

Exhibit No.:
Issue: "Termination of
Service"

Witness/Type of Exhibits: Levesque Rebuttal

Sponsoring Party: KCPL
Case No.: HO-86-139

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF

Robert W. Levesque

ON BEHALF OF

KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

CASE NO. HO-86-139

OFFICIAL CASE FILE
KANSAS PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Exhibit No. 35
Date 7/8/87 Case No. HO-86-139
Reporter 2022222222

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
OF
ROBERT W. LEVESQUE
Manager of Budgets & Valuation Engineering
Case No. HO-86-139

1 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BY WHOM YOU ARE EMPLOYED?

2 A. Robert W. Levesque, and I am employed by Kansas City Power & Light
3 Company.

4 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR TITLE AND CREDENTIALS.

5 A. I am Manager of Budgets and Valuation Engineering. I hold the
6 Bachelor of Engineering degree from the Polytechnic Institute of
7 Brooklyn, and the Master of Business Administration from the Syracuse
8 University. I am registered as a Professional Engineer in New York,
9 Missouri, Kansas and Colorado.

10 Q. MR. LEVESQUE, WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

11 A. The primary purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to show where
12 testimony filed by Staff Consultant Derick Dahlen dealing with a
13 proposed Long Range Rehabilitation Program has seriously
14 underestimated the cost of steam to Downtown customers. Mr. Dahlen
15 initially estimated \$9.97/mlb. for 1987. Upon further review and
16 after discussion with us and review of documentation provided to him
17 and Staff Consultant Robert Miller, we understand that he will be
18 revising his estimates upwards. Any increase moves him closer to a
19 more reasonable estimate. KCPL believes that a conservative estimate
20 of \$17.26/mlb. results from calculations that include all the
21 appropriate factors. My testimony reviews Mr. Dahlen's estimates on

1 an item by item basis in a supplemental study, Appendix A. My
2 testimony also addresses site location and installation aspects of
3 comparing gas and electric boilers, some aspects of natural gas fuel
4 prices, and the inadequacies we perceive in the proposed Short Term
5 Rehabilitation program.

6 Q. MR. LEVESQUE HAVE YOU COME TO ANY CONCLUSIONS REGARDING STAFF
7 CONSULTANT DAHLEN'S DISTRICT STEAM HEAT SCENARIOS, PARTICULARLY THE
8 LONG TERM REHABILITATIONS.

9 A. Yes, we have. When adjustments are made to Mr. Dahlen's assumptions
10 to cover certain discrepancies, inconsistencies, and omissions that he
11 and Staff Consultant Miller made, we find that Mr. Dahlen has done a
12 remarkably good job of justifying a steam heat rate increase! In
13 effect, our calculations and Mr. Dahlen's estimates both conclude the
14 need for a rate increase regardless of whether KCPL or a hypothetical
15 purchaser operates the system. As noted in our conversion plan and
16 Mr. Beaudoin's testimony, continuing to operate the central heat
17 system including renovation would require a current retail steam price
18 of \$26.80/mlb., and for purposes of this case, KCPL has stipulated, on
19 a dollar basis only, to a \$3.2 million (66%) revenue deficiency. When
20 we corrected Mr. Dahlen's initial estimates, we find that a steam
21 price of at least \$17.26/mlb. can be justified. Gross receipt tax in
22 Missouri would increase these and similar steam rates by 11.11%. In
23 this instance, the price the consumer pays would be \$19.18/mlb. As
24 noted elsewhere, the current average steam price of approximately
25 \$10.00/mlb. to Downtown customers is clearly inadequate. In effect,
26 Mr. Dahlen agrees. Thus, I conclude that Mr. Dahlen's analysis helps
27 to justify this 66% increase in steam rates.

1 Q. MR. LEVESQUE, WHAT DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES, AND OMISSIONS ARE
2 YOU REFERRING TO?

3 A. These items are identified and detailed in our study attached as
4 Appendix A. They are summarized here as follows:

- 5 1. Staff Consultant Miller significantly underestimated the
6 costs to operate and maintain the steam distribution system
7 (O&M), whether partially replaced or not. We find that the
8 15 employees we currently have maintaining the system is a
9 good reference point. With the efficiencies of a
10 rehabilitated distribution system, the manpower could be at
11 a level of no less than 10. The 3 employees initially
12 estimated by Mr. Miller would be inadequate. We have
13 discussed this item with Mr. Miller and provided him with
14 some operational experience data and estimates of labor
15 requirements. Of particular note is the expected impact of
16 dealing with asbestos insulation on some of the distribution
17 piping.
- 18 2. Staff Consultant Dahlen neglected to include a return of, or
19 a return on, the current KCPL net plant (\$5.5 million),
20 although he continues to make use of Grand Avenue and the
21 existing steam distribution system in both the Long Range
22 and Short Range Scenarios. KCPL is unwilling to ascribe to
23 a zero plant value.
- 24 3. Mr. Dahlen's base 1987 natural gas price of \$2.18/MMBTU is
25 far below the actual price being paid for gas at Grand
26 Avenue Station. KCPL's forecast for 1987, namely \$3.63, is
27 more in line with the prices that are expected to be charged
28 by KPL Gas Service Co. We corrected Mr. Dahlen's estimates

1 to this more realistic figure and believe he should be
2 reflecting these DRI based gas price forecasts.

- 3 4. Mr. Dahlen, apparently using estimates prepared by Mr.
4 Miller, underestimated the amount of electricity required to
5 run electric auxiliaries at Grand Avenue Station (GAS). We
6 investigated this matter thoroughly and determined the
7 electric consumption of selected equipment at GAS. We also
8 were able to establish the auxiliary consumption at a local
9 major chemical company facility with gas-fired boilers of
10 comparable size to boilers proposed at GAS and have made
11 adjustments that reflect their experience in our
12 calculations.
- 13 5. Mr. Dahlen initially neglected to include property taxes.
14 Property taxes will be due on both any new investment and
15 the original investment. We shared some property tax
16 assessments and abandonment data with Mr. Dahlen to be used
17 in adjusting his estimates.
- 18 6. Mr. Miller computed distribution system losses based on an
19 allocation of current losses by the amount of radiation
20 losses computed for each of the low and high pressure
21 distribution systems. Then he appears to have discarded the
22 losses that he associated with the low pressure system.
23 Apparently he failed to realize that the "other than
24 radiation" losses occur mostly on the customers' premises or
25 are steam leaks which will continue to occur even if new
26 distribution is installed. Again, we discussed this with
27 Messrs. Miller and Dahlen and provided actual measurement
28 data.

1 The impact on steam rates for each of these and other discrepancies
2 has been identified in our study which is contained in Appendix A,
3 which was prepared under my direct supervision and control. They
4 total \$7.29/mlb. Mr. Dahlen's model was recreated in the study
5 contained in Appendix A and then adjusted for each of these
6 discrepancies, inconsistencies, and omissions. Appendix A, Exhibit 1.
7 Thus, we believe Staff should be estimating a 1987 Downtown Steam
8 price of \$17.26/mlb rather than the \$9.97/mlb. originally estimated in
9 the Long Term Rehabilitation Scenario. In other words, were the Long
10 Term Scenario operating today the price of steam would be about
11 \$17.26/mlb.

12 Q. MR. LEVESQUE, HOW DOES NATIONAL STARCH AFFECT THIS SITUATION?

13 A. With great impact. The above stated steam rates include National
14 Starch as a large wholesale customer. Without National Starch, and
15 that will be the case when its contract ends in 1990, the situation
16 can only get worse. By worse, I mean that the price of steam to
17 retail customers will increase dramatically. This is shown in Mr.
18 Dahlen's second (or no National Starch) scenario where, after we make
19 adjustments similar to those mentioned above, a steam rate of
20 \$19.61/mlb. can be shown. Appendix A, Exhibit 2. This is the most
21 likely situation that Downtown steam customers would face after 1990.

22 Q. MR. LEVESQUE, YOU HAVE COMMENTED ON THE STEAM RATES TO RETAIL
23 CUSTOMERS. ARE THERE ANY IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE NUMBER OF
24 CUSTOMERS IN STAFF CONSULTANT DAHLEN'S ANALYSIS THAT AFFECT HIS
25 SCENARIOS.

26 A. Yes, there are. Flying in the face of our experience and that of most
27 other steam systems, Staff has assumed that all steam customers are

1 retained. That is a very grave, misleading, and, we think, erroneous
2 assumption. The number of steam retail customers has been falling in
3 recent years, even when steam prices were below \$10/mlb. The number
4 of customers can be expected to fall in the future as steam rates
5 increase. This means that each of the remaining customers who stay on
6 the system will be paying for an increasing percentage of the fixed
7 plant costs. As we note in Mr. Graham's rebuttal testimony, it is our
8 contention that no amount of marketing or "rate stabilization" would
9 have resulted in 100% customer retention.

10 Q. MR. LEVESQUE, MOST OF YOUR COMMENTS HAVE BEEN ABOUT THE LONG TERM
11 REHABILITATION PLAN THAT WAS PROPOSED BY MR. DAHLEN. DO YOU THINK
12 THAT THE SHORT TERM PROGRAM PROPOSED IS A GOOD WAY OF LEADING INTO THE
13 LONG TERM PROGRAM?

14 A. No, I don't. The short term rehabilitation program makes little sense
15 in that it addresses only a few critical items. It seems to be an
16 attempt to suggest what a prudent operator of the Downtown system
17 would do first in effecting rehabilitation. Nonetheless, there are
18 some clearly deficient items.

19 Q. WHY DO YOU SAY THAT, MR. LEVESQUE? WHAT ARE THEY?

20 A. For the following reasons:

21 Boilers:

22 The summer boiler as proposed appears to us to be inadequate to
23 its task by at least a factor of two. Our very lowest monthly
24 steam requirement has been 46,000 mlb. A more typical monthly
25 load in 1986 was 55,000 mlb. The proposed (70,000 lb/hr) boiler
26 can only generate 50,000 mlb. maximum (assuming 100% capacity

1 factor) for the month. With normal derating and losses a much
2 larger boiler would be required.

3 More importantly, the short term "fix" of installing a summer
4 boiler for efficiency reasons ignores the basic condition of GAS
5 and the older remaining boilers. Replacing just one boiler does
6 not address a myriad of other problems.

7 Distribution System:

8 The so called Short Term program ignores major portions of the
9 distribution system. It recommends modifications to the high
10 pressure system (now serving about 23 customers) and totally
11 ignores the low pressure system (now serving about 100
12 customers)! In fact it appears that Mr. Dahlen or Mr. Miller
13 assume that the low pressure system is to operate 15-20 years
14 without any additional investment. Additional investment would
15 indeed be required to maintain for another 20 years, boilers
16 which are currently over 30 years old and a low pressure
17 distribution system which dates back to the early 1900's. That
18 is hardly short term. And that's why I say the Short Term
19 Rehabilitation Program makes little sense.

20 Q. MR. LEVESQUE, DID YOU MAKE ADJUSTMENTS TO MR. DAHLEN'S SHORT TERM
21 REHABILITATION SCENARIO?

22 A. Yes, and the results are contained in Appendix A, Exhibit 3. The only
23 changes Mr. Dahlen apparently made to his long term rehabilitation
24 pricing analysis to arrive at his short term analysis was to reduce
25 capital investment and associated costs; he did not take into account
26 the other differences between Mr. Miller's long term and short term

1 rehabilitation scenarios. For example, Mr. Dahlen did not increase
2 distribution O&M expense from his long term analysis level, even
3 though the present distribution system is retained in the short term
4 rehabilitation scenario. Similarly, he did not increase production
5 O&M, even though the existing boilers at GAS are retained and used in
6 the short term rehabilitation scenario. These are significant
7 oversights.

8 Q. MR. LEVESQUE, DID YOU INVESTIGATE THE TYPICAL INSTALLATION COSTS OF
9 GAS VS. ELECTRIC BOILERS?

10 A. Yes, we did. First let me say that due to the particulars of specific
11 locations, the term "typical" is misleading.

12 Q. WHY IS THAT, MR. LEVESQUE?

13 A. Well, we showed in our gas vs. electric boiler analysis, Appendix A,
14 Exhibit 4 that the most significant variable factor by far when making
15 cost comparisons of gas vs. electric boilers is the site and the
16 particular installation problems. For example, Mr. Dahlen has
17 generalized a 200 bhp gas boiler requiring installation costs of
18 \$124,000. He compared that with an electric boiler facility requiring
19 installation costs of \$340,000. That would be a complex electric
20 boiler installation. It would be just as valid had Mr. Dahlen
21 selected a relatively simple electric installation and compared it to
22 a complex gas installation. For example, imagine, if you will, a
23 building with no possibility of an outside gas flue vent except on the
24 roof. Such an installation could be very expensive to achieve floor
25 by floor. The Home Savings Building, which is 17 stories high, is a
26 case in point. It is possible to vent a basement located gas boiler
27 there, but we understood that it would be difficult. In fact, Energy

1 Masters consultants have roughly estimated that venting a gas boiler
2 could result in total installation costs that exceed \$250,000-300,000.
3 The point is that while the cost of comparably sized gas and electric
4 boilers is about the same, the cost of installation for these boilers
5 can vary widely. That's why I say the term "typical installation" is
6 misleading.

7 Q. ARE YOU SAYING THAT THE COST OF BOILERS--BE THEY ELECTRIC OR GAS--ARE
8 ABOUT THE SAME.

9 A. Just the boilers, yes, depending on their size of course. But the
10 installation costs can vary widely. That makes comparing
11 installations difficult and misleading.

12 Q. WHAT ABOUT ENERGY COSTS--GAS OR ELECTRICITY?

13 A. The gas price used by Staff Consultant Dahlen needed major adjustment.
14 I note that fuel costs on a btu of delivered heat basis can favor gas
15 this year in some simple gas boiler installations. But all the
16 projections that we see, even those from the KPL Gas Service Company,
17 show gas costs increasing significantly in future years. Indeed, KPL
18 Gas Service has recently announced its intention to seek a significant
19 rate increase in Missouri. In contrast, electric costs, particularly
20 electric heat rates, can be expected to remain relatively stable, and
21 because of Commission order KCPL electric rates are quite predictable.
22 Thus, today's apparently economical gas installation may not compare
23 at all well from an operating fuel cost standpoint in later years. We
24 think that the differential between gas and electric would likely
25 widen over time. The current cost of gas in Downtown Kansas City
26 coupled with DRI based forecasts modified to reflect current and
27 future conditions tend to make gas fuel much less attractive.

1 Q. SO, MR. LEVESQUE, ARE YOU SAYING THAT IT'S A TOSS UP BETWEEN ALL
2 INSTALLATIONS--GAS OR ELECTRIC?

3 A. No I'm not. There are some simple gas installations where flue vents
4 are short that are so economic that gas driven boilers may be the
5 answer. On the other hand there are some gas installations that are
6 so uneconomic, if not impossible, that electric driven boilers are the
7 only answer. But where installation costs are about the same, there a
8 customer maybe wise to select electric since his operating costs are
9 likely to be more attractive in the long run. But it's up to the
10 customer to decide. And that's the basis of our Plan. Let the
11 customer decide what's in his best interest.

12 Q. WHAT ABOUT YOUR SUBSIDIZED ON-SITE BOILERS? HOW DOES THAT AFFECT THE
13 SITUATION?

14 A. As noted elsewhere we are willing to provide electric boilers at no
15 initial cost to the customer. If the Commission so decides, KPL Gas
16 Service could provide gas boilers, too, at no initial cost, assuming
17 that it would want to. Should the Commission see the provision of any
18 kind of boilers as not in keeping with the promotional practices
19 rules, then the customer is still free to make his own unsubsidized
20 choice--gas or electric. Our underlying contention is that the
21 central steam system is uneconomic for all. But individual steam
22 boiler installations are economic at the present time. It's only a
23 matter of whether to go gas or electric.

24 Q. DID YOU MAKE ANY OTHER SPECIAL ANALYSES?

25 A. Yes. We developed a very special case for Mr. Graham using our models
26 that details the price of steam if all the buildings in the KCPL steam

1 service territory were steam heated. That material is appended to Mr.
2 Graham's rebuttal testimony.

3 Q. DOES THAT CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?


4 A. Yes, it does.

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF MISSOURI
COUNTY OF JACKSON

)
) ss.
)

Robert W. Levesque, being first duly sworn, on his oath states: that he has participated in the preparation of the foregoing written testimony, in question and answer form, consisting of 11 pages, to be presented to the Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri in Case No. HO-86-139; that the answers therein contained were given by him; that he has knowledge of the matters set forth in said answers; and that such answers are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.



Robert W. Levesque

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2nd day of April, 1987.


Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

CAROL GILES
Notary Public, State of Missouri
Commissioned in Platte County
My Commission Expires June 15, 1987

Review of the District Steam Heating System Scenarios

As Modeled by Derick O. Dahlen

MPSC Consultant

Mr. Dahlen created three district steam heating scenarios. Each of these scenarios has been reviewed and found to have discrepancies, inconsistencies, and omissions. A modified case for each scenario was developed in order to evaluate the scenarios as provided by Dahlen. More realistic steam prices have been determined after adjusting for the discrepancies, inconsistencies and omissions. Overall, KCPL feels that Dahlen's analysis is ultra-conservative and, after KCPL's adjustments, shows the level of operation attainable by an efficient operator facing no contingencies (i.e., an ideal case). Other areas that KCPL cites as being overly conservative, but which are not fully addressed in this analysis, include: salary levels for all O&M personnel, manpower levels or contract labor required in lieu of additional manpower, maintenance materials for both GAS and the distribution system, annual capital expenditures and customer decline.

Long Term Rehabilitated System Including Sales to National Starch (Exhibit 1)

Summary of Adjustments Made to the Model Developed by Dahlen
In Order of Their \$/MLB Impact

<u>Impact of Adjustments for Year 1987*</u>	<u>\$/MLB</u>
1. Increase of gas prices to a DRI based KCPL forecast	\$3.08
2. Inclusion of current net KCPL investment	2.50
3. Increase of Distribution O&M labor	0.62
4. Inclusion of property taxes	0.60
5. Increase of electricity needed to power auxiliary equipment	0.43
6. Inclusion of station heat and higher level of losses	0.39
7. Reduction in chemical treatment rate to actual GAS charge	<u>(0.33)</u>
All of the above Adjustments	7.29
Dahlen's original estimate	<u>9.97</u>
Adjusted Steam Cost	<u>\$17.26</u>

*Comparable adjustments can be made for subsequent years.

An explanation for each of the adjustments made in creating the revised Long Term Rehabilitated System scenario is as follows:

- 1) The natural gas price forecasts have been adjusted to reflect the most recent prices per a KCPL adjusted DRI based forecast dated March, 1987. These prices agree with KCPL's current cost adjusted to known changes in gas prices. KCPL's March 1987 estimate of \$3.63 per mmbtu is contrasted to Dahlen's figure of \$2.18. Included are sales taxes amounting to approximately 6.5% to 7% of sales which were

neglected.

Impact: \$3.08/mlb.

- 2) The present KCPL investment in the distribution system and the GAS, amounting to \$5,514,000, has been included to reflect the remaining value of these facilities in rendering steam service. Mr. Dahlen assumes there is no value in the current plant. However, KCPL believes there is a value to a potential purchaser in the equipment necessary to serve the current customer base. Further, a depreciation life of 20 years reflecting primarily the expected economic life of replacement packaged boilers and related equipment is used in contrast to an unrealistic 30-year life.

Impact: \$2.50/mlb.

- 3) The Distribution System O&M labor costs were increased from Miller's \$117,500/year to \$400,950 reflecting a higher level of manpower as estimated by KCPL's Steam Department engineers. The Dahlen model, based on Mr. Miller's work, assumes only three distribution maintenance personnel. KCPL's experience with high pressure maintenance indicates that a minimum of ten maintenance personnel is required for maintaining customer service, even with replacement of the low pressure system by high pressure.

Impact: \$0.62/mlb.

- 4) Property taxes amounting to \$79,160 on current steam plant (three boilers and low pressure distribution abandoned) and property taxes of \$193,950 on capital additions to the distribution system and to boilers are included. No property taxes were considered by Dahien.

Impact: \$0.60/mlb.

- 5) The energy costs of auxiliary operations have been adjusted to 6,027 MWH's based on KCPL's actual experience level of 10,853 mw hours and a local chemical company's actual experience of 3.41 kwhrs/mlb transferred. This is contrasted to Dahlen's estimate of 2,892 mw hours, noting that several energy consuming devices are not replaced in either the long or short range rehabilitation scenarios.

Impact: \$0.43/mlb.

- 6) GAS station heat based on actual experience amounting to 15,000 mlbs. and additional system losses of 40,700 mlb. (that Mr. Miller incorrectly removed as part of the allocated low pressure system losses) have been included.

Impact: \$0.39/mlb.

- 7) Chemical treatment rates have been reduced from \$.19/mlb. to \$.04/mlb. reflecting KCPL's favorable experience.

Impact (\$0.33)/mlb.

Long Term Rehabilitated System With No Sales to National Starch (Exhibit 2)

Summary of Adjustments Made to the Model Developed by Dahlen
In Order of Their \$/MLB Impact

<u>Impact of Adjustments for Year 1987*</u>	<u>\$/MLB</u>
1. Increase of gas prices to a DRI based KCPL forecast	\$2.85
2. Inclusion of current net KCPL investment	2.50
3. Increase of Distribution O&M labor	0.62
4. Inclusion of property taxes	0.60
5. Increase of electricity needed to power auxiliary equipment	0.39
6. Inclusion of station heat and higher level of losses	0.39
7. Reduction in chemical treatment rate to actual GAS charge	<u>(0.18)</u>
All of the above Adjustments	7.17
Dahlen's original estimate	<u>12.44</u>
Adjusted steam cost	<u>\$19.61</u>

*Comparable adjustments can be made for subsequent years.

An explanation for each of the adjustments made in creating the revised Long Term Rehabilitated System (less National Starch) scenario is as follows:

- 1) The natural gas price forecasts have been adjusted to reflect the most recent prices per a KCPL adjusted DRI based forecast dated March, 1987. These prices agree with KCPL's current cost adjusted to known changes in gas prices. The 1987 estimate of \$3.63 per mmbtu

is contrasted to Dahlen's \$2.18. Also included are sales taxes amounting to approximately 6.5 to 7% of sales which were neglected.

Impact: \$2.85/mlb.

- 2) The present KCPL investment in the distribution system and the GAS, amounting to \$5,514,000 has been included to reflect the remaining value of these facilities in rendering steam service Mr. Dahlen assumes there is no value in the current plant. However, KCPL believes there is a value to a prospective purchaser in the equipment necessary to serve the current customer base. Further, a depreciation life of 20 years reflecting primarily the expected economic life of replacement packaged boilers and related equipment is used in contrast to an unrealistic 30-year life.

Impact: \$2.50/mlb.

- 3) The Distribution System O&M labor costs were increased from Miller's \$117,500/year to \$400,950 reflecting a higher level of manpower as estimated by KCPL's Steam Department engineers. The Dahlen model, based on Miller's work, assumes only three distribution maintenance personnel. KCPL's experience with high pressure maintenance requires a minimum of 10 maintenance personnel for maintaining customer service even with replacement of the low pressure system by high pressure. Again, our Distribution System manpower analysis was shared with consultants.

Impact: \$0.62/mlb.

- 4) Property taxes amounting to \$79,160 on current steam plant (Three boilers and low pressure distribution abandoned) and property taxes of \$193,950 on capital additions (Distribution and Boilers) are included. No property taxes were considered by Dahlen.

Impact: \$0.60/mlb.

- 5) The energy costs of auxiliary operations have been adjusted to 4,443 mw hours based on KCPL's actual experience level of 10,853 mw hours and a local chemical company's actual experience of 3.41 kwhrs/mlb transferred. This is contrasted to Dahlen's estimate of 1,624 mw hours noting that several energy consuming devices are not replaced in either the long or short term rehabilitation scenarios.

Impact: \$0.39/mlb.

- 6) GAS station heat based on actual experience amounting to 15,000 mlbs. and additional system losses of 40,700 mlb. (that Mr. Miller incorrectly removed as part of the allocated low pressure system losses) have been included.

Impact: \$0.39/mlb.

- 7) Chemical treatment rates have been reduced from \$.19/mlb. to \$.04/mlb. reflecting KCPL's favorable experience.

Impact: (\$0.18)/mlb.

Short Term Rehabilitated System Including Sales to National Starch (Exhibit 3)

Summary of Adjustments Made to the Model Developed by Dahlen
In Order of Their \$/MLB Impact

<u>Impact of Adjustments in 1987*</u>	<u>\$/MLB</u>
1. Increased gas prices to a DRI based KCPL forecast	\$3.27
2. Increase of GAS O&M	2.89
3. Increase of distribution O&M to Staff's level	2.58
4. Inclusion of current net KCPL investment	2.26
5. Increase of electricity for auxiliaries	1.09
6. Inclusion of station heat and higher level of losses	0.67
7. Inclusion of property taxes	0.39
8. Reduction in chemical treatment rate to actual GAS charge	(0.33)
All of the above Adjustments	12.82
Dahlen's original estimate	6.51
Adjusted Steam cost	<u>19.33</u>

*Comparable adjustments can be made for subsequent years.

An explanation for each of the adjustments made in creating the revised Short Term Rehabilitated System scenario is as follows:

- 1) The natural gas price forecasts have been adjusted to reflect the most recent prices per a KCPL adjusted DRI based forecast dated March, 1987. These prices agree with KCPL's current cost adjusted to known changes in gas price. The 1987 estimate of \$3.63 per mmbtu

is contrasted to Dahlen's \$2.18. Also included are sales taxes amounting to approximately 6.5 to 7% of sales which were neglected.

Impact: \$3.27/mlb.

- 2) The GAS O&M Labor Costs were increased from Dahlen's \$693,000/year to \$1,510,380 to reflect the operating costs of continued use of current GAS boilers (for winter operations). This figure assumes a manpower level of 34 at Grand Avenue as a minimum required to operate and maintain the current equipment with all gas fuel. Materials of \$162,400 have been increased to \$670,700 to reflect KCPL's actual 1986 experience of \$1,179,000 modified (reduced) to reflect the transition to gas fired.

Impact: \$2.89/mlb.

- 3) The Distribution System O&M costs were increased from Dahlen's \$257,400/year to \$1,436,729 reflecting the maintenance manpower and materials levels as recommended by Staff in Staff Accounting Schedule 12. The Dahlen model, based on Miller's work, assumes only three distribution system maintenance personnel. Staff recommendation agrees with the KCPL 1987 authorized manpower level of fifteen maintenance personnel. KCPL's experience with high pressure maintenance requires the stated levels of manpower for maintaining customer service even with replacement of the low pressure system by high pressure.

Impact: \$2.58/mlb.

- 4) The present KCPL investment in the distribution system and the GAS amounting to \$5,514,000, has been included to reflect the remaining value of these facilities in rendering steam service. Mr. Dahlen assumes there is no remaining value in the current plant. However, KCPL believes there is a value to a prospective purchaser in the equipment necessary to serve the current customer base. Included are capital additions amounting to \$134,000 annually as noted in the Downtown Steam System Conversion Study. Also included are major retubing maintenance for two of the four existing boilers amounting to approximately \$300,000 each. Two boilers were retubed in 1984. Further, a depreciation life of 20 years reflecting primarily the expected economic life of replacement packaged boilers and related equipment in contrast to an unrealistic 30-year life per Dahlen is included.

Impact: \$2.26/mlb.

- 5) The energy cost of auxiliary operations have been adjusted to KCPL's actual experience level of 10,853 mw hours in contrast to Dahlen's estimate of 2,892 mw hours noting that several energy consuming devices are not replaced in either the long or short term rehabilitation scenarios.

Impact: \$1.09/mlb.

- 6) GAS station heat based on actual experience amounting to 15,000 mlbs. and additional system losses of 79,674 (to reflect 1985 actual loss levels) have been included.

Impact: \$0.67/mlb.

- 7) Property taxes amounting to \$133,933 on current steam plant (GAS and Distribution System) and property taxes of \$44,365 on capital additions (Distribution and Boilers) are included.

Impact \$0.39/mlb.

- 8) Chemical treatment rates have been reduced from \$.19/mlb. to \$.04/mlb. reflecting KCPL's favorable experience.

Impact: \$(0.33)/mlb.

**Evaluation of Dahlen's Testimony
On Individual Electric and Gas Boilers**

In addition, to the district steam heating scenarios, Dahlen developed several scenarios comparing individual boilers fueled by gas or boilers powered by electricity. Since Dahlen chose 200 Bhp for the size of his gas boiler and developed only one scenario using gas, this size was used for reviewing and comparing electric and gas individual boilers. The review revealed some deficiencies in Dahlen's analysis. Primarily, his installed costs were not on a consistent basis and the gas price was not what a gas customer in downtown Kansas City could be expected to pay. A comparative analysis has been prepared using KCPL's actual installation data for the Home Savings building at 1006 Grand. Energy Masters Corporation (who installed the electric boilers at Home Savings) provided preliminary estimates for the installation of gas boilers at the Home Savings site. The results of this comparison are shown in Exhibit 4.

Exhibit 1

Page 1 of 1

8/1/2007

ANNEX CITY POWER & LIGHT CO.
REHABILITATED STORM SYSTEM INCLUDING NATIONAL STORM - LONG TERM
REH. STORM WARE CASE RESULTS TESTIMONY

		1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
SALES:																
REVENUE		488,639 M\$	7,918,091	7,997,064	7,947,218	8,947,771	8,221,942	8,537,271	8,924,229	9,335,553	9,948,388	10,621,808	11,444,581	12,441,582	13,742,314	15,325,094
OPTIONAL STORM		488,639 M\$	3,983,915	3,799,830	3,789,830	3,825,279	3,999,653	4,275,745	4,689,961	5,082,382	5,495,895	6,019,462	6,673,384	7,472,997	8,533,370	9,819,376
TOTAL		884,273 M\$	11,903,007	11,796,894	11,636,248	11,873,051	12,221,595	12,813,016	13,534,190	14,337,855	15,437,483	16,640,490	18,117,965	19,914,559	22,275,684	25,144,470
EXPENSES:																
PAID	1/	1,539,000 M\$	5,589,692	5,851,468	5,851,468	6,097,046	6,467,412	7,052,559	7,768,094	8,592,419	9,624,125	10,748,223	12,134,897	13,827,943	15,876,138	18,201,597
REPAIRS	2/	6,087 M\$	379,219	394,708	406,839	420,282	428,648	458,096	463,827	487,987	438,689	454,858	488,593	587,775	536,222	582,395
STORM	3/		1,094,030	1,132,871	1,171,805	1,218,441	1,272,436	1,333,311	1,401,539	1,476,273	1,558,762	1,646,292	1,739,429	1,837,784	1,948,658	2,064,369
STORM	4/	174,000	174,000	188,568	186,777	194,287	202,813	212,596	223,391	235,383	248,451	262,482	277,247	292,911	309,328	326,458
STORM	5/	48,005	48,005	41,415	42,839	44,543	46,517	48,761	51,237	53,969	56,944	60,184	63,589	67,182	70,945	74,883
STORM			162,489	175,984	181,952	189,198	197,574	207,184	217,628	229,224	242,832	258,624	276,285	295,345	316,329	338,254
STORM			175,989	144,758	149,756	153,592	162,392	170,434	179,089	188,636	199,178	210,363	222,264	234,822	247,376	261,748
STORM		231,000	231,000	239,822	247,241	257,876	268,459	281,418	295,788	311,476	328,879	347,348	366,998	387,733	409,453	432,179
STORM		92,000	92,000	95,195	98,468	102,385	106,983	112,868	117,771	124,851	130,982	138,338	146,164	154,422	163,872	172,123
STORM		176,000	176,000	182,112	188,374	195,868	204,547	214,414	225,381	237,315	250,575	264,646	279,618	295,416	311,983	329,279
STORM	5/	273,110	231,785	289,652	198,297	178,982	151,587	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112
TOTAL		8,252,794	8,669,724	8,734,412	9,053,748	9,528,825	10,234,768	11,078,488	11,984,686	12,982,768	14,128,389	15,412,195	16,823,364	18,499,183	20,462,982	22,938,263
REVENUE	6/	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580	917,580
TOTAL		9,270,294	9,587,304	9,651,912	9,971,328	10,446,405	11,152,348	11,996,068	12,902,268	13,900,348	14,937,069	16,029,656	17,248,064	18,616,863	20,201,462	21,947,783
REVENUE	7/	1,086,473	1,799,218	1,781,963	1,684,766	1,587,453	1,418,198	1,312,943	1,215,688	1,118,433	1,021,178	923,923	826,668	729,413	632,158	534,903
REVENUE		336,931	319,632	302,274	285,095	267,817	250,538	233,260	215,981	198,703	181,424	164,146	146,867	129,589	112,310	95,032
REVENUE		11,903,007	11,796,894	11,636,248	11,873,051	12,221,595	12,813,016	13,534,190	14,337,855	15,437,483	16,640,490	18,117,965	19,914,559	22,275,684	25,144,470	28,477,717
REVENUE		17.26	17.44	17.33	17.35	17.93	18.51	19.46	20.35	21.69	23.15	24.95	27.13	29.95	33.37	37.37
REVENUE		11.118	1.98	1.94	1.93	1.95	1.99	2.87	2.16	2.26	2.41	2.57	2.77	3.81	3.23	4.15
STORM		19.18	19.37	19.25	19.50	19.92	20.68	21.62	22.62	24.10	25.73	27.73	30.14	33.29	37.28	41.92

Exhibit 1 cont'd

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
QAP DEPLETION (1980=1)	1.1729	1.2127	1.2544	1.3043	1.3621	1.4278	1.5003	1.5803	1.6666	1.7623	1.8629	1.9672	2.0774	2.1927	2.3132
QAP RATE	1.0000	1.0347	1.0703	1.1129	1.1622	1.2183	1.2801	1.3484	1.4237	1.5067	1.5987	1.6985	1.8065	1.9235	1.9728
ANNUAL INF. \$/FT ³		3.4735	3.4395	3.9785	4.4315	4.8235	5.0785	5.3325	5.5885	5.6155	5.6575	5.6285	5.6825	5.9235	5.9385
PERCENT OF LAST YEAR	3.63	3.8	3.8	3.96	4.2	4.58	5.04	5.58	6.25	6.98	7.88	8.58	10.44	12.21	14.3
PERCENT OF LAST YEAR		104.6835	100.0005	104.2115	106.0615	109.0405	110.0445	110.7145	112.8075	111.6895	112.8945	113.3995	116.2595	116.9945	117.1795
ELECTRIC COST	62.92	65.49	67.37	69.72	71.12	74.68	77.29	67.68	71.46	75.47	79.74	84.25	86.97	93.91	99.87
QAP RATE PERCENT	4.634	4.924	4.924	5.197	5.687	6.256	7.041	7.963	9.105	10.352	11.809	13.756	16.259	19.239	22.045
QAP RATE PERCENT	3.79	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790
QAP RATE PERCENT	0.424	0.714	0.714	0.987	1.397	1.846	2.331	2.856	3.426	4.142	4.917	5.756	6.669	7.669	8.769
QAP RATE PERCENT	10.200,000	20	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500
QAP RATE PERCENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
QAP RATE PERCENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
QAP RATE PERCENT	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500
QAP RATE PERCENT	79,160	76,543	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927
QAP RATE PERCENT	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000
QAP RATE PERCENT	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950	193,950
QAP RATE PERCENT	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110	272,110
QAP RATE PERCENT	10,200,000	17,432,500	16,515,000	15,597,500	14,680,000	13,762,500	12,845,000	11,927,500	11,010,000	10,092,500	9,175,000	8,257,500	7,340,000	6,422,500	5,505,000
QAP RATE PERCENT	17,432,500	16,515,000	15,597,500	14,680,000	13,762,500	12,845,000	11,927,500	11,010,000	10,092,500	9,175,000	8,257,500	7,340,000	6,422,500	5,505,000	4,587,500
QAP RATE PERCENT	17,091,250	16,973,750	16,856,250	16,738,750	16,621,250	16,503,750	16,386,250	16,268,750	16,151,250	16,033,750	15,916,250	15,798,750	15,681,250	15,563,750	15,446,250
QAP RATE PERCENT	18.685	1,096,473	1,799,216	1,781,963	1,684,708	1,587,453	1,490,198	1,392,943	1,295,688	1,198,433	1,091,178	983,923	876,668	769,413	662,158
QAP RATE PERCENT	34.000	336,931	319,622	302,374	285,095	267,817	250,538	233,260	215,981	198,703	181,424	164,146	146,867	129,589	112,310

QAP

1/ Gas expense includes cost for an additional 15,000 MWh for steam heating the QAP. Also includes an increase in losses from 04,000 (10.0%) to 07,000 (12.7%) MWh. Miller understates losses by allocating the current level of losses to low and high pressure systems based on calculated radiation losses for each system. (See Separate Analysis). Thus, Miller has understated losses for a normal hot system such as Kansas City's. Gas prices shown here reflect QAP's 1987, DRI based forecast.

2/ Electricity rate is based on Midway's experience and actual QAP use for 12 months ended February, 1987.

3/ Distribution QAP Labor is increased due to increasing the manpower required for proper operation and maintenance. QAP feels, based on operating experience, that a manpower level of at least ten would be required to support the steam distribution system. This is conflict with Mr. Miller's estimate of three.

4/ Chemical treatment costs at QAP are approximately 6.04/cu. rather than 6.19 used by Denier.

5/ Property taxes on current plant and the proposed additions were neglected by Denier. Property taxes are assessed on 33% of the depreciated asset (by depreciation ratio) at a rate of 4.533%.

6/ Reflects a depreciation on QAP's current net plant and new boiler additions at 20 year life for both.

7/ Reflects a return of 18.6% on QAP's current net plant (\$5.5 million).

Impact of Adjustments in 1987 (\$/MWh)

Increased gas prices to a DRI based QAP forecast	1.20
Inclusion of current net QAP investment	2.50
Increase of distribution QAP labor	4.62
Inclusion of property taxes	8.68
Increase of electricity for auxiliaries	8.42
Inclusion of station heat and higher level of losses	8.77
Reduction in chemical treatment rate to actual QAP change	12.33
Denier's estimate	7.29
	9.97
	17.25

Exhibit 2

FILE 401.5742

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CHANDLER CITY POWER & LIGHT CO.
RENEWABLES STEAM SYSTEM EXCLUDING NATIONAL STANDARD - LOW TEST
CHANDLER STEAM RATE CASE RESULTS TESTIMONY

			1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
SALES:																		
SALES			408,639 M.B.	8,992,312	9,878,926	9,822,756	9,129,679	9,318,139	9,656,837	10,873,572	10,541,275	11,199,988	11,923,135	12,811,839	13,689,750	15,382,518	17,794,566	19,895,287
NATIONAL STANDARD			0 M.B.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL			408,639 M.B.	8,992,312	9,878,926	9,822,756	9,129,679	9,318,139	9,656,837	10,873,572	10,541,275	11,199,988	11,923,135	12,811,839	13,689,750	15,382,518	17,794,566	19,895,287
EXPENSES:																		
FUEL	1/	981,409 M.B.T.U.	3,272,115	3,425,354	3,425,354	3,569,588	3,785,918	4,128,453	4,543,181	5,829,862	5,633,886	6,291,835	7,143,183	8,394,533	9,418,718	11,286,124	12,888,449	14,888,449
EFFICIENCY	2/	4,643 M.B.T.U.	279,554	290,572	299,325	309,756	315,966	331,883	343,399	380,782	317,497	335,313	354,222	374,323	399,254	417,142	448,168	488,168
0 & 0 - 2000	3/		1,094,050	1,132,871	1,171,826	1,218,441	1,272,436	1,333,811	1,401,539	1,476,273	1,558,768	1,646,292	1,739,429	1,837,794	1,940,620	2,049,140	2,161,321	2,277,321
MAINTENANCE	4/	98,000 \$	98,000	101,406	104,893	109,066	113,899	119,393	125,456	132,145	139,329	147,364	155,781	164,458	173,713	183,554	193,879	204,679
CHANDLER TREATMENT		22,476 \$	22,476	23,259	24,058	25,815	26,124	27,344	28,775	30,349	32,042	33,799	35,712	37,729	39,843	42,054	44,367	46,782
CHANDLER TREATMENT			162,400	175,984	181,952	189,198	197,574	207,184	217,528	229,224	242,832	258,624	276,885	296,545	317,329	339,154	362,047	386,047
DISTRIBUTION			139,980	144,758	149,736	155,692	162,552	170,434	179,889	189,638	199,178	210,363	222,264	234,822	247,976	261,748	276,121	291,121
0 & 0 - 2000		231,000 \$	231,000	239,820	247,241	257,876	268,469	281,418	295,788	311,476	328,879	347,348	366,998	387,732	409,453	432,179	455,949	480,749
0 & 0 - 2000'S & 2000'S		92,000 \$	92,000	95,195	96,468	102,385	106,923	112,068	117,771	124,251	130,982	138,338	146,164	154,422	163,072	172,122	181,599	191,499
CHANDLER TREATMENT		176,000 \$	176,000	182,112	188,374	195,668	204,547	214,414	225,381	237,315	250,575	264,646	279,618	295,415	311,965	329,279	347,399	366,399
CHANDLER TREATMENT	5/		273,118	281,783	289,692	298,297	307,582	317,587	328,312	339,712	351,812	364,512	377,812	391,812	406,412	421,612	437,412	453,812
TOTAL CHANDLER			5,841,449	6,442,356	6,188,928	6,322,377	6,625,378	7,877,882	7,649,878	8,192,186	8,965,353	9,883,832	10,885,471	11,998,756	13,326,117	14,942,788	16,877,867	19,177,867
DEPRECIATION	6/		917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588	917,588
TOTAL CHANDLER DEPRECIATION			6,759,037	6,960,856	7,106,428	7,239,877	7,542,878	7,995,382	8,527,378	9,109,686	9,883,853	10,728,333	11,722,971	12,916,256	14,443,671	16,268,388	18,375,388	20,895,388
REVENUE REQUIRED	7/		1,896,473	1,799,218	1,791,963	1,684,788	1,587,453	1,418,198	1,312,943	1,215,688	1,118,433	1,021,178	923,923	826,668	729,413	632,158	534,903	437,648
CHANDLER TREATMENT			336,931	319,652	302,374	285,095	267,817	250,538	233,259	215,981	198,703	181,424	164,145	146,867	129,589	112,310	95,031	77,752
REVENUE REQUIRED PER M.B.			8,992,312	9,878,926	9,822,756	9,129,679	9,318,139	9,656,837	10,873,572	10,541,275	11,199,988	11,923,135	12,811,839	13,689,750	15,382,518	17,794,566	19,895,287	22,000,287
CHANDLER TREATMENT			19.61	19.88	19.67	19.91	20.32	21.05	21.96	22.98	24.42	26.00	27.93	30.28	33.37	37.38	41.44	46.44
CHANDLER TREATMENT		11.11 \$	2.18	2.28	2.15	2.21	2.26	2.34	2.44	2.55	2.71	2.89	3.18	3.36	3.71	4.12	4.58	5.08
STEAM COST			21.78	21.99	21.86	22.12	22.57	23.39	24.40	25.54	27.13	28.89	31.84	33.65	37.07	41.50	46.02	51.52

Exhibit 2 cont'd

ASSUMPTIONS & CALCULATIONS

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
SNP INFILTRATION (1988=1)	1.1720	1.2127	1.2544	1.3043	1.3621	1.4278	1.5003	1.5803	1.6686	1.7623	1.8620	1.9672	2.0774	2.1927	2.3133
1987 BASE	1.0000	1.0347	1.0763	1.1129	1.1522	1.2183	1.2881	1.3484	1.4237	1.5037	1.5887	1.6785	1.7725	1.8709	1.9736
ANNUAL INFILTRATION		3.473%	3.435%	3.978%	4.431%	4.823%	5.878%	5.332%	5.568%	5.615%	5.657%	5.628%	5.682%	5.928%	5.988%
FUEL COST/MBTU	2.63	3.0	3.0	3.36	4.2	4.58	5.04	5.50	6.25	6.90	7.60	8.30	9.04	10.44	14.3
PERCENT OF LAST YEAR		104.643%	100.000%	104.211%	106.951%	109.040%	118.044%	118.714%	112.887%	111.680%	112.894%	113.929%	116.258%	116.924%	117.119%
ELECTRIC COST	62.92	65.49	67.37	69.72	71.12	74.64	77.29	67.68	71.46	75.47	79.74	84.23	88.97	93.9	98.77
4-STARCH FUEL COST	4.634	4.924	4.924	5.197	5.647	6.255	7.041	7.963	9.186	10.352	11.689	13.155	14.789	16.599	22.844
4-STARCH OTHER	2.79	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790	3.790
OPTIONAL STARCH PRICE	8.484	8.714	8.714	8.987	9.397	10.046	10.831	11.753	12.895	14.142	15.579	17.055	18.649	20.379	25.535
INITIAL PLANT DEPRECIATION	10,220,000	20	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500
PLANT COST, EXPENDITURES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PLANT DEPRECIATION	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL DEPRECIATION	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500	917,500
CURRENT INVESTMENT, MBTU	73,160	76,543	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927	73,927
TOTAL NEW INVESTMENT	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000	12,835,000
NEW INVESTMENT, MBTU	192,950	195,160	135,765	116,370	96,975	77,584	58,185	58,185	58,185	58,185	58,185	58,185	58,185	58,185	58,185
TOTAL PROPERTY TAX	872,110	231,783	289,692	190,297	178,580	151,587	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112	132,112
NETS BASE GDP	16,250,000	17,432,500	16,515,000	15,997,500	14,680,000	13,762,500	12,845,000	11,927,500	11,010,000	10,092,500	9,175,000	8,257,500	7,340,000	6,422,500	5,505,000
NETS BASE GDP	17,432,500	16,515,000	15,997,500	14,680,000	13,762,500	12,845,000	11,927,500	11,010,000	10,092,500	9,175,000	8,257,500	7,340,000	6,422,500	5,505,000	4,587,500
NETS BASE AVERAGE	17,061,250	16,973,750	16,056,250	15,138,750	14,221,250	13,303,750	12,386,250	11,468,750	10,551,250	9,633,750	8,716,250	7,798,750	6,881,250	5,963,750	5,046,250
AVERAGE RETURN	16.646	1,096,473	1,799,218	1,781,963	1,604,780	1,587,433	1,418,198	1,312,943	1,215,588	1,118,433	1,021,178	923,923	825,668	729,413	632,158
INCOME TAXES	34,000	326,531	319,522	302,374	285,955	267,817	250,538	233,250	215,961	198,783	181,424	164,145	146,867	129,589	112,310

NOTES

1/ Fuel savings includes costs for an additional 15,000 MBtu for space heating the BNS. Also includes an increase in losses from 85,000 (1988) to 127,000 (2001) MBtu. Miller underestimates losses by allocating the current level of losses to low and high pressure systems based on calculated radiation losses for each system. (See Separate Analysis). Thus, Miller has understated losses for a system out system such as Kansas City's. Gas prices shown here reflect CIP's 1987, DRI based forecast.

2/ Electricity MBtu is based on Miller's experience and actual BNS use for 12 months ended February, 1987.

3/ Distribution BNS later is increased due to increasing the customer required for proper operation and maintenance. CIP's fuels, based on operating experience, that a customer level of at least ten would be required to support the steam distribution system. This is consistent with Mr. Miller's estimate of three.

4/ Chemical Treatment costs at BNS are approximately 0.04/mbtu, rather than 0.19 used by Denon.

5/ Property taxes on current plant and the proposed additions were neglected by Denon. Property taxes are assessed on 33% of the depreciated asset (ay depreciation ratio) at a rate of 4.533%.

6/ Reflects a depreciation on CIP's current net plant and new boiler additions at 20 year life for both.

7/ Reflects a return of 16.66 on CIP's current net plant (65.5 million).

Impact of Adjustments in 1987 (\$'000)

Increased gas prices to a DRI based CIP forecast	2.25
Inclusion of current net CIP investment	2.59
Increase of distribution CIP labor	0.62
Inclusion of property taxes	0.69
Increase of electricity for auxiliaries	0.23
Inclusion of station heat and higher level of losses	0.73
Reduction in chemical treatment rate to actual CIP charge	48.28

Denon's estimate

7.7

12.44

19.51

Exhibit 3

PLANT CAPITAL

Continued

REVENUE COST POWER & LIGHT CO.

REVENUE COSTS FROM SYSTEMS INCLUDING NATIONAL STARCH - 5-047 ITEM

REVENUE COSTS FROM OTHER SOURCES

		1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
REVENUE																	
REVENUE FROM SYSTEMS		408,639 +.0	8,065,635	9,168,854	9,384,826	9,628,833	10,068,867	10,665,894	11,327,632	11,956,198	12,977,658	13,874,351	15,045,818	16,414,255	18,112,968	20,115,787	22,414,868
NATIONAL STARCH		425,634 +.0	3,585,515	3,799,838	3,799,838	3,825,279	3,999,653	4,275,745	4,649,961	5,082,382	5,469,495	6,019,482	6,673,254	7,472,597	8,533,378	9,819,175	11,127,661
TOTAL		834,273 +.0	12,651,151	12,977,004	13,183,656	13,445,312	14,067,728	14,941,638	15,937,643	16,958,780	18,366,753	19,893,843	21,718,353	23,886,861	26,652,338	29,934,962	33,542,529
EXPENSES																	
DEPRECIATION	1/	1,598,471 +.0	5,082,450	6,074,198	6,974,198	6,329,945	6,713,578	7,328,997	8,056,294	8,919,468	9,994,444	11,157,328	12,595,351	14,354,278	16,588,837	19,517,531	22,658,111
REPAIRS & MAINTENANCE	2/	10,823 +.0	682,871	718,763	731,167	756,671	771,865	818,582	838,858	734,531	775,525	819,876	865,418	914,365	965,551	1,015,582	1,075,287
PROPERTY TAXES	3/		1,518,388	1,562,831	1,616,571	1,680,878	1,755,366	1,844,835	1,933,457	2,036,554	2,154,358	2,271,111	2,399,597	2,535,178	2,677,187	2,825,777	2,981,156
AMORTIZATION		174,388 +.0	174,388	188,368	188,368	194,287	202,813	212,556	223,291	235,383	248,451	262,482	277,247	292,911	309,382	326,488	344,441
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES	4/	48,825 +.0	48,825	41,415	42,839	44,543	46,517	48,761	51,237	53,969	56,984	60,184	63,559	67,182	70,945	74,882	78,888
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES	5/		678,788	673,591	717,893	746,411	779,466	817,667	858,576	904,358	954,889	1,008,311	1,065,565	1,125,789	1,188,833	1,254,816	1,322,551
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES	6/		1,436,729	1,486,522	1,537,741	1,598,913	1,669,763	1,750,389	1,839,155	1,937,255	2,045,588	2,164,363	2,292,535	2,431,547	2,580,633	2,737,982	2,902,854
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES	7/	231,888 +.0	231,888	239,862	247,241	257,076	268,469	281,416	295,788	311,476	328,675	347,348	366,958	387,733	409,453	432,179	455,945
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES	8/	92,888 +.0	92,888	95,195	98,468	102,585	106,923	112,000	117,771	124,451	132,082	139,338	146,154	154,422	163,072	172,123	181,594
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES	9/	176,888 +.0	176,888	182,112	188,374	195,868	204,547	214,414	225,381	237,315	250,575	264,646	279,618	295,416	311,955	329,275	347,252
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES	10/	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918	188,918
TOTAL EXPENSES		18,977,572	11,435,884	11,681,414	12,854,881	12,678,485	13,552,941	14,590,468	15,642,841	17,081,644	18,638,874	20,492,386	22,699,159	25,483,689	28,794,853	32,637,975	
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES	11/	431,198	438,883	445,254	452,718	477,938	466,952	494,669	583,783	513,242	523,317	533,961	545,287	557,883	569,518	582,842	
TOTAL REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES		11,438,722	11,873,157	12,946,667	12,516,711	13,156,415	14,049,833	15,085,157	16,146,544	17,594,886	19,152,198	20,826,867	22,635,365	24,742,772	27,153,671	29,934,962	
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES	12/	858,155	852,466	828,999	788,512	773,825	758,117	723,888	689,634	655,423	621,276	587,283	553,211	519,298	485,499	451,694	
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES		194,243	151,451	145,789	148,888	137,479	134,688	128,686	122,512	116,444	110,377	104,323	98,284	92,253	86,247	80,247	
TOTAL REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES		12,431,191	12,877,884	13,813,856	13,445,312	14,067,728	14,941,638	15,937,643	16,928,728	18,366,753	19,893,843	21,718,353	23,886,861	26,646,346	29,934,962	33,542,529	
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES		19,33	19,99	20,29	20,98	21,95	23,26	24,78	26,47	28,28	30,25	32,48	34,99	37,79	40,81	44,16	
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES		11,115	2,15	2,22	2,25	2,33	2,44	2,58	2,74	2,90	3,12	3,36	3,64	3,98	4,39	4,87	
REVENUE FROM OTHER SOURCES		31,44	22,21	22,51	23,31	24,39	25,84	27,44	29,37	31,28	33,61	36,45	39,77	43,58	47,93	52,83	

Exhibit 3 cont'd

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
600,000,000 (1988-1990)	1,170	1,217	1,254	1,283	1,321	1,476	1,583	1,666	1,753	1,823	1,884	1,942	1,997	2,052	2,107
600,000,000 (1991-1993)	1,000	1,047	1,093	1,129	1,162	1,233	1,281	1,327	1,372	1,417	1,462	1,507	1,552	1,597	1,642
600,000,000 (1994-1996)	3.63	3.8	3.96	4.12	4.28	4.45	4.61	4.78	4.94	5.11	5.27	5.44	5.61	5.78	5.95
600,000,000 (1997-1999)	181,643	186,815	192,000	197,200	202,400	207,600	212,800	218,000	223,200	228,400	233,600	238,800	244,000	249,200	254,400
600,000,000 (2000-2001)	62.32	65.49	67.37	69.25	71.12	73.00	74.88	76.76	78.64	80.52	82.40	84.28	86.16	88.04	89.92
600,000,000 (2002-2003)	4.64	4.89	5.14	5.39	5.64	5.89	6.14	6.39	6.64	6.89	7.14	7.39	7.64	7.89	8.14
600,000,000 (2004-2005)	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79	2.79
600,000,000 (2006-2007)	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74	8.74
600,000,000 (2008-2009)	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408	49,408
600,000,000 (2010-2011)	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000	436,000
600,000,000 (2012-2013)	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700	21,700
600,000,000 (2014-2015)	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150	431,150
600,000,000 (2016-2017)	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933	133,933
600,000,000 (2018-2019)	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000	3,199,000
600,000,000 (2020-2021)	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377	46,377
600,000,000 (2022-2023)	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510	100,510
600,000,000 (2024-2025)	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000	6,439,000
600,000,000 (2026-2027)	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850	8,157,850
600,000,000 (2028-2029)	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425	8,158,425
600,000,000 (2030-2031)	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647	18,647
600,000,000 (2032-2033)	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743
600,000,000 (2034-2035)	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743	159,743

Impact of Requirements in 1987 (See B)

Increased gas prices to a 10% annual 10% forecast
Increase of 50% O&G
Increase of distribution O&G
Increase of current net O&G investment
Increase of electricity for auxiliaries
Inclusion of station net and higher level of O&G
Inclusion of property taxes
Selection in chemical treatment rate to actual 25¢/mgd

Deliveries estimate

1/ Fuel income includes cost for an additional 15,000 m.b. for sales meeting the 50%. Also includes an increase in losses from pressure systems based on collection radiation losses for new system. (See Separate Attachment). Since Miller assumes in this scenario that the current distribution system is left in place, the losses should remain at the current level. Gas prices shown here reflect O&G's 1987, 1988 and 1989 forecasts.

2/ Electricity cost is actual O&G cost for 12 months ended February, 1987.

3/ Distribution O&G is based on the O&G's Accounting Schedule 12 which includes the 1987 authorized customer level. Staff's O&G for same period is based on actual losses and materials. Total distribution is shown here with 1987 losses and materials for O&G cost separately. O&G reference is an average of Miller's estimate and 1986 actual expenses, which reflects the continued use of the current distribution system. Also to reflect continued boiler use, O&G amount was increased from Miller's 16 to 34.

4/ Detailed "Western" cost at O&G are approximately 8.0¢/m.b., rather than 8.5¢ used by Miller.

5/ Property taxes on current plant and the proposed additions were neglected by Miller.

6/ Miller's a communication on O&G's current net plant and new boiler additions at 28 year life for 2010.

7/ Miller's a return on O&G's current net plant of 10.5%.

Exhibit 4

02-Apr-87

EVALUATION OF STAFF CONSULTANT DAHLEN'S
TESTIMONY ON INDIVIDUAL ELECTRIC AND GAS BOILERS
200 BHP BOILERS
1987

	Gas Boiler Per Dahlen	KCPL Adjust	Gas Boiler Per KCPL 1/	Electric Boiler Per Dahlen	KCPL Adjust	Electric Boiler Per KCPL 1/
Installed Cost, \$	124,000	176,000	300,000 2/	340,000	(129,154)	210,846 7/
Sales, MLB	5,519	(1,263)	4,256 3/	5,519	(1,263)	4,256 3/
Fuel, \$	25,340	1,397	26,737 4/	73,260	(16,765)	56,495 8/
Electricity, \$	1,084	0	1,084	141	0	141
Water, Chemical Treatment, \$	395	(90)	305 5/	395	(90)	305 5/
Boiler Insurance, \$	200	0	200	200	0	200
Floor Space, \$	3,450	0	3,450	2,300	0	2,300
Real Estate Tax, \$	1,884	2,673	4,557 6/	5,165	(1,962)	3,203 6/
Operations and Maintenance, \$	6,100	4,400	10,500 6/	11,500	(3,229)	8,271 6/
Return, Debt Svc, Taxes, \$	19,810	28,118	47,928 6/	54,319	(20,634)	33,685 6/
Total	58,264	36,498	94,762	147,279	(42,680)	104,599
Cost Per MLB	10.56	11.71	22.27	26.69	(2.11)	24.58
	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====

Assumptions

Fuel, MMBTU or MWH	8,243	(1,887)	6,356	1,725.24	(394.81)	1,330.43
Fuel, \$/MMBTU or \$/MWH	3.0742	1.1323	4.2065	0.0425	0.0000	0.0425
Electricity, MWH	9,934	0	9,934	715	0	715
Water, Chemical Treat., \$/MLB	0.0716	0.0000	0.0716	0.0716	0.0000	0.0716
Floor Space, Sq. Ft.	600	0	600	400	0	400
Floor Space, \$ / Sq. Ft.	5.75	0.00	5.75	5.75	0.00	5.75
Real Estate Tax, %	1.519	0.000	1.519	1.519	0.000	1.519
Maintenance, %	2.50	0.00	2.50	2.50	0.00	2.50
Return, Debt Service, Taxes, %	15	0	15	15	0	15
Return, Debt Serv., Taxes, Yrs.	20	0	20	20	0	20

Exhibit 4 cont'd

Notes

- 1/ Boiler size for KCPL adjustment was assumed to be 222 BHP (two 111 BHP at Home Savings).
- 2/ Reflects installed costs for gas boilers as estimated by Energy Masters Corporation for the Home Savings test site. The installed costs for individual packaged gas boilers are site dependent. Comparison to electric boilers must be for the same site. Gas boiler installed costs can range from \$200,000 to \$400,000 for a 222 BHP installation depending on flue requirements.
- 3/ Historical analysis of Home Savings steam sales shows an average for 1982 through 1986 of 4256 MLBs per year ranging from 3485 to 5005 MLBs per year, reflecting Kansas City, Missouri winter heating.
- 4/ The reduction in sales (note 3) reduces fuel expense. However, gas price has been adjusted to reflect the March, 1986 KCPL forecast of KPL Gas Service charges for large commercial customers (\$4.20 including gross receipts tax and sales tax).
- 5/ The reduction in sales (note 3) reduces water, sewer, and chemical treatment costs.
- 6/ The increase in installed costs for the boilers (note 2) causes increases in property taxes, maintenance, and return, debt service, and taxes.
- 7/ The installed costs for electric boilers are the actual cost incurred for the installation of the electric boilers at Home Savings (1006 Grand) for the test project. The installed costs for individual packaged electric boilers are site dependent. Comparison to gas boilers must be for the same site. Electric boiler installed costs can range from \$200,000 to \$400,000 for a 222 BHP installation.
- 8/ The reduction in sales (note 3) reduces fuel expense.

Impact of Adjustments in 1987 (\$/MLB)

	Gas	Electric
Installation costs	8.27	(6.07)
Effect of reduced sales on expenses	(1.38)	(3.94)
Gas prices	1.69	0.00
Reduced sales	3.13	7.92
	11.71	(2.09)