BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of the PGA Filing for Laclede Gas Company.) Case No. GR-2004-0273
STAFF'S PREHEAR	ING BRIEF
COMES NOW the Staff of the Missouri	Public Service Commission (Staff), by
and through counsel, and for its Prehearing Brief	states:
THE IS	<u>SSUE</u>
Laclede paid excessive prices for the right	to **
** for the 2003-2004	ACA period. Because these costs were
easily avoided through prudent management de	cision-making, the Commssion should
disallow the excessive costs from the rates charge	d by Laclede to its customers.
Laclede paid over **	
** In the three p	previous years, Laclede had paid only
**	**. In spite of the
tremendous increase in **	** facing Laclede as it sourced its
supply for the 2003-2004 ACA, Laclede didn't ev	ven flinch. Instead, Laclede pressed on
with its past practice and without adequate analysi	s paid over **
** Now Laclede seeks to pass the	costs on to its customers. The Staff
proposes that \$2,055,864 of these **	** be disallowed in rates
and should be refunded to customers.	
Summary of Staff's Position	
The facts show that Laclede was imprude	ent in its planning and decision-making

for the 2003-2004 ACA period because: 1) Laclede did not perform an upda	ited analysis
for **,** and 2) Lac	lede instead
relied on a seriously flawed 1996 study to plan its **	** gas in
2003, and 3) Laclede ignored the tremendous increase in **	
** in order to continue making off-system sales that primarily b	enefitted its
shareholders while customers footed the **** bill to make the	e off-system
sales possible.	
Laclede should have reassessed its gas procurement strategy ba	sed on the
information readily available to it and opted for **	**

BACKGROUND

Natural Gas Pricing

The natural gas commodity is unregulated and LDCs such as Laclede negotiate and contract with natural gas producers for their gas supply. Index pricing is often used by LDCs to set the commodity price for natural gas from producers and marketers. A first of the month (FOM) index price is established during a "bid-week" during the last few days of a month prior to the beginning of the month that the gas flows.² The FOM price will remain fixed for the entire month that the gas flows and be reset at the end of the month during the next bid-week. On the other hand, a daily index price is calculated for each day and may change daily. In both FOM and daily pricing, the price the LDC will eventually pay for the gas is an "absolute unknown", until after the index price is set.3

FOM and daily index pricing are not hedging, contrary to what some LDCs would

¹ Sommerer Direct, p. 4. ² Id.

³ Id. at p. 6.

have us believe. Because the price is unknown until the time it is set, it is subject to the volatility of the natural gas market and may be set higher or lower relative to the previous day's or month's price. For instance, if prices spike during bid-week, the FOM price will be set high for the remainder of the month.

Both FOM and daily pricing for natural gas share the same volatility as demonstrated by the graph attached as Exhibit 1. An FOM price might be set high for a given month based on price peaking during bid-week. FOM price spikes last for the entire month, while daily price spikes tend to spike for a few days and then decline. The FOM price doesn't actually "hedge" the price because the price is absolutely unknown until set during bid-week. And once locked in to the FOM price, the LDC is locked in until the price is reset at month's end during the next bid-week.

Laclede uses **	** to provide gas to its customers.
Baseload is the gas taken everyday in the	same amount. Another type of supply is
**** supply, which offers more flexibi	lity. **** gas allows Laclede to take
anywhere from 0 to its maximum daily qua	ntity (MDQ) under the **** contract.
**	** used to meet demand on particularly
cold days. But the evidence in this case wil	ll establish that Laclede is using ****
for other purposes and foisting the fixed cost	s, **,** associated
with **** gas onto its custome	ers. Laclede also purchases gas it calls
**** supply,	which has characteristics of baseload and
**** in that it has mimimum take provi	sions but allows flexibility in how and when
it is nominated. ⁴	
Laclede has traditionally used a **	

⁴ Id.

** Purchasing gas at **	
** requires Laclede to pay additional **	
^{''} ** **	
	_** even if the price o
gas has risen later during the month.	
** supplies usually have little if any **	
	
5**	
An alternative method to buying **** gas at **_	
	** at dail
index prices. Daily pricing carries mimimal **	** Gas can b
scheduled to reduce the impact of intramonth price spikes.	

The PGA/ACA Process

The cost of natural gas is passed directly to customers through the purchased gas adjustment/actual cost adjustment mechanism (PGA/ACA). "Natural gas distribution companies ... are allowed to recoup approved costs for obtaining natural gas from their suppliers as part of the rate they charge their customers." Laclede periodically adjusts the cost of gas passed on to customers through the PGA process. During the course of a year, Laclede makes PGA filings designed to increase or decrease the cost of gas that customers pay based upon Laclede's costs to procure the gas. At the end of the PGA

⁵ Godat Direct, pp. 5-6.

⁶ State ex rel. Riverside Pipeline Co., L.P. v. PSC of Mo., 165 S.W.3d 152, 153 (Mo. Banc 2005).

period under review, the Staff of the PSC conducts an Actual Cost Adjustment (ACA) review to determine what costs Laclede should be allowed to recover from their customers.⁷ The ACA review includes a "prudence review" to evaluate contracts with suppliers and then decide whether the costs associated with the contracts should be disallowed in whole or part.⁸

THE STANDARD FOR A PRUDENCE REVIEW

A prudence review begins with the presumption that Laclede's costs to procure gas for its customers are prudent. Once "some other participant in the proceeding creates a serious doubt as to the prudence of the expenditure, then [Laclede] has the burden of dispelling these doubts and proving the questioned expenditure to have been prudent."

So, the Staff must first show that Laclede "acted imprudently in making gas supply arrangements which caused higher gas costs than if prudent decisions had been made."

The Staff can meet its burden to rebut the initial presumption of prudence by producing evidence such as excessive cost overruns. "In the Union Electric case, the Commission found that the showing of two billion dollars in cost overruns associated with the building of the Callaway Nuclear Plant was sufficient to raise serious doubts about the prudence of Union Electric's expenditures."

As the U.S. Supreme Court stated regarding prudence, "[t]here should not be excluded from the finding of [rate] base, investments which, under ordinary circumstances, would be deemed reasonable. The term is applied for the purpose of excluding what might be found to be dishonest or obviously wasteful or imprudent

⁷ *Id*.

⁸ *Id*.

⁹ State ex rel. Associated Natural Gas Co. v. PSC, 954 S.W.2d 520, 529 (Mo. App. 1997).

 $^{^{10}}$ Id

¹¹ In the Matter of Missouri Gas Energy, 11 Mo. P.S.C.3d 206, 223 (2002)

expenditures."¹² Thus, prudent expenditures are reasonable, honest and not wasteful. If the Staff shows they are not, the presumption of prudence is rebutted.

Once the initial presumption of prudence is rebutted by Staff's evidence of imprudence, through unreasonable, dishonest or wasteful spending, Laclede must come forward to affirmatively prove that its actions were prudent.¹³

How is prudence evaluated? Prudence is evaluated by evaluating Laclede's conduct using a standard of reasonable care requiring due diligence.¹⁴ Management decisions will be assessed "at the time they are made and ask the question, 'Given all the surrounding circumstances existing at the time, did management use due diligence to address all relevant factors and information known or available to it when it assessed the situation?"¹⁵ The responsibility is really one of determining "how reasonable people would have performed the tasks that confronted the company."¹⁶

ARGUMENT

¹² Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 US 276 (1923)

¹⁴ In the Matter of Missouri-American Water Co., 9 Mo. P.S.C. 3d 254, 280 (2000)

¹⁵ In the Matter of Union Electric, 27 Mo. P.S.C. (N.S.) 183, 194 (1985).

¹⁶ In the Matter of Missouri Gas Energy, 11 Mo. P.S.C. 3d 206, 222.

that bore no relation to the gas market in 2003, and 3) Payment of over**
,** nearly double the amount paid the prior year, in order to
facilitate off-system sales.
1. Lack of Analysis
Laclede didn't bother to perform an analysis justifying its decision to **
** When asked by the Staff whether
the company had performed a study to justify the continued payment of exhorbitant
, Laclede produced a 1996 study. 17 Laclede admits it relied
on a 1996 study to schedule gas for 2003-2004. ¹⁸ Besides being woefully out of date and
stale, the 1996 study proves that Laclede had not performed an updated analysis of the
gas market for over seven (7) years. As Staff witness Sommerer points out in his direct,
"supply and demand fundamentals, pricing, trading, and a host of other factors had
changed. The Enron collapse had not occurred. Supply and demand was not perceived
as being nearly as tight in the mid-1990's. Gas demand for electric generation was
changing during this time period."19 Laclede ignored these factors.
The result of relying on an outdated 1996 study that did not consider the current
conditions of the natural gas market was that Laclede blindly paid the **
** without question. The 1996 study analyzed only the 1995 to
1996 heating season. How could the 1996 study possibly consider the recent
skyrocketing of ** * in 2003 that should have been readily
apparent to Laclede? Had Laclede fully assessed the situation based upon the
information readily available to it, it would plainly see that **

¹⁷ Sommerer Direct, p. 7.
18 Godat Direct, p. 8.
19 Sommerer Direct, p. 7.

** is nearly twice	what it had paid the year before.	
Though Laclede d	lid establish its **	**through a
competitive bidding proces	ss, ²⁰ it did not even consider a	daily pricing scenario for its
**** Lacled	e's after-the-fact analysis quanti	fied **
		** Laclede did not
consider **	** because seven	(7) years earlier a study of the
1995-1996 season showed	that Laclede saved money that ye	ear.
2. The Flawed and	l Outdated 1996 Study	
Curiously, Laclede	's 1996 study, upon which Lac	clede erected their gas supply
portfolio 2003-2004, was p	provided to the Staff for the first	t time in 2005, nearly ten (10)
years after its preparation. ²	1 Even more curious is the fact	that the footnotes to the study
itself proclaim its flaws: **	*	
		.** It's no
wonder the study was kept	from Staff for 10 years.	
The footnotes procl	aim the obvious: **	
		** The 1006 each
itself begs additional study	of these footnoted issues. Lacl	lede did no additional study in

²⁰ Godat Direct, p. 8. ²¹ Sommerer Direct, p. 8.

1996 or for the 2003-2004 ACA. Instead, it paid the ** **
and hopes the Commission will pass the costs on to customers.
In addition to the obvious flaws in the study set forth in prominent footnotes, the
1996 study contains a signficant mathematical error. Ten years after the study was
prepared, the Staff reviewed the study and determined that the calculation of **
** used by Laclede is overstated by 800%. Laclede's
calculations assume that it would pay the same price for ** **
whether it bought gas at **,** when in fact, **
**
The 1996 study relied upon by Laclede compares **
** scenarios for the months October 1995 to April 1996 and declares that even
though Laclede paid **
** Of course, Laclede's study assumes that Laclede
would have purchased gas on the daily market when its price was the highest.
Another factor the 1996 study fails to address is that paying **
** And the 1996 study is
limited to only one year, the 1995-1996 heating season, and ignores the possibility that
** will rise and the market will change by 2003.
Laclede's argument made by Mr. Godat is that "a study conducted by Laclede in
the winter of 1995-1996 **
** and that since that time

"Lacledehad seen no evidence to indicate that such a hedging strategy had become
imprudent or was not cost-effective."22 Apparently, Laclede considers a 500% increase,
from \$4 million to \$20 million, in ** ** "no evidence" of any change.
The Staff suggests that a fivefold increase in costs invites some consideration when
planning gas purchases. And to call a strategy "hedging" when Laclede pays **
** at a price that is an "absolute unknown" when the
**** million is paid almost shocks the conscience.
Laclede argues that paying the *** million for an absolutely unknown price
is what the Commission had in mind when it approved the Natural Gas Price Volatility
Mitigation rule in December 2003. ²³ 4 CSR·240-40.018 encourages natural gas utilities
to "balance market price risks, benefits, and price stability" and warns utilities that
"each has unique risks and costs that require evaluation by the natural gas utility in each
circumstance." Laclede fails to comprehend the rule. First, evaluation of the risk should
be a current evaluation, not a seven year old evaluation. Second, the evaluation should
consider the <i>current</i> market, not the market seven years ago. Third, paying **
** urges additional
current analysis to comply with the rule.
Finally, the 1996 study fails to separate the **
** pricing scenarios should have been isolated and compared, with a view
toward the risks involved with each pricing mechanism. Laclede failed to perform such
an analysis.
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²² Godat Direct, p. 8.
²³ Id, at p. 12.

3. ****
How high would ** ** have to go before Laclede sought a
different course of action? As Laclede entered the 2003-2004 ACA the **
\$30 million? Or \$40 million? Laclede's reliance upon the 1996 study answers that
question with a resounding "YES". No matter how high the *** went, the 1996
study tells Laclede to pay and that's what Laclede did.
A focus on the facts and circumstances known to Laclede at the time they make
gas supply decisions for 2003-2004 clearly shows that ** ** charges had
increased by nearly \$10 million over last year. Laclede's choice was to enter the **
** and avoid daily price spikes by using storage when
needed, thereby saving save **
** Because Laclede has structured its gas purchasing practices in order to facilitate
off-system sales it chose to **
** on to its customers in the PGA and Laclede buys the **
** and make a profit. The
problem is the customers pay the outrageous fixed costs and Laclede's shareholders keep
the profit. In fact, Laclede's customers paid over **
** while its shareholders paid \$0. And while the customers paid over **
**from capacity release and off-system
sales.

Laclede argues that the imputation of \$3.8 million in revenues to Laclede in the

2002 rate case guarantees customers \$3.8 million in lower rates. ²⁴ But this argument				
overlooks the fact that Laclede's customers paid over \$20 million in **				
** in order for Laclede to make **** million in off-system sales. Only a portion				
of the \$3.8 million imputed in revenues is properly attributed to off-system sales. The				
rest is to come from capacity release. For **** in particular, which Laclede				
argues make off-system sales possible, customers paid **				
** to obtain the portion of \$3.8 million imputed in revenues. Laclede is				
not restricted to using only its ** * for off-system sales. Laclede can use				
its **** and save its customers millions.				
Laclede characterizes the ** ** as "miniscule"				
compared to the overall cost of gas. ²⁵ As Staff witness Sommerer points out in his				
testimony a nearly \$10 million increase in **** is hard to view				
as miniscule. Unless, of course, someone else is paying the \$10 million – like customers.				
CALCULATION OF THE ADJUSTMENT				
The following chart prepared by Staff shows the calculation of Staff's adjustment				
based upon the difference between paying outrageous **				
** the Staff has determined that only that portion of the				
** should be disallowed. **				
.** ²⁶ Had Laclede exercised reasonable care				
exercising due diligence it would have opted for **				
,** and customers would have saved \$2,055,864. It is				
				

²⁴ Godat Direct, pp. 10-11. ²⁵ Godat Direct, p. 9. ²⁶ Sommerer Direct, p. 10.

important to note that Staff's c	calculation of the damages caused by Laclede to its
customers are calculated in a v	vay that is extraordinarily generous to Laclede: the
commodity savings for **	** were calculated assuming that Laclede would
have purchased **	
** even if the	daily price was high. No doubt, had Laclede purchased
**** (on the market it would have reduced the impact of any
price spikes and bought gas when	n the daily price was low, using its **
** W	hen prices were highest.

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WHEREFORE, the Staff of the Commission urges the Commission to find

Laclede was imprudent and disallow \$2,055,864 in the rates charged by Laclede.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Steven C. Reed

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing have been mailed with first class postage, hand-delivered, transmitted by facsimile or electronic mail to all counsel and/or parties of record this this 22nd day of January, 2007.

/s/ Steven C. Reed

EXHIBIT 1

IS

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL IN ITS ENTIRETY