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### MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

FILED September 22, 2014 Data Center Missouri Public Service Commission

### Case No. GR-2014-0152

### SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

#### OF

### **ROBERT B. HEVERT**

### SUSSEX ECONOMIC ADVISORS, LLC

#### Submitted on Behalf Of

### LIBERTY UTILITIES (MIDSTATES NATURAL GAS) CORP. d/b/a LIBERTY UTILITIES

August 15, 2014

\* Denotes Proprietary Information \*

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1		BEFORE THE
2		MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
3		CASE No. GR-2014-0152
4		SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY
5		OF
6		Robert B. Hevert
7		SUSSEX ECONOMIC ADVISORS, LLC
8		Submitted on Behalf Of
9		LIBERTY UTILITIES
10	I.	INTRODUCTION
11	Q.	Please state your name, affiliation and business address.
12	A.	My name is Robert B. Hevert. I am Managing Partner of Sussex Economic Advisors,
13		LLC ("Sussex"). My business address is 161 Worcester Road, Suite 503, Framingham,
14		Massachusetts 01701.
15	Q.	Are you the Robert B. Hevert who submitted Direct Testimony and Rebuttal
16		Testimony in this proceeding?
17	A.	Yes, I filed Direct and Rebuttal Testimony on behalf of Liberty Utilities (Midstates
18		Natural Gas) Corp., d/b/a Liberty Utilities ("Liberty Utilities" or the "Company"), an
19		indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp.
20	Q.	Please state the purpose of your Surrebuttal Testimony.
21	A.	The purpose of my Surrebuttal Testimony is to respond to the rebuttal testimony of Mr.
22		Zephania Marevangepo on behalf of the Staff of the Missouri Public Service Commission

1		("Staff") as it relates to the Company's Return on Equity ("ROE"), cost of debt and	
2		capital structure. My analyses and recommendations are supported by the data presented	
3		in Schedules RBH-S26 through RBH-S29, which have been prepared by me or under my	
4		direction.	
5	Q.	Have you updated your analyses from those presented in your Rebuttal Testimony?	
6	А.	No, I have not. I continue to rely on the analyses provided with my Rebuttal Testimony,	
7		which were updated based on market data through June 30, 2014.	
8	Q.	How is the remainder of your Surrebuttal Testimony organized?	
9	A.	The remainder of my Surrebuttal Testimony is organized as follows:	
10		Section II – Provides a summary and overview of my Surrebuttal Testimony;	
11		Section III - Provides my response to Mr. Marevangepo regarding the Company's	
12		cost of capital and capital structure; and	
13		Section IV – Summarizes my conclusions and recommendation.	
14			
15	II.	SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY	
16	Q.	Please summarize the key issues and recommendations addressed in your	
17		Surrebuttal Testimony.	
18	A.	After reviewing the rebuttal testimony of Mr. Marevangepo and considering other	
19		relevant data, including current and expected capital market conditions, my general	
20		observations and conclusions are as follows:	
21		• Mr. Marevangepo's recommendation to impute Liberty Utility Company's	
22		("LUCo") capital structure to Liberty Utilities is inconsistent with highly	
23		relevant and observable benchmarks, including the capital structures in place	

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1	at the proxy companies, and at the Company's ultimate parent, Algonquin
2	Power & Utilities Corp. ("APUC"). In addition, Mr. Marevangepo's
3	suggestion that Liberty Utilities' stand-alone capital structure should include
4	short-term debt, and that that a more leveraged capital structure would be
5	appropriate in the current interest rate environment, ignores the nature of the
6	Company's financing needs and the inherent risk in attempting to time the
7	market.
8	Mr. Marevangepo's 8.70 percent ROE estimate (which would be even lower
9	excluding his * * basis point upward adjustment to reflect the increased
10	risk implied by the Company's credit rating) <sup>1</sup> is unduly low and cannot be
11	reconciled with observable, relevant market data. As discussed in my
12	Rebuttal Testimony, Mr. Marevangepo's 8.70 percent ROE estimate is below
13	any authorized ROE for a natural gas utility in at least 30 years. <sup>2</sup>
14 •	Because his ROE estimate is primarily based on the results of his Constant
15	Growth DCF model, <sup>3</sup> Mr. Marevangepo's ROE recommendation is largely
16	influenced by his reliance on a GDP growth estimate that conflicts with both
17	observable trends in long-term economic growth and investor expectations for
18	future growth. Mr. Marevangepo has provided no rationale to support his
19	assumed decline of more than 70 basis points in the structural growth potential

<sup>1</sup> 

*See,* Staff Cost of Service Report, at 7. Rate case data from Regulatory Research Associates. *See,* Staff Cost of Service Report, at 7. 2

<sup>3</sup> 

1 of the economy over the long-term.<sup>4</sup>

Regarding his CAPM results (which are even lower than his DCF results), Mr.
 Marevangepo's use of a historical estimate of the MRP fails to consider
 observable, market based measures of investors' current return requirements.
 This is particularly important given the well-established finding that the equity
 risk premium moves inversely with interest rates, and given the current 30 year Treasury yield is below both long-term historical averages and consensus
 forecasts.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Marevangepo's general discussion of Staff's experience with financial advisory and equity analyst material is not based on specific references and, therefore, cannot be assessed. It appears, however, that Mr. Marevangepo conflates valuation analyses and assumptions developed for different purposes and under different market conditions with analyses used to estimate Liberty Utilities' Cost of Equity. The Commission has previously addressed the flaws with using valuation analysis inputs to determine a utility's Cost of Equity.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Marevangepo's suggestion that ROEs authorized in other jurisdictions do
 not reflect the actual Cost of Equity overlooks the fact that most jurisdictions
 rely on a standard similar to the ones laid out in the *Hope* and *Bluefield* decisions (as the Commission does), and that other commissions consider data

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> *See*, Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 17, 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, at 33; *See also* Morningstar, Inc., <u>2014 Ibbotson Stocks</u>, <u>Bonds</u>, <u>Bills and Inflation Classic</u> <u>Yearbook</u>, Table 6-7 at 91; <u>Blue Chip Financial Forecasts</u>, Vol. 33, No. 6, June 1, 2014 at 2, 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See, Report and Order, Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri, File No. ER-2011-0028, dated July 13, 2011, at 69-70.

1		similar to the analyses presented by Mr. Marevangepo and me in this
2		proceeding. Moreover, Mr. Marevangepo's position assumes that authorized
3		returns have no bearing on investors' return expectations and requirements,
4		notwithstanding the Commission's prior position to the contrary.
5		• The appropriate cost of debt for Liberty Utilities is the Company's actual 4.50
6		percent embedded cost of debt. LUCo's consolidated cost of debt, which Mr.
7		Marevangepo recommends, includes debt issued more than a decade before
8		APUC acquired Liberty Utilities.
9		
10	III.	RESPONSE TO THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF MR. MAREVANGEPO
11	Q.	Please briefly summarize Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony.
11 12	<b>Q.</b> A.	Please briefly summarize Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony. Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony does not update or revise the ROE or capital
12		Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony does not update or revise the ROE or capital
12 13		Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony does not update or revise the ROE or capital structure analyses included in Staff's Revenue Requirement Cost of Service Report,
12 13 14		Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony does not update or revise the ROE or capital structure analyses included in Staff's Revenue Requirement Cost of Service Report, although it does update the cost of debt calculation from * * percent to * *
12 13 14 15		Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony does not update or revise the ROE or capital structure analyses included in Staff's Revenue Requirement Cost of Service Report, although it does update the cost of debt calculation from * * percent to * * percent. <sup>7</sup> Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony presents six primary areas of
12 13 14 15 16		Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony does not update or revise the ROE or capital structure analyses included in Staff's Revenue Requirement Cost of Service Report, although it does update the cost of debt calculation from * * percent to * * percent. <sup>7</sup> Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony presents six primary areas of disagreement with the analyses and conclusions provided in my Direct Testimony:
12 13 14 15 16 17		Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony does not update or revise the ROE or capital structure analyses included in Staff's Revenue Requirement Cost of Service Report, although it does update the cost of debt calculation from * * percent to * * percent. <sup>7</sup> Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony presents six primary areas of disagreement with the analyses and conclusions provided in my Direct Testimony: • Mr. Marevangepo disagrees with the use of Liberty Utilities' capital structure,
12 13 14 15 16 17 18		<ul> <li>Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony does not update or revise the ROE or capital structure analyses included in Staff's Revenue Requirement Cost of Service Report, although it does update the cost of debt calculation from * * percent to * * percent.<sup>7</sup> Mr. Marevangepo's rebuttal testimony presents six primary areas of disagreement with the analyses and conclusions provided in my Direct Testimony:</li> <li>Mr. Marevangepo disagrees with the use of Liberty Utilities' capital structure, and instead recommends the use of LUCo's capital structure.<sup>8</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>7</sup> See, Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 2-3. *Ibid.*, at 3-4.

1		• Mr. Marevangepo opposes the growth rates used in my DCF analyses,
2		particularly the formulation of my long-term Gross Domestic Product
3		("GDP") growth estimate and my reliance on analysts' three to five year
4		earnings growth rate estimates. <sup>9</sup>
5		• Mr. Marevangepo disagrees with the MRP used in my CAPM, suggesting it
6		would be inappropriate to use the same equity risk premium for regulated
7		utility companies and non-regulated companies. <sup>10</sup>
8		• Mr. Marevangepo disagrees with the use of authorized returns in my Risk
9		Premium analysis, suggesting authorized returns are not the same as the
10		required return on equity. <sup>11</sup>
11		• Mr. Marevangepo suggests his recommended ROE is reasonable because
12		investors view utility stocks as safe "widow and orphan" investments that are
13		alternatives to bond investments. <sup>12</sup>
14		Each of these points is discussed in turn, below.
15	Canit	al Structure
16	Q.	Please summarize Mr. Marevangepo's position regarding capital structure.
10	-	
1/	A.	Mr. Marevangepo reiterates the recommendation, as stated in Staff's Revenue

Requirement Cost of Service Report ("Cost of Service Report"), that Liberty Utilities

should be authorized an equity ratio of \* \* percent based on the capital structure of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, at 12.

Ibid., at 12. *Ibid.*, at 13-14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, at 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, at 8-9.

1		its intermediary parent, LUCo. <sup>13</sup> Mr. Marevangepo makes the following arguments to
2		support his recommendation to use LUCo's capital structure rather than Liberty Utilities'
3		actual capital structure: <sup>14</sup>
4		(1) Mr. Marevangepo suggests LUCo is the only "investable" capital structure
5		because Liberty Utilities is not rated by credit rating agencies and does not
6		issue its own equity or debt;
7		(2) Mr. Marevangepo claims Liberty Utilities' capital structure does not affect the
8		cost of capital required by investors; and
9		(3) Mr. Marevangepo suggests the only logical target capital structure for Liberty
10		Utilities would be LUCo's capital structure, since they have similar business
11		risk.
12		Mr. Marevangepo also states that Liberty Utilities' equity ratio would be lower if
13		the Company included in its capital structure short-term debt used to support working
14		capital and inventory. <sup>15</sup> Lastly, Mr. Marevangepo reasons that LUCo's capital structure
15		is appropriate given the current, relatively low, interest rate environment. <sup>16</sup>
16	Q.	What are your principal conclusions regarding Mr. Marevangepo's recommended
17		capital structure?
18	A.	As discussed in my Rebuttal Testimony, the range of capital structures in place at the

proxy group companies is the appropriate comparison for purposes of assessing the

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, at 1-2. *Ibid.*, at 4-5. *Ibid.* 14

<sup>15</sup> 

Ibid., at 5.

reasonableness of the Company's proposed capital structure.<sup>17</sup> As shown in Schedule
 RBH-R21, Liberty Utilities' 58.34 percent equity ratio is consistent with the proxy
 group's range of equity ratios (48.97 percent to 68.49 percent) and mean equity ratio
 (55.77 percent).

5 In addition, Liberty Utilities' capital structure is consistent with APUC's 6 approximately 57.00 percent equity ratio as of September 30, 2013.<sup>18</sup> While Staff's Cost 7 of Service Report expressed concerns regarding the use of APUC's capital structure as a 8 benchmark for Liberty Utilities' capital structure, those issues were addressed in detail in 9 my Rebuttal Testimony.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, as also discussed in my Rebuttal Testimony, the 10 Commission relied on APUC's capital structure for Algonquin Water Resources of 11 Missouri in Case No. WR-2006-0425.<sup>20</sup>

# Q. What is your response to Mr. Marevangepo's claim that Liberty Utilities' capital structure does not affect the cost of capital required by investors?

A. I disagree with Mr. Marevangepo's assertion. As discussed in my Direct Testimony,
increasing financial leverage increases the risk that a company may not have adequate
cash flow to meet its financial obligations.<sup>21</sup> APUC's aggregate risk level and earnings
are the sum of the risk and financial performance of its operating businesses, including
Liberty Utilities. Consequently, Liberty Utilities' capital structure will influence the risk
level and, therefore, required return of APUC. As noted in Staff's Cost of Service
Report, APUC is the ultimate source of Liberty Utilities' equity and influences the credit

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> *See,* Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, at 43-44.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, at 45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> See, Direct Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 44-45.

rating of LUCo, which is the source of Liberty Utilities' debt.<sup>22</sup> Looked at another way,
APUC investors will expect Liberty Utilities to provide an adequate risk-adjusted return
as a component of their overall investment in APUC, and Liberty Utilities' risk level will
at least partially be based on its capital structure. Consequently, Mr. Marevangepo's
suggestion that Liberty Utilities' "capital structure has no bearing on the cost of capital
required by investors" is misplaced.

Moreover, if Mr. Marevangepo believes that a subsidiary's capital structure is of
no importance to the cost of capital raised at its parent company, APUC's capital
structure would be the primary concern. Using Mr. Marevangepo's approach, it would be
inappropriate to use LUCo's capital structure since APUC is the ultimate source of
LUCo's equity capital and influences LUCo's credit rating.

# Q. What is your response to Mr. Marevangepo's suggestion that LUCo is the only reasonable target capital structure for Liberty Utilities since the two entities have similar business risk?<sup>23</sup>

15 A. I disagree. The proxy group and APUC are also reasonable risk-comparable benchmarks 16 for assessing the capital structure of Liberty Utilities. With respect to the proxy 17 companies, both Mr. Marevangepo and I applied screening criteria that were designed to 18 select companies that reflect Liberty Utilities' risk profile. Regarding APUC, as 19 discussed in my Rebuttal Testimony, there is no reason to believe APUC's business risk 20 is materially different than Liberty Utilities' business risk given that APUC's business

See, Staff Cost of Service Report, at 19-20. Note, LUCo's S&P credit rating is primarily based on S&P's rating of APUC.
 See Bebuttel Testimony of Zenhania Marguengene, at 4, 5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> See Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 4-5.

1		operations consist of regulated utility service and long-term contracted renewable power
2		generation (with more than 88.00 percent of counterparties to the renewable power sales
3		being regulated utilities with credit ratings of BBB or better). <sup>24</sup>
4		The important point is that Liberty Utilities, APUC and the proxy group's capital
5		structures are generally consistent, while LUCo's capital structure does not appear to
6		provide an appropriate target capital structure relative to those benchmarks.
7	Q.	What is your response to Mr. Marevangepo's suggestion that the Company's capital
8		structure should include short-term debt, which would lower its equity ratio?
9	A.	As a preliminary matter, it is important to keep in mind that utilities primarily invest in,
10		and therefore must finance, long-term assets such as property, plant, and equipment. A
11		common financing practice, sometimes referred to as "maturity matching", involves
12		matching the lives of the assets being financed with the maturity (or duration) of the
13		securities issued to finance those assets. In general, the weighted average maturity of
14		outstanding long-term capital is matched with the expected life of the underlying assets,
15		such that the income produced from the assets over their life can cover the debt service
16		payments used to finance the assets, and both interest rate and refinancing risks are
17		minimized. <sup>25</sup> As noted by Brigham and Houston, "[t]his strategy minimizes the risk that
18		the firm will be unable to pay off its maturing obligations." <sup>26</sup> In this proceeding, we are
19		concerned with establishing the return on Liberty Utilities' rate base. Mr. Marevangepo's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> A variant of this approach is to match the "duration" of the debt with the life of the long-term assets being financed. While this approach is computationally different, the intent is the same; matching the tenor of the financing with the life of the asset being financed reduces interest rate risk.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Eugene F. Brigham and Joel F. Houston, <u>Fundamentals of Financial Management</u>, Concise 4th Ed., Thomson South-Western, 2004, at 574.

suggestion that the capital structure should include short-term debt for ratemaking
 purposes is thus at odds with the underlying long-term nature of the majority of the rate
 base assets.

4 I also note that the Commission has not required short-term debt to be included in 5 companies' capital structures in past rate cases. For example, the final order in Case No. 6 ER-2010-0036 for Ameren Missouri approved a capital structure with no short-term debt, noting all parties agreed to the use of the company's actual capital structure.<sup>27</sup> Previous 7 8 orders in Ameren Missouri Case Nos. ER-2011-0028 and ER-2012-0166 also noted that 9 no party raised an issue regarding the use of the companies' actual capital structure 10 (which included no short-term debt). As noted in Staff's Cost of Service Report, Atmos' 11 witness Mr. Robert J. Smith also excluded short-term debt from the requested capital 12 structure when Atmos owned the Missouri natural gas assets subsequently purchased by 13 Liberty Utilities, stating: 14 I excluded from this calculation any impact from short-term debt because the Company's use of short-term debt is seasonal in nature 15 and is intended to be used to finance additions to utility plant.<sup>28</sup> 16 17 18 The settlement approved by the Commission in that case, however, did not specify a

19 capital structure.

See, for example, Report and Order, Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri, Case No. ER-2010-0036, at 13-14. Note, the Order was for Union Electric Company, d/b/a AmerenUE.
 Staff Coat of Samia Banart, et 18

<sup>28</sup> Staff Cost of Service Report, at 18.

# Q. What is your response to Mr. Marevangepo's suggestion that LUCo's capital structure is appropriate as a long-term capital structure in the current interest rate environment?

Although he has provided no analyses or rationale to support his position, Mr. 4 A. Marevangepo seems to suggest that Liberty Utilities should use a higher percentage of 5 6 debt in its capital structure (sometimes referred to as "financial leverage") in the current 7 interest rate environment. Financing decisions, however, must consider many factors in addition to the prevailing level of interest rates. In my practical experience, the factors 8 9 that must be considered in making both day-to-day, and long-term financing decisions include the availability and cost of different forms of financing at a particular time, 10 11 existing and expected capital market conditions (including the availability of capital, the 12 terms at which capital may be acquired, and the ability to subsequently "roll over" 13 maturing financings), the level of existing and proposed debt relative to rating agency 14 criteria, cash flow contingencies, planned and existing capital spending plans, and lead 15 times associated with changing from short-term to long-term financing.

Increasing financial leverage will put pressure on the Company's financial integrity,<sup>29</sup> and may increase the cost of both debt and equity. Equally important is that utilities must maintain access to capital markets and preserve liquidity to ensure they are able to fund necessary investments during unexpected market downturns or credit market contractions. In practice, financing constraints are dynamic in nature, in that they

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> For a more detailed discussion of the implications of Staff's recommended ROE and capital structure recommendations on Liberty Utilities, *see* my Rebuttal Testimony filed July 30, 2014 on Financial Integrity/Revenue Imputation.

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1		continually change in response to market conditions. A very visible example would be
2		the reaction of utilities to the credit constraints experienced during the 2008 market
3		downturn. As Mr. Marevangepo undoubtedly is aware, the U.S. capital markets
4		experienced significant turmoil in 2008 and 2009, and those companies without
5		preexisting and/or contractually obligated sources of liquidity faced either onerous
6		financing terms, or the potential of not being able to access funds at all. As a result,
7		many utilities drew down their existing credit facilities in order to protect their liquidity
8		positions. In October 2008, for example, AEP borrowed approximately \$1.4 billion
9		under its existing credit facilities solely as a means to ensure liquidity in the then-current
10		capital market. As the company noted in an SEC Form 8-K filing:
11 12 13 14		AEP took this proactive step to increase its cash position while there are disruptions in the debt markets. The borrowings provide AEP flexibility and will act as a bridge until the capital markets improve. <sup>30</sup>
15		Had AEP fully drawn its credit lines earlier to take advantage of the comparatively lower
16		level of short-term interest rates, it would not have had that source of liquidity available
17		to it during the 2008 credit contraction.
18		Under constrained financial market conditions, the commercial terms under which
19		long-term debt may be issued become more onerous; call provisions, make-whole
20		provisions, events of default all may become considerably more difficult to negotiate, and
21		more expensive to acquire. As opposed to taking on short-term debt in an attempt to
22		lower equity costs, the prudent course for the Company would be to ensure that it had
23		substantial un-used borrowing capacity available to it, and that it had strengthened its
	30	American Electric Power Company, Inc. SEC Form & K filed October & 2008

American Electric Power Company, Inc., SEC Form 8-K, filed October 8, 2008.

- 1 balance sheet in order to ensure market access if and as needed.
- Mr. Marevangepo also appears to suggest that it is appropriate for the Company to attempt to time the market, and to make financing decisions by anticipating the direction and extent of interest rate movements. As noted earlier, the fundamental financing strategy for utilities is one of duration matching; it is not market timing. In my view, Mr. Marevangepo's suggestion, and his focus on market timing, is both risky and imprudent.
- Q. Did the proxy companies typically decrease their equity ratios as Treasury yields
  declined significantly in 2011 and 2012?
- 9 A. No, they did not. As shown in Table 1 below (see also, Schedule RBH-S26), the average 10 equity ratio for my natural gas proxy group has remained at a generally consistent level 11 over the past five years.<sup>31</sup> It is interesting to note, equity ratios actually trended upward 12 as Treasury yields fell from 2009 to 2012.
- 13

Table 1: Trend in Average Proxy Group Equity Ratios and Treasury Yields

Rolling 4 Quarters	Proxy Group Average Equity Ratio	30-Year Treasury Yield
2013Q2 - 2014Q1	55.41%	3.58%
2012Q2 - 2013Q1	56.14%	2.92%
2011Q2 - 2012Q1	56.77%	3.56%
2010Q2 - 2011Q1	56.00%	4.24%
2009Q2 - 2010Q1	54.91%	4.36%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Source: SEC Filing data as reported by SNL Financial. Capital Structure data was available through Q1 2014 at the time of this analysis. Annual data based on a rolling four quarters.

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Q. How does the trend in equity ratios relate to current economic and capital market
 conditions?

3 That trend of stable to increasing equity ratios indicates that it has generally not been A. considered prudent for natural gas utilities to increase their financial leverage in response 4 to declining interest rates. The increase in equity ratios also is consistent with the 5 6 position that it is important to maintain a strong financial profile and capital structure in 7 the current economic environment. As noted by Mr. Marevangepo, current interest rates 8 are not a sign of economic stability, but are the result of continual intervention by the Federal Reserve in the capital markets.<sup>32</sup> As noted in my Direct and Rebuttal 9 Testimonies, access to capital under a variety of market conditions is of paramount 10 11 importance to capital intensive businesses that provide essential services such as utilities.33 12

13 Cost of Debt

#### 14 Q. Please summarize Mr. Marevangepo's position regarding cost of debt.

A. Mr. Marevangepo continues to recommend an imputed cost of debt based on LUCo's consolidated debt, rather than a cost of debt based on the debt issuances supporting
Liberty Utilities' rate base. After reviewing the Company's response to Data Request
No. 0177.2, Mr. Marevangepo revised his recommendation from \* \* percent to \*
\* percent to reflect debt issuance costs.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> See Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See, Direct Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 44-45; Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 44-45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> See Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 2-3. Debt issuance costs were not included in Mr. Marevangepo's original calculation.

1	Q.	What is your concern with Mr. Marevangepo's position regarding Liberty Utilities'
2		cost of debt?

A. Mr. Marevangepo appears to base his recommendation on the consolidated debt issuances
of LUCo, regardless of whether those debt issuances were related to funding Liberty
Utilities' investments. For example, a number of LUCo's consolidated debt issuances
were issued more than a decade before Algonquin acquired Liberty Utilities from
Atmos.<sup>35</sup> Consequently, I continue to recommend that the authorized cost of debt reflect
Liberty Utilities' embedded cost of debt of 4.50 percent.<sup>36</sup>

### 9 GDP Growth Rate

# Q. Please briefly describe the estimate of long-term GDP growth used in the terminal year of your Multi-Stage DCF model?

A. As explained in my Direct Testimony, I have relied on the long-term historical growth rate in real GDP adjusted to reflect long-term forecasts for inflation in order to establish the projected nominal GDP growth rate in the terminal year of my Multi-Stage DCF analysis.<sup>37</sup> The long-term GDP growth rate in my Direct Testimony was based on the historical real GDP growth rate of 3.29 percent from 1929 through 2012 and an inflation rate of 2.35 percent based on the TIPS spread.<sup>38</sup>

### 18 Q. What are Mr. Marevangepo's concerns with your estimate of GDP growth?

19 A.

Mr. Marevangepo suggests the real GDP growth rate is overstated in comparison to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> See, response to Staff Data Request No. 0177.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> See, Direct Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 22-23.

*Ibid.* Please note, in my Rebuttal Testimony the long-term real GDP growth rate was updated to 3.27% using data through 2013 and the expected inflation rate was updated to 2.36%; *See*, Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 20.

1		2.45 percent real GDP growth rate forecast reported in the U.S. Energy Information
2		Administration's ("EIA") Annual Energy Outlook 2014 for the 2012 - 2040 time
3		period. <sup>39</sup> He also suggests that most forecasts of inflation are 2.00 percent.
4	Q.	What is your response to Mr. Marevangepo with respect to long-term real GDP
5		growth?
6	A.	As discussed in detail in my Rebuttal Testimony, <sup>40</sup> the Annual Energy Outlook 2014
7		forecast period is not sufficiently long to represent a perpetual growth rate and ignores
8		the fact that, up until the recent recession and continuing slow recovery, real GDP growth
9		has cyclically fluctuated around its long-term historical average of 3.27 percent. <sup>41</sup> It also
10		is important to note that EIA's Annual Energy Outlook 2014 (the source of Mr.
11		Marevangepo's real GDP growth forecasts) also reports long-term historical real GDP
12		growth. Updating their calculation of historical growth to reflect recent Bureau of
13		Economic Analysis revisions and updates to the National Income and Product Accounts
14		("NIPA"), EIA estimates a long-term historical average real GDP growth rate very
15		similar to mine:
16 17 18 19 20 21		Although the 2013 comprehensive NIPA revision did not lead to changes in broad economic trends or in the general patterns of past business cycles, it did increase gross domestic product (GDP) in every year back to 1929. The average annual growth rate of real GDP from 1929 to 2012 was revised upward to 3.3%, as compared with the previous estimate of $3.2\%$ .
22		•

<sup>39</sup> See, Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 11-12. See also, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014, April 2014, at CP-2. Note, 2.45% is the average of the 2012-2040 forecasts in Table CP1. 40

See, Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 13, 20-21.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., at 21, Chart 3.

<sup>42</sup> U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2014, April 2014, at IF-29.

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1		Given that Mr. Marevangepo relies on long-term historical data for the purposes
2		of his CAPM analysis, it is unclear why he would not consider the use of long-term
3		historical data for the purpose of developing a long-term GDP growth rate. In that
4		regard, the arithmetic average capital appreciation rate for large-capitalization stocks
5		from 1926 - 2013 has been 7.74 percent (the geometric average has been 5.82 percent), <sup>43</sup>
6		which is substantially higher than Mr. Marevangepo's estimate of long-term GDP
7		growth. As such, the assumptions used in Mr. Marevangepo's DCF analysis and his
8		CAPM analysis are highly inconsistent.
9	Q.	Have you examined the relationship between earnings per share growth and GDP
10		arrowth 9
10		growth?
10	A.	Yes, I have. Using data published by Dr. Robert J. Shiller, I calculated the capital
	Α.	
11	A.	Yes, I have. Using data published by Dr. Robert J. Shiller, I calculated the capital
11 12	A.	Yes, I have. Using data published by Dr. Robert J. Shiller, I calculated the capital appreciation rate of the S&P 500 Index from 1948 to 2013 and compared the results to
11 12 13	A.	Yes, I have. Using data published by Dr. Robert J. Shiller, I calculated the capital appreciation rate of the S&P 500 Index from 1948 to 2013 and compared the results to the average GDP growth rate over the same period. <sup>44</sup> As shown on Schedule RBH-S27,
11 12 13 14	· A.	Yes, I have. Using data published by Dr. Robert J. Shiller, I calculated the capital appreciation rate of the S&P 500 Index from 1948 to 2013 and compared the results to the average GDP growth rate over the same period. <sup>44</sup> As shown on Schedule RBH-S27, the geometric average growth in earnings from 1948 to 2013 was 5.99 percent, while the
<ol> <li>11</li> <li>12</li> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> </ol>	Α.	Yes, I have. Using data published by Dr. Robert J. Shiller, I calculated the capital appreciation rate of the S&P 500 Index from 1948 to 2013 and compared the results to the average GDP growth rate over the same period. <sup>44</sup> As shown on Schedule RBH-S27, the geometric average growth in earnings from 1948 to 2013 was 5.99 percent, while the geometric average growth in nominal GDP was 6.53 percent over the same period. That
<ol> <li>11</li> <li>12</li> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> </ol>	Α.	Yes, I have. Using data published by Dr. Robert J. Shiller, I calculated the capital appreciation rate of the S&P 500 Index from 1948 to 2013 and compared the results to the average GDP growth rate over the same period. <sup>44</sup> As shown on Schedule RBH-S27, the geometric average growth in earnings from 1948 to 2013 was 5.99 percent, while the geometric average growth in nominal GDP was 6.53 percent over the same period. That analysis demonstrates that there has been a strong correlation between earnings per share
<ol> <li>11</li> <li>12</li> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> </ol>	Α.	Yes, I have. Using data published by Dr. Robert J. Shiller, I calculated the capital appreciation rate of the S&P 500 Index from 1948 to 2013 and compared the results to the average GDP growth rate over the same period. <sup>44</sup> As shown on Schedule RBH-S27, the geometric average growth in earnings from 1948 to 2013 was 5.99 percent, while the geometric average growth in nominal GDP was 6.53 percent over the same period. That analysis demonstrates that there has been a strong correlation between earnings per share growth for companies in the S&P 500 and nominal GDP growth since at least the post-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> See, Morningstar, Inc., <u>Ibbotson Stocks</u>, <u>Bonds</u>, <u>Bills and Inflation 2014 Classic Yearbook</u>, at 234-235, Table B2. Calculated from beginning and ending index values.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Note, I reported the average real GDP growth rate over the 1948 – 2013 period in my Rebuttal Testimony.
 For comparison purposes, I now calculate the nominal GDP growth rate over that same period.

1 capitalization companies of 7.67 percent over the same period.<sup>45</sup> In addition, those 2 growth rates also are consistent with the 6.23 percent nominal GDP growth rate for the 3 period from 1929-2013, which is the period covered by my calculation of long-term real 4 GDP growth.<sup>46</sup>

5 Further, industry practice has been to assume that nominal GDP growth is a 6 reasonable surrogate for long-term earnings per share growth. In that regard, the 7 Commission has accepted that practice in prior decisions in which it relied on nominal 8 GDP growth as the appropriate growth rate for the terminal stage of the Multi-Stage DCF 9 Model.<sup>47</sup> As noted in my Rebuttal Testimony, even a brief survey of finance texts speaks 10 to the use of long-term GDP growth as a reasonable estimate for the terminal period.<sup>48</sup>

### 11 Q. What is your response to Mr. Marevangepo with respect to long-term inflation?

A. Mr. Marevangepo asserts "most projections for inflation for GDP are approximately 2.0 percent", but he does not provide any specific sources to support his claim.<sup>49</sup> However, it is interesting to note that Duff & Phelps (the data source Mr. Marevangepo references for the MRP component of his CAPM) reports five surveys of long-term expected inflation, with four of the five estimates 2.30 percent or higher.<sup>50</sup> Regardless, the 2.35 percent inflation rate used in my Direct Testimony (updated to 2.36 percent in my Rebuttal Testimony) is based on the ten-year forward long-term TIPS spread which is a directly

See, Morningstar, Inc., <u>Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 2014 Classic Yearbook</u>, at 234-235, Table B2.
 See, Morningstar, Inc., <u>Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 2014 Classic Yearbook</u>, at 234-235,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts, June 30, 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> See, for example, Report and Order in Case No. ER-2008-0318, January 27, 2009, at 21-22; and Report and Order in Case No. ER-2010-0036, May 28, 2010, at 18-19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> *See*, Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> See Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> See Duff & Phelps, <u>2014 Valuation Handbook</u>, at 3-7.

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1		measurable market-based indicator of investors' expectations for future inflation starting
2		at the time of the terminal stage of my Multi-Stage DCF model. While, as discussed by
3		Mr. Marevangepo, the Federal Reserve currently has a 2.00 percent target for inflation, <sup>51</sup>
4		it is instructive to note inflation has averaged nearly 3.00 percent from 1929 - 2013.52
5		And, as discussed below, some investors, such as Baron Funds' CEO and Chief
6		Investment Officer, expect future inflation will approach its historical average.
7	Q.	Is your GDP calculation methodology consistent with financial literature?
8	A.	Yes, it is. For example, Morningstar describes a three-stage DCF approach (generally
9		consistent with the model included in my Direct & Rebuttal Testimonies) in which the
10		final stage assumes that long-run growth moves toward that of the overall economy.
11		Morningstar describes an approach to calculating the long-term growth estimate that is
12		similar to that which is included in my model in that Morningstar's method also
13		combines historical average real GDP growth rate with a measure of inflation calculated
14		using the TIPS spread. <sup>53</sup>
15	Q.	Is there industry literature indicating investors expect companies to grow at or
16		above your long-term 5.71 percent GDP growth rate?
17	А.	Yes, there is. For example, Baron Fund's recent quarterly report included an introduction
18		from the CEO and Chief Investment Officer, Ron Baron, discussing his general
19		expectation for future long-term stock growth: <sup>54</sup>

<sup>51</sup> See, Staff Cost of Service Report, at 11.

<sup>52</sup> Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Geometric average nominal GDP growth of 6.23% minus geometric average real GDP growth of 3.27% = 2.96%.

<sup>53</sup> See Morningstar, Inc., Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 2013 Valuation Yearbook, at, at 52. 54

Baron Funds, founded in 1982, provides a range of different mutual funds for retail and institutional investors. See http://www.baronfunds.com/ .

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1 Although we believe it is not possible to predict markets in the short 2 term, we think long-term prospects for publicly owned businesses are 3 quite favorable. This is since we think they will continue to double their earnings and their value from present levels about every ten 4 5 years. That represents a 7% compounded annual growth rate. This is 6 while the purchasing power of our money will continue to fall by half 7 every twenty years. That represents, as has been the case for the past 8 hundred years, about a 3.5% annual decline in the dollar's purchasing power.55 9 10 In addition, as noted in my Rebuttal Testimony, in Financial Management: Theory and Practice Eugene F. Brigham and Michael C. Ehrhardt explain:<sup>56</sup> 11 12 Expected growth rates vary somewhat among companies, but dividend growth for most mature firms is generally expected to continue in the 13 future at about the same rate as nominal gross domestic product (real 14 15 GDP plus inflation). On that basis, one might expect the dividends of an average, or "normal," company to growth at a rate of 5% to 8% a 16 vear.57 17 18 Q. What is your response to Mr. Marevangepo's assertion that Staff has reviewed 19 confidential asset and equity valuation reports in the context of mergers, 20 acquisitions and other financial/investment advisor roles and never seen a growth rate greater than 4.00 percent?<sup>58</sup> 21 22 Mr. Marevangepo has expressed Staff's opinion, but has provided no specific references A. 23 that can be reviewed and assessed. For example, it is unclear whether the growth rates referred to by Mr. Marevangepo are real or nominal growth rates.<sup>59</sup> In general, however, 24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Baron Funds, Quarterly Report, June 30, 2014 at 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> See Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 22.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Eugene Brigham and Michael Ehrhardt, <u>Financial Management: Theory and Practice</u>, 12th Ed. (Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008), at 291.
 <sup>58</sup> See Bebuttel Testimony of Zenharia Merguaneane, et 12.

See Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 12.
 Leaste in Case No. 2011 0028 the Staff mittered sized.

I note in Case No. 2011-0028, the Staff witness cited a long-term real terminal growth rate reported by Goldman Sachs as a benchmark for Staff's expected long-term growth rate. The Commission's order in that case noted the flaw with using a *real* growth rate to develop a *nominal* estimate for investor's required return. *See*, Report and Order, Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri, File No. ER-2011-0028, dated July 13, 2011, at 69.

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1 it appears that Mr. Marevangepo is conflating discount rates developed for the purpose of 2 mergers and acquisitions or asset valuations with the Cost of Equity of an equity market 3 investor. The former may reflect a valuation premium associated with the benefit of gaining a controlling interest in a company (often referred to as a "control premium") 4 5 which would not be reflected in an individual equity investors' required return. 6 Consequently, the fair value of a company to a prospective buyer purchasing the entire 7 company will often be higher than the market value to minority investors in the subject 8 company's debt and equity. This fact can be observed in Exelon's offer to acquire Pepco 9 Holdings in an all-cash transaction on April 29, 2014 with an upfront premium of approximately 24.70 percent over the previous day's stock price.<sup>60</sup> 10

11 To that point, I note the Commission's order in Case No. 2011-0028 addressed 12 the use of discount rates developed by financial advisors or equity analysts for purposes 13 other than determining the appropriate ROE for the subject utility, finding that the former 14 should not be used as a measure of the latter.

Q. Are you aware of any recent statements by utility executives that would indicate
they use a required return for merger and acquisition investments that is higher
than the 7.80 percent to 8.80 percent ROE range calculated by Mr. Marevangepo
using his 4.00 percent to 5.00 percent perpetual growth rate?<sup>61</sup>

A. Yes, I am. American Electric Power's ("AEP") Chairman President and CEO, Nicholas
 Akin, stated on the company's July 25, 2014 quarterly financial earnings call that AEP's

See, Exelon Investor Presentation, Exelon Announces Acquisition of Pepco Holdings, Inc., April 30, 2014, at 7.
 See, Staff Cost of Service Percent at 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> See, Staff Cost of Service Report, at 31.

1		merger and acquisition spending would be assessed relative to the return available on its
2		transmission investment spending. <sup>62</sup> A review of AEP's most recent annual Form 10-K
3		filed with the Securities Exchange Commission indicates AEP's authorized rates of
4		return on equity for transmission investments range from 9.96 percent to 12.80 percent,
5		with only one authorized return below 11.00 percent. <sup>63</sup>
6	Earn	ings Growth Rate
7	Q.	What are Mr. Marevangepo's concerns with the earnings growth rates used in your
8		DCF analyses?
9	A.	Mr. Marevangepo suggests (1) utility stock valuations are largely determined by stable
10		dividends rather than earnings growth estimates; and (2) three to five year earnings
11		growth estimates are above expected long-term GDP growth and therefore "inflate" the
12		Quarterly Growth and Constant Growth DCF results when used as estimates of perpetual
13		growth. <sup>64</sup>
14	Q.	What is your response to Mr. Marevangepo regarding investors' use of dividends to
15		value stocks?
16	A.	First, the analyses presented in my Rebuttal Testimony demonstrated that EPS growth is
17		the <i>only</i> statistically significant predictor of the proxy companies' Price/Earnings ratios. <sup>65</sup>
18		Consequently, even if Mr. Marevangepo is of the view that the earnings growth

See, FactSet CallStreet, Corrected Transcript: American Electric Power Co., Inc., Q2 2014 Earnings call, July 25, 2014, at 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> See, American Electric Power, SEC Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013, at 28 - 29. Note, AEP reports internal (the "Transcos" segment) projects' have rates from 11.20% to 11.49% while joint ventures have approved ROEs ranging from 9.96% to 12.80%.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> See, Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 10-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> See, Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 14-16.

projections are too high, empirical evidence and academic research demonstrate that investors rely on earnings growth projections in arriving at their investment decisions.

3

Q.

4

Do you agree with Mr. Marevangepo's concern regarding the sustainability of three to five year earnings growth estimates in the DCF model?

5 A. No, I do not. First, Mr. Marevangepo's position is premised on his observation that the 6 three to five year earnings growth estimates in my Quarterly DCF and Constant Growth DCF models are below his estimate of perpetual GDP growth. However, as discussed 7 8 above, as well as in my Rebuttal Testimony, Mr. Marevangepo's GDP growth estimate is unreasonably low and inconsistent with historical experience and market expectations.<sup>66</sup> 9 10 In contrast, the 5.34 percent average earnings growth rate used in the DCF analyses 11 presented in my Direct Testimony (updated to 5.45 percent in the analyses accompanying 12 my Rebuttal Testimony) is well below the 5.71 percent long-term GDP growth estimate 13 discussed in my Direct and Rebuttal Testimonies.

Second, regardless of whether Mr. Marevangepo believes that analysts' growth rate projections are too high, the relevant analytical question is whether investors rely on those estimates in making their investment decisions. As discussed in my Direct and Rebuttal Testimonies, there is a substantial body of research showing investors are primarily concerned with earnings and cash flow growth.<sup>67</sup> That finding is corroborated by the analyses presented in my Rebuttal Testimony comparing earnings, dividend and book value per share growth measures.

21

Lastly, while Mr. Marevangepo criticizes the use of analyst growth rates, those

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, at 17-24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> See, Direct Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 13-15; Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 13-17.

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1 rates are observable and have a demonstrated empirical relationship to utility valuation 2 multiples. The growth rates included in Mr. Marevangepo's analysis, on the other hand, are based on his subjective opinion as to those which "investors are likely using."<sup>68</sup> That 3 4 is, rather than rely on an independent, observable, and verifiable source of growth rate projections, Mr. Marevangepo provides a discussion of GDP growth and each proxy 5 6 company's historical and projected growth rates, and in the context of that narrative, 7 applies his subjective judgment to arrive at what he considers to be a suitable growth rate. 8 Because it is substantially a function of his judgment, Mr. Marevangepo's analysis cannot 9 be replicated; it is quite likely that other analysts looking at the same information would 10 arrive at entirely different conclusions. Given the empirical support for using published, 11 observable, and verifiable analysts' growth rate projections, Mr. Marevangepo's 12 approach essentially substitutes his judgment for that of the market.

Q. Does Mr. Marevangepo acknowledge that some of the proxy group companies may
 grow at a rate faster than expected long-term GDP growth in the near-term?

A. Yes, Mr. Marevangepo believes it would be acceptable to include three to five year
earnings growth estimates that are greater than the expected growth of the overall
economy in the first stage of a multi-stage DCF model. Mr. Marevangepo, however, did
not use a multi-stage model. Rather, he developed a generic range of growth rates, which
he determined must be at or below his estimate of long-term GDP growth.<sup>69</sup>
Consequently, aside from our differences regarding the appropriate terminal growth rate,
Mr. Marevangepo's analysis understates expected investor return by ignoring shareholder


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Staff Cost of Service Report, at 31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, at 24-26.

- returns expected from above-average near-term growth (that is, before growth converges
   toward a more steady-state long-term average rate).
- 3 Capital Asset Pricing Model
- 4 Q. What are Mr. Marevangepo's concerns with your CAPM analyses?
- 5 A. Mr. Marevangepo suggests that the Market Risk Premium ("MRP") estimates in my 6 Direct Testimony are "inflated" because they are based on market returns calculated 7 using three to five year earnings growth projections. Mr. Marevangepo also notes that 8 regulated utilities should not have the same equity risk premium as non-regulated 9 utilities.<sup>70</sup>
- 10 Q. Did you consider where your MRP estimates fall within the range of historical
  11 observations?
- 12 Yes, I did. Because Mr. Marevangepo concludes that the MRP estimates used in my A. 13 analyses are "inflated", it is instructive to understand how often various ranges of MRPs 14 actually occurred over the 1926 to 2013 period. To perform that analysis, I gathered the 15 annual Market Risk Premia reported by Morningstar and produced a histogram of the 16 The results of that analysis, which are presented in Chart 1 below, observations. 17 demonstrate that MRPs of at least 8.63 percent (the high end of the range of MRP 18 estimates in my Direct Testimony) have occurred nearly half of the time.

Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 13-14.

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### Chart 1: Frequency Distribution of Market Risk Premia, 1926 - 2013<sup>71</sup>

the same ranges of MRP estimates. Those results, which are provided in Chart 2 (below) demonstrate that an MRP of at least 8.63 percent will occur approximately half of the time.


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1

5

Source: Morningstar, Inc., Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 2014 Classic Yearbook, at 196-197.

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### Chart 2: Cumulative Probability of Market Risk Premia, 1926 - 2013<sup>72</sup>

Q. Turning to Mr. Marevangepo's position that the EPS growth rates used to develop
your estimated market return are too high, did you consider where your estimates
fall within the range of historical observations?

A. Yes. I gathered the annual capital appreciation return on Large Company Stocks reported
by Morningstar for the years 1926 through 2013, produced a histogram of those
observations, and calculated the probability that a given capital appreciation return
estimate would be observed. The results of that analysis, which are presented in Chart 3
(below), demonstrate that capital appreciation rates of 10.00 percent and higher occurred
quite often.

1

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


Chart 3: Frequency Distribution of Observed Capital Appreciation Rates<sup>73</sup>

In fact, the average growth rates in my Bloomberg and Value Line MRP analyses, which Mr. Marevangepo asserts are "inflated" by historical standards represent approximately the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of the actual capital appreciation rates observed from 1926 to 2013.

## Q. Do you have any other concerns with Mr. Marevangepo's analysis of your MRP 8 estimates?

9 A. Yes. As noted above in my response to Mr. Marevangepo regarding the growth rate 10 component of the DCF model, there is a significant amount of literature indicating that 11 investors rely on earnings growth rate projections when making investment decisions. In 12 addition, because the Cost of Equity is forward-looking, it is reasonable to rely on 13 forward-looking market return estimates to develop the MRP. Mr. Marevangepo,

2

3

4

5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Source: Morningstar, Inc., <u>Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 2013 Classic Yearbook</u>, Table A-3, at 200-201.

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1 however, relies on long-term historical data to calculate the MRP and a three-month 2 average of the 30-year Treasury yield to calculate the risk-free rate. Mr. Marevangepo's 3 analysis is not only based on historical data, but it includes a temporal mismatch. As 4 discussed in my Direct and Rebuttal Testimonies, academic research has shown that there 5 is an inverse relationship between interest rates and the equity risk premium, which Mr. Marevangepo fails to consider.<sup>74</sup> Based on that inverse relationship, it is not appropriate 6 7 to use a historical equity risk premium (*i.e.*, currently 6.96 percent, as reported by Morningstar), as Mr. Marevangepo has done, because that figure is based on an average 8 9 income-only return on government bonds of 5.10 percent that is substantially higher than the current average yield on government bonds.<sup>75</sup> If Mr. Marevangepo were to use his 10 11 arithmetic historical MRP of 6.20 percent, the historical risk-free rate of 5.10 percent, and 12 his beta coefficient estimate of 0.80, his CAPM result would increase from 8.55 to 10.06 percent (*i.e.*, increase by 151 basis points).<sup>76</sup> Moreover, using Morningstar's 6.96 percent 13 historical market risk premium estimate instead of Mr. Marevangepo's 6.20 percent 14 15 would produce a CAPM result of 10.67 percent.

Q. Do you have any concerns with Mr. Marevangepo's use of the Duff & Phelps 5.00
percent MRP estimate to check the reasonableness of his own MRP estimate?

18

A.

- 19
- 20

<sup>74</sup> See, Direct Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 33-34; and Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 33.

Yes, I do. It is not clear that the discount rate developed by Duff & Phelps is comparable

to the Cost of Equity analyses we are performing for Liberty Utilities in this proceeding.

As discussed earlier, discount rates developed for different purposes are not necessarily

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> See, Morningstar, Inc., <u>Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 2014 Classic Yearbook</u>, Table 6-7 at 91, and Table 11-1 at 142.
 <sup>76</sup> 510% + (0.80 x 6.20%) = 10.06% Note the CABM result does not include Mr. Marguangene's \* ... \*

 $<sup>5.10\% + (0.80 \</sup>times 6.20\%) = 10.06\%$ . Note, the CAPM result does not include Mr. Marevangepo's \* basis point upward adjustment for the credit rating differential between LUCo and Staff's proxy group.

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interchangeable. To that point, and as shown in Table 2 below, CAPM results produced
 using MRP estimates historically reported by Duff & Phelps are consistently below actual
 authorized natural gas utility ROEs.

4

	Average Authorized Natural Gas ROE	Average Implied ROE Using Duff & Phelps MRP <sup>78</sup>	Difference
2014	9.71%	7.67%	-2.04%
2013	9.68%	7.46%	-2.21%
2012	9.94%	7.38%	-2.56%
2011	9.92%	8.57%	-1.35%
2010	10.15%	8.64%	-1.50%
2009	10.22%	8.67%	-1.54%
2008	10.39%	8.65%	-1.74%

### Table 2: CAPM Results Using Duff & Phelps MRP<sup>77</sup>

5

6It appears, therefore, that the Duff & Phelps MRP estimate is not an appropriate7input for determining the required ROE for a utility. Consequently, Duff & Phelps' MRP8estimate does not support the reasonableness of Mr. Marevangepo's own MRP estimates.9Setting aside the appropriateness of Duff & Phelps discount rate for use in the10estimation of Liberty Utilities' required ROE, I note Duff & Phelps recommends the use11of a normalized risk-free rate of 4.00 percent (37 basis points above Mr. Marevangepo's123.63 risk-free rate). Moreover, as discussed in my Rebuttal Testimony, Duff & Phelps

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> See, Schedule RBH-S28.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Calculated as 3-month average 30-year Treasury yield + (0.80 x Duff & Phelps most recent MRP). Data as of each rate case decision date.

1		notes the CAPM formula can be adjusted to compensate for the incremental risk
2		associated with small size. <sup>79</sup> Duff & Phelps' "Micro-Cap" risk premium associated with
3		Liberty Utilities' size would be 3.87 percent. <sup>80</sup>
4	Q.	What is your response to Mr. Marevangepo's observation that regulated utilities
5		should not have the same equity risk premium as non-regulated utilities?
6	A.	Mr. Marevangepo's concern is misplaced. Mr. Marevangepo states that if it is assumed
7		"regulated utilities and unregulated corporations require the same equity returns or
8		greater, then their reported implied equity risk premiums will obviously be much higher
9		than what is actually expected by regulated utility common equity investors." <sup>81</sup> The S&P
10		500 Index used in my estimate of the MRP, however, is not meant to reflect the
11		Company's risk. As explained in my Direct Testimony, the CAPM is based on the
12		principle that investors are compensated for non-diversifiable or "systematic" risk.82
13		Systematic risk is represented by the Beta coefficient, which is a measure of the subject
14		company's risk relative to the overall market. Equations [5] and [6] to my Direct
15		Testimony demonstrate that the expected market return is not meant to reflect the risk of
16		the subject company (in this case Liberty Utilities) as Mr. Marevangepo suggests.
17		Rather, the Beta coefficient relates the subject company's risk to that of the overall
18		market.
10		The relationship emerge the Cost of Fruity the Data coefficient and the menter

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The relationship among the Cost of Equity, the Beta coefficient, and the market risk premium is illustrated by the "Security Market Line". As shown in Chart 4 (below),

See, Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 31-32. See Duff & Phelps, <u>2014 Valuation Handbook</u>, Appendix 3. 80


<sup>79</sup> 

<sup>81</sup> Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 13-14.

<sup>82</sup> See, Direct Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 25.

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only a company with a Beta coefficient of 1.00 would have a risk and return level comparable to the S&P 500 Index.



### Chart 4: Security Market Line<sup>83</sup>

5 Nowhere in my testimony have I suggested that the Company's risk is comparable 6 to the market. It would have been improper to do so. Rather, I have been quite clear in 7 noting that the proxy companies are less risky than the overall market; they have Beta 8 coefficients less than 1.00 and required returns less than that of the overall market. As 9 such, Mr. Marevangepo's concern is unfounded and misplaced.

### 10 Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Approach

#### 11 Q. What are Mr. Marevangepo's concerns with your Risk Premium analyses?

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Note, the 13.03% market return is the average of the 13.35% and 12.70% ex-ante market DCF calculations contained in Schedule RBH-R16 and the 0.78 Beta coefficient is the average of the Bloomberg, Value Line and calculated betas provided in Schedule RBH-R17.

1	A.	Mr. Marenvangepo suggests my Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium analysis is inappropriate
2		because he believes public utility commissions have historically authorized ROEs above
3		the actual Cost of Equity.

# 4 Q. Do you agree that commissions usually authorize ROEs above the actual Cost of 5 Equity?

6 Α. No, I do not. The process for determining the appropriate ROE in other jurisdictions is 7 similar to that relied on by the Commission, with multiple expert witnesses providing a 8 variety of analyses and recommendations. With that data in hand, the commissioners are 9 well informed and able to determine an appropriate authorized ROE for the subject 10 company based on the available information at the time. In addition to the information 11 available to the commissioners, most jurisdictions rely on a standard similar to those laid 12 out in the Hope and Bluefield decisions (as the Commission does). As noted in my Direct 13 Testimony, those standards state that the authorized return must be "just and reasonable" and no more than is necessary while allowing investors a reasonable return.<sup>84</sup> Based on 14 15 the information available from expert witnesses and the Hope and Bluefield standards, it 16 is unclear why commissions would consistently provide utilities with higher returns than 17 are reasonable.

### Q. Has the Commission provided guidance as to the importance of authorized returns in other jurisdictions in determining the ROE for utilities in Missouri?

20 A.

Yes, it has. As stated in my Rebuttal Testimony, Liberty Utilities must compete for

See, Direct Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 5.

1	capital with other comparable regulated natural gas distribution utilities. <sup>85</sup> The
2	Commission, in its Report and Order in Ameren Missouri's most recent rate case,
3	provided similar guidance, noting that it is reasonable to review allowed ROEs in other
4	jurisdictions. <sup>86</sup> The Commission further stated that "Ameren Missouri must compete for
5	capital with other utilities" and if it were authorized an ROE well below those of other
6	utilities, it "could cause that available capital to flow away from Ameren Missouri to the
7	detriment of both shareholders and ratepayers." <sup>87</sup> As such, authorized returns provide a
8	reasonable benchmark for determining the ROE for Liberty Utilities.

# 9 Q. Have you reviewed the most recent authorized ROEs in place at the operating utility 10 companies within the proxy group?

- A. Yes, I have. I calculated the range and average Return on Equity authorized for the
  utility operating companies in my proxy group. As shown in Schedule RBH-S29, the
  average authorized ROE is 10.35 percent, or 165 basis points above Mr. Marevangepo's
  8.70 percent ROE recommendation (the median is 10.10 percent, or 140 basis points
  above Mr. Marevangepo's recommendation).
- 16 Utility Risk and Capital Market Environment

### 17 Q. What is Mr. Marevangepo's position with regard to the risk profile of utilities and

- 18 the required return for utilities in the current capital market?
- 19 A. Mr. Marevangepo states utilities are viewed as "widow and orphan" investments for risk-
- 20 averse investors and "flight to safety" investments for those seeking high yields when

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> See, Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert, at 34.

See, Report and Order, Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri, File No. ER-2012-0166, dated
 December 12, 2012, at 67.
 Ibid at 72

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, at 72.

treasury yields are relatively low due to recessionary and other macro-economic
 conditions.<sup>88</sup> Mr. Marevangepo further suggests utilities are considered alternatives to
 bond investments.

### 4 Q. What is your response to Mr. Marevangepo regarding capital markets and utility 5 risk levels?

6 First, as noted in my response to Mr. Marevangepo regarding the MRP component of A. 7 CAPM, I agree that utility stocks are considered to be less risky than the overall market. 8 However, it also is important to recognize there are risks attendant with equity ownership 9 and utility stocks may not be the safe haven Mr. Marevangepo suggests. For example, 10 from its pre-recession peak on December 10, 2007 to its trough on March 9, 2009, the 11 S&P 500 Utility Index lost nearly 50.00 percent of its value during the recent financial 12 crisis. The S&P 500 Utility Index also substantially underperformed the broader market 13 in 2013.

In addition, when market volatility increases the correlation of returns among different asset classes and equity sectors also increases. That is, as conditions more volatile, all sectors (including utilities) trade more in line with the overall market, indicating that there are fewer "safe harbor" sectors for investors to seek. As noted in <u>The Wall Street Journal</u> shortly following the 2008 – 2009 financial crisis when market volatility was at historically high levels, stocks were "trading in lock-step more than at any time since the 1987 crash, and the trend has some analysts concerned."<sup>89</sup> A January

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 8-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The Herd Instinct Takes Over, <u>The Wall Street Journal</u>, July 12, 2010. See also "Macro" Forces in Markets Confound Stock Pickers, <u>The Wall Street Journal</u>, September 24, 2010.

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1 2012 article in The Wall Street Journal, again following a period of elevated market 2 volatility, noted that "[a] fact of life for investors in recent years, especially in the stock 3 market, has been the dramatic rise in correlations. One surprise of 2011 was the degree to 4 which correlations within and across financial markets returned with a vengeance."<sup>90</sup> As 5 with other asset classes and equity market segments, utility stocks also exhibit increasing 6 correlation with the broad market during periods of market instability (see Table 3, 7 below).

## Table 3: Correlation of Natural Gas Utility Stock Returns to Overall Market Returns During Periods of Higher and Lower Market Volatility (2004 through July 31, 2014)

Volatility (as measured by the VIX) <sup>91</sup>	Correlation of S&P 500 and S&P Natural Gas Utility Index Returns <sup>92</sup>
< 15	0.47
< 20	0.55
> 20	0.72
> 25	0.84

10

11 The practical implication is that as the correlation between natural gas companies 12 and the broad market increases, it is less likely that investors will see utility shares as 13 "defensive" investments that would provide meaningful diversification benefits. Second, 14 as the correlation increases, it is reasonable to expect that the Beta coefficient (which 15 measures the relationship between the return on the broad market and the return on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> *High Correlations Could Be Here To Stay, The Wall Street Journal, WSJ.com, January 4, 2012.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Source: Bloomberg Professional. 90-trading-day average value.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Average of 90-trading-day correlation of weekly returns on S&P 500 Index and the S&P 500 Natural Gas Utility Index during periods when the average VIX value fell within the specified range.

- 1 subject security) also will increase.
- Q. Do you have any observations regarding Mr. Marevangepo's characterization of
  utility stocks as "widow and orphan" investments?
- 4 A. Yes, I do. Mr. Marevangepo's characterization is an over simplification of the universe
  5 of utility investors given that the proxy group companies are largely held by institutional
  6 investors. As shown in Table 4 below, institutional investors own (on average) 62.97
  7 percent of the proxy group companies.

8

Table 4: Institutional Ownership P	Percentage of Proxy Group <sup>93</sup>
------------------------------------	---

Company	Ticker	% Institutional Ownership
AGL Resources	GAS	64.01%
Atmos Energy	ATO	71.44%
Laclede Group	LG	52.63%
New Jersey Resources	NJR	60.17%
Northwest Natural Gas	NWN	61.11%
Piedmont Natural Gas	PNY	51.62%
South Jersey Industries	SJI	61.92%
Southwest Gas	SWX	77.34%
Washington Gas Light	WGL	66.48%
Average:		62.97%

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While Mr. Marevangepo cites an article titled "It's Time to Abandon Utility Stocks" that states utility stocks are often referred to as "widow and orphan stocks", I note that article suggests utility stock valuations have been influenced by the Federal

<sup>93</sup> Source: SNL Financial.

1		Reserve's monetary intervention and may now be too risky for risk-averse investors:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12		To understand why utilities carry so much risk, we first need to understand the dynamics that have driven the sector higher. A large part of the industry's strength has come as a direct result of the Federal Reserve's actions. For more than five years now, the Fed has pumped liquidity into the market in an effort to prop up the economy and bolster employment. The Fed has done this by setting interest rate targets at historically low levels, and then spending massive amounts to buy Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities.  The key point here is that the utility sector is no longer a safe place for "widows and orphans" (or any other conservative investor). As the
13 14 15		Fed backs off its aggressive asset buying program, capital will continue to flow out of this sector, driving stock prices lower.
16	Q.	Are there other financial articles that suggest utility valuations are unsustainably
17		high in the current interest rate environment?
18	A.	Yes, there are. For example an April 2014 Forbes article cited by Mr. Marevangepo
18 19	A.	Yes, there are. For example an April 2014 <u>Forbes</u> article cited by Mr. Marevangepo discussed the perceived overvaluation of utility stocks: <sup>94</sup>
	Α.	
19 20 21 22 23 24	Α.	discussed the perceived overvaluation of utility stocks: <sup>94</sup> The false equivalency that dividends equal safety has led investors to ignore the significant risks and bloated valuations of the stocks that utilities funds hold. Good utility stocks are hard to find because dividend-seeking investors have bid the prices up well beyond their
19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Α.	discussed the perceived overvaluation of utility stocks: <sup>94</sup> The false equivalency that dividends equal safety has led investors to ignore the significant risks and bloated valuations of the stocks that utilities funds hold. Good utility stocks are hard to find because dividend-seeking investors have bid the prices up well beyond their fair valuations. <sup>95</sup>

<sup>94</sup> 

*See,* Rebuttal Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 9. *Dividends Are No Antidote To Overvaluation In Utilities,* Forbes, April 28, 2014. 95

1	purchases.96
2	

2		
3	Q.	What are the implications of potential changes in the valuation levels of utility
4		stocks?
5	A.	One of the underlying assumptions of the Constant Growth DCF model is that
6		Price/Earnings ("P/E") ratios remain constant in perpetuity. The articles noted above,
7		however, suggest that utility P/E ratios may be unsustainably high. If the constant P/E
8		ratio assumption is not expected to hold, then the results of the Constant Growth DCF
9		model (which Mr. Marevangepo relies on to form his ROE recommendation) may by
10		unreliable. <sup>97</sup>
11		
12	IV.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
13	Q.	What are your overall conclusions and recommendation?
14	A.	The differences between Mr. Marevangepo's and my analytical approaches generally
15		remain the same and have been addressed above, as well as in my Rebuttal Testimony. I
16		continue to believe a rate of return on common equity in the range of 10.00 percent to
17		10.50 percent represents the range of equity investors' required rate of return for
18		investment in natural gas utilities. Taking in to consideration the capital environment in
19		which the Company operates and the Company's small size, I continue to recommend an
20		ROE of 10.50 percent.
21		I also continue to believe the Company's actual embedded cost of debt (4.50

96

Natural Gas Prices Dim Utility Stocks, <u>The Wall Street Journal</u>, August 7, 2014. See, Morin, Roger A., <u>New Regulatory Finance</u>, Public Utilities Report, Inc., 2006, at 433. 97

Robert B. Hevert Surrebuttal Testimony Page 41 of 41

- 1 percent) and actual capital structure (58.34 percent common equity and 41.66 percent
- 2 long-term debt) are reasonable and consistent with industry practice.
- 3 Q. Does that conclude your Surrebuttal Testimony?
- 4 A. Yes, it does.

#### BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of Liberty Utilities ) (Midstates Natural Gas) Corp. d/b/a ) Liberty Utilities' Tariff Revisions Designed ) To Implement a General Rate Increase ) For Natural Gas Service in the Missouri ) Service Areas of the Company. )

Case No. GR-2014-0152

#### **AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT B. HEVERT**

#### COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ) ) ss COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX )

Robert B. Hevert, being first duly sworn on his oath, states:

1. My name is Robert B. Hevert. I am Managing Partner of Sussex Economic Advisors, LLC and my business address is 161 Worcester Road, Suite 503, Framingham, Massachusetts 01701.

2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my Surrebuttal Testimony on behalf of Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) Corp. d/b/a Liberty Utilities consisting of forty-one (41) pages and Schedules RBH-S26 through RBH-S29, all of which having been prepared in written form for introduction into evidence in the above-captioned docket.

3. I have knowledge of the matters set forth therein. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded, including any attachments thereto, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Robert B. Hevert

Subscribed and sworn before me this 14<sup>th</sup> day of August, 2014.

Notary Public

My commission expires: April 16, 2015



KIMBERLY H. DAO Notary Public Commonwealth of Massachusetts My Commission Expires April 16, 2015

#### Capital Structure and Interest Rates

	[1]	[2]
	Proxy Group	30-Year
	Average	Treasury
Rolling 4 Quarters	Equity Ratio	Yield
2013Q2 - 2014Q1	55.41%	3.58%
2012Q2 - 2013Q1	56.14%	2.92%
2011Q2 - 2012Q1	56.77%	3.56%
2010Q2 - 2011Q1	56.00%	4.24%
2009Q2 - 2010Q1	54.91%	4.36%

		Common E	quity Ratio							_											
		2014Q1	<u>2013Q4</u>	<u>2013Q3</u>	<u>2013Q2</u>	<u>2013Q1</u>	<u>2012Q4</u>	<u>2012Q3</u>	<u>2012Q2</u>	<u>2012Q1</u>	<u>2011Q4</u>	<u>2011Q3</u>	<u>2011Q2</u>	<u>2011Q1</u>	<u>2010Q4</u>	2010Q3	<u>2010Q2</u>	<u>2010Q1</u>	2009Q4	<u>2009Q3</u>	2009Q2
AGL Resources Inc.	GAS	50.40%	48.78%	48.02%	48.10%	49.83%	49.00%	48.74%	48.90%	48.82%	48.11%	40.81%	46.56%	46.68%	47.90%	49,79%	49.40%	48.15%	47.40%	46.52%	50.82%
Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	55.99%	52.01%	51.23%	51.25%	50.88%	55.34%	54.66%	51.63%	51.69%	50.69%	50.52%	51.40%	52.36%	51.30%	50.09%	51.61%	51.88%	51.00%	50.07%	50.25%
Laclede Group, Inc. (The)	LG	57.06%	53.88%	53.40%	69,94%	57.94%	63.00%	62.26%	62.63%	62.78%	61.79%	61.12%	61.38%	60.95%	60.07%	57.91%	58.41%	58.71%	57.73%	57.05%	57.70%
New Jersey Resources Corporation	NJR	61.52%	60.02%	60.41%	60.42%	62.60%	61.57%	60.43%	65.72%	66.34%	65.11%	64.12%	64.39%	63.97%	62.39%	61.19%	61.59%	62.38%	60.82%	59.89%	61.33%
Northwest Natural Gas Company	NWN	51.24%	50.32%	49.61%	51.97%	52.24%	51.30%	52.68%	53.38%	53.67%	51.06%	51.98%	54.65%	54.54%	53.49%	51.47%	52.04%	52.13%	50.86%	50.15%	52.82%
Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc.	PNY	52.85%	48.25%	55.41%	55.80%	52.99%	51.30%	51.73%	52.20%	60.41%	59.63%	58.17%	58.86%	58.12%	56.87%	55.53%	56.13%	55.61%	53.94%	53.53%	54.08%
South Jersey Industries, Inc.	SJI	54.19%	54.11%	55.74%	55.16%	55.39%	54.03%	54.06%	55.41%	61.03%	59.41%	58.27%	57.32%	57.47%	55.81%	57.78%	57.71%	61.03%	60.98%	59.58%	60.07%
Southwest Gas Corporation	SWX	51.62%	50.39%	51.34%	52.09%	52.36%	49.84%	50.10%	51.19%	48.19%	49.45%	50.65%	51.73%	52.31%	49.32%	50.99%	51.41%	50.85%	46.45%	46.45%	46.80%
WGL Holdings, Inc.	WGL	67.63%	66.92%	68.32%	69.52%	69.90%	68.81%	68.30%	68.55%	67.90%	66.09%	64.42%	65.34%	65.46%	63.36%	64.93%	65.74%	63.23%	61.84%	63.01%	61.55%
4 Quarter Equity Average: 55.41%					56.14%				56.77%				56.00%				54.91%				

Notes: [1] SNL Financial [2] Source: Federal Reserve Board Schedule H.15.

SCHEDULE RBH-S26

Nominal Growth in U.S. GDP and S&P 500 Earnings: 1948 - 2013

[1] [2]

	GDP in Current Dollars	S&P 500
Year	(\$ Billions)	Earnings
1948	274.80	2.29
1949	272.80	2.32
1950	300.20	2.84
1951 1952	347.30 367.70	2.44 2.40
1952	389.70	2.40
1954	391.10	2.77
1955	426.20	3.62
1956	450.10	3.41
1957	474.90	3.37
1958	482.00	2.89
1959	522.50	3.39 3.27
1960 1961	543.30 563.30	3.19
1962	605.10	3.67
1963	638.60	4.02
1964	685.80	4.55
1965	743.70	5.19
1966	815.00	5.55
1967	861.70 942.50	5.33 5.76
1968 1969	1,019.90	5.76 5.78
1970	1,075.90	5.13
1971	1,167.80	5.70
1972	1,282.40	6.42
1973	1,428.50	8.16
1974	1,548.80	8.89
1975	1,688.90	7.96
1976 1977	1,877.60 2,086.00	9.91 10.89
1978	2,356.60	12.33
1979	2,632.10	14.86
1980	2,862.50	14.82
1981	3,210.90	15.36
1982	3,345.00	12.64
1983	3,638.10	14.03
1984 1985	4,040.70 4,346.70	16.64 14.61
1986	4,590.10	14.48
1987	4,870.20	17.50
1988	5,252.60	23.76
1989	5,657.70	22.90
1990	5,979.60	21.34
1991	6,174.00	15.97
1992 1993	6,539.30 6,878.70	19.09 21.88
1993	7,308.70	30.60
1995	7,664.00	33.96

#### Page 2 of 2

		GDP in Current	
		Dollars	S&P 500
	Year	(\$ Billions)	Earnings
	1996	8,100.20	38.73
	1997	8,608.50	39.72
	1998	9,089.10	37.71
	1999	9,665.70	48.17
	2000	10,289.70	50.00
	2001	10,625.30	24.69
	2002	10,980.20	27.59
	2003	11,512.20	48.74
	2004	12,277.00	58.55
	2005	13,095.40	69.93
	2006	13,857.90	81.51
	2007	14,480.30	66.18
	2008	14,720.30	14.88
	2009	14,417.90	50.97
	2010	14,958.30	77.35
	2011	15,533.80	86.95
	2012	16,244.60	86.51
	2013	16,799.70	100.20
Compound	Annual Average:	6.53%	5.99%

#### Notes:

[1] Source: Federal Reserve Board Schedule H.15.[2] Source: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. Data through July, 2014.

		[1]	[2]	[3]		
	· · ·	Average				
		Authorized	Average ROE			
		Natural Gas	Using Duff &			
	Date	ROE	Phelps MRP	Difference		
	2014	9.71%	7.67%	-2.04%		
	2013	9.68%	7.46%	-2.21%		
	2012	9.94%	7.38%	-2.56%		
	2011	9.92%	8.57%	-1.35%		
	2010	10.15%	8.64%	-1.50%		
	2009	10.22%	8.67%	-1.54%		
	2008	10.39%	8.65%	-1.74%		
 	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]
		Authorized		3-Month		CAPM Result
	Date of Natural	Return on	Duff & Phelps	Treasury	Marevangepo	(w/ Duff &
Year	Gas Rate Case	Equity	MRP	Yield	Beta	Phelps MRP)
 2008	1/8/2008	10.75%	5.00%	4.61%	0.80	8.61%
2008	1/17/2008	10.75%	5.00%	4.61%	0.80	8.61%
2008	1/17/2008	10.75%	5.00%	4.61%	0.80	8.61%
2008	2/5/2008	9.99%	5.00%	4.46%	0.80	8.46%
2008	2/5/2008	10.19%	5.00%	4.46%	0.80	8.46%
2008	2/13/2008	10.20%	5.00%	4.46%	0.80	8.46%
2008	3/31/2008	10.00%	5.00%	4.41%	0.80	8.41%
2008	5/28/2008	10.50%	5.00%	4.45%	0.80	8.45%
2008	6/24/2008	10.00%	5.00%	4.48%	0.80	8.48%
2008	6/27/2008	10.00%	5.00%	4.48%	0.80	8.48%
2008	7/31/2008	10.70%	5.00%	4.62%	0.80	8.62%
2008	7/31/2008	10.82%	5.00%	4.62%	0.80	8.62%
2008	8/27/2008	10.25%	5.00%	4.62%	0.80	8.62%
2008	9/2/2008	10.25%	5.00%	4.59%	0.80	8.59%
2008	9/19/2008	10.70%	5.00%	4.59%	0.80	8.59%
2008	9/24/2008	10.68%	5.00%	4.59%	0.80	8.59%
2008	9/24/2008	10.68%	5.00%	4.59%	0.80	8.59%
2008	9/24/2008	10.68%	5.00%	4.59%	0.80	8.59%
2008	9/30/2008	10.20%	5.00%	4.45%	0.80	8.45%
2008	10/3/2008	10.30%	5.00%	4.45%	0.80	8.45%
2008	10/8/2008	10.15%	5.00%	4.45%	0.80	8.45%
2008	10/20/2008	10.06%	5.00%	4.45%	0.80	8.45%
2008	10/24/2008	10.60%	5.00%	4.45%	0.80	8.45%
2008	10/24/2008	10.60%	5.00%	4.45%	0.80	8.45%
2008	11/21/2008	10.50%	6.00%	4.31%	0.80	9.11%
2008	11/21/2008	10.50%	6.00%	4.31%	0.80	9.11%
2008	11/21/2008	10.50%	6.00%	4.31%	0.80	9.11%
2008	11/24/2008	10.50%	6.00%	4.31%	0.80	9.11%
2008	12/3/2008	10.39%	6.00%	4.15%	0.80	8.95%
2008	12/24/2008	10.00%	6.00%	4.15%	0.80	8.95%
2008	12/26/2008	10.10%	6.00%	4.15%	0.80	8.95%
2008	12/29/2008	10.20%	6.00%	4.15%	0.80	8.95%
2009	1/13/2009	10.45%	6.00%	3.68%	0.80	8.48%
2009	2/2/2009	10.05%	6.00%	3.33%	0.80	8.13%
2009	3/9/2009	10.30%	6.00%	3.20%	0.80	8.00%
2009	3/25/2009	10.17%	6.00%	3.20%	0.80	8.00%
2009	4/2/2009	10.75%	6.00%	3.45%	0.80	8.25%
2009	5/5/2009	10.75%	6.00%	3.66%	0.80	8.46%

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2009

5/15/2009

10.20%

6.00%

3.66%

0.80

Difference Between Actual Authorized ROE and Implied ROE Using Duff & Phelps Market Risk Premium

8.46%

Year	Date of Natural Gas Rate Case	Authorized Return on Equity	Duff & Phelps MRP	3-Month Treasury Yield	Marevangepo Beta	CAPM Resul (w/ Duff & Phelps MRP
2009	5/29/2009	9.54%	6.00%	3.66%	0.80	8.46%
2003	6/3/2009	10.10%	6.00%	3.88%	0.80	8.68%
2009	6/22/2009	10.00%	6.00%	3.88%	0.80	8.68%
2009	6/29/2009	10.21%	6.00%	3.88%	0.80	8.68%
2009	6/30/2009	9.31%	6.00%	4.17%	0.80	8.97%
2009	7/17/2009	9.26%	6.00%	4.17%	0.80	8.97%
2009	7/17/2009	10.50%	6.00%	4.17%	0.80	8.97%
2009	10/16/2009	10.30%	6.00%	4.17%	0.80	9.12%
2009	10/26/2009	10.40%	6.00%	4.32%	0.80	9.12% 9.12%
	10/28/2009	10.10%	6.00%	4.32%	0.80	9.12% 9.12%
2009	10/28/2009	10.15%	6.00%	4.32%	0.80	9.12 % 9.12%
2009				4.32%	0.80	9.12 <i>%</i> 9.12%
2009	10/30/2009	9.95%	6.00%			
2009	11/20/2009	9.45%	6.00%	4.25%	0.80	9.05%
2009	12/14/2009	10.50%	5.50%	4.23%	0.80	8.63%
2009	12/16/2009	10.75%	5.50%	4.23%	0.80	8.63%
2009	12/17/2009	10.30%	5.50%	4.23%	0.80	8.63%
2009	12/18/2009	10.40%	5.50%	4.23%	0.80	8.63%
2009	12/18/2009	10.40%	5.50%	4.23%	0.80	8.63%
2009	12/18/2009	10.50%	5.50%	4.23%	0.80	8.63%
2009	12/22/2009	10.20%	5.50%	4.23%	0.80	8.63%
2009	12/22/2009	10.40%	5.50%	4.23%	0.80	8.63%
2009	12/28/2009	10.85%	5.50%	4.23%	0.80	8.63%
2009	12/29/2009	10.38%	5.50%	4.23%	0.80	8.63%
2010	1/11/2010	10.24%	5.50%	4.33%	0.80	8.73%
2010	1/21/2010	10.23%	5.50%	4.33%	0.80	8.73%
2010	1/21/2010	10.33%	5.50%	4.33%	0.80	8.73%
2010	1/26/2010	10.40%	5.50%	4.33%	0.80	8.73%
2010	2/10/2010	10.00%	5.50%	4.47%	0.80	8.87%
2010	2/23/2010	10.50%	5.50%	4.47%	0.80	8.87%
2010	3/9/2010	9.60%	5.50%	4.57%	0.80	8.97%
2010	3/24/2010	10.13%	5.50%	4.57%	0.80	8.97%
2010	3/31/2010	10.70%	5.50%	4.62%	0.80	9.02%
2010	4/1/2010	9.50%	5.50%	4.62%	0.80	9.02%
2010	4/2/2010	10.10%	5.50%	4.62%	0.80	9.02%
2010	4/8/2010	10.35%	5.50%	4.62%	0.80	9.02%
2010	4/29/2010	9.19%	5.50%	4.62%	0.80	9.02%
2010	4/29/2010	9.40%	5.50%	4.62%	0.80	9.02%
2010	4/29/2010	9.40%	5.50%	4.62%	0.80	9.02%
2010	5/17/2010	10.55%	5.50%	4.65%	0.80	9.05%
2010	5/24/2010	10.05%	5.50%	4.65%	0.80	9.05%
2010	6/3/2010	11.00%	5.50%	4.54%	0.80	8.94%
2010	6/16/2010	10.00%	5.50%	4.54%	0.80	8.94%
2010	6/18/2010	10.30%	5.50%	4.54%	0.80	8.94%
2010	8/9/2010	12.55%	5.50%	4.14%	0.80	8.54%
2010	8/17/2010	10.10%	5.50%	4.14%	0.80	8.54%
2010	9/16/2010	9.60%	5.50%	3.97%	0.80	8.37%
2010	9/16/2010	10.00%	5.50%	3.97%	0.80	8.37%
2010	9/16/2010	10.00%	5.50%	3.97%	0.80	8.37%
2010	9/16/2010	10.30%	5.50%	3.97%	0.80	8.37%
	10/21/2010	10.30%		3.85%	0.80	8.25%
2010	11/2/2010	9.75%	5.50% 5.50%	3.85% 3.81%	0.80	8.25% 8.21%
2010						
2010	11/2/2010	9.75%	5.50%	3.81%	0.80	8.21%
2010	11/3/2010	10.75%	5.50%	3.81%	0.80	8.21%
2010	11/19/2010	10.20%	5.50%	3.81%	0.80	8.21%
2010	12/1/2010	10.00%	5.50%	3.94%	0.80	8.34%
2010	12/6/2010	9.56%	5.50%	3.94%	0.80	8.34%
2010	12/6/2010	10.09%	5.50%	3.94%	0.80	8.34%
2010	12/9/2010 12/14/2010	10.25%	5.50%	3.94%	0.80	8.34%
2010		10.33%	5.50%	3.94%	0.80	8.34%

		Authorized		3-Month		CAPM Result
	Date of Natural	Return on	Duff & Phelps	Treasury	Marevangepo	(w/ Duff &
Year	Gas Rate Case	Equity	MRP	Yield	Beta	Phelps MRP)
2010	12/17/2010	10.10%	5.50%	3.94%	0.80	8.34%
2010	12/20/2010	10.10%	5.50%	3.94%	0.80	8.34%
2010	12/23/2010	9.92%	5.50%	3.94%	0.80	8.34%
2011	1/6/2011	10.35%	5.50%	4.16%	0.80	8.56%
2011	1/12/2011	10.30%	5.50%	4.16%	0.80	8.56%
2011	1/13/2011	10.30%	5.50%	4.16%	0.80	8.56%
2011	3/10/2011	10.10%	5.50%	4.53%	0.80	8.93%
2011	3/31/2011	9.45%	5.50%	4.56%	0.80	8.96%
2011	4/18/2011	10.05%	5.50%	4.56%	0.80	8.96%
2011	4/21/2011	10.00%	5.50%	4.56%	0.80	8.96%
2011	5/26/2011	10.50%	5.50%	4.55%	0.80	8.95%
2011	6/21/2011	10.00%	5.50%	4.43%	0.80	8.83%
2011	6/29/2011	8.83%	5.50%	4.43%	0.80	8.83%
2011	8/1/2011	9.20%	5.50%	4.26%	0.80	8.66%
2011	9/1/2011	10.10%	5.50%	4.05%	0.80	8.45%
2011	11/14/2011	9.60%	6.00%	3.32%	0.80	8.12%
2011	12/13/2011	9.50%	6.00%	3.11%	0.80	7.91%
2011	12/20/2011	10.00%	6.00%	3.11%	0.80	7.91%
2011	12/22/2011	10.40%	6.00%	3.11%	0.80	7.91%
2012	1/10/2012	9.06%	6.00%	3.04%	0.80	7.84%
2012	1/10/2012	9.45%	6.00%	3.04%	0.80	7.84%
2012	1/10/2012	9.45%	6.00%	3.04%	0.80	7.84%
2012	1/23/2012	10.20%	5.50%	3.04%	0.80	7.44%
2012	1/31/2012	10.00%	5.50%	3.01%	0.80	7.41%
2012	4/24/2012	9.50%	5.50%	3.14%	0.80	7.54%
2012	4/24/2012	9.75%	5.50%	3.14%	0.80	7.54%
2012	5/7/2012	9.80%	5.50%	3.19%	0.80	7.59%
2012	5/22/2012	9.60%	5.50%	3.19%	0.80	7.59%
2012	5/24/2012	9.70%	5.50%	3.19%	0.80	7.59%
2012	6/7/2012	10.30%	5.50%	3.13%	0.80	7.53%
2012	6/15/2012	10.40%	5.50%	3.13%	0.80	7.53%
2012	6/18/2012	9.60%	5.50%	3.13%	0.80	7.53%
2012	7/2/2012	9.75%	5.50%	2.94%	0.80	7.34%
2012	10/24/2012	10.30%	5.50%	2.75%	0.80	7.15%
2012	10/26/2012	9.50%	5.50%	2.75%	0.80	7.15%
2012	10/31/2012	9.30%	5.50%	2.85%	0.80	7.25%
2012	10/31/2012	9.90%	5.50%	2.85%	0.80	7.25%
2012	10/31/2012	10.00%	5.50%	2.85%	0.80	7.25%
2012	11/1/2012	9.45%	5.50%	2.85%	0.80	7.25%
2012	11/8/2012	10.10%	5.50%	2.85%	0.80	7.25%
2012	11/9/2012	10.30%	5.50%	2.85%	0.80	7.25%
2012	11/26/2012	10.00%	5.50%	2.85%	0.80	7.25%
2012	11/28/2012	10.40%	5.50%	2.85%	0.80	7.25%
2012	11/28/2012	10.50%	5.50%	2.85%	0.80	7.25%
2012	12/4/2012	10.00%	5.50%	2.86%	0.80	7.26%
2012	12/4/2012	10.50%	5.50%	2.86%	0.80	7.26%
2012	12/14/2012	10.40%	5.50%	2.86%	0.80	7.26%
2012	12/20/2012	9.50%	5.50%	2.86%	0.80	7.26%
2012	12/20/2012	10.10%	5.50%	2.86%	0.80	7.26%
2012	12/20/2012	10.25%	5.50%	2.86%	0.80	7.26%
2012	12/20/2012	10.30%	5.50%	2.86%	0.80	7.26%
2012	12/20/2012	10.40%	5.50%	2.86%	0.80	7.26%
2012	12/20/2012	10.50%	5.50%	2.86%	0.80	7.26%
		9.80%	5.50%	2.86%	0.80	7.26%
2012	12/26/2012					
2012 2013	2/22/2013	9.60%	5.50%	2.92%	0.80	7.32%
2012 2013 2013	2/22/2013 3/14/2013	9.60% 9.30%	5.50% 5.00%	3.04%	0.80	7.04%
2012 2013 2013 2013	2/22/2013 3/14/2013 3/27/2013	9.60% 9.30% 9.80%	5.50% 5.00% 5.00%	3.04% 3.04%	0.80 0.80	7.04% 7.04%
2012 2013 2013	2/22/2013 3/14/2013	9.60% 9.30%	5.50% 5.00%	3.04%	0.80	7.04%

	Date of Natural	Authorized Return on	Duff & Phelps	3-Month Treasury	Marevangepo	CAPM Resu (w/ Duff &
Year	Gas Rate Case	Equity	MRP	Yield	Beta	Phelps MRF
2013	6/13/2013	9.40%	5.00%	3.07%	0.80	7.07%
2013	6/18/2013	9.28%	5.00%	3.07%	0.80	7.07%
2013	6/18/2013	9.28%	5.00%	3.07%	0.80	7.07%
2013	6/25/2013	9.80%	5.00%	3.07%	0.80	7.07%
2013	9/23/2013	9.60%	5.00%	3.59%	0.80	7.59%
2013	11/6/2013	10.20%	5.00%	3.74%	0.80	7.74%
2013	11/13/2013	9.84%	5.00%	3.74%	0.80	7.74%
2013	11/14/2013	10.25%	5.00%	3.74%	0.80	7.74%
2013	11/22/2013	9.50%	5.00%	3.74%	0.80	7.74%
2013	12/5/2013	10.20%	5.00%	3.76%	0.80	7.76%
2013	12/13/2013	9.60%	5.00%	3.76%	0.80	7.76%
2013	12/16/2013	9.73%	5.00%	3.76%	0.80	7.76%
2013	12/17/2013	10.00%	5.00%	3.76%	0.80	7.76%
2013	12/18/2013	9.08%	5.00%	3.76%	0.80	7.76%
2013	12/23/2013	9.72%	5.00%	3.76%	0.80	7.76%
2013	12/30/2013	10.00%	5.00%	3.76%	0.80	7.76%
2014	1/21/2014	9.65%	5.00%	3.79%	0.80	7.79%
2014	1/22/2014	9.18%	5.00%	3.79%	0.80	7.79%
2014	2/20/2014	9.30%	5.00%	3.82%	0.80	7.82%
2014	2/21/2014	9.85%	5.00%	3.82%	0.80	7.82%
2014	2/28/2014	9.55%	5.00%	3.77%	0.80	7.77%
2014	3/16/2014	9.72%	5.00%	3.77%	0.80	7.77%
2014	4/21/2014	9.50%	5.00%	3.68%	0.80	7.68%
2014	4/22/2014	9.80%	5.00%	3.68%	0.80	7.68%
2014	5/8/2014	9.10%	5.00%	3.60%	0.80	7.60%
2014	5/8/2014	9.59%	5.00%	3.60%	0.80	7.60%
2014	6/6/2014	10.40%	5.00%	3.51%	0.80	7.51%
2014	6/12/2014	10.10%	5.00%	3.51%	0.80	7.51%
2014	6/12/2014	10.10%	5.00%	3.51%	0.80	7.51%
2014	6/12/2014	10.10%	5.00%	3.51%	0.80	7.51%

Notes:

[1] Equals sum of Col. [5]

[2] Equals sum of Col. [9]

[3] Equals [2]-[1][4] Regulatory Research Associates

[5] Regulatory Research Associates

[6] Duff & Phelps, 2014 Valuation Handbook, at 3-24

[7] Federal Reserve Board Schedule H.15.

[8] Testimony of Zephania Marevangepo, at 33

[9] Equals Col. [7] + Col. [8] x Col. [6]

Date	Compony	Ticker	Docket Number	Jurisdiction	Authorized ROE
Jate 3/25/2009	Company Northern Illinois Gas Company	GAS	D-08-0363		10.17
	Pivotal Utility Holdings, Inc.	GAS	D-030569-GU	FL	10.17
2/9/2004	, .	GAS	D-030509-00 D-GR-09030195	NJ	
	Pivotal Utility Holdings, Inc.	GAS			10.30
5/24/2010	Chattanooga Gas Company		D-09-00183	TN	10.05
1/3/2010	Atlanta Gas Light Company	GAS	D-31647	GA	10.75
12/20/2011	5	GAS	C-PUE-2010-00142	VA	10.00
1/17/1996	Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	D-U-21484 (LGS)	LA	10.77
3/31/2010	Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	D-30442	GA	10.70
11/8/1985	Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	C-U-4728	MS	12.94
12/4/2012	Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	D-GUD-10170 (Mid-Tex)	TX	10.50
10/2/2012	Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	D-GUD 10174 (West Texas)	TX	NA
1/8/2012	Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	D-12-00064	TN	10.10
1/22/2014	Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	C-2013-00148	KY	9.80
8/16/2014	Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	D-13AL-0496G	CO	9.72
/28/2014	Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	D-14-ATMG-221-TAR (GSRS)	KS	NA
4/23/2014	Missouri Gas Energy	LG	C-GR-2014-0007	MO	NA
0/3/2008	New Jersey Natural Gas Company	NJR	D-GR-07110889	NJ	10.3
2/26/2008	Northwest Natural Gas Company	NWN	D-UG-08-0546	WA	10.1
0/26/2012	Northwest Natural Gas Company	NWN	D-UG-221	OR	9.50
1/1/2002	Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc.	PNY	D-2002-63-G	SC	12.60
/23/2012	Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc.	PNY	D-11-00144	TN	10.20
2/17/2013	Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc.	PNY	D-G-9, Sub 631	NC	10.00
9/16/2010	South Jersey Gas Company	SJI	D-GR-10010035	NJ	10.30
2/13/2011	Southwest Gas Corporation	SWX	D-G-01551A-10-0458	AZ	9.50
0/31/2012	Southwest Gas Corporation	SWX	D-12-04005 (Southern)	NV	10.00
5/12/2014	Southwest Gas Corporation	SWX	A-12-12-024 (SoCal)	CA	10.10
/2/2012	Washington Gas Light Company	WGL	C-PUE-2010-00139	VA	9.75
5/10/2013	Washington Gas Light Company	WGL	FC-1093	DC	9.25
6/4/2014	Washington Gas Light Company	WGL	C-9335 (STRIDE Rider)	MD	NA

Most Recent Authorized Return on Equity - Proxy Group Operating Utilities

Mean: 10.35 Median: 10.10

Notes: Source: SNL Financial