE WOODRUFF: My apologies. 1 2 I've heard it every possible way, and I know who А 3 you mean. 4 Q (By Mr. Byrne) Mr. Hevert, by whom are you 5 employed? 6 I am managing partner of Sussex, S-u-s-s-e-x, А 7 Economic Advisors. 8 Q And are you the same Robert Hevert who caused to 9 be filed in this case prefiled direct testimony that's been marked as Exhibit 20, prefiled rebuttal testimony 10 11 that's been marked as Exhibit 21 and prefiled surrebuttal 12 testimony in Highly Confidential and Non-Proprietary form that has been marked as Exhibit 22? 13 14 Yes, I am. А 15 And is the information contained -- well, do you Q 16 have any corrections to any of that testimony? 17 А No, I do not. And is the information contained in that 18 Q 19 pre-filed testimony true and correct to the best of your 20 knowledge and belief? 21 А Yes, it is. 22 Q And if I were to ask you the questions contained 23 in that prefiled testimony today when you're here under 24 oath, would your answers be the same? 25 А Yes, they would.

Page 1540 MR. BYRNE: Your Honor, I'd offer Exhibits 20, 1 2 21 and 22 and tender Mr. Hevert for cross-examination. 3 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. 20, 21 and 22 have been offered. Any objections to their receipt? 4 5 MR. THOMPSON: No objection. JUDGE WOODRUFF: Hearing none, they will be 6 7 received. (Exhibits 20, 21, 22HC, 22NP were offered and 8 admitted into evidence.) 9 10 JUDGE WOODRUFF: For cross-examination, we'll begin with MIEC. 11 12 MS. ILES: Judge, may I have a moment? I have 13 an exhibit that I was going to ask Mr. Hevert to look at it. And I just noticed when I printed it, the footnotes 14 15 had dropped off for some unknown reason, and I just need to make a few additions if I could just have a couple of 16 17 minutes before I do that, before I start. I'm so sorry. JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Back off the record 18 19 for a minute. 20 (Break in proceedings.) 21 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. We're back on the record, then. 22 23 MS. ILES: I should know better than to print 24 documents after 8:00 at night. 25 CROSS-EXAMINATION

Page 1541 BY MS. ILES: 1 2 Okay. Mr. Hevert, I'm going have this marked as Q 3 an exhibit and have you take a look at it. JUDGE WOODRUFF: Next number is 529. Thank you. 4 5 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Thank you. MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. 6 7 MR. BYRNE: Thanks. 8 А Do you have an extra? 9 (By Ms. Iles) I'm sorry. I'll give you the one 0 that's marked. 10 11 А Thank you. 12 You'll notice on that document there are some Q 13 little numbers, reference numbers for footnotes. However, 14 there are no footnotes on the document due to an error on 15 my part. 16 And I want to let you know that the first 17 footnote should refer to your direct testimony in the case ER-2011-0028, which is the last Ameren rate case. That's 18 ER-2011-0028, Hevert Direct at 54. 19 20 The second footnote should be ER-2012-0166, the 21 current case, Hevert Direct at 49. And the third should be ER-2012-0166, Hevert Rebuttal at 113. 22 23 And the final footnote, No. 4, the utility bond yields come from Mr. Gorman's testimony. I believe it's 24 25 his direct at page 5.

Page 1542 MR. BYRNE: Ms. Iles, what -- footnote to what 1 2 page number was that again? 3 MS. ILES: 49, direct at 49. 4 Q (By Ms. Iles) So as you can see, these are 5 numbers that I've taken from your testimony and Mr. Gorman's testimony on the issue of cost of capital. 6 7 Are you -- did you want to have a minute to doublecheck 8 those numbers? 9 А If you don't mind. 10 Would you like to see a copy of your testimony Q 11 from the last case so you can doublecheck that as well? 12 А No. That's fine. 13 Q Okay. Yes. Thank you. 14 А 15 You're ready to proceed? Thank you. All right. Q And let's just kind of walk through this. The first 16 17 column, Column 1 of this exhibit, shows your constant growth DCF results from Ameren Missouri's last rate case, 18 19 correct? 20 А Yes. 21 Then the numbers that are shown on there are 0 22 your mean results. I think you had three and you had a 23 range and that's the mean. Well, let's be clear about that. 24 А 25 Okay. Q

Page 1543 What I show when I produce the constant growth 1 А 2 results -- and this is, of course, because of the 3 limitations inherent in the constant growth model -- are three measures of the mean. The mean low, the mean, the 4 5 mean high. 6 Q Okay. 7 А The mean high being the average DCF result based 8 on the highest of three growth rates that we used, the 9 mean being the average based on the average of the growth rates that I use, and the mean low, of course, being the 10 average of the low the three growth rates that I use. And 11 12 that's a convention that I have consistently applied. 13 And that is, in part, the method by which I used to understand what the range of results and, therefore, 14 the range of estimates may be. 15 16 Q And the only numbers -- numbers I've shown on 17 this exhibit are the mean numbers, correct? А That is correct. 18 19 All right. And then column 2, Rows 1 through 4, Q 20 show the constant growth DCF results included in your 21 direct testimony from this case. The final line is an 22 average of those three. And, again, it's just the mean, 23 not all of your results. I'm sorry. Can you state that one more time? 2.4 Α

Column 2 of this exhibit shows the constant

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Page 1544 1 growth DCF results included in your direct testimony from 2 this case? 3 А Yes. That's correct. 4 Q And finally, Column 3 shows the constant growth 5 DCF results included in your rebuttal testimony from this case, correct? 6 7 А That's correct. 8 And then when I get over to Columns 4 and 5, we Q 9 show -- I show the difference or the change -- I call it the change, but it's actually the difference between your 10 11 constant growth DCF results in the prior rate case and 12 this rate case, correct? 13 Α Yes. That's correct. For -- again, for the limited purpose of the mean results of the constant growth 14 DCF model. That's correct. 15 16 Q It's just this one -- now, you looked at -- and you did a number of different analyses, correct? 17 А I did. 18 19 And you looked at a lot of different data Q 20 points, correct, a lot of different data in determining 21 your recommendation for ROE in this case? 22 Α Well, I used a lot of data. And the data, of 23 course, are inputs to the models, and the models, of 24 course, have results. So when you say data, I'm not quite 25 sure what you're referring to.

	Page 1545
1	Q When I say data, I'm including both your inputs
2	and your results. I'm just saying you looked at a lot of
3	different things, and this is just one part of what you
4	considered in making your recommendation. I just wanted
5	to be clear on that.
6	A I think that's fair, yes.
7	Q I'm not trying to represent in this exhibit
8	everything you looked at. I'm just trying to tease out
9	one thing so we can get a little clarity on how that one
10	that thing has changed since the last rate case.
11	A I appreciate that.
12	Q Is that clear?
13	A Yes.
14	Q Okay. So 4 and 5 Columns 4 and 5 show us
15	what the change has been since the last rate case between
16	your direct testimony in this case and the prior case and
17	between your rebuttal testimony in the last rate case,
18	correct?
19	A Those are the differences, yes.
20	Q The differences. And so they show that the
21	constant growth DCF results declined since the last rate
22	case, at least as you calculated them, correct?
23	A Based on what we have right here, yes. Correct.
24	Q Well, they don't show they go up, do they?
25	A No. No. I'm just saying that, as you mentioned

Γ

Page 1546 earlier, there's a fair amount of data in the testimony. 1 2 But as -- with respect to this particular method, I would 3 agree with it. 4 Q All right. And let's talk a little bit about 5 the DCF -- the constant growth DCF methodology. When you -- when you do that calculation, your points include stock 6 7 price, correct? 8 А That's an input, yes. 9 0 And dividends? 10 А Correct. 11 And do you look at bond yields in that Q 12 calculation? 13 А Bond yield is not an input to the calculation, 14 no. 15 Q That's right. So you're just looking at stock, 16 not bond yields and not risk premium. It's not a risk 17 premium analysis? Risk premium analyses, of course, are other 18 Α methodologies that we use. But in the bond crisis are not 19 20 an input to this particular model. 21 Q Okay. So when we talk about the constant growth 22 DCF results, we're talking about results that are 23 calculated based on data that have to do with stock price and dividends and various aspects relating to stock value, 24 25 correct?

	Page 1547
1	A I'm not sure what you mean by various aspects
2	relating to stock value. The direct inputs are stock
3	prices, dividends and growth rates.
4	Q Okay. Stock growth rates, right?
5	A That's that's a very good question. The
6	growth rate, of course, is meant to the growth rate, of
7	course, is meant to replicate or represent the rate of
8	capital appreciation over time. So what the model
9	basically is telling you or is trying to represent is you
10	buy a share of stock, and you get two things.
11	You get the yield, and you get the capital
12	appreciation in that stock. The capital appreciation, of
13	course, is the extent to which the price increases over
14	the term during which you hold the stock.
15	And while there are different approaches that
16	people sometimes use, Mr. Gorman and I both use estimated
17	earnings per share growth as the important and relevant
18	measure of growth over time, the idea being, of course,
19	that earnings per share are most closely related to
20	capital appreciation over time.
21	Q Okay. And I'm not sure if I was clear on this
22	before. But when we look at Columns 4 and 5, don't they
23	suggest that the cost of equity as calculated based on
24	your constant growth DCF calculations have gone down since
25	Ameren Missouri's last rate case?

	Page 1548
1	A Well, I think there are two important issues
2	here. One is that I don't disagree that the cost of
3	equity has gone down since the last rate case. The
4	question is by how much.
5	Q Okay.
6	A 91 basis points, 62 basis points, I don't think
7	is is correct. And one of the reasons that I use, that
8	other people use other models such as the multi-stage DCF
9	model is that there are several limiting assumptions
10	associated with the constant growth model itself. And in
11	large measure, that's why I tend to calculate the results
12	the way I do. We
13	Q Okay. Can I interrupt you right there? I think
13 14	Q Okay. Can I interrupt you right there? I think we all understand that you didn't rely solely on this
14	we all understand that you didn't rely solely on this
14 15	we all understand that you didn't rely solely on this constant growth DCF, and that's what you're telling me,
14 15 16	we all understand that you didn't rely solely on this constant growth DCF, and that's what you're telling me, correct?
14 15 16 17	<pre>we all understand that you didn't rely solely on this constant growth DCF, and that's what you're telling me, correct? A What I'm telling you is that there are</pre>
14 15 16 17 18	<pre>we all understand that you didn't rely solely on this constant growth DCF, and that's what you're telling me, correct? A What I'm telling you is that there are limitations in the model. And to draw any conclusions</pre>
14 15 16 17 18 19	<pre>we all understand that you didn't rely solely on this constant growth DCF, and that's what you're telling me, correct? A What I'm telling you is that there are limitations in the model. And to draw any conclusions with respect to the absolute decrease in the cost of</pre>
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	<pre>we all understand that you didn't rely solely on this constant growth DCF, and that's what you're telling me, correct? A What I'm telling you is that there are limitations in the model. And to draw any conclusions with respect to the absolute decrease in the cost of equity as a result of the mean results of this one model,</pre>
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>we all understand that you didn't rely solely on this constant growth DCF, and that's what you're telling me, correct? A What I'm telling you is that there are limitations in the model. And to draw any conclusions with respect to the absolute decrease in the cost of equity as a result of the mean results of this one model, which is subject to many limiting assumptions and</pre>
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 22	<pre>we all understand that you didn't rely solely on this constant growth DCF, and that's what you're telling me, correct? A What I'm telling you is that there are limitations in the model. And to draw any conclusions with respect to the absolute decrease in the cost of equity as a result of the mean results of this one model, which is subject to many limiting assumptions and constraints, is not something that I would agree with.</pre>

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1	wouldn't make that?
2	A It's not a yes or no. When you say that
3	conclusion, I agree that the cost of equity has declined
4	somewhat. I don't agree that it has declined to the
5	extent represented in Columns 4 and 5.
6	Q All right. Fair enough. Okay. Let's let's
7	look at utility bond yields that are shown. Now, I told
8	you that these these numbers are reported in
9	Mr. Gorman's testimony. But do they appear to be correct
10	to you? Do you have any I don't think you contested
11	that or disagreed with that part of his testimony.
12	A Oh, no. I have no particular reason to disagree
13	with these.
14	Q Okay. And so, again, we have the A rated
15	utility bond yields shown in Column 1 for the 13-week
16	period ended July 8, 2011, which is around the time of the
17	last Ameren rate case. I think that report and order was
18	issued in July of 2011.
19	And then we have in Column 2, the A rated
20	utility bond yields for the 13-week period ending June
21	15th, 2012. We have the same information for the BAA
22	rated bonds; is that correct?
23	A Yes. That's correct.
24	Q All right. And then, again, over to the right,
25	there's a column that's headed Change. And it shows the

	Page 1550
1	difference or how those bond yield rates have changed
2	since July or during that period, correct?
3	A And, of course, What that shows is the change in
4	the total. It's not broken down between the change in the
5	Treasury yield, which was probably 120 basis points, the
6	long-term Treasury yield relative to the change in credit
7	spreads. The change in credit spreads, of course, which
8	really truly is the measure of incremental risk associated
9	utilities from a fixed income investor's perspective has
10	not decreased that way.
11	Q But I think I'm sorry. So what you just said
12	in that last statement is that Treasury bond yields
13	actually decreased more than the utility bond?
14	A What I'm saying is that
15	Q No. But I mean, what I just said I mean, I
16	know you said more than that. But that's one of the
17	things you just told us, correct? I've only written down
18	here utility bond yields. But you've also indicated the
19	Treasury bond yields have also declined during that period
20	and actually more than utility bond yields?
21	A The the when you look at bond yields, to
22	me, the the important issue is looking at the decrease
23	in the underlying the underlying Treasury security of,
24	say, comparable maturity and then the change in the credit

25 spreads.

	Page 1551
1	And as we look at credit spreads, one of the
2	things we've noted I've noted is that what we refer to
3	as the sort of the incremental credit spread, the BAA
4	to A credit spread has actually increased over that time.
5	So I agree with you that the absolute numbers
6	are down, but I don't agree that the analysis should end
7	there.
8	Q Well, certainly. I'm not suggesting that. I'm
9	just trying, for some of us who don't quite have the
10	comprehension of all the complexities, to get some numbers
11	that we can kind of get our hands around. And that's
12	something that at least I am able to do.
13	A I appreciate that.
14	Q All right. Thank you. All right. Now, what
15	about do you know anything about how these bond yield
16	rates have what they've done since June 15th of this
17	year? They've continued to go down, haven't they?
18	They're actually lower today than they than is reported
19	on this exhibit?
20	A I I couldn't answer that offhand.
21	MS. ILES: Okay. I'd like to move for the
22	admission of this exhibit. I'm sorry.
23	JUDGE WOODRUFF: 529 has been moved. Any
24	objections to its receipt? Hearing none, it will be
25	received.

Page 1552 (Exhibit 529 was offered and received into 1 2 evidence.) 3 MS. ILES: All right. I'd like to have this marked as an exhibit. 4 5 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. This will be 530. May I -- may I have --6 А 7 MS. ILES: I'm sorry. 8 MR. LOWERY: He's the most important one. 9 (By Ms. Iles) That is correct. Let me be clear 0 10 about what we're looking at right one. It's only just Bob. 11 А 12 Q I know. It's okay. 13 А 14 I said I was handing it to you, and I didn't. I Q apologize. Can you tell me what that is? 15 Yes. This is the Regulatory Research 16 Α 17 Associates' summary of what they refer to as major rate case decisions for January through June 2012. 18 19 All right. So what information does this Q 20 report? 21 А I'm sorry. What? 22 Q What information does this report? Well, the -- typically, what these reports are 23 А 24 are authorized overall rates of return, authorized equity returns, authorized capital structures, the type of rate 25
	Page 1553
1	base convention, the eventual revenue increase.
2	And there's additional information in the
3	reports as to whether or not a certain case was with
4	respect to a distribution only company, whether it
5	included certain elements such as a multi-year rate plan,
6	whether there were elements that were stipulated in the
7	case.
8	So it's a it's a report that includes a fair
9	amount of information. I think people typically look at
10	it for issues regarding authorized returns, authorized
11	capital structures and then, again, some of the
12	qualifications around those.
13	Q All right. And by looking at this document,
14	does it tell us what the average ROE authorized for
15	electric utilities was in the United States in the first
16	quarter of 2012?
17	A It it does. On 2012 for the first quarter,
18	the mean is 10.84. The median is 10.5.
19	Q And that's reported on page 4 of this document?
20	A Yes. I'm sorry. I should have made that clear.
21	Q And does the document also explain that those
22	that average is higher due to the inclusion of some
23	decisions in Virginia?
24	A Yes. And that's one of the points I was making
25	before. RRA does, for example, in the case of Virginia

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1	where the company has incentives, the company, largely
2	Virginia Electric Power Company, has incentives with
3	respect to investments in generating assets.
4	And some of these numbers, for example, I
5	believe the 12.4 percent would fall in that category.
6	Yes. And that footnote which is then noted on page 5
7	explains that.
8	Q Could you read the first paragraph of this
9	document that explains that so we'll have that in the
10	record?
11	A I'm sorry. The first paragraph of
12	Q On page 1.
13	A On page 1.
14	Q Uh-huh.
15	A The the entire first paragraph?
16	Q Yes, please.
17	A Sure. The average return on equity (ROE)
18	authorized electric utilities in the first six months of
19	2012 was 10.36 percent (25 observations), slightly higher
20	than the 10.22 percent in calendar 2011.
21	This increase was driven by several
22	surcharge/rider generation cases in Virginia that
23	incorporate ROE premiums. Virginia Statutes authorize the
24	State Corporation Commission to approve ROE premiums of up
25	to 200 basis points for certain generation projects (see

Page 1555 the Virginia Commission profile). 1 2 Excluding these Virginia surcharge/rider 3 generation cases from the data, the average authorized electric ROE was 10.05 percent for the first six months of 4 5 2012. 6 The average ROE authorized gas utilities for the 7 first six months of 2012 was 9.75 percent (13 observations), slightly lower than the 9.92 percent in 8 9 calendar 2011. We note that this report utilizes the simple mean for the return averages. 10 11 Okay. And does this document also show us what 0 12 the second quarter average ROE for electric utilities is? 13 А Yes, it does. 14 0 And what -- what is that number? 15 Well, for the second quarter for electric, А again, on page 4, the average was 9.92. That, of course, 16 17 included the distribution returns for Commonwealth Edison and for Orange and Rockland. And it also included the 18 really extraordinarily low return of 9.25 percent for 19 Northern State Powers in South Dakota. 20 21 Now, why do you believe that one's 0 22 extraordinarily low? Because it is relative to the data. 23 А 24 0 All right. It's just a low number. But there's 25 not any explanation you have that suggests that is in a

Page 1556 1 different category than the other companies? 2 А Well, again, this is footnote -- footnoted as B, 3 which says the order followed stipulation or settlement by the parties. Decision particulars are not necessarily 4 5 precedent setting or specifically adopted by the regulatory body. 6 7 I'm sorry. And then right above it, there's one Q 8 that's nine six. Would you consider that extraordinarily 9 low? 10 I think nine six is low. Yes. А 11 All right. Q 12 А I wouldn't say it's as low as 9.25. Even I can do that math. But it is lower. 13 14 MS. ILES: I'd like to move for the admission 15 of --16 JUDGE WOODRUFF: It will be 530. 17 MS. ILES: -- Exhibit 530. JUDGE WOODRUFF: 530 has been offered. Any 18 objections to its receipt? Hearing none, it will be 19 20 received. 21 (Exhibit 530 was offered and admitted into 22 evidence.) 23 0 (By Ms. Iles) These are some that are two-sided 24 and some that are one-sided. They're all the same 25 thing.

	Page 1557
1	JUDGE WOODRUFF: This will be No. 531.
2	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you.
3	Q (By Ms. Iles) Mr. Hevert, I've handed you what's
4	been marked as Exhibit 531. Here's the marked one if you
5	want to see it's the same. You can have that one.
6	A Oh, no. Thank you.
7	Q All right. Can you tell us what that is?
8	A This, again, is another report dated October
9	third, 2012, by S&L, which is the company that holds
10	within it Regulatory Research Associates.
11	Q And what does this report tell us?
12	A Well, I don't know. I've not seen it.
13	Q Okay. Does it report major rate case decisions
14	from July 12 through September 12 on page 2?
15	A Oh, there we go. Thank you. Yes. I see that
16	now.
17	Q And it includes both electric and gas, but it
18	tells you on that chart the service type, correct?
19	A Yes, it does.
20	Q So from looking at this, can you tell us what
21	the authorized return for the electric companies that were
22	reported during this period?
23	A Well, I guess my question is what kind of
24	electric companies? We've got Atomic Electric Power in DC
25	that's a distribution company. Delmarva Power in Maryland

	Page 1558
1	is a distribution company. Patomic in Maryland is a
2	distribution company.
3	Q So those three are distribution. Are the other
4	are the other electric companies shown, integrated
5	electric companies?
6	A Oh, sorry. I missed Ameren Illinois. So we've
7	got Idaho Power. We've got Entergy, Texas. We've got
8	PacifiCorp, and we've got Oklahoma Gas & Electric.
9	Q So what are the returns on there?
10	A I'm sorry. Pacific I'm sorry. I just need
11	to go through my little checklist here again.
12	Q Why don't we just start at the top, and we can
13	just go through them, and you can tell us what your I
14	think that will be helpful to everyone if you can tell us
15	what kind of company and what return on equity is.
16	A That's a good system.
17	Q Okay. We'll start with Patomic Electric Power
18	Company.
19	A Distribution.
20	Q And what was its return on equity?
21	A 9.5 percent.
22	Q And then we have South Carolina Electric and
23	Gas. But it doesn't tell us their ROE on that one.
24	A Right.
25	Q We have to go down to PacifiCorp.

	Page 1559
1	A PacifiCorp is integrated.
2	Q And what was its authorized ROE?
3	A 9.8 percent.
4	Q All right. And we have Ameren Illinois?
5	A Not integrated.
6	Q And what was its ROE?
7	A 10.05, which is, of course, interesting for it
8	being not an integrated company with a return above $T\&D$
9	companies, but 10.05.
10	Q And then we have Entergy Texas?
11	A Integrated company.
12	Q And what was its ROE?
13	A 9.8 percent. Texas, of course, being recognized
14	as a most least credit supported jurisdictions.
15	Q Okay. Then we have Delmarva Power & Light?
16	A Distribution.
17	Q And what was its ROE?
18	A Delmarva in Maryland was 9.81 percent.
19	Q Okay. And then we have Patomic Electric Power
20	Company.
21	A Which is a distribution company in Maryland. It
22	is, of course, affiliated with or a sister company of
23	Delmarva. The 50 basis point difference there had to do
24	with issues surrounding the company's response to storm
25	restoration, so it reflected a a reduction for that

Page 1560 1 reason. 2 And what was the ROE for that company? Q 3 А Prior to the reduction, it was 9.81 percent. Afterwards, it was a 9.31 reported. 4 5 Q That was the authorized, 9.31? Correct. Yes. After the deduction. 6 А 7 All right. Then we have PacifiCorp, I think? Q Pacificorp, 9.8 percent. Oh, I'm sorry. I 8 А forgot to say vertically integrated. 9 10 Integrated. Oklahoma Gas & Electric? Q Vertically integrated, 10.2 percent. 11 А 12 All right. Thank you. I apologize for that. I Q know it's hard to read. 13 14 No. That's okay. Your approach was better than А 15 mine. 16 MS. ILES: I'll move for the admission of 17 Exhibit 531. 18 JUDGE WOODRUFF: 531 has been offered. Any objections to its receipt? Hearing none, it will be 19 20 received. 21 (Exhibit 531 was offered and received into evidence.) 22 23 0 (By Ms. Iles) Mr. Hevert, you state in your testimony -- you stated in your testimony that -- I think 24 it was on page 47 of your direct, you talk about 25

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Page 1561 1 regulatory lag and earnings attrition and that they were 2 among the things you took in account in arriving at your 3 recommended ROE. А I'm sorry. Can you point me to the page and the 4 5 line? 6 Is that correct? Well, I'm sorry. Q 7 А Oh, direct testimony. 8 Q Direct. It's on page 47. I don't have the line 9 in my notes. 10 Yes. On 47, we refer to a comment by Moody's А and also refer to the extent to which some of the proxy 11 12 group companies are able to do things such as include construction work and process in rate base used to 13 forecast test years and other types of structures, yes. 14 15 Q And you took that -- am I correct in stating 16 that you did take that into account in arriving at your 17 recommended ROE? 18 А It was a consideration, yes. 19 I believe earlier this week when Barnes Q 20 testified for the company that it was something that 21 reduced your ROE -- or increased, I said that wrong, your 22 ROE recommendation. 23 It -- it's a -- it's a consideration -- I think А 24 there was discussion this morning regarding the necessity of judgment in this process. And it was a consideration 25

Page 1562 on my part, the fact that while the Commission certainly 1 2 has done a lot recently to -- to improve the company's 3 situation, vis-a-vis the proxy group, the proxy group companies still have mechanisms available to them that are 4 not available to the company. So, yes, it was -- it was a 5 consideration. I will say I did not attach specific basis 6 7 points to it. 8 Q So it's not something you can quantify? I think it's -- I think it's -- it can be 9 Α difficult to quantify. We can look at things like bond 10 yields. We can look at -- and I've looked at this, the 11 12 extent to which companies may trade in a different pattern 13 before or after, for example, the implementation of a revenue decoupling mechanism or formulate a rate plan. 14 15 And I think what you can often identify is the presence or not of an effect. But I think putting the 16 17 effect in specific basis points, at least in my view, is -- is difficult. 18 19 So you can tell us that it was something you Q 20 considered, but you can't tell us exactly how much it 21 increased your recommendation? Is that what you're 22 saying? I think that's right. But if you look at my 23 А 24 recommendation in the context of the range, of course, my original recommendation was at the mid-point of the range 25

	Page 1563
1	and now with the revised recommendations somewhat below
2	the mid-point of that range.
3	And so, again, while I think that this is an
4	issue that does represent an element of incremental risk,
5	I took it into consideration in determining where I think
6	the returns lies within that range.
7	MS. ILES: Okay. No further questions.
8	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. Public Counsel?
9	MS. BAKER: Thank you.
10	CROSS-EXAMINATION
11	BY MS. BAKER:
12	Q Good morning, Mr. Hevert. I will say it right.
13	A That was very that was very nice of you.
14	That makes me nervous, actually.
15	Q All right. From the questioning before, looking
16	at the overall big picture of the way things are right
17	now, you were you were asked questions about that
18	the overall cost of capital has gone down in the past few
19	years. Would you agree with that on an overall basis?
20	A Yes. I would agree with that.
21	Q And and also when asked earlier, the overall
22	yield is also down?
23	A That's correct. Yes. In large measure because
24	of the fairly significant drop in Treasury yields.
25	Q All right. And would you say that this has,

	Page 1564
1	basically, been what's happening since about 2005?
2	A I'll take a look real quick. Sometimes I think
3	even I have too much paper. I think that's I think
4	that's fair, yes.
5	Q So it's been a good almost seven years of this?
6	A I I would say yes, there's been a I refer
7	to it as sort of a drift downward. It's it's not a
8	steady sort of linear decline. The numbers bump around a
9	little bit. But I would agree that there's been a a
10	long-term secular downward drift in the numbers.
11	Q All right. And so is there an expectation that
12	the economy will rebound substantially within the next few
13	years?
14	A I I am not boy, I wish I knew the answer
15	to that. That
16	Q But your sense of what is going on.
17	A My my sense of what's going on and how it
18	affects the return on equity is quite frankly, goes
19	beyond the extent to which the economy may recover.
20	Excuse me.
21	Q Right. Right.
22	A For example, I think we've already started to
23	see over the past couple of weeks even increases in
24	expected inflation rates.
25	Q Right. But as you said, these things do drift

Page 1565 1 up and down. But you said that the overall cost of 2 capital has gone down and the overall yield has gone down 3 since 2005? А I -- I think that's fair. Yes. 4 5 Q All right. So it would be fair to say that given -- given the ups and downs of it all that the 6 7 economy, as it is today, is a new normal? 8 Δ I -- I've heard that expression. I've never 9 bought into it. The -- when you look at downward drift in the cost of capital, it's really, I think, important to 10 understand what drives those numbers. 11 12 And -- and that's why, in my view, while it is 13 true that Treasury yields, for example, have fallen considerably, you can't look at the absolute change in 14 15 Treasury yields and say that the cost of equity has fallen to a corresponding degree. 16 17 And I think that while there is a downward drift in those numbers, there appears to be -- I don't want to 18 say a limit, but there certainly is not the same type of 19 20 drop in -- in the cost of equity as there are in Treasury. 21 And so as to the issue of a new normal, I really 22 can't say. We've got so many uncertainties facing the economy right now, the fiscal cliff. Again, the issue of 23 -- sometimes referred to as quantitative easing infinity, 24 the effect that that could have on inflation, which, of 25

Page 1566 course, would then have a reversal in terms of the effect 1 2 on yields. 3 And so I have a hard time saying that what we're seeing right now will be normal in perpetuity. And, of 4 5 course, it's in perpetuity that we're looking at for the purpose of cost of equity. 6 7 Well, I mean, what is normal has now lasted for Q 8 seven years and is not expected to change in the next few 9 years. So we're looking at -- at something that basically 10 is here to stay for -- for the foreseeable future? 11 Α I'm sorry. When you say here to stay, I think 12 the notion of just extrapolating this trend -- this trend that we see here in -- in reduced ROEs, authorized ROEs is 13 inappropriate. 14 15 I don't think you can say that there will be a continued decline in the cost of equity, again, because 16 17 while it may be true that things such as Treasury yields have fallen over time, you have to look at why. 18 19 And if you -- if you understand or -- or if you 20 recognize that in large measure part of the reason for the 21 decline in Treasury yields has been investors looking to preserve capital, to avoid the risk of equity loss, so 22 they buy Treasury yield -- excuse me -- buy Treasury 23 24 securities for the relative safety. And as they buy securities, of course, the yield 25

Page 1567 goes down. You can't say that the resulting lower yield 1 2 is a function of people being less risk averse. In fact, 3 they're more risk averse. And so that's why it's a more complicated calculus, I think, than looking at the trend 4 5 and extrapolating it. 6 All right. So as it is, this movement in the Q 7 business world, then, basically, it's just part of doing 8 business. These things go up. These things go down. So 9 you're saying this is a business risk, that it is seen by 10 every business, including Ameren? А I'm -- I'm sorry. I just want to be sure I 11 12 understand your question. The -- when you say this is a 13 business risk, I think a lot of companies and a lot of individuals look at capital markets right now and they see 14 15 uncertainties. And when they see uncertainty, again, they will 16 17 move to the relative security of Treasuries. And that, of course, brings the yield down. The -- looking forward, 18 there's always uncertainty in the market. Whether or not 19 20 that uncertainty will be greater or less than the 21 long-term history, I -- I think is a -- is a good question. I think right now there's considerable 22 uncertainty in the market. 23 24 And there has been since 2005, seven years ago? Q 25 Well, I think it's -- it's fair to say that Α

Page 1568 there have been periods during that time, of course, fall 1 2 of 2008, early 2009, when uncertainty was considerably 3 greater, which brings up another, I think, important 4 point. 5 You talked about sort of the new normal and the -- and the way companies do business now. One of the 6 7 things that I've seen in working with clients is that since 2008, I think there's been a renewed focus on the 8 9 part of investors on risk and, in particular, on what's 10 sometimes referred to as -- it's tail risk, the risk 11 associated with a very adverse, possibly low probability, 12 but significant event. 13 I think people now look at risk as not necessarily something that may happen as good and 14 15 something that may necessarily happen that's bad. But I think they may look at risk as -- as what we saw in late 16 17 2008, which is that there's a significant disruption in the market, and that disruption means that even highly 18 rated utilities have a difficult time accessing capital. 19 20 And so --21 I'm going to cut you off. At this point, I 0 22 think we're moving beyond a little bit of -- of what I'm 23 asking for this. Okay. I misunderstood. 24 Α 25 We're back to -- we're back to -- yes, I 0

	Page 1569
1	understand and we agree that there are movements up and
2	down within within. But focusing on the overall
3	picture of the economy, it is what I'm trying to do
4	moving on from that, during the local public hearings,
5	you're aware that there's been a lot of customer concern
6	over the affordability of rates. You understand that?
7	A Yes, I do.
8	Q Okay. And you would agree that the goal for the
9	Commission is to set rates that are just and reasonable?
10	A I agree with that. Yes.
11	Q And would you agree that part of determining a
12	reasonable rate is to make rates as affordable as possible
13	without causing detriment to the utility?
13 14	<pre>without causing detriment to the utility? A I think I think that's a a way of</pre>
	-
14	A I think I think that's a a way of
14 15	A I think I think that's a a way of characterizing the the important task that the
14 15 16	A I think I think that's a a way of characterizing the the important task that the Commission has of balancing the interests of of
14 15 16 17	A I think I think that's a a way of characterizing the the important task that the Commission has of balancing the interests of of ratepayers and investors.
14 15 16 17 18	A I think I think that's a a way of characterizing the the important task that the Commission has of balancing the interests of of ratepayers and investors. Q All right. And in your testimony, you state
14 15 16 17 18 19	A I think I think that's a a way of characterizing the the important task that the Commission has of balancing the interests of of ratepayers and investors. Q All right. And in your testimony, you state that you calculate a reasonable range of ROE for Ameren to
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	A I think I think that's a a way of characterizing the the important task that the Commission has of balancing the interests of of ratepayers and investors. Q All right. And in your testimony, you state that you calculate a reasonable range of ROE for Ameren to be anywhere between 10.25 and 11.00; is that correct?
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>A I think I think that's a a way of characterizing the the important task that the Commission has of balancing the interests of of ratepayers and investors. Q All right. And in your testimony, you state that you calculate a reasonable range of ROE for Ameren to be anywhere between 10.25 and 11.00; is that correct? A In my rebuttal testimony, correct.</pre>
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 A I think I think that's a a way of characterizing the the important task that the Commission has of balancing the interests of of ratepayers and investors. Q All right. And in your testimony, you state that you calculate a reasonable range of ROE for Ameren to be anywhere between 10.25 and 11.00; is that correct? A In my rebuttal testimony, correct. Q And that is and and based on this

	Page 1570
1	Q And and as you said in your original filing
2	of the case, you calculated a reasonable range to be
3	anywhere between 10.5 and 11.00?
4	A Correct.
5	Q With an original recommendation of 10.75?
6	A That is correct.
7	Q All right. So between February when when
8	your direct testimony was filed and now, your
9	recommendation has moved to what was the bottom of your
10	original range?
11	A Yes. I did two things. One is I moved the low
12	end of the range because, as I said, I recognize that some
13	of the model results have changed. And while you can look
14	at some indicators suggesting that perhaps the the
15	model results are not fully indicative of the cost of
16	equity or changes in the cost of equity, I recognize that
17	they've fallen and I think it's fair and important to
18	recognize that and reflect that in the recommendation.
19	Q Okay. So now the the 10.25 is your lower end
20	of the reasonable range?
21	A Yes. That is correct.
22	Q All right. And according to your testimony, you
23	believe that the regulatory environment in Missouri is
24	less credit supportive than the regulatory environment
25	prevailing in other most other states. Therefore, your

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Page 1571 1 recommendation of an ROE of 10.5 is appropriate; is that 2 correct? 3 А As we talked about a little bit ago, it is -- it is a factor that I considered. 4 5 Q All right. And I -- I assume that you agree with what you stated before, that a reasonable ROE for 6 7 Ameren is one that is adequate to attract capital at 8 reasonable terms, thereby enabling Ameren Missouri to 9 provide safe and reliable electric service that's 10 sufficient to insure Ameren Missouri's financial integrity and commensurate with returns on investments in 11 12 enterprises having corresponding risk; is that correct? 13 А That's correct. And I certainly don't intend to belabor the point. But capital attraction, after what we 14 15 saw in 2008 is, in my view, a very important criteria. 16 Q All right. So an ROE that meets those 17 requirements of a reasonable -- or that I stated, the three points, would be reasonable and not detrimental to 18 19 Ameren, in your view? 20 Yes. That's correct. А 21 MS. BAKER: No further questions. JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. For Staff? 22 23 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. 2.4 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. THOMPSON: 25

Page 1572 1 Good morning, Mr. Hevert. 0 2 Α Good morning, Mr. Thompson. 3 I'm sorry. I apologize. I'll probably Q 4 mispronounce your name all through this. I apologize in 5 advance. It's not on purpose. 6 А No offense taken, believe me. 7 Q Now, you testified in Ameren Missouri's last 8 rate case, correct? I did. 9 А 10 And at that time, you were an employee of Q 11 Concentric; is that not right? 12 А Concentric Energy Advisors, correct. 13 0 And you are no longer with Concentric Energy 14 Advisors? 15 А That is correct. 16 Okay. And you're being paid for your testimony Q 17 today and for the analyses you've conducted in this case; isn't that correct? 18 19 А That is correct. 20 And I wonder if you could tell us how much Q 21 you're being paid. Boy, that is a good question. It's -- it's 22 А through a subcontract agreement with Concentric. I do not 23 know the exact hourly rate. My best guess, it's in the 24 25 \$450 range.

	Page 1573
1	Q Do you know what the estimated total for your
2	services is?
3	A No. Because I'm no longer at Concentric, I
4	really have no sort of insight to that right now.
5	Q Okay. And you have a Master's in Business
6	Administration; is that correct?
7	A I do.
8	Q And you're also a chartered financial analyst?
9	A I am.
10	Q And Mr. Murray also has a Master's in Business
11	Administration; is that correct?
12	A He does.
13	Q And he's also a chartered financial analyst?
14	A He, too, endured the pain. Yes.
15	Q And it's my understanding that is a difficult
16	credential to obtain.
17	A In my view, it is. I agree.
18	Q And Mr. Gorman also has a Master's in Business
19	Administration; isn't that correct?
20	A He does.
21	Q And he is also a chartered financial analyst?
22	A You would think we were the only three in the
23	world, but, yeah, he does, too. That's right.
24	Q And I know you don't agree with the
25	recommendations that either Mr. Murray or Mr. Gorman has

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Page 1574 1 made in this case, but you accept both of them as expert 2 financial analysts, do you not? 3 А I -- I certainly recognize their credentials, 4 yes. 5 Q Okay. Now, I sent you a DR in which I asked you what you believed your role in this proceeding is. Do you 6 7 recall that? No. Well, if I could have a copy of that, it 8 Α 9 might make it easier. 10 MR. THOMPSON: May I approach? 11 JUDGE WOODRUFF: You may. 12 (By Mr. Thompson) I think it's paragraph 2 Q 13 there. 14 Yes. Α 15 Okay. I wonder if you could read your response Q 16 there, paragraph 2? 17 А Paragraph 2, my understanding is that my role in this proceeding is to estimate the required return on 18 equity for Ameren Missouri by using one or more analytical 19 techniques that rely on market-based data for quantifying 20 21 investor expectations regarding required equity returns adjusted for certain incremental costs and risks 22 consistent with the standards established in Hope and 23 Bluefield that return is based on those available from 24 investments of comparable risk. 25

Page 1575 While I am not an attorney and -- and am not 1 2 expressing a legal opinion, my understanding is that the 3 company's authorized return on equity should be neither excessive nor confiscatory. 4 5 Q Thank you. If I could get that back. Thank you, sir. What sort of ROE award would you consider to be 6 7 excessive? 8 Α Well, I think the -- the range that I have 9 established, 10.25 to 11 percent, generally establishes 10 the range that I think is reasonable and would set balance on both ends. 11 12 Okay. So it's your testimony, then, if I 0 13 understand you correctly, that an ROE award below 10.5 would be confiscatory? 14 15 No. That's not correct. А 16 Q Okay. Well, then, please explain to me how I 17 misunderstood you. My range of 10.25 percent to 11 is the range 18 Α would set the -- in my view, the bounds. So the low end 19 of 10.25 percent is what I say rather than the 10.5 that 20 21 you just mentioned. 22 0 I'm sorry. I misspoke. So correcting that 23 question, it's your testimony that an award at below 10.25 24 would be confiscatory? 25 А Again, I'm not an attorney. And as to what is

	Page 1576
1	confiscatory or what is excessive, I suspect it's more a
2	legal issue as I noted in my discovery response. And I
3	look to the Hope and Bluefield standards as guidelines. I
4	don't look at them as an attorney would look at them. I
5	look at them as an analyst would look at them. And so in
6	my view, the lower bounds, excuse me, of 10.25 percent
7	would satisfy those three criteria.
8	Q Okay. Is it your opinion that the cost of
9	equity and the return on equity set by this Commission are
10	the same thing?
11	A It's my view that the excuse me. I'm so
12	sorry. Excuse me for one second. When you called me
13	Mr. Hevert, it really upset me.
14	Q I apologize again.
15	A That's okay. I'll get over it. I'm sorry.
16	After all the excitement, I forgot your question.
17	Q I'm not sure I remember it either.
18	MR. THOMPSON: Could you read it back, please?
19	(The previous question was read back.)
20	A It it's well, it's my view that the
21	Commission has broad discretion in setting the the
22	allowed return on equity. And the Commission takes into
23	consideration factors that it deems to be relevant and
24	gives them the weight that the things should be afforded.
25	What I provide is my estimate of the cost of

Page 1577 equity. Whether or not the Commission sets it at my 1 2 recommendation, of course, is a function of a number of 3 things. But my recommendation represents the cost of equity. 4 5 Q (By Mr. Thompson) Okay. Isn't it true that investors are flying to utility stocks because they are 6 7 safe and less volatile than other stocks? Well, let's break that down. Let's talk first 8 Δ about safer and less volatile than other stocks. I don't 9 think there's any disagreement among anyone here that 10 11 utilities are less risky and that the market utilities 12 typically have beta coefficients of less than one. And beta coefficients, of course, are a measure of the 13 relative volatility of a stock. 14 15 And when I say relative, I mean relative to the broader market. So in that sense, we all agree that 16 17 utility stocks are less volatile than the overall market and, therefore, are less risky than the overall market. I 18 would agree with that. 19 As to the issue of flying to utility stocks, I'm 20 21 not sure I agree with that. I recognize that utility stocks are, in some measure, dividend investments. I 22 spent a lot of years at a utility issuing securities. 23 Ι understand that. 24 25 But in my view, investors don't own utilities

1	Page 1578 simply for the dividend. And in my view, it's I don't
2	believe that an investor would be indifferent between the
3	secured security of a bond and the unsecured and residual
4	claims associated with equity.
5	Q Well, aren't utility stocks, in fact, much like
6	bonds?
7	A I I strongly disagree that any equity is like
8	a bond. And and and let me explain why. Bond
9	investors, of course, have two things. They have security
10	by the underlying provisions of the bond itself, and they
11	have a priority claim on the cash flows.
12	Bond investors are focused on the company's
13	ability to meet its financial obligations, its debt
14	service obligations in a timely manner during the period
15	over which they hold the bond.
16	Equity investors have no contractual claim on
17	either the cash flows or the assets. Equity investors
18	take the residual risk, which means they get the cash left
19	after the bond holders have been paid.
20	To the extent that you are suggesting that an
21	investor, again, would differentiate between one security,
22	which is secured, which has priority, which has a
23	contractual obligation to make interest and principal
24	payments with a secure that has no such obligation and for
25	which you are the residual claimant on the cash flows, I

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Page 1579 disagree that investors are indifferent between the two. 1 2 Okay. Looking at Exhibit 531 -- do you still 0 3 have that there? I'm not sure if I do. So this is the RRA 4 Α 5 October 3rd report? 6 Q Yes, sir. 7 А Yes. I have that. 8 Q And as you went down through them line by line, 9 I think you identified four integrated utilities for which 10 an ROE award is reported here. And they would be 11 PacifiCorp and Entergy Texas and PacifiCorp again and Oklahoma Gas and Electric. Did I read that correctly? 12 Yes. Four. Correct. 13 А 14 Okay. And would you agree with me that three of 0 15 the four, the reported ROE award is 9.8? 16 Yes. I would agree with that. Α 17 Q And for the fourth one, the reported ROE award is 10.2? 18 19 Yes. That is correct. Α 20 And would you agree with me that the average of Q 21 those four numbers is 9.9? As it turns out, I would agree with that. 22 А 23 Thank you. Turn to page 113 in your rebuttal Q 24 testimony. 25 А Yes. I have that.

Page 1580 1 0 Now, on pages 113 and 114, both of those pages 2 are taken up by charts; isn't that correct? 3 А That is correct. And on Table -- excuse me. On page 113 is Table 4 0 5 19-A? 6 А Correct. 7 Summary of Updated Results, Hevert Revised Proxy Q 8 Group? Correct. 9 А 10 And on page 114 is Table 19-B, Summary of Q 11 Updated Results Combined Proxy Group? 12 А Correct. 13 Q And these tables report the results of your 14 updated analyses, correct? 15 А That is correct. 16 Q Is that the very analyses that are summed up 17 when you say that your range was 10.25 to 11 and your point recommendation is 10.5? 18 19 А Correct. 20 Okay. Now, with respect to each of these two Q 21 proxy groups, you performed three different constant growth DCF analyses; isn't that correct? 22 23 No. I -- I performed three DCF analyses, one А 24 constant growth. 25 Q Okay. You can see how easily an attorney

	Page 1581
1	becomes confused, or at least this particular attorney.
2	So when you report under constant growth DCF, and I'm
3	looking at the top off Table 19-A, you have a 30-day
4	average, 90-day average and 180-day average. Those are
5	not separate analyses?
6	A Well, they they're separate in the sense that
7	the what they do is the 30-day average takes each of
8	the companies' stock prices, averages them over a 30-day
9	period and calculates the dividend yield based on that
10	30-day average.
11	The 90-day and 180-day are the same thing. They
12	simply extend the period over which the dividend yield is
13	calculated. And, again, this model calculates the cost of
14	equity as the sum of basically, as the sum of the
15	dividend yield and the expected growth rate.
16	Q Okay. Let's talk about growth rate. What
17	growth rate did you use for your constant growth DCF
18	analysis?
19	A Well, if you turn to it's it's Schedule
20	RBHER-10, you'll see there that we have three different
21	measures of growth. Well, they're not that's probably
22	a poor way of explaining it.
23	What I used, as we mentioned earlier, is
24	expected growth and earnings per share. And for the
25	purpose of developing that information, I looked to three

	Page 1582
1	sources. First call, Zack's and Value Line. First Call
2	and Zack's are what are referred to as consensus
3	projections. Basically, they serve the analysts covering
4	that particular company and find either the mean or the
5	median growth rate that those analysts project over the
6	coming three to five years.
7	So Value Line excuse me Zack's and First
8	Call both, then, are consents of services. Value Line, of
9	course, is simply a value line. And it's the growth
10	expectation of the particular value line analyst covering
11	that company.
12	Q So are you telling me that there is no single
13	number you can give me in response to that question?
14	A I'm sorry. When you say single number, what do
15	you mean?
16	Q I mean, did you use a series of growth rates in
17	conducting your constant growth DCF analysis, or did you
18	use one growth rate?
19	A The answer is yes. The I used one growth
20	rate, which is the expected growth and earnings per share.
21	But I used three sources for that growth rate and took
22	those sources for each of the companies. And so it is one
23	number, and that one number is meant to represent the
24	expected growth and earnings per share, but it comes from
25	three different sources.

Page 1583 1 Did you average what you found in each of 0 Okay. 2 those sources? 3 А Yes. And as we talked about a little bit earlier, the average is what goes into the calculation of 4 5 the mean or the average DCF result. Okay. So -- and what was that average? 6 Q 7 А The -- the average over -- excuse me -- in the 8 rebuttal testimony, which is for the period ending July 9 30th, 2012, the average earnings adequate growth rate was 5.07 percent. 10 11 Q Now, you also performed two multi-stage DCF 12 analyses; isn't that correct? 13 А Yes. That's correct. 14 And it's true, is it not, that a multi-stage DCF 0 uses more than one growth rate? 15 Yes. the -- the whole point is to -- well, I'll 16 А 17 back up. I had mentioned earlier the constant growth model is subject to a number of assumptions and 18 constraints, one of which is the growth rate, the payout 19 20 ratio, the PE ratio, the PB ratio all stay constant in 21 perpetuity. And I think we all know that that's not necessarily the case. 22 23 And so the multi-stage model allows you to apply assumptions with respect to your -- what the growth will 24 25 be over varying stages and the interest of typically

Page 1584 timing periods, which I mentioned is a period covered by 1 2 analysts. 3 The way I run the model, and other people perhaps could come to different thing, a second stage from 4 5 the transition from the second stage to the long-term period. And there's a long-term growth rate. So, yes, 6 7 growth rates change, but the model, depending on the 8 construction, allows you to change other assumptions as 9 well. 10 Okay. Let me make sure I understood what you 0 11 just said. You used an initial short-term growth rate. 12 Then there was a second transitional stage. And then, 13 finally, a third long-term stage; is that correct? 14 That's the first half. А 15 Q That the first half. Okay. That's the first half. Okay. The second half 16 А 17 is -- well, we'll back up one step further. The way the -- this model works and the way I've constructed it is 18 that we model cash flows. That's two things. As we 19 talked about earlier, it's the dividend that you receive 20 21 while you're holding the stock and the price at which you would sell the stock at the end of the holding period. We 22 refer to that as the terminal value. So the price that 23 you would expect to receive when you sell it. 24 Now, not to get complicated, but depending on 25

Page 1585 how you develop the model, that terminal price could be 1 2 the same thing as just running the model out into forever. 3 But in order to calculate the dividends, the way I run the model is we project the earning per share. 4 5 We multiply that by the expected payout ratio in order to get the dividends per share. 6 7 And that's what I said earlier. It's important 8 to recognize that under the constant growth model, which 9 assumes the dividend ratio stays constant in perpetuity, there could be situations where that's not the case. So 10 that's why I model dividends as the product of the 11 12 expected earnings and the expected payout ratio. 13 0 With respect to the first of your multi-stage 14 analyses, the Gordon growth terminal value --15 А Yes. 16 Q -- can you tell me the average growth rate you 17 used for Stage 1? 18 The -- well, again it depends on what we mean by Α growth rate. The average Stage 1 growth rate in earnings 19 would be that same 5.70 percent. The growth rate in 20 21 dividends, though, I believe would be less than that because the payout ratio over that period declined. 22 23 And so while the earnings may have grown at 5.07 24 percent, declining payout ratio means that dividends were slightly lower. So the actual dividend rate would be 25

	Page 1586
1	lower, but I don't know what that number is.
2	Q Okay. And the fact that you don't know what it
3	is, does that suggest you didn't find that to be material?
4	A Not not in the least. It simply is a
5	function of the calculation. And, again, I think that the
6	way I developed the model has a degree of insight. I
7	think that's important, which is to say that to the extent
8	that companies or an industry may have changes in its
9	payout ratio, I think is a very important consideration.
10	Q Okay. And what was the value for the
11	transitional stage?
12	A Well, the transitional stage, again, moved from
13	the from the short-term growth rate to the long-term
14	growth rate. And so it's a it's sort of the it's
15	the compound growth rate that moves from one to the other.
16	It's not exactly linear, but it's pretty close.
17	Q Okay. Is there a single number you can give me?
18	A No. Because it changes each year.
19	Q Okay. And how about the long-term growth rate?
20	A The long-term growth rate is 5.67 percent.
21	Q Okay. And in the second multi-stage that you
22	performed, the historical PE terminal value multi-stage
23	model, what was the average growth rate that you used for
24	the first stage in that model?
25	A The same construct.

Page 1587 1 Q Very good. And, again, are you able to tell me 2 what the figure was for the transition stage? 3 А Well, once again, the transition stage goes from the average. Let's talk about the average of 5.07 percent 4 5 to 5.67 percent on a pro rata basis -- well, on a 6 geometric basis. 7 I understand. Thank you. And, again, you used Q 8 5.67 for the terminal stage; is that correct? A Correct. 9 10 Q Thank you. 11 MR. THOMPSON: I have a question that is highly 12 confidential. 13 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. We will go 14 in-camera. 15 REPORTER'S NOTE: At this point, an in-camera 16 session was held, which is contained in Vol. 27, page 1588. 17 18 * * * * * 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Page 1589 JUDGE WOODRUFF: And we are back in regular 1 2 session. 3 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. 4 Q (By Mr. Thompson) And I wonder if you were 5 aware, Mr. Hevert, that one of the things that Ameren 6 Corporation or Ameren Missouri does, excuse me, with 7 respect to this Commission is to provide an integrated 8 resource plan? I'm aware of many companies providing integrated 9 А 10 resource plans, yes. 11 Okay. And would you be surprised to know that Q 12 in the most recent integrated resource plan update 13 provided by Ameren Missouri to this Commission, expected 14 load growth over the next 20 years was estimated at .75 15 percent? 16 That wouldn't surprise me. А No. 17 Q Okay. Thank you. I wonder if you could tell 18 me, sir, what a ring fence is? 19 A -- well, ring fence is a -- a fairly generic Α 20 term having to do with the ability to separate sometimes 21 functionally, sometimes physically, sometimes contractually and sometimes administratively the actions 22 of one affiliate from another. 23 24 0 Okay. And are you aware that Ameren Corporation 25 owns unregulated merchant generation operation?
Page 1590 1 А I am, yes. 2 And are you also aware that its performance has 0 not been good lately? 3 А Well --4 5 Of course, that's in layman's terms. Q The same could be said for me. But I'm aware of А 6 7 the results. Yes. 8 Q The opinion has been expressed by Mr. Murray at 9 least that Ameren Missouri's credit rating has been pulled 10 down, to use a lay term, by the effects of the Ameren 11 Corporation merchant generation operation. Are you aware 12 of that testimony? 13 А I'm aware -- I am aware -- I am aware of that testimony, and I am aware that the Standard & Poor's as a 14 15 matter of a process and practice, typically, looks to the consolidated operations when considering the rating 16 17 agencies of a subsidiary affiliate. That, of course, is not necessarily the same approach as Moody's or Fitch. 18 19 Q Okay. So are you aware that the Ameren Board of 20 Directors has considered ring fencing in order to reduce 21 the drag of the merchant generation operation on the 22 credit rating of Ameren Missouri? 23 I'm not aware of that. But it would not А surprise me. 24 25 MR. THOMPSON: Okay. I have no further

Page 1591 1 questions. Thank you. 2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. We'll come up for 3 questions from the Bench. Mr. Chairman? CHAIRMAN GUNN: I have a couple. Thanks very 4 5 much. JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. 6 7 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY CHAIRMAN GUNN: 8 9 I want to follow-up just really quick on what 0 Mr. Thompson just asked. I can't buy Ameren Missouri 10 11 stock, correct? 12 А Correct. 13 Q It's just Ameren Corporation? 14 Correct. А 15 So when Standard & Poor's is looking at it, Q 16 they're looking at it at the corporate level rather than 17 the Ameren Missouri level. So they have to -- or at least they choose to take all the -- all the affiliates and 18 19 subsidiaries, regulated and non-regulated into account 20 when they're -- when they're doing the ratings? 21 А Well, I think from Standard & Poor's perspective, because they're a credit rating facility and 22 their focus is on the fixed income investor, they look at 23 24 specific operations of the -- the subject company, in this case, Ameren Missouri. But in the case of Standard & 25

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Page 1592 Poor's, they do note and, in fact, typically, it's one of 1 2 the first sentences that's in their report that says their 3 opinion reflects the effects of the consolidated company. I want to -- I want to look at -- take a look at 4 Q 5 this chart real quick. So Ameren's current allowed ROE is 10.2? 6 7 А Yes, sir. 8 So in the past year, has -- have the conditions Q 9 improved or not improved, the market conditions? 10 I think general market conditions have remained А -- have remained uncertain. There are certain measures 11 12 that have gotten a little bit worse. For example, we look 13 at the -- what I refer to as the incremental credit spread, which is the difference between BAA and A stocks, 14 15 which, in my view, represents the increment of risk that fixed income investors look at moving from a A to -- down 16 17 to BAA. 18 And that's going up, so that suggests to me that over the past year, that incremental credit spread would 19 suggest slightly higher degree of risk as viewed by the --20 21 the fixed income investors. And that's not offset by any decrease in cost of 22 0 23 equity that you were describing before? 24 А Well, the -- I think the -- the interaction there is with respect to the Treasury rates because they 25

	Page 1593
1	both you can look at long-term Treasury rates and you
2	could say, yeah, the the long-term bond rate is a
3	matter of Treasury yields plus a credit spread. At least
4	for the BAA companies, the credit spread does not
5	necessarily stay constant, but has perhaps gone up a
6	little bit.
7	The Treasury yields have gone down. And I think
8	that's in part one of the reasons I would see and I've
9	noticed a somewhat larger cost of equity, which is why I
10	reflected my numbers downwards.
11	The question, of course, becomes, by how much?
12	If the long-term credit has fallen by 120 basis points, is
13	it reasonable to think that cost of equity has fallen 120
14	basis points? I don't think so.
15	Q So there's no explanation between that, but it
16	does reflect some decrease in cost?
17	A It does. And that's why, again, I reduced my
18	recommendation somewhat.
19	Q And and the ten-year Treasury yield has
20	decreased significantly since the from the first
21	quarter of 2010 to the second quarter of 2012, correct?
22	A It it has, as have the longer term maturity
23	Treasuries.
24	Q All right. I want to I want to take you back
25	to this the well, I think MIEC's exhibit. And this

Page 1594 1 -- this says that the -- makes an allowance in computing 2 the average. Or at least mentions that. 3 Virginia seems to have unusually high -- or when 4 taking into account the calculation, Virginia's Regulatory 5 Commission allows premiums on the ROE if they hit certain targets. 6 7 А That's correct. 8 And they specifically mention that they don't Q 9 think it's -- it's unusual enough for them to note and 10 say, it -- it does skew the average higher. 11 А And I agree with that. And when I look at this 12 data myself, I take out those returns because I -- I think that's fair. I don't think that looking -- or trying to 13 sort of impute that -- that bonus, whatever it turns out 14 to be, should be then reflected. 15 16 Now, you mentioned when -- in your Q 17 cross-examination, there was one that you thought was unreasonably low, the 9.2 or 9.25? 18 19 The 9.25, which was Northern State Powers of А South Dakota, I believe, return, it was -- it was very 20 21 low. My understanding is that, in that case, there was an issue as to whether or not certain renewable assets would 22 be included in rate base. And there was an offset in 23 24 terms of the offsets and the ROE to be included in the 25 rate base. But even putting that aside, it was a low

	Page 1595
1	number.
2	Q But it wasn't low enough or wasn't unusual
3	enough for Regulatory Research Associates to make a
4	specific mention of it and say, This skews the average
5	lower?
6	A Well, that's a really good question.
7	Q Well, the question is, it's not in this
8	regulatory I'll get to the second question. I'll let
9	you explain yourself.
10	A Okay.
11	Q But I just want to be clear. They don't mention
12	it as an unusual event worth note that gives people pause
13	when looking at the averages?
14	A In this report?
15	Q In this report.
16	A Right. Right. But Regulatory Research, of
17	course, looks at the specific rate case outcomes in
18	separate reports for specific rate cases. And I I
19	don't know offhand, but it could well be that in their
20	review of that particular case they did mention that.
21	Q Are you familiar with Edison Electric Institute?
22	A Yes, sir.
23	Q And are you familiar with their rate case
24	summary reports that they put out?
25	A I do. And my understanding is that much of that

Page 1596 is based on this same data source. 1 2 And Ameren is -- is Ameren a member of Edison 0 3 Electric Institute? А I don't know. But I would not be surprised. 4 5 It's the -- it's the Electric Utility Trade Q Association, essentially? 6 7 Yes, sir. А 8 Q All right. I have a financial update rate case 9 summary from the first quarter of 2012 from the Edison 10 Electric Institute. And I'm going to ask if any of the 11 parties object to me asking a couple questions about this. 12 MR. BYRNE: No, your Honor. No, Chairman. 13 CHAIRMAN GUNN: Does everybody -- well -- and people can inspect it and see that I've printed it 14 15 directly off of that. Everybody have any problem with agreeing that the information here is -- I guess you don't 16 17 have to go as far as saying accurate, but you're free to cross-examine. But we'll at least for this point say 18 that, for what it's worth, it's a relatively reliable 19 20 source. 21 MR. THOMPSON: Would it be possible to 22 eventually get a copy? 23 CHAIRMAN GUNN: And I can -- I can get printed copies for everybody. 24 25 MR. BYRNE: Yeah. I guess I'll agree -- I've

	Page 1597
1	never seen it before, but I guess I'll agree it's what
2	Edison Electric Institute says.
3	CHAIRMAN GUNN: That's what I'm saying.
4	Everyone agrees I'm not misrepresenting what Edison
5	Electric Institute says, and I'll provide everybody a copy
6	of this for everybody.
7	Q (By Chairman Gunn) But you're familiar with
8	these reports?
9	A Yes, sir, I am.
10	Q All right. And you say it's based on and
11	these two reports, there's not a lot of the subjective
12	stuff that goes in here. In in EEI's report, there
13	actually is some commentary.
14	A Right.
15	Q But a lot of this is just a reflection of what
16	happened. It's not necessarily I don't want to say
17	spinning or or or commenting on the numbers. Most
18	of what it is saying is, Here's what the data says that
19	we've seen in the last quarter.
20	A I I would agree with that. As you say, there
21	is some commentary on some specific issues, but as to the
22	data
23	Q And I'll give you an example of the some of the
24	commentary that is stated. So it says, for example, on
25	page 1, Shareholder owned electric utilities filed 17

Page 1598 1 cases in Quarter 1 2012, which is a factual statement. 2 But then it follows up saying, A number 3 consistent with the trend of rising rate case activity since the early 2000s. That would be an example of some 4 5 of the commentary that they appeared in. 6 А Yes, sir. 7 But, again, even that is probably based on Q 8 historical -- historical --9 А I agree. 10 Okay. So I'm going to -- I'm going to read you 0 a -- a paragraph, again, from page 1 and page -- and page 11 12 2. And it says, The average awarded ROE in Quarter 1 was 13 10.84 percent, which is slightly high -- I'm now stepping 14 out of the quote and saying which is slightly higher than 15 what the Regulatory Research Associates said. 16 And I'm going to go back to the quote. A jump 17 upward from the level in recent years and the highest ROE for any quarter since 2005. And then, However, we do not 18 19 believe the number indicates a trend change. Virginia 20 Utilities settled five rate cases that reflect premiums 21 earned from performance and other factors, skewing the 22 reported average or the ROE upward. 23 If the Virginia cases are removed from the data set, the average ROE was 10.3 percent, a level much closer 24 25 to that of recent quarters. The disparity is further

	Page 1599
1	reflected in comparison with an averaged requested ROE
2	which for Quarter 1 was 10.57. This is the first time in
3	almost twelve years that the average requested ROE for a
4	quarter was lower than the average.
5	That's probably more than necessary, but I
6	wanted to make sure people didn't think I was reading
7	anything out of context. So EEI also mentioned the
8	Virginia skewing upwards.
9	A Right.
10	Q But they don't mention any other any skewing
11	downwards in that, correct?
12	A I would agree with that. And I think that 10.84
13	number is the same
14	Q It may very well be the same.
15	A Yeah. And it's got the same Virginia cases in
16	there.
17	Q Now, Quarter 2, I have another EEI report from
18	Quarter 2 of 2012. I'm assuming everyone feels the same
19	way about it. They state that the average ROE in Quarter
20	2, 2012, was 9.92, a record low for recent decades. But
21	they do mention well, I guess they don't mention
22	they don't mention any specific rate cases that caused
23	that to go down.
24	But they also note that the average regulatory
25	lag for Quarter 2 shoots through the roof to 11.5 in that

Page 1600 1 quarter. And -- and -- and I'll say, too -- I'll read the 2 quote. It says, Average regulatory lag for Quarter 2, 2012 was 11.4 months, well above the ten-month average for 3 4 recent years. 5 During industry restructuring in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the volatile regulatory lag increased 6 7 and the duration rose to almost 13 months. Outside that 8 period, regulatory lag has been fairly consistent at 9 around ten months. Consequently, the increase in Quarter 10 2 is generally unwelcome news. 11 Then they go on to point out that why one of the 12 reasons the regulatory lag has increased is because Hawaii 13 had three cases during the quarter each lasting more than 14 20 months. Everybody here should be happy we're not in 15 Hawaii. 16 MR. BYRNE: I'm not happy about Hawaii. 17 MR. LOWERY: Depends on the reason. (By Chairman Gunn) As a regulated utility. 18 Q Let me put it that way. Fair point. But they -- but they 19 20 mention a reason why -- they specifically mention an 21 unusual thing which skews those percentages upwards. 22 And, again, I'll -- I'll let everybody see these 23 at the break or even afterwards to make sure that I'm --I'm quoting that correctly. My point is that -- is that 24 25 there is -- both Regulatory Research Associates as well as

	Page 1601
1	EEI mention unusual events that caused that average to be
2	to have upward pressure or to look higher than they
3	believe it actually reflects what's happening, correct?
4	A With respect to the rate case lag?
5	Q Well, no. Well right. In regulatory in
6	the regulatory assets, they mentioned Virginia and EEI
7	mentions Virginia when it comes to rate cases.
8	A Correct.
9	Q There is no corresponding in any form, any rate
10	case decision in the first quarter or the first two
11	quarters of 2012, which the Regulatory Regulatory
12	Research Associates covers as well. There is no
13	corresponding no corresponding mention of a of a
14	case that unusually would cause the average to skew lower.
15	A I don't want to speak for them. Oh, I'm sorry.
16	In terms of your question, I agree with that.
17	Q My question is
18	A Yeah. Agreed.
19	Q there is no mention in there that says that?
20	A Agreed.
21	Q Now, as to your point, there may be individual
22	reports out there that I don't have that say, We think
23	North Dakota or South Dakota, whichever one it is, is a
24	really low ROE. But they haven't chosen to put it into
25	their six month wrap-up of where where ROEs are. Fair

Page 1602 1 point? 2 А Fair point. But I think I may have a -- a sense 3 of what's going on with that. When you look at the first quarter, as we mentioned, the Virginia case is where one, 4 5 two, three, four, five of --6 Seventeen. Q 7 А In the first quarter? 8 Q Actually, 25. 9 Α Well, the RRA data has 12 cases that gave the 10.84 percent average. And of those 12, five were 10 11 Virginia generation cases. And so, clearly, that would 12 skew the results. 13 0 Well, but this says -- if you look at the first 14 sentence on July 26th, it says, Average return on equity authorizing a utility in the first six months of 2012 of 15 16 10.36, 25 observations. So --17 Α For the first -- for the first -- I understand. For the first six months, so --18 Q 19 I'm sorry. I thought you said three. А 20 So it's -- the Virginia cases account for five Q 21 out of 25, not 5 out of 12? 22 А Correct. 23 And that's -- and that's what they point out, Q 24 not -- not -- in the first -- EEI does it in the first 25 quarter, but RRA does it within the entire six months?

Page 1603 Agreed. Agreed. 1 А 2 0 All right. 3 А And RRA also breaks it out by quarter as well so you can look at the average. And then on -- and, again, I 4 5 recognize your point that they speak to the first six months. But in that second quarter with respect to laq, 6 7 you're right, you've got Hawaiian Electric, and you also 8 have Arizona which has a pretty low --9 Yeah. I'm not -- I'm not talking about lag 0 because it's --10 Yeah. Understood. 11 А 12 We're talking about ROEs here. I just -- my --Q 13 my point is that EEI especially is consistent with RRA. Ι 14 don't know -- I don't know -- and I -- although Ameren uses ROE, I don't know who makes up ROE. 15 16 А It's --17 Q I don't know where they're coming from. EEI is actually the trade association for the electric utilities. 18 19 So I would assume that what they would put out -- and 20 while I believe they're -- they're very well-respected and 21 I think they are, and I -- I have great respect for them, 22 I would assume that if there was something that 23 significantly caused that ROE number to be pulled down 24 that they would mention it. 25 But, instead, what you have is basically a

	Page 1604
1	statement against interest pulling out which I give
2	them great credit for, which makes it look like ROEs are
3	higher than they believe that they actually are.
4	A Right. And all I would say to that is whether
5	you look at number of observations, even five and 25 will
6	skew the result. One out of 25 might not affect the mean
7	so much. Perhaps that's why they don't address that.
8	Q Fair enough. So let me ask you the question.
9	When you're looking at it is much important and we're
10	in the we're in election politics right, so people will
11	tell you don't look at individual polls, look at the
12	trends.
13	A Right.
14	Q And isn't isn't the same thing important
15	here? It's not individual numbers. It's not individual
16	ROEs that are being rewarded. You have to look at the
17	trends?
18	A I I agree with that.
19	Q And the trend right now, for at least the past
20	six months, is to see ROE awards either stable or going
21	down?
22	A And that's what I say in my testimony.
23	Q Right. They're not going up?
24	A That's correct.
25	Q Okay. So thank you for that. All right.

Page 1605 1 Now, I'm going to move on to -- I'm going to move on to 2 your proxy group, and I just have a quick question. 3 So -- so you had -- in your original proxy group, you excluded Empire, Empire District? 4 5 А Correct. 6 And that was because they had suspended their Q 7 dividend after the tornado? Correct. 8 А 9 But then in the -- in the revised proxy group, 0 10 you added them back in because of the reinstitution of 11 their dividend after a certain period of time being able 12 to financially recover from the tornado? There were two factors. One is that they had 13 А reinstated the dividend. And the second was the 14 expectation that it would not be suspended again in the 15 future. 16 17 Q Fair enough. So it would be sustainable. А 18 19 And my question isn't so much about that as much Q 20 as what exactly -- because that's the only change in your 21 revised proxy group, correct? That was the only company 22 that was added in? There were no other revisions to the 23 companies that you took? 2.4 А Correct. 25 What exactly was the effect of adding Empire 0

Page 1606 1 back in? How did -- how did your numbers change based on 2 the adding in of Empire? 3 А Well, I may have -- I'm sorry. 4 Q That's all right. Take your time. 5 А I don't think it's specifically spelled out. It's certainly something that I can -- it is certainly 6 7 something that I can calculate. But I don't know that I 8 have it. I don't know that I say it in my testimony. 9 That's one of the reasons why I'm asking you. 0 It's -- it's a good question. 10 Α 11 And I'm by no means an expert, you know. I went Q 12 to law school because there is no math on the Bar exam, 13 and there is a lot of math. So I'm asking just for a 14 little bit of -- of an explanation. 15 I'm sorry. It's not in there. Although it А 16 certainly is a number that I can calculate. 17 CHAIRMAN GUNN: Okay. Well, all right. I'll ask that that number -- number be given to us at some 18 point, maybe even -- I don't know when that's appropriate 19 to do that. 20 21 MR. BYRNE: Sure. I -- Judge -- or, 22 Mr. Chairman, here's what I was thinking about asking, and 23 maybe this would be worth throwing out now. 24 You asked him a bunch of questions on those EEI 25 reports, which I don't think he's looked at. I was

	Page 1607
1	wondering if we might take a break for lunch so he could
2	read those and after that
3	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Sure. Absolutely.
4	MR. BYRNE: I'm sure they're what you say they
5	are, but maybe there's something else that would be
6	relevant. And then we could maybe I don't know, Mr.
7	Hevert. Can how hard is it to do that Empire
8	calculation? Could you do it over lunch?
9	A I'll give it a try. Yes.
10	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Which I think it I will stop
11	now. I think we can do the rest of the Commissioners, and
12	then we can it will probably be just about time for a
13	break or after if we can get everything else done and we
14	can come back.
15	And by the way, if you don't feel comfortable
16	doing it and you don't feel comfortable with how I've
17	characterized this report, I absolutely want you to let me
18	know that.
19	A I appreciate that.
20	CHAIRMAN GUNN: And we can we can deal with
21	it at the time. I think it's an absolutely fair point. I
22	sprung it on you. I asked the Judge if it was a problem.
23	And I certainly want to give all the all the parties an
24	opportunity to review these and make sure that how I $$
25	how I described them is accurate and fair to all the

	Page 1608
1	parties.
2	So they're pretty short. They're within
3	they're I think one is nine pages and one is ten pages.
4	And most of them are historical it's historic data.
5	So but they're right up here, and we can get a copy for
6	everybody. I'll ask for the folks to start bringing down
7	copies as we're doing it. So that's all the questions I
8	have. Thank you very much. I appreciate your testimony.
9	A Thank you.
10	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Jarrett?
11	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Yes.
12	CROSS-EXAMINATION
13	BY COMMISSIONER JARRETT:
14	Q It's still morning. Good morning, Mr. Hevert.
15	A Good morning.
16	Q You also testified in the Ameren's previous rate
17	case ER-2011-0028; isn't that right?
18	A Yes, sir, I did.
19	Q Okay. And are you somewhat familiar with the
20	report and order that we issued in that case?
21	A Yes, sir, I am.
22	Q All right. In that case, we found that the
23	national average allowed ROE was 10.3 percent.
24	A Yes.
25	Q What period would that have reflected?

	Page 1609
1	A I I believe that was it was either the
2	most recent six or twelve months. I don't recall which.
3	Q Okay. And you were here when Mr. Byrne gave his
4	opening and he indicated that the current national average
5	for ROE was around 10.2?
6	A About that.
7	Q Do you agree with that?
8	A Yeah. That's I think for the well, hold
9	on one second. And and I know there are, depending
10	upon the time frame as we're sitting here, depending upon
11	the time frame that you choose and the companies that you
12	include or exclude, it can be a little bit different over
13	time. I'm sorry.
14	Yeah. I believe it's it's about 10.2. For
15	some reason, I'm thinking I may have calculated 10.15
16	oh, here we go. The 12 months ended June 30th, 2012, I
17	had calculated, and this is on page 4 of my rebuttal
18	testimony, the average as being 10.15, but among the
19	contiguous states, of course, there's only one, which was
20	OG&E, and that was 10.2. So in that range.
21	Q So anywhere from 10.15 to 10.2? Is that what
22	you're saying?
23	A For for the for the purpose of the the
24	average that I calculated during that time. Yes.
25	Q Okay. I believe the average for the last

Page 1610 1 calendar year, 2011, was 10.22. Does that sound right? 2 А I -- I don't know offhand, but that does not sound off base. 3 4 Q Well, I'm just trying -- you know, because in 5 the past, the Commission has used the zone of reasonableness. 6 7 А Yes, sir. 8 And I'm trying to get some specificity as to Q 9 what we should use as the average to go 100 basis points above and 100 basis points below. Should we use 10.2? 10 I think 10.2 is a good number. 11 А 12 Okay. Thank you. I wanted to ask a few Q questions about Exhibit 530, which is the RRA report. 13 Do 14 you still have that with you? 15 А Yes, sir. I do. 16 And just to be clear, and I think you cleared it Q 17 up with Chairman Gunn, the data on page 4 is essentially the exact same data that's in the EEI reports. The 2012 18 first quarter average RR -- or RRA reports is 10.84, the 19 20 same as the EEI? 21 А Correct. 22 Q And for second quarter, it is 9.92, the same as 23 EEI? 24 Yes, sir. Α 25 Okay. I want to focus on page 4, the 2012 rate Q

	Page 1611
1	cases that are listed there. Now, you had mentioned, I
2	think, in in some of the examination from I can't
3	remember which attorney, but you had referenced Footnote
4	B, which is on page 5. And what is Footnote B on page 5?
5	A Footnote B on page 5 relates to Footnote B on
6	page 5 simply reads, Order followed, stipulation or
7	settlements by parties. Decision particulars not
8	necessarily precedent setting or specifically adopted by
9	the regulatory body.
10	Q Okay. So now as I as I look down that list
11	of electric companies, starting with Hawaii Electric Light
12	Company, it has D by it. So does that mean that that was
13	that was case was reached by settlement?
14	A Oh, I'm sorry. Here we are. Yeah. Excuse me.
15	I think the there's either in total or in part reached
16	by settlement. And that's that's part of one of the
17	issues here where there's a stipulation, it could be a
18	stipulation as to it could be a partial stipulation.
19	Q Okay. We don't know if that 10.0, for example,
20	whether that was a settlement number or whether that was a
21	number that was actually awarded by the Commission absent
22	a settlement?
23	A That's that's that's correct.
24	Q Okay.
25	A And I'm sorry for hesitating. I should know

	Page 1612
1	this because I have filed testimony for Hawaii Electric,
2	but I just can't recall whether that was a litigated
3	or a settled number.
4	Q And, actually, if you look at at the list,
5	seven of those, there was at least a partial settlement?
6	A Right. Right.
7	Q And like I said, we don't know on those ROEs
8	whether that was a settled number or whether it was a
9	disputed number that the Commission ultimately decided?
10	A That that's correct. And not not to
11	interrupt. But that's why I like to use the I like to
12	use a long period of history with lots of rate cases and
13	look at these numbers relative to rates. So that's
14	that's one thing, because it sort of takes out the effect
15	of any individual case.
16	But but, on the other hand, there are
17	partially stipulated amounts. We don't know what those
18	stipulations may have related to. I agree with you on
19	that.
20	Q Okay. I have a couple of questions on Exhibit
21	531, which is that estimate. It's also ROA but
22	A Yes. I have that.
23	Q On the on the back page of that, the major
24	rate case decisions from July 2012 to settlement 2012, you
25	had mentioned I want to make sure I understood because

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Page 1613 1 you had mentioned like, for example, PacifiCorp And it has 2 a 9.8. 3 Is there any -- and this is from Utah. Is there anything unusual in Utah that we ought to consider in that 4 5 9.8 that might be different from Missouri? 6 I -- I just don't know enough about Utah to be А 7 able to say. 8 Q What about Entergy Texas? 9 А In the -- excuse me. The only thing I would say about Texas is that it is considered by RRA and by 10 Standard & Poor's to be among the least credit supportive 11 12 jurisdictions. 13 0 Now, you had talked a little bit, I think, the 14 -- what was it? There was one that was 9.25. It may not even be on this. I think it's on the other one. 15 Yeah. There were -- there were -- there was 16 А 17 two. There was a 9.25 for Northern States Power in South Dakota. And -- and then there is, although this was a 18 distribution case, the Patomic Electric Power Maryland of 19 9.31 percent. 20 21 Q Okay. Well, there was one there was a 22 difference of -- I think it was -- it was a difference 23 because you said they were -- it was a punitive action because of the storm issues. 24 That was the Pepco, the Patomic Electric case, 25 А

Page 1614 9.31. And you can see that it's exactly 50 basis points 1 2 different than the -- the sister company, Delmarva Power & 3 Light. 4 Q Now, is that -- is that what the order said? 5 А Yes. 6 That the ROE is 9.8, but we're going to penalize Q 7 you 50 basis points? To that effect, yes. And the only thing I would 8 А 9 say is that both of those reflect a 50 basis points reduction for the company's revenue decoupling mechanism. 10 11 Q Okay. 12 А So the top line number would have been 10.31. 13 Q Okay. Thank you. Going back to -- to 531, the 14 back page, look that the charts on major rate case 15 decisions. 16 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: No. I think I've asked 17 all the questions I need, and I don't have any further 18 questions. 19 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. Commissioner 20 Kenney. 21 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER KENNEY: 22 23 Q Good morning. 24 Good morning, sir. А 25 Can you pronounce your last name? 0

	Page 1615
1	A It's Hevert, but I'm willing to go with
2	whatever.
3	Q I will call you Mr. Hevert. Thank you. I have
4	some questions. I want to start with some follow-up on
5	some of the other questions that some of the other
6	attorneys asked. And I want to start with your hourly
7	rate, which you indicated was about \$450 an hour?
8	A Well
9	Q Is it a flat rate contract and you're computing
10	what it would turn out to be per hour?
11	A It's the again, I I'm subcontracting on
12	this agreement through Concentric. And I don't recall
13	exactly what the hourly rate is. That's that's what it
14	is through Concentric.
15	My rate with my new firm is lower than that.
16	But on Concentric, that's what it is.
17	Q And are you paid the same to prepare your
18	testimony to appear here in Missouri?
19	A Yes, sir.
20	Q And you were deposed in this case?
21	A Not not in this case, no, sir.
22	Q Okay. And would your rate have been the same
23	had you been deposed?
24	A Yes, sir.
25	Q Okay. And then I looked at your direct

Page 1616
1 testimony, and it's got your your CV and it's got about
2 nine pages of cases in which you've testified at FERC and
3 various other State regulatory bodies. Is that list
4 exhaustive?
5 A It's exhausting, but
6 Q I didn't say that. But it was good reading.
7 But I'm weird.
8 A Yeah. As of as of that time, yes.
9 Q Have you ever testified for a non-utility, so,
10 for instance, on behalf of a ratepayer advocate or Office
11 of Public Counsel?
12 A Not for those agencies, no, sir.
13 Q Any non-utility industrial consumers?
14 A No. Not that I can recall.
15 Q Okay. And you said you worked at a utility,
16 too, right?
17 A Yes, I did.
18 Q So that makes that's fair enough then. Let
19 me go back to some of the questions you were in the
20 room when Mr. Martin was testifying about the credit
21 reporting agencies and credit metrics and all that?
22 A Yes, sir, I was.
23 Q So you heard some of the questions that I asked?
24 A Yes, sir.
25 Q And would you agree with the assertion that in

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	Page 1617
1	assessing whether a particular regulatory body is credit
2	supportive, Moody's, S&P and Fitch are only concerned with
3	the mechanism by which the utility is able to recover its
4	costs and expenses?
5	A Well, I think what they're what the rating
6	agencies are focused on broadly is the utility's ability
7	to meet its debt service obligations. And to the extent
8	that there are mechanisms in place that improve that
9	likelihood, improve that probability, then, yes, I agree
10	that's a focus.
11	Q And you would agree that they are not by
12	they, I mean Moody's and S&P and Fitch, they're not making
13	assessments or judgments as to the prudence and
14	reasonableness of the company's expenditures as that term
15	is used in regulatory parlance?
16	A I I think that's generally true, although I
17	could not speak to how they look at specific
18	circumstances.
19	Q Okay. All right. And I just want to follow up
20	on another question that you were asked Mr. Thompson
21	was asking you about Mr. Murray and Mr. Gorman's
22	qualifications. And you guys are all MBAs and CFAs,
23	right?
24	A Yes, sir.
25	Q And he asked you whether you recognized

	Page 1618
1	Mr. Murray and Mr. Gorman as experts. And you know
2	responded that you recognized their credentials, which I
3	think is slightly a nuance it's a nuance answer that I
4	don't know was directly responsive to Mr. Thompson's
5	question. Do you recognize Mr. Murray and Mr. Gorman as
6	experts?
7	A I believe that they have experience and
8	knowledge well in excess of a lay person. So yes, in that
9	regard, I agree with that.
10	Q That they are experts?
11	A Yes, sir.
12	Q Okay. And then you were asked about whether an
13	ROE below 9 or 10.25, which I think was the low end of
14	your range
15	A Yes.
16	Q whether anything lower than that would be
17	confiscatory, and I think you indicated you're not a
18	lawyer?
19	A Right.
20	Q You cited Hope and Bluefield in your testimony.
21	And so you have some familiarity with the legal
22	terminology that's used in rate cases and some of the
23	legal standards, right?
24	A Yes, sir.
25	Q Would it be fair to say, however, that you don't

Page 1619 1 feel that you're legally qualified to offer an opinion as 2 to whether Mr. Murray's ROE recommendations are 3 confiscatory? А From a legal point of view, I don't -- do not 4 consider myself qualified. 5 6 And then many of the other questions that I was Q 7 going to ask have already been answered and asked. And 8 Mr. -- there is some testimony, and I don't remember where 9 read it, but there's the distinction between cost of equity and return on equity. Are those two distinct terms 10 11 that are -- terms of art that have distinct meanings? 12 А Well, what I would say is that I use them as the 13 same. And, in fact -- in fact, on -- right in the front of my direct testimony I actually have a little footnote 14 there saying that I use the two terms interchangeably. In 15 my view, they're the same thing. 16 17 Q And Mr. Murray, you read his testimony, I'm 18 sure? 19 Yes. А 20 He distinguishes between cost of equity and Q 21 return on equity. 22 А He does. 23 And do you take issue with his distinction? 0 2.4 I think for -- for this purpose what we're А trying to do, which is understand the return required by 25

Page 1620 investors, that the cost of equity is, in fact, the return 1 2 on equity. 3 When you look at the methods that we use, which is that -- we look at data from thousands of investors in 4 5 the process that they use to form prices. And we infer from that the return that they require. And that required 6 7 return on equity, in my judgment, is the same thing as the 8 cost of equity. So I do not see them as separate issues. 9 I want to talk a little bit about the 0 construction of a proxy group. And the whole idea of 10 11 constructing this proxy group is to try to put together a 12 group of enterprises that are of similar risk, correct? 13 А Correct. 14 And that similar risk refers to the risk to the 0 investor's capital. Is that -- is that the risk that 15 16 we're trying to identify? 17 Α Yeah. I think that's fair to say. We're trying to -- and I'll just back up one -- one quick step, which 18 is to say that a lot of this cost of equity information is 19 20 based upon the notion of opportunity cost, meaning the 21 return you would get on one investment is the term that 22 you forgo by not investing somewhere else as a similar 23 risk. So in that perspective, yes, I agree with you. 24 So it's -- it's a term of economic art or 0 25 charter financial analyst art and a legal term of art,

Page 1621 1 correct? 2 А I would agree with that. 3 And the enterprise's risk is a measure of its 0 financial health as well? 4 5 А An enterprise's --6 The measure -- the measure of an enterprise's 0 7 risk can help you determine its financial health? I -- I think they're highly related. The 8 А company's financial health, both current and expected, 9 10 would be a consideration in determining risk, so I think the two are moved together. Right. 11 12 And here I think a few days ago, we had a Q 13 discussion -- and I don't -- I don't remember what 14 context, but we were talking about the possibility that 15 with constructing a proxy group comprised of solely 16 electric utilities that you can get into an echo chamber 17 of sorts where your ROEs are self-perpetuating, self-justified because you're looking at electric 18 19 utilities. Is it possible in constructing a proxy group for 20 21 purposes of assessing ROE to identify enterprises of similar business risks that are not electric utilities? 22 The -- I have seen people do that. I have seen 23 А 24 people look at companies in sectors beyond utilities. And in order to do that, they'll look at parameters such as 25

	Page 1622
1	value lines safety ranking, value lines, financial
2	safety rating, beta coefficients, credit ratings. And
3	they'll use the expected return on equity of the proxy for
4	utilities. That does happen, but not often.
5	Q You anticipated my question. My next question
6	was going to be what are the mechanisms one would use to
7	construct another proxy group not composed of electric
8	utilities? And you said value line, beta coefficients and
9	other mechanisms are other criteria that one could use?
10	A They are. They are metrics that people would
11	consider, measures of investment risks.
12	Q Have you ever constructed a proxy group for an
13	electric utility not comprised of utilities?
14	A No, I have not.
15	Q But you've seen it done?
16	A I've seen it done.
17	Q And would you say that to construct such a proxy
18	group is consistent with your profession and would yield
19	appropriate ROE?
20	A I'm sorry. Do you mean a proxy group beyond
21	it it could. But the reason I don't do it is because,
22	in practice, investors actually do look at separate
23	sectors. And utilities tend to be a separate sector. And
24	even within utilities, electric utilities tend to be a
25	separate sector.

Page 1623 So what I try to do is look at the market the 1 2 way investors would. And since investors do distinguish 3 among various sectors in the economy, that's why I tend to focus on the utility sector. 4 5 Q For purposes of what we're doing here, though, do you think there would be value in doing that, not maybe 6 7 as to supplant a utility, electric utility proxy group, 8 but perhaps to supplement it? 9 А And I should say in the -- the circumstances where I've seen that approach taken, it was for that 10 11 purpose, not just to supplant, as a supplement. 12 Oh, not to -- not strictly for regulatory Q 13 purposes? 14 Well, in rate cases in this type of application, Α I have seen -- I have seen people do that. 15 So you've seen it done, and it's not outside the 16 Q 17 main? I've seen it done. I'll be honest. I don't 18 А know how frequently it's accepted by regulatory 19 Commissions, but I certainly have seen it applied in 20 21 cases. 22 Q Okay. In your direct testimony, you ran a 23 constant growth DCF and then one multi-stage DCF with one terminal? 24 25 А That's correct.

Page 1624 1 Okay. And then in your rebuttal testimony, you 0 2 ran a second multi-stage with a second terminal value for 3 the --А That's correct. Yes. 4 5 Q And then Mr. Gorman also includes in his analysis a sustainable growth DCF model. Why would you 6 7 not have done also a sustainable growth DCF model? I -- in my view, the sustainable growth model is 8 Δ 9 problematic now for electric utilities because it -- it 10 makes some assumptions that I don't think necessarily hold. 11 12 If you -- it assumes that when -- that the --13 that the primary driver of growth is the amount of earnings retained and your expected return on equity. And 14 15 there's another term, which has to do with the extent of shares that you receive and the book values of those 16 17 shares. 18 But when you look at electric utilities, especially now, you have to, in my view, break apart that 19 20 component, that retention, times the expected return on 21 equity and see whether or not you think those are likely to remain stable over the coming period. 22 And as we talked about, I think payout ratios, 23 24 which is sort of the inverse of -- of retention rate, are changing over time. And so you can't really assume that 25

Page 1625 they're going to be stable over the next few years. 1 2 And when you look at the return on equity piece, 3 the expected return, I think you see, also, that as utilities are in the middle of a capital spending cycle, 4 5 the expected return is somewhat diluted by some of the investments that they make, for example. 6 7 So when you put those two things together, I 8 think they become -- there's a lot of moving parts that 9 result -- result in an expected growth rate that's low. And so, too -- and I think Mr. Gorman, you know, to his 10 11 credit, he understood that and accepted that and did not 12 give that result much weight. 13 0 So of all of the different methodologies by 14 which one can calculate ROE, you also ran a CAPM and risk premium analysis. The DC -- putting aside what we've said 15 16 in prior rate orders, because I know all of you guys 17 comment on the fact that we've accepted it in prior rate orders. Putting that aside, independently of whatever any 18 19 Commission has said, is it your opinion that -- that the 20 DCF is -- well, let me state that differently -- that the 21 multi-stage DCF methodology is the most accurate and 22 reliable measure of ROE? 23 А I -- in my view, the multistage DCF allows you to really think about what's driving the numbers and 24 allows you to make assumptions that are reasonable within 25
Page 1626 that context. And so for that reason, these days, I -- my 1 2 view is that that's a model that I - - I do tend to prefer. 3 So then if we -- I mean, the Commission was 0 4 reaching its determination, the fight, so to speak, is in 5 valuing the credibility of the inputs. Would that be fair? 6 7 А The -- I would agree with that. Yes. 8 Q All right. Let me ask a couple more questions 9 about the regulatory environment. Now, you said in your 10 direct testimony that you didn't make explicit adjustments 11 for the regulatory environment, but you did take it into 12 consideration? 13 А Yes, sir. 14 So can you -- can your consideration be 0 15 quantified? I would be reluctant to quantify it. I think --16 А 17 Q You marked this down for not being as credit supportive as maybe somebody else in another state. 18 19 I -- I think so. But the -- when I look at the А 20 -- where the recommendation wound up, both in my direct 21 testimony and subsequently in the rebuttal testimony, it's at the mid-point of the range and then toward the lower 22 23 end of the range. And so I do think it's a consideration. And I 24 do think that when you look at, for example, what some of 25

Page 1627 the rating agencies have said, that is something to be 1 2 taken into account. 3 Again, though, I think it's fair and appropriate to recognize that over time the Commission has instituted 4 5 some policies and designs that have been helpful to the company. And I think that, likewise, needs to be taken 6 7 into consideration. 8 0 And -- and so -- and you mentioned the credit 9 rating agencies. When you use the phrase credit 10 supportive, you're using it in the same fashion, with the 11 same meaning as the credit reporting agencies would use as 12 well? 13 А Yes, sir. 14 And so, again, I think we already established 0 15 when assessing credit supportiveness, they're only looking 16 at cost recovery mechanisms and the utility's ability to 17 recover their costs, not just necessary or reasonableness or prudence of expenditures, right? 18 19 А Well, I think -- right. Yeah. From the perspective of Moody's, you look at mechanisms that are in 20 21 place. And I think in large measure -- well, two things happen. One is you're able to get a sense to which those 22 mechanisms may improve the specific metrics. 23 24 They've talked about this morning the cash flow 25 coverage metrics, and then there's the more qualitative

	Page 1628
1 a	ssessment that Moody's would make that also factors in to
2 t	he assignment of the eventual credit rating. So there's,
3 I	think, really those two parts.
4	Q They're not looking at just prudence of the
5 e	expenditures as we use the term, as regulators would look
6 a	t the prudence of the expenditures?
7	A Yeah. I think the generally, not perhaps, on
8 a	case specific basis, they might.
9	Q And then I think you heard Mr. Martin testify
10 t	hat Moody's is the most transparent in putting forth the
11 c	riteria that they use and their credit metrics?
12	A Yes.
13	Q Would you agree with that?
14	A I would.
15	Q So another expert, another financial analyst,
16 c	ould take their ROE recommendation and plug it into
17 M	loody's formula and see if their ROE recommendation would
18 s	till lead to a particular credit rating?
19	A Yeah. The the only issue there is that
20	Q I mean, they can do that, right?
21	A They could. But it's because the metrics
22 t	hemselves cover I don't want to say a wide range, but
23 t	here's a range over which the metrics will fall and still
24 r	elate to a specific ratings category.
25	And as you as you go through the calculation

	Page 1629
1	to see what would happen on a proforma basis, you can have
2	fairly wide ranges of assumed cost equity ROEs that would
3	satisfy those criteria.
4	And I think, in large measure, that's partly why
5	rating agencies such as Moody's explicitly recognize that
6	there's a qualitative aspect to assigning the ratings.
7	Q So you wouldn't necessarily be able to produce
8	the exact result that a Moody's analyst would produce, but
9	could you get a general idea?
10	A I I think that's fair.
11	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I don't have any other
12	questions. Thank you.
13	A Thank you.
14	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Stoll?
15	COMMISSIONER STOLL: I have no questions, your
16	Honor. But I do want to thank Mr. Hevert for his
17	testimony.
18	A Thank you.
19	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Jarrett? You had
20	something else?
21	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Yeah. I'm sorry. Just
22	real quick, a couple quick questions.
23	RECROSS EXAMINATION
24	BY COMMISSIONER JARRETT:
25	Q Your range is from 10.25 to 11?

Page 1630 1 А Correct. 2 If we ultimately decide anywhere within your 0 3 range, would you consider that to be reasonable? Yes, sir. 4 А 5 Okay. The second thing, I wanted to flesh out Q just a little bit from Commissioner Kenney's questions and 6 7 your answers about using companies and proxy groups that 8 are not electric utilities. And you indicated you had 9 seen that in a few cases. Can you tell us which 10 Commissions have done that in your experience and when they did it? 11 12 А Well, I -- I guess that's the thing. I've seen 13 witnesses use it, but I'm not sure that I've seen Commissions necessarily embrace that approach. 14 15 Q Okay. So you're not aware of any Commission that has actually embraced that and used it in making a 16 17 decision? 18 А I am not aware of that. Correct. COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. Thank you. 19 20 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Kenney? 21 RECROSS EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER KENNEY: 22 23 Are you aware of any Commission that has 0 explicitly rejected it? 24 25 I can't think of that offhand. А No.

Page 1631 1 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: All right. 2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. And then we will 3 break for lunch now, and we'll come back at -- let's say at 1:30. 4 5 MR. BYRNE: I have something, Judge. 6 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. We're on the record. 7 MR. BYRNE: We had committed to take Ms. Ferguson out of -- out of order, and we talked about 8 9 taking her after lunch. I think given the fact that we've got to go to calculate things and read things, it might be 10 a good use of the Commission's time to take Ms. Ferguson 11 12 immediately after lunch. 13 Obviously, I'm going to miss the baseball game no matter what happens, but --14 15 COMMISSIONER GUNN: Not necessarily. 16 MR. BYRNE: But anyway, that's what I would 17 suggest, that after lunch we take Ms. Ferguson and go 18 back. 19 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Anybody have a problem with doing that? That's what we'll do, then, and then we'll 20 21 have Mr. Hevert -- Hevert back after we're done with Ms. 22 Ferguson. 23 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Judge. JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. We are on break 24 25 now till 1:30.

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1	(Break in proceedings.)
2	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Let's come to order, please.
3	We're back from lunch, and I believe there's been some
4	changes in the plans. Mr. Byrne, do you want to explain
5	what's going on?
6	MR. BYRNE: Yes. We had talked about before the
7	lunch break taking Ms. Ferguson, but Mr. Hevert has a
8	flight that he might miss if we do that. So the parties
9	have generously agreed to let us finish up with
10	Mr. Hevert, and then we would take Ms. Ferguson after
11	that.
12	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: You don't want to stay
13	here with us?
14	A I would love to, but my wife would be angry.
15	COMMISSIONER GUNN: Fair enough.
16	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. Well, we are at the
17	moment on questions from the Bench for Mr. Hevert. And,
18	Mr. Chairman, you had some documents you wanted to offer?
19	COMMISSIONER GUNN: Did the parties get a chance
20	to review review these documents?
21	MR. BYRNE: Yes.
22	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Was it a fair representation
23	what I said? Does anybody have any comments about what I
24	said or any corrections or
25	MR. BYRNE: We believe it was a fair

Page 1633 representation of what you said. 1 2 CHAIRMAN GUNN: Does anybody object -- anybody 3 object to these being marked as Commission's A and B and entered into the record? 4 5 MR. BYRNE: No. No objection. 6 MS. BAKER: No. 7 CHAIRMAN GUNN: Judge, I'd like to offer these two documents, Quarter 1, 2012 Financial Update from EEI 8 9 as A, and Quarter 2, 2012 Financial Update Rate Case Summary as Commission Exhibit B. 10 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Commission Exhibits 11 12 A and B have been offered. Any objections to their 13 receipt? Hearing none, they will be received. 14 (Commission Exhibits A and B were offered and received into evidence.) 15 JUDGE WOODRUFF: And I believe there was a 16 17 question you had pending before the break as well that the witness was going to try to answer. 18 19 RECROSS EXAMINATION BY CHAIRMAN GUNN: 20 21 The witness was going to try to do a Q 22 calculation. I asked about what effect the inclusion of 23 the Empire District Electric Company had on his calculations. 24 It turns out that I had done that calculation in 25 А

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1	in the testimony. It is actually on page 93 of my
2	rebuttal testimony. And including Empire in the group is
3	14 to 15 basis points is the effect. And that's based
4	on the multi-stage approach, which, as we talked about, is
5	the approach that we primarily focused on.
6	Q Can you point to the line? It's on page 93 in
7	your rebuttal testimony. Is that 6 through 9? No?
8	A No. I'm sorry. There's a table. Table 15.
9	And it would be and it would be the difference between
10	Step 3 and Step 2. So 9.56 less 9.42.
11	Q Got it. And that starts on Line 4 on page 93?
12	A Yes. Correct.
13	CHAIRMAN GUNN: All right. Thank you very much.
14	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Anything else?
15	CHAIRMAN GUNN: No. I don't have anything else
16	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. Then we'll move to
17	questions recross based on questions from the Bench,
18	beginning with MIEC.
19	RECROSS EXAMINATION
20	BY MS. ILES:
21	Q Mr. Hevert, in response to Chairman Gunn's
22	question just now, you pointed to page 93 of your rebuttal
23	testimony where you made that adjustment made
24	adjustments to Mr. Gorman's multi-stage DCF model,
25	correct?

	Page 1635
1	A That's correct.
2	Q And you also make the same adjustments to his
3	constant growth DCF model, and I believe that's those
4	calculations are shown on page 79 of your rebuttal
5	testimony?
6	A Yes. That's correct.
7	Q And the the effect of including Empire
8	Electric Empire District Electric Company in the proxy
9	group would be the difference between Step 2 and Step 3 on
10	that chart, correct?
11	A That's right.
12	Q Which is 32 basis points, right?
13	A It is for the constant growth. But, of course,
14	again, we talked about we could have done the
15	calculation for all of the methods. But because we
16	focused on the multi-stage, that was the basis of my
17	response.
18	Q Okay. I understand. I just wanted to make
19	clear it's different depending on the methodology.
20	A I agree with that.
21	Q Okay. Then another question in response to
22	Commissioner Jarrett's questions, he pointed out, I
23	believe, and you may recall, that in Exhibit 4 or 530,
24	the RRA from showing the major case major rate case
25	decisions from January through June of 2012.

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1	But according to the footnotes on page 5, which
2	relate to the numbers shown on page 4, the Footnote B
3	shows that some of those ROEs were set in cases that
4	involved settlement, correct? Do you recall that
5	A Yes, I do.
6	Q those questions? So in your experience in
7	working on rate cases, isn't it true that rate cases
8	frequently are either partially or fully resolved through
9	a stipulation?
10	A As a as a general proposition?
11	Q Yes.
12	A Is your question are certain aspects of any
13	given case settled rather than fully litigated?
14	Q Right. They they are, aren't they? I mean,
15	they're it's not unusual I mean, obviously, just
16	looking at this chart, that B footnote shows up on a lot
17	of those decisions?
18	A Yeah. And I think we talked about that this
19	morning.
20	Q Right.
21	A So I would agree with that.
22	Q Right. I didn't think that was controversial.
23	Also in your experience, I mean, in trying to figure out,
24	well, what does that tell us about the ROE, we know that
25	if a company has entered into a stipulation that involves

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1 the ROE, wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that they 2 consider whatever settlement they're entering into as a 3 fair -- a fair return for them? Well, I -- I think the company would take into 4 А 5 consideration the -- the give and take involved in -- in settlement. And so there would be aspects of the case 6 7 that, that they perhaps trade off for something else. But 8 on balance, the company would consider the totality of the outcome to be reasonable. 9 10 Right. But there wouldn't be any reason Q 11 necessarily to assume that because there was a partial or 12 full stipulation that those ROEs are unusually low or 13 lower than they would have been had the Commission issued a decision? 14 15 You know, I can't answer that because, as we А said, the stipulation, settlements typically involve some 16 17 give and take. And as to what the ROE would have been absent that give and take, I think it's hard to say. 18 19 MS. ILES: All right. That's all. JUDGE WOODRUFF: And from Public Counsel? 20 21 MS. BAKER: No questions. Thank you, Mr. Hevert. 22 23 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. For Staff? 2.4 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. 25 RECROSS EXAMINATION

	Page 1638
1	BY MR. THOMPSON:
2	Q Mr. Hevert, you'll recall that Commissioner
3	Jarrett was asking you about the numbers in the RRA
4	report, and you agreed with him that with respect to 2011,
5	the average, the 10.2 is a good number, I think was what
6	you used, the words you used? Do you recall that?
7	A Yes. I recall that.
8	Q Okay. Do you recall the RRA regulatory focus
9	there, Exhibit 530?
10	A I'm sorry. You said that 2010 I'm sorry.
11	Could you repeat your question?
12	Q I thought that you told Commissioner Jarrett
13	that 10.2 was a good number for 2011.
14	A See, I I thought that question had to do with
14 15	A See, I I thought that question had to do with the 12 months ended June 30th, 2012.
15	the 12 months ended June 30th, 2012.
15 16	the 12 months ended June 30th, 2012. Q Well, there was a question about that as well.
15 16 17	<pre>the 12 months ended June 30th, 2012. Q Well, there was a question about that as well. A Okay.</pre>
15 16 17 18	<pre>the 12 months ended June 30th, 2012. Q Well, there was a question about that as well. A Okay. Q What I wanted to direct your attention to is</pre>
15 16 17 18 19	<pre>the 12 months ended June 30th, 2012. Q Well, there was a question about that as well. A Okay. Q What I wanted to direct your attention to is that paragraph that you were asked to read by Ms. Baker on</pre>
15 16 17 18 19 20	<pre>the 12 months ended June 30th, 2012. Q Well, there was a question about that as well. A Okay. Q What I wanted to direct your attention to is that paragraph that you were asked to read by Ms. Baker on the first page of Exhibit 530 where it talks about</pre>
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>the 12 months ended June 30th, 2012. Q Well, there was a question about that as well. A Okay. Q What I wanted to direct your attention to is that paragraph that you were asked to read by Ms. Baker on the first page of Exhibit 530 where it talks about excluding the Virginia surcharge rider generation cases.</pre>
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	<pre>the 12 months ended June 30th, 2012. Q Well, there was a question about that as well. A Okay. Q What I wanted to direct your attention to is that paragraph that you were asked to read by Ms. Baker on the first page of Exhibit 530 where it talks about excluding the Virginia surcharge rider generation cases. A Yes. I recall that.</pre>

Page 1639 Which exhibit was this? 1 А 2 Exhibit 530, the Regulatory Focus for July 6th, 0 3 2012. Right. And this would be the first paragraph? 4 Α 5 First paragraph on the first page. And I have a Q copy of it if you need it. 6 7 А Oh, no. I've got it right here. Thank you, 8 though. Yes. I'm sorry. Yes, there is. 9 Okay. And don't you agree that 10.05 is a 0 better number, at least for the period under consideration 10 there? 11 12 А Well, I think the 10.05 does -- as I said 13 earlier, what I have done, which is to exclude for the purpose of -- for the limited purpose of looking at the 14 15 average authorized return, the generation cases in Virginia. So it's -- which is not to say there's not 16 17 information in those cases. But for the purpose of this calculation, I do exclude that and I agree with that. 18 19 Q Okay. Then to follow up on a question that 20 Commissioner Kenney asked you, whether or not cost of 21 equity and return on equity are the same thing, do you 22 recall that question? А I do. 23 24 And you indicated that you thought, for the Q 25 purpose of what we're doing here, they were the same thing

Page 1640 1 since you're attempting to calculate the return required 2 by investors. 3 А Yes. 4 Q Okay. But there's another way to look at that 5 cost of equity, isn't there? Just -- in other words, in the same way that with return on equity, there is, in 6 7 fact, the company's objective earned return on equity that 8 can be deduced from its operations, the results of its 9 operations, isn't there an objective return -- or cost of 10 equity that can be deduced? А 11 I'm sorry. Are you suggesting that the 12 accounting return on book equity is the same thing as the 13 market required return on common equity? 14 I'm suggesting it's a different way of looking 0 at return on equity. Don't you agree? 15 I think that what you're suggesting has been 16 А 17 often referred to as the comparable earnings approach, which is an approach that really has not been given much 18 traction recently. I don't think comparable earnings is a 19 20 -- a way of estimating the -- the return for two reasons. 21 One is it's historical. It's backward looking. We're looking forward. And we're trying to understand 22 what the return will be and what the required return on 23 the market is going forward. 24 25 And in so doing, we use market-based data as

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1	opposed to accounting-based data. So I think those two
2	distinctions, the use of market versus accounting based
3	data and using forward versus backward looking data are
4	two reasons why I don't think using historical earned
5	return on book equity is an appropriate method.
6	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. No further questions.
7	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Redirect?
8	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
9	BY MR. BYRNE:
10	Q Mr. Hevert, just real quickly, Chairman Gunn
11	asked you some questions about those EEI reports that had
12	been marked as exhibits. Did you get a chance to look at
13	those over the lunch hour?
14	A Yes, I did.
15	Q And, you know, was what Chairman Gunn
16	represented about those reports basically a fair
17	representation?
18	A Yes. I think it's a fair representation. It's
19	fact-based. There's some commentary, as we discussed, but
20	on balance, it's generally fact-based analysis.
21	Q Okay. You earlier this morning, you were
22	given some exhibits by Ms. Iles, and I'd like to go
23	through them if I might.
24	The first exhibit she gave you was 529, which
25	says Cost of Capital Analyses, Changes Since Ameren

Page 1642 Missouri's -- Last Ameren Missouri Rate Case. Can you see 1 2 that one? 3 А Yes, I do. Okay. And -- and as I understand this exhibit, 4 Q 5 at the top, it shows the results of your constant growth DCF from the last rate case and it compares it to your 6 7 position on -- in your direct testimony and your position 8 in your rebuttal testimony, and then it calculates the 9 difference; is that correct? 10 Yes. That's correct. А 11 Let me ask you, first of all, are you primarily Q 12 relying on your constant growth DCF analysis? 13 А No. As we discussed this morning, most of the witnesses in this case -- I think we all give considerable 14 weight to the multi-stage and not so much the constant 15 growth model. 16 17 0 And, I mean, what's wrong with the constant growth model? 18 19 As we said, the constant growth model is really А subject to a number of limiting assumptions. And to the 20 21 extent those assumptions do not hold, in reality, they can 22 give you biased and unreliable results. And in my view, when the market is this 23 volatile, when you see results change that much over a 24 short period of time, you have to wonder the extent to 25

	Page 1643
1	which those assumptions play into that change. And and
2	I think that's in large measure, again, why we tend to
3	give more weight to other forms of the model, the
4	multi-stage form of the model instead of this one.
5	Q I mean, to the extent that that I guess,
6	basically, it shows from your last rate case
7	recommendation on the constant growth DCF model until your
8	rebuttal, there's a looks like a 91 basis point
9	difference; is that correct?
10	A That's correct.
11	Q Does that suggest that Ameren Missouri's cost of
12	equity is 91 base points lower than it was last time?
13	A No. As I said this morning, I don't disagree
14	that the cost of equity has fallen somewhat, but,
15	certainly, not 91 basis points worth.
16	Q Okay. I guess the same I guess the lower
17	part of the exhibit shows declines in A rated utility bond
18	yields and BAA rated utility bond yields. And it looks to
19	me like well, this doesn't tie to your testimony, but
20	it looks to me like what they're trying to show is during
21	the period when the rates were set in the last rate case
22	until, I guess this last summer, there's been a decline in
23	bond yields; is that true?
24	A That's what this shows. Yes.
25	Q Okay. And, I mean, does that suggest to you

4

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1	that there's a comparable reduction in Ameren Missouri's
2	cost of equity?
3	A No. Again, for two reasons. One is, as I
4	mentioned earlier this morning, when you look at the
5	composition of that return, Treasury yields and the credit
6	spread, you'll see that, in fact, when you're looking at
7	BAA bonds, for example, the credit spread has increased
8	over the past year.
9	So while the the Treasury rates has fallen,
10	the credit spread, the increment required by investors to
11	be compensated for the risk, has actually gone up. And in
12	my view, it's important to look at both of those things.
13	I recognize the Treasury yields have fallen.
14	But it's also important to understand that the incremental
15	return required spread over Treasuries has somewhat gone
16	up. That of course, extends to the cost of equity as
17	well, the equity risk premium having gone up even as
18	especially as Treasury yields have gone down.
19	Q So does Exhibit 529 tell you anything about the
20	magnitude in any change on return on equity between the
21	last case and now?
22	A I don't believe so. No.
23	Q Regulatory Focus, which is Exhibit 530, Ms. Iles
24	marked and put in the record. That's the major rate case
25	decisions from RRA from January the through June of

Page 1645 1 2012; is that correct? 2 Α Yes. 3 I wanted to ask you a couple of questions. 0 First of all, there's been some discussion about how the 4 5 actual results for the first six months of 2012 were 10.36 percent. But then that was adjusted down to 10.22 percent 6 7 to take out these Virginia decisions; is that right? Yes. That's correct. 8 Α 9 And my understanding is all of your analyses 0 takes out the Virginia decisions; is that right? 10 Α It does. Yes. 11 12 And that chart, for example, that we have up on Q 13 the easel, that excludes the Virginia decisions, doesn't 14 it? 15 Yes, it does. А 16 Okay. And my question is, is there any -- is Q 17 there any value -- is there any value to looking at the Virginia decisions in addition to the other decisions? 18 19 Well, I think the -- the Virginia decisions --А 20 well, I'd say for the sake of consistency, I did take them 21 out of all of my analyses. And I think it's appropriate to do that. 22 23 But when you look at the Virginia decisions and you recognize that what the Commission has done is to 24 provide an incentive for in-state generation. So the 25

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1	Commission essentially identified a a public objective
2	and developed incentives in order to meet that public
3	objective, which is in the form of the premium allowed on
4	the rate of return.
5	Q And and are those some of the same issues
6	we're struggling with in Missouri?
7	A Yes.
8	Q Okay. I notice if you look on page 4 of the
9	exhibit that has the electric utility decisions, the I
10	guess it's the first and second quarter both. And I
11	Chairman Gunn asked you about the whole a question
12	about Hawaii, and I think there is a 20-month you know,
13	there was a 20-month period of time for the rate case. Do
14	you recall that question?
15	A Yes, I do.
16	Q But I noticed that the decision on Hawaii has an
17	I by it. Do you know what I means?
18	A The the footnote the I indicates that
19	interim rates were implemented prior to the issuance of
20	the final order.
21	Q And and does would interim is there any
22	relationship between interim rates and the length of the
23	regulatory process?
24	A Well, the longer the process, the the more
25	detrimental it would be not to have interim rates put in.

Page 1647 The lag would be extraordinary. The interim rates, of 1 2 course, is a way of mitigating that. 3 Do you know about any other -- any other things 0 about Hawaiian regulation or any aspects that are relevant 4 5 to that in Hawaiian regulation? 6 Well, Hawaii Electric -- and I believe Maui as А 7 well have, for example, decoupling mechanisms which 8 decouple the revenue from usage. And in addition, they 9 have a -- a revenue adjustment mechanism and a combination of those two things are, in some sense, the functional 10 equivalent of a formula rate plan such that revenues are 11 12 meant to be separated from volumes and, at the same time, 13 expenses are subject to an increase, a formula increase outside of the context of a full rate case proceeding. 14 15 Okay. I noticed, you know, one of the footnotes Q 16 -- by some of these footnotes is D. can you tell me what 17 D is? D means that it applies to electric delivery 18 А only, so these are companies that do not have generating 19 20 access. 21 0 When you do your averages, do you include or 22 exclude the D companies? We're focused on vertically generated companies 23 А that own generation as well as distribution. I tend to 24 25 exclude the distribution only companies.

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1	Q And why is that?
2	A Well, because the Commissions that have
3	jurisdiction over those companies typically view them as
4	being less risky than vertically integrated companies
5	because they don't have generation and the operating
6	regulatory financial risk associated with generating
7	assets.
8	Q I believe Commissioner Jarrett asked you about
9	the 2011 returns. Do you recall that?
10	A Yes.
11	MR. BYRNE: I'd like to mark an exhibit if I
12	could.
13	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Your next number is
14	69.
15	Q (By Mr. Byrne) Can you identify that exhibit,
16	Mr. Hevert?
17	A This, again, is a Regulatory Research Associates
18	report, and it's major rate case decisions for calendar
19	year 2011.
20	Q And the first page, what does it show for the
21	average return for electric utilities?
22	A On the first page, it says the average return on
23	equity authorized electric utilities was 10.22 percent.
24	MR. BYRNE: Okay. Your Honor, I'd offer that
25	exhibit.

Page 1649 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Exhibit 69 has been offered. 1 2 Any objections to its receipt? Hearing none, it will be 3 received. (Exhibit 69 was offered and received into 4 5 evidence.) 6 Q (By Mr. Byrne) Okay. I'd like to talk to you 7 about Exhibit 531, which was S&L RRA data for the third --8 I guess it's for the third quarter. It's the single page document. And do you have that? 9 10 Yes, I do. А 11 Okay. And I think there's -- there's a list of 0 12 all the companies. I think it's electric and gas 13 companies, distribution and non-distribution. And I think 14 there were only a handful of companies that you identified 15 that were electric, fully integrated. Can you tell me what those are? 16 17 А Those were PacifiCorp, Entergy Texas, PacifiCorp again and Oklahoma Gas & Electric. 18 19 Q Okay. And I think you said Entergy Texas --20 well, what was the -- Entergy Texas got a 9.8 percent 21 return on equity. Do you have any explanation for that? 22 Α Well, the one observation I would have, again, is that Texas typically is considered to be among the 23 24 least credit supportive jurisdictions. 25 0 How -- how about the PacifiCorp Utah decision?

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1	Do you have any knowledge about that?
2	A Well, I think as we were talking about just a
3	bit earlier, the PacifiCorp decision was a settlement, and
4	it's my understanding it was involved a multi-year
5	settlement. It involved the deferral of some substantial
6	investments.
7	And so there were elements of the case that,
8	again, would be beneficial to the company as part of the
9	entire settlement and as part of the of the overall
10	case.
11	Q I I think well, do you remember or
12	maybe could you could you tell me if you don't remember
13	what the average of integrated electric utility returns on
14	equity for the quarter was? I think it was 9.9 percent;
15	is that right?
16	A It was 9.9. Correct.
17	Q All right. And do you have any I mean, is
18	there any issue with relying on a single quarter of data
19	with a handful of data points in it?
20	A Well, I think any analysis where you're trying
21	to understand some measure of central tendency is
22	relies on more data than less. And I think in a
23	circumstance where you have four observations, I think
24	it's hard to draw conclusions from that regarding the
25	level of returns, the level of required returns overall

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1	for the electric utility industry.
2	Q I mean, do you know if this Commission has
3	typically relied on a single quarter's worth of data, or
4	have they looked at longer periods of time?
5	A My my recollection is the Commission has
6	looked at six and 12-month periods.
7	Q Okay. Commissioner Kenney asked you some
8	questions about the idea of having a proxy group composed
9	of non-utility companies. Do you remember that question?
10	A Yes, I do.
11	Q And I think that ties in with an issue that's
12	come up before, which is the idea that if you use utility
13	companies in the proxy group, you're you're sort of
14	engaged in a circular exercise. Do you do you know
15	what I'm talking about?
16	A I do.
17	Q And and could you address that? Is there a
18	problem with circularity when you use utility companies in
19	proxy groups?
20	A Well, it it is not an issue that concerns me
21	for this purpose, really, for a couple of reasons. One is
22	that, just as a factual matter as we've been noticing
23	today, the numbers have been drifting downward.
24	And if there were sort of a self-perpetuating
25	cycle, you would imagine that there would be no such drift

Page 1652 over time. But we have seen the numbers come down. 1 And 2 as I've said, even based on my analyses, I've suggested 3 somewhat of a downward drift. And I think those two things are consistent. 4 5 But when I look at the way Commissions typically arrive at authorized returns, they are market based, use 6 7 the same methods that we use here. So Commissions will 8 look to the same types of models, the same types of data. 9 By necessity, you have to use proxy groups because you cannot rely -- for the reasons we talked about 10 11 a minute ago, you can't rely on a single company. There 12 could be all sorts of the anomalies that would be in the 13 data that could significantly skew your result. And you also have the issue of opportunity cost 14 and comparable risk, comparable return standards. So it's 15 important to use proxy groups in developing the cost of 16 17 equity. But the methodologies are market-based. 18 And I think the other important consideration is that it is an observable data point that is of value to 19 the financial community. Investors notice it. It's the 20 21 reason that Regulatory Research Associates publish this 22 data. So it's information that's noted, relied upon by 23 the financial community. But at their core, these 24 decisions really are market-based decisions. 25

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1	Q If you look and I know you're saying
2	currently there's a there's a drift downward that's
3	being reflected. But if you look back in history, have
4	utility commissions increased and decreased authorized
5	returns on equity as market conditions change?
6	A They do.
7	Q And and so, for example, what were returns on
8	equities back in the late '70s and early '80s, if you
9	know?
10	A Well, certainly much higher during periods of
11	higher inflation. Higher long-term interest rates, for
12	example, they were higher then.
13	Q How about in the '90s, if you know?
14	A Same thing. The returns in the '90s were in the
15	mid 11, close to 12 percent range.
16	Q Okay. You you talked a little bit to some of
17	the Commissioners about the impact of having or not having
18	regulatory mechanisms in your rate, return on equity
19	analysis. And I think you said, you know, since maybe
20	there are fewer of them in Missouri, you took that into
21	consideration, but it wasn't you couldn't particularly
22	quantify it. Do you remember the that discussion?
23	A Yes, I do.
24	Q And I guess what I wanted to ask is about a
25	particular mechanism and whether you took it into account

Page 1654 1 when you estimated your return on equity. And that is 2 what Ameren Missouri's requesting in this case, which is 3 plant in service accounting. Is that taken into account 4 in your return on equity estimate or not? 5 А It is. And, again, going back to the notion that estimating the cost of equity is a comparative 6 7 analysis, when you look at the type of mechanisms that are 8 in place, the ability for some companies to include 9 construction work in progress in rate base and earn a current return on it or to use a forecasted -- fully or 10 11 partially forecast test year for the purpose of developing 12 the rate base, those are elements that serve the purpose 13 of trying to have companies address the dilutive effect of making substantial capital investments between rate cases. 14 15 And so when you look to the fact that a lot of these companies have that ability or have such mechanisms, 16 17 by comparison, in my view, the plant in service accounting structure is not incrementally risk mitigating. It does 18 not bring the cost of equity down. 19 20 So how many basis points of adjustment should Q 21 the return on equity be adjusted downward if -- if Ameren 22 Missouri gets plant in service accounting? None. Again, because the other -- the proxy 23 А companies have the ability in large measure to -- to have 24 25 those types of mechanisms available to them.

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1	Q I think in response to one of the Commissioners'
2	questions, you were talking about using Value Line,
3	Zack's, First Call growth rates for your constant growth
4	analysis, and you and you mentioned using the mean or
5	the median. Do you recall that?
6	A Yes.
7	Q When would you use the mean, and when would you
8	use the median?
9	A Well, the the median, of course, is a number
10	that takes into account the effect of outlying
11	observations, numbers that are very high, very low
12	relative to the average.
13	And so to the extent that there's significant
14	outliers, you would use the median as opposed to the mean.
15	Q And if there are not significantly outliers?
16	A Typically, the mean.
17	Q Mr. Thompson asked you well, I'm not even
18	sure if it was Mr. Thompson addressed it in his opening
19	statement. Someone asked but, you know, at what points
20	rates become confiscatory. Do you recall those questions?
21	A I do.
22	Q And I guess my question to you is I know
23	you're not a lawyer, but do you think this Commission
24	should set Ameren's Missouri's return on equity at the
25	edge of legal confiscation?

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1	A I think that would be I think a rate that's
2	so low to be considered, as you describe it, at the edge
3	of confiscation would be would put the company in a
4	difficult financial position.
5	Again, we have to remember that the return on
6	equity is important, not only for the purpose of providing
7	a compensatory return to shareholders, but also for the
8	purpose of maintaining the company's financial integrity
9	and, therefore, enabling its access to the capital
10	markets. So I think for those reasons we have to be very
11	careful along those lines.
12	MR. BYRNE: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Hevert.
13	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Mr. Hevert, you can step down
14	and get on your plane.
15	MR. HEVERT: Thank you so much.
16	CHAIRMAN GUNN: Thank you
17	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. It's my
18	understanding, then, we're going to move on to
19	Ms. Ferguson on severance cost.
20	MR. THOMPSON: That's my understanding, Judge.
21	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Are we going to do openings on
22	that issue now or wait Tuesday to do that?
23	MR. LOWERY: I'm not going to do one because I'm
24	not prepared to do one.
25	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. That's fine by me. Go

Page 1657 ahead and bring Ms. Ferguson up, then. Good afternoon. 1 2 MS. FERGUSON: Good afternoon. 3 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Raise your right hand, and I'll 4 swear you in. 5 LISA FERGUSON, being first duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole 6 7 truth, and nothing but the truth, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION 8 BY MR. THOMPSON: 9 10 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. You may inquire. 11 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Judge. 12 (By Mr. Thompson) State your name, please. Q 13 А Lisa Ferguson. 14 And are you the same Lisa Ferguson that Q 15 contributed to the Staff revenue requirement cost of 16 service report and also prepared or caused to be prepared 17 surrebuttal testimony designated as Exhibit 232-HC? 18 А Yes. 19 Is that all your testimony, or did I miss a Q 20 piece? 21 JUDGE WOODRUFF: 232NP. 22 Q (By Mr. Thompson) 232NP? I'm sorry. I believe that's all. 23 А 24 Q Okay. Do you have any corrections to any of 25 that testimony?

Page 1658 А I do not. 1 2 And if I asked you those questions today, would 0 3 your answers be the same? А Yes. 4 5 Q And is the information contained in those pieces of testimony true and correct to the best of your 6 7 knowledge and belief? 8 A Yes. 9 MR. THOMPSON: At this time, your Honor, I will offer Exhibits 232 and 233 and tender Ms. Ferguson for 10 cross-examination. 11 12 JUDGE WOODRUFF: 232 and 233 have been offered. 13 Any objections to their receipt? Hearing none, they will 14 be received. (Exhibits 232 and 233 were offered and received 15 into evidence.) 16 17 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Cross-examination, we begin 18 with MIEC. 19 CROSS-EXAMINATION 20 BY MR. DOWNEY: 21 Q Good afternoon, Ms. Ferguson. A Good afternoon. 22 23 I'm Ed Downey. I represent the MIEC. Since we Q did not have opening statements, could you just briefly 24 25 tell us what the issue is that we're addressing this

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1 afternoon?

A Sure. We're addressing VS11 severance costs. These were severance costs that were incurred by the company in the end of 2011. The severance costs -- the Staff considers them to be non-recurring costs. And we consider them non-recurring because we -- we can't tell or predict them in the future. They're irregular costs that don't happen on a regular basis.

9 That being said, there's usually two occurrences 10 where Staff would allow a non-recurring cost. And one of 11 those would be where there is an act of God and the 12 company can recover those costs through an AAO.

13 The other is -- is if a company incurs a large 14 amount of costs upfront in order to have future costs, 15 which is what's happening in this case.

16 If they -- what we usually do is we allow the 17 company to have a chance to recover those costs. If they 18 do not recover those costs, we give them an ability to 19 recover those costs as long as they have an added cost 20 recovery through amortization? 21 In this case, the company has recovered their 22 costs by the effective date of rates, and I believe

23 anything that we would consider giving them in future 24 rates would be considered double recovery.

Q Okay. What is the amount of these voluntary

25

Page 1660 1 separation 2011 costs? 2 Α They're \$25.8 million. 3 Okay. And have you calculated the resultant Q cost savings through the operation of law date, which 4 5 would be January 2nd of 2013? 6 А Yes, I have. 7 And let me ask you a question. Is this a highly Q 8 confidential number? I'm under the understanding that the total 9 А amount is not, but the individual numbers might be; is 10 that correct? 11 12 MR. LOWERY: The total number is not. (By Mr. Downey) Okay. would you tell the 13 Q 14 Commission what the cost savings were or what they're 15 expected to be by that date? 16 А What I have calculated --17 0 Yes. -- as cost savings? Yes. I have calculated 18 А approximate cost savings of \$26 million. 19 20 Q And is that a conservative number? 21 А Yes, it is. 22 Q Would you explain what you mean? 23 А This number includes only the amount of payroll, 24 the payroll taxes, and the benefits that are comprised by the employees that left. And I - - I originally had a - - a25

Page 1661 more general calculation. I have since then refined my 1 2 calculation. And these salary savings are based off of 3 the actual dates that these employees left employment at Ameren Missouri. That is the same for the benefits and 4 5 the payroll taxes. I have since in my refined calculation added a calculation for the capitalized piece in addition 6 7 to the O&M piece. 8 Q Did you consider any kind of incentive 9 compensation savings? 10 No, I did not. And that's -- that's usually a А 11 very large number. I also did not consider any future 12 pension and OPEB savings. There's -- other things that we 13 could consider, such as future payroll increases. Т didn't include any of that, and any training cost, any 14 15 equipment cost, anything that would be in relation to these employees leaving. 16 17 Q Okay. To state the obvious, then, your calculated cost savings exceeds the actual VS11 costs that 18 19 Ameren incurred; is that correct? 20 А Yes, it does. 21 Did you review MIEC witness Steve Carver's Q 22 testimony? 23 Yes, I did. А 2.4 0 And did he estimate a VS11 savings as well? 25 Yes, he did. Α
	Page 1662
1	Q Is his the same or different than yours?
2	A His is slightly different than mine.
3	Q Do you know why?
4	A I believe it's because he didn't do he didn't
5	calculate the exact times that these employees left
6	Ameren. So I believe his salary is just slightly
7	different.
8	Q Okay. Do you know if the company agrees that
9	the cost savings and the amount of the VS11 cost that
10	Ameren incurred are roughly equal?
11	A I'm sorry. Can you say that again?
12	Q Do you know if the company agrees that the cost
13	savings resulting from VS11 is roughly equal to the cost
14	of implementing VS11?
15	A Roughly. Yes.
16	MR. DOWNEY: Okay. Thank you. Nothing further.
17	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Public Counsel?
18	MR. MILLS: Those were most of my questions, but
19	I do have one more.
20	CROSS-EXAMINATION
21	BY MR. MILLS:
22	Q The savings that you and Mr. Downey talked
23	about, are those persistent savings that will last beyond
24	calendar year 2012?
25	A In reference to anything

	Page 1663
1	Q The savings from the employees leaving that
2	you've calculated. You've calculated an annual amount
3	roughly for calendar year 2012, correct?
4	A Yes.
5	Q And will those savings persist beyond the
6	effective date of rates in this case?
7	A They will persist.
8	MR. MILLS: Okay. That's all I had. Thank you.
9	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. For Ameren?
10	CROSS-EXAMINATION
11	BY MR. LOWERY:
12	Q Good afternoon, Ms. Ferguson.
13	A Good afternoon.
14	Q Do you have a copy of your testimony, both the
15	part of the direct case, the direct report and your
16	surrebuttal? You have that with you; is that true?
17	A I do. Yes.
18	Q And do you have a copy of your deposition with
19	you?
20	A I do.
21	Q Mr. Downey took some of my questions away as
22	well, so I won't have nearly as many for you. I think in
23	response to Mr. Mills' question, you indicated well,
24	let me back up.
25	The the revised calculation that you talked

Page 1664 1 about with Mr. Downey, it's a calculation you actually --2 I don't know whether you completed it, but you provided it 3 to the parties yesterday afternoon; isn't that right? Yes, I did. 4 А 5 Q And that revised calculation is not exactly an annual number, right, because you have -- you took in 6 7 account payroll and benefit savings and associated taxes 8 for employees who left in the latter part of 2011 pursuant 9 to this program, correct? 10 Yes. It's from when each employee left to the А effective date. 11 12 Right. And so -- since a relatively small 0 13 number of employees relative to the total left before 14 January 1, 2012, and also since you picked up two days in 15 2013, your number is not exactly an annual number, right? 16 А I guess you would not consider it an annual 17 number. 18 Q Well, here's what I'm trying to get at. Your 19 number is -- is payroll and benefit savings and associated 20 taxes covering a period of more than 12 months, right, for 21 some of these employees? Yes. But I don't understand how an annual 22 Α 23 number -- I don't understand the importance of that. 24 That's not my question. My question is, is it 0 25 an annual number or not?

	Page 1665
1	A No.
2	Q The annual number, though, the annual payroll
3	and benefits savings and associated taxes would be a
4	little bit less than that total; is that fair to say?
5	A Probably, yes.
6	Q But not significantly less; is that fair to say?
7	A Yes.
8	Q Okay. So the $$ the O&M that will be reflected
9	in the revenue requirement used to set rates in this case,
10	and that would be through $7/31/12$, right, through the
11	true-up period?
12	A Yes.
13	Q The O&M that's going to be reflected is going to
14	be lower by almost as much as the number that you came up
15	with. It's going to be lower by almost that much because
16	all of these roughly 340 employees left as a result of
17	this program, right?
18	A I believe the capital and O&M would both be
19	lower.
20	Q Okay. I'm just talking about O&M at this point,
21	just so we're clear.
22	A Okay.
23	Q I think your calculation is that we'll just
24	look at the O&M piece. I think your calculation is that
25	the total savings, capital and O&M, again, this this

Page 1666 1 number that isn't exactly an annual number was around \$26 2 million, right? 3 А Yes. 4 Q The O&M piece of that is roughly \$25 million, 5 correct? 6 А Yes. Uh-huh. 7 Q So the operations and maintenance expenses 8 reflected in the revenue requirement upon which rates will 9 be based in this case are going to be lower by probably 10 not 25 million, but something close to 25 million as a 11 result of these roughly 340 employees leaving pursuant to 12 this program, right? 13 А Yes. 14 Okay. And -- and that's why, you know, a 0 program like this, and this program in particular, can 15 16 provide substantial benefits to ratepayers because we end 17 up with that reduced test year or trued up test year level of cost; isn't that right? 18 19 А That's true. But there's also benefits to the 20 company. 21 But there are -- that 24 plus million dollars Q 22 benefit is going to be baked into rates, right? 23 А Yes. And -- and that -- that benefit -- putting aside 24 0 25 whatever benefit you say the company may get, that

Page 1667 1 benefit, customers are going to get it next year, and if 2 there's not another rate case the next year unless these 3 employees were hired back; isn't that true? These cost savings, you will have recovered your 4 Α 5 cost by cost savings. On a going forward basis, we will have annualized your payroll levels to met what is needed. 6 7 But you didn't answer my question, Ms. Q 8 Ferguson. The rates set in this case are using a revenue 9 requirement that is, can we agree, approximately 24 million plus lower on the O&M side than it otherwise would 10 11 have been if these roughly 340 people had not left as a 12 result of the program? True or false? 13 А True. 14 And so -- and then we'll calculate rates based 0 15 on a revenue requirement that's 24 million lower, right? 16 А True. 17 Q And if there are no new rates before 12/31/13, 18 then customers will pay rates reflected that lower revenue 19 requirement through all of '13, correct? 20 А Yes. 21 And if there are no new rates before 12/31/14, 0 22 customers will pay rates that are also based on that lower 23 revenue requirement throughout all of '14, correct? 2.4 А Yes. 25 So for those two years, customer rates in total, 0

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1	if you assume normalized sales and the sales don't vary,
2	will have in total then \$48 million lower roughly than
3	they would have been had these 340 employees not left as a
4	result of this program. Isn't that true?
5	A Yes.
6	Q It's not Staff's position that the VS11 program
7	is imprudent, is it?
8	A No, it's not.
9	Q And as we just discussed, it's obviously not the
10	Staff's position that the program won't benefit
11	ratepayers; isn't that true?
12	A That is true.
13	Q It's also true that the company did not have to
14	offer this program at all; isn't that right?
15	A That is true.
16	Q In other words, the company could have chosen to
17	continue to employ these 340 people or roughly 340 people
18	and continue to pay them, right?
19	A That's true.
20	Q And had the company done that, then the trued up
21	test year O&M used to set rates in this case would have
22	been approximately 24 plus million higher than it's going
23	to be; isn't that right?
24	A That's true.
25	Q So in '13 and '14 in my hypothetical when

Page 1669 1 there's no new rates, customers would have paid about 48 2 million plus more in rates than they're going to pay; 3 isn't that right? А That's true. 4 5 Because of the company's decision to engage in Q this program; isn't that right? 6 7 А That's true. 8 Q All else being equal, if the company cannot 9 obtain a financial benefit as a result of a severance 10 program, then even you would agree that perhaps that would 11 provide a disincentive for the company to offer such a 12 program in the future, right? I don't believe it does provide a disincentive. 13 Α 14 Well, you said at your deposition -- would you 0 turn to page 73, please? 15 16 А 73. 17 0 Line No. 16 and confirm that I'm reading the question and answer correctly. Question -- and this 18 19 wasn't my question, but I'm going to read it anyway. 20 Question: I don't want to beat this to death 21 either, but if the company can't, for whatever reason, obtain a financial benefit as a result of a severance 22 23 program, do you think that provides a disincentive for that company to offer that or a similar severance program 24 in the future? 25

Page 1670 1 Answer: I don't know. There could be benefits 2 other than financial. 3 Question: Managerial efficiencies, things of that nature? 4 5 Answer: Right. There could be other 6 possibilities. 7 Question: What if I am talking just purely 8 about financial benefits? 9 Answer: All else being equal, perhaps yes. 10 Did I read that accurately? 11 А Yes. 12 Now, I want to talk about your revised Q 13 calculation is a little bit that you sent us yesterday. 14 And I think your point is that in addition to O&M savings in the form of lower payroll benefits and the taxes 15 16 associated with that -- and I'm putting aside your 17 theories or your contention or your belief about pension and OPEB. I'm putting that aside. Do you follow me? 18 19 А Okay. 20 But in addition to O&M savings, you claim that Q 21 there's about an additional million dollars of savings for 22 the company associated with the portion of these 340 23 employees' salaries that historically had been allocated to capital, right? 24 25 А Yes.

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1	Q And when I say allocated to capital, what that
2	means is you have employees paid \$60,000 a year. Perhaps
3	25 percent of that employee's salary gets capitalized on
4	the company's books because it's deemed under the
5	accounting rules that they're working on a capital project
6	or something of that nature, right?
7	A Yes.
8	Q That's the capital portion we're talking about
9	here, right?
10	A Yes.
11	Q Okay. Now, let me let me ask you this. It's
12	my understanding that the company and the Staff have
13	agreed or they very nearly agree on both plant in service
14	and the depreciation reserve balances that will be used to
15	set rates in this case as of 7/31/12?
16	A Yes.
17	Q Okay. Now, when the company allocates some part
18	of an employee's salary, benefits and taxes, the
19	associated taxes to capital as opposed to O&M, that part
20	would be booked in construction work in progress while the
21	capital project is being built and before it goes into
22	service; is that true?
23	A Yes.
24	Q And then after the plant goes into service,
25	effectively, that amount of money shifts to plant in

Page 1672 1 service, right? Shift is my word. 2 А Correct. 3 When the roughly 340 employees that took the Q 4 severance left, did the company's CWIP balance go down by 5 an amount equal to the cumulative salary, benefits and taxes for those employees that had previously been booked 6 7 for CWIP but not been moved to plant in service? 8 А That, I don't know. 9 0 You don't know? 10 А No. 11 Well, let's -- let's explore that for a minute. Q 12 If I had an employee who will be working and, let's say, 13 from the beginning of their employment until now there had been X percent of their salary and benefits allocated to 14 15 capital, and let's say that that was \$50,000. And that --16 it just so happens that that \$50,000 was all on projects 17 that were still in CWIP. Are you with me so far? 18 А Okay. 19 Let's say they got fired on that day. All Q 20 right? Or they left. It doesn't really matter. They 21 So they left. They went somewhere else. left. Did 22 \$50,000 come out of CWIP on that day? 23 А I would assume if they're not working anymore on 24 the capital project it would not be included in CWIP any 25 longer.

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1	Q No. I think you're changing my hypothetical.
2	\$50,000 of their salary and benefits has already been
3	booked for CWIP. It was booked to CWIP already before
4	they left. Okay?
5	A Okay.
6	Q So it's sitting in CWIP. They're working on a
7	they're working on an electrostatic precipitator at the
8	Labadie plant, and \$50,000 of their work has been booked
9	to that project and that precipitator is not yet in
10	service so it's still sitting in CWIP, right?
11	A Okay.
12	Q And they left, right?
13	A Yes.
14	Q Was the \$50,000 of work, was it already done or
15	not?
16	A I would assume not.
17	Q Their \$50,000 of work? When they left, did the
18	\$50,000 worth of the contribution to the project suddenly
19	if they installed four valves and a pump, did the pump
20	and the four valves get removed from the electrostatic
21	precipitator the day they left?
22	A I would assume not.
23	Q Okay. I'm sorry. I must have misunderstood
24	you. The \$50,000 of their salary that had already been
25	booked to CWIP, it stayed in CWIP when they left, didn't

	Page 1674
1	it?
2	A Okay.
3	Q I need you to answer yes or no.
4	A Yes.
5	Q So when they left, the CWIP balance didn't go
6	down by that \$50,000, did it?
7	A From the scenario we're talking about, I would
8	agree.
9	Q And that's true of the other all the other
10	cumulative amount of payroll, benefits and taxes booked to
11	CWIP associated with the work of these roughly 340
12	employees, that that cumulative number, whether it's
13	half a million dollars, ten million dollars, I have no
14	idea what it is, that number also didn't get removed from
15	CWIP when those people separated from the company, right?
16	A That may be true. But regardless to that, there
17	are other savings outside of the capital piece. So if you
18	would like to remove the capital piece, there are other
19	savings that we could consider.
20	Q You said that may be true. Is it true or not?
21	A Yes.
22	Q Okay. Now, when those now let's take another
23	scenario. Let's say that we had these 340 employees or
24	so, and, cumulatively, they had had \$5 million of their
25	time and benefits and taxes allocated to projects that had

Page 1675 1 already gone into service at the -- at the time they left. 2 Are you with me? 3 А Okay. 4 Q In that case, plant in service didn't go down by 5 that \$5 million when they left either, did it? 6 А No. 7 Okay. Now, your theory is that because these Q 8 roughly 340 employees left that there would be less plant 9 to put into service than if they had still been there; 10 isn't that right? Salaries as a part of plant? Is that what 11 А 12 you're --13 0 Your theory is that because they left that 14 there's going to be less plant put into service prospectively than had they stayed around, right? 15 The capitalized piece of salary. Not just in 16 А 17 plant. 18 Q Plant in service can be expressed in dollars, 19 right? 20 А Yes. 21 So your theory is that the dollars that Q Okay. 22 will be capitalized into plant and service is going to be 23 less because these -- prospectively because these 340 -roughly 340 people left because your theory is that the 24 other resources of the company, other employees are not 25

Page 1676 1 going to fully take up the slack, and the company's not 2 going to be putting as much plant in service as if these 3 employees had stayed around; isn't that true? I didn't say that. 4 А 5 Q Well, then what's the basis for your calculation that you sent us yesterday? You've done a calculation 6 7 that took the amount of the capitalized portion of these 8 340 employees salary, right? 9 А Uh-huh. 10 That's what you did. And then you applied Q 11 composite depreciation rate to it, right? 12 А Uh-huh. 13 Q And you said the company's going to save roughly 14 \$125,000 annually in depreciation expense on the theory 15 that the plant in service balance is going to be less by that seven million dollars, right? 16 17 Α By the salaries that are being capitalized. These salaries wouldn't be there any longer if these 18 employees are gone. 19 20 That's right. That's right. So you're Q 21 assuming --That doesn't mean a piece of plant, and that 22 Α doesn't mean --23 24 0 So you're assuming -- so you're assuming that 25 the capitalized portion of these folks' salaries and --

Page 1677 1 well, let's look at the number. 2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Ms. Ferguson, while there's a break, you need to get closer to the microphone. Thank 3 4 you. 5 (By Mr. Lowery) Do you have your work paper with Q 6 you? 7 А Not the full work paper, no. 8 Q Does -- for 2012, does about 7.4 million, 9 7.5 million, does that sound about like the number we're talking about? 10 11 А For the capital piece, yes. 12 For 2011, it was about 300,000. Does that sound 0 13 about right? 14 I believe so. Α 15 Q What you did was you made an assumption that 16 plant in service in 2012, when we get to the end of the 17 2012 that the dollars in plant and service were going to be less by about seven and a half million dollars because 18 19 these employees are gone, right? 20 А Yes. 21 0 And what that has to mean is you're assuming 22 that the other employees of the company aren't going to do 23 that seven million dollars of work -- or aren't going to 24 do work that -- that ends up being allocated -- seven and 25 a half million dollars is being allocated to plant in

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1	service, right?
2	A Yes.
3	Q So if if other employees take up the slack,
4	then your number would be too high, wouldn't it?
5	A I don't think so.
6	Q Well
7	A Because those salaries would already be included
8	in capital.
9	Q The employees that left at the end of 2012
10	A No. Employees that are picking up the slack are
11	already in the capital piece.
12	Q That's true. That's absolutely true.
13	A So on a forward on a forward going basis,
14	that would be less for those who left.
15	Q But you're assuming, are you not, that the plant
16	in service balance at the end of 2012 is going to be seven
17	and a half million dollars less because you're assuming
18	that the employees who left, had they been there, they
19	would have had seven and a half million dollars of their
20	salaries and benefits put into plant in service during
21	2012, right?
22	A Yes.
23	Q But because they're gone, that won't happen,
24	right?
25	A Yes.

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1	Q But if other employees if other employees did
2	all of the work that they would have done had they been
3	there, then that seven and a half million dollar figure
4	would go away, right?
5	A Perhaps. But the effect is not seven million
6	dollars.
7	Q Okay.
8	A And irregardless as to if you remove the capital
9	piece, there is still sufficient savings.
10	Q So your but the bottom line is even with your
11	calculation, you're attributing an additional \$130,000 or
12	so of ongoing depreciation expense savings?
13	A Yes.
14	Q Now, the rest of your roughly million dollars of
15	capital-related savings that you came up with relates to
16	return, right?
17	A Yes.
18	Q Okay. I'd like for you to explain to me and to
19	the Commission how the reduction in a company's return
20	constitutes a savings to the company from a severance
21	program.
22	A The capitalized piece of the salaries has, as
23	Mr. Lowery said, a depreciation piece and also a return
24	that's earned on it because it's as a part of rate
25	base.

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1	If the amount of capital is removed for rate
2	base, then they would not earn a return on that piece. So
3	the savings of these salaries that that affect rate
4	base would not earn that return.
5	Q Ms. Ferguson, is the return that a company
6	receives on its rate base a cost of the company or a
7	benefit to the company?
8	A I don't know as it could be a cost, but but
9	you would not have received it without this piece.
10	Q If the company doesn't receive a return, is that
11	a savings that the company gets to gets the benefit of?
12	A No. If you want to look at it like that, no.
13	Q Isn't that the only way you can look at it?
14	A I suppose. But
15	Q Well
16	A yet again, irregardless, with this
17	approximate 900,000 and 130,000, the company will have
18	received cost savings.
19	Q Let's start over. I will give you,
20	theoretically, that if the company's plant in service
21	balance is \$7.5 million lower at the end of the 2012
22	because these employees are no longer around and the
23	company doesn't put as much plant in service, I will give
24	you, theoretically, that the company's depreciation
25	expense will go down, assuming your composite depreciation

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1	expense is right by \$130,000 a year. I'll concede that
2	point to you. But it makes no sense to me that you could
3	claim that the company is getting a benefit of \$900,000 a
4	year because it is going to earn on a smaller rate base
5	because it has a lower plant in service balance.
6	Now, is it still your contention that that
7	\$900,000 is a benefit, it is a savings generated by the
8	VS11?
9	A I believe so.
10	MR. LOWERY: Well, I guess we'll leave it at
11	that.
12	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Anything else?
13	MR. LOWERY: No.
14	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. We'll come up for
15	questions from the Bench then. Chairman Gunn?
16	CHAIRMAN GUNN: I don't have any questions.
17	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Jarrett?
18	COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I have no questions.
19	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Kenney?
20	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: No questions. Thank you.
21	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Stoll?
22	COMMISSIONER STOLL: I have no questions. Thank
23	you.
24	JUDGE WOODRUFF: No questions from the Bench, so
25	no recross. Any redirect?

Page 1682 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Judge. 1 2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Ms. Ferguson, you 3 can step down. All right. And then we'll go back to the ROE issues. We'll take a break before we do that. And 4 5 we'll come back at 2:45. 6 (Break in proceedings.) 7 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Let's come back to 8 order. We're back on the record. 9 MR. LOWERY: Your Honor, I have a -- I guess a process comment or question, and then -- and then I don't 10 11 know if it's a request or a proposal. 12 But on the process comment, Mr. Gorman had 13 policy testimony and was actually scheduled as a policy witness and wasn't able to be here, and we agreed to take 14 that up today. 15 16 I'm actually going to do the cross-examination 17 on the policy issue, and I was wondering if it might make sense to do that as a sort of a separate mini issue. But, 18 you know, you could do that in an ROE cross by Mr. Byrne 19 20 and go through the whole thing. It's completely up to 21 Mr. Byrne is handling the ROE portion, and I'm just you. 22 questioning on another narrow issue. 23 JUDGE WOODRUFF: How do the parties feel about 24 that? 25 MS. ILES: We have the same issue.

Page 1683 MR. DOWNEY: Judge, we have the same issue. 1 I'm 2 here for the -- for the earnings attrition part, and 3 Carole is handling ROE. JUDGE WOODRUFF: Well, let's -- let's go ahead 4 5 and do the policy portion first, and -- and then we'll do it all over again for the ROE. 6 7 MR. LOWERY: And then I guess I would throw this 8 out and would certainly understand if this doesn't work, 9 but we are -- we have an open day -- or almost a nearly 10 open day on Tuesday that we didn't have before. 11 I think it's going to be a real challenge to 12 probably even get completely done with this issue today. I would suggest we might consider if the Commissioners are 13 Cardinal baseball fans that we adjourn early enough that 14 15 we might be able to see that game today and we just start first thing Tuesday morning and finish this issue up. 16 17 JUDGE WOODRUFF: I think that would be acceptable. We want -- maybe just to do the first, the 18 policy issue today and then worry about ROE on Tuesday? 19 20 MR. LOWERY: That would be acceptable to the 21 company. JUDGE WOODRUFF: Is that acceptable to the other 22 23 parties? 24 MS. VUYLSTEKE: Your Honor, I think that it would be possible to have Mr. Gorman available to come in 25

Page 1684 on Tuesday. If that's the Commission's preference, we're 1 2 certainly happy to do that. If it's possible to finish 3 Mr. Gorman on ROE and then take the other witnesses on ROE on Tuesday. 4 5 We know all Commissioners are able to be here today, and so we certainly would like to present 6 7 Mr. Gorman this afternoon if -- if the Commission doesn't 8 mind and then maybe move on to the rest of ROE on Tuesday. 9 JUDGE WOODRUFF: That would be -- Mr. Murray is the only other ROE witness. But I think that's likely --10 MR. THOMPSON: I'm advised that Mr. Murray is 11 12 not available on Tuesday. 13 JUDGE WOODRUFF: He's not available on Tuesday. 14 MR. LOWERY: Oh. 15 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. I guess that means --16 MR. LOWERY: There went that idea. 17 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. We'll be slogging on, and I guess we can watch the Cardinals game on tape. 18 Okay. At this point, then, we're going to be doing --19 well, I need to swear him in first. 20 21 MICHAEL GORMAN, being first duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole 22 23 truth, and nothing but the truth, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION 24 BY MS. ILES: 25

Page 1685 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. We're going to do 1 2 the policy issue separately first. And so direct. 3 MS. ILES: Well, it's all -- he only has one set 4 of testimony. 5 JUDGE WOODRUFF: You can go ahead and offer it all at this time then. 6 7 MS. ILES: That's all I'm going to do. 8 Q (By Ms. Iles) Would you state your name and 9 address for the record, please? 10 My names is Michael Gorman. My address is 16690 А 11 Swingley Rich Road, Chesterfield, Missouri. 12 Ad are you the same Michael Gorman who caused to Q 13 be prepared and filed in this case direct and surrebuttal 14 testimony on behalf of MIEC, which is marked as Exhibits 15 507, 508 and 509, and that's Direct Highly Confidential 16 Direct NP and the surrebuttal testimony? 17 А Yes. 18 Q Do you have any corrections to your testimony? 19 I do. In my direct testimony, my Schedule Α MPG-21, the rate of returns were -- are incorrect on that 20 21 schedule. The common equity balance was -- the incorrect total common equity balance of the utility was used in 22 developing those returns on equity. So I've corrected 23 24 that schedule using the total reported common equity balance for Ameren Missouri. 25

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1	Q And did you prepare a substitute schedule?
2	A I did. A revised Schedule MPG-21.
3	MS. ILES: Your Honor, should we have this
4	marked as an exhibit, or how do we do that?
5	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Yeah. Let's mark it as a
6	separate exhibit. It will be 532.
7	MS. ILES: Thank you.
8	MR. DOWNEY: Judge, what was the number?
9	JUDGE WOODRUFF: 532.
10	MR. DOWNEY: Thank you.
11	Q (By Ms. Iles) The exhibit has been marked as
12	532. Is that your substitute schedule?
13	A Yes.
14	Q Is there anything else you wanted to tell the
15	Commission about that?
16	A The the error in the original schedule is I
17	did not include a component of common equity capital, the
18	line item referred to as Paid In Capital. And that had
19	the effect of understating total common equity from the
20	balance sheet and overstating a return on equity. So the
21	revised schedule includes that correction.
22	MS. ILES: I guess I need to move for the
23	Q (By Ms. Iles) Or do you have any other
24	corrections to your testimony?
25	A I do not.

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1	MS. ILES: I'd like to move for the admission of
2	Exhibits 507, 508, 509 and 532 and tender the witness for
3	cross.
4	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. 507, 508, 509 and
5	532 have been offered. Any objections to their receipt?
6	Hearing none, they will be received.
7	(Exhibit Nos. 507, 508, 509 and 532 were offered
8	and received into evidence.)
9	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For cross-examination, we'll
10	begin with Public Counsel.
11	MS. BAKER: No questions on this issue. Thank
12	you.
13	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Staff?
14	CROSS-EXAMINATION
15	BY MR. THOMPSON:
16	Q I only have one policy question for you. During
17	the policy portion of this hearing last week, there was
18	talk about whether or not it would be appropriate to make
19	an ROE adjustment if the Commission granted plant in
20	service accounting to the company as a device to
21	ameliorate earnings attrition. Do you have an opinion as
22	to whether or not such an adjustment would be appropriate?
23	A I do. The my recommended return on equity is
24	based on the company's current investment risk. If
25	regulatory mechanisms are implemented which reduce that

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1	risk, then it would be appropriate to consider a reduction
2	to the authorized return on equity to reflect a risk that
3	is lower than the risk of the company that currently
4	stands without those enhanced regulatory mechanisms.
5	I do recommend, however, staying within my
6	recommended return on equity range. The ability to
7	accurately estimate the the increments for for
8	implementing mechanisms that reduces the existing
9	operating risk of the company would be difficult to gauge.
10	But staying within my recommended range, I think, would be
11	appropriate.
12	Q So when you say staying within your recommended
13	range, would you mean a reduction from 9.3 to 9.2?
14	A In this case, yes.
15	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. No further questions.
16	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. For Ameren?
17	CROSS-EXAMINATION
18	BY MR. LOWERY:
19	MR. LOWERY: You took away 95 percent of my
20	cross-examination, which everybody's probably going to be
21	happy about. I do have an exhibit I'd like to get marked,
22	your Honor
23	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right.
24	MR. LOWERY: to speed things up.
25	JUDGE WOODRUFF: You're up to No. 70.
1	

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1	Q (By Mr. Lowery) Mr. Gorman, I've handed you
2	what's been marked for identification as Exhibit No. 70.
3	Would you agree that the graph on the first page of
4	Exhibit 70 is either remarkably similar to or identical to
5	the revised Schedule MPG-1 that was just put into the
6	record?
7	A Yes.
8	Q And the only reason I'm going through this is
9	I'd like to ask you to verify, if you would, whether or
10	not the calculations shown on all of the other pages of
11	Exhibit 70 which you recognize to be your work paper as
12	revised, do you not?
13	A Yes.
14	Q Would you verify that the calculations of the
15	ROE to comment on those pages of Exhibit No. 70 are
16	accurate and and I guess I'll ask you a compound
17	question to speed this up, and that the additional equity
18	that has been added to your original work paper is also
19	accurate?
20	A I believe it to be accurate. Yes.
21	MR. LOWERY: With that, your Honor, I move for
22	the admission of Exhibit 70.
23	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Exhibit 70 has been offered.
24	Any objections to its receipt? Hearing none, it will be
25	received.

Page 1690 (Exhibit 70 was offered and received into 1 2 evidence.) 3 MR. LOWERY: And if you'll bear with me just a second, your Honor, I might not have any more questions. 4 5 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. MR. LOWERY: Those are all my questions, your 6 7 Honor. 8 JUDGE WOODRUFF: We'll come up for questions 9 from the Bench on policy questions. Chairman Gunn? 10 CHAIRMAN GUNN: No questions. COMMISSIONER JARRETT: No questions on policy. 11 12 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: No, thank you. 13 COMMISSIONER STOLL: No questions, your Honor. 14 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. No need for recross. Any redirect? 15 16 MR. DOWNEY: I think just one question. 17 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. 18 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 19 BY MR. DOWNEY: 20 Okay. Mr. Gorman, the calculations shown on the Q 21 spreadsheet that is a part of Exhibit 70, are those the 22 same calculations that you used to create MIEC Exhibit 23 532? 24 They are effectively the same calculations. I А revised the way I developed the total common equity 25

Page 1691 capital in my revised schedule. But the effective -- the 1 2 effect of including the premium on capital stock as shown 3 on Schedule 70 is the same correction that I included in my revised Schedule 21. 4 5 Q All right. And does -- does this revised schedule in any way change any of the opinions you gave in 6 7 your testimony? 8 Α No. 9 MR. DOWNEY: Thank you. Nothing further. I 10 guess those were two questions. JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. We'll let you slide this 11 12 time. All right. Then we'll start the process over again on the ROE issue. We can begin with Public Counsel. 13 MS. BAKER: Thank you. 14 15 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. BAKER: 16 17 Q Good afternoon, Mr. Gorman. А Good afternoon. 18 19 You were here whenever questions were asked of Q 20 Mr. -- Mr. Hevert. In your -- in your experience, has the 21 cost of capital gone down in the past few years? It -- it has been on a declining trend over the 22 А 23 last few years. I think more recently in the last six 24 months or so, it has -- has had a very noticeable drop and declined quite a bit throughout 2012. 25

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1	Q All right. And in your experience, has the
2	overall yield also gone down?
3	A The bond yields have also decreased in a very
4	significant way, yes.
5	Q And do you know among the economic community, is
6	there an expectation that the economy will rebound
7	substantially within the next couple of years?
8	A Well, I think there's a great debate on how long
9	it will take the economy to recover from this recession.
10	But I do think there is an optimism that the the
11	economy has made a turn in the road. And it does appear
12	as though it will start strengthening throughout 2013 and
13	forward.
14	Q All right. And fluctuations in the economy are
15	a normal part of business, aren't they?
16	A Yes.
17	Q Okay. Let's see. There were questions that
18	were asked earlier about a DCF analysis using a
19	non-electric company proxy group. Do you remember that
20	questioning?
21	A I do. Yes.
22	Q Okay. Have you ever performed a DCF analysis
23	using a non-electric company proxy group?
24	A You know, I specifically, I think the
25	question was a non-regulated proxy group.

Page 1693 1 A non-regulated proxy group. Right. 0 2 А And I have not. And I have argued against the 3 use of a non-regulated proxy group for reliably estimating a utility market return. So I -- I would continue to do 4 5 that here. 6 Q All right. Whenever you are looking at 7 non-regulated business entities such as Fortune 500 8 companies and the like, do you see that their returns have 9 lowered significantly in the economy lately? 10 Well, I have a schedule on my testimony that А 11 that shows both corporate and utility bonds as well as 12 Treasury bonds. And it shows that -- that investment 13 grade utilities -- or securities cost have decreased 14 recently. 15 That is shown on my Schedule 13. Under Column 6 and 7, I show AAA and BAA corporate bond yields that are 16 17 -- Columns 2 and 3, I show the single A and BAA utility bond yields. And as you can see, the corporate and 18 utilities as well as the Treasury bond yields which are 19 shown under Column 1 have all decreased over the last few 20 21 years. 22 Q And for a non-regulated business entity, they 23 have more risk than a regulated monopoly such as Ameren. 24 Would you agree with that statement? 25 А Generally speaking, yes.

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1	Q Okay. So it would be logical to expect that in
2	the economy today, given a regulated monopoly with much
3	lower risk that it would have returns that are somewhat
4	lower than a Fortune 500 company would have?
5	A I would agree with that. And the difficulty,
6	again, if you would look at my Schedule MPG-13 is that a
7	non-regulated company or a regulated company, even if they
8	had the same risk characteristics such as a BAA bond
9	rating as an example, the market price is a non-regulated
10	security differently than the price of a regulated
11	security.
12	And that's evidenced by simply tracking
13	difference in bond yields. For a utility bond yield with
14	a BAA rating versus a non-regulated corporate bond with a
15	BAA rating, the BAA rating indicate they're comparable in
16	risk, but the market simply values them differently, and
17	the cost of capital for a non-regulated company is
18	distinct and separate from the cost of capital of a
19	utility company.
20	You make the same analogy with a AAA rated bond
21	rating of a corporate relative to the U.S. Treasury
22	securities whereas a piece it says they're rated AAA,
23	where Moody's and Fitch does.
24	While the AAA rating would indicate a Treasury
25	security has the same investment risk as a AAA

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1	corporation, you look at the yield difference between a
2	Treasury and a AAA corporate, and they're just not the
3	same. So the risk measures would indicate comparable
4	risk, but the market valuation and pricing security is
5	just very different.
6	So I question whether or not you can reliably
7	estimate utility's cost of capital for a regulated company
8	using non-regulated securities.
9	Q Okay. You also heard testimony about the art in
10	choosing the inputs to to basically reflect what one is
11	seeking from the model results to be. Did you hear
12	testimony like that this morning?
13	A I don't remember specifically the the use of
14	the word art. But I do recall Mr. Hevert describing the
15	the the type of data used in these bonds.
16	Q Okay. Does it surprise you that given the
17	inputs that Ameren chose for its study that their results
18	show the highest ROE reasonable range?
19	A It I it does not surprise me. And I did
20	respond to Mr. Hevert's ROE studies, and I believe that he
21	has overstated fair return on equity for Ameren Missouri
22	in this case.
23	And I outlined those criticisms and offered some
24	modifications to the studies to produce what I believe to
25	be a more reasonable or more accurate estimate of what

	Page 1696
1	Ameren Missouri's cost of equity is in this case.
2	Q And one of the other things that that was
3	discussed was the the credit or the environment of
4	the regulatory system in Missouri and the fact that
5	Mr. Hevert gave a little bit of a bump to his ROE because
6	of the regulatory climate in Missouri; is that correct?
7	A That's my understanding, yes.
8	Q Okay. But states do go about their regulatory
9	rate setting a little bit differently, such as don't
10	states like Illinois, for example, use an average year
11	rate rate base?
12	A Well, for a future test year, they do.
13	Historical test year, often, they will use end of year.
14	Q And does
15	A And, you know, more recently, Illinois has
16	adopted a formula rate methodology for electric utilities.
17	So the within that formula rate process, it was a very
18	very disputed issue. But I believe the Commission
19	ultimately adopted the recommendation for use of an
20	average rate base in that formulary process.
21	Q Are there other states that that also use
22	this average rate base mechanism?
23	A I think it's it's fairly common for use of
24	future test years. So I
25	Q Okay. And in Missouri, generally, aren't we in

	Page 1697
1	this case specifically using the actual rate base as the
2	true-up cutoff date?
3	A Yes. Well, the true-up date rate base.
4	Q Right.
5	A Which would be at the end of the true-up period
6	rate base.
7	Q Yes. So isn't that a part of the process in
8	Missouri that's favorable to utilities? They get their
9	rate base actually stated as of the true-up date rather
10	than averaged or forecast?
11	A Generally speaking, the rate base at the very
12	end of the true-up period would be higher than the average
13	rate base over the entire 12-month period leading up into
14	the true-up period.
15	So it is more favorable to the utility to use a
16	higher rate base because it produces a higher revenue
17	requirement. So I would agree with that.
18	Q So you would agree that that is at least one
19	example of I'm sure there are several where Missouri
20	has a better or a more favorable environment for the
21	utility in its rate-making?
22	A I'd say that's one element of the rate making
23	calculus that is favorable for the utility. Yes.
24	Q All right. In your testimony, you calculate
25	that a reasonable range for ROE is between two 9.2 and
Page 1698 1 9.4. And your recommended ROE is 9.3; is that correct? 2 А Correct. 3 And I assume that you agree with the statements Q earlier that a reasonable ROE for Ameren is one that is, 4 5 one, adequate to attract capital at reasonable terms thereby enabling Ameren Missouri to provide safe and 6 7 reliable electric service that is sufficient to ensure 8 Ameren Missouri's financial integrity and is commensurate 9 with returns on investments in enterprises having 10 corresponding risks? 11 А Yes. 12 So, therefore, in your opinion, at a return on Q equity range of anywhere between 9.2 and 9.4, Ameren is 13 14 adequately able to attract capital at reasonable terms 15 enabling it to provide safe and reliable electric service? 16 А Yes. 17 Q And anywhere within that range, Ameren's financial integrity is ensured? 18 19 А I believe so. Yes. 20 And last, and given your research, a return on Q 21 equity anywhere between 9.2 and 9.4 is commensurate with 22 the returns of other similar enterprise like Ameren who have similar risks? 23 24 Well, it's similar measure of what the cost of А capital is for those companies based on today's 25

Page 1699 marketplace. 1 2 0 Okay. So you -- you do believe that your --3 that your recommendation meets that -- meets that 4 requirement? 5 А Yeah. My -- my studies are specifically 6 designed to accomplish measuring a return on equity that 7 meets that standard. 8 Q All right. And so Ameren would receive a 9 reasonable return on equity anywhere between 9.2 and 9.4. That's your recommendation? Or that is your -- your 10 11 opinion? 12 А Correct. 13 MS. BAKER: Okay. No further questions. 14 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. For Staff? 15 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Judge. 16 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. THOMPSON: 17 18 Q Good afternoon, Mr. Gorman. 19 A Good afternoon. 20 Are you familiar with the zone of reasonableness Q 21 analytical method that has been used by this Commission in 22 the past? 23 А Generally, yes. And do you understand that to essentially 24 Q 25 encompass a range of 100 basis points above and 100 basis

Page 1700 1 points below the average of awarded ROEs as reported by 2 Regulatory Research Associates? 3 А That's my understanding. 4 Q Do you believe that that method is flawed by a 5 circularity of reasoning? 6 I believe if you use it by itself, it would А 7 certainly be flawed. I believe considering what other 8 Commissions are awarding is -- is appropriate information to consider in estimating what a fair return on equity is. 9 10 But the trend in those authorized returns, I 11 think, are important, particularly when they are 12 considered along with reasonable estimates of what the 13 current market cost of equity is. 14 0 And I know you're not an attorney, right? 15 Correct. А 16 But you are familiar with the parameters that Q 17 are set by the Hope and the Bluefield decisions insofar as you have to work with them in creating your testimony? 18 19 А Yes. 20 Do you have an opinion as to what the points of Q 21 confiscation would be with respect to awarding an ROE to 22 Ameren Missouri? Well, I -- based on my studies, I think a fair 23 А 24 estimate of the current market return on equity is within my range of 9.2 to 9.4. So I wouldn't be comfortable in 25

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Page 1701 this market recommending return on equity lower than 9.2. 1 2 Okay. And you were here, were you not, for the 0 3 testimony by Mr. Hevert? А Yes. 4 5 And did you understand him to testify that he Q used growth rates based on earnings per share projections 6 7 drawn from Zack's, First Call and --COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Value Line. 8 9 (By Mr. Thompson) -- Value Line? 0 10 Yes. For his constant growth DCF model. That's А correct. 11 12 And, also, I believe, for the initial stage of Q 13 his two multi-stage DCF models? 14 А Correct. And the number that he used was 5.07. 15 Q For the group average growth rate, I believe --16 А 17 yeah. I have to check the number, but that sounds 18 correct. 19 Q Okay. If I told you that's what his testimony 20 was, would you have any reason to disagree? 21 А I would not. 22 Q Okay. And do you consider that an appropriate 23 growth rate figure to use? 2.4 I think over the next three to five years, I А think it's probably a pretty reasonable estimate to expect 25

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1	the growth rate through those companies.
2	Whether or not it can be sustained indefinitely,
3	I think is a separate issue, and it's an important issue
4	of the constant growth DCF model. 5.07 is not
5	significantly higher than the consensus analysts
6	projection of future GEP growth which is 4.9 percent. So
7	I think it's higher than what I would be comfortable
8	concluding is a reasonable estimate of long-term
9	sustainable growth. But I think it's close.
10	Q What is the figure that you would be comfortable
11	with?
12	A That would not be reasonable or that
13	Q I think you said that 5.07 is higher than what
14	you would be comfortable with for long-term sustainable
15	growth. So my follow-up question is, well, what what
16	is the figure you would be comfortable for long-term
17	sustainable growth?
18	A In my testimony, I used a growth rate of 4.9
19	percent.
20	MR. THOMPSON: Okay. That's all I have. Thank
21	you.
22	JUDGE WOODRUFF: For Ameren?
23	CROSS-EXAMINATION
24	BY MR. BYRNE:
25	Q Good afternoon, Mr. Gorman.

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Page 1703 1 Good afternoon. А 2 Do you have a calculator with you? 0 Yes, I do. 3 А 4 Q Do you have your deposition that I took last --5 September 18th with you, by chance? 6 I did not bring that, no. А 7 Okay. I've got -- fortunately, I've got an Q 8 extra copy for you. 9 А I was hoping you would. 10 MR. BYRNE: May I approach, your Honor? 11 JUDGE WOODRUFF: You may. 12 (By Mr. Byrne) Here's your deposition. I think Q 13 I have one for your attorney, too. 14 MR. BYRNE: Ms. Iles, do you need a copy of the 15 deposition? 16 MS. ILES: No. I brought mine. 17 MR. THOMPSON: I could use one. MR. BYRNE: Sure. 18 19 (By Mr. Byrne) Mr. Gorman, I was going to start Q 20 by asking you a follow-up to a couple of the questions 21 that Mrs. Baker asked you. And one was you -- you had a 22 discussion with her about -- and I think you basically 23 said you didn't think it was appropriate to use 24 non-regulated companies in a proxy group to determine a 25 return on equity for a regulated company. Do you remember

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Page 1704 1 that? 2 А Well, let me clear that up if that's what I 3 said. What I intended to say is I don't think you can reliably estimate --4 5 Q Okay. 6 -- a regulated company's return on equity with a А 7 non-regulated proxy group because of the differences in the market valuation and pricing of securities for 8 9 non-regulated companies versus the regulated companies. 10 Okay. And so -- and I quess I -- I quess, Q 11 therefore, you don't see a problem with circularity in 12 using regulated companies in a proxy group? 13 Α Well, I do not. As long as you use market -observable market data and you're trying to capture how 14 investors value securities and their return requirements 15 for making investments in utility companies, I -- I don't 16 17 think there's a -- I do not believe that there's a circularity in using those models to estimate fair 18 19 compensation, particularly when you can -- can also look at the results of the regulatory decisions. 20 21 If authorized returns on equity were consistently too low, you would hear credit rating 22 agencies being critical of regulatory Commissions' 23 authorized returns. We're not seeing that. 24 25 Credit rating agencies are rating utility

Page 1705 industry stable. That's an indication that regulatory 1 2 treatment is supportive of credit standing, which includes 3 fair compensation and the ability to maintain adequate access to capital. 4 5 So there is market evidence that suggests that the way things are being done is accomplishing the 6 7 objective. 8 Q Okay. Ms. Baker also asked you a question about 9 updating rate base to the end of the true-up period, and I 10 think you -- I think you said that was a positive thing 11 about the regulatory frame work in Missouri. Is that a 12 fair summary of what you said? Or what exactly did you 13 say about that? 14 I think she asked me whether or not the use of А an end of true-up period rate base was more beneficial to 15 investors than the use of an average rate base within the 16 17 true-up period. 18 And my comment was it is more beneficial because it results in a higher rate base normally, which results 19 in a higher revenue requirement and earnings entitlement 20 21 for the companies. 22 0 I mean, is it less beneficial than having 23 projected rate base? 2.4 It's not necessarily less beneficial. I mean, А you need to consider how the future test year would be 25

	Page 1706
1	developed in forecasting what a rate base would be and
2	whether or not there's restrictions to properly reflect
3	what sales growth might be with growth in customers,
4	growth in unit sales per customer, changes in operating
5	costs throughout that same time period and changes in cost
6	of capital.
7	So that that's a pretty complicated issue. I
8	don't know if you can necessarily generalize it. But
9	there are forms of future test years, which I don't think
10	more accurately reflect the utility's cost of service when
11	the rates are actually in effect than Missouri's procedure
12	of the true-up mechanism is able to to put rates into
13	effect, which provides a a reasonable opportunity to
14	earn their cost of capital.
15	Q Okay. I'd like to ask you some questions about
16	Staff Witness Murray's position on return on equity. Have
17	you read Mr. Murray's testimony?
18	A It was a while ago, but, yes, I have.
19	Q And are you aware that Mr. Murray is is
20	asserting that cost of capital witnesses such as you and
21	Ameren Missouri witness Mr. Hevert and and other
22	this Commission and other Commissions are not properly
23	estimating the cost of equity when they set return?
24	A Generally, I I do recall some language to
25	that effect. I don't know exactly that he said it that

Page 1707 1 way, but --2 And he believes that the actual cost of equity 0 3 is much lower than anyone is recommending in this case. 4 Are you aware of that? 5 А I do understand that to be his position. Do you agree with him? 6 Q 7 Α I do not. I -- I -- my clients hire me to 8 estimate the cost of capital in a way that provides fair 9 compensation but not excessive compensation to AmerenUE 10 that will -- will allow them to maintain the financial integrity and provide high quality and reliable service. 11 12 It's important to my client. They want competitive rates, but they also want 13 high quality, reliable service. So they asked me to do my 14 15 best job of estimating what the fair compensation is for a utility to accomplish all the objectives we just 16 17 described, and I think I've done that. 18 Well, maybe you just said this. What would Q 19 happen if the Commission sets an ROE that's too low? What 20 are the negative consequences to your clients and, I 21 quess, to my client? 22 Α Well, if you take it to the extreme, if the 23 return is too low, then there could be a couple negative 24 consequences. One is the utility's cash flow metrics may 25 not be adequate to support its bond rating.

	Page 1708
1	The second consideration is that the utility may
2	because it has a fiduciary responsibility to manage its
3	investors' capital prudently may limit capital investments
4	in utility plant and equipment, and that could have an
5	effect on service quality and reliability. And those two
6	factors may result in the service area incurring greater
7	costs because certain companies business and homes that
8	operate with the assumption that they're going to get high
9	quality, reliable service.
10	Q Mr. Murray argues in his testimony that instead
11	of or or perhaps in addition to using the
12	traditional analyses like, you know, DCF analyses we've
13	talked about and CAPM and risk premium analyses, that cost
14	of capital experts should look at what investment analysts
15	are using to estimate the value of the utility stocks and
16	even when investment analysts use to value stocks or
17	assets outside of the regulated arena. Are you aware of
18	that testimony of his?
19	A I'm aware that he considers projected returns by
20	some money managers, yes.
21	Q I mean, why don't you use information like that
22	in estimating the cost of equity?
23	A Well, I am concerned about the reliability of
24	the accuracy of the projections. My analysis is based to
25	the greatest extent possible on information that is

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available to investors, that investors may rely on to
value the prices of the securities, including the
companies in my proxy group.

Because I'm trying get a sense of what 4 5 investors' expectations are in reaching the values of those prices in my proxy based on DCF studies. Because if 6 7 -- the available market information concerning those companies, specifically being a proxy for what investors 8 9 are likely expecting from those companies, is the best 10 information I think that's available to estimate what investors' return requirements are to assume the 11 12 investment risk of the utility companies included in my 13 proxy groups.

14 So I believe that starting the analysis with observable utility stock prices for a proxy group that is 15 measured to be reasonable and consistent with the 16 17 investment risk of the underlying company or observable utility bond yields, measured beta estimates which is tied 18 to stock price variations relative to the market. Ties 19 20 the entire analysis to the focus of the proxy group, or at 21 least focus of the industry, which I believe is -- is the best estimate for capturing what investor current return 22 23 requirements are. 24 Mr. Murray did a multi-stage DCF analysis that 0

25 had three stages; is that correct?

	Page 1710
1	A Again, I looked at his testimony a while ago,
2	but I believe that's correct.
3	Q Well, and and my understanding is that when
4	you do a multi-stage DCF analysis, the growth rate you use
5	in Stage 3 is a pretty important input to that; is that
6	fair to say?
7	A I think all the data is pretty important to
8	input into that model. But, yeah, the long-term
9	sustainable growth rate is driving the growth and the
10	longest period of dividend within that cash flow
11	projections.
12	Q Would it be fair to say that growth rate in
13	Stage 3 has a big impact on the result that's produced by
14	the multi-stage model?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Okay. And Mr. Murray used a 3 to 4 percent
17	growth rate from his Stage 3. Do you do you recall
18	that other
19	A I would have to verify that.
20	Q Okay. Assume with me that he did use a 3 to 4
21	percent growth rate for Stage 3. Do you think that's an
22	appropriate growth rate for Stage 3 of a multi-stage DCF
23	model?
24	A If I thought that was the appropriate third
25	state growths rates, I would have used that in my model.

	Page 1711
1	For the reasons outlined in my testimony, I did not use a
2	growth rate of 3 or 4 percent. I used one of 4.9.
3	Q Okay. Let's discuss your recommendation. As
4	you testified before, you're recommending a 9.2 percent to
5	a 9.4 percent range, right?
6	A Yes.
7	Q And my understanding from your deposition is
8	that you agree that any any point within that range
9	would be reasonable; is that true?
10	A Yes.
11	Q Okay. Mr. Gorman, would you agree with me that
12	estimating the appropriate return for regulated electric
13	utility is not an exact science?
14	A Yes.
15	Q And is that why experts like you and Mr. Hevert
16	typically provide a range for your recommended ROE and Mr.
17	Murray, too, has a range for his recommended ROE as well
18	as a specific point recommendation?
19	A Well, yes. I think that's why all of us use
20	more than one methodology to try and estimate the current
21	market rate of cost of equity.
22	Q Would you agree with me that a basic tenant of
23	finance is the risk return trade-off?
24	A I do.
25	Q So that investors require a higher return more

	Page 1712
1	for more risky investments?
2	A Yes.
3	Q And would you also agree that an important
4	consideration on setting return on equity for an electric
5	utility is the risk that the utility faces?
6	A Yes.
7	Q All else being equal, would it be fair to say
8	that a utility facing a higher risk should get a higher
9	return and a utility facing a lower risk should get a
10	lower return?
11	A Well, I don't know what you mean by all else
12	equal. By if a utility is facing higher risk because of
13	imprudence or unreasonable management, then I wouldn't
14	agree with that.
15	Q Okay.
16	A But if the management and prudence and
17	management-induced problems were not a factor, then higher
18	risk companies should get a higher risk return.
19	Q Fair enough. And I think you would agree with
20	me, would you not, that Ameren Missouri competes for
21	capital with other electric utilities?
22	A Yes.
23	Q Okay. And I we've had a lot of discussion
24	about RRA data. And I assume you would agree that RRA is
25	a a reputable firm and provides reliable data?

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Page 1713 1 А I do. 2 And I think on Schedule MPG-11, which is one of 0 3 the schedules in the risk premium analysis, you have a list of returns for integrated electric utilities or maybe 4 5 electric utilities? 6 А Yeah. This is an electric utility industry 7 average return. I do not agree with Mr. Hevert that it's appropriate to separate integrated electrics from wires or 8 9 distribution only companies because I think that's too simplistic of a consideration of risk differentials. 10 11 0 So these numbers would include both wires only 12 and integrated electric utilities? Correct. 13 А 14 Do you have your calculator? Do you -- could 0 15 you tell me what the average authorized return on equity for electric utilities for the past five years was? 16 17 Α Based on my Schedule MPG-11, which goes through the end of 2011 for that five-year period --18 19 Q Okay. -- 10.37 percent for the period 2007 through 20 А 21 2011. 22 Q Could you do the same calculation for the last 23 ten years? 2.4 10.56. А 25 Okay. Now, as I understand it, you and 0

	Page 1714
1	Mr. Hevert used the same proxy group of companies at least
2	in your direct testimony; is that correct?
3	A In our direct testimony, that is correct.
4	Q But then he added Empire, and you did not; is
5	that correct?
6	A Correct.
7	Q Okay. We had a couple of documents
8	MR. BYRNE: May I approach the witness?
9	JUDGE WOODRUFF: You may.
10	Q (By Mr. Byrne) We had a couple of documents that
11	were entered into the record as exhibits, and they were
12	the RRA the RRA information from calendar year 2011,
13	which Exhibit 69, and the RRA data for the first six
14	months of 2012, which was Exhibit No. 530.
15	And so I'm going to give you a copy of those.
16	And what I tried to do, Mr. Gorman, was to mark within
17	that document the proxy group companies that had reported
18	authorized ROEs. And I'd like to walk through the
19	document, if you would, the two documents and let me know
20	if I did it right. Maybe we could start with the calendar
21	year 2011 document.
22	A All right.
23	Q And I show on on the I guess starting on
24	page 5 of that document, it's the list of all the
25	decisions, and I show Public Service Company of Oklahoma

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Page 1715 1 the first company on the list being an AEP subsidiary; is 2 that correct? 3 А It's noted as that. I believe that's correct. 4 Yes. 5 Q Okay. And they -- and then they got a 10.15 percent ROE; is that correct? 6 7 А Yes. 8 Q And the next one I had is Wisconsin Public 9 Service. Is that one of the companies in one of the proxy 10 group companies, if you know? 11 А In my proxy group companies? 12 Yeah. In the common group of proxy companies Q that you and Mr. Hevert had in direct testimony. 13 14 А Yes. 15 Okay. And that shows an ROE of 10.3 percent; is Q 16 that correct? 17 А Yes. 18 Q And the next one I have is Appalachian Power/Wheeling Power, and that's shown as a subsidiary of 19 20 AEP; is that correct? 21 А Yes. 22 Q And that shows 10 percent; is that correct? 23 It is. А 24 Q And then the next one is Kansas City Power & 25 Light Company?

Page 1716 1 А Yes. 2 And that shows 10 percent; is that correct? Q 3 А It does. 4 Q And then Ottertail Power, and that's in your 5 group; is that not right? 6 А It is. 7 And it shows 10.74 percent; is that correct? Q 8 Α Yes. 9 And then the next two are KCPL Greater Missouri 0 10 Operations, and those are in your proxy group, too, right? Α Yes. 11 12 And there's 10 percent, 10 percent for two Q decisions for that company; is that correct? 13 14 А Yes. 15 And then Empire is marked, but it's really not Q 16 in your proxy group. And at any rate, there's no 17 authorized return specified, correct? It is. 18 А 19 And if you turn the page, there is another --Q 20 there is an Appalachian Power decision and Appalachian 21 Power is in your proxy group; is that correct? 22 А Yes. 23 And that's 10.9 percent; is that correct? Q AEP is in my proxy group. Appalachian Power is 24 А 25 the subsidiary, yes.

	Page 1717
1	Q And that shows 10.9 percent for Appalachian
2	Power?
3	A Yes.
4	Q And Columbus Southern Power is also a subsidiary
5	of AEP; is that correct?
6	A It is.
7	Q And it shows 10 percent for them?
8	A Yes.
9	Q And Ohio Power is also a subsidiary of AEP?
10	A Yes.
11	Q And it shows 10.3 percent for them?
12	A Yes.
13	Q And Upper Peninsula Power is also in your proxy
14	group; is that true?
15	A Yes, it is.
16	Q And that's 10.2 percent?
17	A Yes.
18	Q And that's all the reported returns on that
19	document; is that correct?
20	A Well, there's one for Georgia Power. No. I'm
21	sorry. Yes. That is correct.
22	Q Okay. And can you take a look and see if I've
23	missed any? Are those all the are those all the
24	companies within your proxy group that are on that
25	document?

Page 1718 1 А I believe it is. 2 Okay. And then on the next document, which is Q 3 Exhibit 530, which should be a lot shorter, I'm looking at page 4 where they start listing the company and the 4 5 company's authorized returns. The first one I marked was Indiana Michigan Power, which I believe is a subsidiary of 6 7 AEP; is that correct? 8 А Yes. 9 You have it at 10.2 percent return on equity, 0 10 correct? А Yes. 11 12 And then Idaho Power, that's in your proxy Q group, correct? 13 14 А Yes. 15 And that is a 9.9 percent ROE? Q 16 А Yes. 17 Q And then Gulf Power, which is a Southern Company subsidiary? 18 19 А Correct. 20 And that's in your proxy group, correct? Q 21 А Yes. 22 And 10.05 percent ROE? Q 23 Yes. А And Arizona Public Service, that's in your proxy 24 Q 25 group; is that correct?

Page 1719 1 А Yes. 2 And at 10 percent ROE. And that's the last one 0 3 on that list. Can you take a look at that list to make 4 sure I didn't miss any? 5 Α It appears to be. And isn't it true that of all those data points 6 Q 7 we just went over, only one, Idaho Power, got below a 10 8 percent return on equity, and they got 9.9 percent; is 9 that correct? 10 Yeah. For the time period these rate cases took А 11 place, that is correct. 12 Okay. I -- okay. I -- I'd like to take a look 0 13 at your analyses. My understanding is you did three types 14 of analyses models in your testimony, discounted cash flow 15 analyses, and I know you did a couple different -- several different kinds of those, and risk premium analyses and a 16 17 capital asset pricing model analysis; is that correct? It is. 18 А 19 Okay. And my understanding is the upper bound Q 20 of your range, which is 9.4 percent, was based on results 21 of your DCF analyses; is that correct? Yes, sir. 22 Α 23 And the lower bounds you have in your range was Q 24 based upon your risk premium analyses; is that correct? 25 А Yes.

1	Page 1720 Q Okay. So let's talk about the one that didn't
2	figure into the range, which is the capital asset pricing
3	model or CAPM. Can you briefly explain how a CAPM
4	analysis works?
5	A CAPM analysis estimates a firm specific risk
6	factor above a risk free rate. The firm specific risk
7	factor is calculated by developing what is referred to a
8	company specific beta estimate and multiplying that beta
9	estimate by the market risk premium.
10	The product of multiplying the beta times the
11	market risk premium produces a very specific risk factor.
12	And you add that to what is the risk free rate, which I
13	use a proxy for as the 30-year Treasury bond rate, and the
14	sum of those two components, the firm specific risk
15	component and the Treasury bond yield produces the CAPM
16	return estimate for the company.
17	Q And what were what was the result of the CAPM
18	analysis? What return return on equity did it produce?
19	A Shown on page 36, it produced a return of 8.7
20	percent.
21	Q And can you explain why you didn't use that
22	result in your in developing your recommendation?
23	A Well, I was a little concerned about the
24	reliability of that result because, essentially, the
25	market risk premium I'd used reflected more normal risk

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Page 1721 premium levels where the risk free rate, the Treasury bond 1 2 rate was at a very low level. 3 So I was concerned that it was a bit of a mismatch between firm specific risk component, which 4 5 doesn't reflect the -- the general belief, including myself, that market risk premiums are a little high for 6 7 risky securities and -- and applying that with a risk free 8 rate. 9 So based on those parameters and my assessment in consideration of the results of the other models, I 10 11 thought CAPM return estimate was too low in this case. 12 Isn't it true that you were also using a Q 13 projected Treasury bond rate in your capitalization? 14 I always do that. Yes. А 15 Q Okay. And what -- what was the projected rate 16 that you were using? 17 Α Three point -- 3.7 percent. 18 Q And for what period was that projected? 19 It would have been two years out at the time of Α the forecast. It would have been out through about June 20 21 of 2014. 22 0 And do you know what the actual 30-year Treasury 23 bond rate was at the time you filed your direct testimony? 24 It was 3 percent. А 25 And I'm assuming if you would have used -- if 0

Page 1722 1 you would have used the 3 percent as the Treasury bond 2 component, then your result would be an even 70 points 3 lower; is that true? А 4 Yes. 5 Okay. And do you know, by the way, what the Q 30-year Treasury bond rate is right now? 6 7 А I believe it's fallen under 3. I can't tell you exactly what it is, but I'm fairly certain it's less than 8 9 3 percent now. 10 And the CAPM model reflects point for point a Q 11 reduction in the -- in the Treasury bond rate; is that 12 correct? 13 А Well, the way I employ it, it does because I don't measure the market risk premium with my risk free 14 rate estimate. But if you did, the market risk premium 15 would adjust with changes in the risk free rate. 16 17 Q And didn't you also testify that Treasury bond yields are really higher than a true risk free rate? 18 19 А yes. 20 So -- so if you use a really true risk free Q 21 rate, the result would have been even -- even lower than 22 it was; is that correct? Well, that's -- that's true every time I file 23 А testimony, including this time. 24 25 Okay. And I think you testified that we're in a Q

Page 1723 1 market that does not reflect normal valuations of 2 Treasury; is that true? 3 I think there's a very, very profound flight to А quality in the existing marketplace and low risk 4 5 securities like Treasuries and like utility securities are being sold at a premium. 6 7 And, I mean, what -- okay. And is it -- are you Q 8 saying that the -- that the rate of return on Treasury 9 bonds is lower than normal? Is that your point? 10 The price of Treasury bonds is higher than А normal and the yield is lower. 11 12 Okay. Okay. And is the only reason for that Q the flight to quality, or does Government monetary policy 13 affect that as well? 14 Well, on the short end of the curve, Government 15 Α monetary policy impacts Treasury bill yields and possibly 16 17 Treasury notes. It's debatable whether or not the Federal Reserve can actually impact the long end of the yield 18 curve. I believe they have limited inputs on it. 19 Under monetary policy, what's going on at the 20 21 Fed now with them buying corporate securities, it's having an impact I think on bond yields. But that's because of 22 the extraordinary economic conditions we're in right now. 23 24 0 And my understanding is when you calculated your 25 market risk premium, you may have said this already, but

	Page 1724
1	when you calculated your market risk premium group, your
2	CAPM, you looked at the achieved return in stock
3	investments versus Treasury bond investments with a data
4	set that started in 1926 and up till the present; is that
5	correct?
6	A Yes.
7	Q Okay. And isn't it true that you use historical
8	information like this because, over the long run, the
9	expectation is that the market will revert to what it has
10	done in the past?
11	A Well, that is the the assumption for use of
12	long historical time periods and then the way I've done it
13	for measuring the market risk premium. So that is the
14	assumption I'm making
15	Q Okay.
16	A in this case. But
17	Q No. That's let me let me ask you a little
18	about your risk premium analysis. And I think we talked
19	about this a bit in your deposition. Can well, first
20	of all, can you briefly explain how the risk premium
21	method works?
22	A Well, risk premium, like the CAPM, relies on
23	observable bond yields as a starting point for estimating
24	your required return for common equity securities. A risk
25	premium that I use starts with the Treasury bond yield and

	Page 1725
1	estimates an appropriate equity risk premium to add to
2	that bond yield estimated with the market required return
3	on common equities for utility companies.
4	That equity risk premium will change over time
5	based on the investment risk perceptions of the
6	marketplace that equity securities is relative to debt
7	securities.
8	So I attempt to gauge what an appropriate equity
9	risk premium over Treasury bond yields is by looking at a
10	relative spread of Treasuries and utility securities to
11	get a sense of how the market perceives the utility
12	industry at that time and whether or not they're pricing
13	utility securities to produce a premium return, an average
14	return or maybe a below average return.
15	In this instance, I thought market was pricing
16	utility securities for an above average equity risk
17	premium, so I incorporated that in my first risk premium
18	study over Treasury bonds.
19	The second risk premium study was over
20	observable utility bond yields. And again, it required
21	measuring what the contemporary equity risk premium would
22	be for utility bond yields, estimate the return on equity.
23	And, again, it required gauging what the market's risk
24	assessment is for equity securities versus debt
25	securities, which is approximated by comparisons at

	Page 1726
1	utility valuations relative to Treasury securities and
2	then estimating what appropriate equity risk premium is
3	over utility bond yields in this marketplace.
4	Q Just so I understand, I mean, what you need in
5	order to do a risk premium is you need a risk free rate,
6	and then you need a market premium to go on top of it? Is
7	that true? And you add those two things together, and
8	that's the number that is produced?
9	A Well, you need an observable utility bond
10	yield
11	Q Okay.
12	A and an equity risk premium.
13	Q Okay.
14	A The risk free rate was from the CAPM study.
15	Q Okay. But you've also you've done two
16	separate CAPM studies, one using Treasury bond rates,
17	correct?
18	A Yes. And I do characterize that as risk free
19	rate in my CAPM. But I it's a fair characterization,
20	but I don't call it risk free rate in this bond.
21	Q I think what you did is you have two premium
22	risk analyses, and then you averaged your results, and
23	that average is what constituted the lower boundary of
24	your range; is that correct?
25	A Well, I developed a range based on my risk

	Page 1727
1	premium study and then developed a point estimate using
2	the risk premium model which is how I also interpreted the
3	results of my DCF study and ultimately my CAPM study.
4	Q Okay. Let's take a look at your two risk
5	premium analyses. And my understanding is for your risk
6	premium analyses, you used data from 1986 to 2011 to
7	calculate the risk premium in both of those studies; is
8	that correct?
9	A Yes.
10	Q Okay. And and the first one used Treasury
11	bonds, right?
12	A Yes.
13	Q And my understanding is the results of your two
14	separate risk premium analyses are set out on Schedule
15	MPG-11 and MPG-12 attached to your direct testimony,
16	correct?
17	A Yes.
18	Q Okay. Well, let's take them individually. I
19	went ahead and made a blow-up of this is unfortunately
20	where we start to get down to the weeds, but there's no
21	there's no avoiding it.
22	I went ahead and blew up MPG-11. And I'm hoping
23	you can tell me well, let me let me walk through how
24	I think it works, and you can tell me if I'm right or
25	wrong.

Page 1728 1 On MPG-11, you've got all the years from Okay. 2 1986 to 2011. That's the first column that just lists the 3 years, right? А 4 Yes. 5 Q And the second column, Authorized Electric Return, that's the electric utility return based on RRA 6 7 data or average electric utility return for each of those 8 years based on RRA, correct? 9 Α Industry average, yes. 10 So like, for example, the 10.22 is here for 0 11 2011. That's a number we've been talking about today, 12 correct? 13 А Yes. 14 Okay. The next column has Treasury bond yields. 0 15 And as I understand it, that is 20-year Treasury yields, 16 the average for each of those years; is that correct? 17 А It's the long-term bond. Yes. Okay. They just didn't have a 30-year bond or 18 Q -- it could be 30 years once they had them? 19 20 А No. It was 20 years because there was a period 21 during the '90s when the U.S. Government went to surplus budgets that they stopped selling 20-year Treasury bonds 22 and the data wasn't available for part of the analysis. 23 24 Q Okay. And this last column is indicated risk 25 premium, and that's each year you subtract the Treasury

Page 1729 1 bond yields from the authorized electric return for that 2 year, and then you get an indicated risk premium for that year, right? 3 4 А Yes. 5 And there's 26 different years with 26 different Q indicated risk premiums, right? 6 7 А Yes. 8 Okay. So then, as I understand it, to figure Q 9 out a risk premium, the first thing you did with this data 10 set is you threw out the three highest results and the 11 three lowest results; is that correct? 12 А Yes. 13 Q Okay. And the three highest results, I'm going 14 to mark them with a plus. And let's see. I think they 15 were -- no. Let me catch up with my notes here. Okay. 16 It looks like the three highest results were 6.41 from 17 2009; is that correct? I'm going to put a little plus here, so hope I don't get it wrong. 18 19 А Yes. 20 That's the highest result. And so you threw it Q 21 out. And the next highest result was 6.31 from 2011, so 22 you threw out that result; is that correct? 23 А Yes. 24 And then the next highest result is 6.18 from 0 25 2008, so you threw out that result; is that correct?

Page 1730 1 А Yes. 2 So for the -- for the high results that you 0 3 threw out, you threw out the results for three out of the last four years; isn't that correct? 4 5 А Yes. 6 Then you threw out the lowest results, Q Okay. 7 too. And I think the low -- the lowest result was 3.83 8 way back in 1988. So I'm going to put a minus sign by 9 that one. You threw that out because it was too low, right? 10 Yes. 11 А 12 Q And then the next lowest was 1994 at 3.97, 13 right? 14 Α Yes. 15 Put a minus sign by that. And then the next Q lowest one was 4.09 from 1990. So I put a minus sign by 16 17 that, right? 18 А Yes. 19 Is that -- am I doing all right so far? Q 20 Yeah. А 21 And then my understanding is after you threw the Q 22 three highest and the three lowest out, you established 23 your range with the highest remaining risk premium and 24 lowest remaining risk premium; is that correct? 25 А Yes.

Page 1731 1 And in this instance, the highest remaining risk 0 premium was the one from 1986, right? I'm going to circle 2 3 that if that was one of the bounds of your range. Is that 4 true? 5 Α Yes. And the lowest risk premium, coincidentally 6 Q 7 enough, was the next year, 4.41 percent in 1987, right? 8 Α Yes. 9 Okay. And so -- and then -- well, and then, as 0 10 I understand it, once you had this range established --11 well, in order to -- for these risk premiums to be turned 12 into a return on equity, you've got to add back in the 13 Treasury bond yield; is that right? 14 Yes. Α And so as I understand it, you took these two 15 Q 16 numbers and you added the 3.7 percent, which is what 17 you're using as a Treasury bond yield. I understand it's not current. It was a projected two years into the 18 future, but that's what you're using, right? 19 20 А It is. 21 Okay. So you would add 3.7 to 6.13, and that Q 22 would be the top of your range. Do you know what that 23 ended up being? Can you -- can you add those two numbers 24 together? That's at page 30 of my testimony. And the high 25 Α

Page 1732 end of the rage was 9.83 percent. It's on page 30, line 1 2 10. And the low end of the range was 8.11 percent shown 3 on line 9. 4 Q Okay. And then my understanding is that you 5 weighted the high end of the range, which was 9.83? 6 А Yes. 7 Q You weighted that two to one -- or weighted it 8 two-thirds, and you rated the low end of your range, which 9 is 8.11 percent, up one-third; is that correct? 10 It is. А 11 And so then for this, it gave you a result of 0 12 9.3 percent, right? 9.26, and I rounded it to 9.3. 13 Α 14 Okay. And so -- I mean, what obviously struck 0 15 me about this is, you know, throughout the -- you threw 16 out three out of the last four years for being too high, 17 and the ones that you threw out for being too low were in 1998 and 1990 and 1994. That's correct, isn't it? 18 19 А That's how it turned out in this case, yes. 20 Sure. And then what you -- but what you ended Q 21 up doing is you're using risk premium from 1986 and 1987 22 to figure out what our return on equity should be here in 23 2000 -- I guess it's 2013 by the time the rate come into 24 effect; isn't that correct? 25 А That's a -- that's a fair -- I mean, that's not

Page 1733 how the analysis --1 2 0 Just please answer --3 А -- is structured, but that's the result of the analysis. 4 5 Q Okay. And wouldn't you agree with me that the financial conditions prevailing back in 1986 and 1987 were 6 7 completely different from the financial conditions that 8 are prevailing now? Not completely different. The reason I 9 А 10 selected --11 0 I'm not -- I'm not asking you the No. No. 12 reason that you did it. I'm asking you if the financial 13 conditions are completely different. Yes or no? 14 А The financial conditions are the reason I 15 selected this time period. Well, isn't it true -- just look at your chart. 16 Q 17 My gosh. Isn't it true authorized electric returns were 14 percent and 13 percent in -- you know, almost 14 18 percent, almost 13 percent in '86 and '87; isn't that 19 20 true? 21 А It is. 22 Q Isn't it true that Treasury bond yields were 7.8 23 and 8.5 percent back in those years? Isn't that true? 2.4 А Yes. 25 Do you know what the Dow Jones industrial 0
Page 1734 1 average was in 1986? 2 It was less than it is now. А 3 Q Would you believe it was less than 2,000? Subject to check. 4 А 5 Okay. Q 6 MR. BYRNE: All right. Your Honor, I've got 7 copies of this chart that I would like to mark and offer as an exhibit. 8 9 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Your next number is 71. 10 MR. THOMPSON: I'm sorry, Judge. What did you 11 12 say the next number is? JUDGE WOODRUFF: 71. 13 14 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. 15 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Thank you. 16 CHAIRMAN GUNN: Premarked. Nicely done. 17 Q (By Mr. Byrne) Okay. Well, let's look at the next chart, which I think is MPG-12. And this, I believe, 18 was your second risk premium analysis; is that correct? 19 20 А Yes. 21 And I think --Q MR. BYRNE: Oh, your Honor, I'd like to offer 22 Exhibit 71, if that's what it was. 23 24 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. 71 has been offered. Any objections to its receipt? Hearing none, it 25

```
Page 1735
     will be received.
 1
 2
               (Exhibit 71 was offered and received into
 3
     evidence.)
               (By Mr. Byrne) You know, before I leave the
 4
          Q
 5
     other one, I think I'll ask you, wouldn't it -- wouldn't
     it have been possible to use more recent data to do your
 6
 7
     analysis, Mr. Gorman?
 8
          А
               If you're attempting to increase the return on
 9
     equity estimate by manipulating the date, you could, yes.
10
               So, for example, if I wanted to use the most
          Q
11
     recent five years of data and do the same analysis that
12
     you did, what -- what result would it produce?
13
               Let me see if I can walk you through it.
                                                          If you
14
     only used the last five years data, one, two, three, four,
15
     five, the high end of your return would be 6.41 percent,
     correct?
16
17
          А
               Are we throwing out the high and the low or --
                    This is -- this is instead of the data set
18
          Q
               No.
19
     after the high and low have been thrown out. If you use
20
     the last five years --
21
          А
               So excluding them --
22
          Q
               The last five years as the whole data set.
23
     That's what I'm asking.
24
               Throwing out the high and low is a way of trying
          А
     to capture the central tendency of all the data.
25
```

	Page 1736
1	Q sure. I'm not doing that here. I'm asking if
2	you used the last years of data, what would it be?
3	A You're asking me if I used the last five years
4	of data and I didn't try to capture the central tendency
5	of the data net end, then yes.
6	Q Okay.
7	A The high end of the data would be 6.41 percent.
8	Q 6.41 percent, plus you have to add 3.7 percent,
9	don't you?
10	A Yes.
11	Q What would that be?
12	A 10.1 percent.
13	Q Okay. And what and the low end would be 5.53
14	percent plus 3.7 percent. What would that be?
15	A 9.2.
16	Q And what if you weighted the high end two-thirds
17	like you did in your analysis and the low end one-third?
18	What would that result be?
19	A 9.8.
20	Q And what if you just used the simple average of
21	the last five years of risk premium? What would that
22	simple average be?
23	A The risk premium would be 6.1 percent. And with
24	the bond yield of 3.7, it would be 9.8 percent.
25	Q So that would also be 9.8 percent?

	Page 1737
1	A Yes.
2	Q What about ten years of data? If you used ten
3	years of data, the highest ROE or the highest risk
4	premium would still be 6.41 percent; is that correct? And
5	so if you add 3.7, that, again, would be the high end
6	of your range would be ten 10.1 percent, correct?
7	A Yes.
8	Q But the low end would move that to 5.37 percent
9	from 2007. And so if you add 3.7 to that, that would be
10	9.07 would be the low end; is that correct?
11	A It is.
12	Q And if you weighted the high end two-thirds and
13	the low end one-third, it would produce 9.75 percent; is
14	that correct?
15	A 9.76. Yes.
16	Q Okay. And what if, again, you just used a
17	simple average of the last ten years of risk premium? I
18	calculate a 5.9 percent risk premium; is that correct?
19	A I'm sorry. You got what?
20	Q I got 5.9 percent.
21	A Yes.
22	Q And then if you add 3.7, that yields 9.6
23	percent; is that correct?
24	A It is.
25	Q Okay. Now we'll get into the other one. Sorry,

Page 1738 1 this is the part where it gets boring. 2 MR. THOMPSON: Oh. 3 Q (By Mr. Byrne) Okay. So that I've reproduced 4 MPG-12, which, again, I think is your second risk premium 5 analysis. And this one uses A rated utility bond yields in the place of the Treasuries from the last chart; is 6 7 that correct? 8 А Yes. 9 And it's the same 26 years' worth of data? 0 10 Correct. А 11 Okay. And so -- so, again, you threw out the Q 12 three highest and the three lowest. The highest one looks 13 to me like it's 5.18 percent in 2011; is that correct? 14 А Yes. 15 The most recent year of data. And then the next Q highest is 4.89 in 2009; is that right? Wait. 16 17 А 4.88.89. 18 4.88. Is that the highest? Q 19 2010. Oh, I'm sorry. Yeah. 2006. А 20 Yeah. You're right. Thanks. I'm sorry. Q 2006, 21 4.89? 22 А Yes. 23 Okay. And then I must have mistyped. And then Q 24 what's the third highest, if you know? 25 And I think it's the 4.88. А

Page 1739 1 0 Then it goes to 4.88. Okay. So the three 2 highest this time were in 2001, 2010 and 2006. How about 3 the three lowest? I think 2.30 in 1988 is the lowest. Does that sound right to you? 4 5 А Yes. 6 Minus --Q 7 2.89 in '87. А 8 Q 2.89 is the second lowest? Well, 2.84 in '91 -- or '90. 9 А 10 Okay. So these are the three lowest are 1987, Q 1988 and 1990, right? 11 12 А Yes. 13 Q And so then, again, you pick the lowest and the 14 highest of the remaining, which it looks like -- I think 15 those were in, I think, 1994. The 3.03 is the lowest; is 16 that correct? 17 Α I will my doublecheck my testimony. 18 Okay. I show 3.03 as being the lowest and 4.62 Q in '98 being the highest? 19 20 А Yes. 21 So at least these -- you know these are '95 and 0 '98. No. '94 and '98. 22 23 А Yes. 24 Q So at least they're a little more current. But still Clinton era. 25

Page 1740 MR. BYRNE: Okay. Your Honor, I also have 1 2 copies of this I'd like to mark as an exhibit if I could. 3 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. Your next number is 72. 4 Q (By Mr. Byrne) I'm going to ask you to do the 5 same thing again with this chart. Mr. Gorman, if you pick out the last five years worth of data, if you set your --6 7 the high end of your range at the high point in the last 8 five years, it would be 5.18, correct? 9 А Yes. 10 And if you added -- and what risk premium are 0 11 you adding to those for the -- for the bond yield? 12 А To this, I'm adding the bond yield that's 13 appropriate for AmerenUE, which is a BAA bond yield of 5.01 percent. 14 15 Okay. So if you add the 5.18 plus the 5.01 Q 16 percent, that would be a 10.2 percent ROE on the high end; 17 is that correct? 18 А 10.19 , yes. 19 Okay. And then the low end of the range would Q 20 be the risk premium of 3.93 percent from 2008; is that 21 correct? 22 Α Yes. 23 And if you add 5.01 to that, that would yield Q 24 8.94 percent; is that correct? 25 А Yes.

Page 1741 1 0 And if you weighted the high end two-thirds and 2 the low end one-third, what would that result be? 3 А 9.77. 4 Q Okay. And, again, could you calculate it 5 averaging the last five years of risk premiums? 6 Five-year average of 4.54 gets a return on А 7 equity estimate of 9.55. 8 Q Okay. And if you did the same thing over ten 9 years, my understanding is that 5.18 would still be the 10 highest risk premium; is that correct? Α 11 Yes. 12 So it would still be 10.2 percent on the high Q end of your range, but the low would now be 3.79 percent, 13 14 correct? 15 А Yes. 16 Q And that would -- so that would yield a return 17 of 8.8 percent; is that correct? 18 А Yes. 19 And if you weight the highest end two-thirds and Q 20 the lowest end one-third, that would be 9.73 percent; is 21 that correct? 22 9.73. А 23 Q Yeah. 24 Yes. Α And then, finally, if you averaged the risk 25 Q

Page 1742 1 premiums of the last ten years, what result would that 2 produce? 3 А It's 4.47. That would be 9.48. MR. BYRNE: Okay. Judge, I'd like to offer 4 5 Exhibit 72 into the record. 6 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Exhibit 72 has been offered. 7 Any objections to its receipt? MR. THOMPSON: I'm going to object, Judge, 8 9 because while entertaining, this lengthy cross has shown that it's possible to manipulate the data set used by 10 Mr. Gorman to achieve different results than the results 11 12 he did achieve. But it's not his testimony. And I think it's -- it's, frankly, irrelevant. 13 14 JUDGE WOODRUFF: I'm going to overrule the objection, and it will be admitted. 15 16 (Exhibit 72 was offered and received into 17 evidence.) 18 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. 19 Q (By Mr. Byrne) Let's talk a little bit about 20 your DCF analysis, Mr. Gorman. It's my understanding the 21 high end of your range, 9.4 percent, is based on your 22 discounted cash flow or DCF analysis; is that correct? 23 А Yes. 24 0 And my understanding is you did three separate 25 DCF analyses; is that correct?

	Page 1743
1	A Yes.
2	Q You did a constant growth DCF analysis; is that
3	correct?
4	A Using an analyst's growth rates, yes.
5	Q And you also did a constant growth sustainable
6	growth version of the model; is that correct?
7	A It is.
8	Q And then you did a multi-stage version of the
9	model; is that correct?
10	A Yes.
11	Q Okay. And with regard to the sustainable growth
12	version of the model, it's my understanding that it
13	produced an ROE estimate of 8.63 percent; is that correct?
14	A Yes.
15	Q And that result was even lower than your CAPM
16	result; is that correct?
17	A It is.
18	Q Which you testified that you didn't use because
19	it was too low; is that correct?
20	A I testified I didn't use it because it was too
21	low for the concerns I had with the level of Treasury bond
22	yields and the way the market risk premium was measured in
23	my model.
24	Q Okay. Fair enough. But in any event, it's my
25	understanding that your sustainable growth model results

Page 1744 1 do not play a part in your ROE recommendation in this 2 case; is that correct? 3 А That is true, but not for the reasons I decided 4 not to rely on the CAPM results. 5 But, nonetheless, it didn't play a role in your Q -- in your recommendation; is that true? 6 7 А Well --8 Q Do you have your deposition? Because I think we 9 talked about this in your deposition. 10 Well, but I didn't use it in developing my А range, but --11 12 That's answers my question. Q 13 А Well, no. 14 That answers my question. Okay. Then the Q remaining DCF analyses that you conducted produced ROEs of 15 16 9.3 percent for the constant growth, correct? 17 А Yes. And 9.38 percent for the multi-stage growth; is 18 Q that correct? 19 20 А I -- yeah. I rounded that up to 9.40 percent. 21 But --22 Q Okay. But for purposes of summarizing the results of 23 А the DCF studies. 24 25 Q And then, as I understand it, from reading your

Page 1745 1 testimony to be conservative, you picked 9.4 percent, 2 which was the highest -- or the higher of the two for your 3 -- for the top end of your range; is that correct? А That is correct. 4 5 Q Okay. I -- Mr. Gorman, I'd like to show you a copy of your testimony from Case No. ER-2010-06. 6 7 MR. BYRNE: Your Honor, may I approach the 8 witness? 9 JUDGE WOODRUFF: You may. 10 (By Mr. Byrne) Okay. And do you recognize that Q document? 11 12 А Yes. 13 Q And in that case, I don't know if you recall, 14 but you had two separate proxy groups. And do you -- do you recall that? Maybe you can take a look at it and see 15 16 if you recall that. 17 Α Yes. There is two proxy groups here. 18 Q Okay. And what were the names of the proxy 19 groups? One was Integrated Electric Utilities, and the 20 А 21 other one was S&P Electric Utilities. 22 Q Okay. And my understanding is you did six 23 separate DCF analyses in that case -- three separate DCF 24 analyses, but using two proxy groups in each analysis; is 25 that correct?

	Page 1746
1	A Yeah. The later description is correct.
2	Q Okay. So I'd like to walk you through the
3	results of your analyses in that case. And I have another
4	chart that has these results. And I want to I want you
5	to verify that I've accurately produced the results. So
6	the first thing the first result was the constant
7	growth DCF for Integrated Electric Utilities, okay? And I
8	think that is shown you have a schedule for that?
9	A MPG-6.
10	Q MPG-6. And on MPG-6, that has an average of
11	12.02 and a median of 11.03, which are on this chart; is
12	that correct?
13	A Do you have a copy I could
14	Q Oh, sure. Actually, I do. I hate that I have
15	to acknowledge that I'm getting old.
16	MR. BYRNE: In fact, as long as I'm doing it,
17	I'll have it marked as an exhibit.
18	JUDGE WOODRUFF: It will be 73.
19	Q (By Mr. Byrne) And so it shows my chart or
20	actually, Exhibit 73 shows 12.2 for the mean and 11.03 for
21	the median for your constant growth DCF Integrated
22	Electric Utilities proxy group; is that correct?
23	A Yes.
24	Q Okay. And then how about the constant growth
25	result for the S&P Electric Utilities? I show a mean of

Page 1747 1 11.99 percent and a median of 11.01 percent. Is that 2 correct? 3 А Yes. And for the next one, I show the constant growth 4 Q 5 sustainable growth for the Integrated Electric Utilities with a mean of 10.68 and a median of 10.2; is that 6 7 correct? 8 А Yes. 9 And then for the next one, I show the 0 10 sustainable growth for the S&P Electric Utilities, the 11 mean of 11.59 percent and the median of 11.5 percent; is 12 that correct? 13 А Yes. 14 And then for the multi-stage DCF for the 0 15 Integrated Electric Utilities proxy group, I show a mean 16 of 10.73 and a median of 10.25 percent; is that correct? 17 А Yes. And for the multi-stage DCF S&P Electric 18 Q 19 Utilities proxy group, mean is 10.51 and the median is 20 10.06 percent; is that correct? 21 А It is. 22 Q And isn't it true that in that case, when you 23 chose to use the median, which I -- you chose to use the 24 median, which in every case was lower than the mean in 25 that -- in that case; is that true?

	Page 1748
1	A Well, based on the analysis at that time that's
2	the reason you would choose
3	Q Well, I mean, I just want to know if it's true
4	or not. Maybe on redirect you can explain why.
5	A Trying to save a little time. It's true for the
6	constant growth. It's true for the constant growth with
7	sustainable growth. And it's true for the multi-stage
8	growth.
9	Q Okay. I'll hand you your testimony from the
10	last rate case, which was Case No. ER-2011-0028. Do you
11	recognize that testimony, Mr. Gorman?
12	A Yes.
13	Q And, again, I think in this case, you only had
14	one proxy group; is that correct?
15	A Yes.
16	Q And you did three you did three DCF studies;
17	is that correct?
18	A Yes.
19	Q And, again well, maybe I can get you a I
20	guess you already have that. And, again, the can you
21	confirm that I've correctly put on Exhibit 73 and on this
22	chart the the results of your studies?
23	I show for the constant growth a mean result of
24	10.31 and a median of 10.17; is that correct?
25	A Yes.

	Page 1749
1	Q And for the sustainable growth, I show a mean of
2	10.26 and a median of 9.67; is that correct?
3	A Yes.
4	Q And for the multi-stage DCF, I show a 9.65
5	percent for the mean and a 9.86 percent for the median; is
6	that correct?
7	A It is.
8	Q And then my understanding is, in this case, you
9	your your recommendation or your your DCF result
10	resulted from averaging the three results; is that
11	correct?
12	A Pardon me?
13	Q Your your the summary of your DCF the
14	DCF result that you used was an average of those three
15	results; is that correct? And I'm specifically, I'm
16	looking on page 24 of your testimony.
17	A No. My I used the highest estimate of the
18	model, multi-stage model of 9.4 in this case. In the
19	other cases, I considered gave some weight to the other
20	models.
21	Q Okay. You didn't you didn't look on page
22	24 of your testimony.
23	A One six?
24	MR. LOWERY: Tom, he's confused. He's looking
25	at his current testimony.

	Page 1750
1	Q (By Mr. Byrne) Oh, I'm sorry. I'm looking at.
2	Your 2011-0028 testimony.
3	A I'm sorry.
4	Q I apologize for the confusion. And all your DCF
5	results are on a table, Table 2 on page 24. Do you see
6	that?
7	A Yes.
8	Q And it looks to me like you used the average of
9	all of the medians of the three studies; is that correct?
10	A It is.
11	Q And isn't it true that the average of the
12	medians produces a lower result than the average of the
13	means would have for those studies? I mean, I haven't
14	done the math, but the constant growth, 10.31 is higher
15	than 10.17. 10.26 is a lot higher than 9.67. And
16	A I would suspect it would be higher. Yes.
17	Q Okay. But then along comes the current case.
18	And, again, you did I don't have to hand you anything
19	because this is all in the record. But, again, you did
20	three DCF studies. You did a constant growth. You did a
21	sustainable growth. And you did a multi-stage growth.
22	But this time, instead of picking the median to
23	use for your result, you picked the mean; isn't that
24	correct?
25	A Yes.

	Page 1751
1	Q And if you would have picked the the mean
2	result, your constant growth was 9.3 percent. But if you
3	would have picked the median, it would have been 9.9
4	percent; is that right?
5	A Yes.
6	Q And the mean for your multi-stage was 9.38
7	percent. But if you would have picked the median, it
8	would have been 9.7 percent; isn't that right?
9	A Yes. And the sustainable growth would have been
10	8.47 percent instead of 8.63.
11	Q That's true. Mr. Gorman, isn't it true that you
12	told me in your deposition that the reason that you use a
13	median rather than a mean is to account for outliers?
14	A Well, generally, yes. But, I mean, the
15	Q Okay.
16	A Well, what you're trying to describe is what the
17	central
18	Q I think that answers my question. I just asked
19	if that's what you told me during your deposition, and you
20	said yes. So yeah.
21	MR. BYRNE: I guess, your Honor, I'd like to
22	offer Exhibit 73.
23	JUDGE WOODRUFF: 73 has been offered. Any
24	objections to its receipt? Hearing none, it will be
25	received.

```
Page 1752
               (Exhibit 73 was offered and received into
 1
 2
     evidence.)
 3
          Q
               (By Mr. Byrne) I tried to do a scattered plot
     graph. And I'll -- I know it's a little bit hard to see
 4
 5
     on the chart, so I'll give it to you.
 6
               JUDGE WOODRUFF: Will this be 74?
 7
               MR. BYRNE: Yes.
 8
          Q
               (By Mr. Byrne) And the scattered plot graph that
 9
     I just gave you that is on the board tries to show a
10
     comparison of the results of your proxy group for your
11
     constant growth DCF model in this case, which is on the
12
     bottom with the results from your constant growth DCF
13
     model from the last case, Case No. ER-2011-0028, which is
14
     on top.
15
               Let me ask you this: Can you confirm for me
16
     that those scatter plots reflects the data in your
17
     constant growth DCF schedules for those two cases?
18
          А
               Well, I would need the data used to produce this
     graph. But --
19
20
          Q
               Well, the data is on the schedules in your
21
     testimony that you have that -- for the -- for the
22
     constant growth.
               I would need to confirm that that data used to
23
          А
24
     produce this graph is consistent with the data on my
     schedules.
25
```

Page 1753 1 0 Well, then we'll just -- I quess we can Okay. 2 walk through it. Let's start with ER-2011-0028. And do 3 you have -- still have your testimony from that case? 4 А Yes. 5 Okay. And I believe your constant growth DCF Q model is shown on -- I believe it's shown on Schedule 6 7 MPG-4; is that correct? 8 А Yes. 9 So looking at the scatter plot graph, the first 0 10 result is from American Electric Power Company; is that 11 correct? 12 А It is. 13 Q 9.05. Do you see it on the scatter plot graph? 14 Α It appears to be there. 15 Q Okay. The next one is Cleco Corporation, 7.71. 16 Do you see it as the next dot on the scatter plot graph? 17 А Yes. The next one is DPL, 11.05. Do you see it as 18 Q 19 the next dot on the scatter plot graph? I do. 20 А 21 Then the next one doesn't have an ROE. 0 Then the 22 next one is Idacorp, which is 8.18. See it as the next 23 point on the scatter plot graph? 24 It appears to be. А 25 And the next one is 10.7. Do you see that as 0

	Page 1754
1	the next point on the scatter plot graph?
2	A Appears to be.
3	Q The next one is 12.81. That's the next point,
4	correct?
5	A Appears to be.
6	Q 10.31 is the next one, correct?
7	A Appears to be.
8	Q And 9.97 is the next one
9	A Appears to be.
10	Q correct? 10.03 is the next one?
11	A Appears to be.
12	Q And 13.28 is the next one?
13	A Appears to be.
14	Q Okay. And then same with your testimony in this
15	case. Well, perhaps you could just do the same thing on
16	your own with the testimony in this case. Or would you
17	like me to walk through it plot by plot?
18	A It appears to reflect this data.
19	Q And I guess the point of me making these scatter
20	plot graphs is is to show the the relative outliers
21	in ER-2011-0028 where you used the median and this case,
22	ER-2012-0166, where you used the mean. Isn't the most
23	outlying point on either of these graphs the 5 point I
24	guess it's just a little over 5 percent result that's on
25	that's in this case? Isn't that the most outlying

Page 1755 point on either of those graphs? 1 2 In terms of being the furthest away from the Α 3 average? 4 Q Yes. 5 Probably is, yes. А 6 Q I mean, aren't there about as many outliers on 7 the ER-2012-0166 scatter plot graph as there are on the 8 ER-2011-0028 scatter plot graph? 9 А Well --10 It's a yes or no question. Q 11 А Could you repeat the question? 12 Aren't there about as many outliers in this case Q 13 as there were in the last case? If anything, it appears 14 to be there's more outliers in this case; isn't that correct? 15 Are you asking how I interpreted the results of 16 А 17 the data or --I'm asking you, isn't it true there's as 18 Q No. 19 many or more outliers on the scatter plot graph for this 20 case as there are on the scatter plot graph for that case? 21 Yes or no? In this case, they are six points above the 22 А average. In this case, they were four -- in this case, 23 24 it's four points below. In the last case, there was one, 25 two, three, four right on the average and median with

Page 1756 three above and three below. 1 2 Okay. Let's try it for your multi-stage growth. 0 3 And I tell you what, your -- let's try it for the 4 multi-stage growth. Again, I've put together a scatter 5 plot graphs, and I can walk you through them, or could you just check to see if --6 7 А I'll agree to it subject to check. 8 Q Okay. And, again, doesn't -- doesn't this show 9 about the same amount of outliers in both this case and the last case? 10 I probably will need a copy of that to check it. 11 А 12 Q I'm sorry. Yeah. Let me --13 JUDGE WOODRUFF: It will be 75, then. Well, there are outliers. But, again, in the 14 Α 15 last case, there were more observations kind of scattered on the median and means than there was in this case. 16 17 There's more of a dispersion of the results in this case than there was in the last case. 18 19 MR. BYRNE: Your Honor, I'd offer Exhibits 74 and 75 for the record. 20 21 JUDGE WOODRUFF: 74 and 75 have been offered. Any objections to their receipt? Hearing none, they will 22 be received. 23 (Exhibits 74 and 75 were offered and admitted 24 into evidence.) 25

Page 1757 1 MS. ILES: What was the number? I'm sorry. 2 MR. LOWERY: 75 was the last one, Carole. 3 MR. BYRNE: If I can have just a minute, your I'm disorganized. 4 Honor. 5 (By Mr. Byrne) Mr. Gorman, I'd like to ask you a Q couple of questions about the growth rate in Stage 3 of 6 7 your multi-stage analysis. I think we talked a little bit 8 about it earlier. 9 My recollection is you used a 4.8 percent growth rate for Stage 3; is that correct? 10 Α 11 It is. 12 And can you tell me where you got that 4.9 0 13 percent? 14 4.9 percent is an average of the consensus of Α economists projections of GEP growth rate over the next 15 five and ten-year periods. 16 17 0 Okay. And doesn't that create some degree of a problem for an analyst because what you're really trying 18 to do is project growth that doesn't begin until year '11 19 20 in Stage 3 of the multi-stage growth model? Isn't there a 21 disconnect between using five-year and ten-year data to --22 to project growth that's to occur beginning in year '11 23 and continuing to infinity? 2.4 А There -- there is a problem with identifying publicly available forecasts by independent economists of 25

Page 1758 GEP growth rates longer than ten years. And the growth 1 2 rate used in the model covers a period longer than ten 3 vears. I mean, I quess the problem is there really 4 Q 5 isn't market-based information available; is that fair to 6 say? 7 А Well, there are some individual analysts that 8 project long-term growth rates. And I think I identified 9 some of those in my testimony. But it's the only source of consensus economist projections, which is my preferred 10 source because I think it better captures what the likely 11 12 expectations of investors are. MR. BYRNE: Okay. Thank you. That's all the 13 questions I have. 14 15 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. Then we'll come up for question from the Bench. Commissioner Kenney? 16 17 CROSS-EXAMINATION 18 BY COMMISSIONER KENNEY: 19 Q Hello. Good afternoon. 20 А 21 I just have a few questions. You were here when Q 22 I was questioning Mr. Hevert about some of the things I 23 asked him about. I was going to ask you about the whole notion of using non-regulated utility proxy groups, but I 24 25 think you sufficiently answered that under questioning

Page 1759 1 from other counsel, so I'll skip all that. 2 А If I would be permitted, I've got --3 Q Sure. 4 А Utilities compete with non-regulated companies 5 for capital. Right. 6 Q 7 А So it's not my position that the investment 8 returns for those companies utilities compete with for 9 capitals are irrelevant. My point is that the -- the ability to accurately estimate a return for those 10 11 companies which truly are valued by the marketplace in a 12 comparable way that utility securities is valued and the 13 cost of capitals are set is highly uncertain. 14 And some risk factors that suggest that they're comparable in risk and you would expect to get the same 15 cost of capital, when there is observable evidence on that 16 17 what cost of capital is, you can see that they're not the same, even though you would think they would be the same 18 because they're comparable risk. 19 20 So you could construct a proxy group of Q 21 comparable risk, but the value placed on their stock would be different? 22 Well, I think the reliability of your cost 23 А estimate to identify what the investors required return 24 for the utility securities are would be highly 25

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1	problematic.
2	Q So would you argue, then, that there would be no
3	value in constructing such a proxy group as a supplement
4	to the typical proxy group?
5	A I think all data points are worth giving some
6	consideration, so I wouldn't say there's no value.
7	Q Okay.
8	A I would just caution the use of a non-regulated
9	proxy group in estimating a fair return.
10	Q Okay. Fair enough. So let me just ask a few
11	questions, and then I'll try to get us out of here. What
12	what's your hourly rate?
13	A \$215.
14	Q And is that the same for deposition and trial?
15	A It is.
16	Q Were you deposed?
17	A Yes.
18	Q Okay. And have you I looked at your CV, and
19	I saw that there was a list of agencies for which you
20	sponsored entities for which you had sponsored
21	testimony in front of different regulatory bodies.
22	A Uh-huh.
23	Q Have you sponsored testimony for an Office of
24	Public Counsel or residential ratepayer advocate entity?
25	A I have worked for Office of Public Counsel here

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1	in Missouri and Washington state.
2	Q That that was when you were employed by
3	Office of Public Counsel, or you were employed as an
4	expert by
5	A No. My current employment.
6	Q Okay. And have you ever sponsored testimony for
7	on behalf of a regulated utility?
8	A I've been hired as an advisor to the regulators
9	to make decisions, but I've never offered testimony on
10	their behalf.
11	Q For regulators?
12	A Yes.
13	Q In which states?
14	A Actually, I was in the providence of New
15	Finland.
16	Q Okay. How about an investor-owned utility?
17	A I sponsored testimony once on behalf of a
18	investor-owned utility.
19	Q Okay.
20	A I've been hired by utilities to do studies, but
21	I've only sponsored testimony in their behalf once.
22	Q Okay. Now, Mr. Murray refers in his testimony
23	to the terms cost of equity and return on equity as
24	different and distinct concepts. What's your your
25	opinion about defining those two terms distinctly?

Page 1762 I'm not sure how Mr. Murray is drawing that 1 Α 2 distinction. I mean, the cost of equity is -- is the cost 3 to the utility to be able to attract equity capital. А return on equity, I suppose, would be what investors 4 5 receive after they -- they make an investment in a company. 6 7 And I think you heard my discussion earlier Q 8 about the credit rating agencies and their notions in 9 assessing risk has more do with the utility's ability to recover its costs and their assessment of the regulatory 10 11 environment in which the utility is operating. Would you 12 agree with me, though, that the credit rated -- credit 13 rating agencies don't make any determination or pass any judgments upon the prudence of the utility's expenditures? 14 15 А Yes. It's my understanding credit rating agencies are -- are focused exclusively on the utility's 16 17 ability to meets the debt service requirements of the bond 18 holders. 19 Q Exclusively? 20 А Exclusively. 21 Okay. And I think -- we talked about Moody's Q 22 and S&P and Fitch's and how Moody's credit metrics are 23 more transparent. And I think in your testimony, you used 24 your proposed ROE and ran it through whatever metrics 25 Moody's utilized and came up with the conclusion that your

Page 1763 1 ROE wouldn't -- wouldn't cause any damage to their -- to 2 Ameren's credit rating; is that correct? 3 А Well, I used S&P benchmark, not Moody's. 4 Q Okay. 5 А And the reason I used S&P's is because they are focused exclusively on investor capital. 6 7 Q Okay. 8 А Third party off balance sheet obligations. 9 Moody's ratios, on the other hand, include zero cost capital components such as deferred taxes, which is 10 relevant, but -- but it's also -- the way it's treated 11 12 here in Missouri, those are rate-based offsets, so it just 13 seemed more of a direct comparison of a return on equity and depreciation of rates and expense recoveries to rely 14 on Standard & Poor's benchmarks. 15 And, also, Standard & Poor's has some published 16 17 quidelines to help gauge whether or not they are within the range adequate to support an investment pre pondere. 18 19 Q Could you perform the same analysis with 20 Moody's? 21 Α I could. They would be slightly different ratios, and you could use Moody's medians as a way of 22 judging the adequacy of their ratio. But Moody's does not 23 24 publish a benchmark like S&P does. 25 Okay. And then would you offer an opinion one Q

	Page 1764
1	way or the other on whether Mr. Murray's ROE
2	recommendations are legally confiscatory?
3	A I can't. It's the legality of it.
4	Q Okay. And a similar question that I asked
5	Mr. Hevert, do do you consider Mr. Hevert and
6	Mr. Gorman I mean, Mr. Murray, rather, to be experts?
7	A Yes.
8	COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay. All right. That's
9	all I have. Thank you.
10	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Commissioner Stoll?
11	COMMISSIONER STOLL: One quick question.
12	CROSS-EXAMINATION
13	BY COMMISSIONER STOLL.
14	Q Earlier in your conversation with Mr. Byrne, you
15	mentioned that you didn't use the results of the analysis
16	of the capital asset pricing method.
17	A Correct.
18	Q Would you care to elaborate on that at this
19	time?
20	A I performed the analysis, and I showed what the
21	results were. But I was concerned with whether or not
22	that model was producing a reliable result now because I
23	think there is a a large risk premium in the
24	marketplace today relative to risk free proxies, Treasury
25	securities.

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1	Treasury bond yields right now are very low and
2	have been low as long as we've been in economic distress
3	as a country. One would expect and we see this with
4	utility securities and with corporate securities, that
5	there is a an above average risk premium for for
6	increasing levels of risk in the marketplace.
7	But my CAPM analysis had a market risk premium
8	that was based more on average risk premiums over time
9	rather than above average risk premium that I think exists
10	in today's marketplace. So I think it produced a return
11	that was too low.
12	Q So I I guess so, obviously, then, in if
13	other economic conditions existed, then you may have used
13 14	other economic conditions existed, then you may have used that analysis?
14	that analysis?
14 15	<pre>that analysis? A This is only for about the last year or year</pre>
14 15 16	<pre>that analysis? A This is only for about the last year or year and a half, I I either have not used the CAPM or I put</pre>
14 15 16 17	<pre>that analysis? A This is only for about the last year or year and a half, I I either have not used the CAPM or I put some very, very strong cautions on use of the CAPM.</pre>
14 15 16 17 18	<pre>that analysis? A This is only for about the last year or year and a half, I I either have not used the CAPM or I put some very, very strong cautions on use of the CAPM. As the economy recovers and market turns to more</pre>
14 15 16 17 18 19	<pre>that analysis? A This is only for about the last year or year and a half, I I either have not used the CAPM or I put some very, very strong cautions on use of the CAPM. As the economy recovers and market turns to more normal conditions, I likely will start using the CAPM</pre>
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	<pre>that analysis? A This is only for about the last year or year and a half, I I either have not used the CAPM or I put some very, very strong cautions on use of the CAPM. As the economy recovers and market turns to more normal conditions, I likely will start using the CAPM again as part of my estimates to support my return on</pre>
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>that analysis? A This is only for about the last year or year and a half, I I either have not used the CAPM or I put some very, very strong cautions on use of the CAPM. As the economy recovers and market turns to more normal conditions, I likely will start using the CAPM again as part of my estimates to support my return on equity recommendations.</pre>
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 22	<pre>that analysis?</pre>

Page 1766 1 MS. BAKER: No questions. Thank you. 2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: For staff? 3 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. RECROSS EXAMINATION 4 5 BY MR. THOMPSON: 6 You'll recall, Mr. Gorman, a series of questions Q 7 -- I guess they were "what if" questions from Mr. Byrne 8 relating to your Schedules MPG-11 and MPG-12. 9 MR. BYRNE: I'm going to object. This is not based on questions from the Bench. 10 JUDGE WOODRUFF: He just said it was questions 11 12 from Mr. Byrne. MR. THOMPSON: They were questions from 13 Mr. Byrne. 14 15 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. I'll sustain the objection. 16 17 MR. THOMPSON: Okay. 18 (By Mr. Thompson) Well, let me ask one question, Q 19 then, based on what Commissioner Kenney asked. You stated 20 that you consider Mr. Murray and Mr. Hevert to be experts 21 in financial analysis? 22 I do. А 23 Do you consider Mr. Byrne to be an expert in Q 24 financial analysis? 25 I do not. А

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1	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. No further questions.
2	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. Recross Ameren?
3	MR. BYRNE: No, thank you.
4	JUDGE WOODRUFF: Redirect?
5	MS. ILES: Thank you, your Honor.
6	RECROSS EXAMINATION
7	BY MS. ILES:
8	Q Mr. Gorman, Mr. Byrne asked you a number of
9	questions about the results reported in the RRA documents
10	that have been admitted into testimony into evidence
11	from one which is Ameren 69 showing the rate decisions
12	from calendar 2011 and then Exhibit 530, which is the
13	major case decisions from January through June of 2012.
14	Do you remember Mr. Byrne asking you about those?
15	A I do.
16	Q What conclusions do you draw from the
17	information that he pointed out to you in his
18	cross-examination of you?
19	A Well, the conclusions I draw is the findings are
20	not that surprising because capital market costs a couple
21	years ago were higher than they are today. AmerenUE's
22	or Ameren Missouri's last authorized return on equity was
23	10.2 percent.
24	The focus of my testimony is to provide evidence
25	of why its cost of equity is no longer that high. I

Page 1768 suspect that if I would have offered testimony for all 1 2 these other proxy companies in the regulatory Commissions 3 addressing their authorized return on equity, I would have provided similar evidence. 4 5 So what's relevant in this case, I believe, or I submit to the Commission for your consideration is what 6 7 the current market cost of equity is for Ameren Missouri and these other companies, not what was their last 8 9 authorized return on equity. 10 I agree that it's relevant because the markets's 11 looking at it. But nevertheless, the return which is fair 12 to the company and fair to investors is what the current 13 market cost of equity is. 14 And I say that because it's not always going to be a lower number. There will be instances where the 15 return in a rate case may be higher than the last 16 17 authorized return on equity. And if the utility has a right to expect to 18 increase on return on equity in a rate case, I think 19 20 customers have the right to expect you to decrease the 21 return on equity in a rate case if the return on equity suggests that's a fair thing to do. 22 23 Mr. Byrne also asked you some questions about 0 your equity risk premium calculations, specifically, your 24

Schedule MPG-12 and MGP -- or MGP -- MPG-11 and MPG-12,

25

Page 1769 1 which are Exhibits 61 and 62. Do you remember those 2 questions? 3 А Yes. 4 Q And, specifically, he asked you about -- and he 5 asked you a number of questions about the time period reflected on these schedules and the fact that they go 6 7 back to 1986. Can you explain why you used the time 8 period that you did? 9 А I can. And the time period was selected because this is a period over which the observable market evidence 10 indicated utilities had access to equity capital. Go back 11 12 to -- to some of the cross we had before. The principles of a fair return on equity is 13 fair compensation and the ability to go to the market for 14 15 additional capital if you need it to fund infrastructure and investments. 16 17 Since 1986, electric utility stocks have, on average, traded at premiums to book value. What that 18 means is the utility could sell additional shares of 19 20 common stock without diluting the value of shares --21 existing shares through existing shareholders. So that's an indication that the valuations that 22 were in part supported by these authorized returns on 23 24 equity supported the utility's access to external additional equity capital. 25
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1	Prior to 1986, market to book ratios were below
2	one. And that argument didn't hold up for that time
3	period. So this time period was collected specifically to
4	reflect a period where authorized returns on equity
5	contributed towards the valuation of utility securities
6	which supported the utility's access to additional equity
7	capital in the marketplace.
8	Q So I think Mr. Byrne specifically asked you
9	whether the financial conditions in 1986 and 1987 were
10	completely different from current conditions. And I don't
11	think he really gave you a chance to answer that. So
12	would you like to explain?
13	A Well
14	Q Are there any similarities?
15	A there the circumstances of the marketplace
16	change constantly. so if if Mr. Byrne's point was that
17	authorized returns on equity are lower today and bond
18	observable bond yields are lower today, that's true.
19	But as can you see, this analysis is attempting
20	to estimate the relationship between the cost of equity
21	and the cost of bond. So that relationship also changes
22	over time, but it's a relative measure that you need
23	historical, observable evidence to get a sense of what
24	that range of equity risk premiums are.
25	And the only way to get that range is to look at

	Page 1771
1	historical evidence. And and the time period I
2	selected, again, was intentionallly selected because the
3	authorized returns on equity must have equaled the
4	investor required returns because the bond or the stock
5	prices of the utility securities during that time were
6	premiums to book value which insured the utility had
7	access to external equity capital.
8	Q And then he Mr. Byrne led you through a
9	series of recalculations of your risk premium analysis
10	looking at, in each of these cases, five years of data and
11	and in another ten case years of data. Do you recall
12	those questions?
13	A I do.
14	Q And I wrote down most of them. I think I was
15	keeping track of them. It seems to me that as you were
16	going through all those, if you did the calculations the
17	way Mr. Byrne wanted you to, all of the ROE calculations
18	came out below 10 percent; isn't that correct?
19	A It is.
20	Q And why did you do the calculations that way?
21	A Well well, there were some point estimates
22	that were right at 10 percent, 10.1, 10.2.
23	Q Right. But when you did the weighting and
24	average, I think they all came out below?
25	A Correct. Right.

Page 1772 1 And why didn't you do the calculations the way 0 2 Mr. Byrne had you do them? 3 А Because I think it's a, you know, self-serving data mining type exercise that Mr. Byrne was going through 4 5 to try to find a way to find numbers that produced a higher return of equity. I would note that some of the 6 7 risk premiums he was using were during one of the worst periods of Financial crisis this country has ever 8 9 experienced. 10 The 2007 through 2009 time period reflected an instance where utility companies in some instances came 11 12 close to defaulting on their financial obligations because short-term borrowing facilities were shut down. Their 13 utility cost of borrowing for some companies sky-rocketed. 14 15 For example, Ameren Illinois, during the 2008/2009 time period, had the issue of mortgage bond at 16 17 an interest rate of over 10 percent Because this was a very unique time period that created significant distress 18 19 on utility companies in particular and the U.S. corporate 20 securities in general. 21 So focusing on a time period largely impacted by one of the worst financial markets we've had in the last 22 hundred years, I don't think is a very credible analysis. 23

Going back ten years, he smoothed that out a little bit. But it's still largely focused on a relatively short time

period that was captured to build up to the financial
 market collapse and then the very slow recovery from that
 collapse.

So I think Mr. Byrne simply found a way to add 4 5 numbers together to produce a high return on equity without constructing analysis which really captured what 6 7 my objective was, and that is to get a pretty good sense 8 of what the range in market risk premiums were above Treasury bonds and then again above utility bonds, and 9 then to explore based on current market information where 10 this in that estimated range a reasonable estimate of the 11 current market premium lies. 12

13 So I think my analysis was more biased, more 14 direct in trying to get as legitimate an estimate of where 15 the current cost of equity is. Mr. Byrne, on the other 16 hand, is simply data mining to come up with a higher 17 return on equity estimate.

18 Q Now, he also asked you about your sustainable 19 growth DCF calculation, which was 8.63 percent. And you 20 started to explain how you considered those results, and I 21 think he cut you off. Was there something you wanted to 22 add about the significance of the sustainable growth 23 result that you came up with? 24 Well, yeah. He kind of lumped it in with the А 25 results of my CAPM study, and I -- I took exception to

that. My sustainable growth rate DCF analysis is 1 2 developed ultimately on my Schedule MPG-7. It's developed 3 onto -- the growth rate is actually produced on schedules before that. 4 5 But the sustainable -- the sustainable growth rate is 4.2 percent for the proxy group. That is not an 6 7 unreasonable long-term growth rate estimate based on the parameters forecasted by Value Line. 8 It's lower than I think is sustainable in the 9 long-term based on other considerations I see in the 10 utility industry. But based on the sustainable growth 11 12 rate model, it produces a number of about 4.2 percent. So I'm uncomfortable recommending a return on 13 equity that low in this environment because return on 14 15 equity estimates have dropped so significantly in the last year, in particular, in the last couple years, and in 16 17 general, because I think some -- some conservative or caution is necessary in awarding a return on equity for an 18 electric utility company because dropping that authorized 19 return on equity too fast can create financial trouble, 20 21 even if the return on equity reflects fair compensation in 22 the marketplace. 23 So I considered things like the authorized 24 return on equity ability to support the current dividend payment or whether or not a sustained level of dropped 25

1 cost of capital will persist. The utility can -- can 2 modify its management of its dividend to reduce the cost 3 of dividend so it can still support it in the sustainable 4 cost capital market environment. 5 If return on equity estimates stay in this low

area over indefinite period of time, I eventually will be
recommending return on equities lower than I am now.

8 But my concern is that if the cost of capital 9 drops and stays low, the utility needs time to modify its 10 financial housekeeping in order to maintain its financial 11 integrity while receiving a very low authorized return on 12 equity, even if it is consistent with current market 13 costs.

Again, the cost of dividends is an issue. The ability to refinance outstanding or imbedded debt -- debt securities takes time. So all of that was -- was in part of my judgment in recommending a return on equity which I thought reflected fair compensation but would also maintain the financial integrity of the utility.

20QNext, Mr. Byrne asked you a bunch of questions21concerning your use of either a mean or median results in22your recommendations. Do you recall those questions?23AI do. Yes.24QLet me just ask you, do other expert -- you've

25 testified in a number of cases. You've read testimony by

1 a number of other expert witnesses over the years. Do 2 other experts only rely on mean or only rely on median, or 3 do they, like you, sometimes use mean and sometimes use median? 4 5 А Well, I think we heard Mr. Hevert talk about this this morning. In one instance, you would use mean. 6 7 In other instances, you would use median depending on the central tendency of the results of your proxy group. 8 9 Which of those two factors best approximate the general tendency of the return on equity estimates within the 10 11 proxy group? 12 In the last case, I thought the median was a better estimate of it because a lot of the estimates kind 13 of clustered around the median. In this case, it was more 14 of a dispersion above and below the -- the mean -- the 15 median, so, on average, I thought better to describe those 16 17 high and low estimates. Didn't actually the charts that Mr. Byrne had us 18 Q look at, the scatter charts, actually support what you're 19 20 just saying? 21 They absolutely do support it. Mr. Byrne Α wouldn't let me explain that. But that's precisely why I 22 decided to use a median in the last case and an average in 23 this case or a mean in this case. 24 25 And, importantly, in both the last case and in

	Page 1777
1	this case, even though I used either the mean or the
2	the mean or the median, I showed both results to be as
3	transparent as possible because I believe in this case the
4	mean best summarizes the overall tendency of the proxy
5	group. In the last couple cases, I thought the median
6	did.
7	Q So just to be real clear, when you look at a
8	chart like on page on Exhibit 74, at the top, there are
9	a number of diamonds that are right in the middle. And in
10	a case like that, you're saying that would have that
11	would be the type of data set where you would use the
12	median?
13	A Yes.
14	Q And on the bottom, the which is for this
15	case, only one of the little diamonds is actually right on
16	the line there. So you would you used the mean in this
17	case. That's really what you're talking about, central
18	tendencies?
19	A Yes, that is.
20	MS. ILES: Okay. I just wanted to make sure I
21	understood that. No further questions.
22	JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Then Mr. Gorman,
23	you can step down. Thank you. And before we go to
24	Mr. Murray, I just want to ask the parties, it's now 5:00.
25	And I know Mr. Murray is not going to be available next

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Page 1778 Tuesday. Would he be available any other day next week, 1 2 including Friday, which is --3 MR. THOMPSON: Are you available another day? He says he would be. 4 5 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. I'll let parties decide amongst themselves when we want to bring him back, 6 7 and I'll indicate that the Commission will be available on 8 Friday. Mr. Byrne? 9 MR. BYRNE: I mean, there's -- I'm influenced by the Cardinal play-off games going on right now, so I would 10 rather do it next week. 11 12 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. All right. Well, then, 13 that's what we'll do. And you can tell me on Tuesday when -- when you want to take him up, if it's on Friday or at 14 15 some other time next week. 16 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Judge. 17 MR. MURRAY: I'd rather be gone, to be honest with you. 18 19 JUDGE WOODRUFF: I understand that. But you're 20 probably the only one in the room who would. 21 MR. MURRAY: Doing surrebuttal and this case, 22 it's been crazy lately. 23 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. With that, then, we will adjourn until 1 p.m. on Tuesday, correct? 24 25 MR. THOMPSON: That is correct, Judge. Thank

	Page 1779
1	you.
2	MR. LOWERY: Thank you.
3	(The proceedings were concluded at 5:10 p.m. on
4	October 5.)
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1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE				
2					
3	STATE OF MISSOURI)				
4)ss.				
5	COUNTY OF OSAGE)				
6					
7	I, Monnie S. Mealy, Certified Shorthand Reporter,				
8	Certified Court Reporter #0538, and Registered				
9	Professional Reporter, and Notary Public, within and for				
10	the State of Missouri, do hereby certify that I was				
11	personally present at the proceedings as set forth in the				
12	caption sheet hereof; that I then and there took down in				
13	stenotype the proceedings had at said time and was				
14	thereafter transcribed by me, and is fully and accurately				
15	set forth in the preceding pages.				
16					
17					
18					
19					
20					
21	Monnie S. Mealy, CSR, CCR #0539				
22	Registered Professional Reporter				
23					
24					
25					

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