

EXHIBIT
tabbles
GMU-261

Exhibit No.:
Issues: Rate of Return,
Capital Structure
Witness: David Murray
Sponsoring Party: MoPSC Staff
Type of Exhibit: True-Up Rebuttal Testimony
File No.: ER-2010-0356
Date Testimony Prepared: February 28, 2011

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

UTILITY SERVICES DIVISION

TRUE-UP REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

DAVID MURRAY

**Great Plains Energy, Incorporated
KCP&L GREATER MISSOURI OPERATIONS COMPANY**

FILE NO. ER-2010-0356

Jefferson City, Missouri
February, 2011

GMU270
Staff Exhibit No. GMU261
Date 3/3/11 Reporter JMB
File No. ER-2010-0356

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OF

DAVID MURRAY

**Great Plains Energy, Incorporated
KCP&L GREATER MISSOURI OPERATIONS COMPANY**

FILE NO. ER-2010-0356

CAPITAL STRUCTURE 1
EMBEDDED COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT 2

1 A. Only as it relates to his inclusion of Kansas City Power & Light Company
2 (“KCPL”) preferred stock in the capital structure. Otherwise, the balances of the other capital
3 components appear to be accurate.

4 **EMBEDDED COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT**

5 Q. Do you have any concerns about the ramifications of Mr. Cline’s updated GMO
6 embedded cost of debt as of December 31, 2010?

7 A. Yes. Mr. Cline assigns \$250 million of 3-year, 2.75 percent Great Plains Energy,
8 Incorporated (“GPE”) debt (“2.75 percent debt”) to GMO for purposes of his embedded cost of
9 debt recommendation. GPE issued this debt on August 13, 2010. This assignment causes
10 GMO’s embedded cost of debt to drop to 6.42 percent from GMO’s previous assigned overall
11 embedded cost of debt of 7.07 percent as of June 30, 2010. This compares to the 6.82 percent
12 cost of debt Mr. Cline recommends for KCPL in his True-up Direct Testimony in
13 File No. ER-2010-0355 and KCPL’s assigned embedded cost of debt of 6.82 percent as of
14 June 30, 2010.

15 Q. If GMO is financially weaker than KCPL, why is GMO’s embedded cost of debt
16 now lower than KCPL’s embedded cost of debt?

17 A. Internal financing decisions and credit support from GPE. As Staff explained in
18 its True-Up Direct Testimony in the KCPL case, File No. ER-2010-0356, both KCPL and GMO
19 had short-term debt balances of \$297 million and \$267 million as of June 30, 2010, respectively.
20 As of September 30, 2010, KCPL and GMO had short-term debt balances of \$209 million and
21 \$0, respectively. Consequently, it appears that most of the \$250 million of debt proceeds were
22 used to eliminate the balance on GMO’s credit facility.

1 Q. Considering GMO's weak stand-alone financial condition, how was GMO able
2 to procure debt proceeds at a coupon rate of 2.75 percent?

3 A. GPE's credit support, which has been rated investment grade by the major rating
4 agencies before and after it acquired the GMO properties. GMO's credit metrics on a stand-
5 alone basis are more consistent with below investment-grade credit ratings. In fact, GPE
6 guarantees all of GMO's debt, which directly supports the creditworthiness of GMO's debt that
7 would otherwise be considered by the rating agencies as "junk" quality if GMO were a stand-
8 alone company.

9 Q. How has GPE been able to maintain its investment-grade credit rating?

10 A. The credit support it receives from its KCPL operations as these are the only
11 other assets that GPE owns.

12 Q. Does the need for GMO to have support for its debt come at a cost to KCPL?

13 A. Yes. If GPE is issuing debt on behalf of GMO, then this holding company debt
14 would reduce KCPL's total credit capacity and increase the cost of the remaining credit
15 capacity.

16 Q. Should this cost be borne by KCPL ratepayers?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Do you believe KCPL's ratepayers will be negatively impacted if the Missouri
19 Public Service Commission ("Commission") accepts Mr. Cline's proposal to assign the entire
20 amount of the 2.75 percent debt to GMO?

21 A. Yes. The acceptance of this proposal would allow GPE's internal financing
22 decisions to not only negatively impact KCPL ratepayers in terms of a higher cost of debt

1 compared to GMO in this case, but possibly in future rate cases if this assignment process is
2 construed to be endorsed by the Commission in this case.

3 Q. Did KCPL's ratepayers pay higher rates than traditional cost of service
4 ratemaking during the period of KCPL's Experimental Alternative Regulatory Plan
5 ("Regulatory Plan")?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Why was this allowed?

8 A. Signatory parties to KCPL's Experimental Plan, which was approved by the
9 Commission in Case No. EO-2005-0329, had the understanding that this consideration would be
10 used to target benchmark credit metrics consistent with a 'BBB+' credit rating.

11 Q. Did the higher rates paid by KCPL's ratepayers also support GPE's credit rating?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. How can the Commission ensure fair and equitable treatment to KCPL ratepayers
14 for the higher rates they paid to allow GPE the ability issue lower cost of debt on behalf of
15 GMO?

16 A. Some of the 2.75 percent debt should be assigned to KCPL for purposes of its
17 cost of debt. This would have the effect of lowering KCPL's embedded cost of debt and
18 increasing GMO's embedded cost of debt.

19 Q. If it appears that most of the funds from the 2.75 percent debt were used to pay
20 down GMO's credit facility, then why is this appropriate?

21 A. GPE could have just as easily used proceeds from the 2.75 percent debt to reduce
22 KCPL's short-term debt balances in order to create more short-term debt capacity for KCPL. If
23 GPE had made this decision, then KCPL would have had the entire 2.75 percent debt issuance

1 assigned to KCPL's embedded cost of debt and GMO would have continued to have a higher
2 embedded cost of debt.

3 Q. Does GPE have a financial incentive to consistently carry short-term debt at
4 KCPL rather than at GMO?

5 A. Yes. KCPL has access to the commercial paper markets, whereas GMO does
6 not. The cost of commercial paper is usually lower than that of direct borrowings on credit
7 facilities. For example, as of June 30, 2010, KCPL had a weighted-average interest rate on its
8 commercial paper outstanding of 0.44 percent, whereas GMO had a weighted-average interest
9 rate of 1.625 percent on its direct borrowings from its credit facility.

10 Q. Why is Staff concerned about GPE's decision to refinance the higher cost
11 short-term debt if this a financially responsible decision for GPE?

12 A. Because it demonstrates that GPE's focus is on maximization of wealth of GPE's
13 shareholders. It does not appear that financial decisions are being made for the best interests of
14 the individual subsidiaries. I believe it is important for Staff to ensure that the setting of a fair
15 and reasonable rate of return, including the cost of debt in this situation, should not be driven by
16 processes and procedures of a debt assignment process, but based on the fairness of the
17 end-result. In this situation, the end-result, i.e., using KCPL's credit capacity and
18 creditworthiness to allow GPE to lower the embedded cost debt for only GMO, is not fair.

19 Q. How can the Commission ensure fairness in this situation?

20 A. As discussed previously, assign at least part of the 2.75 percent debt to KCPL.

21 Q. Why didn't you recommend doing this in your True-up Direct Testimony in the
22 KCPL case?

1 A. Because I did not recommend inclusion of the 2.75 percent debt for either KCPL
2 or GMO. I recommended using The Empire District Electric Company's ("Empire") embedded
3 cost of debt for GMO. However, if the Commission were to adopt GPE's decision to assign the
4 entire amount of the 2.75 percent debt to GMO's cost of debt, then this may be construed as the
5 Commission's preferred approach. In Staff's opinion, this would be inherently unfair and
6 detrimental to KCPL's customers.

7 Q. If the Commission accepts the inclusion of the 2.75 percent debt for purposes of
8 the true-up, how can this cost be assigned to both KCPL and GMO?

9 A. Simply use a GPE consolidated cost of debt for both GMO's and KCPL's rate of
10 return ("ROR").

11 Q. Did you not indicate in your True-Up Direct Testimony in the KCPL rate case
12 that if GPE's credit metrics were more consistent with that of KCPL's credit metrics that GPE's
13 3-year bonds could have been issued at an even lower coupon rate than 2.75 percent?

14 A. Yes. During the period of the Regulatory Plan, KCPL was allowed to charge
15 higher rates in order to directly target credit metrics consistent with benchmarks for a 'BBB+'
16 credit rating. Because KCPL has been affiliated with companies with either a weaker business
17 or financial risk profile over the period of the Regulatory Plan, it is difficult to know with
18 certainty whether KCPL and/or GPE would have been rated at the targeted level. However, if
19 KCPL would have been able to achieve a 'BBB+' credit rating, then GPE's unsecured debt
20 rating would have likely been one notch lower at 'BBB' due to structural subordination.
21 According to utility bond yield data from Bloomberg that GMO provided in response to Staff
22 Data Request No. 379, 3-year utility bonds rated 'BBB' and 'BBB+' had yields that averaged
23 2.21 percent and 1.87 percent, respectively, during the month of August 2010 (the month in

1 | which GPE issued the 2.75 percent debt). Staff will use a 2-percent coupon for purposes of the
2 | embedded cost of debt it recommends the Commission use if it were to include the 2.75 percent
3 | debt in the embedded cost of debt for purposes of the true-up in this case.

4 | Q. Does Staff's consolidated embedded cost of debt estimate assume the
5 | Commission adopts the Company's proposed GMO cost of debt in the general rate case?

6 | A. Yes. Staff is providing this estimate to the Commission based on this premise. If
7 | the Commission were to adopt the Staff's proposal to use Empire's cost of debt as a proxy for
8 | GMO's cost of debt, then this issue is moot.

9 | Q. Is it possible that Staff may recommend an adjusted consolidated embedded cost
10 | of debt for KCPL and GMO, which includes the debt in question, in future rate cases?

11 | A. Yes.

12 | Q. Assuming the Commission adopts GMO's proposed cost of debt in the general
13 | rate case, what embedded cost of debt do you recommend the Commission adopt for GMO for
14 | purposes of the true-up?

15 | A. 6.598 percent, which assumes that the Commission accepts Staff's adjustment to
16 | the coupon rate of the 2.75 percent debt.

17 | Q. If you used a 6.598 percent embedded cost of debt for the Empire proxy cost of
18 | debt you used in your True-Up Direct Testimony, what is the indicated ROR range?

19 | A. 7.75 percent to 8.21 percent, midpoint of 7.98 percent (see Schedule 1).

20 | Q. What would the consolidated embedded cost of debt be if the Commission were
21 | to accept the actual coupon rate of 2.75 percent?

22 | A. 6.659 percent.

1 Q. If you used a 6.659 percent embedded cost of debt for the Empire proxy cost of
2 debt you used in your True-Up Direct Testimony, what is the indicated ROR range?

3 A. 7.78 percent to 8.24 percent, midpoint of 8.01 percent (see Schedule 2).

4 Q. Does this conclude your True-up Rebuttal Testimony?

5 A. Yes.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of the Application of KCP&L)
Greater Missouri Operations Company for)
Approval to Make Certain Changes in its) File No. ER-2010-0356
Charges for Electric Service)

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID MURRAY


STATE OF MISSOURI)
) ss.
COUNTY OF COLE)

David Murray, of lawful age, on his oath states: that he has participated in the preparation of the foregoing True-Up Rebuttal Testimony in question and answer form, consisting of 8 pages to be presented in the above case; that the answers in the foregoing True-Up Rebuttal Testimony were given by him; that he has knowledge of the matters set forth in such answers; and that such matters are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.


David Murray

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February, 2011.

D. SUZIE MANKIN Notary Public - Notary Seal State of Missouri Commissioned for Cole County My Commission Expires: December 08, 2012 Commission Number: 08412071
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Notary Public

**Weighted Cost of Capital as of December 31, 2010
 for KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company**

Capital Component	Percentage of Capital	Embedded Cost	Weighted Cost of Capital Using Common Equity Return of:		
			8.50%	9.00%	9.50%
Common Stock Equity	46.58%	-----	3.96%	4.19%	4.43%
Preferred Stock	0.00%	0.000%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Long-Term Debt	48.87%	6.598% ^{1,2}	3.22%	3.22%	3.22%
Equity Units	<u>4.55%</u>	12.351% ^{1,3}	<u>0.56%</u>	<u>0.56%</u>	<u>0.56%</u>
Total	<u>100.00%</u>		<u>7.75%</u>	<u>7.98%</u>	<u>8.21%</u>

Notes:

1. Data for Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt, Embedded Cost of Preferred Stock and Embedded Cost of Equity Units Provided in Response to Staff Data Request No. 0159T in File No. ER-2010-0356.
2. Embedded cost of long-term debt is based on GPE's consolidated cost of debt using adjusted coupon of 2.00% on the 3-year debt.
3. Adjusted consistent with adjustment made in the general rate case for the period ending June 30, 2010.

KCPL Greater Missouri Operations Company
File No. ER-2010-0356

Weighted Cost of Capital as of December 31, 2010
for KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company

Capital Component	Percentage of Capital	Embedded Cost	Weighted Cost of Capital Using Common Equity Return of:		
			8.50%	9.00%	9.50%
Common Stock Equity	46.58%	---	3.96%	4.19%	4.43%
Preferred Stock	0.00%	0.000%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Long-Term Debt	48.87%	6.659% ^{1,2}	3.25%	3.25%	3.25%
Equity Units	<u>4.55%</u>	12.351% ^{1,3}	<u>0.56%</u>	<u>0.56%</u>	<u>0.56%</u>
Total	<u>100.00%</u>		<u>7.78%</u>	<u>8.01%</u>	<u>8.24%</u>

Notes:

1. Data for Embedded Cost of Long-Term Debt, Embedded Cost of Preferred Stock and Embedded Cost of Equity Units Provided in Response to Staff Data Request No. 0159T in File No. ER-2010-0356.
2. Embedded cost of long-term debt is based on GPE's consolidated cost of debt using actual coupon of 2.75% on the 3-year debt.
3. Adjusted consistent with adjustment made in the general rate case for the period ending June 30, 2010.