

# EXHIBIT

Exhibit No.:

405

Issue(s):

Gas Supply Incentive Plan/  
Off-System Sales and Capacity  
Release Sharing Mechanism/  
Consistent Treatment of Natural  
Gas Storage Inventory Costs

Witness/Type of Exhibit:

Riley/Direct

Sponsoring Party:

Public Counsel

Case No.:

GR-2017-0215

GR-2017-0216

FILED

December 28, 2017

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Missouri Public

Service Commission

## DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

JOHN S. RILEY

Submitted on Behalf of the Office of the Public Counsel

**LACLEDE GAS COMPANY  
MISSOURI GAS ENERGY**

CASE NO. GR-2017-0215

CASE NO. GR-2017-0216

September 8, 2017

OPC Exhibit No. 405  
Date 12-15-17 Reporter A.E.  
File No. GR-2017-0216, GR-2017-0215

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

In the Matter of Laclede Gas Company's     )  
Request to Increase Its Revenues for Gas     )           Case No. GR-2017-0215  
Service   )


In the Matter of Laclede Gas Company     )  
d/b/a Missouri Gas Energy's Request to     )           Case No. GR-2017-0216  
Increase Its Revenues for Gas Service     )

**AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN S. RILEY**

STATE OF MISSOURI     )  
   )     ss  
COUNTY OF COLE     )

John S. Riley, of lawful age and being first duly sworn, deposes and states:


1. My name is John S. Riley. I am a Public Utility Accountant III for the Office of the Public Counsel.
2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my direct testimony.
3. I hereby swear and affirm that my statements contained in the attached testimony are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

  
John S. Riley, C.P.A.  
Public Utility Accountant III

Subscribed and sworn to me this 8<sup>th</sup> day of September 2017.



JERENE A. BUCKMAN  
My Commission Expires  
August 23, 2021  
Cole County  
Commission #13754037

  
Jerene A. Buckman  
Notary Public

My Commission expires August 23, 2021.

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**DIRECT TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**JOHN S. RILEY**

**LACLEDE GAS COMPANY  
MISSOURI GAS ENERGY**

CASE NO. GR-2017-0215

CASE NO. GR-2017-0216

1 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

2 A. John S. Riley, PO Box 2230, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

3 **Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

4 A. I am employed by the Missouri Office of the Public Counsel ("OPC") as a Public Utility  
5 Accountant.

6 **Q. Please describe your educational background.**

7 A. I earned a B.S. in Business Administration with a major in Accounting from Missouri State  
8 University.

9 **Q. Please describe your professional work experience.**

10 A. I was employed by the OPC from 1987 to 1990 as a Public Utility Accountant. In this  
11 capacity I participated in rate cases and other regulatory proceedings before the Public  
12 Service Commission ("Commission" or "PSC"). From 1994 to 2000 I was employed as an  
13 auditor with the Missouri Department of Revenue. I was employed as an Accounting  
14 Specialist with the Office of the State Court Administrator until 2013. In 2013, I accepted a  
15 position as the Court Administrator for the 19<sup>th</sup> Judicial Circuit until April, 2016 when I  
16 joined the OPC.

17 **Q. Are you a Certified Public Accountant ("CPA") licensed in the State of Missouri?**

1 A. Yes. I am also a member of the Institute of Internal Auditors (“IIA”)

2 **Q. Have you previously filed testimony before the Missouri Public Service Commission?**

3 A. Yes I have. A listing of my Case filings is attached as JSR-D-1

4 **Q. What is the purpose of your direct testimony?**

5 A. The purpose of my testimony is to explain the OPC’s opposition to the continued use of the  
6 Gas Supply Incentive Program (“GSIP”) and the sharing mechanism used in the distribution  
7 of off system sales margins and capacity credits between the Company and ratepayers. The  
8 OPC also asserts that Laclede and MGE should both include the carrying cost of gas  
9 inventory in their PGA/ACA mechanisms as opposed to including the costs in rate base.

10 **Gas Supply Incentive Plan**

11 **Q. Could you summarize the OPC’s opposition to the GSIP?**

12 A. The OPC is opposed to the continuation of Laclede’s GSIP in this current low price and low  
13 volatility natural gas market. There is no need to provide the Company with incentives to  
14 keep gas price low when upward volatility is not expected in the near future.

15 **Q. Why does OPC believe a GSIP is not necessary in this current natural gas pricing  
16 environment?**

17 A. We have seen little in the way of high prices or volatility since 2009. Natural gas is in a low  
18 price and low volatility trend that leading authorities expect to be prevalent for many years.  
19 The most recent Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) forecast continues to predict  
20 low prices:

21 In July, the average Henry Hub natural gas spot price was \$2.98 per million  
22 British thermal units (MMBtu), about the same as in June. Higher natural  
23 gas exports and growing domestic natural gas consumption in 2018  
24 contribute to the forecast Henry Hub natural gas spot price rising from an

1 annual average of \$3.06/MMBtu in 2017 to \$3.29/MMBtu in 2018.  
2 NYMEX contract values for December 2017 delivery that traded during the  
3 five-day period ending August 3 suggest that a range of \$2.17/MMBtu to  
4 \$4.48/MMBtu encompasses the market expectation for December Henry  
5 Hub natural gas prices at the 95% confidence level.”<sup>1</sup>  
6

7 The Market Realist, an investment research firm, compiled a short list of recent natural gas  
8 price predictions. All indicate low stable prices for the foreseeable future:

9  
10 “Long-term natural gas price forecast

11 Below are some of the forecasts for natural gas prices.

12 Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that US natural gas prices  
13 could average around \$3.60 per MMBtu by 2020.

14 The World Bank forecasts that US natural gas prices could trade  
15 around \$3.90 per MMBtu by 2020.

16 The IMF (International Monetary Fund) estimates that US natural  
17 gas prices could average about \$3.10 per MMBtu during the same  
18 period.

19 The EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration) forecasts that  
20 gas prices could average around \$2.71 per MMBtu and \$3.32 per  
21 MMBtu in 2016 and 2017, respectively.”<sup>2</sup>  
22

23 Because the purpose of the GSIP was to reduce “the impact of upward natural gas  
24 commodity price volatility on the Company’s customers”<sup>3</sup>, the plan is not necessary at this  
25 time to achieve that goal.

26 **Q. Can you provide an overview of the current GSIP?**

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<sup>1</sup> August 3, EIA Short Term Energy Outlook

<sup>2</sup> <http://marketrealist.com/2016/02/whats-long-term-forecast-natural-gas-prices/>

<sup>3</sup> Opening line of the Gas Supply Incentive Plan tariff 28-b.-1

1 A. The current GSIP was developed in and around 2002 to encourage gas distribution  
2 companies like Laclede to actively seek the lowest priced natural gas in their market area.  
3 Currently, only Laclede is employing a GSIP, however, Spire is requesting that both  
4 Laclede and MGE have the same plan. The basic concept is to establish an index price level  
5 known as a benchmark where the Company would be rewarded when its gas purchases are  
6 priced lower than that benchmark. A tier system was developed in order to determine if the  
7 market activity and the Company's actions should qualify for an incentive reward. The  
8 current tier system from the tariffs is reproduced below ( P.S.C. Mo. No. 5 Consolidated,  
9 Third Revised Sheet No. 28-b-1):

10  
a. In order to determine if the Company is eligible for incentive compensation due to its  
purchasing activities, Net Commodity Gas Price per MMBtu and the Annual Benchmark Price per  
MMBtu of natural gas for the ACA period will be evaluated to determine in which of the following  
tiers each respective price falls.

TIER LEVELS

|        |   |
|--------|---|
| Tier 1 | less than or equal to \$4.000 per MMBtu   |
| Tier 2 | greater than \$4.000 per MMBtu and less than or equal to the Incentive Sharing<br>Ceiling set forth below |
| Tier 3 | greater than the Incentive Sharing Ceiling set forth below  |

The Incentive Sharing Ceiling price shall be as follows:  
\$8.00 per MMBtu effective October 1, 2007  
\$8.48 per MMBtu effective October 1, 2008  
\$8.99 per MMBtu effective October 1, 2009

11 b. In order for the Company to be able to receive incentive compensation, Net Commodity Gas  
Price per MMBtu must be below the Annual Benchmark Price per MMBtu and the Net Commodity  
Gas Price per MMBtu must fall within Tier 1 or Tier 2. Further, the Annual Benchmark Price per  
MMBtu must fall within Tier 2 or Tier 3.

1 If the current price of natural gas is below the price set in Tier 1 (\$4.00) then gas costs are  
2 considered low and the Company is not eligible for reward. Recent history has shown that  
3 gas prices have not reached the \$4.00 level since the summer of 2014.<sup>4</sup>

4 There are no indications that gas prices will escalate above \$4.00 before the Company is  
5 required to file another rate case, which supports a suspension of the GSIP at this time.

6 **Q. Please restate the OPC position on the GSIP.**

7 A. The OPC believes the GSIP should be suspended at this time. The natural gas market is not  
8 the unpredictable, spiking and expensive platform that the GSIP was created to address by  
9 reducing the impact of upward natural gas commodity price volatility on the Company's  
10 customers. Reviving the GSIP could be entertained in the Company's next general rate  
11 case.

12 That being said, if the Commission believes that the GSIP should continue, tiers and caps  
13 need to remain in place so that the Company does not stand to benefit when prices are such  
14 that incentives only benefit the Company.

15 **Off-System Sales and Capacity Release Sharing Mechanism**

16 **Q. What is the current off-system sales margin and capacity release sharing mechanism**  
17 **contained in the Company's rates?**

18 A. The current sharing mechanism for Laclede is as follows:

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<sup>4</sup> EIA Average monthly natural gas pricing table indicates the last month prices averaged over \$4 was July 2014.  
[www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm](http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm)



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| Annual Off-System Sales Margins and Capacity Release Revenues | Firm Sales and Firm Transportation Customers Share | Company Share |
|---|--|---------------|
| First \$2,000,000   | 85%*   | 15%*          |
| Next \$2,000,000  | 80%  | 20%           |
| Next \$2,000,000  | 75%  | 25%           |
| Over \$6,000,000  | 70%  | 30%           |

MGE applies the same company sharing percentages but the threshold is \$1.2 million instead of \$2 million.

**Q. Does OPC propose a different approach?**

A. Yes. This incentive plan should be revised in favor of a 95/5 sharing mechanism for all off-system sales and capacity release revenues. The Commission has found that a 95/5 sharing mechanism is a sufficient incentive for electric companies employing a Fuel Adjustment Clause ("FAC"). When applying a 95/5 split to an FAC, 95% of any reductions in fuel costs benefit ratepayers while 5% of any reductions benefit shareholders. The theory of this 95/5 split is that allowing the utility to retain 5% of fuel savings is significant enough to incentivize the utility to seek such fuel cost reductions. Under a 95/5 sharing mechanism for Laclede, the company would retain 5% of all off-system sales and capacity release revenues, which, like FAC fuel cost reductions, also result in reductions in fuel costs for gas companies. The current approach of applying different percentages for different revenue amounts would be eliminated and the 95/5 would apply to all off-system and capacity release revenues. The theory would be the same as an FAC in that allowing Laclede to retain 5% of off-system sales and capacity releases is sufficient to incentivize the company to maximize the revenues it recovers through such off-system sales and capacity releases.

1 **Consistent Treatment of Natural Gas Storage Inventory Costs**

2 **Q. The Company currently recovers Laclede's gas storage carrying costs through its**  
3 **PGA/ACA. MGE recovers their gas storage carrying costs through its base rates.**  
4 **The Company is proposing that Laclede switch to MGE's rate base method of**  
5 **recovery. How does OPC propose Laclede and MGE recover their storage**  
6 **inventory costs?**

7 **A. The carrying cost of maintaining gas storage is nothing more than a cost of gas. Laclede**  
8 **and MGE's gas costs are recovered through their Purchased Gas Adjustment ("PGA")**  
9 **clauses in their respective tariffs. Laclede and MGE should not be allowed to recover the**  
10 **same cost – cost of natural gas – through both the PGA and base rates in a rate case.**

11 In the past Laclede and the Commission have determined that gas costs should be  
12 recovered through the PGA rate mechanism. It cannot be reasonably argued that the cost  
13 of maintaining natural gas inventories is not a natural gas cost. Therefore, the  
14 Commission should order that both Laclede and MGE exclude natural gas costs in the  
15 form of a return on natural gas inventories in rate base in this rate case. The Commission  
16 should order Laclede to continue its current recovery through the PGA and order MGE to  
17 adopt the same methodology currently used by Laclede.

18 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

19 **A. Yes it does.**

**John S. Riley, CPA**  
**Summary of Case Participation**

|   |                       |
|---|-----------------------|
| ST LOUIS COUNTY WATER COMPANY             | CASE NO. WR-88-5      |
| SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY       | CASE NO. TC-89-21     |
| EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY          | CASE NO. ER-2016-0023 |
| KCP&L GREATER MISSOURI OPERATIONS COMPANY | CASE NO. ER-2016-0156 |
| KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY         | CASE NO. ER-2016-0285 |
| AMEREN MISSOURI                           | CASE NO. ER-2016-0179 |
| EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC PRUDENCE REVIEW  | CASE NO. EO-2017-0065 |