

Exhibit No.:
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Witness: Robert B. Hevert
Sponsoring Party: Liberty Utilities
(Midstates Natural Gas) Corp.
d/b/a Liberty Utilities
Case No.: GR-2018-0013
Date Testimony Prepared: September 28, 2017

**Before the Public Service Commission
of the State of Missouri**

Direct Testimony

of

**Robert B. Hevert
ScottMadden, Inc.**

On Behalf Of

**Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) Corp.
d/b/a Liberty Utilities**

September 2017



DIRECT TESTIMONY
OF
ROBERT B. HEVERT
LIBERTY UTILITIES
BEFORE THE
MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
CASE NO. GR-2018-0013

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY.....	2
III.	OVERVIEW OF THE COMPANY’S REQUEST AND NEED FOR REGULATORY RATE REFORM.....	3
IV.	RATEMAKING PRINCIPLES AND THE BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVE RATEMAKING MECHANISMS	11
V.	ALTERNATIVE RATEMAKING TRENDS IN THE U.S.	14
VI.	THE COMPANY’S PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE RATE STRUCTURES	16
	Revenue Decoupling.....	16
	Cost Recovery Adjustment Mechanisms	22
VII.	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	25

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, AFFILIATION, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

3 A. My name is Robert B. Hevert. I am a Partner at ScottMadden, Inc. (“ScottMadden”).
4 My business address is 1900 West Park Drive, Suite 250, Westborough, MA 01581.

5 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU SUBMITTING THIS TESTIMONY?**

6 A. I am submitting this direct testimony (“Direct Testimony”) before the Missouri Public
7 Service Commission (“Commission”) on behalf of Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural
8 Gas) Corp., d/b/a Liberty Utilities (“Liberty” or the “Company”), an indirect, wholly
9 owned subsidiary of Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp (“APUC”).

10 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL**
11 **EXPERIENCE.**

12 A. I hold a Bachelor’s degree in Business and Economics from the University of Delaware,
13 and an MBA with a concentration in Finance from the University of Massachusetts. I
14 also hold the Chartered Financial Analyst designation.

15 I have worked in regulated industries for over thirty years, having served as an
16 executive and manager with consulting firms, a financial officer of a publicly traded
17 natural gas utility (at the time, Bay State Gas Company), and an analyst at a
18 telecommunications utility. In my role as a consultant, I have advised numerous energy
19 and utility clients on a wide range of financial and economic issues including corporate

1 and asset-based transactions, asset and enterprise valuation, transaction due diligence,
2 and strategic matters. As an expert witness, I have provided testimony in more than 200
3 proceedings regarding various financial and regulatory matters before numerous state
4 utility regulatory agencies, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Alberta
5 Utilities Commission.

6 **Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY BEFORE THIS**
7 **COMMISSION?**

8 A. Yes. Since 2010, I have filed testimony before the Commission in eleven rate
9 proceedings.

10 **II. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY**

11 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?**

12 A. The purpose of my Direct Testimony is to provide an overview of regulatory ratemaking
13 reform policies and support the Company's request for new ratemaking mechanisms.
14 Specifically, my testimony addresses Liberty's proposals¹ for regulatory rate reform
15 through alternative ratemaking mechanisms that are designed to better align the interests
16 of customers and the Company, consistent with fundamental regulatory objectives and
17 ratemaking principles.

18 **Q. HOW IS THE REMAINDER OF YOUR TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?**

19 A. The remainder of this Testimony is organized as follows:

20 Section III – Provides an overview of the Company's request and need for regulatory
21 reform;

¹ The Company's proposals are explained by Company witness Timothy S. Lyons.

1 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE**
2 **COMPANY’S PROPOSALS, AND HOW THEY BENEFIT BOTH CUSTOMERS**
3 **AND INVESTORS.**

4 A. As discussed throughout the balance of my testimony, the Company’s proposals are
5 driven by several factors that combine to reduce revenues and increase operating costs
6 just as cash flow is needed to fund the capital investments needed to provide safe and
7 reliable service. Those factors – declining use per customer, increasing operating costs,
8 and continuing capital investment requirements – have affected natural gas utilities across
9 the Country. Other utilities, and other regulatory commissions, have recognized that
10 under current conditions, traditional cost of service regulation is not likely to provide the
11 timely recovery of costs needed to ensure customers are served by financially sound
12 utility companies. They have addressed those concerns by implementing structures
13 similar to those included in the Company’s proposal.

14 Other utility companies, regulatory commissions, and the financial community
15 have recognized that traditional cost recovery no longer adequately addresses the needs
16 of customers and investors, and that some form of regulatory reform is needed to protect
17 the interests of multiple constituencies. As with the Company’s proposed structures, the
18 mechanisms put in place at other utilities address the dilution in cash flow that inevitably
19 would diminish their financial profile, ultimately to the detriment of their customers and
20 investors. And like other utilities, the Company’s proposed mechanisms would mitigate
21 the need for increasingly frequent rate proceedings, to the benefit of customers.

1 **Q. WHAT HAS BEEN THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK OF COST**
2 **RECOVERY FOR UTILITIES SUCH AS LIBERTY?**

3 A. Under traditional regulation, utilities are granted an exclusive service territory in
4 exchange for the obligation to provide service to customers within that territory, and to be
5 subject to rate regulation, including a regulated rate of return. In large measure, cost of
6 service regulation, which establishes the authorized level of revenue and returns, arises
7 from the “essential” nature of utility services, whose unit costs decrease with increasing
8 levels of output. Because of their declining cost structures, utility services in a given
9 market area are more efficiently provided by a single firm than by multiple firms.
10 Although they may serve different market sectors (e.g., electricity, natural gas, water,
11 waste water) utilities typically are capital-intensive enterprises, whose investments are
12 long-lived, essentially irreversible, and represent high “sunk” costs.

13 Under traditional cost-of-service ratemaking, the process of setting of just and
14 reasonable rates applies historical costs to a test year to determine revenue requirements
15 and billing determinants. The rates approved in the rate proceeding are then fixed until
16 the next rate case. That is, historical costs are used to set future rates, which results in a
17 lag between the time funds are expended, and the time rates are set to recover those costs.
18 If sales are higher than anticipated, the utility’s profit will be higher. Under a traditional
19 ratemaking approach, the utility retains the excess profit between rate cases to fund
20 additional investment. However, if sales are lower than anticipated, revenues (and profit)
21 will be lower, and the utility may not have sufficient earnings to cover its fixed costs and
22 invest in the capital necessary to provide safe and reliable service. Regulatory lag,
23 therefore, is a significant challenge for utilities in situations in which costs are rising

1 more rapidly than sales.

2 **Q. HOW DOES THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT DIFFER FROM THE**
3 **SCENARIO IN WHICH TRADITIONAL COST OF SERVICE REGULATION**
4 **ENABLED UTILITIES TO MAINTAIN THEIR FINANCIAL STRENGTH AND**
5 **TO PROVIDE SAFE AND RELIABLE SERVICE?**

6 A Quite simply, sales volumes have declined even though the need to maintain service
7 reliability and service, to replace aging infrastructure, and to address public policy
8 objectives have continued, or even increased. For example, investments required to
9 maintain system integrity and safety do not generate incremental revenue through
10 additional volume growth. Unlike prior periods, when traditional cost of service
11 regulation and volume growth enabled the timely return of and on incremental non-
12 revenue producing investments, the current environment does not.

13 As a result, utilities such as Liberty cannot rely on load growth or increased
14 profitability generated through reduced O&M costs to fund their infrastructure
15 replacements, or to sustain their financial integrity as those investments are being
16 undertaken. That condition presents considerable financial challenges for utilities that,
17 like Liberty, have a continuing need to invest significant amounts of capital in non-
18 revenue producing infrastructure. That earnings pressure becomes even more acute as the
19 rate of capital expenditures accelerates.

20 The ability to efficiently acquire the capital needed to fund the growing level of
21 infrastructure investments is dependent on the ability to recover that investment in a
22 timely manner. As noted by the American Gas Association:

23 Timely cost recovery of prudently incurred safety and reliability

1 investments is of utmost importance to the financial stability of natural
2 gas utilities. Because traditional ratemaking allows recovery of
3 infrastructure investments only following approval in a rate case, there
4 is often a multi-year delay before the recovery of such investments
5 begins. Investments that are recovered long after they are incurred
6 cause the utility to bear carrying costs without the opportunity to
7 recover these prudent expenditures. Credit agencies criticize
8 companies with lag in the recovery of their costs and assign a lower
9 credit rating to such utilities that ultimately translates into higher rates
10 for customers. The only alternative is to file a rate case each year,
11 which is a costly activity that also leads to higher rates for customers.²

12
13 Increasing capital investments, together with reduced sales, have created a
14 circumstance under which each dollar of invested assets produces fewer dollars of
15 revenue. When that occurs, the ability to fund capital investments through growth-related
16 revenue increases will be limited. As the American Gas Association noted, absent other
17 solutions, the only alternative to funding those investments is more frequent rate filings.

18 **Q. HAVE FINANCIAL PARTICIPANTS SUCH AS RATING AGENCIES**
19 **RECOGNIZED THE CONCERNS SUMMARIZED ABOVE?**

20 A. Yes, they have. Standard and Poor's ("S&P"), for example, states that "[o]ne significant
21 aspect of regulatory risk that influences credit quality is the regulatory environment in the
22 jurisdictions where a utility operates."³ S&P explains that "[w]hen we evaluate U.S
23 utility regulatory environments, we consider financial stability to be of substantial
24 importance. Cash takes precedence in credit analysis. A regulatory jurisdiction that
25 recognizes the significance of cash flow in its decision-making is one that will appeal to

² American Gas Association, Infrastructure Cost Recovery Update, June, 2012, at 2.

³ S&P Global Ratings, RatingsDirect, "Assessing U.S. Investor-Owned Utility Regulatory Environments," August 10, 2016, at 2.

1 creditors.”⁴

2 Similarly, Moody’s states that regulators’ “actions have a significant impact on
3 the environment in which a utility operates.”⁵ Moody’s considers the regulatory
4 structure to be so important that 50.00 percent of the factors that weigh in a ratings
5 determination are related to the nature of regulation.⁶ Among the factors considered by
6 Moody’s in assessing the regulatory framework are the effect of regulatory actions on
7 cash flow generation:

8 As the revenues set by the regulator are a primary component of a utility’s
9 cash flow, the utility’s ability to obtain predictable and supportive
10 treatment within its regulatory framework is one of the most significant
11 factors in assessing a utility’s credit quality. The regulatory framework
12 generally provides more certainty around a utility’s cash flow and
13 typically allows the company to operate with significantly less cushion in
14 its cash flow metrics than comparably rated companies in other industrial
15 sectors.⁷

16
17 While the Infrastructure System Replacement Surcharge (“ISRS”) mechanism in
18 Missouri has been a positive factor in addressing this issue, in my view additional
19 measures are necessary and I believe rating agencies would see the Company’s proposed
20 structures as credit-supportive which, ultimately, is in the best interests of customers and
21 investors.

4 *Ibid.*, at 6.

5 Moody’s Investor Service, *Consistency and Predictability of Regulatory Decisions Drive Differences in US Utility Credit Profiles*, July 21, 2014, at 2.

6 Moody’s Investors Service, *Rating Methodology; Regulated Gas and Electric Utilities* at 6 (Dec. 23, 2013).

7 Moody’s Investors Service, *Regulatory Frameworks – Ratings and Credit Quality for Investor-Owned Utilities* at 2 (June 18, 2010).

1 **Q. TURNING TO THE COMPANY'S PROPOSALS, WHY ARE THEY NOW**
2 **NEEDED?**

3 A. The request is necessary because the stability of having an opportunity to achieve its
4 authorized return is important to the Company and its customers to offset (1) the effect of
5 reduced sales volumes on the recovery of revenues authorized by the Commission in the
6 Company's most recent rate case, GR-2014-0152; (2) persistent increases in operating
7 costs and expenses; and (3) the cost of carrying infrastructure investments not yet
8 incorporated into rates. Because those factors are both persistent and generally beyond
9 the Company's control, without the requested regulatory reforms, Liberty will need to
10 seek rate more frequent rate relief to maintain the financial integrity necessary to meet its
11 obligation to provide safe and reliable distribution service to customers.

12 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE TREND IN THE COMPANY'S SALES.**

13 A. The Company's⁸ customer count and end user volumes have declined from 2003 to 2016,
14 resulting in lower sales. The total number of end user customers has declined from
15 almost 60,000 in 2003 to approximately 53,000 in 2016.⁹ On a per-customer basis,
16 annual consumption has declined from 110 dekatherms (Dth) to 89 Dth over the same
17 period.¹⁰ As shown in Chart 1 below, the decline is primarily due to warmer weather, as
18 sales volume is strongly correlated to heating degree days. Additionally, increased
19 conservation has contributed to the decline.


⁸ Historical customer and sales volume trends presented here represent that of the Company (2012-2016) and of its predecessor Atmos Energy (2003-2011).

⁹ Source: SNL Financial.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

1

Chart 1: Natural Gas Sales Volume vs. Heating Degree Days¹¹



2 **Q. WHAT EFFECT DO DECLINING SALES HAVE ON THE COMPANY AND ITS**
3 **CUSTOMERS?**

4 A. As noted earlier, lower sales volumes produce lower revenue, which reduces the
5 Company's ability to recover its fixed costs, putting upward pressure on rates and
6 increasing the burden on customers. Absent an ability to offset lower revenues with cost
7 savings, the result is an inability to earn the Company's authorized return.


8 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY BEEN ABLE TO EARN ITS AUTHORIZED RETURN ON**
9 **A CONSISTENT BASIS?**

10 A. No, it has not. The combination of lower revenues described above, together with
11 increases in costs and non-revenue producing capital investment have prevented the
12 Company from earning its authorized return over a sustained period between rate cases
13 (*see* Chart 2 below). Going forward, regulatory rate reform will be necessary to maintain

¹¹ Source: SNL Financial; Heating Degree Days data provided by the Company.

1 the financial integrity necessary to provide safe and reliable service.

2 **Chart 2: Overall Rate of Return: Earned vs. Authorized¹²**



3 **IV. RATEMAKING PRINCIPLES AND THE BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVE**
4 **RATEMAKING MECHANISMS**

5 **Q. WOULD THE COMPANY AND ITS CUSTOMERS BENEFIT FROM**
6 **REGULATORY REFORM?**

7 A. Yes. As explained below, consistent with universal ratemaking principles, the proposed
8 regulatory reforms provide important benefits to both customers and investors.

9 **Q. WHAT ARE RATEMAKING PRINCIPLES?**

10 A. In his seminal text *Principles of Public Utility Rates*, James C. Bonbright outlined the

¹² Source: SNL Financial. Earned return calculated as Net Utility Operating Income / Net Utility Plant. In GR-2014-0152, the Commission authorized Liberty an Overall Rate of Return of 7.22 percent. The previous two rate cases (GR-2010-0192 and GR-2006-0387) for the Company's predecessor, Atmos Energy, included settlements that did not determine the rate of return.

1 principles of a sound rate structure, as summarized in Chart 3 below:

2 **Chart 3: Ratemaking Principles and Regulatory Objectives¹³**

Ratemaking Principle	Regulatory Objectives
Economic Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Rates are cost-based ■ Rates encourage efficient consumption of resources (i.e., send proper price signals) ■ Rates encourage prudent cost control
Equity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Rates are non-discriminatory ■ Fair allocation of costs and risks ■ Avoidance of cross-subsidization
Revenue Adequacy and Stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Revenue sufficient to ensure financial integrity and encourage new investment ■ Recovery of prudent utility costs ■ Profit stability
Bill Stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Rate stability and continuity ■ Avoidance of rate shock ■ Affordability
Public Acceptance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Simplicity ■ Reliable service ■ Understandability ■ Moderate regulatory burden ■ Promotion of social objectives, e.g., <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diverse sources of energy • Utility sponsorship of energy efficiency programs • Environmental policies

3
4 As discussed below, the Company’s proposed mechanisms reflect those ratemaking
5 principles, and are intended to satisfy the multiple, sometimes conflicting objectives.

6 **Q. HOW DO THE COMPANY’S PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE RATEMAKING**
7 **MECHANISMS PROMOTE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY?**

8 A. The Company’s proposed revenue decoupling mechanism encourages more efficient
9 consumption by breaking the link between sales volume and revenues, which removes
10 the disincentive to promote conservation measures.

¹³ Sources: Sources: James C. Bonbright, Albert L. Danielsen and David R. Kamerschen, *Principles of Public Utility Rates*, 2nd Edition, Public Utilities Reports (March, 1988), *Alternative Rate Mechanisms and Their Compatibility with State Utility Commission Objectives*, National Regulatory Research Institute, April 2014; *Alternative Electricity Ratemaking Mechanisms Adopted By Other States*, Christensen Associates prepared for Public Utility Commission of Texas, May 25, 2016; *Alternative Regulation for Emerging Utility Challenges: 2015 Update*, Edison Electric Institute, November 11, 2015.

1 **Q. DO THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE RATEMAKING**
2 **MECHANISMS ALSO PROMOTE EQUITY?**

3 A. As explained in more detail in Section VI, the Company's proposed revenue decoupling
4 mechanism promotes equity by more fairly enabling the Company's recovery of fixed
5 costs. Decoupling also may mitigate cross-subsidization that may affect low income and
6 low volume customers.

7 **Q. DO THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE RATEMAKING**
8 **MECHANISMS ALSO ENABLE REVENUE AND BILL STABILITY?**

9 A. Yes, they do. As also explained in more detail in Section VI, the Company's proposed
10 revenue decoupling mechanism stabilizes the Company's revenues by mitigating the
11 over- and under-recovery of costs resulting from fluctuations in customer usage. As
12 noted earlier, revenue stability benefits both the Company and customers by ensuring the
13 Company's financial integrity, which allows the company to provide safe and reliable
14 service.

15 Moreover, revenue stability enables bill stability. In a traditional cost-of-service
16 framework, rate shock can occur when large capital investments are put into rate base at
17 once. Under decoupling, actual revenues are reconciled against authorized levels, and
18 rates are adjusted up or down accordingly. Those adjustments, however, are generally
19 small, thereby mitigating rate shock.

20 **Q. ARE THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE RATE MECHANISMS GENERALLY**
21 **ACCEPTED BY THE PUBLIC?**

22 A. Yes. As explained below, alternative ratemaking mechanisms are common, as a
23 substantial number of utilities have implemented mechanisms similar to those proposed

1 by the Company.¹⁴ Further, the proposed mechanisms alleviate regulatory lag and
2 improve the Company's financial health, which would diminish the need to file frequent,
3 costly rate cases. Moreover, the proposed vegetation management tracker and CR
4 Tracker recover costs incurred to improve safety and reliability. Lastly, as noted earlier,
5 revenue decoupling encourages conservation and encourages the Company's pursuit of
6 energy efficiency measures.

7 **V. ALTERNATIVE RATEMAKING TRENDS IN THE U.S.**

8 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RANGE OF ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS**
9 **IMPLEMENTED BY UTILITIES.**

10 Alternative ratemaking mechanisms fall along a spectrum from incremental reform to
11 comprehensive reform. Mechanisms that represent incremental reform apply to a single
12 component, such as a purchased gas adjustment mechanism or a future test year.
13 Mechanisms that represent comprehensive reform include ratemaking structures that
14 address the overall revenue requirement such as revenue decoupling, multiyear rate plans,
15 formula rates, and performance based rates.

16 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN, GENERALLY, THE TREND IN REGULATORY**
17 **RATEMAKING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES.**

18 A. Alternative ratemaking mechanisms have been implemented to supplement the traditional
19 ratemaking process, primarily to mitigate regulatory lag. Cost recovery adjustment
20 mechanisms arose from the need to address rapidly rising fuel costs during the early
21 1970s, when fuel prices climbed more rapidly than the utilities could obtain rate

¹⁴ See Schedule RBH-1.

1 recognition of the increased costs through the traditional rate case process. During that
2 time, utility earnings were under considerable pressure, which prompted jurisdictions to
3 allow more timely recovery of cost increases that were beyond the control of the
4 utilities.¹⁵

5 Alternative ratemaking has been of increased interest in recent years due to rising
6 and volatile utility costs, growth in non-revenue producing capital expenditures, and
7 sluggish demand growth. Declining usage per customer and slow economic growth has
8 placed pressure on traditional volume-based, cost-of-service ratemaking. Further,
9 sending a volume-based price signal to recover largely fixed costs to accommodate peak
10 usage is not economically efficient, and generally violates the cost causation ratemaking
11 principle.

12 More recently, states have pursued certain public policy initiatives and have
13 developed mechanisms to support and advance those policies. For gas utilities,
14 alternative ratemaking mechanisms have been spurred by declining usage per customer,
15 environmental and safety concerns, state-mandated energy efficiency programs, and a
16 desire to improve utility performance.


17 **Q. ARE ALTERNATIVE RATEMAKING MECHANISMS COMMON IN THE U.S.?**

18 A. Yes, they are. As shown on Chart 4 below, according to Regulatory Research Associates
19 (“RRA”), all utilities have a mechanism to recover fuel, purchased power, or gas
20 commodity costs. Further, half of the utilities covered by RRA have infrastructure cost
21 recovery or revenue decoupling mechanisms in place, and 60.00 percent have

¹⁵ Source: Regulatory Research Associates, *Adjustment Clauses: A State-by-State Overview*, September 12, 2017, at 2.

1 mechanisms to recover energy efficiency program expenses.

2 **Chart 4: Cost Recovery Adjustment Mechanisms in Place at U.S. Utilities¹⁶**



3
4 Additionally, more comprehensive forms of alternative mechanisms, such as multiyear
5 rate plans and formula rate plans, have been implemented in 24 states.¹⁷

6 **VI. THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE RATE STRUCTURES**

7 ***Revenue Decoupling***

8 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF DECOUPLING**
9 **MECHANISMS.**

10 A. The term “decoupling” encompasses a category of alternative ratemaking mechanisms
11 designed to decouple, or break, the link between a utility’s revenue and its volume of
12 sales. Decoupling is intended to align the interests of customers and shareholders by

¹⁶ Regulatory Research Associates, *Adjustment Clauses: A State-by-State Overview*, September 12, 2017.

¹⁷ Source: Lowry, Makos, Waschbusch, *Alternative Regulation for Emerging Utility Challenges: 2015 Update*, Edison Electric Institute, November 11, 2015.

1 allowing the utility to recover its allowed revenues while also supporting programs to
2 promote energy efficiency.

3 A central principle underlying the concept of decoupling is that the utility's costs
4 of providing service (particularly distribution service) are primarily fixed and do not vary
5 based on sales volume. Like other utilities, Liberty incurs customer-related and demand-
6 driven costs to provide distribution service that generally are not affected by its sales
7 volume. By "decoupling" revenues from the volume of sales, the Company is better able
8 to recover the revenues relied upon in setting rates when customers consume less natural
9 gas, and as a result, is financially indifferent to changes in customer usage due to factors
10 beyond the Company's control.

11 **Q. PLEASE PROVIDE SOME EXAMPLES OF "CUSTOMER-RELATED" AND**
12 **"DEMAND-DRIVEN" FIXED COSTS THAT ARE INCURRED BY THE**
13 **COMPANY.**

14 A. A utility's customer-related costs are the fixed costs incurred to serve customers
15 regardless of the amount of energy consumed. These include items such as billing, meter
16 reading, collections, call centers, meters, laterals, and other infrastructure and expenses
17 necessary to connect customers to the distribution system. Demand-driven costs are the
18 distribution system investments necessary to meet customers' peak demands on the
19 system or individual lines. These costs include, for example, mains and gate stations that
20 are sized, constructed, and maintained to meet customers' maximum peak demands. Once
21 the Company makes these investments to serve customers and meet peak demand, the
22 costs do not vary based on sales volumes; they are largely "fixed." In other words, the
23 cost of those distribution system investments and services does not change based on

1 customers' consumption of natural gas.

2 **Q. WHY IS DECOUPLING AN APPROPRIATE RATEMAKING MECHANISM**
3 **FOR THE COMPANY?**

4 A. Although the Company's cost of providing distribution service is not driven by
5 customers' natural gas consumption, a significant portion of its revenue is recovered
6 through volume-based charges. As noted earlier, this creates a misalignment between
7 cost causation and cost recovery.

8 For the Company's residential rate classes, 100.00 percent of the cost of providing
9 distribution service is fixed. None of the Company's distribution costs vary with volume-
10 based sales. However, 41.00 percent of residential revenue is recovered based on
11 consumption through non-fixed (i.e., variable) volume-based charges. At a total
12 Company level, as with residential service, none of the distribution costs vary with sales
13 volumes as they are 100.00 percent fixed; yet nearly 49.00 percent of revenues are
14 derived from variable volume-based charges.

15 **Q. WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO FLUCTUATIONS IN SALES VOLUMES?**

16 A. There are several factors that contribute to the fluctuations in customer usage for a gas
17 utility. For the Company, the most significant factor that contributes to fluctuations in
18 customer usage is weather, and more specifically, fluctuations in temperature (*see* Chart 1
19 above). In colder weather customer usage increases; in warmer weather it decreases.
20 Other factors include customer-initiated conservation efforts and the Company's
21 implementation of energy efficiency measures.

1 **Q. DO OTHER UTILITIES EXPERIENCE SIMILAR OVER- AND UNDER-**
2 **RECOVERY OF COSTS?**

3 A. Yes. This type of over- and under-recovery of costs is not unique to Liberty - it is a
4 challenge for the natural gas industry. Gas utilities in 33 jurisdictions have mechanisms
5 in place that decouple revenues from sales volume in a full or limited fashion.¹⁸

6 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED VBA RIDER.**

7 A. As explained in more detail by Mr. Lyons, the Company proposes a VBA Rider, which
8 would reconcile annually differences between actual and authorized revenues (*i.e.*,
9 revenues reflected in current base rates that were approved by the Commission in the
10 most recent rate case proceeding), thereby mitigating the over- and under- recovery of
11 costs resulting from fluctuations in customer usage faced by many gas utilities.

12 **Q. WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF THE VBA RIDER?**

13 A. The VBA Rider is a symmetrical and transparent formula for collecting the approved
14 distribution revenue requirements – no more, no less. There are additional benefits to
15 customers from the VBA Rider. Specifically, the VBA Rider reduces the reliance on an
16 imperfect forecasting process, and diminishes the advantage a utility has in choosing the
17 timing of the next rate case. Because fluctuations in weather are beyond the Company's
18 control, the VBA Rider also allows the Company to focus on things it can control to
19 provide safe and reliable service. It also reduces the potential for cross-subsidization
20 between low volume and higher volume customers present in fixed-variable rate designs.
21 Additionally, the VBA Rider protects consumers against the negative effects of declining

¹⁸ See Regulatory Research Associates, "Adjustment Clauses: A State-by-State Overview" September 12, 2017. Includes lost revenue adjustment mechanisms for energy-efficiency programs, weather normalization adjustment mechanisms, and straight fixed variable rate designs. See also, Schedule RBH-1.

1 load on utilities and revenue losses attributable to energy efficiency programs and,
2 therefore, encourages adoption of customer-initiated and utility-sponsored energy
3 efficiency measures.

4 Lastly, the decoupling mechanism ensures that customer bills are more stable over
5 the longer term. To the extent actual revenues are higher than approved levels in a given
6 period (and therefore bills for distribution service are higher than anticipated), rates will
7 be reduced. The reverse would be true in that if revenues (and bills) are lower than
8 anticipated, rates would increase. In this regard, decoupling will smooth customer bills
9 over the longer term such that the rates they pay recover only the approved revenue
10 levels. As such, the decoupling mechanism ensures that the customer pays no more than
11 the amount authorized by the Commission.

12 As explained earlier, revenue stability is an important ratemaking principle that
13 has governed regulatory commissions' rate-setting objectives for decades.¹⁹ The VBA
14 Rider provides revenue stability that enables the Company to recover its cost of service,
15 the majority of which is fixed. As such, the VBA Rider supports Liberty's financial
16 health to provide safe, reliable and efficient service to its customers. As discussed in
17 Section IV above, revenue stability also enables bill stability, another important
18 ratemaking principle that customers benefit from.

19 **Q. IS THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED MECHANISM CONSISTENT WITH**
20 **MISSOURI STATUTE?**

21 A. Although I am not an attorney, my plain reading of relevant statutes suggests it is. RSMo

¹⁹ Sources: James C. Bonbright, Albert L. Danielsen and David R. Kamerschen, "Principles of Public Utility Rates, 2nd Edition", Public Utilities Reports (March, 1988), at 382-383, 387-388.

1 386.266.3 specifically states that “. . .any gas corporation may make an application to the
2 commission to approve rate schedules authorizing periodic rate adjustments outside of
3 general rate proceedings to reflect the non-gas revenue effects of increases or decreases
4 in residential and commercial customer usage due to variations in either weather,
5 conservation, or both.” On balance, it is my understanding that the statute authorizes the
6 Commission to approve a rate adjustment mechanism that addresses between rate cases
7 the revenue effects from changes in residential and commercial usage.

8 To date, the Commission has addressed this issue by authorizing a higher monthly
9 customer charge to recover fixed costs, or by establishing rate blocks in which most fixed
10 costs will be recovered once the customer uses a relatively modest amount of gas.
11 Although those approaches have somewhat mitigated revenue volatility, they have
12 shortcomings. Depending on the situation, a high customer charge may not be equitable
13 for low-income and low-volume customers, as those customers may pay more than their
14 share of fixed costs, potentially subsidizing higher use customers.

15 **Q. IF DECOUPLING REMOVES THE LINK BETWEEN SALES AND REVENUES,**
16 **DOES IT GUARANTEE A UTILITY WILL ACHIEVE ITS ALLOWED RATE**
17 **OF RETURN?**

18 A. No, it does not. Decoupling only addresses the revenue component of the income
19 statement, not operating expenses or rate base investment, and is designed to recover only
20 the amount of revenue authorized by the Commission. As explained earlier, under
21 traditional cost-of-service ratemaking, utilities rely on incremental revenues beyond the
22 rate case rate year as a means of maintaining a reasonable rate of return on investment in
23 between rate cases. Those additional funds historically have financed necessary capital

1 investment and helped offset inflationary pressures. When the costs of providing service
2 escalates faster than sales (and therefore revenue), in the long run the utility's rate of
3 return will likely erode. Stable, predictable revenues over time help the utility to
4 maintain a reasonable level of earnings, and to avoid frequent and costly rate cases.
5 Decoupling mechanisms therefore may stabilize a utility's revenues and improve its
6 financial integrity, enabling the utility to provide safe and reliable service to customers.
7 Decoupling does not, however, guarantee a base level of earnings or rate of return, nor
8 does it create windfall profits for the utility.

9 *Cost Recovery Adjustment Mechanisms*

10 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN, GENERALLY, THE PURPOSE OF COST RECOVERY**
11 **ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS.**

12 A. As discussed above, cost recovery adjustment mechanisms have been implemented by
13 utilities since the 1970s to provide more timely recovery of costs between rate cases. As
14 a principle, these adjustment mechanisms have been implemented to recover costs that
15 are: (1) large, (2) volatile, and/or (3) exogenous, or outside of the utility's control. More
16 recently, adjustment mechanisms have been implemented to address public policies
17 mandated by state statute or by the regulatory commission. Some examples include
18 energy efficiency programs and infrastructure replacement programs, such as the
19 Company's current Infrastructure System Replacement Surcharge ("ISRS"). As noted
20 earlier, all utilities now have an adjustment mechanism in place to recover fuel,
21 purchased power, or gas commodity costs, such as the Company's Purchased Gas
22 Adjustment ("PGA") mechanism.

23 As noted earlier, and as explained further by Mr. Lyons, the Company is

1 proposing to implement the CR Tracker to defer through a regulatory asset for future
2 recovery in rates the carrying costs associated with incremental capital spending not
3 included in base rates, and three additional tracking mechanisms to track and reconcile
4 actual expenses incurred during the year with those reflected in current base rates. The
5 proposed O&M trackers would track and reconcile expenses related to: (1) Ad Valorem
6 Taxes; (2) Bad Debt expenses; and (3) Vegetation or Right-of-Way Management
7 expenses.

8 **Q. ARE THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THOSE MECHANISMS LARGE,**
9 **VOLATILE, AND/OR BEYOND THE COMPANY'S CONTROL?**

10 A. Yes. For example, the Company's bad debt expense can vary widely with wholesale gas
11 costs, temperature, and the state of the economy. Similarly, the Company's property tax
12 expense depends on state and local government assessment inputs and tax rate changes,
13 of which the Company has no control over.

14 **Q. ARE THE PROPOSALS CONSISTENT WITH MISSOURI STATUTE?**

15 A. Yes. The proposed tracking mechanisms do not adjust rates between rate cases; rather,
16 costs are reconciled against expenses included in base rates, and any expenses under or
17 over that amount will be deferred in a regulatory asset/liability account to be included in
18 rate base in the next rate case, with a proposed amortization schedule.

19 **Q. ARE SIMILAR MECHANISMS IN PLACE AT OTHER NATURAL GAS**
20 **UTILITIES?**

21 A. Yes. According to the American Gas Association ("AGA"), 96 gas utilities in 35
22 jurisdictions have full infrastructure cost recovery mechanisms in place. Another eight
23 companies in three states have infrastructure cost recovery mechanisms that are more

1 limited in nature. With respect to bad debt cost recovery, the AGA notes 64 natural gas
2 utilities in 26 jurisdictions have been authorized a mechanism to recover bad debt
3 expenses (*see* Schedule RBH-1).

4 **Q. HOW DO CUSTOMERS BENEFIT FROM THE PROPOSED COST RECOVERY**
5 **ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS?**

6 A. The proposed mechanisms enable the Company to maintain its financial integrity to the
7 benefit of customers. A financially healthy utility has a greater capability to invest in its
8 system and provide safe and reliable service. Further, as noted earlier, a utility's credit
9 rating depends largely on its financial integrity; a higher credit rating results in lower debt
10 costs for customers. Additionally, a financially healthy utility can better withstand
11 adverse changes in business or market conditions.

12 **Q. WHY SHOULD THE COMMISSION APPROVE THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED**
13 **COST RECOVERY ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS?**

14 A. The proposed mechanisms alleviate the challenge of eroding revenues and increasing
15 costs, while providing benefits to customers. Without timely cost recovery, certain of
16 these important expenditures might be deferred or reduced. Others, such as the
17 Company's bad debt expense and property tax expense, cannot be avoided and are
18 beyond the Company's control. Moreover, the investments proposed for recovery are
19 non-revenue producing. That is, none of the investments generates additional revenues
20 for the Company to offset the expenditures being made. Lastly, the proposed
21 mechanisms are consistent with Missouri statute. For these reasons, the Commission
22 should approve the Company's proposed cost recovery adjustment mechanisms.

1 **VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

2 **Q. PLEASE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY.**

3 A. The Company's proposed rate reforms arise from circumstances that have affected many
4 natural gas utilities throughout the Country. The difficult combination of declining
5 customer usage, sustained capital investments, and large and volatile operating costs has
6 created a circumstance in which it will become increasingly challenging under traditional
7 cost-of-service ratemaking to maintain the strong financial profile that benefits both
8 customers and investors. The proposed structures are meant to address that financial
9 strain, enable the financial profile needed to continue providing safe and reliable service,
10 while reducing the need for frequent rate filings.


11 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?**

12 A. Yes, it does.

Innovative Rates, Non-Volumetric Rates, and Tracking Mechanisms: Current List

As of December 2016

States with Accelerated Infrastructure Cost Recovery



Utilities with Full Infrastructure Cost Recovery Mechanisms

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| 1. AL – Alabama Gas Company | 36. MA – Columbia Gas of Massachusetts | 66. OK – CenterPoint Energy |
| 2. AL – Mobile Gas Service | 37. MA – National Grid Massachusetts | 67. OR – Avista Corp. |
| 3. AR – Arkansas Oklahoma Gas | 38. MA – Eversource Energy | 68. OR – NW Natural |
| 4. AR -- SourceGas | 39. MA – Liberty Utilities | 69. PA – Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania |
| 5. AR – CenterPoint Energy | 40. MA—Unitil | 70. PA – Equitable Gas |
| 6. CA – San Diego Gas and Electric | 41. MD – Baltimore Gas and Electric | 71. PA – Peoples Gas Company |
| 7. CA – Southern California Gas | 42. MD – Columbia Gas of Maryland | 72. PA – Peoples TWP |
| 8. CA – Southwest Gas | 43. MD – Washington Gas | 73. PA – UGI Central Penn Gas |
| 9. CO – Public Service Co. of Colorado | 44. MI – Consumers Energy | 74. PA – UGI Penn Natural Gas |
| 10. CO – Atmos Energy | 45. MI – DTE | 75. PA – PECO |
| 11. CO -- SourceGas | 46. MI – SEMCO Energy | 76. PA – Philadelphia Gas Works |
| 12. CT – Connecticut Natural Gas | 47. MN – Xcel Energy | 77. RI – National Grid Narragansett Gas |
| 13. DC – Washington Gas | 48. MO – Ameren Missouri | 78. SC – Piedmont Natural Gas |
| 14. FL – Chesapeake Utilities | 49. MO – Liberty Utilities | 79. SC – South Carolina Electric and Gas |
| 15. FL – Florida Public Utilities Company | 50. MO – Laclede Gas | 80. TN – Atmos Energy |
| 16. FL – Florida City Gas | 51. MO – Missouri Gas Energy | 81. TN – Piedmont Natural Gas |
| 17. FL – TECO Peoples Gas | 52. MS – Atmos Energy | 82. TX – Atmos Energy |
| 18. GA – Atlanta Gas Light | 53. MS – CenterPoint Energy | 83. TX – CenterPoint Energy |
| 19. GA – Liberty Utilities | 54. NC – Piedmont Natural Gas | 84. TX – Texas Gas Service |
| 20. IL – Ameren Illinois | 55. NC – Public Service of North Carolina | 85. UT – Questar Gas |
| 21. IL – NICOR Gas | 56. NH – Liberty Utilities | 86. VA – Atmos Energy |
| 22. IL – Peoples Gas | 57. NJ – New Jersey Natural | 87. VA – Columbia Gas of Virginia |
| 23. IN – Vectren North Indiana Gas | 58. NJ – Elizabethtown Gas | 88. VA – Virginia Natural Gas |
| 24. IN – Vectren South SIGECO | 59. NJ – Public Service Electric and Gas | 89. VA – Washington Gas |
| 25. IN – NIPSCO | 60. NJ – South Jersey Gas | 90. WA – Avista Corporation |
| 26. KS – Atmos Energy | 61. NV – Southwest Gas | 91. WA – Puget Sound Energy, Inc. |
| 27. KS – Black Hills | 62. OH – Columbia Gas of Ohio | 92. WA – Cascade Natural Gas Company |
| 28. KS – Kansas Gas Service | 63. OH – Dominion East Ohio | 93. WA – Northwest Natural Gas Company |
| 29. KY – Atmos Energy | 64. OH – Duke Energy | 94. WV – Mountaineer Gas Company |
| 30. KY – Columbia Gas of Kentucky | 65. OH – Vectren Ohio | 95. WV- Dominion Hope |
| 31. KY – Delta Natural Gas | | 96. WY– Black Hills |
| 32. KY – Duke Energy Kentucky | | |
| 33. LA – CenterPoint Energy | | |
| 34. LA – Entergy Gulf States | | |
| 35. MA—Berkshire Gas | | |

Limited and Pending Infrastructure Mechanisms

LIMITED – 3 States

1. AZ – Southwest Gas
2. ME – Northern Utilities
3. NY – Consolidated Edison
4. NY – Corning Natural Gas
5. NY – National Grid NYC
6. NY – National Grid Long Island
7. NY – National Grid Niagara Mohawk
8. NY – Orange and Rockland


PENDING – 3 States

1. KS – All utilities
2. NJ – Elizabethtown Gas
3. NY – Consolidated Edison
4. NY – All utilities


GENERIC RULINGS OR LEGISLATION – 3 States

1. Iowa – All utilities may apply
2. Nebraska – All utilities may apply
3. West Virginia – All utilities may apply

States with Non-Volumetric Rate Designs



Current Status of Decoupling Mechanisms




Utilities with Approved Decoupling Mechanisms

1. AR – Arkansas Oklahoma Gas
2. AR – SourceGas
3. AR – CenterPoint Energy
4. AZ – Southwest Gas
5. AZ – UNS Gas
6. CA – Pacific Gas and Electric
7. CA – San Diego Gas and Electric
8. CA – Southern California Gas
9. CA – Southwest Gas
10. CT – Connecticut Natural Gas
11. GA – Liberty Utilities
12. ID – Avista
13. IL – Ameren Illinois
14. IL – Peoples Gas
15. IL – North Shore Gas
16. IN- Citizens Energy Group
17. IN – Vectren North Indiana Gas
18. IN – Vectren South SIGECO
19. MA – Columbia Gas of Massachusetts
20. MA – Fitchburg Gas and Electric
21. MA – National Grid Massachusetts
22. MA – Eversource Energy
23. MA – Liberty Utilities
24. MD – Baltimore Gas and Electric
25. MD – Columbia Gas of Maryland
26. MD – Washington Gas
27. MI – Consumers Energy
28. MI – DTE
29. MN – CenterPoint Energy
30. MN – Minnesota Energy Resources
31. NC – Piedmont Natural Gas
32. NC – Public Service Company of North Carolina
33. NJ – New Jersey Natural Gas
34. NJ – South Jersey Gas
35. NV – Southwest Gas
36. NY – Corning Natural Gas
37. NY – National Grid NYC
38. NY – National Grid Long Island
39. NY – National Grid Niagara Mohawk
40. NY – National Fuel Distribution
41. NY – New York State Electric and Gas
42. NY – Orange and Rockland
43. NY – Rochester Gas and Electric
44. NY – Central Hudson Gas and Electric
45. OR – Avista Corp.
46. OR – Cascade Natural Gas
47. OR – Northwest Natural Gas
48. RI – National Grid Narragansett
49. TN – Chattanooga Gas
50. UT – Questar Gas
51. VA – Columbia Gas of Virginia
52. VA – Virginia Natural Gas
53. VA – Washington Gas
54. WA – Avista Corp.
55. WA – Cascade Natural Gas
56. WA – Puget Sound Energy
57. WY – SourceGas
58. WY – Questar Gas

Pending Mechanisms

1. DC – Washington Gas
2. DE – Delmarva Power and Light
3. ID – Intermountain Gas
4. MI – Consumers Energy
5. NH – Passed Legislation
6. VA – Washington Gas

Current Status of Flat Monthly Fee Rate Designs (SFV)



Utilities with Flat Monthly Fee Rate Designs (SFV)

Approved SFV

1. GA – Atlanta Gas Light – Individually determined monthly demand charge
2. MO – Missouri Gas Energy – Flat monthly fee
3. ND – Montana-Dakota Utilities
4. ND – Xcel Energy – Flat monthly fee
5. OH – Columbia Gas of Ohio – Flat monthly fee
6. OH – Dominion East Ohio – Flat monthly fee
7. OH – Duke Energy – Flat monthly fee
8. OH – Vectren Ohio – Flat monthly fee

Similar to SFV

1. FL – TECO Peoples Gas – Three-tier monthly charge plus a small variable charge
2. IL - Ameren Illinois – 80% revenue for Residential and Small GS Customers per flat fee plus small variable charge
3. IL – Nicor Gas – Flat fee plus a small variable charge
4. MO – Ameren – Modified rate blocks for Residential Service customers
5. MO – Liberty Utilities – Flat fee plus a small variable charge
6. MO – Laclede Gas – Modified rate blocks
7. NE – Black Hills – Declining rate blocks
8. NE – SourceGas – Modified rate blocks
9. OK – Oklahoma Natural Gas – Two-tier plan – Offers customers a choice
10. TX – Texas Gas Service – Flat fee up to 200 ccf/month

Pending

1. DE – Delmarva Power and Light

Current Status of Rate Stabilization Tariffs


Approved

1. AL – Alabama Gas
2. AL – Mobile Gas
3. AR – CenterPoint Energy
4. GA – Liberty Utilities
5. LA – Atmos Energy
6. LA – CenterPoint Energy
7. LA – Entergy
8. MS – Atmos Energy
9. MS – CenterPoint Energy
10. OK – CenterPoint Energy
11. OK – Oklahoma Natural Gas
12. SC – Piedmont Natural Gas
13. SC – South Carolina Electric and Gas
14. TN – Atmos Energy
15. TX – Atmos Energy

Authorized by Legislation

1. Arkansas


Current Status of Weather Normalization Adjustments



Utilities with Approved Weather Normalization Adjustments

1. AZ – Southwest Gas
2. AL – Alabama Gas
3. AL – Mobile Gas
4. AR – SourceGas
5. AR – CenterPoint Energy
6. GA – Liberty Utilities
7. IN – Citizens Energy Group
8. IN – Vectren North Indiana Gas
9. IN – Vectren South SIGECO
10. KS – Atmos Energy
11. KS – Black Hills
12. KS – Kansas Gas Service
13. KY – Atmos Energy
14. KY – Columbia Gas of Kentucky
15. KY – Delta Natural Gas
16. KY – Louisville Gas and Electric
17. LA – Atmos – Louisiana Gas Service
18. LA – Atmos – Trans Louisiana
19. LA – CenterPoint Energy
20. MD – Chesapeake Utilities
21. MD – Columbia Gas of Maryland
22. MS – Atmos Energy
23. MS – CenterPoint Energy
24. ND – Montana-Dakota Utilities
25. NJ – Elizabethtown Gas
26. NJ – New Jersey Natural Gas
27. NJ – Public Service Electric and Gas
28. NY – Central Hudson Gas and Electric
29. NY – Consolidated Edison
30. NY – National Fuel Gas Distribution
31. NY – National Grid Long Island
32. NY – National Grid Niagara Mohawk
33. NY – National Grid NYC
34. NY – New York State Electric and Gas
35. NY – Orange and Rockland Utilities
36. NY – Rochester Gas and Electric
37. OK – CenterPoint Energy
38. OK – Oklahoma Natural Gas
39. OR – Northwest Natural Gas
40. PA – Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania
41. PA – Philadelphia Gas Works
42. SC – Piedmont Natural Gas
43. SC – South Carolina Electric and Gas
44. SD – Montana-Dakota Utilities
45. TN – Atmos Energy
46. TN – Chattanooga Gas
47. TN – Piedmont Natural Gas
48. TX – Atmos Energy
49. TX – Texas Gas Service
50. UT – Questar Gas
51. VA – Atmos Energy
52. VA – City of Richmond Dept. of Public Utilities
53. VA – Columbia Gas of Virginia
54. VA – Roanoke Natural Gas
55. VA – Southwestern Virginia Natural Gas
56. VA – Virginia Natural Gas
57. VA – Washington Gas

Current Status of Bad Debt Cost Recovery




Bad Debt Cost Recovery Mechanism Rate Stabilization Mechanism No Bad Debt Cost Recovery Mechanism or Rate Stabilization Mechanism

Utilities with Bad Debt Cost Recovery

1. CT – Connecticut Natural Gas
2. CT – Southern Connecticut Natural Gas
3. CT – Yankee Gas
4. DC – Washington Gas
5. IL – Ameren Illinois
6. IL – Peoples Gas
7. IL – North Shore Gas
8. IL – Nicor Gas
9. IN – Citizens Energy Group
10. IN - NIPSCO
11. IN – Vectren North Indiana Gas
12. IN – Vectren South SIGECO
13. KS – Atmos Energy
14. KS – Black Hills
15. KS – Kansas Gas Service
16. KY – Atmos Energy
17. KY – Columbia Gas of Kentucky
18. KY – Delta Natural Gas
19. KY – Duke Energy
20. LA – CenterPoint Energy
21. MA – Columbia Gas of Massachusetts
22. MA – National Grid
23. MA – NSTAR Gas
24. MD – Baltimore Gas and Electric
25. MD – Washington Gas
26. ME – Northern Utilities
27. MI – DTE
28. MI – Michigan Gas Utilities
29. MS – CenterPoint Energy
30. NC – Piedmont Natural Gas
31. NE – Black Hills
32. NE – SourceGas
33. NH – Liberty Utilities
34. NH – Northern Utilities
35. NV – Southwest Gas
36. NY – Central Hudson Gas and Electric
37. NY – Consolidated Edison
38. NY – National Fuel Gas Distribution
39. NY – National Grid Long Island
40. NY – National Grid Niagara Mohawk
41. NY – National Grid NYC
42. NY – New York State Electric and Gas
43. NY – Orange and Rockland Utilities
44. OH – Columbia Gas of Ohio
45. OH – Dominion East Ohio
46. OH – Eastern Natural Gas
47. OH – Pike Natural Gas
48. OH – Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio
49. OK – CenterPoint Energy
50. OK – Oklahoma Natural Gas
51. RI – National Grid
52. SC – Piedmont Natural Gas
53. SC – South Carolina Electric and Gas
54. TN – Atmos Energy
55. TN – Chattanooga Gas
56. TN – Piedmont Natural Gas
57. TX – Atmos Energy
58. TX – Texas Gas Service
59. UT – Questar Gas
60. VA – Washington Gas
61. VA – Atmos Energy
62. VA – Columbia Gas of Virginia
63. VA – Virginia Natural Gas
64. WI – Wisconsin Gas


Current Status of Pension and OPEB Cost Recovery



Utilities with Pension and OPEB Cost Recovery

1. CA – San Diego Gas and Electric
2. CA – Southern California Gas
3. CO – Public Service Company of CO (Xcel)
4. DC – Washington Gas
5. KS – Atmos Energy
6. KS- Black Hills
7. KS – Kansas Gas Service
8. LA – Atmos Energy
9. LA – CenterPoint Energy
10. MA – Columbia Gas of Massachusetts
11. MA – Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Co.
12. MA – National Grid
13. MA – NSTAR Gas Co.
14. MD – Baltimore Gas and Electric Co.
15. MI – DTE
16. MO – Ameren Missouri
17. MO – Laclede Gas
18. MO – Missouri Gas Energy
19. MS – Atmos Energy
20. MS – CenterPoint Energy
21. NY – Central Hudson Gas and Electric
22. NY – Consolidated Edison
23. NY – Orange and Rockland Utilities
24. NY – National Grid NYC
25. OH – Columbia Gas of Ohio
26. OK – CenterPoint Energy
27. OK – Oklahoma Natural Gas
28. PA – Philadelphia Gas Works
29. RI – National Grid
30. SC – Piedmont Natural Gas
31. SC – South Carolina Electric and Gas
32. TN – Piedmont Natural Gas
33. TX – Atmos Energy
34. TX – CenterPoint Energy
35. WI – Wisconsin Power and Light

Current Status of Natural Gas Energy Efficiency Programs



Utilities with Natural Gas Energy Efficiency Programs

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| 1. AR – Arkansas Oklahoma Gas | 31. IL – Nicor Gas | 61. MO – Empire Natural Gas |
| 2. AR – SourceGas | 32. IL – North Shore Gas | 62. MO – Laclede Gas |
| 3. AR – CenterPoint Energy | 33. IL – Peoples Gas | 63. MO – Missouri Gas Energy |
| 4. AZ – Southwest Gas | 34. KY – Atmos Energy | 64. MS – Atmos Energy |
| 5. CA – Pacific Gas and Electric | 35. KY – Columbia Gas of Kentucky | 65. MS – CenterPoint Energy |
| 6. CA – San Diego Gas and Electric | 36. KY – Delta Natural Gas | 66. MT – Montana-Dakota Utilities |
| 7. CA – Southern California Gas | 37. KY – Duke Energy Kentucky | 67. NC – Piedmont Natural Gas |
| 8. CA – Southwest Gas | 38. KY – Louisville Gas and Electric | 68. NC – Public Service Co. of NC |
| 9. CO – Atmos Energy | 39. LA – Atmos Energy | 69. ND – Montana-Dakota Utilities |
| 10. CO – Black Hills Energy | 40. LA – CenterPoint Energy | 70. NH – Liberty Utilities |
| 11. CO – Colorado Natural Gas | 41. MA – Columbia Gas of Massachusetts | 71. NH – Northern Utilities |
| 12. CO – SourceGas | 42. MA – Berkshire Gas | 72. NJ – Elizabethtown Gas |
| 13. CO – Public Service Co. of Colorado | 43. MA – Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light | 73. NJ – New Jersey Natural Gas |
| 14. CT – Connecticut Natural Gas | 44. MA – Liberty Utilities | 74. NJ – Public Service Electric and Gas |
| 15. CT – Southern Connecticut Natural Gas | 45. MA – National Grid Massachusetts | 75. NJ – South Jersey Gas |
| 16. CT – Yankee Gas Service | 46. MA – NSTAR Gas and Electric | 76. NM – New Mexico Gas |
| 17. FL – TECO Peoples Gas | 47. MD – Baltimore Gas and Electric | 77. NV – NV Energy |
| 18. GA – Atlanta Gas Light | 48. MD – Columbia Gas of Maryland | 78. NV – Southwest Gas |
| 19. IA – Liberty Utilities | 49. MD – Washington Gas | 79. NY – Central Hudson Gas and Electric |
| 20. IA – Black Hills Energy | 50. ME – Northern Utilities | 80. NY – Consolidated Edison |
| 21. IA – Interstate Power and Light | 51. MI – Consumers Energy | 81. NY – National Fuel Gas |
| 22. IA – MidAmerican Energy | 52. MI – DTE | 82. NY – National Grid NY |
| 23. IN – Citizens Energy Group | 53. MI – Michigan Gas Utilities | 83. NY – National Grid Long Island |
| 24. IN – NIPSCO | 54. MN – CenterPoint Energy | 84. NY – National Grid Niagara Mohawk |
| 25. IN – Vectren North Indiana Gas | 55. MN – Great Plains Natural Gas | 85. NY – Orange and Rockland Utilities |
| 26. IN – Vectren South SIGECO | 56. MN – Interstate Power and Light | 86. NY – St. Lawrence Gas |
| 27. ID – Avista Utilities | 57. MN – Minnesota Energy Resources | 87. OH – Columbia Gas of Ohio |
| 28. ID – Intermountain Gas | 58. MN – Xcel Energy | 88. OH – Dominion East Ohio |
| 29. IL – Ameren Illinois | 59. MO – Ameren | 89. OH – Duke Energy |
| 30. IL – MidAmerican Energy | 60. MO – Liberty Utilities | 90. OH – Vectren Energy Delivery of Ohio |

Utilities with Natural Gas Energy Efficiency Programs (Cont.)

- 91. OK – CenterPoint Energy
- 92. OK – Oklahoma Natural Gas
- 93. OR – Avista Utilities
- 94. OR – Cascade Natural Gas
- 95. OR – Northwest Natural Gas
- 96. PA – Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania
- 97. PA – Equitable Gas
- 98. PA – PECO
- 99. PA – Peoples Natural Gas
- 100. PA – Philadelphia Gas Works
- 101. PA – UGI Central Penn Gas
- 102. PA – UGI Penn Natural Gas
- 103. PA – UGI Utilities
- 104. RI – National Grid
- 105. SC – Piedmont Natural Gas
- 106. SC – South Carolina Electric and Gas
- 107. SD – MidAmerican Energy
- 108. SD – Montana-Dakota Utilities
- 109. TN – Chattanooga Gas
- 110. TX – Atmos Energy
- 111. TX – Texas Gas Service
- 112. UT – Questar Gas
- 111. VA – Columbia Gas of Virginia
- 112. VA – Virginia Natural Gas
- 113. VA – Washington Gas
- 114. VT – Vermont Gas Systems
- 115. WA – Avista Utilities
- 116. WA – Cascade Natural Gas
- 117. WA – Northwest Natural Gas
- 118. WA – Puget Sound Energy
- 119. WI – City Gas
- 120. WI – Madison Gas And Electric
- 121. WI – Midwest Natural Gas
- 122. WI – St. Croix Valley Natural Gas
- 123. WI – Superior Water, Light and Power
- 124. WI – We Energies
- 125. WI – Wisconsin Light and Power
- 126. WI – Wisconsin Public Service
- 127. WI – Xcel Energy
- 128. WY – Montana-Dakota Utilities
- 129. WY – Questar Gas

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT B. HEVERT


COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS)
) ss
COUNTY OF WORCESTER)

On the 28 day of September, 2017, before me appeared Robert B. Hevert, to me personally known, who, being by me first duly sworn, states that he is a partner at ScottMadden, Inc. and acknowledges that he has read the above and foregoing document and believes that the statements therein are true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief.



Robert B. Hevert

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28 day of September, 2017.



Notary Public

My commission expires: March 11, 2022

