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Incentive Plan
Benchmark
Michael J. Wallis
MO PSC Staff
Direct Testimony
GC-98-335

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

UTILITY SERVICES DIVISION

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

MICHAEL J. WALLIS

MISSOURI GAS ENERGY

A division of

SOUTHERN UNION COMPANY

CASE NO. GC-98-335

Jefferson City, Missouri
February, 1998

FILED
FEB 23 1998
MISSOURI
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Direct Testimony of
Michael J. Wallis

1 Q. Have you previously filed testimony before this Commission?

2 A. Yes. Schedule 1, attached to my direct testimony, is a list of cases in which I
3 have filed testimony before this Commission.

4 Q. What is the purpose of your direct testimony?

5 A. The purpose of my direct testimony is to address a number of weaknesses in
6 Missouri Gas Energy's (MGE or Company) incentive plan benchmark.

7 Q. How is MGE's incentive plan benchmark derived?

8 A. MGE's incentive plan benchmark is derived by (1) multiplying the first of
9 the month index price in *Inside FERC's Gas Market Report* (IFGMR) for Williams Natural
10 Gas Company (WNG) by 70% and for Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company (PEPL) by
11 30%, and adding the products together, to arrive at a weighted average index price; and (2)
12 multiplying the weighted average index price, calculated in (1) above, by a 4% premium
13 allowance to arrive at the total incentive plan benchmark price.

14 Q. What are the weaknesses in MGE's incentive plan benchmark?

15 A. First, the benchmark upon which the entire incentive plan sharing grid is
16 based, has no cap and thus, has no limit on upward price movement. For example, as a
17 result of a period of extremely cold weather, the benchmark could rise to \$10 per MMBtu
18 and MGE, by incurring actual gas costs of \$9.95 per MMBtu, would receive 50% of the
19 savings between the \$9.95 per MMBtu actual gas costs and the \$10 per MMBtu
20 benchmark gas costs. Thus, MGE would be retaining 2.5 cents per MMBtu in profits
21 (funded by its customers through a future ACA filing) from its incentive plan, while its
22 customers were struggling to pay their excessively high gas bills.

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1 Second, because the benchmark is not capped, MGE will make a windfall in profits
2 by following its normal practice of negotiating premiums in its gas supply contracts which
3 are not based on the index price plus a percentage. For example, if the first of the month
4 index price in IFGMR was \$10 per MMBtu, the premium portion of the benchmark would
5 be \$.40 per MMBtu (\$10 times 4%) and thus the benchmark would be \$10.40 per MMBtu.
6 MGE would take advantage of the high level of the \$.40 per MMBtu premium by
7 negotiating premiums in its gas supply contracts which were not based on a percentage of
8 the index price but were specified as a certain number of cents to be added to the index
9 price. For example, an MGE gas supply contract could specify index plus \$.10, thus MGE
10 would save \$.30 on the premium. MGE would receive 50% of the savings from beating the
11 premium simply because of the fact that the premium is tied to the index price on a
12 percentage basis. MGE will automatically retain, as profit, 2 cents per MMBtu for every
13 dollar [$(\$1 \times .04) \times 50\%$] by which the benchmark weighted average IFGMR index price
14 exceeds the historical index price upon which the 4% premium is based. This situation
15 could arise primarily because of periods of extremely cold weather and since, MGE has no
16 control over the weather, the Company should not be allowed to profit, through its
17 incentive plan, when the price of natural gas escalates due to actual or expected changes in
18 the weather.

19 Third, the incentive plan benchmark does not consider, as a part of the total
20 weighted average IFGMR index price, any of the MGE non-Tight Sands gas supplies
21 which are sourced from the Rocky Mountain supply area and which should be priced at
22 first of the month index prices in IFGMR for Colorado Interstate Gas Company (CIG).

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1 MGE purchased approximately 5% of its non-Tight Sands gas supplies from the
2 Rocky Mountain supply area during the first year of its incentive plan, yet its benchmark
3 calculation is only based on a 70% WNG-30% PEPL first of the month weighted average
4 IFGMR index price. This flaw in MGE's incentive plan benchmark is significant because
5 over the course of the last 52 months (November 1993 to February 1998), the WNG
6 IFGMR index prices have been an average of 39 cents higher than the CIG IFGMR index
7 prices (see Schedule 2 attached to my direct testimony). MGE will purchase an even
8 greater percentage of its non-Tight Sands gas supplies from the Rocky Mountain supply
9 area in the second and third years of its incentive plan because KN Interstate Gas
10 Transmission Company's Pony Express pipeline project (which was completed in October
11 1997) will provide MGE with over 100,000 MMBtu per day of additional Rocky Mountain
12 based pipeline capacity.

13 Q. Do you have any other comments with regard to MGE's incentive plan?

14 A. Yes. MGE's incentive plan acts as a disincentive for MGE to hedge its gas
15 supply portfolio. The costs that MGE would have to pay for premiums, commissions, and
16 brokerage fees would be added to the actual costs of gas and thus, would deduct from any
17 savings which MGE would experience if the actual gas costs were below the benchmark
18 gas costs and would add to any losses which MGE would experience if the actual gas costs
19 were above 104% of the benchmark gas costs.

20 Q. Please summarize your direct testimony.

21 A. The Staff believes there are a number of weaknesses with regard to MGE's
22 incentive plan benchmark in that (1) the benchmark upon which the entire incentive plan

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1 sharing grid is based, has no cap and thus, has no limit on upward price movement, (2)
2 because the benchmark is not capped, MGE will make a windfall in profits by negotiating
3 premiums in its gas supply contracts which are not based on an index price plus a
4 percentage, but instead are specified as a certain number of cents to be added to the index
5 price, and (3) the incentive plan benchmark does not consider, as a part of the first of the
6 month weighted average IFGMR index price, any of the MGE non-Tight Sands gas
7 supplies which are sourced from the Rocky Mountain supply area.

8 Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?

9 A. Yes, it does.

SUMMARY OF RATE CASE INVOLVEMENT

MICHAEL J. WALLIS

COMPANY NAME

CASE NO.

St. Joseph Light & Power Company	GR-88-115
Capital City Water Company	WR-88-215
GTE North Incorporated	TR-89-182
The Empire District Electric Company	WR-90-56
The Empire District Electric Company	ER-90-138
Ozark Natural Gas Company	GA-90-321
United Cities Gas Company	GR-91-249
St. Joseph Light & Power Company	EC-92-214
Western Resources Inc.	GR-93-140
Tartan Energy Company, L.C.	GA-94-127
Associated Natural Gas Company	GR-94-189
Associated Natural Gas Company	GR-95-213
Missouri Public Service	GR-95-273
Union Electric Company	EM-96-149
Missouri Public Service	GR-96-192
Laclede Gas Company	GR-96-193
Associated Natural Gas Company	GR-96-227
Atmos Energy Corporation and United Cities Gas Company	GM-97-70
Associated Natural Gas Company	GR-97-272
Missouri Gas Energy	GO-97-409
United Cities Gas Company	GO-97-410

Case No. GC-98-335 INDEX PRICE COMPARISON

Source: Inside FERC Gas Market Report

Month	Mid-Cont. WNG	Rky Mtn. CIG	Index Pricing Difference
November, 1993	1.83	1.70	-0.13
December, 1993	2.25	2.23	-0.02
January, 1994	1.94	1.88	-0.06
February, 1994	2.10	1.76	-0.34
March, 1994	2.11	1.86	-0.25
April, 1994	1.76	1.52	-0.24
May, 1994	1.77	1.55	-0.22
June, 1994	1.53	1.32	-0.21
July, 1994	1.61	1.39	-0.22
August, 1994	1.55	1.39	-0.16
September, 1994	1.33	1.33	0.00
October, 1994	1.24	1.16	-0.08
November, 1994	1.45	1.44	-0.01
December, 1994	1.60	1.57	-0.03
January, 1995	1.51	1.35	-0.16
February, 1995	1.23	1.06	-0.17
March, 1995	1.24	1.05	-0.19
April, 1995	1.27	1.05	-0.22
May, 1995	1.40	1.07	-0.33
June, 1995	1.44	1.14	-0.30
July, 1995	1.23	0.98	-0.25
August, 1995	1.18	0.84	-0.34
September, 1995	1.42	0.95	-0.47
October, 1995	1.49	1.04	-0.45
November, 1995	1.60	1.25	-0.35
December, 1995	1.88	1.31	-0.57
January, 1996	2.03	1.26	-0.77
February, 1996	1.84	1.16	-0.68
March, 1996	1.90	1.16	-0.74
April, 1996	2.15	1.06	-1.09
May, 1996	2.00	1.06	-0.94
June, 1996	2.03	1.06	-0.97
July, 1996	2.18	1.18	-1.00
August, 1996	2.14	1.21	-0.93
September, 1996	1.67	1.19	-0.48
October, 1996	1.68	1.25	-0.43
November, 1996	2.50	2.25	-0.25
December, 1996	3.68	3.50	-0.18
January, 1997	4.30	4.18	-0.12
February, 1997	2.81	2.48	-0.33
March, 1997	1.63	1.40	-0.23
April, 1997	1.70	1.43	-0.27
May, 1997	1.92	1.63	-0.29
June, 1997	2.11	1.46	-0.65
July, 1997	2.04	1.44	-0.60
August, 1997	2.06	1.38	-0.68
September, 1997	2.38	1.47	-0.91
October, 1997	2.98	2.10	-0.88
November, 1997	3.15	2.99	-0.16
December, 1997	2.37	1.94	-0.43
January, 1998	2.15	2.04	-0.11
February, 1998	1.92	1.70	-0.22

Total Monthly Average  -0.39
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footnote: WNG is Williams Natural Gas Company 1st of month index
CIG is Colorado Interstate Gas Company 1st of month index