Exhibit No.: Issue: Witness: Sponsoring Party: Type of Exhibit: Case No.: Date Testimony Prepared:

Rate of Return David C. Parcell MoPSC Staff Direct Testimony ER-2007-0004 January 18, 2007

### MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

7

### UTILITY SERVICES DIVISION

**DIRECT TESTIMONY** 

OF

MAY 2 2007 Missouri Public Service Commission

FILED

### **DAVID C. PARCELL**

### AQUILA, INC. d/b/a AQUILA NETWORKS-MPS-ELECTRIC AND AQUILA NETWORKS-L&P-ELECTRIC

#### **CASE NO. ER-2007-0004**

Stoff Exhibit No. 2 Case No(s). FP-2001 Date - 2-07 Rptr-Rptr 🖄

Jefferson City, Missouri January 2007

#### **BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

#### **OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

In the Matter of Aquila, Inc. d/b/a Aquila Networks-MPS and Aquila Networks-L&P, for ) authority to file tariffs increasing electric rates for ) the service provided to customers in the Aquila ) Networks-MPS and Aquila Networks-L&P service ) area. )

Case No. ER-2007-0004

#### AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID C. PARCELL

STATE OF MISSOURI	)	
	)	SS.
COUNTY OF COLE	)	

belief.

David C. Parcell, of lawful age, on his oath states: that he has participated in the preparation of the foregoing Direct Testimony in question and answer form, consisting of 3/ pages to be presented in the above case; that the answers in the foregoing Direct Testimony were given by him; that he has knowledge of the matters set forth in such answers; and that such matters are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and

David c. Parel

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of January 2007.

Rusan W. Cien Notary Public My Commission Expires: 3/31/10:



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1		DIRECT TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS
2		OF
3		DAVID C. PARCELL
4 5		ON BEHALF OF MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION STAFF
6 7 8 9		AQUILA, INC. d/b/a AQUILA NETWORKS MPS-ELECTRIC AND AQUILA NETWORKS L&P-ELECTRIC
10 11		CASE NO. ER-2007-0004
11		
12	I.	INTRODUCTION
13	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
14	A.	My name is David C. Parcell. I am Executive Vice President and Senior Economist of
15		Technical Associates, Inc. My business address is Suite 601, 1051 East Cary Street,
16		Richmond, Virginia 23219.
17		
18	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND
19		PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE.
20	А.	I hold B.A. (1969) and M.A. (1970) degrees in economics from Virginia Polytechnic
21		Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) and a M.B.A. (1985) from Virginia
22		Commonwealth University. I have been a consulting economist with Technical
23		Associates since 1970. I have provided cost of capital testimony in public utility
24		ratemaking proceedings dating back to 1972. In connection with this, I have
25		previously filed testimony and/or testified in over 375 utility proceedings before about
26		35 regulatory agencies in the United States and Canada. Schedule 1 provides a more
27		complete description of my education and relevant work experience.
28		
29	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
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A. I have been retained by the Staff of the Missouri Public Service Commission ("Staff")
 to evaluate the cost of capital aspects of the current filing of Aquila, Inc. d/b/a Aquila
 Networks MPS ("MPS") and Aquila Networks L&P ("L&P"). I have performed
 independent studies and am making recommendations of the current cost of capital for
 Aquila.

### Q. HAVE YOU PREPARED AN EXHIBIT IN SUPPORT OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

A. Yes, I have prepared one exhibit, identified as Schedule 1 through Schedule 15. This exhibit was prepared either by me or under my direction. The information contained in this exhibit is correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

### 12 II. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY

### Q. WHAT ARE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS PROCEEDING?

A. My overall cost of capital recommendations for Aquila are:

15		Aquila Ne	tworks MPS	
16		Percent	Cost	Return
17	Long-Term Debt Common Equity	52.5% 47.5%	6.73% 9.0-10.25%	3.53% 4.28-4.87%
18	Total	100.00%		7.81-8.40%
19				8.11% Mid-Point
20		Aquila Ne	tworks L&P	
21		Percent	Cost	Return
	T Dala	50.50/	7.050/	4.17%
	Long-Term Debt	52.5%	7.95%	4.1//0
22	Long-Term Debt Common Equity	52.5% 47.5%	7.95% 9.0-10.25%	4.17%
22 23	Common Equity Total			4.28-4.87%
	Common Equity	47.5%		4.28-4.87%

Aquila's application requests a return on common equity of 11.5 percent and overall rate of return of 8.99 percent for MPS and 9.63 percent for L&P. I propose a return on common equity of 9.625 percent and an overall rate of return of 8.11 percent for MPS and an 8.75 percent return for L&P.

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# Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR COST OF CAPITAL ANALYSES AND RELATED CONCLUSIONS FOR AQUILA.

A. This proceeding is concerned with Aquila's regulated electric utility operations in Missouri (i.e., MPS and L&P). My analyses are concerned with the Company's total costs of capital. The first step in performing an analysis of the Company's cost of capital is the development of the appropriate capital structure. Aquila's proposed capital structure is a hypothetical capital structure comprised of 52.5 percent debt and 47.5 percent common equity, which is described as the "internal capital assignment process" utilized by the company. I do not accept the concept of a hypothetical capital structure for Aquila, particularly since this capital structure has historically differed substantially from the actual capital structure of Aquila. I instead use the actual September 30, 2006 consolidating capital structure of Aquila. I note that Aquila has recently significantly improved its equity ratio, primarily from debt reduction associated with asset sales.

The second step in a cost of capital calculation is a determination of the embedded cost rate of long-term debt. Aquila's application employs a 6.73 percent cost of debt for MPS and a 7.95 percent cost of debt for L&P, both of which are tied to the "internal assignment process" cited above. Even though I do not endorse the "internal assignment process," I do use these cost rates since they appear to represent the actual rates supporting Missouri electric operations.

The third step in the cost of capital calculation is the estimation of the cost of common equity. I have employed three recognized methodologies to estimate the cost of equity for Aquila. Each of these methodologies is applied to two groups of proxy electric utilities. These three methodologies and my findings are:

Methodology	Ranges
Discounted Cash Flow	9.0-9.5%
Capital Asset Pricing Model	9.75-10.25%
Comparable Earnings	10.0%

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Based upon these findings, I conclude that the cost of common equity for Aquila is within a range of 9.0 percent to 10.25 percent (9.625 percent mid-point).

#### III. **ECONOMIC/LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND METHODOLOGIES**

### Q. WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES THAT ESTABLISH THE STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING A FAIR RATE OF **RETURN FOR A REGULATED UTILITY?**

A. Public utility rates are normally established in a manner designed to allow the recovery of their costs, including capital costs. This is frequently referred to as "cost of service" ratemaking. Rates for regulated public utilities traditionally have been primarily established using the "rate base - rate of return" concept. Under this method, utilities are allowed to recover a level of operating expenses, taxes, and depreciation deemed reasonable for rate-setting purposes, and are granted an opportunity to earn a fair rate of return on the assets utilized (i.e., rate base) in 14 providing service to their customers.

The rate base is derived from the asset side of the utility's balance sheet as a dollar amount and the rate of return is developed from the liabilities/owners' equity side of the balance sheet as a percentage. The revenue impact of the cost of capital is thus derived by multiplying the rate base by the rate of return (including income taxes).

The rate of return is developed from the cost of capital, which is estimated by weighting the capital structure components (i.e., debt, preferred stock, and common equity) by their percentages in the capital structure and multiplying these by their cost rates. This is also known as the weighted cost of capital.

Technically, "fair rate of return" is a legal and accounting concept that refers to an ex post (after the fact) earned return on an asset base, while the cost of capital is an economic and financial concept which refers to an ex ante (before the fact) expected or required return on a liability base. In regulatory proceedings, however, the two terms are often used interchangeably. I have not distinguished between the two concepts in my testimony.

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1	From an economic standpoint, a fair rate of return is normally interpreted to
2	mean that an efficient and economically managed utility will be able to maintain its
3	financial integrity, attract capital, and establish comparable returns for similar risk
4	investments. These concepts are derived from economic and financial theory and are
5	generally implemented using financial models and economic concepts.
6	Although I am not a lawyer and I do not offer a legal opinion, my testimony is
7	based on my understanding that two United States Supreme Court decisions are
8	universally cited as providing the standards for a fair rate of return. The first is
9	Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of West
10	Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923). In this decision, the Court stated:
11	What annual rate will constitute just compensation depends upon many
12 13	circumstances and must be determined by the exercise of fair and enlightened judgment, having regard to all relevant facts. A public
13	utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the
15	value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the
16	public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the
17	same general part of the country on investments in other business
18 19	undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are
20	realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative
21	ventures. The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure
22	confidence in the financial soundness of the utility, and should be
23	adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and
24 25	support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties. A rate of return may be
25 26	
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28	conditions generally.
29	It is my understanding that the <u>Bluefield</u> decision established the following standards
30	for a fair rate of return: comparable earnings, financial integrity, and capital
31	attraction. It also noted the changing level of required returns over time as well as an
32	underlying assumption that the utility be operated in a efficient manner.
33	The second decision is Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
34	U.S. 591 (1942). In that decision, the Court stated:
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expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock. By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.

The Hope case is also frequently credited with establishing the "end result" doctrine, which maintains that the methods utilized to develop a fair return are not important as long as the end result is reasonable.

The three economic and financial parameters in the Bluefield and Hope decisions - comparable earnings, financial integrity, and capital attraction - reflect the economic criteria encompassed in the "opportunity cost" principle of economics. The opportunity cost principle provides that a utility and its investors should be afforded an opportunity (not a guarantee) to earn a return commensurate with returns they could expect to achieve on investments of similar risk. The opportunity cost principle is consistent with the fundamental premise on which regulation rests, namely, that it is intended to act as a surrogate for competition.

#### HOW CAN THESE PARAMETERS BE EMPLOYED TO ESTIMATE THE 20 Q. COST OF CAPITAL FOR A UTILITY?

A. Neither the courts nor economic/financial theory have developed exact and mechanical procedures for precisely determining the cost of capital. This is the case because the cost of capital is an opportunity cost and is prospective-looking, which dictates that it must be estimated.

There are several useful models that can be employed to assist in estimating the cost of equity capital, which is the capital structure item that is the most difficult to determine. These include the discounted cash flow ("DCF"), capital asset pricing model ("CAPM"), comparable earnings ("CE") and risk premium ("RP") methods. Each of these methods (or models) differs from the others and each, if properly employed, can be a useful tool in estimating the cost of common equity for a regulated utility.

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### Q. WHICH METHODS HAVE YOU EMPLOYED IN YOUR ANALYSES OF THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY IN THIS PROCEEDING?

A. I have utilized three methodologies to determine Aquila's cost of common equity: the DCF, CAPM, and CE methods. Each of these methodologies will be described in more detail in my testimony that follows.

### 6 IV. GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

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### 8 Q. WHY ARE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS IMPORTANT IN 9 DETERMINING THE COSTS OF CAPITAL?

- 10 A. The costs of capital, for both fixed-cost (debt and preferred stock) components and 11 common equity, are determined in part by current and prospective economic and 12 financial conditions. At any given time, each of the following factors has an influence 13 on the costs of capital: the level of economic activity (i.e., growth rate of the 14 economy), the stage of the business cycle (i.e., recession, expansion, or transition), and 15 the level of inflation. My understanding is that use of these factors is consistent with the Supreme Court's Bluefield decision, which noted that "[a] rate of return may be 16 17 reasonable at one time, and become too high or too low by changes affecting 18 opportunities for investment, the money market, and business conditions generally."
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### Q. WHAT INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITY HAVE YOU EVALUATED IN YOUR ANALYSES?

A. I have examined several sets of economic statistics for the period 1975 to present. I
 chose this period because it permits the evaluation of economic conditions over three
 full business cycles plus the current cycle to date, and thus makes it possible to assess
 changes in long-term trends. This period also approximates the beginning and
 continuation of active rate case activities by public utilities.

A business cycle is commonly defined as a complete period of expansion (recovery and growth) and contraction (recession). A full business cycle is a useful and convenient period over which to measure levels and trends in long-term capital

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costs because it incorporates the cyclical (<u>i.e.</u>, stage of business cycle) influences and thus permits a comparison of structural (or long-term) trends.

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### Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE TIMEFRAME OF THE THREE PRIOR BUSINESS CYCLES AND THE MOST CURRENT CYCLE.

A. The three prior complete cycles and current cycle cover the following periods:

Business Cycle	Expansion Cycle	Contraction Period
1975-1982	Mar. 1975-July 1981	Aug. 1981-Oct. 1982
1982-1991	Nov. 1982-July 1990	Aug. 1990-Mar. 1991
1991-2001	Apr. 1991-Mar. 2001	Apr. 2001-Nov. 2001
Current	Dec. 2001-Present	

# Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE CHANGING TRENDS IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON COSTS OVER THIS BROAD PERIOD?

- Yes, I do. As I will describe below, the U.S. economy has enjoyed general prosperity 16 Α. 17 and stability over the period since the early 1980s. This period has been characterized by longer economic expansions, relatively tame contractions, relatively low and 18 declining inflation, and declining interest rates and other capital costs. The current 19 20 business cycle began in late 2001, following a somewhat modest recession earlier in 21 the year. During the recession and early in the succeeding expansion, the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates (i.e., Fed Funds rate) 11 times in 2001 and twice in 22 23 2003 in an effort to stimulate the economy.
- 24

# Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE RECENT AND CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE COSTS OF CAPITAL.

A. Schedule 2 shows several sets of economic data. Page 1 contains general macroeconomic statistics while Pages 2 and 3 contain financial market statistics. Page 1 of Schedule 2 shows that the U.S. economy is currently in the fifth year of an economic expansion. This is indicated by the growth in real (<u>i.e.</u>, adjusted for

inflation) Gross Domestic Product, industrial production, and the unemployment rate. This current expansion has generally been characterized as slower growth, in comparison to prior expansions. This has resulted in lower inflationary pressures and interest rates, as well as slower growth in corporate profits.

The rate of inflation is also shown on Page 1 of Schedule 2. As is reflected in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), for example, inflation rose significantly during the 1975-1982 business cycle and reached double-digit levels in 1979-1980. The rate of inflation declined substantially in 1981 and remained at or below 6.1 percent during the 1983-1991 business cycle. Since 1991, the CPI has been 3.4 percent or lower. The 3.4 percent rate of inflation in 2005, which was similar to the level for 2004, was slightly higher than the most recent years, but was well below the levels of the past thirty years.

#### Q. WHAT HAVE BEEN THE TRENDS IN INTEREST RATES?

A. Page 2 of Schedule 2 shows several series of interest rates. Rates rose sharply to record levels in 1975-1981 when the inflation rate was high and generally rising. Interest rates then fell substantially in conjunction with inflation rates throughout the remainder of the 1980s throughout the 1990s. Interest rates declined even further from 2000-2005 and generally recorded their lowest levels since the 1960s.

This low level of interest rates, in conjunction with the recent strength of the U.S. economy, may create an expectation that any near-term movement of interest rates will be upward. In fact, the Federal Reserve has, since the middle of 2004, increased short-term interest rates on 17 occasions, although each time by only 0.25 percent, in an attempt to insure that any perceived inflationary expectations will not stifle continued economic growth. Nevertheless, the economic recovery to date has not resulted in a pronounced increase in long-term rates. In fact, even the current level of Fed Funds is about the same as the level in existence when the series of reductions began in 2000. Even if rates were to increase moderately, they would still remain well below historical levels.

#### Q. WHAT HAVE BEEN THE TRENDS IN COMMON SHARE PRICES?

A. Page 3 of Schedule 2 shows several series of common stock prices and ratios. These 1 2 rates indicate that share prices were basically stagnant during the high inflation/high 3 interest rate environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s. On the other hand, the 4 1983-1991 business cycle and the most recent cycle have witnessed a significant 5 upward trend in stock prices. During the initial years of the current expansion, 6 however, stock prices were volatile and declined substantially from their highs 7 reached in 1999 and early 2000. Share prices have increased somewhat since 2003 8 and currently stand at near record high levels.

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### Q. WHAT CONCLUSIONS DO YOU DRAW FROM THIS DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS?

- A. It is apparent that capital costs are currently low in comparison to the levels that have
   prevailed over the past three decades. In addition, even a moderate increase in interest
   rates, as well as other capital costs, would still result in capital costs that are low by
   historic standards. Therefore, it can reasonably be expected that cost of equity
   models, such as the DCF, currently will produce returns that are lower than was the
   case in prior years.
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V.

### AQUILA'S OPERATIONS AND RISKS

### 20 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE AQUILA AND ITS OPERATIONS.

A. Aquila is a public utility that generates, transmits, and distributes electric energy in
 two states, one of which is Missouri, and distributes natural gas in four states. It also
 conducts unregulated operations. Aquila operates two electric utility divisions in
 Missouri -- MPS and L&P, which correspond to Missouri Public Service Company
 and St. Joseph Light & Power Company.

Aquila is presently organized into three segments – electric utilities, gas utilities, and merchant services (unregulated). The Company was originally known as Missouri Public Service Company, changed its name to UtiliCorp United, Inc. in 1985, and then changed its name to Aquila in 2002.

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#### Q. WHAT ARE AQUILA'S BUSINESS SEGMENT RATIOS?

A. Aquila's business ratios are shown on Schedule 3 for the years 2003-2005. As indicated, the "Electric Utility" segment and "Gas Utility" segment have been profitable, while the "Merchant Services" segment has not been profitable.

The unregulated segment of Aquila is operated by Aquila Merchant Services. Prior to 2002, this company marketed natural gas, electricity, and other commodities on a large scale throughout North America and Western Europe. Since 2002, Aquila has been divesting much of its merchant services operations and currently owns or controls non-regulated merchant power plants.

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### PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE AQUILA'S EXPERIENCE WITH, AND DIVESTITURE OF, ITS NON-REGULATED OPERATIONS.

A. As noted previously, prior to 2002 Aquila was heavily involved in the unregulated wholesale energy trading business. Beginning in 2002, Aquila experienced very unsatisfactory results in these operations. In connection with this, the 2002 Form 10-K of Aquila cited "significant net losses and negative cash flows" and noted the resulting credit downgrades in the Company's securities. In fact, Aquila was downgraded in 2002 from Triple-B ratings (i.e., investment grade) to Caa1 (Moody's), B (S&P), and B- (Fitch); each of these is non-investment grade.

Also, in 2002 Aquila reported a \$1.72 billion loss from continuing operations and a net loss of over \$2 billion. Its stock price declined from a second quarter high of \$25.23 to a fourth quarter low of \$1.56. The Company also eliminated its dividend in 2002. (Source: Aquila 2002 Form 10-K).

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### WHAT WERE THE CAPITAL MARKET CONSEQUENCES OF AQUILA'S MERCHANT SERVICES?

A. As I noted above, Aquila's securities were downgraded to non-investment grade status
 as a result of the Company's unregulated merchant services operations. This was
 noted, for example, in a S&P Ratings Direct reported dated November 19, 2002:
 Standard & Poor's Ratings Services today lowered its corporate credit
 rating on electricity and natural gas distributor Aquila Inc. to 'BB' from

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1	'BBB-' to reflect the slower-than-expected recovery of its credit quality
2	as the company exits the merchant energy business.
2 3	
4	"Despite significant progress in its plan to restore its financial strength,
5	
	Standard & Poor's believes that depressed power prices and negative
6	spark spreads will continue to be a drag on Aquila's operating cash
7	flows on the Network Utilities side of the business," said Standard &
8	Poor's credit analyst Rajeev Sharma.
- 9	•••
10	As the company transitions from a wholesale energy marketing and
11	trading company to a traditional utility, Aquila will face continuing
12	restructuring expense curtailing cash flow improvement.
13	restructuring expense curtaining cash now improvement.
ß	
14	Subsequent to 2002, Aquila continued to sell much of its assets, both regulated and
15	unregulated, in an effort to strengthen its finances. In an October 31, 2005
16	RatingsDirect report on Aquila, S&P noted the following points:
17	
18	Major Rating Factors
19	
20	Strengths:
21	• Regulated electric and gas operations provide a relatively stable
22	
n n	source of cash flows,
23	Pending asset sales may contribute to material debt reduction,which
24	is likely to alter the company's debt maturity schedule and
25	reduce refinancing risk, and
26	<ul> <li>Pending gas utility asset sales will reduce the company's working</li> </ul>
27	capital requirements, which should improve liquidity.
28	
- 29	Weaknesses:
30	• The company is aggressively leveraged,
31	High interest expense and cash losses at its merchant services
32	segment challenge the company's ability to generate positive funds
33	from operations, and
34	• Pending litigation related to the South Harper peaking facility
35	
	could adversely affect the timing and magnitude of future cash
36	flows.
37	
38	Rationale
39	The ratings on diversified energy company Aquila Inc. are on
40	CreditWatch with positive implications reflecting the company's
41	announcement that it is selling four utility businesses for a total of \$897
42	million, plus working capital and subject to net plant adjustments. If
43	approved by the various regulatory commissions, the sales would

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 33 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38		<ul> <li>provide an opportunity for debt reduction—potentially 30% of total adjusted debt.</li> <li></li> <li>Standard &amp; Poor's expects the sale to improve the Kansas City, Mo.based company's financial profile overall. First, the company intends to use sales proceeds to pay down debt. The debt reduction is likely to alter the company's maturity schedule, which would reduce intermediate refinancing risk Second, the asset sales involve three gas utilities. As such, the sales will reduce the company's working-capital requirements, which should improve liquidity.</li> <li></li> <li>Over the last two years, the company has worked to stem material cash losses by exiting its noncore businesses and terminating its tolls and gas contracts. For the first time since 2001, Aquila generated positive (albeit marginally positive) funds from operations (FFO) in the first half of the year.</li> <li></li> <li>The company is aggressively leveraged.</li> </ul> Business Profile Aquila's business profile score is '8' (weak) on Standard & Poor's scale The weak business profile score reflects the merchant drivious' poor business fundamentals The company is aggressively leveraged. The company is workel to perations continue to drain cash due to weak industry fundamentals albeit at a considerably lesser rate than in previous years. Over the past three to four years, the company has pared down its wholesale energy trading activities, sold portions of its merchant loan portfolio, and sold its natural gas pipeline, gathering and storage assets and its investments in international utility networks and Quanta Services Inc The Company's merchant gas-fired plants barely cover their carrying costs. These plants operate in regions fraught with overcapacity The Company's merchant gas-fired plants barely cover their carrying costs. These plants operate in regions fraught with overcapacity.
39 40	0	WHAT HAVE BEEN THE MORE RECENT STRUCTURAL CHANGES
	Q.	
41	*	INVOLVING AQUILA?
42	А.	The Company continues to divest itself of assets, including regulated utility assets. In
43		2006, the Company sold gas distribution utility assets in Michigan, Missouri and

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1		Minnesota, as well as electric utility assets in Kansas. The proceeds of these sales
2		were largely used to reduce the Company's debt.
3		were largery used to reduce the company's debt.
4	Q.	WHAT ARE THE CURRENT BOND RATINGS OF AQUILA?
5	<b>Q</b> . A.	The present bond ratings are as follows:
6	11.	The present bolid ratings are as follows.
7		Moody's B2
8		Standard & Poor's B- Fitch B-
9		These ratings remain below investment grade.
10		
11	Q.	WHAT HAVE BEEN THE TRENDS IN AQUILA'S BOND RATINGS?
12	A.	This is shown on Schedule 4, which indicates that Aquila has had single B or lower
13		ratings since 2002. The ratings of Aquila were lowered in 2002 in connection with the
14		Company's non-regulated losses and related restructuring.
15		
16	Q.	HAVE THERE BEEN ANY RECENT COMMENTS MADE BY THE RATING
17		AGENCIES CONCERNING AQUILA?
18	A.	Yes. S&P made the following comments in a September 1, 2006 RatingsDirect report
19		on Aquila:
20 21 22		Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate credit rating on Aquila Inc. to 'B' from 'B-'. The rating remains on CreditWatch with positive implications.
23		croater atom which positive implications.
24		
251		The upgrade reflects the company's improved business risk profile, significant debt reduction and plans for further deleveraging expected
25 26		significant debt reduction and plans for further deleveraging, expected cash-flow improvement, and lower ongoing working capital
26 27		significant debt reduction and plans for further deleveraging, expected
26		significant debt reduction and plans for further deleveraging, expected cash-flow improvement, and lower ongoing working capital
26 27 28 29 30		significant debt reduction and plans for further deleveraging, expected cash-flow improvement, and lower ongoing working capital requirements.  The ratings on Aquila were placed on CreditWatch with positive implications in September 2005 after the company signed definitive
26 27 28 29		significant debt reduction and plans for further deleveraging, expected cash-flow improvement, and lower ongoing working capital requirements.  The ratings on Aquila were placed on CreditWatch with positive implications in September 2005 after the company signed definitive agreements to sell four of its regulated utilities. The company's plan
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33		significant debt reduction and plans for further deleveraging, expected cash-flow improvement, and lower ongoing working capital requirements.  The ratings on Aquila were placed on CreditWatch with positive implications in September 2005 after the company signed definitive agreements to sell four of its regulated utilities. The company's plan was (and continues to be) to use proceeds from the above sales and additional nonregulated sales to pay down \$1.2 billion in debt and other
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34		significant debt reduction and plans for further deleveraging, expected cash-flow improvement, and lower ongoing working capital requirements.  The ratings on Aquila were placed on CreditWatch with positive implications in September 2005 after the company signed definitive agreements to sell four of its regulated utilities. The company's plan was (and continues to be) to use proceeds from the above sales and
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36		significant debt reduction and plans for further deleveraging, expected cash-flow improvement, and lower ongoing working capital requirements.  The ratings on Aquila were placed on CreditWatch with positive implications in September 2005 after the company signed definitive agreements to sell four of its regulated utilities. The company's plan was (and continues to be) to use proceeds from the above sales and additional nonregulated sales to pay down \$1.2 billion in debt and other obligations (including the Elwood toll).  Aquila business profile score has been revised to a '6' Over the last
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35		significant debt reduction and plans for further deleveraging, expected cash-flow improvement, and lower ongoing working capital requirements.  The ratings on Aquila were placed on CreditWatch with positive implications in September 2005 after the company signed definitive agreements to sell four of its regulated utilities. The company's plan was (and continues to be) to use proceeds from the above sales and additional nonregulated sales to pay down \$1.2 billion in debt and other obligations (including the Elwood toll).

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7		<ul> <li>unwinding energy trading contracts that remained from its energy and gas trading days in the late 1990s and early 2000s, selling assets related to its former merchant services segment, and exiting the Everest communications business. The company is now primarily a regulated electric and gas utility company</li> <li>[Emphasis Added]</li> <li>In addition, Moody's made similar comments in a September 19, 2006 Global Credit</li> </ul>
8		Research Report on Aquila:
9 10 11 12 13 14 15		In recent years the company has focused its efforts on reducing leverage and improving its credit profile following a severe weakening of its business and liquidity in 2002/2003 due to its interests in unregulated energy and trading operations. Over the course of 2005/2006 the company has made significant advances towards recovery by exiting its weaker operations, selling assets and reducing financial obligations; thereby improving its short-term liquidity profile
16 17 18 19 20 21		as well reducing long-term business risk.  Going forward, the company is now primarily viewed as a regional electric generation, transmission and distribution company with a smaller, yet still significant gas distribution business.
22 23 24 25 26		Recent Developments On September 15, 2006, Moody's upgraded Aquila's \$300 million senior secured bank facility to Ba2 from Ba3. At the same time, Moody's raised Aquila's corporate family rating to B1 from B2.
27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35		Rating Rationale Aquila's ratings primarily reflect the company's position as a leveraged, substantially integrated, regional electric and gas utility provider in the Midwestern U.S. The company's credit profile has shown improvement since 2005 as it continues to execute on its strategic plan to exit uneconomic tolling arrangements with certain non-core assets, and utilize proceeds to reduce debt levels; largely a legacy of its merchant energy and other unregulated businesses.
36	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THESE RATING
37		AGENCY COMMENTS AND ACTIONS CONCERNING AQUILA.
38	A.	The following points are evident:
39 40 41 42		<ul> <li>In years leading up to 2002, UtiliCorp United (now Aquila) was heavily involved in unregulated operations, largely merchant energy;</li> </ul>

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22		<ul> <li>The Company experienced disastrous results in these non-regulated operations that resulted in significant operating and income losses and related negative financial implications (e.g., dividend elimination, very large write-offs, plunge in stock price, and decline in equity ratio);</li> <li>The rating agencies downgraded Aquila's securities to non-investment grade status (i.e., "junk" status);</li> <li>Aquila exited from the non-regulated operations to the extent that it could, however, this led to further losses;</li> <li>Aquila was forced to sell portions of its profitable utility operations in order to reduce its debt load (i.e., leverage) in an effort to restore its financial profile;</li> <li>Aquila is now largely an electric/gas utility, although it retains some remaining merchant energy operations; and,</li> <li>The Company's securities remain below-investment grade, but due to the lingering effects of the non-utility operations.</li> </ul>
23	Q.	WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS TRANSGRESSION OF EVENTS?
24	А.	Aquila has been for the past five years, and remains at this time, a company whose
25		financial profile has been troubled and characterized as non-investment grade. This
26		situation has resulted from the Company's large-scale and disastrous venture into non-
27		regulated activities, as its utility operations have remained strong and profitable.
28		It would not be appropriate, and indeed it would be unfair, to request Aquila's
29		utility ratepayers to pay higher rates to offset any losses resulting from its non-
30	-	regulated operations.
31	VI.	CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND COST OF DEBT
32	Q.	WHAT IS THE IMPORTANCE OF DETERMINING A PROPER CAPITAL
33		STRUCTURE IN A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK?
34	А.	A utility's capital structure is important because the concept of rate base - rate of
35		return regulation requires that a utility's capital structure be determined and utilized in
36		estimating the total cost of capital. Within this framework, it is proper to ascertain

whether the utility's capital structure is appropriate relative to its level of business risk and relative to other utilities.

As discussed in Section III of my testimony, the purpose of determining the proper capital structure for a utility is to help ascertain its capital costs. The rate base – rate of return concept recognizes the assets employed in providing utility services and provides for a return on these assets by identifying the liabilities and common equity (and their cost rates) used to finance the assets. In this process, the rate base is derived from the asset side of the balance sheet and the cost of capital is derived from the liabilities/owners' equity side of the balance sheet. The inherent assumption in this procedure is that the dollar values of the capital structure and the rate base are approximately equal and the former is utilized to finance the latter.

The common equity ratio (i.e., the percentage of common equity in the capital structure) is the capital structure item which normally receives the most attention. This is the case because common equity: (1) usually commands the highest cost rate; (2) generates associated income tax liabilities; and, (3) causes the most controversy since its cost cannot be precisely determined.

# Q. HOW HAVE YOU EVALUATED THE CAPITAL STRUCTURES OF AQUILA?

A. I have first examined the five year historic (2001-2005), and recent (September 30, 2006) capital structure ratios of Aquila. Schedule 5 shows the capital structures of Aquila. The common equity ratios of this company are shown below:

	Including S-T Debt	Excluding S-T Debt
2001	47.0%	51.2%
2002	35.6%	38.0%
2003	33.4%	33.4%
2004	32.3%	32.3%
2005	39.7%	39.8%
Sept. 30, 2006	47.5%	47.5%

These indicate a significant decline in Aquila's equity ratio in 2002, the year in which the Company began to de-emphasize its merchant services, followed by a gradual

increase through 2005. The 2006 equity ratio is back to the 2001 level, reflecting in large part the retirement of debt with the proceeds of the recent sales of corporate assets.

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### HOW DO THESE CAPITAL STRUCTURES COMPARE TO THOSE OF INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES?

 A. Schedule 6 shows the common equity ratios (including short-term debt in capitalization) for the two groups of electric utilities covered by AUS Utility Reports. These are:

		<b>Combination</b> Gas
Year	Electric	And Electric
2001	42%	38%
2002	38%	36%
2003	42%	38%
2004	47%	43%
2005	44%	47%

These common equity ratios are generally higher than those of Aquila over the 2001-2005 period. The 2005 equity ratio of the electric industry is similar to Aquila's 2006 level.

### 20 Q. WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS HAS AQUILA REQUESTED IN 21 THIS PROCEEDING?

22 A. The Company requests use of the following capital structure:

23	Capital Item	Percent
24		52.50%
25	Common Equity	47.50%
26	This is a hypothetical capital structure that	is described

This is a hypothetical capital structure that is described by the Company as an "internal capital assignment process."

29 Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE USE OF A HYPOTHETICAL CAPITAL
30 STRUCTURE FOR AQUILA?

- A. No, I do not. Aquila's proposed hypothetical capital structure, based on its "internal capital assignment process" is not appropriate. Aquila's proposal amounts to an attempt to impute capital of MPS and L&P in a manner that has, until recently, differed materially from the actual capital structure of the Company.
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### WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE DO YOU PROPOSE TO USE IN THIS PROCEEDING?

- A. I have utilized the actual consolidated capital structure of Aquila, as of September 30,
   2006. This capital structure reflects the per books ratios of Aquila as of this date. By
   coincidence, this matches the proposal of Aquila.
- 12 Q. WHAT IS THE COST RATE OF LONG-TERM DEBT IN THE COMPANY'S
   13 APPLICATION?

A. The Company's filing cites a cost of long-term debt of 6.73 percent for MPS and 7.95 percent. Aquila maintains that these rates reflect the actual costs of the debt financing the MPS and L&P divisions.

Consistent with my preference to use the actual consolidated capital structure of Aquila, it might appear logical to also use the actual consolidated cost of Aquila's debt. However, the Company's debt cost is also adversely impacted by the events of 2002/2003. Two of Aquila's debt issues – a \$250 million senior notes issue at 9.95 percent and a \$500 million senior notes issue at 14.875 percent, were issued during the turbulence associated with Aquila's non-regulated operations crisis. As a result, it is not proper to require utility ratepayer recovery of these excessive costs. It would be potentially possible to either eliminate or "reprice" these two debt issues from Aquila's consolidated cost of debt. However, even this would require making assumptions.

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For the purposes of this proceeding, I have accepted Aquila's proposal to use the MPS and L&P division-specific cost rates.

An alternative way to calculate the cost of debt for Aquila is to combine the individual debt cost rates for MPS and L&P into a single, weighted debt cost. This

can be done, for example, by weighting each division's debt cost by the respective size of the rate base, as follows:

	Debt Cost	Rate Base	Rate Base %	Wgt. Debt Cost
MPS	6.73%	\$887,106,225	83.03%	5.59%
L&P	7.95%	\$181,348,201	16.97%	1.35%

Should the Commission decide to establish a single cost of debt, and thus single cost of capital, for MPS and L&P, a cost of debt of 6.94 percent, as calculated above, can be applied to the common capital structure ratios for these two divisions.

### 10Q.CAN THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY BE DETERMINED WITH THE11SAME DEGREE OF PRECISION AS THE COST OF DEBT?

A. No. The cost rate of debt is largely determined by interest payments, issue prices, and
 related expenses. The cost of common equity, on the other hand, cannot be precisely
 quantified, primarily because this cost is an opportunity cost. There are, however,
 several models which can be employed to estimate the cost of common equity. Three
 of the primary methods - DCF, CAPM, and CE - are developed in the following
 sections of my testimony.

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### VII. SELECTION OF PROXY GROUPS

## 20Q.HOW HAVE YOU ESTIMATED THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY FOR21AQUILA?

A. Aquila is a publicly traded company. As a result, it is possible to conduct direct analyses of the cost of common equity for Aquila. However, the financial situation of this Company, as well as the continuing diversified nature of its operations, indicate that it is not an adequate proxy for a cost of equity analysis. As a result, it is necessary to analyze groups of comparison or "proxy" companies as a substitute for Aquila to determine its cost of common equity.

I have examined two such groups for comparison to Aquila. I have selected one group of electric utilities using the criteria listed on Schedule 7. These criteria are as follows:

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	(1) Market capitalization of \$500 million to \$5 billion;
	(2) Electric revenues 50% or greater;
	(3) Common equity ratio 40% or greater;
	(4) Value Line Safety of 2 or 3;
	(5) S&P and/or Moody's bond ratings of Single A or Triple B;
	(6) S&P stock ranking of B or B+;
	(7) Company has not eliminated or reduced dividends; and,
	(8) Company not currently involved in a major merger.
	Second, I have conducted studies of the cost of equity for the proxy group of 24
	electric utilities selected by Aquila's witness Hadaway.
VIII.	DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS
~	WHAT IS THE THEORY AND METHODOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE
Q.	WHAT IS THE THEORY AND METHODOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE
Q.	DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL?
<b>Q.</b> A.	
-	DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL?
-	DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL? The discounted cash flow (DCF) model is one of the oldest, as well as the most
-	<b>DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL?</b> The discounted cash flow (DCF) model is one of the oldest, as well as the most commonly-used, models for estimating the cost of common equity for public utilities.
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	VIII.

P = current priceD = current dividend rate

G = constant rate of expected growth

This formula essentially recognizes that the return expected or required by investors is comprised of two factors: the dividend yield (current income) and expected growth in dividends (future income).

### Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU HAVE EMPLOYED THE DCF MODEL.

A. For purposes of my analysis I have utilized the constant growth DCF model. In doing so, I have combined the current dividend yield for each group of proxy utility stocks described in the previous section with several indicators of expected dividend growth.

### Q. HOW DID YOU DERIVE THE DIVIDEND YIELD COMPONENT OF THE DCF EQUATION?

A. There are several methods that can be used for calculating the dividend yield component. These methods generally differ in the manner in which the dividend rate is employed; i.e., current versus future dividends or annual versus quarterly compounding of dividends. I believe the most appropriate dividend yield component is a quarterly compounding variant, which is expressed as follows:

$$Yield = \frac{D_0(1+0.5g)}{P_0}$$

This dividend yield component recognizes the timing of dividend payments and dividend increases.

The  $P_0$  in my yield calculation is the average (of high and low) stock price for each proxy company for the most recent three month period (October-December 2006). The  $D_0$  is the current annualized dividend rate for each proxy company.

### Q. HOW HAVE YOU ESTIMATED THE DIVIDEND GROWTH COMPONENT OF THE DCF EQUATION?

A. The dividend growth rate component of the DCF model is usually the most crucial and
 controversial element involved in using this methodology. The objective of estimating
 the dividend growth component is to reflect the growth expected by investors that is
 embodied in the price (and yield) of a company's stock. As such, it is important to

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recognize that individual investors have different expectations and consider alternative indicators in deriving their expectations. This is evidenced by the fact that every investment decision resulting in the purchase of a particular stock is matched by another investment decision to sell that stock.

A wide array of indicators exist for estimating the growth expectations of investors. As a result, it is evident that no single indicator of growth is always used by all investors. It therefore is necessary to consider alternative indicators of dividend growth in deriving the growth component of the DCF model.

I have considered five indicators of growth in my DCF analyses. These are:

- 2001-2005 (5-year average) earnings retention, or fundamental growth (per Value Line);
- 5-year average of historic growth in earnings per share (EPS), dividends per share (DPS), and book value per share (BVPS) (per Value Line);
- 3. 2006, 2007, and 2009-2011 projections of earnings retention growth (per Value Line);
- 4. 2003-2005 to 2009-2011 projections of EPS, DPS, and BVPS (per Value Line); and

 5-year projections of EPS growth as reported in First Call (per Yahoo! Finance).

I believe this combination of growth indicators is a representative and appropriate set with which to begin the process of estimating investor expectations of dividend growth for the groups of proxy companies. I also believe that these growth indicators reflect the types of information that investors consider in making their investment decisions. As I indicated previously, investors have an array of information available to them, all of which should be expected to have some impact on their decision-making process.

### **30 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR INITIAL DCF CALCULATIONS.**

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1 A. Schedule 8 presents my DCF analysis. Page 1 shows the calculation of the "raw" (i.e., 2 prior to adjustment for growth) dividend yield for each proxy company. Pages 2 and 3 3 show the growth rates for the groups of proxy companies. Page 4 shows the "raw" 4 DCF calculations, which are presented on several bases: mean, median, and range of low/high values. These results can be summarized as follows:

	Mean	Median	High
Comparison Group	8.1%	8.3%	9.5%
Hadaway Group	8.2%	8.0%	9.5%

I note that the individual DCF calculations shown on Schedule 8 should not be interpreted to reflect the expected cost of capital for the proxy groups; rather, the individual values shown should be interpreted as alternative information considered by investors.

The DCF results in Schedule 8 indicate average (mean and median) DCF cost rates of about 8 percent to 8.5 percent. The highest DCF rates (i.e., using the highest growth rates only) are 10.2 percent for my comparison group and 9.6 percent for the Hadaway group.

#### WHAT DO YOU CONCLUDE FROM YOUR DCF ANALYSES? Q.

Based upon my analyses, I believe a broad range of 8 percent to 9<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> percent represents the current DCF cost of equity for Aquila. This is approximated by the upper portion of the average/mean values, as well as the top DCF calculations for my comparison group examined in the previous analysis. I recommend a 9 percent to 91/2 percent range for Aquila, which focuses on the upper portion of the broad DCF range.

With respect to my DCF analysis, generally I have focused on the upper portion of the DCF calculations because current financial conditions (low interest rates and high market-to-book ratios for utilities) have the effect of driving DCF results to low levels by historic standards.

Using only the highest growth rate.

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### IX. <u>CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL ANALYSIS</u>

### Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE THEORY AND METHODOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL.

A. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a version of the risk premium method. The CAPM describes and measures the relationship between a security's investment risk and its market rate of return. The CAPM was developed in the 1960s and 1970s as an extension of modern portfolio theory (MPT), which studies the relationships among risk, diversification, and expected returns.

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**Q**.

#### HOW IS THE CAPM DERIVED?

A. The general form of the CAPM is:

$$K = R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f)$$

where: K = cost of equity

R<sub>f</sub> = risk free rate

 $R_m =$  return on market

 $\beta$  = beta

 $R_m$ - $R_f$  = market risk premium

As noted previously, the CAPM is a variant of the risk premium method. I believe the CAPM is generally superior to the simple risk premium method because the CAPM specifically recognizes the risk of a particular company or industry (i.e., beta), whereas the simple risk premium method assumes the same cost of equity for all companies exhibiting similar bond ratings.

### 25 26

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28 29 Q.

### WHAT GROUPS OF COMPANIES HAVE YOU UTILIZED TO PERFORM YOUR CAPM ANALYSES?

 A. I have performed CAPM analyses for the same groups of proxy utilities evaluated in my DCF analyses.

30 Q. WHAT RATE DID YOU USE FOR THE RISK-FREE RATE?

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The first term of the CAPM is the risk-free rate  $(R_f)$ . The risk-free rate reflects the 1 A. level of return that can be achieved without accepting any risk.

> In CAPM applications, the risk-free rate is generally recognized by use of U.S. Treasury securities. Two general types of U.S. Treasury securities are often utilized as the R<sub>f</sub> component - short-term U.S. Treasury bills and long-term U.S. Treasury bonds.

> I have performed CAPM calculations using the three month average yield (October-December 2006) for 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds. Over this three month period, these bonds had an average yield of 4.83 percent.

#### Q. WHAT IS BETA AND WHAT BETAS DID YOU EMPLOY IN YOUR CAPM?

Α. Beta is a measure of the relative volatility (and thus risk) of a particular stock in relation to the overall market. Betas of less than 1.0 are considered less risky than the market, whereas betas greater than 1.0 are more risky. Utility stocks traditionally have had betas below 1.0. I utilized the most recent Value Line betas for each company in the groups of proxy utilities.

#### 17 HOW DID YOU **ESTIMATE** THE Q. MARKET RISK PREMIUM 18 **COMPONENT?**

19 A. The market risk premium component  $(R_m-R_f)$  represents the investor-expected premium of common stocks over the risk-free rate, or government bonds. For the 20 purpose of estimating the market risk premium, I considered alternative measures of 21 22 returns of the S&P 500 (a broad-based group of large U.S. companies) and 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds. 23

First, I have compared the actual annual returns on equity of the S&P 500 with the actual annual yields of U.S. Treasury bonds. Schedule 9 shows the return on equity for the S&P 500 group for the period 1978-2005 (all available years reported by S&P). The average return on equity for the S&P 500 group over the 1978-2005 period is 14.09 percent. This schedule also indicates the annual yields on 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds, as well as the annual differentials (i.e., risk premiums) between the S&P 500 and U.S. Treasury 20-year bonds. Based upon these returns, I conclude that this version of the risk premium is about 6.2 percent.

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I have also considered the total returns (i.e., dividends/interest plus capital gains/losses) for the S&P 500 group as well as for long-term government bonds, as tabulated by Ibbotson Associates, using both arithmetic and geometric means. I have considered the total returns for the entire 1926-2005 period, which are as follows:

	S&P 500	L-T Gov't Bonds	Risk Premium
Arithmetic	12.3%	5.8%	6.5%
Geometric	10.4%	5.5%	4.9%

I conclude from these total returns that the expected risk premium is about 5.9 percent (i.e., average of all three risk premiums). I believe that a combination of arithmetic and geometric means is appropriate because investors have access to both types of means and, presumably, both types are reflected in investment decisions and thus stock prices and cost of capital.

Schedule 10 shows my CAPM calculations using the risk premium. The results are:

	Mean	Median
Comparison Group	10.3%	10.1%
Hadaway Group	9.9%	9.8%

# 18 Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE CAPM COST OF 19 EQUITY?

A. The CAPM results collectively indicate a cost of about 9.8 percent to 10.3 percent for
 the two groups of comparison utilities. I conclude that the CAPM cost of equity for
 Aquila is within a range of 9<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> percent to 10<sup>1</sup>/<sub>4</sub> percent.

23 X. COMPARABLE EARNINGS ANALYSIS

### 24 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE BASIS OF THE CE METHODOLOGY.

A. The CE method is derived from the "corresponding risk" standard of the <u>Bluefield</u> and
 <u>Hope</u> cases. This method is thus based upon the economic concept of opportunity
 cost. As previously noted, the cost of capital is an opportunity cost: the prospective
 return available to investors from alternative investments of similar risk.

The CE method is designed to measure the returns expected to be earned on the original cost book value of similar risk enterprises. Thus, this method provides a 1

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direct measure of the fair return, because the CE method translates into practice the competitive principle upon which regulation is based.

The CE method normally examines the experienced and/or projected returns on book common equity. The logic for examining returns on book equity follows from the use of original cost rate base regulation for public utilities, which uses a utility's book common equity to determine the cost of capital. This cost of capital is, in turn, used as the fair rate of return which is then applied (multiplied) to the book value of rate base to establish the dollar level of capital costs to be recovered by the utility. This technique is thus consistent with the rate base methodology used to set utility rates.

## 12 Q. HOW HAVE YOU EMPLOYED THE CE METHODOLOGY IN YOUR 13 ANALYSIS OF AQUILA'S COMMON EQUITY COST?

14 A. I conducted the CE methodology by examining realized returns on equity for several 15 groups of companies and evaluating the investor acceptance of these returns by 16 reference to the resulting market-to-book ratios. In this manner it is possible to assess 17 the degree to which a given level of return equates to the cost of capital. It is generally 18 recognized for utilities that market-to-book ratios of greater than one (i.e., 100%) 19 reflect a situation where a company is able to attract new equity capital without 20 dilution (i.e., above book value). As a result, one objective of a fair cost of equity is the maintenance of stock prices above book value. 21

I would further note that the CE analysis, as I have employed it, is based upon market data (through the use of market-to-book ratios) and is thus essentially a market test. As a result, my CE analysis is not subject to the criticisms occasionally made by some who maintain that past earned returns do not represent the cost of capital. In addition, my CE analysis uses prospective returns and thus is not backward looking.

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### Q. WHAT TIME PERIODS HAVE YOU EXAMINED IN YOUR CE ANALYSIS?

A. My CE analysis considers the experienced equity returns of the proxy groups of
 utilities for the period 1992-2005 (i.e., last fourteen years). The CE analysis requires
 that I examine a relatively long period of time in order to determine trends in earnings

over at least a full business cycle. Further, in estimating a fair level of return for a future period, it is important to examine earnings over a diverse period of time in order to avoid any undue influence from unusual or abnormal conditions that may occur in a single year or shorter period. Therefore, in forming my judgment of the current cost of equity I have focused on two periods: 2001-2005 (the last five years - the average length of a business cycle) and 1992-2001 (the most recent complete business cycle).

Q.

### PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR CE ANALYSIS.

A. Schedules 11 and 12 contain summaries of experienced returns on equity for several groups of companies, while Schedule 13 presents a risk comparison of utilities versus unregulated firms.

Schedule 11 shows the earned returns on average common equity and marketto-book ratios for the two groups of proxy utilities. These can be summarized as follows:

	Historic		Prospective
Group	ROE	M/B	ROE
Comparison Group	9.9-11.2%	144-154%	8.2-10.1%
Hadaway Group	10.6-11.2%	155-156%	9.7-10.7%

These results indicate that historic returns of 9.9-11.2 percent have been adequate to produce market-to-book ratios of 144-155 percent for the groups of proxy utilities. Furthermore, projected returns on equity for 2006, 2007, and 2009-2011 are within a range of 8.2 percent to 10.7 percent for the utility groups. These relate to 2005 market-to-book ratios of 154 percent or higher.

### Q. HAVE YOU ALSO REVIEWED EARNINGS OF UNREGULATED FIRMS?

A. Yes. As an alternative, I also examined a group of largely unregulated firms. I have examined the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite group, because this is a well recognized group of firms that is widely utilized in the investment community and the composite group is indicative of the competitive sector of the economy. Schedule 12 presents the earned returns on equity and market-to-book ratios for the S&P 500 group over the past fourteen years. As this exhibit indicates, over the two stated periods this

group's average earned returns ranged from 12.2-14.7 percent with market-to-book ratios ranging between 299 percent and 341 percent.

## Q. HOW CAN THE ABOVE INFORMATION BE USED TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF EQUITY FOR AQUILA?

A. The recent earnings of the proxy utility and S&P 500 groups can be utilized as an indication of the level of return realized and expected in the regulated and competitive sectors of the economy. In order to apply these returns to the cost of equity for proxy utilities, however, it is necessary to compare the risk levels of the electric utility industries with those of the competitive sector. I have done this in Schedule 13, which compares several risk indicators for the S&P 500 group and the utility groups. The information in this exhibit indicates that the S&P 500 group is slightly more risky than the utility proxy groups.

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16.

### Q. WHAT RETURN ON EQUITY IS INDICATED BY THE CE ANALYSIS?

A. Based on the recent earnings and market-to-book ratios, I believe the CE analysis indicates that the cost of equity for the proxy utilities is no more than 10 percent. Recent returns of 9.9-11.2 percent have resulted in market-to-book ratios of 144 and greater. Prospective returns of 8.2-10.7 percent have been accompanied by market-to-book ratios of over 154 percent. As a result, it is apparent that returns below this level would result in market-to-book ratios of well above 100 percent. An earned return of 10 percent or less should thus result in a market-to-book ratio of at least 100 percent. As I indicated earlier, the fact that market-to-book ratios substantially exceed 100 percent indicates that historic and prospective returns of 10 percent reflect earnings levels that exceed the cost of equity for those regulated companies.

### XI. RETURN ON EQUITY RECOMMENDATION

# 28 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF YOUR THREE COST OF 29 EQUITY ANALYSES.

30 A. My three methodologies produce the following:

Discounted Cash Flow	9.0-9.5%
Capital Asset Pricing Model	9.75-10.25%
Comparable Earnings	10.0%

My overall conclusion from these results is an overall range of 9.0 percent to 10.25 percent, which focuses on the respective ranges of my individual model findings. I recommend a cost of equity rate of 9.0 percent to 10.25 percent for Aquila.

### XII. TOTAL COST OF CAPITAL

### Q. WHAT IS THE TOTAL COST OF CAPITAL FOR AQUILA?

A. Schedule 14 reflects the total cost of capital for the Company using the September 30, 2006 capital structure of Aquila and costs of long-term debt, and my common equity cost recommendations. The resulting total cost of capital for MPS is a range of 7.81 percent to 8.40 percent, with a mid-point of 8.11 percent. I recommend that this 8.11 total cost of capital be established for MPS. The corresponding numbers for L&P is a cost of capital range of 8.45 percent to 9.04 percent, with a mid-point of 8.75 percent. I recommend that this 8.75 percent cost of capital be established for L&P.

# Q. DOES YOUR COST OF CAPITAL RECOMMENDATION PROVIDE THE COMPANY WITH A SUFFICIENT LEVEL OF EARNINGS TO MAINTAIN ITS FINANCIAL INTEGRITY?

- A. Yes, it does. Schedule 15 shows the pre-tax coverage that would result if Aquila earned the mid-point of my cost of capital recommendation. As the results indicate, the mid-point of my recommended range would produce a coverage level for MPS within the benchmark range for a BBB rated utility. In addition, the debt ratios for both MPS and L&P (which reflects the capital structure as proposed by the Company) are within that benchmark for a BBB rated utility.

### 27 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR PRE-FILED TESTIMONY?

A. Yes, it does.

### BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE PROFILE DAVID C. PARCELL, MBA, CRRA EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT/SENIOR ECONOMIST

#### **EDUCATION**

1985	M.B.A., Virginia Commonwealth University
1970	M.A., Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
	(Virginia Tech)
1969	B.A., Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
	(Virginia Tech)

#### POSITIONS

1995-Present	Executive Vice President and Senior Economist, Technical
	Associates, Inc.
1993-1995	Vice President and Senior Economist, C. W. Amos of Virginia
1972-1993	Vice President and Senior Economist, Technical Associates, Inc.
1969-1972	Research Economist, Technical Associates, Inc.
1968-1969	Research Associate, Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic
	Institute and State University

#### ACADEMIC HONORS

Omicron Delta Epsilon - Honor Society in Economics Beta Gamma Sigma - National Scholastic Honor Society of Business Administration Alpha Iota Delta - National Decision Sciences Honorary Society Phi Kappa Phi - Scholastic Honor Society

#### PROFESSIONAL DESIGNATIONS

Certified Rate of Return Analyst - Founding Member Member of Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR)

#### **RELEVANT EXPERIENCE**

<u>Financial Economics</u> -- Advised and assisted many Virginia banks and savings and loan associations on organizational and regulatory matters. Testified approximately 25 times before the Virginia State Corporation Commission and the Regional Administrator of National Banks on matters related to branching and organization for banks, savings and loan associations, and consumer finance companies.

Advised financial institutions on interest rate structure and loan maturity. Testified before Virginia State Corporation Commission on maximum rates for consumer finance companies.

Testified before several committees and subcommittees of Virginia General Assembly on numerous banking matters.

Clients have included First National Bank of Rocky Mount, Patrick Henry National Bank, Peoples Bank of Danville, Blue Ridge Bank, Bank of Essex, and Signet Bank.

Published articles in law reviews and other periodicals on structure and regulation of banking/financial services industry.

<u>Utility Economics</u> -- Performed numerous financial studies of regulated public utilities. Testified in over 300 cases before some thirty state and federal regulatory agencies.

Prepared numerous rate of return studies incorporating cost of equity determination based on DCF, CAPM, comparable earnings and other models. Developed procedures for identifying differential risk characteristics by nuclear construction and other factors.

Conducted studies with respect to cost of service and indexing for determining utility rates, the development of annual review procedures for regulatory control of utilities, fuel and power plant cost recovery adjustment clauses, power supply agreements among affiliates, utility franchise fees, and use of short-term debt in capital structure.

Presented expert testimony before federal regulatory agencies Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Federal Power Commission, and National Energy Board (Canada), state regulatory agencies in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ontario (Canada), Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Yukon Territory (Canada).

Published articles in law reviews and other periodicals on the theory and purpose of regulation and other regulatory subjects.

Clients served include state regulatory agencies in Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Missouri, North Carolina, Ontario (Canada), and Virginia; consumer advocates and attorneys general in Alabama, Arizona, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia; federal agencies including Defense Communications Agency, the Department of Energy, Department of the Navy, and General Services Administration; and various organizations such as Bath Iron Works, Illinois Citizens' Utility Board, Illinois Governor's Office of Consumer Services, Illinois Small Business Utility Advocate, Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Wisconsin's Citizens Utility Board, and Old Dominion Electric Cooperative.

<u>Insurance Economics</u> -- Conducted analyses of the relationship between the investment income earned by insurance companies on their portfolios and the premiums charged for insurance. Analyzed impact of diversification on financial strength of Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plans in Virginia.

Conducted studies of profitability and cost of capital for property/casualty insurance industry. Evaluated risk of and required return on surplus for various lines of insurance business.

Presented expert testimony before Virginia State Corporation Commission concerning cost of capital and expected gains from investment portfolio. Testified before insurance bureaus of Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Vermont concerning cost of equity for insurance companies.

Prepared cost of capital and investment income return analyses for numerous insurance companies concerning several lines of insurance business. Analyses used by Virginia Bureau of Insurance for purposes of setting rates.

<u>Special Studies</u> -- Conducted analyses which evaluated the financial and economic implications of legislative and administrative changes. Subject matter of analyses include returnable bottles, retail beer sales, wine sales regulations, taxi-cab taxation, and bank regulation. Testified before several Virginia General Assembly subcommittees.

Testified before Virginia ABC Commission concerning economic impact of mixed beverage license.

Clients include Virginia Beer Wholesalers, Wine Institute, Virginia Retail Merchants Association, and Virginia Taxicab Association.

<u>Franchise, Merger & Anti-Trust Economics</u> -- Conducted studies on competitive impact on market structures due to joint ventures, mergers, franchising and other business restructuring. Analyzed the costs and benefits to parties involved in mergers. Testified in federal courts and before banking and other regulatory bodies concerning the structure and performance of markets, as well as on the impact of restrictive practices.

Clients served include Dominion Bankshares, asphalt contractors, and law firms.

<u>Transportation Economics</u> -- Conducted cost of capital studies to assess profitability of oil pipelines, trucks, taxicabs and railroads. Analyses have been presented before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Alaska Pipeline Commission in rate proceedings. Served as a consultant to the Rail Services Planning Office on the reorganization of rail services in the U.S.

<u>Economic Loss Analyses</u> -- Testified in federal courts, state courts, and other adjudicative forums regarding the economic loss sustained through personal and business injury whether due to bodily harm, discrimination, non-performance, or anticompetitive practices. Testified on economic loss to a commercial bank resulting from publication of adverse information concerning solvency. Testimony has been presented on behalf of private individuals and business firms.

## **MEMBERSHIPS**

American Economic Association Virginia Association of Economists Richmond Society of Financial Analysts Financial Analysts Federation Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts Board of Directors 1992-2000 Secretary/Treasurer 1994-1998 President 1998-2000

#### **RESEARCH ACTIVITY**

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#### **Books and Major Research Reports**

"Stock Price As An Indicator of Performance," Master of Arts Thesis, Virginia Tech, 1970

"Revision of the Property and Casualty Insurance Ratemaking Process Under Prior Approval in the Commonwealth of Virginia," prepared for the Bureau of Insurance of the Virginia State Corporation Commission, with Charles Schotta and Michael J. Ileo, 1971

"An analysis of the Virginia Consumer Finance Industry to Determine the Need for Restructuring the Rate and Size Ceilings on Small Loans in Virginia and the Process by which They are Governed," prepared for the Virginia Consumer Finance Association, with Michael J. Ileo, 1973

State Banks and the State Corporation Commission: A Historical Review, Technical Associates, Inc., 1974

"A Study of the Implications of the Sale of Wine by the Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control", prepared for the Virginia Wine Wholesalers Association, Virginia Retail Merchants Association,

Virginia Food Dealers Association, Virginia Association of Chain Drugstores, Southland Corporation, and the Wine Institute, 1983.

"Performance and Diversification of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plans in Virginia: An Operational Review", prepared for the Bureau of Insurance of the Virginia State Corporation Commission, with Michael J. Ileo and Alexander F. Skirpan, 1988.

<u>The Cost of Capital - A Practitioners' Guide</u>, Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts, 1997 (previous editions in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995).

#### Papers Presented and Articles Published

"The Differential Effect of Bank Structure on the Transmission of Open Market Operations," Western Economic Association Meeting, with Charles Schotta, 1971

"The Economic Objectives of Regulation: The Trend in Virginia," (with Michael J. Ileo), <u>William and Mary Law Review</u>, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1973 "Evolution of the Virginia Banking Structure, 1962-1974: The Effects of the Buck-Holland Bill", (with Michael J. Ileo), <u>William and Mary Law Review</u>, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1975

"Banking Structure and Statewide Branching: The Potential for Virginia", <u>William and Mary</u> Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1976

"Bank Expansion and Electronic Banking: Virginia Banking Structure Changes Past, Present, and Future," <u>William and Mary Business Review</u>," Vol. 1, No. 2, 1976

"Electronic Banking - Wave of the Future?" (with James R. Marchand), Journal of Management and Business Consulting, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1976

"The Pricing of Electricity" (with James R. Marchand), Journal of Management and Business Consulting, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1976

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"The Public Interest - Bank and Savings and Loan Expansion in Virginia" (with Richard D. Rogers), <u>University of Richmond Law Review</u>, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1977

"When Is It In the 'Public Interest' to Authorize a New Bank?", <u>University of Richmond Law</u> <u>Review</u>, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1979

"Banking Deregulation and Its Implications on the Virginia Banking Structure," <u>William and</u> <u>Mary Business Review</u>, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1983

"The Impact of Reciprocal Interstate Banking Statutes on The Performance of Virginia Bank Stocks", with William B. Harrison, <u>Virginia Social Science Journal</u>, Vol. 23, 1988

"The Financial Performance of New Banks in Virginia", Virginia Social Science Journal, Vol. 24, 1989

"Identifying and Managing Community Bank Performance After Deregulation", with William B. Harrison, Journal of Managerial Issues, Vol. II, No. 2, Summer 1990

"The Flotation Cost Adjustment To Utility Cost of Common Equity - Theory, Measurement and Implementation," presented at Twenty-Fifth Financial Forum, National Society of Rate of Return Analysts, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, April 28, 1993.

Biography of Myon Edison Bristow, Dictionary of Virginia Biography, Volume 2, 2001.

Exhibit\_\_\_(DCP-1) Schedule 2 Page 1 o f 3

#### ECONOMIC INDICATORS

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	REAL	IND PROD	UNEMP		
	GDP GROWTH	GROWTH		CPI	PP!
		1975	- 1982 Cycle		
1975	-1.1%	-8,9%	8.5%	7.0%	6.6%
1976	5.4%	10.8%	7.7%	4.8%	3.7%
	5.5%	5.9%	7.0%	6.8%	6.9%
1977	5.0%	5.7%	6.0%	9.0%	9.2%
1978		4.4%	5.8%	13,3%	12.8%
1979	2.8%			12,4%	11.8%
1980	-0.2%	-1.9%	7.0%		7.1%
1981	1.8%	1.9%	7.5%	8,9%	3.6%
1982	-2.1%	-4.4%	9.5%	3.8%	3.6%
		1983	- 1991 Cycle		
1983	4.0%	3.7%	9.5%	3.8%	0.6%
1984	6.8%	9.3%	7.5%	3.9%	1.7%
1985	3,7%	1.7%	7.2%	3.8%	1.8%
1986	3.1%	0.9%	7.0%	1.1%	-2.3%
1987	2,9%	4,9%	6.2%	4.4%	2.2%
1988	3.8%	4.5%	5.5%	4.4%	4.0%
1989	3.5%	1.8%	5.3%	4.6%	4.9%
1990	1.8%	-0.2%	5.6%	6.1%	5.7%
1991	-0.5%	-2.0%	6.8%	3.1%	-0.1%
•					
		1992	- 2001 Cycle		
1992	3.0%	3.1%	7.5%	2.9%	1.6%
1993	2.7%	3.3%	6.9%	2.7%	0.2%
1994	4.0%	5.4%	6.1%	2.7%	1.7%
1995	2.5%	4,8%	5.6%	2.5%	2.3%
1996	3.7%	4.2%	5.4%	3.3%	2.8%
1997	4.5%	7.3%	4.8%	1.7%	-1.2%
1998	4.2%	5.9%	4.5%	1.6%	0.0%
1999	4.5%	4,5%	4.2%	2.7%	2.9%
2000	3.7%	4,3%	4.0%	3.4%	3.6%
2000	0.8%	-3.5%	4.7%	1.6%	-1.6%
		CL	irrent Cycle		
2002	1.6%	0,1%	5.8%	2.4%	1.2%
2002	2.7%	0.6%	6.0%	1.9%	4.0%
2004	3.9%	4.1%	5.5%	3.3%	4.2%
2004	3,2%	3.3%	5.1%	3.4%	5.4%
2004					
1st Qtr.	3,9%	2.8%	5.6%	5.2%	5.2%
2nd Qtr.		4.9%	5.6%	4.4%	4.4%
3rd Qtr.		4.6%	5.4%	0.8%	0.8%
4th Qtr.		4.3%	5.4%	3.6%	7.2%
2005	3 40/	3 99/	5,3%	4.4%	5.6%
1st Qtr.		3.8%	5.1%	1.2%	1.6%
2nd Qtr		3.0%		9.6%	10.8%
3rd Qtr.		2.7%	5.0%		4.0%
4th Qtr.	1.8%	3.1%	4.9%	-2.0%	7.070
2006	E 08/	7 ×0/	A 704	4.8%	-0.2%
1st Qtr. 2nd Qtr		3.4%	4.7% 4.6%	4.8%	5.6%
	. 2.6%	4.5%			
3rd Qtr	. 2.2%	5.3%	4,7%	0.4%	-4.4%

Source: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Indicators, various issues.

Exhibit\_\_\_(DCP-1) Schedule 2 Page 2 of 3

INTEREST RATES

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	PRIME	US TREAS T BILLS	US TREAS T BONDS	BONDS	UTILITY BONDS	UTILITY BOND\$	BONDS
EAR	RATE	3 MONTH	10 YEAR	Aaa	A	A	Baa
			1975 - 198	2 Cycle			
1975	7.86%	5.84%	7.99%	9,03%	9.44%	10.09%	10,96%
1976	6,84%	4,99%	7.61%	8.63%	8.92%	9.29%	9.82%
1977 1978	6.83% 9.06%	5.27% 7.22%	7.42% 8.41%	8,19% 8.87%	8.43% 9.10%	8.51% 9.29%	9,06%
1979	12.67%	10.04%	9.44%	9.86%	10.22%	10.49%	9.62% 10.96%
1980	15.27%	11,51%	11.46%	12,30%	13.00%	13.34%	13,95%
1981	18.89%	14.03%	13.93%	14.84%	15.30%	15.95%	16,60%
1982	14.86%	10.69%	13.00%	14.22%	14.79%	15.86%	16.45%
			1983 - 199	1 Cycle			
1983	10.79%	8.63%	11.10%	12.52%	12.83%	13.66%	14.20%
1984 1985	12,04% 9,93%	9.58% 7.48%	12.44% 10.62%	12.72% 11.68%	13.56% 12.06%	14.03% 12.47%	14,53%
1986	8.33%	5.98%	7,68%	8.92%	9.30%	9.58%	10,00%
1987	8.21%	5.82%	8,39%	9.52%	9.77%	10.10%	10,53%
1988	9,32%	6,69%	8.85%	10.05%	10.26%	10.49%	11.00%
1989	10.87%	8.12%	8.49%	9.32%	9.56%	9.77%	9.97%
1990	10.01%	7.51%	8.55%	9.45%	9.65%	9.86%	10.06%
1991	8.46%	5.42%	7,86%	8.85%	9.09%	9.36%	9.55%
			1992 - 200	1 Cycle			
1992	6.25%	3,45%	7.01%	8.19%	8.55%	8.69%	8.86%
1993	6.00%	3.02%	5.87%	7.29%	7.44%	7.59%	7.91%
1994	7.15%	4.29%	7.09%	8.07%	8.21%	8.31%	8.53%
1995 1996	8.83% 8.27%	5.51% 5.02%	6.57% 5.44%	7.68% 7.48%	7.77% 7.57%	7,89%	8.29% 8.16%
1990	8.44%	5.07%	6.35%	7.43%	7.54%	7.75% 7,60%	7 95%
1997	8.35%	4.81%	5.26%	6.77%	6.91%	7,04%	7.26%
1999	8.00%	4.66%	5,65%	7.21%	7.51%	7,62%	7,88%
2000	9.23%	5.85%	6,03%	7.88%	8.06%	8,24%	8.36%
2001	6.91%	3.45%	5.02%	7.47%	7.59%	7.78%	8.02%
			Current C	vcle			
2002	4.67%	1.62%	4.61%		7.19%	7,37%	8.02%
2003	4,12%	1.02%	4.01%		6,40%	6.58%	6.84%
2004	4.34%	1.38%	4.27%		6.04%	6,16%	6.40%
2005	6.19%	3.16%	4.29%		5,44%	5.65%	5.93%
2004							
Jan	4.00%	0.89%	4.15%		6.06%	6.15%	6.47%
Feb	4.00%	0.92%	4.06%		6.10%	6.15%	6.28%
Mar	4.00%	0.94%	3.83%		5.93%	5,97%	6.12%
Apr	4.00%	0.94%	4.35%		6.33%	6.35%	6.46%
May	4.00%	1.04%	4.72%		6.66%	6.62%	6.75%
June	4.00% 4.25%	1.27%	4.73%		6.30%	6.46%	6.84%
July Aug	4.50%	1.35% 1.48%	4.50% 4.26%		6.09% 5.95%	6.27% 6.14%	6.67% 6.45%
Sept	4.75%	1.65%	4.13%		5.79%	5.98%	6.27%
Oct	4.75%	1.75%	4.10%		5.74%	5,94%	6,17%
Nov	5.00%	2.06%	4.19%		5.79%	5,97%	6.16%
Dec	5.25%	2.20%	4.23%		5.78%	5.92%	6.10%
2005	6 75%	3 738/	4 9 9 9		5.68%	5 786	5 6507
Jan Feb	5.25% 5.50%	2.32% 2.53%	4.22% 4.17%		5.55%	5.78% 5.81%	5.95% 5.76%
Mar	5.75%	2.53%	4.17%		5.76%	5.83%	6.01%
AD	5.75%	2.79%	4.34%		5.56%	5.64%	5,95%
May	6.00%	2.86%	4.14%		5.39%	5.53%	5.88%
June	6.25%	2.99%	4,00%		5.05%	5.40%	5.70%
Juły	6.25%	3.22%	4.18%		5.18%	5.51%	5.81%
Aug	6.50%	3.45%	4.26%		5.23%	5,50%	5.80%
Sept	6.75%	3.47%	4.20%		5 27%	5.52%	5.83%
Oct	6.75%	3.70%	4.46%		5.50%	5.79%	6.08%
Nov Dec	7.00% 7.25%	3.90% 3.89%	4.54% 4.47%		5.59% 5.55%	5.88% 5.80%	6.19% 6.14%
2006							
Jan	7.50%	4.20%	4.42%		5.50%	5.75%	6.06%
Feb	7.50%	4.41%	4.57%		5.55%	5.82%	6.11%
Mar	7.75%	4.51%	4.72%		5.71%	5.98%	6.26%
Apr	7.75%	4.59%	4.99%		6.02%	6.29%	6.54%
May	8.00%	4.72%	5.11%		6.16%	6.42%	6.59%
June	8.25%	4.79%	5.11%		6.15%	6.40%	6.61%
July	8.25%	4.96%	5.09%		6 13%	6.37%	6.61%
Aug Sept	5.25% 8.25%	4.98% 4.82%	4.88% 4.72%		5.97% 5.81%	6.20% 6.00%	6.43% 6.26%
Sept	8 25%	4.82%	4.72%		5.80%	6.00% 5.98%	6.24%
Oct	B.25%						

Sources: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Indicators; Moody's Bond Record; Federal Reserve Bulletin; various issues,

Exhibit\_\_\_(DCP-1) Schedule 2 Page 3 of 3

#### STOCK PRICE INDICATORS

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YEAR	S&P Composite	Nasdaq Composite	DJIA	S&P	S&P
	oomposite	Composite	UJIA	D/P	E/P
		1975 - 198	2 Cycle		
1975			802.49	4.31%	9,15%
1976			974.92	3.77%	8,90%
1977			894.63	4.62%	10.799
1978			820.23	5.28%	12.039
1979			844.40	5.47%	13.46
1980			891.41	5.26%	12.669
1981			932.92	5.20%	11.96
1982			884.36	5.81%	11,605
		1983 - 199	1 Cycle		
1983			1,190.34	4.40%	8.03%
1984			1 178.48	4.64%	10.029
1985			1,328,23	4.25%	8.12%
1986			1,792.76	3.49%	
1987					6.09%
1988			2,275.99	3.08%	5.48%
			2,060.82	3.64%	8.D1%
1989	322.84		2,508.91	3.45%	7.41%
1990	334.59		2,678.94	3.61%	6.47%
1991	376.18	491.69	2,929.33	3.24%	4.79%
		1992 - 200	1 Cycie		·
1992	415.74	599.26	3,284.29	2.99%	4.22%
1993	451.21	715.16	3,522.06	2.78%	4.46%
1994	460.42	751.65	3 793 77	2.82%	5.83%
1995	541.72	925.19	4,493.76	2.56%	6,09%
1996	670.50	1,164.96	5,742.89	2.19%	5.24%
1997	873.43	1,469.49	7,441.15	1.77%	
1998					4.57%
	1,085.50	1,794,91	8,625.52	1.49%	3.46%
1999	1,327.33	2,728.15	10,464.88	1.25%	3.17%
2000	1,427.22	3,783.67	10,734.90	1.15%	3.63%
2001	1,194.18	2,035.00	10,189.13	1.32%	2.95%
		Current	Cycle		
2002	993.94	1,539.73	9,226.43	1.61%	2.92%
2003	965.23	1,647,17	8,993.59	1.77%	3.84%
2004	1,130.65	1,966.53	10,317.39	1.72%	4.89%
2005	1,207.23	2,099.32	10,547.67	1.83%	5.40%
2002					
1st Qtr	1,131.56	1,879.85	10,105.27	1.39%	2.15%
2nd Qtr.	1,068,45	1,641.53	9,912.70	1.49%	2.70%
3rd Qtr.	894.65	1,308.17	8,487.59	1.76%	3.68%
4th Qtr.	887.91	1,346.07	8,400.17	1.79%	3.14%
2003					
1st Otr.	860,03	1,350,44	8,122.83	1.89%	3.57%
2nd Qtr.	938.00	1,521.92	8,684.52	1.75%	3.55%
3rd Otr.	1,000.50	1,765.96	9,310.57	1.74%	3.87%
4th Qtr.	1,056.42	1,934.71	9,856.44	1.69%	4.38%
2004					
ist Qtr.	1,133.29	2,041.95	10,488.43	1.64%	4.62%
2nd Qtr.	1,122.87	1,984,13	10,289.04	1.71%	4.92%
3rd Qtr.	1,104.15	1,872.90	10,129.85	1.79%	5.18%
4th Qtr.	1,162.07	2,050.22	10,362.25	1.75%	4.83%
2005					
1st Qtr.	1,191.98	2,056.01	10,648.48	1.77%	5.11%
2nd Qtr.	1,181.65	2,012.24	10,382.35	1,85%	5.32%
3rd Qtr.	1,224,14	2,149.20	10,544.06	1,83%	5.42%
4th Qtr	1,230.47	2,178.67	10,615.78	1.86%	5.60%
2006					
	1,283.04	2,287.97	10,996.04	1,85%	5.61%
2006	1,283.04	2,287.97 2,240,46	10,996.04 11,188.84	1,85% 1,90%	5.61% 5.88%

Source: Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Indicators, various issues

## AQUILA, INC. SEGMENT FINANCIAL INFORMATION 2003 - 2005 (\$millions)

Segment	Sales	EBITA	Identifiable Assets
		2003	
Electric Utilities	\$545.1 55.4%	\$128.0	
Gas Utilities	\$506.2 51.5%	\$46.8	
Merchant Services	-\$70.1 -7.1%	-\$378.4	
Aquila, Inc. (Consolidated)	\$983.1	-\$184.6	
		2004	
Electric Utilities	\$594.9 61.3%	\$130.3	\$1,862.3 39.0%
Gas Utilities	\$529.0 54.5%	\$34.9	\$1,353.4 28.3%
Other	-\$152.9 -15.7%	-\$416.7	\$1,080.6 22.6%
Aquila, Inc. (Consolidated)	\$971.0	-\$275.3	\$4,777.3
		2005	
Electric Utilities	\$684.7 52.1%	\$147.7	\$2,073.8 44.8%
Gas Utilities	\$631.1 48.0%	\$33.6	\$1,421.9 30.7%
Other	-\$1.6 -0.1%	-\$22.6	\$918.6 19.8%
Aquila, Inc. (Consolidated)	\$1,314.2	\$55.5	\$4,630.7

Note: Percentages may not add to 100.0% due to corporate and other.

Source: Aquila, Inc, Form 10-K.

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# **BOND RATINGS**

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Date	S&P
2000	BBB
2001	BBB
2002	BBB-/BB
2003	B+/B
2004	B-/CCC+
2005	B-
2006	В

Source: Response to Data Request No. MPSC-150.

# AQUILA, INC. CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS 2001 - 2006 (\$000)

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YEAR	COMMON	LONG-TERM DEBT	SHORT-TERM DEBT
2001	\$2,551.6	\$2,432.9	\$445.0
	47.0%	44.8%	8.2%
	51.2%	48.8%	
2002	\$1,607.9	\$2,624.8	\$287.8
	35.6%	58.1%	6.4%
	38.0%	62.0%	
2003	\$1,359.3	\$2,706.0	\$0.0
	33.4%	66.6%	0.0%
	33.4%	66.6%	
2004	\$1,130.5	\$2,366.4	\$0.0
	32.3%	67.7%	0.0%
	32.3%	67.7%	
2005	\$1,309.9	\$1,979.5	\$12.0
	39.7%	60.0%	0.4%
	39.8%	60.2%	
Sept. 30, 2006	\$1,272.1	\$1,407.4	\$0.0
-	47.5%	52.5%	0.0%
	47.5%	52.5%	
			0.078

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding.

Source: Aquila, Inc. 2005 Form 10-K, response to Data Request No. MPSC-0151.

# AUS UTILITY REPORTS ELECTRIC UTILITY GROUPS AVERAGE COMMON EQUITY RATIOS

Year	Electric	Combination Electric and Gas
2001	42%	38%
2002	38%	36%
2003	42%	38%
2004	47%	43%
2005	44%	47%

Note: Averages include short-term debt.

Source: AUS Utility Reports.

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#### **COMPARISON COMPANIES BASIS FOR SELECTION**

Company	Market Cap (000)	Percent Revenues Electric	Common Equity Ratio	Value Line Safety	Moody's/ S&P Bond Rating	S&P Stock Ranking
Aquila	\$1,700,000	68%	41%	5	B/B+	В
Comparison Group*						
Cleco	\$1,300,000	96%	52%	3	Baa1/BBB	B+
Empire District Electric	\$675,000	93%	49%	3	Baa1/BBB+	В
Energy East	\$3,300,000	56%	44%	2	A3/BBB+	B+
Hawaiian Electric Industries	\$2,300,000	83%	53%	2	Baa2/BBB	B+
Pepco Holdings	\$4,600,000	79%	42%	3	Baa1/BBB+	В
Hadaway Reference Group						
Alliant Energy	\$4,200,000	71%	53%	3	A2/A-	в
Ameren	\$10,900,000	79%	54%	1	Baa1/BBB	A-
American Electric Power	\$14,000,000	95%	45%	3	Baa1/BBB	В
CH Energy Group	\$750,000	52%	58%	1	A2/A	A-
Central Vermont P. S.	\$225,000	100%	62%	3	NR/BBB	NR
Consolidated Edison	\$11,100,000	64%	49%	1	A1/A	B+
DTE Energy	\$7,200,000	57%	45%	3	A3/BBB+	B+
Duquesne Light	\$1,500,000	79%	37%	4	Baa1/BBB+	В
Empire District Electric	\$675,000	93%	49%	3	Baa1/BBB+	В
Energy East	\$3,300,000	56%	44%	2	A3/BBB+	B+
Green Mountain Power	\$175,000	100%	59%	3	Baa1/BBB	В
Hawaiial Electric Industries	\$2,300,000	83%	53%	2	Baa2/BBB	B+
MGE Energy	\$675,000	60%	61%	1	Aa3/AA-	B+
NiSource	\$5,800,000	16%	48%	3	Baa2/BBB	В
Northeast Utilities	\$3,500,000	71%	35%	3	Baa1/BBB	В
NSTAR	\$3,400,000	79%	39%	1	A1/A+	A-
Pinnacle West	\$4,800,000	75%	57%	1	Baa1/BBB-	A-
PPL Corp	\$13,000,000	68%	42%	2	Baa1/BBB+	В
Progress Energy	\$11,000,000	80%	43%	2	A3/BBB	B+
Puget Energy	\$2,800,000	61%	46%	3	Baa2/BBB	В
SCANA	\$4,600,000	39%	47%	2	A1/A-	в
Southern Co.	\$25,000,000	98%	44%	1	A2/A	A-
Vectren	\$2,000,000	20%	49%	2	A3/A	8+
Xcel	\$9,000,000	75%	47%	2	A3/A-	в

\* Selected using following criteria: Market cap of \$500 million to \$5 billion.

Electric Revenues of 50% or greater.

Common Equity Ratio of 40% or greater. Value Line Safety of 2 or 3.

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S&P and Moody's bond ratings of BBB and/or A.

S&P stock ranking of B or B+.

Company has not eliminated or reduced dividends.

Company not involved in a merger.

Sources: C.A. Turner Utility Reports, Standard & Poor's Stock Guide, Value Line Investment Survey.

Exhibit\_\_\_(DCP-1) Schedule 8 Page 1 of 4

#### COMPARISON COMPANIES DIVIDEND YIELD

		Octobe	r - Decemb	ier, 2006	
COMPANY	DPS	HIGH	LOW	AVERAGE	YIELD
Comparison Group					
Cleco	\$0.90	\$26.20	\$24.78	\$25.49	3.5%
Empire District Electric	\$1.28	\$25.10	\$21.61	\$23.36	5.5%
Energy East	\$1.20	\$25.66	\$23.62	\$24.64	4.9%
Hawaiian Electric Industries	\$1.24	\$28.18	\$26.50	\$27.34	4.5%
Pepco Holdings	<b>\$</b> 1.04	\$26.99	\$24.25	\$25.62	4.1%
Average					4.5%
Hadaway Reference Group					
Alliant Energy	\$1.15	\$39.96	\$35.69	\$37.83	3.0%
Ameren	\$2.54	\$55.24	\$52.19	\$53.72	4.7%
American Electric Power	\$1.56	\$43.13	\$36.49	\$39.81	3.9%
CH Energy Group	\$2.16	\$54.92	\$50.25	\$52.59	4.1%
Central Vermont P. S.	\$0.92	\$23.92	\$20.94	\$22.43	4.1%
Consolidated Edison	\$2.30	\$49.28	\$46.04	\$47.66	4.8%
DTE Energy	\$2.12	\$49.24	\$41.37	\$45,31	4.7%
Duquesne Light	\$1,00	\$20.28	\$19.49	\$19,89	5.0%
Empire District Electric	\$1.28	\$25.10	\$21.61	\$23.36	5.5%
Energy East	\$1.20	\$25.66	\$23.62	\$24,64	4.9%
Green Mountain Power	\$1.12	\$34.10	\$33.22	\$33,66	3.3%
Hawaiial Electric Industries	\$1.24	\$28,18	\$26,50	\$27.34	4.5%
MGE Energy	\$1.39	\$37.00	\$32.17	\$34,59	4.0%
NiSource	\$0.92	\$24.80	\$21.48	\$23.14	4.0%
Northeast Utilities	\$0.75	\$28.90	\$23.26	\$26.08	2.9%
NSTAR	\$1.21	\$35.90	\$33.26	\$34.58	3.5%
Pinnacle West	\$2.10	\$51.00	\$45.12	\$48,06	4.4%
PPL Corp	\$1.10	\$37.34	\$32.39	\$34,87	3.2%
Progress Energy	\$2.42	\$49.55	\$44.40	\$46.98	5.2%
Puget Energy	\$1.00	\$25.91	\$22.72	\$24.32	4.1%
SCANA	\$1.68	\$42.43	\$39.55	\$40,99	4.1%
Southern Co.	\$1.55	\$37.40	\$34.49	\$35,95	4.3%
Vectren	\$1.26	\$29.25	\$26.67	\$27,96	4.5%
Xcel	\$D.89	\$23.63	\$20.56	\$22,10	4.D%
Average					4.2%

Source: Yahoo! Finance.

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Exhibit\_\_\_(DCP-1) Schedule 8 Page 2 of 4

#### COMPARISON COMPANIES RETENTION GROWTH RATES

COMPANY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Average	2006	2007	2009-2011	Average
Comparison Group										
Ne	6.5%	5.6%	3.5%	3.9%	4.1%	4.7%	2.5%	3.5%	4.0%	3.3%
Cleco Caraira District Electric	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	3.0%	1.3%
Empire District Electric	7.1%	2.9%	3.1%	3,8%	3.7%	4.1%	3.0%	2.0%	2.5%	2.5%
Energy East Hawaijan Electric Industries	4.4%	4.3%	3.9%	1.1%	1.5%	3.0%	1.5%	2.0%	3.5%	2.3%
Pepco Holdings	12.6%	5.3%	2.0%	2.5%	2.4%	5.0%	1.5%	3.0%	5.0%	3.2%
Average						3.4%	<u></u>			2.5%
adaway Reference Group	<u></u>		<u> </u>	╺╼╼╼╤╤╼╼╶╴		<u>kan</u>	<u></u>		z=z=	<u></u>
	1.60/	0.0%	2.5%	3.8%	8.1%	3,2%	5.0%	5.5%	4.0%	4.8%
Alliant Energy	1.6% 3.6%	0.0%	2.2%	0.9%	1.7%	1.7%	1.0%	1.5%	2.0%	1.5%
Ameren		2.4%	4.5%	5.7%	5.2%	4.2%	5.5%	5.5%	5.5%	5.5%
American Electric Power	3.4%		2.0%	1.7%	2.0%	1.8%	1.5%	2.0%	3.0%	2.2%
CH Energy Group	3.1%	0.0%	3.2%	1.5%	0.0%	1.8%	3.0%	3.0%	3.5%	3.2%
Central Vermont P. S.	0.5%	3,9%		0.8%	2.6%	2.8%	1.5%	2.0%	2.0%	1.8%
Consolidated Edison	3.8%	4.0%	2.9%		2.0%	2.8%	0.0%	4.5%	3.5%	2.7%
DTE Energy	0.1%	6.4%	2.5%	1.6%		2.8%	0.0%	2.0%	4.5%	2.2%
Duquesne Light	0.0%	1.5%	2.5%	5.4%	4,5%		0.0%	1.0%	3.0%	1.3%
Empire District Electric	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0%	2.0%	2.5%	2.5%
Energy East	7.1%	2.9%	3.1%	3.8%	3.7%	4.1%		4.5%	4.0%	4.2%
Green Mountain Power	7.7%	8.7%	6.5%	6.0%	5.0%	6.8%	4.0%	4.5%	4.0% 3.5%	2.3%
Hawaiiał Electric Industries	4.4%	4.3%	3.9%	1.1%	1.5%	3.0%	1.5%		3.5% 4.5%	3.5%
MGE Energy	2.3%	2.6%	2.5%	2.3%	2,5%	2.4%	2.5%	3.5%	4.5%	3.2%
NiSource	0.0%	3.9%	3.0%	3.9%	0.9%	2.3%	2.0%	3.5%		4.3%
Northeast Utilities	5.6%	3.2%	3.7%	1.6%	1.5%	3.1%	5.0%	4.0%	4.0%	4.3%
NSTAR	5.0%	5.2%	5.2%	4.9%	4,7%	5.0%	3.0%	5.5%	6.5%	-
Pinnacle West	7.3%	2.9%	2.6%	2.3%	1.0%	3.2%	3.5%	4.0%	3.0%	3.5%
PPL Corp	20.2%	12.4%	11.7%	9.3%	8.8%	12.5%	10.0%	8.5%	10.5%	9.7%
Progress Energy	4.3%	5.0%	3.7%	2.6%	1.7%	3.5%	4.0%	5.5%	1.0%	3.5%
Puget Energy	0.0%	1.3%	2.1%	2.8%	2.9%	1.8%	2.0%	3.0%	3.5%	2.8%
SCANA	4.6%	5.5%	5.5%	5.6%	5.3%	5.3%	4.0%	4.0%	4.5%	4.2%
Southern Co.	2.5%	4.1%	4.4%	4.7%	4.6%	4.1%	4.0%	4.0%	4.5%	4.2%
Vectren	0.3%	4.8%	3.0%	1.9%	4.0%	2.8%	1.5%	3.5%	3.0%	2.7%
Xcel	4.3%	0.0%	3.9%	3.9%	2.9%	3.0%	4.0%	3.5%	4.0%	3.8%
						3.5%				3.5%

Source: Value Line Investment Survey.

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Exhibit\_\_\_(DCP-1) Schedule 8 Page 3 of 4

### COMPARISON COMPANIES PER SHARE GROWTH RATES

	5-1	/ear Historic	Growth Rat	tes		03-'05 to '09		Rates
COMPANY	EPS	DPS	BVPS	Average	EPS	DPS	BVPS	Average
Comparison Group								
Cleco	1.0%	2.0%	4.0%	2.3%	7.0%	5.0%	8.5%	6.8%
Empire District Electric	-5.0%	0.0%	2.0%	-1.0%	9.5%	0.0%	2.0%	3.8%
Energy East	-2.5%	5.0%	6.0%	2.8%	4.0%	5.0%	2.5%	3.8%
Hawaiian Electric Industries	1.0%	0.0%	3.0%	1.3%	3.0%	0.0%	2.5%	1.8%
Pepco Holdings	-1.0%		0.5%	-0.3%	8.0%	3.0%	3.0%	4.7%
Average				1.1%				4.2%
Hadaway Reference Group								
Alliant Energy	-1.0%	-12.5%	-2.5%	-5.3%	5.5%	7.5%	3.5%	5.5%
Ameren	0.5%	0.0%	5.0%	1.8%	1.0%	0.0%	3.0%	1.3%
American Electric Power	3.5%	-9.0%	-3.5%	-3.0%	6.5%	5.0%	6.0%	5.8%
CH Energy Group	-1.5%	0.0%	2.0%	0.2%	3.0%	0.5%	2.0%	1.8%
Central Vermont P. S.	1.0%	0.5%	2.5%	1.3%	10.0%	-1.0%	1.5%	3.5%
Consolidated Edison	-2.0%	1.0%	2.5%	0.5%	2.0%	1.0%	2.5%	1.8%
DTE Energy	-2.0%	0.0%	3.5%	0.5%	3.0%	2.0%	2.0%	2.3%
Duquesne Light	-12.0%	-8.5%	-14.5%	-11.7%	5.0%	0.0%	5.5%	3.5%
Empire District Electric	-5.0%	0.0%	2.0%	-1.0%	9.5%	0.0%	2.0%	3.8%
Energy East	-2.5%	5.0%	6.0%	2.8%	4.0%	5.0%	2.5%	3.8%
Green Mountain Power		5.0%	3.0%	4.0%	3.5%	10.0%	3.0%	5.5%
Hawaiial Electric Industries	1.0%	0.0%	3.0%	1.3%	3.0%	0.0%	2.5%	1.8%
MGE Energy	4.0%	1.0%	5.0%	3.3%	6.0%	0.5%	7.0%	4.5%
NiSource	0.0%	1.0%	7.0%	2.7%	3.5%	0.5%	3.0%	2.3%
Northeast Utilities		30.5%	3.0%	16.8%	8.5%	6.5%	1.5%	5.5%
NSTAR	4.0%	1.0%	2.0%	2.3%	7.5%	8.0%	6.0%	7.2%
Pinnacle West	-4.5%	6.5%	4.0%	2.0%	7.0%	5.0%	4.0%	5.3%
PPL Corp	8.5%	8.5%	12.0%	9.7%	11.0%	13.5%	8.0%	10.8%
Progress Energy	4.5%	3.0%	6.5%	4.7%	-1.5%	2.0%	3.0%	1.2%
Puget Energy	-7.5%	-11.5%	0.5%	-6.2%	5.0%	1.5%	4.0%	3.5%
SCANA	7.0%	2.0%	3.0%	4.0%	3.5%	4.5%	5.0%	4.3%
Southern Co.	2.0%	1.0%	-1.0%	0.7%	3.5%	4.0%	5.0%	4.2%
Vectren	4.0%	3.5%	4.5%	4.0%	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%
Xcel	-5.5%	-11.0%	-4.5%	-7.0%	6.0%	5.5%	3.5%	5.0%
Average				1.2%				4.1%

Source: Value Line Investment Survey.

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Exhibit\_\_\_(DCP-1) Schedule 8 Page 4 of 4

#### COMPARISON COMPANIES DCF COST RATES

COMPANY	ADJUSTED YIELD	HISTORIC RETENTION GROWTH	PROSPECTIVE RETENTION GROWTH	HISTORIC PER SHARE GROWTH	PROSPECTIVE PER SHARE GROWTH	FIRST CALL EPS GROWTH	AVERAGE GROWTH	DCF RATES
Comparison Group								
Cleco	3.6%	4.7%	3.3%	2,3%	6.8%	40.59	C 501	
Empire District Electric	5.5%	4.7%	3.3% 1.3%	2,370	3.8%	10.5%	5.5%	9.2%
Employ East	5.0%	4.1%	1.3%	0.00/		3.0%	2.0%	7.6%
Hawalian Electric Industries	4.6%	4.1%	2.3%	2.8%	3.8%	4.0%	3.5%	8.4%
Pepca Holdings	4.0%	5.0%	2.3% 3.2%	1.3%	1.8% 4.7%	3.0% 4.0%	2.3% 4.2%	6.9% 8.3%
Average	4.6%	3.4%	2.5%	2.2%	4.2%	4.9%	3.5%	8.1%
Median		······						8.3%
Composite		7.9%	7.1%	6.7%	8.6%	9.5%	8,1%	<u> </u>
Hadaway Reference Group					· · · · · · · · ·			
Alliant Energy	3.1%	3.2%	4,8%		5,5%	6.0%	4.9%	8.0%
Ameren	4.8%	1.7%	1.5%	1.8%	1.3%	5.0%	2.3%	7,1%
American Electric Power	4.0%	4.2%	5.5%		5.8%	4.0%	4.9%	8.9%
CH Energy Group	4.1%	1.6%	2.2%	0.2%	1,8%		1.5%	5.6%
Central Vermont P. S.	4.2%	1.8%	3.2%	1.3%	3.5%		2.5%	6.6%
Consolidated Edison	4.9%	2.8%	1.8%	0.5%	1.8%	3.0%	2.0%	6.9%
DTE Energy	4.7%	2.9%	2.7%	0.5%	2,3%	5.0%	2.7%	7.4%
Duquesne Light	5.1%	2.8%	2.2%		3.5%		2.8%	7.9%
Empire District Electric	5.5%	0.0%	1.3%		3.8%	3.0%	2.0%	7.6%
Energy East	5.0%	4.1%	2.5%	2.8%	3.8%	4.0%	3.5%	8.4%
Green Mountain Power	3.4%	6.8%	4,2%	4.0%	5.5%		5.1%	8.5%
Hawaiial Electric Industries	4,6%	3.0%	2.3%	1.3%	1,8%	3.0%	2.3%	6.9%
MGE Energy	4,1%	2.4%	3,5%	3.3%	4.5%		3.4%	7.5%
NiSource	4.0%	2.3%	3,2%	2.7%	2.3%	3.5%	2.8%	6.6%
Northeast Utilities	3.0%	3.1%	4.3%	16.8%	5,5%	12.0%	8.3%	11.3%
NSTAR	3.6%	5.0%	5.0%	2.3%	7.2%	7.0%	5.3%	8.9%
Pinnacle West	4.5%	3.2%	3.5%	2.0%	5,3%	6.0%	4.0%	8.5%
PPL Com	3.3%	12.5%	9.7%	9.7%	10.6%	10.5%	10.6%	14.0%
Progress Energy	5.2%	3.5%	3.5%	4.7%	1.2%	4.0%	3.4%	8.6%
Puget Energy	4.2%	1.8%	2.8%		3.5%	4.0%	3.0%	7.2%
SCANA	4.2%	5.3%	4.2%	4.0%	4.3%	5.0%	4.6%	8.8%
Southern Co.	4.4%	4.1%	4.2%	0.7%	4.2%	5.0%	3.6%	8.0%
Vectren	4.6%	2.8%	2.7%	4.0%	3.0%	4.0%	3.3%	7.9%
Xcel	4,1%	3.0%	3.8%		5.0%	6.0%	4.5%	8.6%
Average	4.3%	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	4.1%	5.3%	3.9%	8.2%
Median	<b></b>	<u></u>						8.0%
Composite		7.8%	7.8%	7.8%	8.3%	9.5%	8.2%	

Note: Negative average values not considered.

Sources: Prior pages of this schedule.

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# STANDARD & POOR'S 500 COMPOSITE 20-YEAR U.S. TREASURY BOND YIELDS RISK PREMIUMS

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Year	EPS	BVPS	ROE	20-YEAR T-BOND	RISK PREMIUM
<u> </u>				<u> </u>	
1977		\$79.07			
1978	\$12.33	\$85.35	15.00%	7.90%	7.10%
1979	\$14.86	\$94.27	16.55%	8,86%	7.69%
1980	\$14.82	\$102.48	15.06%	9.97%	5.09%
1981	\$15.36	\$109.43	14.50%	11.55%	2.95%
1982	\$12.64	\$112.46	11.39%	13.50%	-2.11%
1983	\$14.03	\$116.93	12.23%	10.38%	1.85%
1984	\$16.64	\$122.47	13.90%	11.74%	2.16%
1985	\$14.61	\$125.20	11.80%	11.25%	0.55%
1986	\$14.48	\$126.82	11.49%	8.98%	2.51%
1987	\$17.50	\$134.04	13.42%	7.92%	5.50%
1988	\$23.75	\$141.32	17.25%	8.97%	8.28%
1989	\$22.87	\$147.26	15.85%	8.81%	7.04%
1990	\$21.73	\$153.01	14.47%	8.19%	6.28%
1991	\$16.29	\$158.85	10.45%	8.22%	2.23%
1992	\$19.09	\$149.74	12.37%	7.29%	5.08%
1993	\$21.89	\$180.88	13.24%	7.17%	6.07%
1994	\$30.60	\$193.06	16.37%	6.59%	9.78%
1995	\$33.96	\$215.51	16.62%	7.60%	9.02%
1996	\$38.73	\$237.08	17.11%	6.18%	10.93%
1997	\$39.72	\$249.52	16.33%	6.64%	9.69%
1998	\$37.71	\$266.40	14.62%	5.83%	8.79%
1999	\$48.17	\$290.68	17.29%	5.57%	11.72%
2000	\$50.00	\$325.80	16.22%	6.50%	9.72%
2001	\$24.69	\$338.37	7.43%	5.53%	1.90%
2002	\$27.59	\$321.72	8.36%	5.59%	2.77%
2003	\$48.73	\$367.17	14.15%	4.80%	9.35%
2004	\$58.55	\$414.75	14.98%	5.02%	9.96%
2005	\$69.93	\$453.06	16.12%	4.69%	11.43%
Average			14.09%	7.90%	6.19%

Sources: Standard & Poor's Analysts' Handbook and Ibbotson Associates 2006 Yearbook.

#### COMPARISON COMPANIES CAPM COST RATES

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COMPANY	RISK-FREE RATE	BETA	MARKET PREMIUM	CAPM RATES
Comparison Group				
Cleco	4.83%	1.30	5.90%	12.5%
Empire District Electric	4.83%	0.80	5,90%	9.6%
Energy East	4 83%	0.90	5.90%	10.1%
Hawaiian Electric Industries	4.83%	0.70	5,90%	9.0%
Pepco Holdings	4.83%	0.90	5.90%	10.1%
Average	4.83%	0.92	5.90%	10.3%
Median				10.1%
Hadaway Reference Group	<u> </u>		••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	
Alliant Energy	4.83%	0.95	5.90%	10.4%
Ameren	4.83%	0.75	5,90%	9.3%
American Electric Power	4.83%	1.35	5.90%	12.8%
CH Energy Group	4.83%	0.85	5.90%	9.8%
Central Vermont P. S.	4.83%	0.70	5.90%	9.0%
Consolidated Edison	4.83%	0.75	5,90%	9.3%
DTE Energy	4.83%	0.75	5.90%	9.3%
Duquesne Light	4.83%	1.00	5.90%	10.7%
Empire District Electric	4.83%	0.80	5.90%	9.6%
Energy East	4.83%	0.90	5.90%	10.1%
Green Mountain Power	4.83%	0.60	5.90%	8.4%
Hawaiial Electric Industries	4.83%	0,70	5.90%	9.0%
MGE Energy	4.83%	0.75	5.90%	9.3%
NiSource	4.83%	0,95	5.90%	10,4%
Northeast Utilities	4.83%	0,90	5.90%	10.1%
NSTAR	4.83%	0,60	5.90%	9.6%
Pinnacle West	4.83%	1.00	5.90%	10.7%
PP1, Corp	4.83%	0.95	5.90%	10.4%
Progress Energy	4.83%	0.90	5.90%	10.1%
Puget Energy	4.83%	0.80	5.90%	9.6%
SCANA	4.83%	0.85	5.90%	9.8%
Southern Co.	4.83%	0.70	5.90%	9.0%
Vectren	4.83%	0.90	5.90%	<b>1</b> 0.1%
(ce) 	4.83%	D.90	5.90%	10,1%
Average	4.83%	0.89	5.90%	9.9%
Median	- <u>-</u>			9.8%

Sources: Value Line Investment Survey, Standard & Poor's Analysts' Handbook, Federal Reserve.

Exhibit\_\_(DCP-1) Schedule 11 Page 1 of 2

#### COMPARISON COMPANIES RATES OF RETURN ON AVERAGE COMMON EQUITY

Company	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1990	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	1992-2001 Average	2001-2005 Average	2006	2007	2009-20
omparison Group																			
Cleco	14.0%	12.4%	12.9%	13,4%	13.8%	12.8%	12.8%	12.9%	15.0%	14 6%	13.5%	11.5%	12.6%	11.6%	13.4%	12.6%	8.0%	9 0%	10.5%
Empire District Electric	10.3%	9.4%	10.6%	9.4%	9.4%	9.9%	11.6%	8.4%	10,0%	4.3%	8.4%	8.7%	5.7%	6.2%	9.3%	6.7%	7.0%	9.0%	10.5%
nergy East	10.7%	9.1%	10.3%	10.5%	10.1%	9.9%	11.2%	14.4%	15,1%	13,4%	9.3%	6.3%	9.1%	9.3%	11.5%	9.9%	9.0%	8.0 4	9.0%
laweian Electric Industnes	10.9%	10.5%	11,1%	11.0%	10.5%	10.9%	11.5%	11,1%	98%	12 4%	11.9%	11.1%	9.3%	9.7%	11 0%	10.9%	10.0%	10.0%	11.0%
epcs Holdings	10.6%	12.0%	10.6%	10.5%	11.7%	10.5%	11.3%	15.7%	8.9%	11,9%	3 8%	7.6%	8.3%	8.1%	11.0%	9.1%	7.0%	6 5%	10.5%
verage	11.3%	10.7%	11.1%	11 0%	11.1%	10.8%	11.6%	11,7%	11.8%	11.3%	10.6%	9 4%	9.0%	9.0%	\$1.2%	9.9%	8.2%	8.9%	10.3%
Composite				·					······································						11.2%	9.9%			
Hadaway Reference Group	·																-		
Alliant Energy	12 2%	11.5%	11.6%	12.0%	11.6%	9 6%	6.2%	9.1%	9 3%	10.3%	57%	7.6%	8.5%	10.3%	10.3%	8 5%	10.5%	11.0%	10 0%
Ameren	12.7%	12.8%	13.7%	13.1%	12.5%	10.8%	12.7%	12.5%	14.5%	14.3%	10.8%	12.2%	10.0%	10.3%	13.0%	11.5%	9.D%	9.5%	9.0%
American Electric Power	11,1%	11.9%	12.0%	12.4%	13.2%	13.5%	11.3%	10.5%	4.1%	12.9%	12.3%	12 4%	12.7%	11,9%	11.3%	12.4%	11 5%	11.5%	12.5%
CH Energy Group	11.0%	11.1%	10.7%	10.7%	11.3%	10.9%	104%	10.2%	10 5%	10.4%	7.0%	9,1%	8.7%	8.9%	10.7%	8.8%	8.0%	8.5%	9.0%
Central Vermont P. S	12.1%	11.2%	8.7%	9.6%	8.9%	6.1%	1.1 %	8,1%	7.0%	5.7%	9.4%	8,1%	69%	0.4%	8.1%	6.1%	8.5%	6.0%	8.0%
Consolidated Edison	12.0%	12.5%	13.5%	12.7%	12.2%	11.9%	11.9%	12.2%	107%	12.2%	11.5%	10.0%	8.0%	10.2%	12.2%	10 4%	9.0%	9.0%	90%
DTE Energy	18.7%	15.3%	11.5%	13.0%	11.8%	11.9%	12.2%	12.7%	11.0%	7.6%	13.7%	9.7%	8.1%	10.2%	12.7%	9.9%	6.5%	10.5%	9.5%
Duquésne Light	12.4%	12.0%	12.5%	13.2%	13.2%	12.9%	13.1%	14.0%	5.0%	2.7%	16.2%	15.0%	15.6%	14.1%	11.4%	12.7%	6.0%	13.0%	13 5%
Empire District Electric	10.3%	9.4%	10.6%	9.4%	9.4%	9.9%	11.6%	8.4%	10 0%	4.3%	B.4%	8.7%	5.7%	6.2%	9.3%	6.7%	7.0%	9.0%	10.5%
Energy East	10.7%	9.1%	10.3%	10 5%	10 1%	9.9%	11.2%	14.4%	15 1%	13.4 %	9.3%	8.3%	9,1%	9.3%	11.5%	9.9%	9 0%	8.0%	9 0%
Green Mountain Power	12.3%	10.4%	10.4%	10.4%	10.1%	7.1%	3,6%	2.4%	-0.3%	10.9%	10.8%	10.5%	10.2%	9.6%	7.0%	10.4%	9.0%	9.5%	10.D%
Hawanal Electric Industries	10 8%	10.5%	11.1%	11.0%	10.5% 7.1%	10.9%	11.5%	11.1%	9.8%	12.4%	11.9% 13.2%	11.1%	93%	9.7%	11.0%	10.9%	10.0%	10.0%	11.0%
ViSource	13.1% 12.9%	13.3% 14.3%	13.1% 14.6%	12.5% 15.4%	7,1%	12.5% 15.9%	12.2% 15.9%	13.0% 12.3%	14.2%	13.1% 5.8%	11,4%	12.5% 9.5%	17.4%	8.1% 6.0%	12.4%	11.7%	10.5%	11.5%	12.0%
Northeast Utilities	12.6%	9.4%	12.6%	11,9%	0.1%	-0.2%	-2.3%	7.3%	-1,3%	8.6%	6.4%	7,1%	5.1%	5.4%	3.8%	6.5%	9.5%	8,5%	6.0%
NSTAR	11.4%	11.9%	12.2%	10.2%	12.6%	12.6%	12.5%	11.4%	12.3%	13.4%	14.0%	13.9%	13.4%	13.1%	12.1%	13.6%	13.0%	14.0%	15.0%
Pinnacie West	10.7%	10.9%	10.2%	10.6%	11.2%	11.9%	11.5%	12.3	12.4%	12.8%	8.6%	8.3%	8.2%	6.9%	11.5%	8 0%	9.5%	9.5%	9.0%
PPL Corp	13.1%	13,2%	10.8%	12.1%	12.4%	11.7%	15.8%	17.9%	26 1%	27.0%	23.6%	23.1%	18.3%	16.8%	16.0%	21.8%	18 5%	17.0%	21.0%
Progress Energy	15.4%	13,9%	12.3%	14.8%	15.3%	14.6%	14,4%	12.5%	9.8%	12.8%	13,7%	11.5%	10.1%	9.4%	13.6%	11.5%	8.0%	8.0%	8.5%
Pupel Energy	12.4%	11.0%	8.6%	10.2%	10.2%	7.4%	11,5%	11.8%	13.2%	7.6%	7.8%	7.4%	6.0%	84%	10.4%	7.8%	7.5%	8.5%	8 5%
SCANA	11.0%	13.5%	11.0%	11.5%	13,3%	11.7%	12.6%	7.8%	10.7%	10.7%	11.7%	12.4%	12.6%	12.4%	11.4%	12.0%	10.5%	10.5%	11.0%
Southern Co.	13.4%	13.4%	12.4%	13.0%	12.6%	11.4%	12.3%	13.1%	13.6%	11.9%	15.7%	15.6%	15.2%	15.0%	12.7%	14.7%	14 0%	14 0%	14.0%
Vector	13.9%	13.9%	13.8%	13.6%	13.4%	13.6%	13.2%	10.9%	10.0%	8.5%	13.3%	11,6%	9,9%	12.3%	12.5%	11.2%	9.5%	11.5%	11.0%
Kce)	9.1%	11.3%	12.4%	13.5%	12.6%	10.3%	11.4%	8.8%	9.8%	13.2%	2.8%	10.0%	9.8%	9.1%	11.2%	9.0%	10.0%	10.0%	11.0%
Average	12.3%	12.0%	11.7%	12.0%	11.3%	10.6%	10.4%	10.4%	10.5%	11.0%	11.2%	11,1%	10.2%	9.8%	11.2%	10.6%	9.6%	10.4%	10.5%
Composite															11.2%	10.5%			

Source: Calculations made from data contained in Value Line Investment Survey.

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#### COMPARISON COMPANIES MARKET TO BOOK RATIOS

Company	1992	1993	1994	1995	1995	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	1992-2001 Average	2001-20 Average
omparison Group																
Cleco	177%	175%	156%	162%	168%	171%	183%	172%	223%	224%	154%	134%	177%	177%	181%	173%
Empire District Electric	184%	178%	143%	142%	143%	136%	168%	177%	183%	162%	132%	133%	144%	148%	162%	144%
Energy East	131%	143%	105%	96%	94%	108%	169%	186%	151%	131%	121%	119%	138%	141%	131%	130%
awaiian Electric Industries	175%	154%	141%	149%	147%	147%	154%	132%	127%	145%	153%	151%	179%	181%	147%	162%
epco Holdings	160%	162%	135%	138%	161%	151%	161%	166%	139%	124%	110%	103%	109%	122%	150%	114%
Average	165%	162%	136%	137%	143%	143%	167%	167%	165%	157%	134%	128%	149%	154%	154%	144%
Composite															154%	144%
Hadaway Reference Group																
Alliant Energy	190%	185%	154%	152%	154%	155%	156%	120%	120%	129%	110%	97%	120%	131%	152%	117%
Ameren	169%	188%	160%	170%	175%	174%	180%	167%	163%	173%	183%	162%	181%	172%	172%	186%
American Electric Power	143%	159%	143%	156%	176%	187%	191%	154%	147%	179%	138%	124%	155%	165%	164%	152%
CH Energy Group	123%	133%	107%	112%	114%	135%	155%	133%	125%	141%	152%	147%	149%	146%	128%	147%
Central Vermont P. S.	158%	156%	115%	92%	85%	79%	78%	76%	70%	96%	108%	118%	117%	108%	101%	109%
Consolidated Edison	141%	160%	125%	125%	127%	138%	188%	170%	129%	142%	144%	146%	143%	154%	144%	146%
DTE Energy	162%	154%	120%	130%	137%	126%	165%	145%	126%	142%	145%	142%	132%	143%	141%	140%
Duquesne Light	137%	151%	130%	151%	163%	165%	197%	205%	255%	217%	219%	221%	240%	218%	177%	223%
Empire District Electric	184%	178%	143%	142%	143%	138%	168%	177%	183%	162%	132%	133%	144%	148%	162%	144%
Energy East	131%	143%	105%	96%	94%	108%	169%	186%	151%	131%	121%	119%	138%	141%	131%	130%
Green Mountain Power	152%	159% 154%	127% 141%	120%	118% 147%	99% 147%	71% 154%	56% 132%	56% 127%	89% 145%	102%	112%	126%	136%	105%	113%
Hawaiial Electric Industries MGE Energy	171% 189%	196%	189%	149% 183%	203%	169%	197%	177%	172%	197%	153% 214%	151% 223%	179% 207%	181% 207%	147% 189%	162% 210%
NiSource	159%	189%	174%	192%	203%	227%	293%	229%	161%	153%	116%	114%	123%	128%	198%	127%
Northeast Utilities	154%	149%	127%	124%	20776 95%	22/ % 64%	29370	113%	138%	129%	99%	95%	12376	108%	118%	107%
NOTITIE AST CONDES	138%	154%	130%	130%	125%	146%	181%	166%	161%	161%	170%	175%	189%	202%	149%	179%
Pinnacie West	116%	125%	99%	116%	133%	152%	180%	143%	145%	154%	116%	114%	130%	130%	136%	129%
PPL Corp	170%	181%	144%	138%	143%	128%	176%	232%	257%	352%	253%	239%	230%	259%	192%	267%
Progress Energy	171%	192%	159%	181%	209%	207%	233%	189%	163%	164%	152%	145%	144%	137%	187%	148%
Puget Energy	149%	146%	112%	119%	130%	155%	\$70%	146%	143%	143%	126%	129%	137%	133%	141%	134%
SCANA	161%	168%	157%	166%	175%	164%	195%	145%	134%	135%	137%	158%	171%	179%	160%	156%
Southern Co.	154%	180%	161%	174%	176%	167%	198%	186%	188%	209%	230%	233%	227%	238%	179%	227%
Vectren	199%	192%	157%	162%	171%	150%	209%	215%	180%	181%	174%	170%	175%	185%	185%	177%
Xcel	164%	165%	154%	159%	162%	165%	178%	144%	141%	163%	113%	113%	132%	139%	159%	132%
Average	158%	165%	139%	143%	148%	150%	174%	159%	151%	162%	150%	149%	157%	152%	155%	156%
Composite							·								155%	156%

Source: Calculations made from data contained in Value Line Investment Survey.

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# STANDARD & POOR'S 500 COMPOSITE RETURNS AND MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIOS 1992 - 2005

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YEAR	RETURN ON AVERAGE EQUITY	MARKET-TO BOOK RATIO
1992	12.2%	271%
1993	13.2%	272%
1994	16.4%	246%
1995	16.6%	264%
1996	17.1%	299%
1997	16.3%	354%
1998	14.6%	421%
1999	17.3%	481%
2000	16.2%	453%
2001	7.5%	353%
2002	8.4%	296%
2003	14.2%	278%
2004	15.0%	291%
2005	16.1%	278%
A		
Averages:		
1992-2001	14.7%	341%
2001-2005	12.2%	299%

Source: Standard & Poor's Analyst's Handbook, 2006 edition, page 1.

## **RISK INDICATORS**

GROUP	VALUE LINE SAFETY	VALUE LINE BETA	VALUE LINE FIN STR	S & P STK RANK
S & P's 500 Composite	2.7	1.05	B++	8+
Comparison Group	2.6	0.92	B+	B+
Hadaway Reference Group	2.2	0.85	B++	B+

Sources: Value Line Investment Survey, Standard & Poor's Stock Guide.

Definitions:

Safety rankings are in a range of 1 to 5, with 1 representing the highest safety or lowest risk.

Beta reflects the variability of a particular stock, relative to the market as a whole. A stock with a beta of 1.0 moves in concert with the market, a stock with a beta below 1.0 is less variable than the market, and a stock with a beta above 1.0 is more variable than the market.

Financial strengths range from C to A++, with the latter representing the highest level.

Common stock rankings range from D to A+, with the latter representing the highest level.

# AQUILA, INC. TOTAL COST OF CAPITAL

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ITEM	PERCENT		COST RATE		WEIGHT	ED COST
		Aqui	la Netw	orks MPS		
Long-Term Debt	52.50%		6.73%		3.5	53%
Common Equity	47.50%	9.00%		10.25%	4.28%	4.87%
Total	100.00%				7.81%	8.40%
					8	.11%
		Aqu	ila Netw	orks L&P		
Long-Term Debt	52.50%		7.95%		4.1	7%
Common Equity	47.50%	9.00%		10.25%	4.28%	4.87%
Total	100.00%				8.45%	9.04%
					8	.75%

## AQUILA, INC. PRE-TAX COVERAGE

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ITEM	PERCENT	COST RATE	WEIGHTED COST	PRE-TAX COST	
	Aqui	la Network	s MPS		-
Long-Term Debt	52.50%	6.73%	3.53%	3.53%	
Common Equity	47.50%	9.63%	4.57%	7.42%	_(1)
TOTAL CAPITAL	100.00%		8.11%	10.95%	
	Aqui	la Network	is L&P		
Long-Term Debt	52.50%	7.95%	4.17%	4.17%	
Common Equity	47.50%	9.63%	4.57%	7.42%	-
Long-Term Debt	100.00%		8.75%	11,59%	

(1) Post-tax weighted cost divided by .616114 (composite tax factor)

Pre-tax coverage =	10.95%/3.53% <b>3.10 X</b>	Aquila Networks MPS
	11.59%/4.17% <b>2.78 X</b>	Aquila Networks L&P

Standard & Poor's Utility Benchmark Ratios:

	BBB
Pre-tax coverage (X) Business Position:	
6	3.1 - 4.5x
Total Debt to Total Capital (%) Business Position	
6	48 - 58%

Note: Since 2004, S&P no longer uses the ratio "Pre-tax Coverage" as one of its benchmark ratios. The benchmark levels shown above reflect the 1999 levels cited by S&P.