1	STATE OF MISSOURI
2	PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
3	
4	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
5	Oral Argument
6	
7	October 1, 2009 Jefferson City, Missouri Volume 4
8	
9	
10	In the Matter of Laclede Gas) Company's Purchased Gas Adjustment)Case No. GR-2005-0203
11	for 2004-2005,)
12	
13	KENNARD L. JONES, Presiding
14	SENIOR REGULATORY LAW JUDGE ROBERT M. CLAYTON, III, Chairman,
15	JEFF DAVIS, TERRY JARRETT,
16	ROBERT S. KENNEY, COMMISSIONERS
17	
18	
19	
20	REPORTED BY: Monnie S. Mealy, CCR, CSR, RPR Midwest Litigation Services
21	3432 W. Truman Boulevard, Suite 207 Jefferson City, MO 65109
22	(573) 636-7551
23	
24	
25	

1 APPEARANCES 2 For Staff of the Missouri Public Service Commission: 3 Mr. Kevin A. Thompson and Ms. Lera Shemwell 4 Public Service Commission 200 Madison Street 5 P.O. Box 309 Jefferson City, MO 65102 6 (573) 751-6514 7 For Office of Public Counsel and the Public: 8 Mr. Marc Poston 9 Office of Public Counsel 200 Madison Street 10 P.O. Box 2230 Jefferson City, MO 65102 (573) 751-5558 11 12 For Laclede Gas Company: 13 Mr. Michael C. Pendergast 14 Attorney at Law 720 Olive Street 15 St. Louis, MO 63101 (314) 342-0532 16 Mr. Rick Zucker 17 Attorney at Law 720 Olive Street, Suite 1524 18 St. Louis, MO 63101 (314) 342-0533 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

PROCEEDINGS 1 JUDGE JONES: Okay. We are on the record with 2 3 Case Nos. GR-2005-0203 and GR-2006-0288 in the matter of 4 Laclede Gas Company's purchased gas adjustments for 5 2004-2005 and for 2005-2006. 6 I'll point out that although these matters are being heard together with regard to this specific issue, 7 8 they have not been consolidated. 9 The arguments we will hear today are relevant to 10 the Staff of the Commission's request for information from Laclede, and that has been ongoing and continues through 11 12 today. And with that, we'll start with the Staff of the 13 14 commission. Oh, let me take entries of appearances first from Staff. 15 16 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, your Honor. Kevin 17 Thompson and Lera Shemwell for the Staff of the Missouri 18 Public Service Commission. JUDGE JONES: And the Office of Public Counsel? 19 MR. POSTON: Marc Poston appearing for the 20 21 Office of Public Counsel and the public. 22 JUDGE JONES: And Laclede Gas Company? 23 MR. PENDERGAST: Michael C. Pendergast and Rick Zucker on behalf of Laclede Gas Company. 24 25 JUDGE JONES: And that will start with Staff.

1 MR. THOMPSON: May it please the Commission. 2 I'm not going to waste a lot of your time. I know that 3 you're familiar with this matter. It's been heard in this 4 room before.

5 This is a discovery dispute, and it's a б discovery dispute that is occurring within the context of 7 a PGA/ACA case. And to quickly rehearse what that is, in 8 the world of natural gas, rates are treated somewhat 9 differently than they are in the area of electric and 10 water and sewer so that the commodity rate, that is, the cost of the gas itself, is separate from all the other 11 12 costs of the gas company.

And the commodity cost is passed directly 13 14 through to the customer through the PGA/ACA process. And 15 it's an annual thing. The company will estimate what they think the cost of gas will be for the a -- a period of 16 17 time, and these clauses will vary from company to company. 18 And the estimated cost is then approved by the 19 Commission. And that's what people pay until the company 20 comes and changes it either up or down.

At the end of the year when the gas is being used, we go into the ACA phase. And the ACA phase includes a true-up where Staff does a prudent audit of the actual costs, and the company's rolling balance is then adjusted either in favor of the ratepayers or in favor of

the company, depending on whether those estimated costs
 that were paid during the year when the gas was being
 used, how closely it tracked the actual costs.

And this is done because the volatility in the commodity costs are -- is so great that the company, frankly, cannot have enough cash on hand to absorb the swings in the commodity costs only to recover later in a traditional rate case.

9 So this discovery request comes as part of a
10 prudence review. Laclede Gas Company has an affiliate,
11 LER, Laclede Energy Resources, I believe that is. And the
12 two companies engage in transactions.

Because they engage in transactions, Staff must determine whether or not the transactions were prudent from the point of view of the regulated company, Laclede Gas Company.

17 The Commission has, as you know, affiliate 18 transaction rules. The standard in that rule is, "A 19 regulated gas corporation shall not provide a financial 20 advantage to an affiliated entity." It's just that 21 simple.

22 So the prudence review is simply to determine 23 whether or not a financial advantage has been provided. 24 As part of that prudence review, Staff has sought certain 25 documents. These documents, for the most part, have to do with the sources of certain gas used by LER to fill
 contracts with Laclede. So this is a transaction where
 gas is flowing from LER to Laclede Gas Company in exchange
 for money.

5 And Staff seeks documents on the origin of the 6 gas in order to determine the price at which LER acquired 7 it. In an audit, you go to original documents. Staff is 8 not saying today that we believe Laclede Gas Company or 9 LER has done anything improper.

We don't know that. We're simply seeking to acquire certain documents in order to complete an audit. The documents that we seek are relevant and necessary. Thank you.

14 JUDGE JONES: Okay. And --

15 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I have some questions, 16 Judge.

17 JUDGE JONES: why don't we go ahead and do
18 questions --

19 MR. THOMPSON: Sure.

20JUDGE JONES: -- from Staff while you're there.21MR. THOMPSON: Ms. Shemwell help me respond to22questions because she knows an awful lot more about this23than I do.

24 JUDGE JONES: All right. Thank you,

25 Mr. Thompson.

1 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: In going back through the 2 multitude of pleadings in this case, specifically, I was 3 looking at -- the first document I want to talk about is 4 the document that was filed by Staff on July 25th of 2008. 5 And by the way, I'm referring to the 2006 case. б And this document was entitled List of Documents 7 Required by Staff to Analyze Laclede's ACA Filings and 8 Motion for Order Directing Laclede to Produce. 9 MS. SHEMWELL: Commissioner, what was the date 10 on that, please? COMMISSIONER JARRETT: July -- July 25th of '08. 11 And while she's looking for that, Counsel, let me 12 summarize my reading of that. 13 14 My -- my reading of that is the argument by 15 Staff was that there's allegations of imprudence of 16 Laclede's gas purchasing practices and potential 17 violations of the Commission's affiliate transaction rules and that Staff needed these documents to properly analyze 18 19 the business dealings between Laclede and the one 20 affiliate that's at issue in this case. 21 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. 22 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Does that sound accurate? 23 MR. THOMPSON: I'm sure it's accurate, sir. I was not involved in drafting it. I don't know that there 24 are allegations of improprieties. There's simply a need 25

1 to review certain documents to determine that there were 2 not any.

3 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. Then we had an 4 oral argument in this case on March 26th. All right? And 5 the transcript of that is Transcript Vol. II and, again, 6 in the 2006 case is the transcript I'm looking at. And 7 I'm looking at page 47 of that.

8 So I'll let Ms. Shemwell maybe find that. But I 9 want to go back to the affiliate transaction rule for a 10 moment that quoted the standard. You quoted the first 11 sentence of the standard. I want to continue on.

The second sentence says, "For the purposes of 12 13 this rule, a regulated gas corporation shall be deemed to 14 provide a financial advantage to an affiliated entity if, No. 1, it compensates an affiliated entity for goods or 15 services above the lesser of, A, the fair market price, 16 17 or, B, the fully distributed costs to the regulated gas corporation to provide the goods or services for itself." 18 19 So in that case, that is where the gas company 20 purchases the gas from the affiliate; is that right? 21 Is that what situation that applies to? 22 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir.

23 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. So if it purchases
24 the gas above the lesser of the fair market price or the
25 fully distributed costs to the regulated gas corporation,

1 then it has granted a financial advantage to the

2 affiliate?

3

MR. THOMPSON: That's correct.

4 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. And then No. 2 5 talks about the reverse, where the affiliate provides 6 something to the gas company. So if the fully distributed 7 cost -- or excuse me -- it transfers information, assets 8 or gas or services of any kind to an affiliated entity 9 below the greater of the fair market price or the fully 10 distributed costs of the regulated gas corporation.

11 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir.

12 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And I guess that has to 13 do the with the allegation of the capacity issue?

14 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir.

15 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Right. So, again, the 16 standard, under the rule, for both of these is it's either 17 the lesser of or the greater of the fair market price or 18 the fully distributed -- distributed cost?

19 MR. THOMPSON: That's correct.

20 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Correct. Now, in the 21 March 26th oral argument, and I'm referring to page 47 of 22 Volume 2 of the transcript, Counsel for Staff stated, "The 23 primary purpose for this information that Staff is 24 seeking" -- and I'm starting on Line 2 of the -- of page 25 47 of Page.

1 "The primary purpose for this information is to 2 determine whether Laclede paid too much to the affiliate 3 for gas and determine whether the affiliate -- determine 4 what the affiliate did with Laclede's capacity that was 5 released to the affiliate." б MR. THOMPSON: That's correct. 7 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And Commissioner Murray said, "And too much would be defined by the rule, would it 8 9 not?" And counsel said, "Not necessarily." 10 Now, where in that standard that you agree is the standard under the rule is a "not necessarily" clause? 11 12 MR. THOMPSON: There is no such clause. COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. So was counsel 13 14 wrong when he said not necessarily? 15 MR. THOMPSON: I don't believe so, sir. No. COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. Then why was 16 17 counsel not incorrect? 18 MR. THOMPSON: Because it may be that the affiliate transaction rule does not occupy or define the 19 20 entire universe of improper affiliate transactions. 21 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Well, the rule addresses 22 whether a regulated gas corporation has provided a 23 financial advantage to an affiliated entity or vice versa; isn't that right? 24 25 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir.

1 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. So what you're 2 saying is that a utility could completely comply with the 3 rule and still be imprudent? 4 MR. THOMPSON: Let me answer that with a 5 hypothetical, if I may. And I beg your indulgence. б COMMISSIONER JARRETT: All right. 7 MR. THOMPSON: Because I know you're not looking 8 for a narrative answer. 9 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I'm just looking for a 10 goo -- for a good answer that can I understand. MR. THOMPSON: Okay. And I hope I can provide 11 that. Suppose -- suppose that you have a regulated gas 12 company that has an unregulated marketing subsid --13 14 affiliate, much as we have here. And suppose that the 15 unregulated affiliate sells gas under a contract to the 16 regulated entity. 17 And suppose that the contract specifies a 18 particular price per unit, and that price per unit is the 19 price at a certain location in the nation where gas is traded as of a certain date. And suppose that the 20 21 unregulated entity is able to acquire cheaper gas with 22 which to fill that contract. 23 Now, from the point of view of a business person, you would say, Well, that's business. 24 25 Buy low, sell high. That's what you do. And from the

1 point of view of contract administration, you would say, 2 Well, they met their contract. They provided the required 3 quantity of gas, and they were paid the bargained-for 4 price. Nothing irregular there. But --5 MS. SHEMWELL: Is that a cell phone? б JUDGE JONES: Probably. MR. THOMPSON: It ain't me. From the point of 7 8 view of a prudence auditor -- from the point of view of a 9 prudence auditor, that difference between the contract 10 price and the price at which the gas was acquired to fill the contract, isn't that a profit that the ratepayers have 11 12 unnecessarily paid? Because would it not have been possible for the 13 14 company, the regulated company, to acquire that gas itself 15 at the same location that the unregulated entity acquired 16 it? 17 That's one scenario. I'm not saying that happened here. 18 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Can I ask -- may I ask the question slightly differently? And I think it's the same 20 21 thing that Commissioner Jarrett is getting at. And To my 22 mind, it's the crux of the issue, and I'm going to ask 23 Laclede the same question. 24 Is the analysis that Staff goes through for 25 purposes of a prudence review under an ACA the same or

different than the analysis that goes into determining whether the regulated entity did or did not violate the affiliate transaction rule? Is that -- it do you understand my question? It's a bit --

5 MR. THOMPSON: I believe I understand your 6 question. And I would think -- and, of course, I'm not an 7 auditor. But I think the two analyses are not necessarily 8 identical.

9 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay. So is it Staff's 10 position that the regulated entity could comply with the 11 affiliate transaction rule but still have made an 12 imprudent decision for purposes of the ACA analysis? 13 MR. THOMPSON: I think so. I think it's 14 possible.

COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And is there case law to 15 that effect, or is that an economic question or is it an 16 17 auditing question? Where do we go to determine 18 definitively whether or not that is or is not the answer? 19 MR. THOMPSON: To go back to this hypothetical --20 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Oh, I'm sorry. 22 MR. THOMPSON: -- It seems to me it would turn 23 on what is the fair market price. Is It the contract price, or is it the price at which the unregulated 24 25 affiliate actually acquired the gas?

1 If the contract price is the fair market price, 2 then there's no violation of the rule. None at all. If 3 the fair market price is the well head price at which the 4 gas was acquired, then there is a violation of the rule 5 because the regulated entity paid more per unit.

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And let me -- let me ask 7 another question, then. In your hypothetical, then, the 8 fair market price is the well head price. Are you arguing 9 that the regulated entity should have bypassed its 10 affiliated entity and purchased directly from the well 11 head and violate its contract?

MR. THOMPSON: What I'm saying is if we were to acquire those documents and if we were to find out that these transactions occurred, maybe we would argue that to the Commission when we come to the final evidentiary hearing, the determination state of this ACA case.

We're not there yet. We don't know that we will find anything like that. But the hypothetical is to illustrate why we're looking for these documents, why we need the documents that show the original price.

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And I'm sorry if I
22 encroached on Commissioner Jarrett's questions, so I'll -23 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: No. Not at all.
24 MS. SHEMWELL: Might I add something? I think
25 that we do our analysis as well under Statute -- under

1 393.140(12), which says that when a regulated utility has 2 an affiliate, the Commission may inquire into and 3 apportion capitalization earnings. We're looking at these 4 as debts and dispenses fairly and justly to be borne by 5 the regulated utility as distinguished from the б unregulated affiliate. 7 So I believe that the Commission makes its 8 prudence determination under parts of the statute. 9 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: But, again, this is what 10 counsel argued, page 47 --MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. 11 12 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: -- in March. "The primary purpose for this information is to determine 13 14 whether Laclede paid too much to LER for gas and determine 15 what LER did with Laclede's capacity that was released to LER." And I believe you said that was correct. 16 17 MR. THOMSON: yes, sir. COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Now you guys are arguing 18 19 something different than that. Now you're arguing that this isn't about LER. It's about whether Laclede should 20 21 have gone to the well head and bought the gas independent 22 of buying it from LER. Are you not? 23 MS. SHEMWELL: I think we're stating the evidence that we need to show prudence, What kind of --24 25 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I'm just asking -- this

is what counsel said in March as to what the purpose of
 getting this information was.

3 MR. THOMPSON: I don't think counsel misspoke.
4 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: To determine whether -5 to determine whether Laclede paid too much to LER for gas.
6 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir.

7 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And what you're arguing 8 now is Laclede should have gone to the well head to 9 determine if -- if the fair market price was lower than 10 what LER was charging, and if it was, they should buy is 11 directly at well head and not from LER. That's completely 12 different from what counsel argued in March.

13 MR. THOMPSON: If the well head price was ten 14 and the contract price was 15, then we would say Laclede 15 did pay too much to LER for gas that. Instead of buying 16 the gas from LER, Laclede should have gone and acquired 17 the gas. That would be more prudent.

18 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Right. But that wasn't19 the argument in March. I'll move on.

20 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Not to belabor this, but 21 I'm -- I am -- I want to make sure I'm clear in my mind 22 that the affiliate transaction rule is a separate 23 determination from a prudence review.

24 MR. THOMPSON: Well, a prudence review is an 25 auditing function in which you compare -- you look at 1 actions that the company took, and you assess those 2 actions against the context within which they were taken 3 to determine whether the decisions that were made, whether 4 the actions that were taken were sensible, prudent at the 5 time they were taken.

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So is it -- and would it 7 be accurate to say that the affiliate transaction rule with a capital A and capital T as defined under the 8 9 regulations is one action, but then you're talking 10 generally about transactions between affiliated entities, not as a defined term, but just as a part of analyzing 11 whether certain purchases were, in fact, prudent? Is that 12 13 correct?

MR. THOMPSON: Absolutely. There would be a prudence review whether or not there had been any affiliate transactions.

17 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But in this particular circumstance, certain transactions between affiliated 18 19 entities become relevant to your prudence analysis? 20 MR. THOMPSON: Because they occurred. 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: All right. All right. 22 All right. And so what Mr. Reed was arguing back in March at page 47, Line 2, isn't necessarily contradictory or 23 inconsistent with what you're saying today? 24 25 MR. THOMPSON: I don't believe it is.

1 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I think he said it's the 2 primary purpose, but not the sole purpose. Is that --3 it's not inconsistent necessarily? 4 MR. THOMPSON: Well, what Mr. Reed said was we 5 want to find out if Laclede paid too much to LER for this б gas. And the hypothetical that I gave you was to explain 7 in more detail how it is that Laclede might have paid too 8 much to LER for the gas. 9 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: All right. 10 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Counsel, wouldn't your 11 argument in your hypothetical mean gas companies couldn't enter into hedging {} contracts? Because they enter into 12 13 these contracts, they may pay a higher price for the gas. 14 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. COMMISSIONER JARRETT: But in order get some 15 long-term stability, they pay more for the gas. 16 17 MR. THOMPSON: Right. 18 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: So under your 19 argument --20 MR. THOMPSON: And that's viewed as prudent. 21 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Well, under your 22 argument, if the contract is a certain price, if they can 23 go somewhere else and buy it lesser than under the contract, then that's not prudent. I mean, isn't -- isn't 24 25 that the same argument you're making?

1 MR. THOMPSON: I think there's some differences. 2 First of all -- I don't know when they made this contract. 3 And I'm sure Lera could probably tell you. The other 4 thing is, is that I think it's a heightened scrutiny when 5 the transaction is between a regulated entity and an 6 affiliate, an unregulated affiliate. 7 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Right. And we have standards for that. It's in the rule. 8 9 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. 10 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Right. MR. THOMPSON: As lera pointed out with the 11 reference to the statute, the rule isn't the only 12 13 consideration. 14 MS. SHEMWELL: Commissioner Jarrett, may I say that hedging is not typically done with an affiliate. 15 Here the concern is that the affiliate is performing much 16 17 the same service as the regulated. 18 Laclede has other affiliates, and they do 19 completely separate business. In this case, LER is 20 selling -- acquiring and selling gas. And that's what 21 Laclede does. It acquires and sells gas. 22 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Right. But, again, if 23 we're talking about the relationship between Laclede and its affiliate, that's handled under the rule. 24 25 MS. SHEMWELL: Among other things. Yes.

1 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Right. One other 2 question I had was about the CAM, the Cost Allocation 3 Manual. There was a lot of discussion about the CAM in 4 the last oral argument in March. 5 And again, going back to transcript Vol. II, б page 49, starting at line 21, Commissioner Murray starts a 7 -- an inquiry of counsel about how the CAM provides for dealings with the affiliate. And counsel for Staff says, 8 9 Yes, that's right. 10 And then over on page 50, Commissioner Murray says, "And is says the higher -- depending on whether it's 11 sale of purchase, the higher of the fair market value or 12 fully distributed cost?" Counsel, "Right." Counsel, 13 14 "Yes. Or the lower of these two things." 15 So I take it from that exchange that Laclede's CAM is consistent with our rule on that? 16 17 MS. SHEMWELL: No. MR. THOMPSON: Ms. Shemwell will speak to that. 18 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: At least on that -- at 19 20 least on that issue. 21 MS. SHEMWELL: Let me speak to the CAM. The CAM 22 -- the rule says Commission approved CAM. This CAM has 23 never been Commission approved. 24 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: When was it -- when was 25 it submitted to the Commission for approval?

1 MS. SHEMWELL: It has never been submitted to 2 the Commission for approval. 3 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. 4 MS. SHEMWELL: There was a CAM that was 5 submitted to the Commission before the affiliate 6 transaction rules went into place. And Laclede said --7 and it was submitted in that case. Or it was to be 8 submitted in that case --9 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. 10 MS. SHEMWELL: -- in 2001. Laclede's CAM has never been submitted. We do not believe that their CAM 11 actually contains the same pricing provisions as are 12 required in the affiliate rule. 13 14 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: So, again, Mr. Reed was incorrect when he said is that? 15 16 MS. SHEMWELL: Did he say the CAM complied with 17 the affiliate rules? 18 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: That's what -- I'll read 19 it again. And, again, I'm looking on page 49 and 50. Commissioner Murray, "So if there is -- and at this point 20 21 I'd like to know, is there a specific way that the Cost 22 Allocation Manual provides for dealings with an affiliate, 23 correct?" Mr. Reed, "Yes. That's right." 24 Over to page 50, line 1. Commissioner Murray, 25 "And it says the higher, depending on whether it's the

1 sale or purchase, the higher the fair market value or fully distributed cost." Mr. Reed, "Right. Yes." 2 3 So all I'm asking is, is -- at least in that 4 respect, is the CAM consistent with the rule? 5 MS. SHEMWELL: No. б COMMISSIONER JARRETT: So Mr. Reed was wrong? 7 MS. SHEMWELL: I believe Mr. Reed -- to the very limited extent Commissioner Murray posed that, I suppose 8 9 that the answer could be yes. My complete answer would be 10 that, technically, it does not comply with the Commission's affiliate rules. 11 12 We have to reserve the right, Commissioner, to learn and grow and read and study. And we continue to do 13 14 so. 15 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Seems to be a lot of that between March and now. Just a moment. I believe in the 16 17 oral argument -- and I'll try not to put words in 18 Mr. Pendergast's mouth, but I believe he argued that Staff 19 wasn't judging this from fair market value standard. 20 Staff wanted to look at this as the affiliate's lowest 21 cost of gas from anywhere in its portfolio, so not a fair 22 market value standard. You just have to look at whatever 23 the -- whatever the lowest cost gas is in the portfolio. Is that -- would you agree with that? 24 25 MR. THOMPSON: I wasn't here during that

1 argument, sir.

2 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. Well, I'll ask you 3 now. Do you agree with it, assuming that what I said was 4 accurate? 5 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. б COMMISSIONER JARRETT: You Do agree with that? 7 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. 8 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: So it's not a fair market 9 value standard? MS. SHEMWELL: Actually --10 MR. THOMPSON: Go ahead. 11 12 MS. SHEMWELL: I would suggest that what Staff wants to look at is the fair market value. The 13 14 transaction between Laclede and its affiliate is not an 15 arm's length transaction. So that does not establish fair 16 market value. 17 A transaction between independent parties with no affiliation looks -- will establish the fair market 18 19 value. We are looking at what the fair market value is. The fair market value of gas, Commissioner Jarrett, can 20 21 change from day to day, certainly from location to 22 location. 23 There are many, many influences on what the fair market of gas is, especially in today's market. We do 24 25 want to assure that, in fact, what Laclede is buying from

LER is the lowest price at which Laclede could have
 acquired the gas itself.

3 Our question is, would it have been prudent for 4 Laclede to do the transaction itself rather than buying 5 gas from LER? If they had purchased from a third party, 6 might they have bought the gas cheaper? Did they pay LER 7 more?

8 We're looking -- and that's the fair market 9 price is the transaction between LER and a third party, 10 not the transaction between Laclede and its affiliate. 11 There can't be a presumption of prudence when a utility is dealing with its affiliate because the Supreme Court said 12 in the ATMOS case, "When there is an affiliate, the 13 14 utility has the opportunity and the incentive to benefit 15 its affiliate to the detriment of its customers."

16 That's the ATMOS case that the Supreme Court 17 approved the Commission's affiliate transactions rules. I 18 have copies if you'd like to see it.

19 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. So fair market 20 price -- if I'm -- if I'm understanding you correctly, the 21 fair market price can mean one thing under the affiliate 22 transaction rule, but another thing under prudence review? 23 MS. SHEMWELL: I think fair market price is fair 24 market price. It's how you establish the fair market 25 price that we're trying to get to. What is the fair market price? That's the documents that we seek to show what is the fair market price for the transactions between Laclede and LER. And we cannot assume when it's an affiliate transaction that that establishes fair market value because they're affiliated entities. It's a third party transaction.

7 Those are presumed prudent, as in any rate case. 8 When Laclede goes out and buys from anybody, there's a 9 presumption of prudence until someone raises a substantial 10 question about it.

11 With an affiliate, there can't be a presumption 12 of prudence because, just as the Supreme Court said in 13 ATMOS, there's the opportunity as well as the incentive to 14 give a benefit to the affiliate.

And here's why. When Laclede makes off system sales, it has to share all of that with its customers. And when it makes off system sales, 80 percent of that goes back and reduces customers' rates, cost of gas, and Laclede keeps 20 percent.

20 When LER makes an off-system sale, 100 percent 21 of that goes to the holding company. So there is a strong 22 incentive to benefit LER to give that financial advantage. 23 All we're asking is show us that you didn't. Just produce 24 the documents to show us that, in fact, when you dealt 25 with LER, it was similar to, very close to the same trans -- the same as the transaction would have been with a
 third party.

3 And what we're saying is, when LER -- for 4 example, Laclede makes an off system sale, if LER turns 5 around and almost immediately makes a similar sale to a 6 third party and there is a substantial gain on it, our 7 question is, why didn't Laclede make that transaction 8 itself? Because it's customers have paid for everything 9 for Laclede to make the off-system sales. It's paid for 10 the personnel, the gas, the capacity, the computers, 11 everything.

12 So off-system sales, that activity, is 13 completely supported by consumers, and consumers should 14 get the benefit. If, in fact, it's shifted to LER so that 15 LER can get the benefit, that goes back to the company and 16 none of it is shared with customers.

That's our question. And that's how we show
fair market value is to look at a directly comparable
transaction between independent parties.

20 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: But isn't that a
21 hindsight review?

MS. SHEMWELL: It's got to be based on what they knew at the time. If they sold to LER and LER was able to make a -- a similar sale, then -- I mean, it couldn't have been six months later. The sale has to be fairly contemporaneous. But the question is why wouldn't Laclede
 have made the sale?

3 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Right. But wouldn't that4 be a hindsight review, what you just described?

5 MS. SHEMWELL: We're having -- I don't know any 6 other way to look at fair market value. They're required 7 to make the sale to LER at fair market value. How do we 8 determine fair market value? At the time. What was the 9 fair market value on the date they made the sale?

10 What -- and if, in fact, they made the sale to 11 LER at \$2 less than the fair market price on that day, 12 it's what they knew on that day. So I don't see it as 13 hindsight.

14 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. Now. Laclede has 15 to provide, according to our rule, record-keeping 16 requirements, provide a whole slew of information on or 17 before March 15th of every year. I assume -- I assume 18 that's an annual deal, right?

19 MS. SHEMWELL: Yes.

20 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And they provide a list 21 of all goods or services provided to or received from 22 affiliated entities, the -- the amount that they've paid. 23 So Staff already has records regarding all of the 24 transactions Laclede made with the affiliate and the price 25 they paid, right? 1 MR. THOMPSON: Right.

MS. SHEMWELL: In total. In total. 2 3 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Right. 4 MS. SHEMWELL: Not individual. 5 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. But they have the 6 dates? 7 MS. SHEMWELL: Yes. 8 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: So you don't have on a 9 day-to-day basis, Laclede paid this amount for this 10 purchase? MS. SHEMWELL: No. I suspect that's in those 11 12 thousands and thousands of documents that Mr. Pendergast 13 described the last time, the last oral argument. 14 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. And that's not provided -- a full and complete list of all of the 15 affiliate transactions they're taking; is that right? 16 MS. SHEMWELL: In total. It's in total. 17 The 18 list comes in in total. COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I don't understand. What 19 does that mean, by total? 20 21 MS. SHEMWELL: The total amount of transactions. 22 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: So it comes in --MS. SHEMWELL: It's not these invoices. 23 24 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: LER, it just says 50 25 transactions?

1 MS. SHEMWELL: I haven't actually reviewed that 2 lately. May I ask someone who may have? 3 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: All right. 4 MS. SHEMWELL: It doesn't tell you the number of 5 transactions. It just tells you the dollars. Or just б tells us the dollars because it's submitted. It's not 7 filed, I don't think. 8 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: So when the rule says a 9 full and complete list of all affiliate transactions undertaken and the amount of all affiliate transactions by 10 affiliated entity and account charged, that's just totals? 11 12 MS. SHEMWELL: That's correct. 13 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Do you think that's what 14 the rule says? MS. SHEMWELL: Well, it sounds like it could 15 16 require more. COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And how long has that 17 18 rule been in effect? MS. SHEMWELL: 2003. 19 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. And Staff has just 20 21 been accepting those kind of reports since 2003? 22 MS. SHEMWELL: I would suggest that, yes, every company reports in a different way. Some have very few. 23 Some have many. But yes. 24 25 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And then there's also in

1 the rule all kinds of records that affiliated entities 2 have to keep and the company, the gas company, has to make 3 available to the Commission; is that correct? 4 MS. SHEMWELL: Yes, sir. 5 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. Is Staff saying 6 that any of these records in No. 5, records of affiliated 7 entities, Laclede is refusing to provide? 8 MS. SHEMWELL: They're refusing to provide 9 records of their affiliate entities in those transactions. 10 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: There's eight of them 11 listed here. Could you tell me which one of the eight that they're refusing to provide? 12 MR. THOMPSON: No. 1. Documentation of the 13 14 costs associated with affiliate transactions that are 15 incurred by the parent or affiliated entity and charged to 16 the regulated gas corporation. 17 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Okay. And they're not providing that? You were asking for documents that LER 18 had with other entities other than Laclede; isn't that 19 20 correct? Isn't that what the problem is? 21 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. 22 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: No. 1 doesn't apply to 23 that. MR. THOMPSON: I guess it would depend on how 24 25 narrowly you would read that one.

1 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Well, it -- it is 2 transactions between the affiliate and the regulated gas 3 corporation, isn't it, and charged to the regulated gas 4 corporation? So that's not even at issue here, is it? 5 You're looking for documents where the affiliate б has made transactions with other entities. That's my 7 understanding. Am I wrong? 8 MS. SHEMWELL: If you look under C, records 9 identifying the basis, which is fair market value of fully 10 distributed costs to records and books or accounts and supporting records in sufficient detail to permit 11 12 verification of compliance. 13 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: With this rule. 14 MS. SHEMWELL: Yes. COMMISSIONER JARRETT: But aren't you arguing 15 16 that what you're looking for is really beyond this rule? 17 MS. SHEMWELL: I think what we're suggesting is 18 that we're trying to determine prudence. And the 19 Commission may look at whether or not Laclede Gas, as a regulated entity, has made prudent purchases. 20 21 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And I asked this once. 22 I'll ask it again. So I think what I understood Mr. Thompson to say is that Laclede could comply with 23 every letter in spirit of this rule and still be 24 25 imprudent. Is that what you're saying?

MS. SHEMWELL: Well, I think it's possible.
 Certainly, compliance with the rule would get them a long
 way to showing prudence. We don't know. We don't know
 what they've done.

5 We're not saying yet that they've been 6 imprudent. We're suggesting we need documents to 7 determine that. And the documents we're asking for would 8 show fair market value in a very accurate way.

9 And they are required to describe the basis 10 used, fair market value or fully distributed costs. We're 11 look looking for documents that show fair market value. 12 They've offered some substitutes, but those substitutes do 13 not actually demonstrate the fair market value.

As I said, it can change day to day, the fair market value. it's dependent on many things, where it's delivered, capacity, time of year, many things. So we're looking for documents that actually demonstrate the fair market value, and that is LER's dealings with a third party will determine -- will establish fair market value. There might be some alternatives. And if they'd

21 like to put those forward, we'd be happy to see any 22 documents they have that shows the fair market value of 23 the transaction.

24 But we're saying that the best evidence, the 25 best evidence, is either what LER paid for the gas from Laclede, bought from it, what LER actually paid for that
 gas that it's supplying to Laclede.

We can only know that by looking at the amount for which they purchased it. LER's purchase of the gas establishes the fair market value. LER's sale to Laclede does not establish the fair market value.

7 So we're looking for those documents that prove 8 fair market value. If they produce those under the rule 9 and we see that, yes, they were paying LER a reasonable, 10 prudent price, a fair market value for the gas, what they 11 could have acquired it for themselves or they have sold to 12 LER at what they could have sold it, sold the gas to a 13 third party.

14 So we're looking for documents that prove that. 15 Our position is that the transactions of LER with the 16 third party are the best evidence of that. Laclede could 17 show --

18 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I guess my confusion is
19 in -- and I think Commissioner Kenny, by his few
20 questions, agrees with me.

It's like we keep slipping in and out of the rule. It's like we have the rule, and then we have prudence. You know, if -- if the rule is fully complied with, are they still -- could they still be imprudent? Maybe. Maybe not.

1 So I don't -- I mean, all the company and the 2 public have to go by is the rule. And I -- and I --3 MS. SHEMWELL: There's also statute that 4 requires a company not to engage in discriminatory 5 conduct. б COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Right. But if they follow the rule, they're not engaging in discriminatory 7 8 conduct, are they? 9 MS. SHEMWELL: Commissioner, if they provide us 10 documents to demonstrate that they have complied with the rule, we'll be a long way towards answering the question. 11 12 They have provided nothing. We're asking them to provide evidence. 13 14 Mr. Pendergast stands up and says, We've complied with the affiliate report rules. But we haven't seen it. We 15 haven't seen the documents, and we're looking for the best 16 17 evidence. We're looking for source documents. 18 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: All right. So what we 19 really are looking at, then, is whether they violated the 20 rule or not? 21 MS. SHEMWELL: That is not exactly the purview, 22 though, of a prudence review. While we think there's an 23 extraordinarily slim chance that they could comply with the rule and still be imprudent, so we can't say 24 25 absolutely, that's a very slim chance. It's unlikely.

1 It's most likely that if they comply with the 2 rules, then they have made a prudent decision. But for me 3 to say 100 percent when there may be a half a percent 4 chance that something was imprudent, I don't want to tell 5 you 100 percent.

6 But if they can show us that they complied with 7 the rule -- but they also have to comply, again, with 8 non-discriminatory provisions under 393.140 that they 9 don't discriminate, that all charges are just and 10 reasonable, that they're giving their affiliate a benefit 11 and that their charges are not just and reasonable.

JUDGE JONES: Sure. Mr. Poston. And this kind of follows with what Lera just said. This is a rate-making function when the Commission considers these because these rates have not been considered to determine whether they were just and reasonable.

MR. POSTON: Can I add something?

12

And complying with the affiliate transaction rule would get to the just part -- or a portion of the just part because there's other rules. But there's still that reasonable piece out there that -- that I think gets at the prudency part of it.

It needs to be both just and reasonable under 393.130. So I think that's where -- yeah, there's the affiliate transaction piece for the just part. But, you

1 know, the Commission's rate-making function goes beyond 2 that, and rates must be both just and reasonable. 3 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Commissioner Jarrett, may 4 I? 5 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Sure. Go ahead. б COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Let me -- correct me if 7 I'm wrong because it sounds like, I think, somehow along the way, these issues have gotten conflated. Let's assume 8 9 that the regulated entity purchases no gas from an 10 affiliate. MR. THOMPSON: right. 11 12 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: The affiliate transaction rule is not implicated, correct? 13 14 MR. THOMPSON: Right. 15 MS. SHEMWELL: Correct. 16 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But you still have to 17 undertake a prudence analysis, correct? 18 MR. THOMPSON: Exactly. COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So they're separate and 19 distinct from either other? 20 21 MR. THOMPSON: Right. 22 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Correct? 23 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. 24 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: This does not define in 25 total the scope of your discovery request; is that

1 correct?

25

2 MS. SHEMWELL: Yes, sir. 3 MR. THOMPSON: That is correct. 4 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay. So the affiliate 5 transaction rule in compliance with or a violation of it 6 is one component of a prudence review. It's not the total 7 sum of a prudence review, correct? 8 MR. THOMPSON: Correct. 9 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay. all right. I 10 understand, then. Thanks. MS. SHEMWELL: Thank you. 11 12 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Well, I'm looking at the purpose under 4 CSR 240-40.015 Affiliate -- Affiliate 13 14 Transaction Purpose. This rule is intended to prevent regulated utilities from subsidizing their non-regulated 15 16 operation. In order to accomplish this objective, the 17 rule sets forth financial standards, evidentiary standards 18 and record-keeping requirements applicable to any Missouri 19 Public Service Commission regulated gas corporation 20 whenever such corporation participates in transactions 21 with any affiliated entity except with regard to HVAC 22 services as defined in Section 386.754 RSMO Supp., 1998 by 23 the General Assembly of Missouri. 24 This rule and its effective enforcement will

provide the public the assurance that their rates are not

1 adversely impacted by the utility's non-regulated activities. So aren't we really talking about the rule 2 3 and the scope of the rule? 4 MR. THOMPSON: I think we are. I think the rule 5 is certainly -- the prudence review is not identical to a 6 review of compliance with that rule. But a prudence 7 review where there had been affiliate transactions 8 necessarily implicates that. 9 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Right. So I guess my 10 question is, what Staff is arguing is that the prudence review goes beyond this rule? 11 12 MR. THOMPSON: That's correct. COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Even though the purpose 13 14 says that the rule and its effective enforcement will 15 provide the public the assurance that their rates are not adversely impacted by the utility's non-regulated 16 17 activities? 18 MS. SHEMWELL: But the Commission's 19 determination that a rate is just and reasonable also does 20 that. There are many things that may assure the public 21 that it is paying only just and reasonable rates. 22 The statutes requiring non-discriminatory 23 service, for example, the statutes that require them -- it says all unjust and unreasonable rates are invalid, 24 25 393.130. So the Commission must assure just and

1 reasonable rates. This is one method of doing that. 2 But prudence review reviews all of the gas 3 transactions, not just those with affiliates. 4 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: All right. I don't think 5 I have any more questions right now. I'm sure after 6 Mr. Pendergast speaks, I may have some more questions of 7 him and then, also, of Staff. 8 JUDGE JONES: Commissioner Kenney, do you have 9 any questions of Staff? 10 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: No. I'm good. Thanks. 11 MS. SHEMWELL: Thank you. JUDGE JONES: Thank you. Mr. Poston, I noticed 12 you jumped in. Are you wanting to give an opening or --13 14 MR. POSTON: No. I don't have anything prepped. 15 Thank you. JUDGE JONES: Okay. Mr. Pendergast? 16 17 MR. PENDERGAST: Thank you. I'd just like to begin by noting that we did file a motion for the 18 19 Commission to rescind its prior order, and I won't go into 20 detail here since I went into detail there. 21 But, quite frankly, there were three 22 Commissioners that already voted, in our view, to deny 23 these motions for reconsideration. It was clear on the record of the Commission's agenda meeting that that 24 25 determination was made. I, to this day, don't know why

that wasn't ultimately reflected in a final order that was
 issued so that we wouldn't have to be here today.

3 The Commission's scheduling process is rather 4 opaque. It's difficult to determine why decisions are 5 made and why things are scheduled as they are. But I just 6 want to note from the very beginning that because we're 7 participating in this and we appreciate the opportunity to 8 do it, that we don't acquiesce to the justness and 9 reasonableness and lawfulness of being here today.

10 That said, what we really have here today is not 11 just a simple discovery matter. If It was a simple 12 discovery matter, it would have been resolved one way or 13 another a long time ago.

14 I think what we really have here today is a 15 test. And it's a test of whether the Commission is going 16 to comply with its own practices, procedures and rules or 17 its not going to and it's going to dismiss them and run 18 rough-shod over them out of some misdirected desire for 19 information.

We had a lot of talk about the standards, and I think Commissioner Kenney and I think Commissioner Jarrett got to the heart of the matter and it got to the heart of the matter rather quickly.

And the standards we've been living under for the last eight years since we had our holding company reorganization and for the last seven years or six years since the affiliate transaction rule became applicable to us are what was in that CAM that was lawfully approved by the Commission and what was in the affiliate transaction rule.

б And I'd like to direct your attention to a 7 hand-out I gave -- and I think you also have it, 8 Commissioner Jarrett. Maybe not. But at the time we had 9 our holding company -- and you had a lot of discussion 10 here about the cost allocation manual. And, really, the 11 cost allocation manual was borne th in the holding company docket that we had and was also woven into the affiliate 12 13 transaction rule as a way of making sure that the 14 standards you've talked about today are being complied 15 with.

At the time we had the holding company, there was a lot of discussion among the Staff about, Well, how do we protect ratepayers? How do we make sure ratepayers aren't adversely impacted if we have transactions between Laclede and its affiliates?

And as you can see on page 3, the discussions in support of the stipulation and agreement that was ultimately filed talked about the Cost Allocation Manual. And in that, it said Staff Witness, Steven Rackers, filed testimony that stated that the CAM should be maintained and submitted to ensure that ratepayers were not being
 harmed by any affiliate corporation transactions that
 might take place after the proposed restructuring.

After extensive negotiation, substantially all
of the CAM suggestions sought by Staff were accepted by
the gas company.

7 In addition, compliance with the CAM procedures 8 was extended to all personnel of the gas company, would be 9 made a standard elements of the company's code of conduct 10 applicable to employees.

11 Now, what we have here is the Staff coming 12 forward with a blueprint. And the blueprint says, This is 13 what you'll do, this is how you'll conduct your 14 transactions, this is how you will price your transactions 15 in order to ensure that ratepayers will be protected.

We fast forward six or seven years, and we have 16 17 Mr. Reed coming up on behalf of the Commission Staff and saying, Not so fast. Not so fast. We may have provided 18 19 you a blueprint six or seven years ago. We may have said, 20 This is what you need to do in toward to go ahead and make 21 sure ratepayers are protected, but now there's something 22 else that we want to go ahead and say might be added to 23 the element.

24 We didn't tell you about it back then. We
25 didn't tell you about it until we filed an ACA

1 recommendation. But it's something different, something 2 new, something you haven't seen before, and that's how 3 we're going to go ahead and judge the propriety of your 4 actions that have already taken place under the blueprint 5 that we developed and we provided to you.

6 The same thing is true of the affiliate 7 transaction rule. It sets forth with great detail what 8 the standards of those -- you're supposed to follow in 9 pricing out your transactions, whether you're purchasing 10 from a utility or you're selling to go a utility.

We have complied with those transactions. Contrary to Ms. Shemwell's statement, we have provided thousands of pages of documents showing that we bought gas at a fair market price and how we came up with a determination it was a fair market price based on sales that were being made by unaffiliated vendors.

17 We have provided lots of information showing what our costs are. And the problem we have here is that 18 19 instead of the standard that's in the affiliate 20 transaction rule, which is basically a fair market price 21 because if we're going to buy stuff in the wholesale 22 market, you know, we don't have our own gas supply. We 23 don't have our own oil wells or gas wells. We have to buy from a third party. So fair market price and cost of the 24 25 utility are essentially the same thing.

1 We have provided significant information to 2 Staff that shows that it was a fair market price, but 3 Staff has a different standard. And I think Mr. Thompson 4 said what that standard was today. It's the lowest cost 5 of gas in the affiliate's portfolio.

6 Well, read the CAM. You won't find that 7 standard in it. Read the affiliate transaction rule. You 8 won't find that standard in it. And the reason you won't 9 find it in it is because nobody would do affiliate 10 transactions under those circumstances.

If I'm a company and I'm going to sell you gas, and every time I sell you gas, I have to go ahead and sell it at the lowest cost of gas in my portfolio, and not only the lowest cost of gas in my portfolio, but without any profit, without my markup, who in the world is going to make a sale under those circumstances? Nobody. Of course nobody's going to do it.

And that's why Staff's standard for which they're seeking the information to go ahead and prove up is incontinence by affiliate transaction rule. It's not in any way consistent with the CAM.

And, quite frankly, they should not be allowed to pursue additional information to prove up that patently unlawful standard. Do you have a question?

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Well, I do. But I want to

1 let you finish first.

2 Mr. PENDERGAST: Okay. The same thing is true 3 on the sales side. On the sales side, they're saying, 4 Well, you know, you may have gone ahead and made a sale to 5 your affiliate. It may have been at a market price at the б time you went ahead and made it, but maybe the affiliate 7 took that and maybe it went ahead and made an additional 8 sale someplace else. If they did, we want to go ahead and 9 get whatever profit they made on that additional sale. 10 Once again, what company would ever buy from 11 another company if the deal was, okay, I'm going to sell it to you, but if you make any money on it, if you sell it 12

13 to anybody else, we want whatever profit you made.

14 Nobody would go ahead and operate under that 15 kind of business. And that's why the standard for which 16 they're seeking information to prove is not contemplated 17 by the affiliate transaction rule, not contemplated by the 18 CAM because it would effectively make it impossible to do 19 transactions that the rules freely permit us to do.

And we summed it up in the last oral argument that we had, and I think it bears repeating. The rule, the CAM, basically provides that it's a fair market price, whether it's a sale or whether it's a purchase. That is the price that you have to go ahead and look at. That's the documentation we have provided to show both the sales

and the purchases that we made involving LER were done in
 that kind of fashion based on a fair market price.

And as I said, when it comes to purchases, Staff wants to go ahead and make it the lowest cost of gas in the portfolio, in the affiliate's portfolio. Nowhere to be found in the rule.

7 And the problem with that is it's not in the 8 rule. Ours is. Theirs isn't. There's another part of 9 the rule that does says don't discriminate between 10 affiliates -- or between affiliated suppliers or marketers 11 -- unaffiliated suppliers and marketers.

Well, if we're going to go ahead and tell LER, 12 13 If we buy gas from you, you have to go ahead and give it 14 to us at the lowest cost of gas in your portfolio, but we 15 buy something from BP/Amoco and we say, Well, we'll buy it 16 from you at the market price regardless of what kind of 17 costs you have in the portfolio, are we discriminating? Are we saying we're going to treat LER in a different 18 19 fashion, erratically different fashion than we are 20 BP/Amoco? Of course, we are.

And that's what Staff's proposed standard does. It's not what our proposed standard does. Our standard is consistent with the non-discrimination provisions in the rule. Complies with the Cost Allocation Manual? Ours does. Staff's does not. 1 As I said before, you can look throughout the 2 CAM. You can look throughout the affiliate transaction 3 rule. You won't see lowest cost of gas in the affiliate's 4 portfolio or whatever the affiliate makes on whatever you 5 sell them anywhere in those rules or that CAM. б Permits rational affiliate transactions to 7 occur? Ours does. If we buy something and it's a fair 8 market price, LER or anybody else we buy gas from has at 9 least an opportunity to make a profit. Under Staff's

10 approach, you can't.

And if we sell something to you, we're going to go ahead and take the benefit of any profits you may make on that later on. You can't do transactions under those circumstances.

15 So our approach and our standard permits these 16 transactions to take place as contemplated by your rule. 17 Staff's standard does not. And is it in the interest of 18 the best -- best interest of the company's ratepayers? I 19 submit to you that it's not. And I'll show you why.

Here's what the real impact of having a marketing affiliate like LER has been. Everybody understands that not too long ago, credit markets were very, very tight. Liquidity was very, very low.

24 LER, because it has had some success, has 25 generated cash, and that cash was loaned to Laclede at

extremely favorable rates. And it became a source of
 revenue that we could use to make sure that we had plenty
 of resources to purchase gas supplies, to hedge gas
 supplies, so forth and so on.

5 It's been a reliable supplier to us in the few 6 instances that we've used them. They've never failed us. 7 They've never failed to deliver on the gas supply. And 8 they've been a market for our off system sales.

9 And you had a lot of discussion here about, 10 Well, we need to go ahead and look at whether or not LER 11 is taking capacity or gas sales that Laclede has made and 12 use that to go ahead and make sales that could have gone 13 to Laclede.

14 Well, let's take it at look at it on a macro 15 basis. Now, if you take Staff at its word, you would 16 think that there's been some concerted effort to say, 17 Let's release capacity to LER. Let's go ahead and let them use our gas supply assets so that they can go out and 18 19 make some money and they'll be able to go ahead and keep 20 all that, whereas if Laclede, the gas company, goes ahead 21 and does it, you know, we have to gift 70 percent back or 22 50 percent or whatever the percentage was at the time. 23 Well, we've got the 2004-2005 ACA periods here, the 20050-2006. And if you look at what our off-system 24 25 sales on the regulated side have done, you see that they

1 have not only gone up since 2003, but nearly doubled.

2 Now, you know, if you look at something like 3 that and you think there's been some big conspiracy to 4 migrate revenues from the gas company over to LER, 5 clearly, it was a very subtle conspiracy, presumably one б where everybody sat down and said, Well, let's do that, 7 but let's try and make it look good on the regulated side 8 by making sure that we increase and increase significantly 9 the off-system sales we're making on the regulated side 10 just so hopefully nobody will notice.

11 You would also go ahead and take it from Staff 12 that LER's fortunes have gone ahead and been fueled by its 13 reliance on sales and assets of Laclede Gas Company.

Let's put it in perspective. Here are LER's sales to Laclede over the last four years. And in your packet, I think you also have LER's purchases from Laclede. And it's pretty comparable in nature.

As you can see, Laclede's -- or LER' sales from Laclede have always been below 10 percent, and they've been declining to where in 2008 they were below 1 percent. The same thing is true if you look at is on the flip-side and its purchases LER from Laclede.

I suggest to you that that doesn't sound like a
-- an arrangement where LER has in any way lived off the
assets of Laclede Gas Company. And it's these small blue

area right here, small blue area here that Staff is using as a pretext based on its unauthorized and unlawful standards to get access to all of the records of LER for the other 95 percent of transactions that it's done with third parties.

6 And I suggest to you that they haven't done 7 anything, anything to show that it's appropriate to do 8 that. But you don't have to take my word for it. From 9 the have beginning of this proceeding, what we have said 10 -- and Staff came in with a couple of supposed 11 transactions that they thought were inappropriate.

12 And the thing that we ought to do, like we do in every ACA proceeding is, let's have a hearing. Let's have 13 14 an evidentiary hearing where Staff can come in. They can 15 present these transactions. They can say why they think it's inappropriate. We can go ahead and say why we think 16 17 it's consistent with the affiliate transaction rule, why it's consistent with the CAM, why there was nothing rotten 18 19 in Denmark, why there was nothing inappropriate.

20 We'll have everybody subjected to the rigors of 21 cross-examination. It won't be just a bunch of attorneys 22 standing around talking about facts that aren't in 23 evidence. It will be an evidentiary hearing, and we'll 24 see whether there's any substance or any validity to the 25 examples that they've given.

You'll have a full factual record on which to 1 2 determine what the law really is, how the law really 3 applies and whether there's any reason to go forward and 4 have this mammoth investigation of an unregulated company. 5 Now, I have to ask you, why isn't that fair? б Why isn't that the appropriate thing to do? If Staff has 7 its theory and its brought forward examples of what it thinks is inappropriate pricing, then let's have a hearing 8 9 and see whether there's any substance to those 10 allegations.

I submit to you that that's the fair thing to do. That's the reasonable thing to do. That protects us and gives us some due process in this process. And there's absolutely no reason in the world why we shouldn't pursue that particular approach.

I think it's time for Staff to come forward with more than just ways of trying to suggest that the rules aren't what they say or they're not complete or there's something else out there that nobody knew about and nobody was advised about and nobody was notified about that adds to these standards.

I think it's time to go ahead -- and if Staff's confident in what it's say, let's have an evidentiary hearing and see whether there's any validity to what they say or any validity to what we say. Thank you. JUDGE JONES: Okay. Questions from the Bench?
 Commissioner jarrett? Commissioner Kenney?

3 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Let me -- thank you. And 4 I'll ask some of the same questions. Let me back up and 5 -- the evidentiary hearing and -- why isn't this, what 6 we're here for today, simply a discovery dispute and 7 nothing more? Because, I mean, I'm framing it in my brain 8 as just that. And so I'm asking that question.

9 But then, secondarily, if we assume, as I'm 10 assuming, that this is a discovery dispute, the issues 11 that you're discussing will be held in abeyance for an 12 evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary hearing isn't 13 precluded by this proceeding that we're going through 14 today and what the outcome of this proceeding is.

MR. PENDERGAST: Well, it may not be precluded ultimately from doing it, but the typical approach in an ACA is Staff comes in and makes a recommendation.

18 In this case, they made a recommendation that 19 said, I think there should be a couple of disallowances 20 because you paid too much for gas not withstanding what we 21 think was full compliance with the affiliate transaction 22 rule.

And to pursue this particular approach, we need to go ahead and obtain all this additional information, do an audit of a billion dollar company in order to go ahead 1 and see whether there's anything inappropriate here.

2 And i suggest to you, Commissioner, that's3 putting the cart before the horse.

4 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Well -- and let -- so let 5 me -- that begs the question, though. I mean, if that is, б in fact, what Staff is doing and they're asserting some 7 theory and they're making recommendations that certain 8 costs should be disallowed, by allowing access to these 9 documents, if that what we ultimately do, we're not 10 passing judgment on the appropriateness or the inappropriateness of this new standard that Staff is 11 coming up with, are we? 12

MR. PENDERGAST: No. What you're doing is 13 you're ignoring what your rules say. You're ignoring what 14 15 the CAM said. You're ignoring what the standards are and 16 you're saying, We're not going to go ahead and pay any 17 attention to them. We're going go ahead and allow the party to pursue whatever information they it wants no 18 19 matter how inconsistent they happen to be with their own 20 rules and their own CAM that a utility has religiously and 21 faithfully relied upon for the last six or seven years. 22 And I don't think you should permit a fishing

23 expedition based on what I think are patently unlawful 24 standards.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Well, and that -- that's

1 two different statements there. And so let me ask you this: I think you're right. We shouldn't allow fishing 2 3 expeditions if that's what this, in fact, is. 4 But isn't that different than saying that we are 5 -- that an ACA, in the contures of the information that б they are allowed to obtain, is limited by what's in the 7 CAM and the affiliate transaction rule? 8 MR. PENDERGAST: You know, Commissioner, I -- I 9 -- and I said it at the last oral argument. I think there 10 are a limited number of instances where the rule wouldn't necessarily -- compliance with the rule wouldn't 11 necessarily bless a transaction. Let me tell you what I 12 13 think they are. 14 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So you do agree -- so 15 Staff and Laclede are in agreement in that regard at least? 16 17 MR. PENDERGAST: Certainly not in agreement on what they say is a reasonable area to look into that may 18 19 not be covered by the rule. And let me tell -- you --COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But the general 20 21 proposition that compliance with the affiliate transaction 22 rule does not automatically mean that you've complied with 23 the -- that you've been prudent. MR. PENDERGAST: It -- it does not --24 25 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: You agree with that?

1 MR. PENDERGAST: I agree with that in a very 2 limited number of circumstances, one of which is decidedly 3 not this one. And let's give you a couple examples. 4 Let's say I go forward and I buy twice as much 5 gas as I really need. Okay? And the Staff comes in and б said, What did you buy all that gas all for? You didn't 7 need all that. You only needed half of it to go ahead and 8 serve your customer.

9 now, whether I had gone ahead and bought it from 10 an affiliate or not, you know, just because I bought it 11 from an affiliate and it happened to be appropriately 12 priced, the fact that I bought twice as much as I need, I 13 think, would be still be a matter of prudence. That has 14 not been alleged in this case. That is not what Staff is 15 seeking information to.

The second area is if I bought gas, say, at a very expensive pipeline and I said, I'm going to go ahead and buy down here even though I could go ahead and take it over there, and I'm going to go ahead and -- and do it no matter what the economics are, I guess, whether I bought if from an affiliate or not an affiliate, you could go ahead and second-guess that and do a prudence.

The interesting thing about either of those is you don't need affiliate records to go ahead and do a prudence evaluation on that. You can determine whether I 1 bought too much gas just by how much gas I bought.

2 You don't have to go ahead and have affiliate 3 records to go ahead and determine, Well, you should have 4 bought it over on this pipeline rather than that pipeline. 5 You have plenty of records to go ahead and establish that. 6 You do not need this fishing expedition in order to get 7 that kind of information.

8 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Let me ask another 9 question, then. Is the basis of Laclede's objection that 10 these documents that they're asking -- what's the basis --11 I mean is it irrelevant? Is it overly broad and unduly 12 burdensome?

MR. PENDERGAST: It's irrelevant because they're 13 14 being asked pursuant to a standard that's directly contrary to your rules. And there's no question about it. 15 That's been conceded. It's been admitted. And it's 16 17 directly contrary to the CAM. And there's no exception, 18 whether you want to call it prudence or anything else, 19 that justifies obtaining this kind of information for the 20 kind of standard that they're saying ought to be followed. 21 You don't have a standard that says lowest cost 22 of gas in the gas portfolio. And we don't need, you know, 23 even a hearing to make that determination.

24 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But we're not -- we're not
25 blessing that standard.

MR. PENDERGAST: Well, if you go ahead and you 1 2 tell Staff based on a blatantly false, unsupported 3 standard like that they can go out and they can pursue a 4 massive audit of an unregulated company in order to try 5 and prove up that standard, I think everybody today can б sit there and look at the rule and say it ain't in there, 7 then I think you may not be blessing it, but you're certainly putting a lot of people to a lot of burden for 8 9 what is patently an unreasonable exercise. 10 And -- and as I said, Commissioner, you know,

11 you don't have to make a determination today. Have an 12 evidentiary hearing where we can go ahead and sort through 13 these things, and we can all say what our view of the 14 affiliate transaction rule is and what our view of 15 prudence is and we can look at the transactions that Staff 16 has brought up.

And if after you do that and you determine,
Well, there's something fishy here, there's something
rotten in Denmark, then maybe you go ahead and do that.
I don't think you will.

But I think you either deny this outright or you say, Staff, it's time to go ahead and put your allegations to the test. Because I certainly haven't heard a cogent defense of the standard that they've said they want to pursue this information to obtain. Maybe you have. But I 1 haven't.

2 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: All right. I mean -- and 3 I just want to encapsulate this and put this -- you have 4 to forgive me. I'm thinking about this as a litigator, so 5 I'm trying to put this in the context of how this would be 6 argued in a traditional litigation context.

7 Is Laclede's argument that the CAM and the 8 affiliate transaction rule, in this context at least, 9 define the contures of the documents that Staff is allowed 10 access to?

11 MR. PENDERGAST: Yes. I would say that the CAM 12 and affiliate transaction rule affirmatively preclude the 13 kind of standard that Staff is relying on in order to 14 obtain the information that it says it wants.

15 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But I'm thinking about 16 this in two different steps. I mean, this -- I'm not 17 putting a stamp of approval or casting an opinion about 18 the standard that Staff is putting forward. I just want 19 to know whether the documents are relevant to a prudence 20 review.

21 MR. PENDERGAST: No. And I don't think they're 22 relevant to a prudence review. And I think you ought to 23 go ahead and take to heart what Kevin Thompson here, when 24 he was a regulatory law judge, wrote in an AmerenUE case. 25 It says that it is true that the Commission is authorized to require and examine the dealings with
 regulated entities with their unregulated affiliates.
 However, that authority applies to transactions between
 the affiliates and the regulated entity.

5 It does not apply to transactions between the 6 unregulated affiliates and third parties absent a specific 7 showing of relevancy to transactions between the 8 affiliates and the regulated entity.

9 And what the Staff has done to show you relevance is to come in and say, I've got a standard here. 10 It's a standard of lowest cost gas in the affiliate's 11 portfolio or it's a standard of, Let's follow the 12 affiliate around and see if it did anything with the 13 14 assets that you sold to them at the fair market price. It doesn't even begin to comply with any 15 standard that you've authorized and any standard that 16 17 would make that information relevant. Doesn't even begin 18 to.

19 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: The -- the opinion that 20 you were just reading from, was that in the context of an 21 ACA review?

22 MR. PENDERGAST: No. That was in the context of 23 an Ameren case.

24 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay.

25 MR. PENDERGAST: And it had to do with their

1 dealings with this an unregulated affiliate. And I just have to quite tell you, quite candidly, that the ability 2 3 to go out and do prudence reviews and to say, The 4 affiliate transaction rules, well, they don't apply, or, 5 we can go ahead in the form of a prudence review come up б with any standard we want -- I mean, if we had known, I 7 guess, back in 2001 that here are the standards that we 8 have to meet, here's how we have to conduct our 9 transactions and, oh, yes, at some point in the future, 10 somebody on Staff may come in and say, Well, I've got this vague, ill-defined prudence standard that's going to go 11 ahead and change all of the standards that you've been 12 13 living by over the last six is or seven years, and -- you 14 know, I don't know. Maybe we never would have done any 15 transactions at all. But I tell you, that's a fundamental problem 16 17 with due process, advising parties what the rules of game 18 are. And what Staff is trying to do is change those rules 19 today. And you shouldn't let them do it. 20 MR. ZUCKER: Commissioner Kenney? Over here. 21 If I may supplement Mr. Pendergast's response? 22 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Sure. 23 MR. ZUCKER: You've asked the question is prudence the same as the affiliate transaction rule? How 24 25 close to do they overlap in this case? Is there some

1 prudence -- is there some part of prudence that isn't part 2 of affiliate transaction rule?

And the answer is that, in this case, there is not. They overlap 100 percent. And the prudence is the affiliate transaction rule. And I'll tell you why. That's because that in this case, Staff's done an audit. They've looked for -- they spend a year doing it.

8 And what they've come up with a -- an allegation 9 that Laclede Gas Company paid too much when they bought 10 gas from LER. And so the sole issue here is the pricing 11 of an affiliate transaction.

And when that is the issue, the -- the Commission has a rule that covers that issue specifically, as you and Commissioner Jarrett have raised, and that rule is the affiliate from action rule. It tells you -between that on and our CAM, it tells you exactly how those transactions should be priced.

And that's exactly what this case should be about. Did Laclede price these transactions in accordance with the affiliate transaction rule? And the information Staff's looking for has nothing to do with the affiliate transactions that Laclede entered into.

23 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I mean, I think -- it
24 occurs to me or it seems to me that Staff is conceding
25 that it's going beyond the list of standards that are set

1 forth in the affiliate transaction rule because they don't 2 overlap in their -- in their estimation. And so what I'm 3 trying to get my brain wrapped around, it seems to me what 4 they're arguing is that they need to see the documents 5 that demonstrate the transaction between LER and whomever 6 it bought the gas from. Is that your understanding of 7 what they're looking at? 8 MR. PENDERGAST: You know what? My 9 understanding of what they're looking at is they want to 10 find the lowest cost of gas in LER's portfolio so they can go ahead and say, Instead of using fair market price, I 11 want to use that lowest cost of gas in your portfolio. 12 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: What --13 14 MR. PENDERGAST: I mean, Mr. Thompson said that. 15 That's not in your rules. COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I didn't -- let me make 16 17 sure I'm understanding because I didn't hear him say that. Presumably, LER buys gas, right? 18 19 MR. PENDERGAST: Right. COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Some of it it sells to 20 21 Laclede, and some to other folks, right? 22 MR. PENDERGAST: Right. 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Are -- is Staff asking for the underlying documents showing the purchases, LER's 24 25 purchases of the gas that it ultimately sold to Laclede,

1 or are they asking for the underlying documents of all of 2 LER's purchases, whether they sold to Laclede or somebody 3 else?

MR. PENDERGAST: They're looking for the underlying documents of all purchases that were made by LER from whatever source for whatever reason. You know, we provided them with documents showing what LER -- what they purchased from on the pipeline that we were providing this from.

10 You know, they -- they wanted more than that. 11 They wanted to go ahead and see all LER invoices. They 12 wanted to see all of LER's sales information, 95 percent 13 of which involves transactions with other parties.

They want to go ahead and see what LER did with any capacity that we went ahead and released to them. And they want to do it, as I said before, pursuant to a standard that's unlawful and unauthorized by the rules that you have gone ahead and adopted.

19 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Are they making an
20 allegation that any of those transactions are
21 inappropriate, or are they just wanting to determine
22 whether or not they are appropriate?
23 MR. PENDERGAST: My -- my --

24 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: It seems that they can't 25 make a determination one way or the other until they 1 actually see the documents.

2 MR. PENDERGAST: They can make a determination 3 because we have shown them time and time again what the 4 market-based price was for these transactions from 5 unaffiliated suppliers and unaffiliated purchasers at the 6 same time that they made these transactions with LER. 7 Now, that's the fair market kind of indicia 8 that's provided for in our CAM. It's provided for in the 9 affiliate transaction rule. And that's what's relevant. 10 What isn't relevant is, Can I find someplace where LER would serve a heck of a lot more customers than 11 just Laclede, may have bought gas for somebody other than 12 13 Laclede and attributed that lowest price gas to the 14 regulated gas company? 15 Once again, it's not in your rules. And the 16 reason it's not in your rules is because nobody would do 17 business under those circumstances. And that's the standard Staff's trying to apply. 18 19 MS. SHEMWELL: Staff is trying to apply a prudence standard. It --20 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: What Mr. Pendergast just 22 described, is that the standard that Staff is attempting 23 to apply? I mean, are you looking into all of LER's sales -- or purchases rather, and then its ultimate sales to 24 25 other entities other than Laclede and trying to determine

1 whether -- whatever the lowest price that it paid 2 irrespective of have who it ultimately sold to? Is that 3 the price you're trying to attribute purchases -- sales to 4 Laclede? Did I restate what you just articulated? 5 MR. PENDERGAST: I think pretty fairly. б MR. THOMPSON: We're trying to determine what 7 LER spent to acquire the gas that it sold to Laclede in 8 fulfillment of those contracts. 9 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So are the underlying 10 documents you're trying to obtain just the documents that 11 would reflect the gas that LER purchased that ultimately sold to Laclede or all of LER's purchases irrespective of 12 13 to whom it ultimately was sold? 14 MR. THOMPSON: I think we're trying to get all purchase information for four months out of the two-year 15 period. 16 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: All -- all of LER's 17 purchases irrespective of to whom it was ultimately sold? 18 19 MR. THOMPSON: Well, the gas mixes. 20 MS. SHEMWELL: Spongeable. 21 MR. THOMPSON: I mean, it's not -- you can't say 22 that this molecule that was acquired in Texas eventually wound up with Laclede while this other molecule from 23 Louisiana wound up somewhere else. 24 25 MR. PENDERGAST: And Mr. Thompson is guite

1 right. It is just a portfolio of gas supply sources from 2 different areas. And that's why the exercise is going to 3 be even more futile and even more irrelevant regardless of 4 whether it's done pursuant to a standard that you've 5 authorized, which you didn't.

б They're going to go ahead and see a lot of gas 7 that was bought for different purposes at different 8 places. And -- and what is that going to mean in the 9 context and in terms of whether what we purchased from LER 10 at the time with unaffiliated suppliers being used to show 11 what the benchmark price was was a fair market price or not? How -- how is that possibly relevant to anything? 12 13 Can you answer that question?

14 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Whoa, whoa. I want to get 15 in here just for a second. And tell me -- I mean, why --16 I mean, why -- why is the weighted average cost of the gas 17 relevant?

MS. SHEMWELL: We're trying to establish fair market value. What's the fair market value of what Laclede bought from LER?

21 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: If they -- but -- the fair 22 market -- I mean, when we -- I'm just trying to think of 23 how to -- how to articulate this question here. But when 24 we -- Commissioner Kenney, forgive me, but you're -- I 25 mean, it certainly seems like -- you have market data. I

1 mean, doesn't that market data -- I mean, you know the 2 difference between -- between Henry Hub, the ICE market --3 I mean, we know what those market prices are. So how is 4 this -- how is this different, Ms. Shemwell? 5 MS. SHEMWELL: Under the contract for LER, б Laclede has established a price that is Nimex minus 10 7 cents. LER is likely buying gas from Mid-Continent, which 8 is much lower. If it's lower, then Laclede has not -- is 9 not buying at a fair market value. Laclede could buy from 10 another supplier out in the Mid-Continent at -- at a lower 11 price. So to buy from LER when the price is much higher 12 than they could otherwise acquire it or higher than the 13 14 fair market value is the question. Now --15 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And can you determine that 16 without looking at the underlying purchases by LER? 17 MS. SHEMWELL: No. COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay. 18 19 MS. SHEMWELL: Because there is no index price 20 for St. Louis. 21 MR. PENDERGAST: What you can look at is --22 MS. SHEMWELL: The fair market price for St. 23 Louis is not Nimex. MR. PENDERGAST: But let me tell you what you 24 25 can look at. What you can look at is a BP/Amoco contract

1 we gave you for the same location where we went ahead and 2 bought gas from LER. And that BP contract will show that 3 the pricing considerations that LER sold the gas to us for 4 were the same as BP/Amoco, an unaffiliated supplier was 5 willing to provide. Ms. Shemwell said, We've got to look б at the St. Louis market because BP -- or Laclede -- or 7 excuse me -- LER had the ability to go ahead and deliver 8 to the St. Louis market and maybe, just maybe, they could 9 have gotten gas from a cheaper source. 10 Well, then let's look at the St. Louis market. And what we have provided to Staff is the contract that 11 LER has with unaffiliated purchases, the School 12 13 Aggregation people that was put out for a competitive bid 14 because the schools have to go ahead and do that. 15 And it just so happens that the price that LER 16 charged Laclede was at or blow the prices that LER was 17 charging all of these schools, 280, 300 schools, at or 18 below.

19 Now, you know, why doesn't the inquiry end there
20 under your rule? I think it should. And --

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: What you just described,22 is that defined by the affiliate transaction rule?

23 MR. PENDERGAST: Yeah.

24 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: LER's sales to other third25 parties? Is that encompassed by the affiliate transaction

1 rule?

MR. PENDERGAST: We -- we had already provided 2 3 Staff with information on the MRT Westline that showed 4 that this was a reasonable deal if you purchase down 5 there. 6 We had purchased down there religiously for the 7 last seven or eight years. Staff never alleged that we 8 shouldn't be purchasing from there. But in an additional 9 effort to try and appease them and show them some 10 additional information to set them at ease, we gave them that as well. 11 12 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: You see what I'm getting at, though? 13 14 MR. PENDERGAST: I do see what you're getting 15 at. COMMISSIONER KENNEY: You've already provided 16 17 them documents that are outside of the scope of --18 MR. PENDERGAST: We've gone above and beyond, 19 and we've been rewarded with --COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Yeah. Let me -- let me 20 21 finish my question. 22 MR. PENDERGAST: Yes. 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: What you just described to me, the sales that you were just describing to me, in 24 25 order to demonstrate the relevant St. Louis market, were

1 those sales governed by the affiliate transaction rule? 2 MR. PENDERGAST: Is that something we were 3 required to provide under the affiliate transaction rule? 4 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Right. 5 MR. PENDERGAST: Probably not. Probably -б COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So you're -- you're -- you 7 will concede, then, that you -- Laclede is willing to provide documents that fall outside of the contures of 8 9 what's required under the affiliate transaction rule? 10 MR. PENDERGAST: What I will concede, 11 Commissioner, is that in an effort to go above and beyond, what we're required to do to satisfy Staff is this is an 12 above-board transaction, and if you look at it six ways 13 14 from Sundays, belts and suspenders, that this provides you 15 with all the fair market information anybody could 16 possibly need. 17 And -- and I don't think that having been forthcoming like that, our reward should be to go ahead 18 19 and say, Well, we want to see everything that you have. COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And I think you're right. 20 21 You shouldn't be penalized for doing what you're -- what 22 you describe as extra. What I'm asking you or what I 23 guess I'm getting at, though, is that the discovery process for the purposes of an ACA review are not limited 24 25 by what's set forth in the affiliate transaction rule.

1 MR. PENDERGAST: I think in this particular 2 instance, it absolutely is because the affiliate 3 transaction rule says that parties are entitled to get --4 I mean, you know, you don't necessarily have any 5 jurisdiction over LER. Okay? I mean, you know whether 6 it's informational or otherwise. 7 The jurisdiction that you do have comes from 8 your lawfully approved affiliate transaction rules. Those 9 affiliate transaction rules not something in a PGA or 10 something a prudence review -- I'm sorry go ahead. COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. Before you get to 11 the talking too fast, now, the Commission did approve --12 what was is it? There is -- there is -- there is some 13 14 order that gives us a little more authority to look into 15 the dealings of LER than just the affiliate transaction 16 rule. Would you agree with that statement, 17 Mr. Pendergast? I mean, was it the --COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Stipulation? 18 19 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Yeah. The stipulation that 20 settled that case back in --21 MR. PENDERGAST: Oh, if you're talking about the 22 2000 -- actually, what that stipulation says, if you go 23 through it, is we were re organizing the company. COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Right. 24 25 MR. PENDERGAST: It was separate utility,

remained a separate utility. And there's very clear language in there that says that this isn't supposed to go ahead and impact the scope of the Commission's authority over LER or any other affiliate above and beyond what's under existing law.

6 What it did say is that we would not object on 7 the grounds of relevancy if, in fact, we were saying 8 something was irrelevant because of the restructuring that 9 took place. But nothing here is a basis that we're using 10 to go ahead and say it's irrelevant because of the 11 restructuring that took place.

12 It's irrelevant because your affiliate
13 transaction rules say that this is the standard, and the
14 Staff's using a different standard to get this
15 information.

16 It also said, as I said earlier, it had had a 17 CAM that was designed to protect ratepayers in the event 18 of affiliate transactions were done. I just read earlier 19 from the Staff's suggestions in support of that where the 20 Staff wrote that Steve Rackers had proposed CAM provisions 21 in order to protect ratepayers, Laclede had agreed to all 22 of those provisions.

And, quite frankly, that's what we've lived under and complied with. And what I'm saying is now Staff wants to come up with a totally new standard than what 1 they developed back in that holding company docket.

And I think it's entirely inappropriate to do that after the fact. If you want to change the affiliate transaction rules on a going forward basis, you want to change our CAM on a going forward basis, you know, we can all have that discussion. But you shouldn't do it on a retroactive basis. And that's basically what they're trying to do.

9 MS. SHEMWELL: The standard is and always has 10 been are the charges just and reasonable, 393.130. Are --11 always the standard, and that continues to be the standard 12 in rate cases.

13 MR. PENDERGAST: You can't read away specific 14 rules and specific requirements and specific standards by 15 saying there's some general concept out here saying just 16 and reasonable rates or prudence and -- and that makes all 17 those specifics go away. You just can't do that.

18 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: We need to read these all 19 together in context, I -- to my mind.

20 MR. PENDERGAST: I agree.

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So I guess that gets back 22 to my initial point. Can we read the affiliate 23 transaction rule in isolation and say that that is what 24 governs the scope of discovery in an ACA review? 25 MR. PENDERGAST: I --

1 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I'm really is asking that rhetorically. Let me ask a different question. 2 3 Didn't the Commission originally grant this 4 Motion to Compel? 5 MR. PENDERGAST: Yeah, they did. б COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And what happened? 7 Because I'm just -- I did a little time line for myself, and it looks like in September of '08, we granted it. 8 9 October of '08, rather. And then there was motion to 10 reconsider. MR. PENDERGAST: Right. And -- and --11 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And didn't they come --12 didn't -- at some point, didn't Staff narrow the amount of 13 14 documents that it was asking for? MR. PENDERGAST: Staff went ahead and said, 15 16 Well, just give us two months or four months instead of 17 twelve months. But from the standpoint of wanting to see 18 records of all sales from transactions, what margins you 19 made on them, records of all capacity, you know, it was 20 still a very broad, I want to come in and I want to look 21 at every invoice that your unregulated company has. 22 I want to look at every sale they've made including all the sales, 95 percent of customers that 23 weren't Laclede Gas Company. So did they narrow it from a 24 25 number-wise? Yeah. Did they narrow it from a scope-wise? 1 Not too much.

COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But, I mean, they narrowed 2 3 the time that they wanted to examine? 4 MR. PENDERGAST: I think they said, We'll take 5 several months in each ACA period. I don't know whether б it was two or four. I don't have it in front of me right 7 now. 8 But the way these contracts work, you now, many 9 of them are for an entire year. That doesn't really narrow it substantially. But more importantly, whether 10 it's a lot of information or a little bit of information 11 -- and it's a lot, it's a lot. You know, the thing is, 12 they want it for a standard that I think we've talked 13 14 about today, that isn't contemplated by your rule. 15 And you can't, in the guise of prudence or you can't in the guise of just and reasonable rates, say, 16 17 We're going to go ahead and rejigger those standards that we've gone ahead and -- and had in effect while we do 18 19 these transactions. It's just not appropriate. COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Did I hear Staff 20 21 acknowledge that that was, in fact, the standard that they 22 were attempting to apply? 23 MS. SHEMWELL: I'm sorry. The affiliate transactions rule is the standard? 24 25 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: No. The standard that

Mr. Pendergast was just describing, that you're looking at
 whatever the lowest -- and can you restate it? Because I
 don't think I ever got a clear answer.

4 MR. PENDERGAST: Sure. The purpose from LER is 5 looking for the lowest cost of gas in LER's supply б portfolio without any markup for profit or for the risk 7 and efforts undertaken by LER to line up that gas supply and provide it to us. And for a sale, it's not what the 8 9 market price was at the time you made the sale, but, 10 instead, did LER take that someplace else and use that capacity to make a sell to somebody else? And if they 11 did, we want that money. 12

13 MR. THOMPSON: No. That's not the standard that14 Staff is seeking to apply, sir.

MR. PENDERGAST: Well, that's what I said their standard was at the last oral argument, and nobody said disagree with me. Maybe finally they are, and maybe finally we'll find out what their standard is because I don't know.

20 MR. THOMPSON: You might -- you might have been21 talking too fast for anyone to follow.

22 MR. PENDERGAST: Okay. Well, perhaps.

23 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: All right, gentlemen. I
24 don't want to cause a ruckus between you two. Just keep
25 talking --

MR. THOMPSON: I apologize.

1

2 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Just keep talking to us. 3 All right. So -- and I guess -- I'll ask this question of 4 Staff or -- have you -- are you trying to determine a 5 standard or are you just trying to get the information so б that you determine whether these were prudent purchases or 7 not? 8 MR. THOMPSON: We're -- we're trying to 9 determine the prices at which they acquired the gas. 10 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay. For a finite period of time? 11 12 MR. THOMPSON: For a finite period of time. COMMISSIONER KENNEY: All right. 13 14 MR. THOMPSON: And we want to compare that to 15 the price -- the contract price at which they sold certain 16 amounts of gas to Laclede. 17 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Is that, what he just 18 described, in your mind, relevant to the ACA review and 19 the prudence analysis? MR. PENDERGAST: No. It is -- it's not relevant 20 21 to either, not in this case. The reason it's not relevant 22 is under the CAM and under the affiliate transaction rule, 23 we have to demonstrate that we purchased gas from LER at competitive, fair market price. 24

25 It doesn't matter what LER's costs are as long

1 as we can show it's consistent with what other vendors 2 were selling it for. That's where the inquiry should end. 3 And if you go further than that you and you say, We want 4 to look at their cost and see if there was a more 5 favorable cost in there, you're treating them in a 6 discriminatory fashion inconsistent with your rule. 7 You're treating them under a standard inconsistent what 8 what's in your rule and basically telling us, Don't do any 9 more transactions like that.

10 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Let's assume for the sake 11 of this argument that that's -- that they want to examine 12 these underlying transactions. that, to your mind, is 13 going to automatically lead to a disallowance of those 14 purchases?

15 MR. PENDERGAST: No. I don't think it will 16 automatically lead to a disallowance. They've proposed a 17 disallowance based on the standards that not authorized by 18 the affiliate transaction rule.

And now what they're trying to do is, you know, on the pretext of that unlawful, unauthorized standard get information to try and, I guess, prove it up. And I don't know why they should be allowed to prove up the standard that -- that you have not authorized, that you have -that is directly contrary to what you have authorized. I mean, I think it's about as simple as that. 1 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So in order for -- I guess 2 what you're saying is that it's irrelevant because it goes 3 beyond what's authorized by the affiliate transaction rule 4 and the cost allocation rule?

5 MR. PENDERGAST: I'm saying it's irrelevant, and 6 three Commissioners said it was irrelevant, and they did 7 that back on May 27th. That should have been the final 8 matter on it. You know, we shouldn't even be here today, 9 to be quite frank.

10 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But that order denying the 11 Motion to Compel was an initial order granting it, and it 12 didn't set forth any specific rationale.

MR. PENDERGAST: I know. And we've -COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So we don't know why they
denied it. And that's what I'm trying to get at.

MR. PENDERGAST: I mean -- we -- we -- we've referenced that in our pleading. We've said it was unfortunate that it didn't go ahead and provide more information. We submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the Commission could have utilized for that.

They said based on the arguments of counsel, we determined that it's not irrelevant. And those are the arguments I made then, and it's the arguments I'm making today. So I'm assuming that's what the Commission relied 1 on.

COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Again, as I said at the 2 3 beginning, I appreciate you all coming out here because 4 it's primarily for my purposes. So what I'm asking, 5 irrespective of what was argued before and what the б initial order, are you saying that it's irrelevant because 7 it goes beyond what's required by the affiliate 8 transaction rule and the cost allocation manual? 9 MR. PENDERGAST: I'm saying it's irrelevant not 10 only because it goes beyond what's required by the CAM and 11 what's required by the affiliate transaction rule, but because it presumes a standard that's directly contrary to 12 the one that appears in those rules and that CAM. 13 14 It cannot be reconciled with the standards that 15 you say ought to be used to govern these transactions. 16 And I'm saying that you can't overcome that by just 17 saying, Well, it's a prudence review or just and 18 reasonable rates. Your standards are what they are. COMMISSIONER KENNEY: All right. So what we 19 20 would have to determine, then, is that, in this particular 21 case at least, a prudence review is defined and is limited 22 to what's set forth under the affiliate transaction rule 23 in the CAM? 24 MR. PENDERGAST: As Mr. Zucker said, in this

25 particular instance where the only issue is whether the

purchase from the affiliate was done at a proper price, what you would have to determine is our rules and the --and the company's CAM says what that price ought to be, and that's what they have proven up. And that's --COMMISSIONER KENNEY: That's what it says it should be for purposes of compliance with the affiliate transaction rule, right?

8 MR. PENDERGAST: You know, for purposes of the 9 affiliate transaction rule, which is, as Commissioner 10 Jarrett pointed out, designed to go ahead and prevent any 11 appropriate subsidization, which as the CAM pointed out, 12 Mr. Rackers testified to two seven or eight years ago is 13 designed to ensure that ratepayers are adequately 14 protected.

And I'm sorry. I can't go ahead and agree with the concept that, suddenly, we have a new definition of what it takes to go ahead and protect ratepayers that was uncontemplated at that time that we wrap in a general rubric of prudence and that's fundamentally different than what you were living and operating under in good faith all these years.

22 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I don't think it's 23 fundamentally different. I think that it's just -- it's 24 not the only -- it's not the only governing -- governing 25 document for purposes of a prudence review.

1 And I quess this goes back to my original 2 question. It sounds like that we've conflated the 3 analysis for prudence review with the analysis for the 4 affiliate transaction rule. And that seems to be the 5 fundamental disagreement. I just want to make sure I'm -б MR. PENDERGAST: I think it is. And, quite 7 frankly, just to be candid about it, I think it's a purposeful osfutation. I think people are trying to move 8 9 away from what it says in the affiliate transaction rule, 10 what says in our CAM, what those clear standards are by throwing up the word "prudence" and saying, Well, you 11 know, we've got prudence here and that might be somehow 12 13 different.

And when you ask them to get more specific on what they really mean by that, they come up with the standard lowest cost of gas in the portfolio or whatever the affiliate made when it sold gas to somebody else that you can't tie back to anything.

19 You know, that is the standard that is in the 20 mind of David summer, the Staff witness who proposed these 21 disallowances. It is not in your rules. It is not in the 22 CAM. And we shouldn't be required to provide a lot of 23 information pursuant to a rule that is blatantly 24 inconsistent with the rules that you have -- you've 25 approved and that we were supposed to live by.

1 They need to live by them, too.

2 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I think I understand 3 Laclede's position. 4 MR. PENDERGAST: Thank you. 5 THE COURT REPORTER: Excuse me. I need to 6 change paper. 7 JUDGE JONES: okay. Go ahead. 8 (Break in proceedings.) 9 JUDGE JONES: Okay. Commissioner Kenney? COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I want to make sure I've 10 encapsulated your position in easily digestible terms, and 11 12 this is just for my own education. 13 Mr. PENDERGAST: Sure. Appreciate that. 14 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: It's inconsistent -- or it's irrelevant -- the information Staff seeks in 15 Laclede's information is irrelevant because it's 16 17 inconsistent with the CAM and the affiliate transaction 18 rules? 19 MR. PENDERGAST: Because it --COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Is there an independent 20 21 basis that Laclede could argue for its irrelevancy, 22 separate and apart from the CAM on the affiliate 23 transaction rule? 24 MR. PENDERGAST: Yeah. I guess I would just 25 argue if there was no CAM and there was no affiliate

transaction rule and we could go ahead and demonstrate, as
I think we have, and we could prove that we made these
purchases from LER, here is the information we provided to
show you that it was made on a fair market value basis
based on what other marketers were willing to go ahead and
sell gas to you -- to us, that it was fully competitive
and reasonably priced from that standpoint.

8 I would think under those circumstances, whether 9 there was a CAM or not, looking at what LER may have gone 10 ahead and paid for that gas supply would be irrelevant.

COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So Laclede's position, 11 then, would be to -- the definition or the way to 12 determine fair market value would be the price that 13 14 Laclede paid from other non-affiliates, not what its 15 affiliate paid for the gas in the first instance? 16 MR. PENDERGAST: Absolutely. I think that's the 17 fair market test that is in our CAM. I think it's the fair market test that is supported by the affiliate 18 19 transaction rule.

And, you know, quite frankly -- you know, I'm not the first one to -- to say this. This isn't the first time Staff has tried to come up with different standard. Back -- as far back as the late '90s, they wanted to have Utilicorp that was releasing capacity to their affiliates have those capacity releases basically counted for at the

1 full maximum rate.

And at that time, the Commission said, No, this is a fair market price. That's the what market was going to pay for that capacity at that time. And if we charged them the full fair market -- or not fair market -- the full capacity release rate, they probably wouldn't have purchased it and ratepayers would be worse off.

8 By the same token, if we had to live under an 9 environment where LER could only do business with us if it 10 was willing to give us the lowest cost in its portfolio or 11 go ahead and remit to us any profits it makes on anything 12 we sell them at fair market price, they would not go ahead 13 and ever do business with us.

14 And our customers would be the losers in that circumstance because that's one more market for off-system 15 16 sales, which, as I showed you before, have increased 17 tremendously during the period when we were supposedly 18 migrating them over to LER. They just wouldn't be there 19 as a potential customer. And I don't think that would be good for anybody. And it certainly wouldn't be consistent 20 21 with your rules.

22 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay.

23 JUDGE JONES: Commissioner Jarrett?

24 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Go ahead.

25 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. So, Ms. Shemwell, I

1 mean, you're basically telling me that Staff cannot calculate the difference between sales and the 2 3 Mid-Continent and sales in the Nimex market? 4 MS. SHEMWELL: We can. 5 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. So -б MS. SHEMWELL: We just don't know what they were 7 at the time. 8 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Well, if you -- if you can, 9 then -- then why can't -- why can't you calculate that? 10 Because it -- it seems to me that I have seen graphs in the past that talk about the spread between Mid-Continent 11 12 Gas and Nimex or Henry Hub. And, obviously, it's a lot -- in the past, it 13 has been a lot more than -- than 10 cents per million BTU. 14 So I'm still not sure what -- what the --15 MR. THOMPSON: The piece that's missing, sir, is 16 where was LER actually acquiring the gas? We know what 17 18 the index prices were at the various locations. We know 19 what the gas was selling for. But what gas did they buy? MS. SHEMWELL: There's no Mid-Continent index at 20 21 -- okay. They've set their price in the contract based 22 generally on Nimex minus 10 cents. 23 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Right. MS. SHEMWELL: So that's what they're paying 24 25 LER. Our question is, did LER buy gas much more cheaply

somewhere else? And Laclede could have bought that same
 gas much more cheaply from a different marketer or from
 someone else.

4 MR. PENDERGAST: If I could just respond to 5 that. Why don't we ask BP/Amoco when it makes a sale to 6 us whether or not they bought gas significantly more 7 cheaply from someplace else than what they sold to us at market price at a particular time and location and tell 8 9 BP/Amoco that if they did buy that gas or buy some gas at 10 a cheaper location, we want them to go ahead and adjust 11 the contract price?

12 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay, Rowdy. I'll get to13 you in a minute here.

14 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I mean, the reason we 15 don't do that, though, is we subject affiliate 16 transactions to a heightened scrutiny as a general 17 practice. And I don't mean affiliate transactions as 18 defined in the general regulations. I'm using it with a 19 little a and little d.

20 When we -- by definition, we wouldn't give that 21 transaction because between BP and Laclede the same 22 position we would give the transaction --

23 MR. PENDERGAST: I agree with you completely,
24 Commissioner, and that's why we have affiliate transaction
25 rules. That's why we have asymmetrical pricing standards

that are designed to go ahead and make sure that those
 prices are reasonable.

And that's what we've lived with. And you also have non-discrimination rules. And if you can't make a BP/Amoco do that, you shouldn't make an affiliate do that because you're treating them in a highly discriminatory fashion if you do. I'm sorry, Commissioner.

8 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right.

9 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Sorry about that.

10 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: It's -- it's all right. 11 I interrupted you earlier. All right. Let me switch 12 gears and go back to Mr. Pendergast here. Let's talk 13 about the release of pipeline capacity for a second.

Now, obviously, if Laclede releases capacity to LER and then LER turns around and sells that capacity at a -- at a -- at a marked up price, I mean, that's -- that's a problem, isn't it?

18 MR. PENDERGAST: Oh, I think, you know, LER or 19 any other vendor out there is going to go ahead and take 20 whatever -- I mean, they're buying it from us for a 21 reason, whether it's capacity or gas supply. And that's 22 so that they can serve other customers.

23 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. But we're -- I mean,
24 you know, we're not talking about you selling gas to
25 Mr. Poston over here. I mean, we're talking about, you

1 know, Ken Nices and Ken Nices.

2 So it's like, you know, if I'm -- hypothetically 3 speaking, if -- if, you know, it's Ken Nices says, Well, 4 you know, here I am at Laclede. I'm going to release this 5 pipeline capacity to LER, and then LER is going to turn б around, I mean -- I mean, I'm not -- I mean, I'm not sure 7 that that passes the reasonable person's standard, 8 Mr. Pendergast. So tell me -- tell me why you think I'm 9 wrong on that. 10 MR. PENDERGAST: No. I'm not saying that that's

11 not a reason to go ahead and have a legitimate concern.
12 No. 1, I think that's why you have rules that say when you
13 release that capacity or you sell it, it has to be at a
14 fair market price.

No. 2, I think you can look at what we have 15 16 provided to you. And we provided with you performance 17 bonus information that shows that the gas supply people who make these determinations right up to Mr. Nices, that 18 19 when they get evaluated as to whether they're going to be 20 compensated and whether they're going to go ahead and have 21 a bonus, it's whether they have maximized off-system sales 22 for the regulated gas company.

23 Staff asked for that information. We provided 24 it to you. George Godat or whoever makes those sales 25 doesn't get rewarded if LER makes more money. He gets rewarded if Laclede Gas Company makes more money in its
 off system sales.

And, secondly, I think we ought to have -- if we're going to have an evidentiary hearing have Mr. Godat come in here and tell you how he makes sure he maximizes his off-system sales revenue, how he makes sure that he's not giving capacity away when he could go ahead and bundle it with gas supply and get more money to not only benefit the company but benefit himself.

And I -- and we have those protections in place. And I've shown you the macro information on how our off system sales have grown throughout this period when we were supposedly migrating them over to LER.

14 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Right.

MR. PENDERGAST: And at the very least, doesn't that justify having a hearing?

17 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. So is it your opinion that what this is all about is Staff looks at LER 18 19 and they say, Oh, my, here is this LER, and they are making obscene amounts of money, and we think that, since 20 21 this is all, in essence, underwritten by the -- the 22 regulated utility that the ratepayers ought to be entitled to a bigger slice of that action? Is that -- is that --23 is that what -- is that your impression of their -- of 24 25 what they're ultimately thinking? Or is it something

1 else?

MR. PENDERGAST: Well, that does sound like a 2 3 Staff thought process to me. And, you know, I -- I would 4 imagine that if LER was losing money or LER was hardly 5 making any money, I don't know if we would even be here. б I'm absolutely confident that if we had done 7 this same transaction that we did with with LER with 8 anybody else at the same price we wouldn't be here today. 9 I think it's because LER has had revenues grow and it has 10 been successful that Staff has tried to go ahead and make the case that it's due to Laclede allowing them to use 11 Laclede's assets or selling things to them at a price that 12 13 wasn't appropriate. 14 And all I can say to that is if you look at how 15 much business LER has actually done with Laclede, whether it's on sales or purchases, it's a very small component of 16 17 their overall business. 18 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. But let -- let me 19 ask another question. Let me ask it this way: Should the 20 prudence of a contract between Laclede and LER be judged 21 at the time the contract is signed, or should it be, you 22 know, three years down the road? 23 MR. PENDERGAST: I think under the prudence

23 MR. PENDERGASI. I think under the prudence
24 standard, it ought to be evaluated based on what was known
25 and what the circumstances were at the time it was entered

1 into.

And I don't think that's really what the Staff's 2 3 disallowance in this case does. I think it's a 4 retrospective review. I think they want to go ahead and 5 look back in time and see if they can find, you know, б other instances where LER may have --7 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: You know, I mean, as I 8 understand it, one of the purposes of LER is to assume 9 risk. 10 MR. PENDERGAST: Sure. COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. But, really, when --11 when you sign a gas contract to purchase gas for Nimex 12 minus 10 cents -- I mean, to me, that doesn't seem like 13 14 LER is assuming a whole lot of risk. I mean, you know, basically, I mean, you're just 15 16 saying, Hey, they can beat the -- the -- the average 17 monthly price by -- by 10 cents a million CCF or whatever; 18 is that correct? 19 MR. PENDERGAST: Yeah. Actually, the 20 transactions under consideration in these two ACA 21 proceedings, they took place and they were at a Nimex 22 minus something or other, nine or ten. And that was the 23 year where we had Katrina. 24 We had prices blow out. And if you talk to LER, 25 they'll tell you that they lost money on it. And we --

they wanted to renegotiate the contract. And we
 ultimately had real problems doing that.

And we finally made an arrangement that was less favorable to them than what other suppliers were getting at the same time. You know, it was based on the BP/Amoco purchases that we were making at the time.

7 We gave them the same pricing deal that BP/Amoco
8 was giving us. And, you know, from our perspective,
9 that's pretty good evidence that it was a fair market
10 price down in Westline off of MRT.

MR. ZUCKER: Commissioner, let me supplement that answer. You asked when -- at a price of Nimex minus ten it doesn't sound like LER is taking a lot of risk.

14 The answer is, the price that -- the price by 15 itself doesn't tell us anything. What tells us whether 16 the -- the utility ratepayer is being protected is whether 17 that price meets other comparable prices. Right?

18 That's what the rule is. This is pretty simple. 19 You want to make sure the ratepayer isn't paying more than 20 a market price. So you look at comparables, right? 21 Just like they do in the real estate market when you buy 22 -- when you buy a house.

And so the question isn't what -- what Nimex minus ten is. The question is what are -- what are the comparables? And that's the question that Staff should be

1 asking, not what did LER pay for gas out in the field at 2 the well head that they later brought to some other 3 location and sold to Laclede. 4 What LER paid for their gas is irrelevant to 5 whether our not Laclede paid a price higher than the 6 comparables would dictate. 7 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And in order to determine 8 what's comparable, you're comparing LER -- LER's sales to 9 Laclede as compared to BP's sales to Laclede? 10 MR. ZUCKER: Right. COMMISSIONER KENNEY: In order for it to be a 11 full -- a full and accurate --12 13 MR. ZUCKER: Comparison. 14 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: -- Comparison, don't we 15 need to know the underlying -- I mean, how do we know that the BP sales and the LER sales are, in fact, comparable? 16 17 MR. PENDERGAST: Well, I think -- I think you have to go ahead and -- and assume that the operating 18 19 assumptions behind the fair market test is that the fair 20 market is going to go ahead and provide a competitive 21 reasonable price. 22 Because if other people are willing to sell it 23 or willing to buy it at the same price you're selling it or buying it from the affiliate, then that's good evidence 24 25 that it's a reasonable price.

1 And, you know, I don't know where you go if you 2 start looking behind that and you start saying, Well, I 3 know what people in the marketplace were charging and 4 demanding for it. But what was their cost structure like? 5 And where were they getting their gas from and how much? 6 And what's the difference between that and what they were 7 selling it for? I think you're just in a complete morass 8 at that point. 9 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Why isn't that enough? 10 And this is to Mr. Thompson and Ms. Shemwell. MR. THOMPSON: It's not enough because LER is an 11 12 affiliate. MS. SHEMWELL: The BP contract is not --13 14 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Let me ask the question this way. If the goal is to determine whether Laclede is 15 16 purchasing gas at a reasonable price from its affiliate, 17 why isn't it sufficient to look to what Laclede was paying to other non-affiliates? And if they are comparable, why 18 isn't that sufficient? 19 MR. THOMPSON: First of all, the goal is to 20 21 determine whether the price Laclede is paying for gas from 22 everybody is appropriate. It's a prudence review. So we're not just looking at its transactions with LER. 23 We're looking at all of its transactions. 24 25 But when we come to the transactions with LER,

1 we have additional questions that we ask: Are they buying 2 gas from LER where perhaps they should have done something 3 else? And one way to look at that is to see if they are 4 paying an inordinate margin to LER. 5 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So that's more than a fair б market test. I mean, that's greater than a fair market 7 test. 8 MR. THOMPSON: No. That's a prudence test. 9 That's the prudence test. 10 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: Okay. MR. THOMPSON: In other words, were the actions 11 taken by Laclede prudent? 12 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: So irrespective of whether 13 14 they pass a fair market test, it may still not be a 15 prudent purchase? 16 MR. THOMPSON: That's exactly right, as 17 Mr. Pendergast himself said. 18 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And you don't agree with that? 19 MR. PENDERGAST: I don't for the life of me 20 21 understand under those circumstances where it's 22 competitive with what other people were willing to sell it 23 to, why that doesn't end the discussion. 24 I mean, if you were looking at BP/Amoco and 25 determining whether our arrangement with them was

1 reasonable, you'd look at what other people were selling 2 gas for down in that particular location at that 3 particular time, and you would say, okay, it's in line 4 with those prices. Well, the same thing ought to be true 5 of your affiliate. б COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. But --MR. THOMPSON: Let's go back, if I could, just 7 8 for a moment, sir. 9 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. Can you go back and 10 restate your argument one more time before you restate 11 whatever you want to state? 12 MR. THOMPSON: Our concern is whether the actions that Laclede took were prudent. Were they the 13 14 best actions Laclede could have taken at the time given 15 what they knew or should have known at the time? COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Wait. You said best. 16 17 MR. THOMPSON: Right. COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Is best really the 18 19 standard, or is it reasonable under the circumstances by a person who knows all of the relevant facts and would be in 20 21 a similar position? 22 MR. THOMPSON: I think that best and reasonable 23 are -- are essentially the same in this circumstance. 24 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: No. Because if you say, I 25 bought gas at a reasonable price versus buying gas at the

1 best price, I think those are two entirely different 2 standards. Don't you, Mr. Thompson? MR. THOMPSON: Well, it would have to do with 3 4 the duty owed by Laclede to its ratepayers. 5 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. б MR. THOMPSON: Now, if we're -- if we're looking 7 at whether the price was just and reasonable --8 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Isn't that -- I mean, isn't 9 that --10 MR. THOMPSON: How is best and reasonable -- how are they different? The ratepayers expect to be getting 11 gas at the best price. 12 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I understand. But we're 13 not measuring ratepayer expectations here. I mean, the 14 15 problem is under your standard, Mr. Thompson. As I -- as 16 I -- as I understand the standard that you have just 17 articulate, you are encouraging these people to speculate 18 and take risks. MR. THOMPSON: Well, let's back away from best, 19 20 then. Let's say reasonable. 21 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. Let's say 22 reasonable. I mean, because -- I mean, I'm concerned -you know, right now, at -- you know, \$3 gas is not that 23 reasonable. 24 25 But the question is, let's say the economy picks

1 back up and the price of natural gas is \$7 next year. 2 Okay? Does Mr. Pendergast buy that \$7 gas, or does he 3 wait because he thinks the price might go down and then 4 it's -- are you going to come back up -- when the price 5 goes to ten, are you going to come in and say, Well, you б should have locked in at seven? 7 MR. THOMPSON: Well --8 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: You know --9 MR. THOMPSON: You know, the standard is what 10 they knew or should have known at the time they made the 11 decision. 12 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And you say it was their --MR. THOMPSON: Our concern, sir, is --13 14 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: So would the standard be 15 reasonable under the circumstances using their best 16 judgment? Is that how you'd apply best? 17 I mean, I'm just trying to get this figured out I mean, I just want to make sure you're not sending 18 here. 19 Mr. Pendergast down to Harrah's with a wad of money to put 20 on black or red. 21 MR. THOMPSON: I would never send Mr. Pendergast 22 down to Harrah's. What I'm concerned with is Ken Nices at 23 LER selling gas to Ken Nices at Laclede Gas Company. 24 And I think that we owe it to the people of 25 Missouri to look closely at those transactions to make

sure that Ken Nices, in his two hats, is not gaming the
 system to take their money in an unfair way.

You now, it could be that Laclede is the best operated gas company in this country. That could be. I don't know. We want to look at these documents to get one more piece of information to help Staff determine whether or not these actions were prudent at the time they were taken.

9 MR. PENDERGAST: You know, and I don't really 10 disagree with -- with the fact that you have to give these 11 heightened scrutiny. You know, that's why we have an 12 affiliate transaction rule. That's why we have a CAM. 13 That's why we have special pricing provisions, to address 14 the very concerns that Staff has raised. That's why we 15 have the rule.

And having gotten the rules and having applied the rules, you don't go ahead and make up new rules because you're maybe dissatisfied with how they protect the ratepayers.

If you want to change the rules as you go forward, you change the rules, and as far as what a reasonable man standard is, you know what we knew at the time we did these transactions? We knew what your rules were. We knew what the standards in those rules were. We knew what the CAM was. We knew what the -- what the

1 standards in those CAMs were. We knew how those

2 transactions ought to be priced, what we ought to look at, 3 what we ought to do to support them.

4 What we didn't know was this new standard that 5 came along after the fact that's completely different from 6 what was in those rules. And, you know, whether you want 7 to talk about due process or reasonable expectations or 8 living by the rules and not having them changed in the 9 middle, you know, you don't go ahead and do that. You 10 just don't do it. And that's what Staff's trying to do 11 here.

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I mean, but Staff's not 13 the final arbiter. I mean, we're going to determine it at 14 the end of day. I mean, really, what we're determining 15 here is whether Staff is going to have access to certain 16 information so that it can then make a recommendation to 17 us.

I mean, at the end of the day, we're going to determine what standard applies and what to disallow and what to allow.

21 MR. PENDERGAST: And -- and I agree. And all 22 I'm saying, Commissioner, is I think that Staff at this 23 point has conceded a standard that it's trying to pursue 24 that is inconsistent with your rules and the standards in 25 your rules, and those standards say your access to

1 affiliate information is only as far as needed to go ahead 2 and ensure compliance with these particular rules. 3 And -- and they're saying, No, I want to go 4 further because I've got a different standard than what is 5 in the rules. And I don't think they should be allowed to б go ahead and good on a fishing expedition based on a 7 patently unlawful, unauthorized standard. 8 JUDGE JONES: Commissioner Jarrett had some --9 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Yes. I just -- sort of. 10 I guess, to sort of bring this full circle and put it in the context of discovery, what is the standard this 11 Commission uses for discovery? 12 MR. PENDERGAST: I think the standard they use 13

14 is the one that's in Civil procedure reasonably calculated 15 to lead to relevant information and under --

16 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: Lead to admissible
17 evidence, whatever.

18 MR. PENDERGAST: Yeah.

19 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: And I -- so Laclede's 20 position is that Staff's request is not reasonable 21 calculated to lead to admissible evidence because? 22 MR. PENDERGAST: Because it is pursuant to a 23 standard and presumes a standard, pricing standard, that 24 is directly contrary to the pricing standards that you had 25 in your rules, that we have in our CAM. I mean, we're not coming upon this sui generous as an entirely new issue where there's nothing out there to determine what might be reasonable or what might be unreasonable or relevant or irrelevant.

5 You have rules that -- that specify what those 6 things are. And I don't think you can change those rules 7 in mid-stream, whether it's for discovery purpose, 8 disallowance purposes or anything else and say, We're 9 going to let these guys go out and get a bunch of 10 information.

If they wanted to come in and say, You shouldn't do transactions with affiliates if they have red-haired employees, you know, I want to go ahead and do some -- I want to do some investigation to see if you've got any red-headed employees over at Laclede.

16 We'd all say that that's irrelevant. You can't 17 do that. Well, you can't go in and say, I want to get 18 this information to prove up a standard that's also 19 inconsistent.

20 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: I was red-headed, too, 21 once. And, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Shemwell, I want to give you 22 the chance. Your position is that your requests are 23 reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence 24 because?

25 MR. THOMPSON: Because they go to whether or not

1 these affiliated companies are -- are abusing their 2 relationship and gaming the system to make an inordinate 3 profit. 4 COMMISSIONER JARRETT: All right. That's all I 5 have. Thank you. б JUDGE JONES: Any other questions? 7 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I do not. 8 MR. PENDERGAST: I meant no offense to anybody 9 that happens to have red hair. I just want to go on the 10 record and say that. COMMISSIONER JARRETT: You might want to issue a 11 12 formal apology. MR. PENDERGAST: I will. I will. 13 14 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Let me just say that -- I 15 mean, I don't know how long we've been studying this 16 issue, but we've opinion studying it for quite -- quite 17 some time now. 18 And I'm not sure what the answers are. But I 19 think there are some changes that need to be made, at least on a going-forward basis. But, you know, I am --20 21 and that goes with Laclede. 22 I mean, the -- I mean, I don't know how you 23 respond to this, Mr. Pendergast, but the whole -- I mean, the whole idea that, you know, Ken Nices is selling gas to 24 25 Ken Nices is very troubling.

1 You know, on the other hand, I'm concerned that 2 Mr. Thompson's, you know, standard is, you know, somewhat 3 -- you know, we want to -- I mean, this -- and, 4 Mr. Thompson, I want to hear what you have to say about 5 this. б But, I mean, certainly, it seems like if you 7 want to ensure that Laclede got the, quote, best price on the gas at the time, I mean, to my -- that just seems --8 9 MR. THOMPSON: I may have misspoken when I said 10 best. COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. 11 MR. THOMPSON: Reasonable. Fair. We 12 understand, as Mr. Pendergast said, LER wouldn't sell the 13 14 gas to Laclede if there wasn't some markup. I understand 15 that. I think Staff understands that. 16 The question is, how much markup? And -- and 17 our concern is not with the actions of LER, but with the 18 actions of Laclede. In other words, did they -- did they 19 buy gas from LER where they should have gone out and 20 sought gas elsewhere because a reasonable price would be 21 lower, significantly lower? That's all. And to know 22 that, we have to know what LER was obtaining the gas for. COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I --23 Mr. ZUCKER: Commissioner Davis, that is the not 24 25 complaint that they have filed.

1 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Mr. Thompson, I am still --2 I -- you're telling me that this is the only way -- I 3 mean, you're telling me that you can't get market data 4 from any other source, that you can't find -- you can't 5 determine whether these transactions -- that you can't 6 find the other transactions or other pricing information 7 anywhere else? 8 I mean -- you know, I mean, that -- when you say 9 market, I mean, that implies that there are other people 10 out there buying and selling. And it's like -- it's like -- I mean -- I mean, my impression is you're trying to 11 apply a company specific standard here. 12 MR. THOMPSON: We -- we just want to know what 13 14 LER was obtaining gas for. What -- what were they paying for gas? 15 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. And, once again, how 16 17 is that relevant? Not to beat the horse to death here. 18 MR. THOMPSON: It's relevant because the 19 contract that Ken Nices made with Ken Nices called for gas delivered in St. Louis, which means he could use gas that 20 21 he got anywhere.

22 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Right.23 MR. THOMPSON: And the gas delivered in St.

24 Louis was to be priced at Nimex.

25 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Minus 10 cents.

1 MR. THOMPSON: Minus 10 cents. Okay. Which is 2 a high price. So if he can obtain gas somewhere else more 3 cheaply -- do you understand? 4 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I understand. But -- let 5 -- okay. Let me ask you -- let me ask you this, б Mr. Thompson. 7 MR. THOMPSON: Sure. 8 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: We have Laclede. We have 9 Missouri Gas Energy. 10 MR. THOMPSON: Right. COMMISSIONER DAVIS: We have -- what is it? 11 Southern Missouri Gas? I mean, don't some of these other 12 gas utilities have similar contracts? I mean -- I mean, 13 14 it's -- it's my recollection that Southern Missouri or 15 somebody had one that was also, you know, minus ten or maybe it was Industrial Consumers that had one that was 16 17 Nimex minus ten. 18 You know, we have lots of cases flying through 19 here, so I -- I don't have the data off the top of my 20 head. Maybe someone that's working for me will be 21 listening up there and will start plowing through things. 22 But I don't think they're going to be able to find it 23 before we leave here today. 24 But, I mean, that -- to your knowledge, Ms. 25 Shemwell, are there other contracts out there like this

1 one that were signed at the same time by other Missouri
2 utilities?

3 MS. SHEMWELL: If there are, we looked at 4 prudence, whether or not it was prudent to enter into that 5 contract. And let me say ATMOS has a gas marketing 6 affiliate. When it's an arm's length transaction, then 7 there's a presumption of prudence. When it's an affiliate 8 transaction, there can be no presumption of prudence 9 because what ATMOS -- the ATMOS case and what the Supreme 10 Court said in the ATMOS case.

11 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. So, hypothetically 12 speaking, Southern Missouri Gas does haven't a marketing 13 affiliate?

14 MS. SHEMWELL: That's right.

15 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And if they have a Nimex 16 minus ten contract that was signed within a month of 17 Mr. Nices signing a contract with Mr. Nices, you're saying 18 that that's wholly irrelevant?

MS. SHEMWELL: I'm saying that we will look at the prudence of that. We will look at the prudence of all of the contract.

22 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. But if Southern 23 Missouri's contract was prudent, then wouldn't that be 24 evidence that Laclede's is prudence?

25 MS. SHEMWELL: No, sir.

1 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And why not again? 2 MS. SHEMWELL: Because Laclede is a very 3 different company from Southern Missouri Natural Gas. 4 They have different options. They buy from different 5 parts of the country. They have different suppliers. 6 They have storage.

7 Each gas company is quite different in how it is 8 supplied. Ameren buys from different suppliers than 9 Laclede. I mean, they're very different. They have 10 different considerations. They have different credit ratings. So the credit rating may affect whether or not 11 Southern Missouri Natural Gas can get as good a price as 12 Laclede or not. There are many things that might affect 13 14 the prudence of a contract.

15 MR. PENDERGAST: You know, if I could just --16 you're asking are there other indicia of these being 17 reasonable contracts out there. And, once again, I think 18 there is.

Once again, these purchases were made down on the MRT Westline. Staff didn't say we shouldn't have been buying gas down there. We bought it in conformance with our historical purchases on the MRT Westline.

23 We priced the purchases from LER at the same 24 prices we were paying to BP/Amoco. We thought that 25 satisfied the fair market price. Staff said, Well, you

1 know, they had the ability to go ahead and maybe serve 2 that St. Louis market from some area that might have also been cheaper. So we said, Okay, let us give you market 3 4 data for the St. Louis purchases during that very time. 5 it was a very robust set of data. It's what б hundreds of schools were buying gas under RFPs from more 7 than one marketer, from a competitive supply. And it just turns out that what LER was selling gas to us for was at 8 9 or below the prices that had been competitively determined 10 in this RFP process by school purchases. 11 And, once again, how does that not establish the reasonableness of this arrangement? 12 13 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: I think the more we talk, 14 the more questions I -- but what you just described 15 establishes perhaps that there was -- that establishes a baseline for a fair market determination in that St. 16 17 Louis market. 18 MR. PENDERGAST: Right. 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: But that's -- in Staff's 20 estimation, that's a separate analysis from whether the 21 purchases in and of themselves were prudent purchases. 22 MR. PENDERGAST: And what Staff --23 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: And I think that those are two distinct analyses, right? 24 25 MR. PENDERGAST: Well, I don't think that

they're two distinct analyses in this particular instance
 because the only way we could go ahead and purchase gas
 was to go ahead and purchase it from a marketer or
 producer out in the field.

5 Like I said, we don't have our own natural gas 6 well. We don't own our own pipelines. we have to buy our 7 capacity and we have to buy our gas supplies from third 8 parties.

9 And so when you determine whether or not that 10 purchase you make from a third party was -- whether it be an affiliate or not a affiliate is reasonable, you look at 11 what the market prices were that were being offered at 12 that time. And you don't go behind the veil and you don't 13 14 go ahead and start saying whether it's an affiliate or 15 non-affiliate, I need to know what, you know, cost went 16 into that or whether you might have been able to get 17 cheaper gas from someplace.

As long as we can go ahead and demonstrate, had we bought it from another affiliated supplier would the unaffiliated supplier -- would be the price be the same because we were making those purchases, that ought to be the end of the inquiry.

I mean, that's what your rule really provides
for. That's what the CAM provides for. It's a fair
market test. If you want to argue should we have been

buying less gas, if you want to go ahead and argue should
 we have been buying gas somewhere place else, you can do
 that.

But they didn't make those arguments. They were just saying with this appropriately priced, I think you paid too much. And I don't see how you can say that when it's a fair market price as established by all sorts of alternative prices that were being paid by unaffiliated people.

10 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: What they're -- what Staff is saying is that -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- it's 11 not whether the gas was appropriately priced, whether LER 12 priced it based upon what everybody else in the St. Louis 13 14 market was pricing it. Staff's inquiry isn't whether LER 15 appropriately priced the gas, but whether Laclede's purchase from LER for that specific gas was a prudent 16 17 purchase.

18 MR. PENDERGAST: And -- and -- and --19 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: It's a subtle nuance, but 20 it's different.

21 MR. PENDERGAST: But if it's appropriately 22 priced, then what basis would you have for saying it 23 wasn't a prudent purchase? If you're going to say we 24 didn't need to buy any gas at all, that might be one 25 thing. But they're not saying that. 1 If you're saying we should have go ahead and bought 2 the gas from somebody else, that might be another thing or 3 from some other location, but they're not saying that. I 4 mean, what they're saying is you bought it from LER, and 5 because you bought it from LER, we're not going to accept 6 the fair market price that we would accept if you bought 7 it from anybody else.

8 And, you know, it's treating LER differently in 9 a discriminatory fashion, and it's inconsistent with your 10 affiliate transaction rule. And you can't wipe that away 11 by just saying, Well, we're really talking about prudence 12 here.

You know, if it was bought at a fair market price and they're not saying we shouldn't have bought that much gas and they're not saying we should have gone ahead and bought it someplace else, that's the end of the equation.

You can talk prudence all day long, but it doesn't change the fact that there's really nothing else to go ahead and look into.

21 JUDGE JONES: Mr. Poston?

22 MR. POSTON: Excuse me. I would just like to go 23 back and talk about the discovery standard is that admiss 24 -- or is it likely to lead to the discovery of admissible 25 evidence.

1 And I think to apply that standard, you need to 2 look at the overall standard. The Commission needs to 3 look at just and reasonable rates under 393.130. 4 And so -- so I think what you need to do is 5 consider is this evidence likely to lead to discovery of б admissible evidence to show the lawfulness portion of 7 this. Did it follow the affiliate transaction rule? 8 But you also need to look at is it admissible to 9 show the reasonableness? Is it reasonable for Laclede, 10 for Ken Nices to make transactions in a way that boosts the profits of LER on the back of Laclede's ratepayers? 11 And I think that's where -- where I believe that 12 13 this evidence is truly admissible is that it's 14 unreasonable to do those kinds of transactions which --15 which Commissioner Davis seemed to acknowledge when he made the statement that there needs to be some changes 16 17 done if this is how transactions are being conducted. MR. PENDERGAST: You know, and if changes want 18 19 to be offered and suggested, like I said, we're willing to sit down and talk with them. But what I can tell you is 20 21 your rules explicitly permit corporate overheads to be 22 shared. 23

They clearly contemplate that at the end of the day, somebody has to be at the end of the pyramid. We do have steps in place to make sure that we do specific

transactions, that the gas supply personnel are separated
 from LER personnel and that they both work in accordance
 with their own interests.

The performance evaluation information we give is probably the most robust indication of that. And -and so, consequently, I think the measures are already there in the rule to address those particular situations.

8 And if you want to rewrite the rule and you want 9 to have a different rule, then I think that's a discussion 10 we should have. We just shouldn't do it retroactively.

11 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right. Mr. Pendergast, 12 let me ask you this question: How much of a hardship 13 would it be to Laclede if we said Laclede cannot purchase 14 gas from LER anymore?

MR. PENDERGAST: You know, having just shown you all this information about how small our purchases are already, I -- how could I sit there and say it would be a major burden? I can't say that it would be.

You know, I think it would be unfortunate from the standpoint that they are a potential supplier and you like to keep your portfolio suppliers as broad as you can. But would we survive? Would we be okay? Sure.

23 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. Now, let me ask -24 let me ask this question: I mean -- and you're going to
25 have to forgive me because I do not have intimate

knowledge of how natural gas purchasing transactions
 contracts work.

But would it be possible to say, I mean, you have to put this out for a -- a public bid to do like an RFP where everyone -- you know, where there's a transparent process where, you know -- and I don't know --I mean, I understand the market moves quickly sometimes. So I mean, that's my hesitance.

9 But, you know, is there an electronic means 10 where if -- you know, if Laclede were to post, say, you 11 know, we're looking for a -- a long-term, you know, gas 12 contract, a collar or whatever, that, you know, there 13 would -- there would be a -- an open, transparent process 14 going forward?

Because, I mean, my concern is -- I mean, we're going to spend a year or two hashing out -- I mean, we've already spent 13 months, and we're not there yet. And I'm just wondering if there's something that we need to be doing now to, you know, prevent having these issues on a going-forward basis.

I mean, does that -- does that make sense,
Mr. Pendergast?
MR. PENDERGAST: It makes sense.

24 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And so -- so -- can you do 25 an RFP so everyone in here would be assured that if -- if 1 LER gets the bid, then everyone knows --

2 MR. PENDERGAST: That makes absolute 100 percent 3 sense from my perspective. And I think one of the 4 unfortunate things, you know, about this having dragged on 5 for so long, I mean, we've been interested in sitting down 6 and talking with the Staff and talking to the Public 7 Counsel so that we can go ahead and come up with a very 8 kind of system that you're talking about.

9 I mean, it doesn't do us any good to run into 10 these disputes to not know what really what the rules of 11 the game are and what other people -- and I think there 12 are things that can you do.

We have ICE out there now. That's a -- a bulletin board where if you want to sell gas or you want to buy gas, you don't know who's on the other end of the transaction, but you post it on ICE, and, you know, you get bids and you get offers.

We use that extensively now. I think that's a mechanism for substantially reducing, you know, any concerns that anybody might be -- have because you don't even know who is on the other side of the transaction. When you do have somebody on the other side of the transaction, that people were interested in a more

24 robust RFP process, I think that merits a lot of

25 consideration, and we ought to sit down and do it.

1 And we ought to sit start this today because, 2 quite frankly, we've been operating under rules now for 3 the last seven or eight years where we don't know what the 4 rules are. And, you know, they seem to change from our 5 perspective.

6 And I think sitting down and doing that -- and 7 if there are more definitive things that need to be done 8 with the affiliate transaction rule to spell out exactly 9 how you want to go ahead and account for these 10 transactions and how you ought to do them, I'm all for it. 11 I'd like to start working on that tomorrow.

12 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Anyone else have a response
13 to that?

MS. SHEMWELL: Mr. Pendergast talks about us changing the rules. But, Commissioner Davis, the statute for rate cases has always been just and reasonable. There's no question about that. So the affiliate rules have specific requirements.

But the gas that they're -- the cost of the gas that they're charging their customers still has to be just and reasonable. Mr. Pendergast is not surprised by that standard.

23 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. And I know that.
24 Well, I -- I'm moving on, Ms. Shemwell, to, you know,
25 areas that aren't necessarily the subject of the

1 evidentiary dispute. And it's like -- I mean, are you
2 perfectly content to keep litigating this issue and to
3 keep, I mean, litigating this issue with Mr. Pendergast
4 for years? I mean --

5 MR. THOMPSON: We would be happy to sit down 6 with Mr. Pendergast and work something out on a 7 going-forward basis.

8 MR. PENDERGAST: I think that would be great. 9 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And honestly -- I mean, 10 honestly, I'm not -- I want to make sure that you know 11 that we're not asking you to work everything out. But, 12 you know, some proposals, some agreements and summaries 13 would be nice.

And if you have irreconcilable differences, then, you know, just -- just like Office of Public Counsel has proposed rules for pay stations, you know, they could say, Here's our proposal. Here's Staff's proposal. Here's Mr. Pendergast's proposal. Now, Commission, you decide.

But it's like I'm, you know, I'm concerned that -- that everyone is so focused on this case that -- I mean, if you -- if you're truly concerned that the ratepayers have been harmed, which I think is your concern, then --

25 MR. THOMPSON: Our concern --

1 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: What do you do? Are you 2 just going to do nothing to stop the bleeding going 3 forward? Or do you think if you ultimately get a verdict 4 against Mr. Pendergast, then -- a year from now, then that 5 will stop it? I mean, is -- I'm just trying to figure -б I'm not asking you for your litigation strategy. 7 I mean, just -- I mean, what's ultimately in the 8 best interest of the -- of the rate-paying public here? 9 MR. THOMPSON: We would be happy to talk to 10 Mr. Pendergast about changes that would be made on a going-forward basis. We're certainly not surrendering our 11 position with respect to the evidence that we're here to 12 13 talk about today. 14 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Right. MR. THOMPSON: I would have to talk with the --15 the gas staff. I mean, many more people than I would be 16 17 involved --18 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Right. 19 MR. THOMPSON: -- in what Staff's position would 20 be -- what Staff's concerns would be. But we're always 21 willing to talk. But what would not change is in every 22 ACA period, there would still be a prudence review. 23 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Right. Right. No one's saying ditch the -- ditch the prudence review. But, 24 25 obviously, if we can just promulgate an emergency rule

here in six months that said, you know, Laclede can't buy
 gas from LER anymore, that would at least solve the
 problem.

I mean, you'd have the -- you'd have the ACA arguments for every succeeding period up to that point. But after that point, you wouldn't have the issue -- that issue. You still might have other issues in the ACA, correct?

9 MR. THOMPSON: Correct. And -- and I don't even 10 know that Staff's position is that transactions with LER 11 are always bad or that the sum total is bad. To do a 12 prudence review, we simply feel we need the information 13 we're seeking.

14 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. All right. And I'm 15 just trying to figure out if there is a larger problem 16 that needs to be solved.

MR. THOMPSON: Well, maybe. When we get to the point of actually having the evidentiary hearing, that would be more clear. At this point, we're simply justifying why we want particular evidence.

21 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. So you're saying 22 that you've got to have -- you've got to have the receipts 23 in hand before you know that you don't like the idea of 24 Mr. Nices dealing with Mr. Nices?

25 MR. THOMPSON: I don't mean to be flippant, but

1 did you ever know an auditor that did not want the 2 receipts? 3 MR. PENDERGAST: As long as the company is 4 supposed to be regulating, no. 5 MR. THOMPSON: Well, you know -б COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. Okay, 7 Mr. Pendergast. I'm looking at Mr. Thompson here. We --8 MR. PENDERGAST: Sorry. 9 MR. THOMPSON: We want the receipts. We --COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. We understand that 10 11 you want the receipts. 12 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, sir. COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And I'm just trying to find 13 14 out, are there any other policy changes that we need to be making here? 15 MR. THOMPSON: Could we address that at a later 16 17 time? Because I don't want to say something stupid. 18 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Well, yeah. Obviously --19 and I think yes. But, I mean, today is October 1st. I 20 mean, certainly, if Mr. Poston, yourself or anyone -- you 21 know, I'm -- I don't know what a reasonable amount of time 22 is. 23 But if you have other policy concerns, maybe you can get them together and get them back to us in a month. 24 25 MR. THOMPSON: Well, we -- we will do that, sir.

COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Because I just -- I'd like
 to -- to solve this -- I'd like to solve this problem once
 and for all if we could.

4 MR. PENDERGAST: Chairman, apropos that, too, as 5 a result of our last rate case, there was a provision in 6 the rate case that talked about the Staff and Public 7 Counsel and Laclede sitting down and going through our 8 Cost Allocation Manual and trying to develop provisions 9 that would be satisfactory to everybody.

10 Now, since this whole thing has been going on 11 for the last 13 months, you know, we haven't really had 12 the opportunity, I guess, or the will to sit down and 13 continue those discussions.

14 I think we had a couple of meetings, and I think getting back and -- and doing that would be something that 15 could potentially benefit everybody. But I -- I do think 16 17 that knowing what the rules are and reaching, you know, as much consensus as we can on how you track transactions, 18 19 ICE, whether you make them available on an Internet bull 20 -- bulletin board that the Staff can have access to, so it 21 has nearly contemporaneous information, whenever you do a 22 competitive transaction what the competitive price was, I 23 think those are all worthy of discussion. And I think 24 it's a discussion we ought to have sooner rather than 25 later.

2 questions? Commissioner Davis? Commissioner Kenney? I 3 -- go ahead. 4 COMMISSIONER KENNEY: No. I don't have any more 5 questions. But it -- in -- assuming nobody else does, let б me, again, say that I appreciate the length of time that you all have been battling this particular issue. 7 8 And I thank you again for indulging me for the 9 last few hours while I ask my questions. So -- and both 10 of you gave very good presentations, and I appreciate the -- the caliber and quality of your lawyering. 11 12 MR. PENDERGAST: Thank you very much. And we appreciate the opportunity to come here and talk to you 13 14 today. JUDGE JONES: Okay. With that, then, we're off 15 the record and adjourned. 16 17 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Judge, while we're still on 18 the record, I mean, are we going to do a directive 19 ordering filing or --JUDGE JONES: No, no, no. No more filings or 20 21 nothing. We're just going to wait for the transcript to 22 come up have time to review that. It will be on agenda 23 for discussion.

JUDGE JONES: Does anyone have any more

1

24 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. Well, what about -25 what about my request that if they have policy

1 suggestions, that's --

2 JUDGE JONES: Well -- well, quite frankly, I 3 don't think that's relevant to the discovery issue. 4 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: It's not relevant to the 5 discovery issue. So I guess, you know -- if you have a б motion to make or if you want an issue addressed by the 7 Commission, I guess I'm saying I'd appreciate that you do 8 it in the next 30 days. 9 And if you don't, then your silence, I guess, 10 can be construed as acceptance of the status quo with regard to those rules. Is that fair? 11 12 MR. THOMPSON: That's fair, sir. And we will file whatever policy suggestions we have within a month 13 14 from today. 15 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Does that seem reasonable, Mr. Poston? 16 MR. POSTON: Yes. 17 18 JUDGE JONES: Can you do that and start a different docket, a new -- we don't want the --19 MR. THOMPSON: A New docket. 20 21 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Don't muddy up Judge Jones' 22 docket any more than it already is. 23 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. 24 MS. SHEMWELL: Yes, sir. 25 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Thank you.

1	JUDGE JONES: Okay. With that, then, we're	
2	adjourned.	
3	(The proceedings were concluded at 1:45 p.m. on	
4	October 1, 2009.)	
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

_	Page 247
1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF MISSOURI)
)55.
4	COUNTY OF OSAGE)
5	
6	I, Monnie S. Mealy, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
7	Certified Court Reporter #0538, and Registered
8	Professional Reporter, and Notary Public, within and for
9	the State of Missouri, do hereby certify that I was
10	personally present at the proceedings as set forth in the
11	caption sheet hereof; that I then and there took down in
12	stenotype the proceedings had at said time and was
13	thereafter transcribed by me, and is fully and accurately
14	set forth in the preceding pages.
15	
16	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
17	seal on October 5, 2009.
18	
19	1 Nouis Seller
20	Monnie S. Mealy
21	Monnie S. Mealy, CSR, CCR #0539
22	Registered Professional Reporter
23	
24	
25	

_ .

		('		
	accordance 181:19	adjustments 123:4	203:25 204:15,18	162:20,22 163:3
<u>A</u>	235:2	administration	207:15,17,24	164:12,19 165:4,6
abeyance 172:11	according 147:15	132:1	208:5 214:24	165:7,8,14,24
ability 180:2 188:7		admiss 233:23	215:12,16 217:5	166:4,12,13
230:1	account 149:11			
able 131:21 146:23	238:9	admissible 222:16	220:12 222:1	167:12 168:10,12
168:19 227:22	accounts 151:10	222:21 223:23	228:6,7,13 231:11	168:17,19,20
231:16	accurate 127:22,23	233:24 234:6,8,13	231:11,14 233:10	169:11,12 170:16
about 126:22 127:3	137:7 143:4 152:8	admitted 176:16	234:7 238:8,17	171:22 172:24,25
129:5 135:20,20	214:12	adopted 183:18	affiliated 125:20	173:16,17 175:7,9
137:10 139:23	accurately 247:13	advantage 125:20	128:14,15 129:8	175:17,18,19,22
140:2,3,7 145:10	acknowledge	125:23 128:14	130:23 134:10	175:24 176:2,3,5
158:2 160:20	195:21 234:15	129:1 130:23	137:10,18 145:5	177:1,12,19,22
	acquiesce 160:8	145:22	147:22 149:11	178:23 180:5,12
161:10,14,17,23	acquire 126:11	adversely 158:1,16	150:1,6,15 157:21	182:11 183:11,14
162:24,25 168:9	131:21 132:14	161:19	166:10 224:1	183:15,18 186:6
170:22 171:19,20	134:13 185:7	advised 171:20	231:19	188:1,7,14 190:18
171:20 175:23	187:13	advising 180:17	affiliates 139:18	191:10 192:3,10
176:15 178:4,15	acquired 126:6	affect 229:11,13	159:3 161:20	191:10 192:3,10
178:17 181:19				
191:21 195:14	132:10,15 133:25	affiliate 125:10,17	166:10 179:2,4,6	199:18 201:10,15
198:25 202:7	134:4 136:16	127:17,20 128:9	179:8 204:24	201:17 203:7
206:11 208:9,13	144:2 153:11	128:20 129:2,5	223:12	204:1,5,10 205:11
208:24,25 210:18	185:22 197:9	130:2,3,4,5,19,20	affiliate's 142:20	205:12,24 207:10
221:7 225:4	acquires 139:21	131:14,15 133:3	164:5 166:5 167:3	208:1,19 209:11
233:11,23 235:16	acquiring 139:20	133:11,25 135:2,6	179:11	209:20 210:7
237:4,8 238:14,17	206:17	136:22 137:7,16	affiliation 143:18	211:10 212:4
240:10,13 243:6	action 137:9 181:15	139:6,6,15,16,24	affirmatively	214:18,20 220:17
244:24,25	210:23	140:8 141:5,13,17	178:12	221:9 222:1,6
above 128:16,24	actions 137:1,2,4	141:22 142:11	after 159:5 162:3,4	223:13 230:1
189:18 190:11	163:4 216:11	143:14 144:10,12	177:17 193:3	231:2,3,14,18
192:4	217:13,14 220:7	144:13,15,17,21	221:5 241:6	232:1 233:1,15,20
	225:17,18	145:4,11,14	again 128:5 129:15	237:7 238:9 244:3
above-board	activities 158:2,17	147:24 148:16	135:9 139:22	ain't 132:7 177:6
190:13	activity 146:12	149:9,10 150:9,14	140:5 141:14,19	allegation 129:13
absent 179:6	actual 124:24 125:3	151:2,5 154:15	141:19 151:22	181:8 183:20
absolute 237:2	actually 133:25	155:10,18,25	155:7 165:10	allegations 127:15
absolutely 137:14	141:12 143:10	156:10,12 157:4	184:3,15 200:2	127:25 171:10
154:25 171:14	149:1 152:13,17	157:13,13 158:7	226:16 229:1,17	177:22
191:2 204:16	1 · · ·	161:2,4,12 162:2	229:19 230:11	alleged 175:14
211:6	153:1 184:1	,		
absorb 125:6	191:22 206:17	163:6,19 164:7,9	244:6,8	189:7
abusing 224:1	211:15 212:19	164:20 165:5,6,17	against 137:2 240:4	allocation 140:2
ACA 124:22,22	241:18	167:2,4,6,21	agenda 159:24	141:22 161:10,11
127:7 132:25	add 134:24 155:12	170:17 172:21	244:22	161:23 166:24
133:12 134:16	added 162:22	174:7,21 175:10	Aggregation 188:13	199:4 200:8 243:8
162:25 168:23	addition 162:7	175:11,21,21,24	ago 160:13 162:19	allow 173:17 174:2
170:13 172:17	additional 164:23	176:2 177:14	167:22 201:12	221:20
174:5 179:21	165:7,9 172:24	178:8,12 179:13	agree 130:10	allowed 164:22
190:24 193:24	189:8,10 216:1	180:1,4,24 181:2	142:24 143:3,6	174:6 178:9
190.24 193.24	address 220:13	181:5,11,15,20,21	174:14,25 175:1	198:22 222:5
212:20 240:22	235:7 242:16	182:1 184:9	191:16 193:20	allowing 173:8
	addressed 245:6	188:22,25 190:1,3	201:15 207:23	211:11
241:4,7	addresses 130:21	190:9,25 191:2,8	216:18 221:21	almost 146:5
accept 233:5,6	adds 171:20	190.9,25 191.2,8	agreed 192:21	along 156:7 221:5
acceptance 245:10		· · ·		
accepted 162:5	adequately 201:13	192:18 193:3,22	agreement 161:22	already 147:23
accepting 149:21	adjourned 244:16	195:23 197:22	174:15,17	159:22 163:4
access 170:3 173:8	246:2	198:18 199:3	agreements 239:12	189:2,16 235:6,17
access 170.5 175.0				
178:10 221:15,25	adjust 207:10	200:7,11,22 201:1	agrees 153:20	236:17 245:22
178:10 221:15,25	adjust 207:10 adjusted 124:25	201:6,9 202:4,9	ahead 126:17	alternative 232:8
	adjust 207:10		- U	

MIDWEST LITIGATION SERVICES Phone: 1.800.280.3376

- -

although 123:6	apologize 197:1	138:11,19,22,25	195:22	baseline 230:16
always 169:19	apology 224:12	140:4 142:17	attention 161:6	basically 163:20
193:9,11 238:16	appearances 123:14	143:1 148:13	173:17	165:22 193:7
240:20 241:11	appearing 123:20	165:20 174:9	Attorney 122:14,17	198:8 204:25
Ameren 179:23	appears 200:13	178:7 196:16	attorneys 170:21	206:1 212:15
229:8	appease 189:9	198:11 217:10	attribute 185:3	basis 148:9 151:9
AmerenUE 178:24	applicable 157:18	arguments 123:9	attributed 184:13	152:9 168:15
атопд 139:25	161:2 162:10	199:22,24,24	audit 124:23 126:7	176:9,10 192:9
161:17	applied 220:16	232:4 241:5	126:11 172:25	193:4,5,7 203:21
amount 147:22	applies 128:21	arm's 143:15 228:6	177:4 181:6	204:4 224:20
148:9,21 149:10	171:3 179:3	around 146:5	auditing 133:17	232:22 236:20
153:3 194:13	221:19	170:22 179:13	136:25	239:7 240:11
242:21	apply 150:22 179:5	182:3 208:15	auditor 132:8,9	battling 244:7
amounts 197:16	180:4 184:18,19	209:6	133:7 242:1	bears 165:21
210:20	184:23 195:22	arrangement	authority 179:3	beat 212:16 226:17
aualyses 133:7	196:14 219:16	169:24 213:3	191:14 192:3	became 161:2 168:1
230:24 231:1	226:12 234:1	216:25 230:12	authorized 179:1	become 137:19
analysis 132:24	apportion 135:3	articulate 186:23	179:16 186:5	before 124:4 141:5
133:1,12 134:25	appreciate 160:7	218:17	198:17,23,24	147:17 163:2
137:19 156:17	200:3 203:13	articulated 185:4	199:3	167:1 173:3
197:19 202:3,3	244:6,10,13 245:7	asked 151:21	automatically	183:16 191:11
230:20	approach 167:10,15	176:14 180:23	174:22 198:13,16	200:5 205:16
analyze 127:7,18	171:15 172:16.23	209:23 213:12	available 150:3	217:10 227:23
analyzing 137:11	appropriate 170:7	asking 135:25 142:3	243:19	241:23
	171:6 183:22	145:23 150:18	average 186:16	beg 131:5
annual 124:15				0
147:18	195:19 201:11	152:7 154:13	212:16	begin 159;18
another 134:7	211:13 215:22	172:8 176:10	away 193:13,17	179:15,17
144:22 160:13	appropriately	182:23 183:1	202:9 210:7	beginning 160:6
165:11 166:8	175:11 232:5,12	190:22 194:1,14	218:19 233:10	170:9 200:3
176:8 187:10	232:15,21	200:4 214:1	awful 126:22	begs 173:5
211:19 231:19	appropriateness	229:16 239:11	В	behalf 123:24
233:2	173:10	240:6	B 128:17	162:17
answer 131:4,8,10	approval 140:25	Assembly 157:23		behind 214:19
133:18 142:9,9	141:2 178:17	asserting 173:6	back 127:1 128:9	215:2 231:13
181:3 186:13	approve 191:12	assess 137:1	133:19 137:22	being 123:7 124:21
196:3 213:12,14	approved 124:18	assets 129:7 168:18	140:5 145:18	125:2 160:9
answering 154:11	140:22,23 144:17	169:13,25 179:14	146:15 162:24	161:14 162:1
answers 224:18	161:3 191:8	211:12	168:21 172:4	163:16 176:14
anybody 145:8	202:25	associated 150:14	180:7 191:20	186:10 213:16
165:13 167:8	apropos 243:4	assume 145:3	193:1,21 199:7	229:16 231:12
190:15 205:20	arbiter 221:13	147:17,17 156:8	202:1,18 204:23	232:8 234:17
211:8 224:8 233:7	area 124:9 170:1,1	172:9 198:10	204:23 208:12	belabor 136:20
237:20	174:18 175:16	212:8 214:18	212:5 217:7,9	believe 125:11
anymore 235:14	230:2	assuming 143:3	218:19 219:1,4	126:8 130:15
anymore 235:14 241:2	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25	172:10 199:25	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11	133:5 135:7,16
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20 244:1	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25 232:1	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25 158:15	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24 bargained-for	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12 below 129:9 169:19
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20 244:1	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25 232:1	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24 bargained-for 132:3	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20 244:1 anything 126:9	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25 232:1 argued 135:10	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25 158:15	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24 bargained-for 132:3 based 146:22	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12 below 129:9 169:19
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20 244:1 anything 126:9 134:18 159:14	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25 232:1 argued 135:10 136:12 142:18	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25 158:15 assure 143:25	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24 bargained-for 132:3	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12 below 129:9 169:19 169:20 188:18
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20 244:1 anything 126:9 134:18 159:14 170:7,7 173:1	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25 232:1 argued 135:10 136:12 142:18 178:6 200:5	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25 158:15 assure 143:25 158:20,25	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24 bargained-for 132:3 based 146:22	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12 below 129:9 169:19 169:20 188:18 230:9
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20 244:1 anything 126:9 134:18 159:14 170:7,7 173:1 176:18 179:13	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25 232:1 argued 135:10 136:12 142:18 178:6 200:5 arguing 134:8	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25 158:15 assure 143:25 158:20,25 assured 236:25	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24 bargained-for 132:3 based 146:22 163:15 166:2	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12 below 129:9 169:19 169:20 188:18 230:9 belts 190:14
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20 244:1 anything 126:9 134:18 159:14 170:7,7 173:1 176:18 179:13 186:12 202:18	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25 232:1 argued 135:10 136:12 142:18 178:6 200:5 arguing 134:8 135:18,19 136:7	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25 158:15 assure 143:25 158:20,25 assured 236:25 asymmetrical	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24 bargained-for 132:3 based 146:22 163:15 166:2 170:2 173:23	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12 below 129:9 169:19 169:20 188:18 230:9 belts 190:14 Bench 172:1
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20 244:1 anything 126:9 134:18 159:14 170:7,7 173:1 176:18 179:13 186:12 202:18 205:11 213:15 223:8	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25 232:1 argued 135:10 136:12 142:18 178:6 200:5 arguing 134:8 135:18,19 136:7 137:22 151:15 158:10 182:4	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25 158:15 assure 143:25 158:20,25 assured 236:25 asymmetrical 207:25 ATMOS 144:13,16	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24 bargained-for 132:3 based 146:22 163:15 166:2 170:2 173:23 177:2 198:17	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12 below 129:9 169:19 169:20 188:18 230:9 belts 190:14 Bench 172:1 benchmark 186:11
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20 244:1 anything 126:9 134:18 159:14 170:7,7 173:1 176:18 179:13 186:12 202:18 205:11 213:15 223:8 anywhere 142:21	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25 232:1 argued 135:10 136:12 142:18 178:6 200:5 arguing 134:8 135:18,19 136:7 137:22 151:15 158:10 182:4 argument 121:5	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25 158:15 assure 143:25 158:20,25 assured 236:25 asymmetrical 207:25	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24 bargained-for 132:3 based 146:22 163:15 166:2 170:2 173:23 177:2 198:17 199:22 204:5	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12 below 129:9 169:19 169:20 188:18 230:9 belts 190:14 Bench 172:1 benchmark 186:11 benefit 144:14 145:14,22 146:14
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20 244:1 anything 126:9 134:18 159:14 170:7,7 173:1 176:18 179:13 186:12 202:18 205:11 213:15 223:8 anywhere 142:21 167:5 226:7,21	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25 232:1 argued 135:10 136:12 142:18 178:6 200:5 arguing 134:8 135:18,19 136:7 137:22 151:15 158:10 182:4 argument 121:5 127:14 128:4	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25 158:15 assure 143:25 158:20,25 assured 236:25 asymmetrical 207:25 ATMOS 144:13,16 145:13 228:5,9,9 228:10	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24 bargained-for 132:3 based 146:22 163:15 166:2 170:2 173:23 177:2 198:17 199:22 204:5 206:21 211:24 213:5 222:6	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12 below 129:9 169:19 169:20 188:18 230:9 belts 190:14 Bench 172:1 benchmark 186:11 benefit 144:14 145:14,22 146:14 146:15 155:10
anymore 235:14 241:2 anyone 196:21 238:12 242:20 244:1 anything 126:9 134:18 159:14 170:7,7 173:1 176:18 179:13 186:12 202:18 205:11 213:15 223:8 anywhere 142:21	230:2 areas 186:2 238:25 argue 134:14 203:21,25 231:25 232:1 argued 135:10 136:12 142:18 178:6 200:5 arguing 134:8 135:18,19 136:7 137:22 151:15 158:10 182:4 argument 121:5	172:10 199:25 212:14 244:5 assumptions 214:19 assurance 157:25 158:15 assure 143:25 158:20,25 assured 236:25 asymmetrical 207:25 ATMOS 144:13,16 145:13 228:5,9,9	218:19 219:1,4 233:23 234:11 242:24 243:15 bad 241:11,11 balance 124:24 bargained-for 132:3 based 146:22 163:15 166:2 170:2 173:23 177:2 198:17 199:22 204:5 206:21 211:24	133:5 135:7,16 137:25 141:11 142:7,16,18 234:12 below 129:9 169:19 169:20 188:18 230:9 belts 190:14 Bench 172:1 benchmark 186:11 benefit 144:14 145:14,22 146:14

www.midwestlitigation.com

	1			
243:16	186:7,20 188:2	С	cases 193:12 227:18	circumstance
best 152:24,25	207:1,6 217:25		238:16	137:18 205:15
153:16 154:16	229:21 231:19	C 122:1,13 123:1,23	cash 125:6 167:25	217:23
1		151:8	167:25	
167:18,18 217:14	233:1,4,5,6,13,14	calculate 206:2,9		circumstances
217:16,18,22	233:16	calculated 222:14	casting 178:17	164:10,16 167:14
218:1,10,12,19	Boulevard 121:20	222:21 223:23	cause 196:24	175:2 184:17
219:15,16 220:3	Box 122:5,10	caliber 244:11	CCF 212:17	204:8 211:25
225:7,10 240:8	BP 188:2,6 207:21	call 176:18	CCR 121:19 247:21	216:21 217:19
between 127:19	214:16 215:13	called 226:19	cell 132:5	219:15
132:9 137:10,18	BP's 214:9	CAM 140:2,3,7,16	cents 187:7 206:14	City 121:7,21 122:5
139:5,23 142:16	BP/Amoco 166:15	140:21,21,22,22	206:22 212:13,17	122:10
143:14,17 144:9	166:20 187:25		226:25 227:1	Civil 222:14
144:10 145:2	188:4 207:5,9	141:4,10,11,16	certain 125:24	clause 130:11,12
146:19 151:2	208:5 213:5,7	142:4 161:3,25	126:1,11 128:1	clauses 124:17
161:19 166:9,10	216:24 229:24	162:5,7 164:6,21	131:19,20 137:12	CLAYTON 121:14
179:3,5,7 181:16	brain 172:7 182:3	165:18,22 167:2,5	137:18 138:22	clear 136:21 159:23
		170:18 173:15,20		
182:5 187:2,2	Break 203:8	174:7 176:17	173:7 197:15	192:1 196:3
196:24 206:2,11	bring 222:10	178:7,11 181:16	221:15	202:10 241:19
207:21 211:20	broad 176:11	184:8 192:17,20	certainly 143:21	clearly 169:5
215:6	194:20 235:21	193:5 197:22	152:2 158:5	234:23
beyond 151:16	brought 171:7	200:10,13,23	174:17 177:8,23	close 145:25 180:25
156:1 158:11	177:16 214:2	201:3,11 202:10	186:25 205:20	closely 125:3
181:25 189:18	BTU 206:14	202:22 203:17,22	225:6 240:11	219:25
190:11 192:4	bull 243:19	203:25 204:9,17	242:20	code 162:9
199:3 200:7,10	bulletin 237:14	220:12,25 222:25	CERTIFICATE	cogent 177:23
bid 188:13 236:4	243:20	231:24	247:1	collar 236:12
237:1	bunch 170:21 223:9	came 163:14 170:10	Certified 247:6,7	come 134:15 170:14
bids 237:17	bundle 210:7	221:5	certify 247:9	171:16 179:10
big 169:3	burden 177:8	CAMs 221;1	Chairman 121:14	180:5,10 181:8
bigger 210:23	235:18	candid 202:7	243:4	192:25 194:12,20
billion 172:25	burdensome 176:12		chance 154:23,25	202:15 204:22
bit 133:4 195:11	business 127:19	candidly 180:2	155:4 223:22	210:5 215:25
black 219:20	131:23,24 139:19	capacity 129:13	change 143:21	219:4,5 223:11
blatantly 177:2	165:15 184:17	130:4 135:15	152:14 180:12,18	237:7 244:13,22
202:23	205:9,13 211:15	146:10 152:16	193:3,5 203:6	comes 124:20 125:9
bleeding 240;2	211:17	168:11,17 183:15	220:20,21 223:6	
bless 174:12	buy 131:25 136:10	194:19 196:11		148:18,22 166:3
		204:24,25 205:4,6	233:19 238:4	172:17 175:5
blessing 176:25	138:23 163:21,23	208:13,14,15,21	240:21	191:7
177:7	165:10 166:13,15	209:5,13 210:7	changed 221:8	coming 162:11,17
blow 188:16 212:24	166:15 167:7,8	231:7	changes 124:20	173:12 200:3
blue 169:25 170:1	175:4,6,18 187:9	capital 137:8,8	224:19 234:16,18	223:1
blueprint 162:12,12	187:12 206:19,25	capitalization 135:3	240:10 242:14	commission 121:1
162:19 163:4	207:9,9 213:21,22	caption 247:11	changing 238:15	122:2,4 123:14,18
board 237:14	214:23 219:2	cart 173:3	charged 149:11	124:1,19 125:17
243:20	225:19 229:4	case 121:10 123:3	150:15 151:3	134:15 135:2,7
bonus 209:17,21	231:6,7 232:24	124:7 125:8 127:2	188:16 205:4	140:22,23,25
books 151:10	237:15 241:1	127:5,20 128:4,6	charges 155:9,11	141:2,5 150:3
boosts 234:10	buying 135:22		193:10	151:19 155:15
borne 135:4 161:11	136:15 143:25	128:19 133:15	charging 136:10	157:19 158:25
both 129:16 155:23		134:16 139:19 141:7,8 144:13,16	188:17 215:3	159:19 160:15
	1 [44:4][87:79]	i 141°/X 144°14 16 1		
1 156:2 165:25	144:4 187:7,9 208:20 214:24		238-20	161-4 162-17
156:2 165:25	208:20 214:24	145:7 172:18	238:20 chesper 131:21	161:4 162:17
235:2 244:9	208:20 214:24 216:1 217:25	145:7 172:18 175:14 178:24	cheaper 131:21	178:25 181:13
235:2 244:9 bought 135:21	208:20 214:24 216:1 217:25 226:10 229:21	145:7 172:18 175:14 178:24 179:23 180:25	cheaper 131:21 144:6 188:9	178:25 181:13 191:12 194:3
235:2 244:9 bought 135:21 144:6 153:1	208:20 214:24 216:1 217:25 226:10 229:21 230:6 232:1,2	145:7 172:18 175:14 178:24	cheaper 131:21 144:6 188:9 207:10 230:3	178:25 181:13 191:12 194:3 199:20,25 205:2
235:2 244:9 bought 135:21 144:6 153:1 163:13 175:9,10	208:20 214:24 216:1 217:25 226:10 229:21 230:6 232:1,2 buys 145:8 182:18	145:7 172:18 175:14 178:24 179:23 180:25	cheaper 131:21 144:6 188:9 207:10 230:3 231:17	178:25 181:13 191:12 194:3 199:20,25 205:2 222:12 234:2
235:2 244:9 bought 135:21 144:6 153:1 163:13 175:9,10 175:12,16,20	208:20 214:24 216:1 217:25 226:10 229:21 230:6 232:1,2 buys 145:8 182:18 229:8	145:7 172:18 175:14 178:24 179:23 180:25 181:3,6,18 191:20	cheaper 131:21 144:6 188:9 207:10 230:3 231:17 cheaply 206:25	178:25 181:13 191:12 194:3 199:20,25 205:2 222:12 234:2 239:18 245:7
235:2 244:9 bought 135:21 144:6 153:1 163:13 175:9,10 175:12,16,20 176:1,1,4 181:9	208:20 214:24 216:1 217:25 226:10 229:21 230:6 232:1,2 buys 145:8 182:18	145:7 172:18 175:14 178:24 179:23 180:25 181:3,6,18 191:20 197:21 200:21 211:11 212:3	cheaper 131:21 144:6 188:9 207:10 230:3 231:17 cheaply 206:25 207:2,7 227:3	178:25 181:13 191:12 194:3 199:20,25 205:2 222:12 234:2 239:18 245:7 Commissioner
235:2 244:9 bought 135:21 144:6 153:1 163:13 175:9,10 175:12,16,20	208:20 214:24 216:1 217:25 226:10 229:21 230:6 232:1,2 buys 145:8 182:18 229:8	145:7 172:18 175:14 178:24 179:23 180:25 181:3,6,18 191:20 197:21 200:21 211:11 212:3 228:9,10 239:21	cheaper 131:21 144:6 188:9 207:10 230:3 231:17 cheaply 206:25	178:25 181:13 191:12 194:3 199:20,25 205:2 222:12 234:2 239:18 245:7
235:2 244:9 bought 135:21 144:6 153:1 163:13 175:9,10 175:12,16,20 176:1,1,4 181:9	208:20 214:24 216:1 217:25 226:10 229:21 230:6 232:1,2 buys 145:8 182:18 229:8	145:7 172:18 175:14 178:24 179:23 180:25 181:3,6,18 191:20 197:21 200:21 211:11 212:3	cheaper 131:21 144:6 188:9 207:10 230:3 231:17 cheaply 206:25 207:2,7 227:3	178:25 181:13 191:12 194:3 199:20,25 205:2 222:12 234:2 239:18 245:7 Commissioner

www.midwestlitigation.com

MIDWEST LITIGATION SERVICES Phone: 1.800.280.3376

___.

127:22 128:3,23	208:10,23 210:14	220:4 226:12	conceded 176:16	193:19 222:11
129:4,12,15,20	210:17 211:18	229:3,7 242:3	221:23	continue 128:11
130:7,7,13,16,21	212:7,11 213:11	сотралу's 121:10	conceding 181:24	142:13 243:13
131:1,6,9 132:19	214:7,11,14 215:9	123:4 124:24	concept 193:15	continues 123:11
132:21 133:9,15	215:14 216:5,10	162:9 167:18	201:16	193:11
133:21 134:6,21	216:13,18 217:6,9	201:3	concern 139:16	contract 131:15,17
134:22,23 135:9	217:16,18,24	comparable 146:18	209:11 217:12	131:22 132:1,2,9
135:12,18,25	218:5,8,13,21	169:17 213:17	219:13 225:17	132:11 133:23
136:4,7,18,20	219:8,12,14	214:8,16 215:18	236:15 239:24,25	134:1,11 136:14
137:6,17,21 138:1	221:12,22 222:8,9	comparables	concerned 218:22	138:22,24 139:2
138:9,10,15,18,21	222:16,19 223:20	213:20,25 214:6	219:22 225:1	187:5,25 188:2,11
139:7,10,14,22	224:4,7,11,14	compare 136:25	239:20,22	197:15 206:21
140:1,6,10,19,24	225:11,23,24	197:14	concerns 220:14	207:11 211:20,21
141:3,9,14,18,20	226:1,16,22,25	compared 214:9	237:20 240:20	212:12 213:1
141:24 142:6,8,12	227:4,8,11 228:11	comparing 214:8	242:23	215:13 226:19
142:15 143:2,6,8	228:15,22 229:1	Comparison 214:13	concerted 168:16	228:5,16,17,21,23
143:20 144:19	230:13,19,23	214:14	concluded 246:3	229:14 236:12
146:20 147:3,14	232:10,19 234:15	Compel 194:4	Conclusions 199:20	contracts 126:2
147:20 148:3,5,8	235:11,23 236:24	199:11	conduct 154:5,8	138:12,13 185:8
148:14,19,22,24	238:12,15,23	compensated	162:9,13 180:8	195:8 227:13,25
149:3,8,13,17,20	239:9 240:1,14,18	209:20	conducted 234:17	229:17 236:2
149:25 150:5,10	240:23 241:14,21	compensates	confident 171:23	contradictory
150:17,22 151:1	242:6,10,13,18	128:15	211:6	137:23
151:13,15,21	243:1 244:2,2,4	competitive 188:13	conflated 156:8	contrary 163:12
153:18,19 154:6,9	244:17,24 245:4	197:24 204:6	202:2	176:15,17 198:24
154:18 156:3,3,5	245:15,21,25	214:20 216:22	conformance	200:12 222:24
156:6,12,16,19,22	Commissioners	230:7 243:22,22	229:21	contures 174:5
156:24 157:4,9,12	121:16 159:22	competitively 230:9	confusion 153:18	178:9 190:8
158:9,13 159:4,8	199:6	complaint 225:25	consensus 243:18	copies 144:18
159:10 160:21,21	Commission's	complete 126:11	consequently 235:6	corporate 234:21
161:8 164:25	123:10 127:17	142:9 148:15	consider 234:5	corporation 125:19
172:2,2,3 173:2,4	142:11 144:17	149:9 171:18 215:7	consideration 139:13 212:20	128:13,18,25 129:10 130:22
173:25 174:8,14	156:1 158:18 159:24 160:3	completely 131:2	237:25	150:16 151:3,4
174:20,25 176:8 176:24 177:10	192:3	136:11 139:19	considerations	157:19,20 162:2
178:2,15 179:19	commodity 124:10	146:13 207:23	188:3 229:10	correct 129:3,19,20
179:24 180:20,22	124:13 125:5,7	221:5	considered 155:16	130:6 135:16
181:14,23 182:13	companies 125:12	compliance 151:12	considers 155:15	137:13 141:23
181:14,29 182:15	138:11 224:1	152:2 157:5 158:6	consistent 140:16	149:12 150:3,20
183:19,24 184:21	company 122:12	162:7 172:21	142:4 164:21	156:6,13,15,17,22
185:9,17 186:14	123:22,24 124:12	174:11,21 201:6	166:23 170:17,18	157:1,3,7,8
185:9,17 180:14	123.22,24 124.12	222:2	198:1 205:20	158:12 212:18
187:18 188:21,24	125:1,5,10,15,16	complied 141:16	consolidated 123:8	232:11 241:8,9
189:12,16,20,23	126:3,8 128:19	153:23 154:10,14	conspiracy 169:3,5	correctly 144:20
190:4,6,11,20	129:6 131:13	155:6 161:14	construed 245:10	cost 124:11,13,16
190:4,0,11,20	132:14,14 137:1	163:11 174:22	consumers 146:13	124:18 129:7,18
193:18,21 194:1,6	145:21 146:15	192:24	146:13 227:16	140:2,13 141:21
194:12 195:2,20	149:23 150:2,2	Complies 166:24	contains 141:12	142:2,21,23
195:25 196:23	154:1,4 160:25	comply 131:2	contemplate 234:23	145:18 161:10,11
197:2,10,13,17	161:9,11,16 162:6	133:10 142:10	contemplated	161:23 163:24
198:10 199:1,10	162:8 164:11	151:23 154:23	165:16,17 167:16	164:4,13,14 166:4
199:14 200:2,19	165:10,11 168:20	155:1,7 160:16	195:14	166:14,24 167:3
201:5,9,22 203:2	169:4,13,25 171:4	179:15	contemporaneous	176:21 179:11
203:9,10,14,20	172:25 177:4	complying 155:18	147:1 243:21	182:10,12 186:16
203:3,10,14,20	181:9 184:14	component 157:6	content 239:2	196:5 198:4,5
205:24,25 206:5,8				199:4 200:8
	191:23 193:1	1 211:10	I CODIEXI 124:0 1.57:2	1 177.4 400.0
206:23 207:12.14	191;23 193:1 194:21.24 209:22	211:16 computers 146:10	context 124:6 137:2 178:5.6.8 179:20	1
206:23 207:12,14 207:24 208:7.8.9	194:21,24 209:22	computers 146:10	178:5,6,8 179:20	202:16 205:10
206:23 207:12,14 207:24 208:7,8,9				1

www.midwestlitigation.com

Т

238:19 243:8	208:8,10,23	226:20,23	216:25 221:14	154:4,7 198:6
costs 124:12,24	210:14,17 211:18	demanding 215:4	detriment 144:15	208:6 233:9
125:1,3,5,7	212:7,11 217:6,9	demonstrate 152:13	develop 243:8	discussing 172:11
128:17,25 129:10	217:16,18,24	152:17 154:10	developed 163:5	discussion 140:3
150:14 151:10	218:5,8,13,21	182:5 189:25	193:1	161:9,17 168:9
152:10 163:18	219:8,12,14	197:23 204:1	dictate 214:6	193:6 216:23
166:17 173:8	224:14 225:11,23	231:18	difference 132:9	235:9 243:23,24
197:25	225:24 226:1,16	denied 199:15	187:2 206:2 215:6	244:23
counsel 122:7,9	226:22,25 227:4,8	Denmark 170:19	differences 139:1	discussions 161:21
123:19,21 127:12	227:11 228:11,15	177:19	239:14	243:13
129:22 130:9,13	228:22 229:1	deny 159:22 177:21	different 133:1	dismiss 160:17
130:17 135:10	234:15 235:11,23	denying 199:10	135:19 136:12	dispenses 135:4
136:1,3,12 138:10	236:24 238:12,15	depend 150:24	149:23 163:1	dispute 124:5,6
140:7,8,13,13	238:23 239:9	dependent 152:15	164:3 166:18,19	172:6,10 239:1
199:22 237:7	240:1,14,18,23	depending 125:1	174:1,4 178:16	disputes 237:10
239:15 243:7	241:14,21 242:6	140:11 141:25	186:2,7,7 187:4	dissatisfied 220:18
counted 204:25	242:10,13,18	describe 152:9	192:14 194:2	distinct 156:20
country 220:4	243:1 244:2,17,24	190:22	201:19,23 202:13	230:24 231:1
229:5	245:4,15,21,25	described 147:4	204:22 207:2	distinguished 135:5
COUNTY 247:4	day 143:21,21	148:13 184:22	218:1,11 221:5	distributed 128:17
couple 170:10	147:11,12 152:14	188:21 189:23	222:4 229:3,4,4,5	128:25 129:6,10
172:19 175:3	152:14 159:25	197:18 230:14	229:7,8,9,10,10	129:18,18 140:13
243:14	221:14,18 233:18	describing 189:24	232:20 235:9	142:2 151:10
course 133:6 164:16	234:24	196:1	245:19	152:10
166:20	days 245:8	designed 192:17	differently 124:9	ditch 240:24,24
Court 144:12,16	day-to-day 148:9	201:10,13 208:1	132:20 233:8	docket 161:12
145:12 203:5	deal 147:18 165:11	desire 160:18	difficult 160:4	193:1 245:19,20
228:10 247:7	189:4 213:7	detail 138:7 151:11	digestible 203:11	245:22
covered 174:19	dealing 144:12	159:20,20 163:7	direct 161:6	document 127:3,4,6
covers 181:13	241:24	determination	Directing 127:8	201:25
credit 167:22	dealings 127:19	134:16 135:8	directive 244:18	documentation
229:10,11	140:8 141:22	136:23 158:19	directly 124:13	150:13 165:25
cross-examination	152:18 179:1	159:25 163:15	134:10 136:11	documents 125:25
170:21	180:1 191:15	176:23 177:11	146:18 176:14,17	125:25 126:5,7,11
crux 132:22 CSR 121:19 157:13	dealt 145:24	183:25 184:2	198:24 200:12	126:12 127:6,18
247:21	death 226:17 debts 135:4	230:16 determinations	222:24	128:1 134:13,19 134:20 145:1,24
customer 124:14	decide 239:19	209:18	disagree 196:17 220:10	134:20 143:1,24 148:12 150:18
175:8 205:19	decidedly 175:2	determine 125:14	disagreement 202:5	151:5 152:6,7,11
customers 144:15	decision 133:12	125:22 126:6	disallow 221:19	152:17,22 153:7
145:16.18 146:8	155:2 219:11	128:1 130:2,3,3	disallowance	153:14 154:10,16
146:16 184:11	decisions 137:3	133:17 135:13,14	198:13,16,17	154:17 163:13
194:23 205:14	160:4	136:4,5,9 137:3	212:3 223:8	173:9 176:10
208:22 238:20	declining 169:20	147:8 151:18	disallowances	178:9,19 182:4,24
200,22 230.20	deemed 128:13	152:7,19 155:16	172:19 202:21	183:1,5,7 184:1
D	defense 177:24	160:4 171:2	disallowed 173:8	185:10,10 189:17
d 123:1 207:19	define 130:19	175:25 176:3	discovery 124:5,6	190:8 194:14
data 186:25 187:1	156:24 178:9	177:17 183:21	125:9 156:25	220:5
226:3 227:19	defined 130:8 137:8	184:25 185:6	160:11,12 172:6	doing 159:1 172:16
230:4,5	137:11 157:22	187:15 197:4,6,9	172:10 190:23	173:6,13 181:7
date 127:9 131:20	188:22 200:21	200:20 201:2	193:24 222:11,12	190:21 213:2
147:9	207:18	204:13 214:7	223:7 233:23,24	236:19 238:6
dates 148:6	definition 201:16	215:15,21 220:6	234:5 245:3,5	243:15
David 202:20	204:12 207:20	221:13,19 223:3	discriminate 155:9	dollar 172:25
Davis 121:14	definitive 238:7	226:5 231:9	166:9	dollars 149:5,6
186:14,21 191:11	definitively 133:18	determined 199:23	discriminating	done 125:4 126:9
191:19,24 205:25	deliver 168:7 188:7	230:9	166:17	139:15 152:4
206:5,8,23 207:12	delivered 152:16	determining 133:1	discriminatory	166:1 168:25

www.midwestlitigation.com

170:4,6 179:9	223:13,15	186:18 230:11	examples 170:25	171:11 179:14
180:14 181:6	encapsulate 178:3	established 187:6	171:7 175:3	182:11 184:7
186:4 192:18	encapsulated	232:7	except 157:21	186:11,18,19,21
201:1 211:6,15	203:11	establishes 145:4	exception 176:17	187:9,14,22
216:2 234:17	encompassed	153:5 230:15,15	exchange 126:3	190:15 197:24
238:7	188:25	estate 213:21	140:15	204:4,13,17,18
doubled 169:1	encouraging 218:17	estimate 124:15	excuse 129:7 188:7	205:3,5,5,12
down 124:20 169:6	encroached 134:22	estimated 124:15	203:5 233:22	209:14 213:9
	end 124:21 188:19	125:1	exercise 177:9	214:19,19 216:5,6
175:18 189:4,6	198:2 216:23	estimation 182:2	186:2	216:14 225:12
211:22 213:10	221:14,18 231:22	230:20	existing 192:5	229:25 230:16
217:2 219:3,19,22		evaluated 209:19	expect 218:11	231:24 232:7
229:19,21 234:20	233:16 234:23,24 237:15	211:24	expectations 218:14	233:6,13 245:11
237:5,25 238:6	Energy 125:11	evaluation 175:25	221:7	245:12
239:5 243:7,12 247:11	227:9	235:4	expedition 173:23	fairly 135:4 146:25
	enforcement 157:24	even 151:4 158:13	176:6 222:6	185:5
drafting 127:24	158:14	175:18 176:23	expeditions 174:3	faith 201:20
dragged 237:4 due 171:13 180:17	engage 125:12,13	179:15,17 186:3,3	expensive 175:17	faithfully 173:21
	154:4	199:8 211:5	explain 138:6	fail 190:8
211:11 221:7				false 177:2
during 125:2	engaging 154:7	237:21 241:9	explicitly 234:21 extended 162:8	familiar 124:3
142:25 205:17	enough 125:6 215:9	event 192:17		far 204:23 220:21
230:4	215:11	eventnally 185:22 ever 165:10 196:3	extensive 162:4	222:1
duty 218:4	ensure 162:1,15	205:13 242:1	extensively 237:18 extent 142:8	fashion 166:2,19,19
E	201:13 222:2 225:7	every 147:17	extra 190:22	198:6 208:7 233:9
E 122:1,1 123:1,1	enter 138:12,12	149:22 151:24	extra 190.22 extraordinarily	fast 162:16,18,18
each 195:5 229:7	228:4	149.22 151.24	154:23	191:12 196:21
earlier 192:16,18	entered 181:22	194:21,22 240:21	extremely 168:1	favor 124:25,25
208:11	211:25	241:5	can entry room	favorable 168:1
earnings 135:3	entire 130:20 195:9	everybody 167:21	F	198:5 213:4
ease 189:10	entirely 193:2 218:1	169:6 170:20	fact 137:12 143:25	feel 241:12
easily 203:11	223:2	177:5 215:22	145:24 146:14	few 149:23 153:19
economic 133:16	entities 137:10,19	232:13 243:9,16	147:10 173:6	168:5 244:9
economics 175:20	145:5 147:22	everyone 236:5,25	174:3 175:12	field 214:1 231:4
economy 218:25	150:1,7,9,19	237:1 239:21	192:7 193:3	figure 240:5 241:15
education 203:12	151:6 179:2	everything 146:8,11	195:21 199:19	figured 219:17
effect 133:16	184:25	190:19 239:11	214:16 220:10	file 159:18 245:13
149:18 195:18	entitled 127:6 191:3	evidence 135:24	221:5 233:19	filed 127:4 149:7
effective 157:24	210:22	152:24,25 153:16	facts 170:22 217:20	161:23,24 162:25
158:14	entity 125:20	154:13,17 170:23	factual 171:1	225:25
effectively 165:18	128:14,15 129:8	213:9 214:24	failed 168:6,7	filing 244:19
effort 168:16 189:9	130:23 131:16,21	222:17,21 223:23	fair 128:16,24	filings 127:7 244:20
190:11	132:15 133:2,10	228:24 233:25	129:9,17 133:23	fill 126:1 131:22
efforts 196:7	134:5,9,10 139:5	234:5,6,13 240:12	134:1,3,8 136:9	132:10
eight 150:10,11	149:11 150:15	241:20	140:12 142:1,19	final 134:15 160:1
160:25 189:7	151:20 156:9	evidentiary 134:15	142:21 143:8,13	199:7 221:13
201:12 238:3	157:21 179:4,8	157:17 170:14,23	143:15,18,19,20	finally 196:17,18
either 124:20,25	entries 123:14	171:23 172:5,12	143:23 144:8,19	213:3
129:16 152:25	environment 205:9	172:12 177:12	144:21,23,23,24	financial 125:19,23
156:20 175:23	equation 233:17	210:4 239:1	144:25 145:2,4	128:14 129:1
177:21 197:21	erratically 166:19	241:18	146:18 147:6,7,8	130:23 145:22
electric 124:9	especially 143:24	exactly 154:21	147:9,11 151:9	157:17
electronic 236:9	essence 210:21	156:18 181:16,18	152:8,10,11,13,14	find 128:8 134:13
element 162:23	essentially 163:25	216:16 238:8	152:17,19,22	134:18 138:5
elements 162:9	217:23	examine 179:1	153:5,6,8,10	164:6,8,9 182:10
elsewhere 225:20	establish 143:15,18	195:3 198:11	163:14,15,20,24	184:10 196:18
emergency 240:25	144:24 152:19	example 146:4	164:2 165:22	212:5 226:4,6
employees 162:10	153:6 176:5	158:23	166:2 167:7 171:5	227:22 242:13

		r		
Findings 199:19	153:1 156:9,20	gaming 220:1 224:2	233:2,15 235:1,14	198:3 199:18
finish 165:1 189:21	157:15 160:6	gas 121:9,10 122:12	236:1,11 237:14	201:10,15,17
finite 197:10,12	163:10,24 165:10	123:4,4,22,24	237:15 238:19,19	203:7 204:1,5
first 123:14 127:3	166:13,15,16	124:8,11,12,16,21	240:16 241:2	205:11,12,24
128:10 139:2	167:8 169:4,11,16	125:2,10,16,19	gave 138:6 161:7	207:10 208:1,12
165:1 204:15,21	169:18,22 170:8	126:1,3,3,6,8	188:1 189:10	208:19 209:11,20
204:21 215:20	172:1,16 175:9,11	127:16 128:13,17	213:7 244:10	210:7 211:10
fishing 173:22	175:21 179:20	128:19,20,24,25	gears 208:12	212:4 214:18,20
174:2 176:6 222:6	181:10,15 182:6	129:6,8,10 130:3	general 157:23	215:1 217:7,9
fishy 177:18	183:6,8,9 184:4	130:22 131:12,15	174:20 193:15	219:3 220:17.20
flippant 241:25	185:23 186:1,9,20	131:19,21 132:3	201:18 207:16,18	221:9 222:1,3,6
flip-side 169:21	187:7,9,12 188:2	132:10,14 133:25	generally 137:10	223:9,13,17,25
flowing 126:3	188:9 189:8	134:4 135:14,21	206:22	224:9 230:1 231:2
flying 227:18	190:14 191:7	136:5,15,16,17	generated 167:25	231:3,13,14,18
focused 239:21	192:19 194:17,18	138:6,8,11,13,16	generous 223:1	232:1 233:1,20,22
folks 182:21	194:24,25 196:4	139:20,21 142:21	gentlemen 196:23	237:7 238:9 244:3
follow 154:7 163:8	197:23 201:1	142:23 143:20,24	George 209:24	goal 215:15,20
179:12 196:21	202:9 203:22	144:2,5,6 145:18	gets 155:21 193:21	Godat 209:24 210:4
234:7	202.9 203.22 204:3,7,14 207:2	146:10 150:2,16	209:25 237:1	goes 132:24 133:1
followed 176:20	204.3,7,14 207.2	151:2,3,19 152:25	getting 132:21	145:8,18,21
follows 155:14	213:8 214:24	151:2,3,19 152:25	136:2 189:12,14	146:15 156:1
forgive 178:4	215:5,16,21 216:2	156:9 157:19	190:23 213:4	158:11 168:20
186:24 235:25	218:19 221:5	159:2 162:6,8	215:5 218:11	199:2 200:7,10
form 180:5	225:19 226:4	163:13,22,23	243:15	202:1 219:5
formal 224:12	229:3,4,8,23	164:5,11,12,13,14	gift 168:21	202.1 219.5
forth 157:17 163:7	230:2,6,7,20	166:4,13,14 167:3	give 145:14,22	going 124:2 127:1
168:4 182:1	231:3,7,10,17,19	167:8 168:3,3,7	159:13 166:13	132:22 140:5
190:25 199:12	232:16 233:2,3,4	168:11,18,20	175:3 194:16	160:15,17,17
200:22 247:10,14	233:5,7 235:2,14	169:4,13,25	205:10 207:20,22	163:3,21 164:11
forthcoming 190:18	235:19 237:3	172:20 175:5,6,16	220:10 223:21	164:15,17 165:11
fortunes 169:12	238:4 240:4 241:2	176:1,1,22,22	230:3 235:4	166:12,18 167:11
forward 152:21	245:14	179:11 181:9,10	given 170:25 217:14	172:13 173:16,17
162:12,16 171:3,7	front 195:6	182:6,10,12,18,25	gives 171:13 191:14	175:17,19 180:11
171:16 175:4	fueled 169:12	184:12,13,14	giving 155:10 210:7	181:25 186:2,6,8
178:18 193:4,5	fulfillment 185:8	185:7,11,19 186:1	213:8	193:4,5 195:17
220:21 236:14	full 148:15 149:9	186:6,16 187:7	go 124:22 126:7,17	198:13 205:3
240:3	171:1 172:21	188:2,3,9 194:24	128:9 133:17,19	208:19 209:4,5,19
found 166:6	205:1,5,6 214:12	196:5,7 197:9,16	138:23 143:11	209:20 210:4
four 169:15 185:15	214:12 222:10	197:23 202:16,17	154:2 156:5	214:20 219:4,5
194:16 195:6	fully 128:17,25	204:6,10,15	159:19 162:20,22	221:13,15,18
framing 172:7	129:6,9,18 140:13	206:12,17,19,19	163:3,10 164:12	223:9 227:22
frank 199:9	142:2 151:9	206:25 207:2,6,9	164:19 165:8,14	232:23 233:5
frankly 125:6	152:10 153:23	207:9 208:21,24	165:24 166:4,12	235:24 236:14,16
159:21 164:22	204:6 247:13	209:17,22 210:1,8	166:13 167:12	240:2,2 243:7,10
192:23 202:7	function 136:25	212:12,12 214:1,4	168:10,12,17,18	244:18,21
204:20 238:2	155:15 156:1	215:5,16,21 216:2	168:19 169:11	going-forward
245:2	fundamental	217:2,25,25	170:16 171:3,22	224:20 236:20
freely 165:19	180:16 202:5	218:12,23 219:1,2	172:24,25 173:16	239:7 240:11
from 123:10,15	fundamentally	219:23,23 220:4	173:17 175:4,7,17	gone 135:21 136:8
124:11,17 125:15	201:19,23	224:24 225:8,14	175:18,19,21,24	136:16 165:4
126:3,20 128:20	further 198:3 222:4	225:19,20,22	176:2,3,5 177:1,3	168:12 169:1,12
131:23,25 132:7,8	futile 186:3	226:14,15,19,20	177:12,19,22	175:9 183:18
134:10 135:5,22	future 180:9	226:23 227:2,9,12	178:23 180:3,5,11	189:18 195:18
136:11,12,16,23		227:13 228:5,12	182:11 183:11,14	204:9 225:19
140:15 142:19,21	G	229:3,7,12,21	186:6 188:7,14	233:15
143:21,21,25	G 123:1	230:6,8 231:2,5,7	190:11,18 191:10	goo 131:10
144:5,5 145:8	gain 146:6	231:17 232:1,2,12	191:22 192:2,10	good 131:10 159:10
147:21 152:25	game 180:17 237:11	232:15,16,24	193:17 195:17	169:7 201:20
	l		::	

- -

MIDWEST LITIGATION SERVICES Phone: 1.800.280.3376

.

205:20 213:9	Harrah's 219:19,22	hours 244:9	198:6,7 202:24	instances 168:6
214:24 222:6	hashing 236:16	house 213:22	203:14,17 221:24	174:10 212:6
229:12 237:9	hats 220:1	Hub 187:2 206:12	223:19 233:9	instead 136:15
244:10	having 147:5	hundreds 230:6	incontinence	163:19 182:11
goods 128:15,18	167:20 190:17	HVAC 157:21	164:20	194:16 196:10
147:21	210:16 220:16,16	hypothetical 131:5	incorrect 130:17	intended 157:14
gotten 156:8 188:9	221:8 235:15	133:20 134:7,18	141:15	interest 167:17,18
220:16	236:19 237:4	138:6,11	increase 169:8,8	240:8
govern 200:15	241:18	hypothetically	increased 205:16	interested 237:5,23
governed 190:1	head 134:3,8,11	209:2 228:11	incnrred 150:15	interesting 175:23
governing 201:24	135:21 136:8,11		independent 135:21	interests 235:3
201:24	136:13 214:2	I	143:17 146:19	Internet 243:19
governs 193:24	227:20	ICE 187:2 237:13	203:20	interrupted 208:11
grant 194:3	hear 123:9 182:17	237:16 243:19	index 187:19	intimate 235:25
granted 129:1	195:20 225:4	idea 224:24 241:23	206:18,20	invalid 158:24
194:8	heard 123:7 124:3	identical 133:8	indication 235:5	investigation 171:4
granting 199:11	177:23	158:5	indicia 184:7	223:14
graphs 206:10	hearing 134:16	identifying 151:9	229:16	invoice 194:21
great 125:5 163:7	170:13,14,23	ignoring 173:14,14	individual 148:4	invoices 148:23
239:8	171:8,24 172:5,12	173:15	indulgence 131:5	183:11
greater 129:9,17	172:12 176:23	H 128:5 140:5	induiging 244:8	involved 127:24
216:6	177:12 210:4,16	HI 121:14	Industrial 227:16	240:17
grounds 192:7 grow 142:13 211:9	241:18 heart 160:22,22	illustrate 134:19 ill-defined 180:11	influences 143:23	involves 183:13 involving 166:1
	,		information 123:10	
grown 210:12 GR-2005-0203	178:23	imagine 211:4 immediately 146:5	129:7,23 130:1	irreconcilable
121:10 123:3	heck 184:11	impact 167:20	135:13 136:2	239:14
GR-2006-0288	hedge 168:3 hedging 138:12	192:3	147:16 160:19 163:17 164:1,19	irregular 132:4 irrelevancy 203:21
123:3	139:15	impacted 158:1,16	164:23 165:16	irrelevant 176:11
guess 129:12 150:24	heightened 139:4	161:19	172:24 173:18	176:13 186:3
153:18 158:9	207:16 220:11	implicated 156:13	174:5 175:15	192:8,10,12 199:2
175:20 180:7	held 172:11	implicates 158:8	176:7,19 177:25	199:5,6,23 200:6
190:23 193:21	help 126:21 220:6	implies 226:9	178:14 179:17	200:9 203:15,16
197:3 198:21	Henry 187:2 206:12	importantly 195:10	181:20 183:12	204:10 214:4
199:1 202:1	hereof 247:11	impossible 165:18	185:15 189:3,10	223:4,16 228:18
203:24 222:10	hereunto 247:16	impression 210:24	190:15 192:15	irrespective 185:2
243:12 245:5,7,9	hesitance 236:8	226:11	195:11,11 197:5	185:12,18 200:5
guise 195:15,16	Hey 212:16	improper 126:9	198:21 199:19	216:13
guys 135:18 223:9	high 131:25 227:2	130:20	202:23 203:15,16	isolation 193:23
	higher 138:13	improprieties	204:3 209:17,23	issue 123:7 127:20
<u> </u>	140:11,12 141:25	127:25	210:11 220:6	129:13 132:22
hair 224:9	142:1 187:12,13	imprudence 127:15	221:16 222:1,15	140:20 151:4
half 155:3 175:7	214:5	imprudent 131:3	223:10,18 226:6	181:10,12,13
hand 125:6 225:1	highly 208:6	133:12 151:25	235:4,16 241:12	200:25 223:2
241:23 247:16	him 159:7 182:17	152:6 153:24	243:21	224:11,16 239:2,3
handled 139:24	himself 210:9	154:24 155:4	informational	241:6,7 244:7
hand-out 161:7	216:17	inappropriate	191:6	245:3,5,6
happen 173:19	hindsight 146:21	170:11,16,19	initial 193:22	issned 160:2
happened 132:18	147:4,13	171:8 173:1	199:11 200:6	issues 156:8 172:10
175:11 194:6	historical 229:22	183:21 193:2	inordinate 216:4	236:19 241:7
happens 188:15	holding 145:21	inappropriateness	224:2	· T
224:9	160:25 161:9,11	173:11	inquire 135:2	J
happy 152:21 239:5	161:16 193:1	incentive 144:14	inguiry 140:7	jarrett 121:15
240:9	honestly 239:9,10	145:13,22	188:19 198:2	126:15 127:1,11
hardly 211:4 hardship 235:12	Honor 123:16 hope 131:11	includes 124:23 including 194:23	231:22 232:14	127:22 128:3,23
harmed 162:2	hopefully 169:10	inconsistent 137:24	instance 191:2	129:4,12,15,20
239:23	horse 173:3 226:17	138:3 173:19	200:25 204:15	130:7,13,16,21
237.23	norse 175;5 220;17	150/5 175:19	231:1	131:1,6,9 132:21

www.midwestlitigation.com

134:23 135:9,12	135:25 137:11	Kenney 121:15	159:25 163:22	139:18,21,23
135:18,25 136:4,7	142:16,22 145:12	132:19 133:9,15	165:4 168:21	141:6 143:14,25
136:18 138:10,15	145:23 147:4	133:21 134:6,21	169:2 174:8	144:1,4,10 145:3
138:18,21 139:7	148:24 149:5,5,11	136:20 137:6,17	175:10 176:22	145:8,15,19 146:4
139:10,14,22	149:20 155:9,11	137:21 138:1,9	177:10 178:19	146:7,9 147:1,14
140:1,19,24 141:3	155:14,17,19,20	156:3,6,12,16,19	180:14,14 182:8	147:24 148:9
141:9,14,18 142:6	155:23,25 156:2	156:22,24 157:4,9	183:6,10 187:1,3	150:7,19 151:19
142:15 143:2,6,8	158:19,21,25	159:8,10 160:21	188:19 191:4,5	151:23 153:1,2,5
143:20 144:19	159:3,17 160:5,11	164:25 172:2,3	193:5 194:19	153:16 161:20
146:20 147:3,14	169:10 170:21	173:4,25 174:14	195:5,12 196:19	167:25 168:11,13
147:20 148:3,5,8	171:17 172:8	174:20,25 176:8	198:19,22 199:8	168:20 169:13,15
148:14,19,22,24	175:10 176:1	176:24 178:2,15	199:13,14 201:8	169:17,19,22,25
149:3,8,13,17,20	178:3,18 179:20	179:19,24 180:20	202:12,19 204:20	174:15 181:9,19
149:25 150:5,10	180:1 183:21	180:22 181:23	204:20 206:6,17	181:22 182:21,25
150:17,22 151:1	184:12,21 185:4	182:13,16,20,23	206:18 208:18,24	183:2 184:12,13
151:13,15,21	185:10 186:1,15	183:19,24 184:21	209:1,2,3,4 211:3	184:25 185:4,7,12
153:18 154:6,18	186:22 188:8,15	185:9,17 186:24	211:5,22 212:5,7	185:23 186:20
156:3,5 157:12	188:21 189:23,24	187:15,18 188:21	212:15 213:5,8	187:6,8,9 188:6
158:9,13 159:4	191:15 192:18	188:24 189:12,16	214:15,15 215:1,1	188:16 190:7
160:21 161:8	193:10,15,17	189:20,23 190:4,6	215:3 218:23,23	192:21 194:24
172:2 181:14	194:7,16 195:16	190:20 191:18	219:8,9 220:5,9	197:16 203:21
201:10 205:23,24	195:19 196:1,24	193:18,21 194:1,6	220:11,22 221:4,6	204:14 207:1,21
222:8,9,16,19	197:2,5,17 200:16	194:12 195:2,20	221:9 223:13	208:14 209:4
223:20 224:4,11	200:17 201:23	195:25 196:23	224:15,20,22,24	210:1 211:11,15
Jarrett's 134:22	202:5,7 203:12,24	197:2,10,13,17	225:1,2,2,3,21,22	211:20 214:3,5,9
JEFF 121:14	205:18 206:6	198:10 199:1,10	226:8,13 227:15	214:9 215:15,17
Jefferson 121:7,21	207:4 212:15	199:14 200:2,19	227:18 229:15	215:21 216:12
122:5,10	213:21 215:7,23	201:5,22 203:2,9	230:1 231:15,15	217:13,14 218:4
Jones 121:13 123:2	217:7 218:7,16	203:10,14,20	233:8,13 234:18	219:23 220:3
123:19,22,25	219:17,18 221:10	204:11 205:22	235:15,19 236:5,6	223:15 224:21
126:14,17,20,24	222:9 224:9,14	207:14 208:9	236:6,9,10,11,11	225:7,14,18 227:8
132:6 155:13	225:8 226:13	214:7,11,14 215:9	236:12,19 237:4	229:2,9,13 234:9
159:8,12,16 172:1	229:15 230:7,14	215:14 216:5,10	237:10,15,16,19	235:13,13 236:10
203:7,9 205:23	232:5 233:11,22	216:13,18 221:12	237:21 238:3,4,23	241:1 243:7
222:8 224:6	234:3 235:10,15	224:7 230:13,19	238:24 239:10,12	Laclede's 127:7,16
233:21 244:1,15	236:18 238:16,20	230:23 232:10,19	239:15,16,20	130:4 135:15
244:20 245:2,18	239:15,15 240:2,5	244:2,4	241:1,10,23 242:1	140:15 141:10
245:21 246:1	240:7,25 241:15	Kenny 153:19	242:5,21,21	169:18 176:9
judge 121:13 123:2	242:13 243:1 244:21	Kevin 122:3 123:16	243:11,17 245:5	178:7 203:3,16
123:19,22,25	justifies 176:19	178:23 kind 129:8 135:24	knowing 243:17 knowledge 227:24	204:11 211:12 222:19 228:24
126:14,16,17,20			236:1	232:19 228:24
126:24 132:6	justify 210:16 justifying 241:20	149:21 155:13 165:15 166:2,16	230:1 known 180:6	
155:13 159:8,12 159:16 163:3	justly 135:4		211:24 217:15	language 192:2 larger 241:15
172:1 178:24	justness 160:8	176:7,19,20 178:13 184:7	211:24 217:15	last 140:4 148:13,13
203:7,9 205:23	Justices 100.0	237:8	клоws 126;22	160:25 161:1
203:7,9 205:23	К	kinds 150:1 234:14	217:20 237:1	165:20 169:15
233:21 244:1,15	Katrina 212:23	knew 146:23 147:12	217.20 237.1	173:21 174:9
244:17,20 245:2	keep 150:2 153:21	171:19 217:15	L	180:13 189:7
244:17,20 245:2	168:19 196:24	219:10 220:22,23	L 121:13	196:16 238:3
judged 211:20	197:2 235:21	220:24,25,25	Laclede 121:9	243:5,11 244:9
judging 142:19	239:2,3	220.24,25,25	122:12 123:4,11	late 204:23
judgment 173:10	keeps 145:19	know 124:2 125:17	123:22,24 125:10	lately 149:2
219:16	Keeps 145.19 Ken 209:1,1,3	126:10 127:24	125:11,15 126:2,3	later 125:7 146:25
July 127:4,11,11	219;22,23 220:1	131:7 134:17	126:8 127:8,19	167:13 214:2
jumped 159:13	224:24,25 226:19	139:2 141:21	130:2 132:23	242:16 243:25
jurisdiction 191:5,7	226:19 234:10	139.2 141.21	135:14,20 136:5,8	law 121:13 122:14
just 125:20 131:9	KENNARD 121:13	153:3,23 156:1	136:14,16 138:5,7	122:17 133:15
Just 125.20 151.7	ANDINIARD 121.13	133,3,23 130,1	150.17,10 100.5,/	122.17 155.15
L	1	L	l	·

.

. --

171:2,2 178:24	232:12,14,16	238:11 239:1,15	213:20 215:17	made 133:11 137:3
192:5 199:20	233:4,5,8 234:11	239:20 241:23	216:3 217:1	139:2 147:2,9,10
lawfully 161:3	235:2,14 237:1	243:1,2	219:25 220:5	147:24 151:6,20
191:8	241:2,10	likely 155:1 187:7	221:2 228:19,20	155:2 159:25
lawfulness 160:9	lera 122:3 123:17	233:24 234:5	231:11 233:20	160:5 162:9
234:6	139:3,11 155:14	limited 142:8 174:6	234:2,3,8	163:16 165:4,6,7
lawyering 244:11	LER's 152:18 153:4	174:10 175:2	looked 181:7 228:3	165:9,13 166:1
lead 198:13,16	153:5 169:12,14	190:24 200:21	looking 127:3,12	168:11 172:18
222:15,16,21	169:16 182:10,24	line 129:24 137:23	128:6,7 131:7,9	183:5 184:6
223:23 233:24	183:2,12 184:23	140:6 141:24	134:19 135:3	194:19,22 196:9
234:5	185:12,17 188:24	194:7 196:7 217:3	141:19 143:19	199:24 202:17
learu 142:13	196:5 197:25	Liquidity 167:23	144:8 151:5,16	204:2,4 213:3
least 140:19,20	214:8	list 127:6 147:20	152:11,17 153:3,7	219:10 224:19
142:3 167:9	less 147:11 213:3	148:15,18 149:9	153:14 154:16,17	226:19 229:19
174:16 178:8	232:1	181:25	154:19 157:12	234:16 240:10
200:21 210:15	lesser 128:16,24	listed 150:11	181:21 182:7,9	Madison 122:4,9
224:20 241:2	129:17 138:23	listening 227:21	183:4 184:23	maintained 161:25
leave 227:23	let 123:14 127:12	litigating 239:2,3	187:16 196:1,5	major 235:18
legitimate 209:11	128:8 131:4 134:6	litigation 121:20	204:9 215:2,23,24	make 136:21 146:7
length 143:15 228:6	134:6 140:21	178:6 240:6	216:24 218:6	146:9,24 147:7
244:6	156:6 165:1	litigator 178:4	236:11 242:7	150:2 161:18
LER 125:11 126:1,3	168:17 172:3,4	little 191:14 194:7	looks 143:18 194:8	162:20 164:16
126:6,9 135:14,15	173:4,4 174:1,12	195:11 207:19,19	210:18	165:12,18 166:4
135:16,20,22	174:19 176:8	live 202:25 203:1	losers 205:14	167:9,12 168:2,12
136:5,10,11,15,16	180:19 182:16	205:8	losing 211:4	168:19 169:7
138:5,8 139:19	187:24 189:20,20	lived 169:24 192:23	lost 212:25	176:23 177:11
144:1,5,6,9 145:3	194:2 208:11	208:3	lot 124:2 126:22	179:17 182:16
145:20,22,25	211:18,18,19	living 160:24	140:3 142:15	183:25 184:2
146:3,4,14,15,23	213:11 215:14	180:13 201:20	160:20 161:9,17	196:11 202:5
146:23 147:7,11	223:9 224:14	221:8	168:9 177:8,8	203:10 208:1,4,5
148:24 150:18	227:4,5,5 228:5	loaned 167:25	184:11 186:6	209:18 211:10
152:25 153:1,9,12	230:3 235:12,23	location 131:19	195:11,12,12	213:19 219:18,25
153:15 166:1,12	235:24 244:5	132:15 143:21,22	202:22 206:13,14	220:17 221:16
166:18 167:8,21	letter 151:24	188:1 207:8,10	212:14 213:13	224:2 231:10
167:24 168:10,17	let's 156:8 168:14	214:3 217:2 233:3	237:24	232:4 234:10,25
169:4,18,22,24	168:17,17 169:6,7	locations 206:18	lots 163:17 227:18	236:21 239:10
170:3 181:10	169:14 170:13,13	locked 219:6	Louis 122:15,18	243:19 245:6
182:5,18 183:6,7	171:8,23 175:3,4	long 149:17 152:2	187:20,23 188:6,8	makes 135:7 145:15
183:11,14 184:6	179:12 188:10	154:11 160:13	188:10 189:25	145:17,20 146:4,5
184:11 185:7,11	198:10 208:12	167:22 197:25	226:20,24 230:2,4	167:4 172:17
186:9,20 187:5,7	217:7 218:19,20	224:15 231:18	230:17 232:13	193:16 205:11
187:12,16 188:2,3	218:21.25	233:18 237:5	Louisiana 185:24	207:5 209:24,25
188:7,12,15,16	life 216:20	242:3	low 131:25 167:23	210:1,5,6 236:23
191:5,15 192:4	like 134:18 141:21	long-term 138:16	lower 136:9 140:14	237:2
196:4,7,10 197:23	144:18 149:15	236:11	187:8,8,10 225:21	making 138:25
204:3,9 205:9,18	152:21 153:21,22	look 136:25 142:20	225:21	161:13 169:8,9
206:17,25,25	156:7 159:17	142:22 143:13	lowest 142:20,23	173:7 183:19
208:15,15,18	161:6 167:21	146:18 147:6	144:1 164:4,13,14	199:24 210:20
209:5,5,25 210:13	169:2,23 170:12	151:8,19 152:11	166:4,14 167:3	211:5 213:6
210:18,19 211:4,4	177:3 186:25	165:24 167:1,2	176:21 179:11	231:21 242:15
211:7,9,15,20	190:18 194:8	168:10,14,24	182:10,12 184:13	mammoth 171:4
212:6,8,14,24	198:9 202:2 209:2	169:2,7,21 174:18	185:1 196:2,5	man 220:22
212:0,8,14,24 213:13 214:1,4,8	211:2 212:13	177:6,15 187:21	202:16 205:10	manual 140:3
		-	202.10 205.10	
214:16 215:11,23	213:13,21 215:4	187:25,25 188:5	- <u>- </u>	141:22 161:10,11
215:25 216:2,4	225:6 226:10,10	188:10 190:13	<u>M 121:14</u>	161:23 166:24
219:23 225:13,17	227:25 231:5	191:14 194:20,22		200:8 243:8
225:19,22 226:14	233:22 234:19	198:4 209:15	macro 168:14 210:11	many 143:23,23
229:23 230:8	235:21 236:4	211:14 212:5	210.11	149:24 152:15,16

MIDWEST LITIGATION SERVICES Phone: 1.800.280.3376

158:20 195:8	massive 177:4	226:11,11 227:12	227:9,12,14 228:1	much 130:2,8
229:13 240:16	matter 121:9 123:3	227:13,13,24	228:12 229:3,12	131:14 135:14
Marc 122:8 123:20	124:3 160:11,12	229:9 231:23	247:3,9	136:5,15 138:5,8
March 128:4	160:22,23 173:19	233:4 235:24	Missouri's 228:23	139:16 172:20
129:21 135:12	175:13,20 197:25	236:3,7,8,15,15	misspoke 136:3	175:4.12 176:1.1
136:1,12,19	199:8	236:16,21 237:5,9	misspoke 130.5	181:9 187:8,12
137:22 140:4	matters 123:6	239:1,3,4,9,22	mixes 185:19	195:1 206:25
	maximized 209:21	240:5,7,7,16	MO 121:21 122:5	207:2 211:15
142:16 147:17 margin 216:4	maximizes 210:5	240:3,7,7,10	122:10,15,18	215:5 225:16
		241:4,25 242:19	molecule 185:22,23	232:6 233:15
margins 194:18	maximum 205:1	means 226:20 236:9	moment 128:10	235:12 243:18
marked 208:16	may 124:1 130:18			244:12
market 128:16,24	131:5 132:19	meant 224:8	142:16 217:8	
129:9,17 133:23	135:2 138:13	measures 235:6	money 126:4	muddy 245:21
134:1,3,8 136:9	139:14 149:2,2	measuring 218:14	165:12 168:19	multitude 127:2
140:12 142:1,19	151:19 155:3	mechanism 237:19	196:12 209:25	Murray 130:7
142:22 143:8,13	156:3 158:20	meeting 159:24	210:1,8,20 211:4	140:6,10 141:20
143:16,18,19,20	159:6 162:18,19	meetings 243:14	211:5 212:25	141:24 142:8
143:24,24 144:8	165:4,5 167:12	meets 213:17	219:19 220:2	must 125:13 156:2
144:19,21,23,24	172:15 174:18	meet,here's 180:8	Monnie 121:19	158:25
144:24 145:1,2,4	177:7 180:10,21	merits 237:24	247:6,21	myself 194:7
146:18 147:6,7,8	184:12 199:7	met 132:2	month 228:16	
147:9,11 151:9	204:9 212:6	method 159:1	242:24 245:13	<u> </u>
152:8,10,11,13,15	216:14 225:9	Michael 122:13	monthiy 212:17	N 122:1 123:1
152:18,19,22	229:11	123:23	months 146:25	narrative 131:8
153:5,6,8,10	maybe 128:8	middle 221:9	185:15 194:16,16	narrow 194:13,24
163:14,15,20,22	134:14 153:25,25	Midwest 121:20	194:17 195:5	194:25 195:10
163:24 164:2	161:8 165:6,7	Mid-Continent	236:17 241:1	narrowed 195:2
165:5,22 166:2,16	177:19,25 180:14	187:7,10 206:3,11	243:11	narrowly 150:25
167:8 168:8	188:8,8 196:17,17	206:20	morass 215:7	nation 131:19
179:14 182:11	220:18 227:16,20	mid-stream 223:7	more 126:22 134:5	natural 124:8 219:1
184:7 186:11,19	230:1 241:17	might 134:24 138:7	136:17 138:7,16	229:3,12 231:5
186:19,22,25	242;23	144:6 152:20	144:7 149:16	236:1
187:1,2,3,9,14,22	Mealy 121:19 247:6	162:3,22 196:20	159:5,6 171:17	nature 169:17
188:6,8,10 189:25	247:21	196:20 202:12	172:7 183:10	nearly 169:1 243:21
190:15 196:9	mean 138:11,24	219:3 223:3,3	184:11 186:3,3	necessarily 130:9
197:24 204:4,13	144:21 146:24	224:11 229:13	191:14 195:10	130:11,14 133:7
204:17,18 205:3,3	148:20 154:1	230:2 231:16	198:4,9 199:18	137:23 138:3
205:5,5,12,15	172:7 173:5	232:24 233:2	202:14 205:15	158:8 174:11,12
206:3 207:8	174:22 176:11	237:20 241:7	206:14,25 207:2,6	191:4 238:25
209:14 213:9,20	178:2,16 180:6	migrate 169:4	209:25 210:1,8	necessary 126:12
213:21 214:19,20	181:23 182:14	migrating 205:18	213:19 216:5	need 127:25 134:20
216:6,6,14 226:3	184:23 185:21	210:13	217:10 220:6	135:24 152:6
226:9 229:25	186:8,15,16,22,25	million 206:14	227:2 230:6,13,14	162:20 168:10
230:2,3,16,17	187:1,1,3 191:4,5	212:17	237:23 238:7	172:23 175:5,7,12
231:12,25 232:7	191:17 195:2	mind 132:22 136:21	240:16 241:19	175:24 176:6,22
232:14 233:6,13	198:25 199:16	193:19 197:18	244:1,4,20 245:22	182:4 190:16
236:7	202:15 206:1	198:12 202:20	most 125:25 155:1	193:18 203:1,5
marketer 207:2		minus 187:6 206:22	235:5	214:15 224:19
1	207:14,17 208:16			231:15 232:24
230:7 231:3	208:20,23,25	212:13,22 213:12	motion 127:8	
marketers 166:10	209:6,6,6 212:7	213:24 226:25	159:18 194:4,9	234:1,4,8 236:18
166:11 204:5	212:13,15,15	227:1,15,17	199:11 245:6	238:7 241:12
marketing 131:13	214:15 216:6,24	228:16	motions 159:23	242:14
167:21 228:5,12	218:8,14,22,22	minute 207:13	mouth 142:18	needed 127:18
marketplace 215:3	219:17,18 221:12	misdirected 160:18	move 136:19 202:8	175:7 222:1
markets 167:22	221:13,14,18	missing 206:16	moves 236:7	needs 155:23 234:2
market-based 184:4	223:1 224:15,22	Missouri 121:1,7	moving 238:24	234:16 241:16
markup 164:15	224:22,23 225:3,6	122:2 123:17	MRT 189:3 213:10	negotiation 162:4
196:6 225:14,16	225:8 226:3,8,8,9	157:18,23 219:25	229:20,22	never 140:23 141:1
		l		

.....

141:11 168:6,7	object 192:6	218:5,21 219:2	160:1 162:15	231:4 236:4,16
180:14 189:7	objection 176:9	225:11 226:16	172:25 176:6	237:13 238:8
219:21	objective 157:16	227:1,5 228:11,22	177:4 178:13	239:6,11 241:15
new 163:2 173:11	obscene 210:20	230:3 235:22,23	189:25 191:14	242:14
192:25 201:16	obtain 172:24 174:6	238:23 241:14,21	192:21 199:1,10	outcome 172:14
220:17 221:4	177:25 178:14	242:6,6,10 244:15	199:11 200:6	outright 177:21
223:2 245:19,20	185:10 227:2	244:24 246:1	214:7,11	outside 189:17
next 219:1 245:8	obtaining 176:19	Olive 122:14,17	ordering 244:19	190:8
nice 239:13	225:22 226:14	once 151:21 165:10	organizing 191:23	over 140:10 141:24
Nices 209:1,1,3,18	obviously 206:13	184:15 223:21	origin 126:5	160:18 169:4,15
219:22,23 220:1	208:14 240:25	226:16 229:17,19	original 126:7	175:19 176:4
224:24,25 226:19	242:18	230:11 243:2	134:20 202:1	180:13,20 191:5
226:19 228:17,17	occupy 130:19	one 127:19 132:17	originally 194:3	192:4 205:18
234:10 241:24,24	occur 167:7	137:9 140:1	OSAGE 247:4	208:25 210:13
Nimex 187:6,23	occurred 134:14	144:21 150:11,25	osfutation 202:8	223:15
206:3,12,22	137:20	157:6 159:1	other 124:11 139:3	overall 211:17
212:12,21 213:12	occurring 124:6	160:12 169:5	139:18,25 140:1	234:2
213:23 226:24	occurs 181:24	175:2,3 183:25	147:6 150:19,19	overcome 200:16
227:17 228:15	October 121:6	200:13 204:21	151:6 155:20	overheads 234:21
nine 212:22	194:9 242:19	205:15 212:8	156:20 170:4	overlap 180:25
nobody 164:9,16	246:4 247:17	216:3 217:10	182:21 183:13,25	181:4 182:2
165:14 169:10	off 145:15,17 146:4	220:5 222:14	184:12,25,25	overly 176:11
171:19,19,20	168:8 169:24	227:15,16 228:1	185:23 188:24	owe 219:24
184:16 196:16	205:7 210:2,11	230:7 232:24	192:4 198:1 204:5	owed 218:4
244:5	213:10 227:19	237:3	204:14 208:19,22	own 160:16 163:22
nobody's 164:17	244:15	one's 240:23	212:6,22 213:4,17	163:23 173:19,20
none 134:2 146:16	offense 224:8	ongoing 123:11	214:2,22 215:18	203:12 231:5,6,6
non-affiliate 231:15	offered 152:12	only 125:7 139:12	216:11,22 217:1	235:3
non-affiliates	231:12 234:19	153:3 158:21	224:6 225:1,18	
204:14 215:18	offers 237:17	164:13 169:1	226:4,6,6,9	P
non-discrimination	Office 122:7,9	175:7 200:10,25	227:12,25 228:1	P 122:1,1 123:1
166:23 208:4	123:19,21 239:15	201:24,24 205:9	229:16 233:3	packet 169:16
non-discriminatory	off-system 145:20	210:8 222:1 226:2	237:11,15,21,22	page 128:7 129:21
155:8 158:22	146:9,12 168:24	231:2	241:7 242:14,23	129:24,25 135:10
non-regulated	169:9 205:15	opaque 160:4	otherwise 187:13	137:23 140:6,10
157:15 158:1,16	209:21 210:6	open 236:13	191:6	141:19,24 161:21
Nos 123:3	oh 123:14 133:21	opening 159:13	ought 170:12	pages 163:13
Notary 247:8	180:9 191:21	operate 165:14	176:20 178:22	247:14
note 160:6	208:18 210:19	operated 220:4	200:15 201:3	paid 125:2 130:2
nothing 132:4	oil 163:23	operating 201:20	210:3,22 211:24	132:3,12 134:5
154:12 170:18,19	okay 123:2 126:14	214:18 238:2	217:4 221:2,2,3	135:14 136:5
172:7 181:21	128:3,23 129:4	operation 157:16	231:21 237:25	138:5,7 146:8,9
192:9 223:2	130:13,16 131:1	opinion 178:17	238:1,10 243:24	147:22,25 148:9
233:19 240:2	131:11 133:9	179:19 210:18	out 123:6 134:13	152:25 153:1
244:21	141:3,9 143:2	224:16	138:5 139:11	172:20 181:9
notice 169:10	144:19 147:14	opportunity 144:14	145:8 153:21	185:1 204:10,14
noticed 159:12	148:5,14 149:20	145:13 160:7	155:21 160:18	204:15 214:4,5
notified 171:20	150:5,17 157:4,9	167:9 243:12	163:9 168:18	232:6,8
noting 159:18	159:16 165:2,11	244;13	171:19 177:3	paper 203:6
Nowhere 166:5	172:1 175:5	options 229:4	180:3 185:15	parent 150:15
nuance 232:19	179:24 187:18	oral 121:5 128:4	187:10 188:13	part 125:9,24,25
number 149:4	191:5,11 196:22	129:21 140:4	193:15 196:18	137:11 155:19,20
174:10 175:2	197:10 203:7,9	142:17 148:13	200:3 201:10,11	155:22,25 166:8
number-wise	205:22,25 206:5	165:20 174:9	208:19 212:24	181:1,1
194:25	206:21 207:12	196:16	214:1 219:17	participates 157:20
	208:23 210:17	order 126:6,11	223:2,9 225:19	participating 160:7
0	211:18 212:11	127:8 138:15	226:10 227:25	particular 131:18
0 123:1	216:10 217:3,6,9	157:16 159:19	229:17 230:8	137:17 171:15

www.midwestlitigation.com

MIDWEST LITIGATION SERVICES Phone: 1.800.280.3376

172:23 191:1	208:18 209:8,10	perspective 169:14	155:13 159:12,14	212:17 213:10,12
200:20,25 207:8	210:15 211:2,23	213:8 237:3 238:5	208:25 233:21,22	213:14,14,17,20
217:2,3 222:2	212:10,19 214:17	PGA 191:9	242:20 245:16,17	214:5,21,23,25
231:1 235:7	216:17,20 219:2	PGA/ACA 124:7,14	potential 127:16	215:16,21 217:25
241:20 244:7	219:19,21 220:9	phase 124:22,22	205:19 235:20	218:1,7,12 219:1
parties 143:17	221:21 222:13,18	phone 132:5	potentially 243:16	219:3,4 225:7,20
146:19 170:5	222:22 224:8,13	picks 218:25	practice 207:17	227:2 229:12,25
179:6 180:17	224:23 225:13	piece 155:21,25	practices 127:16	231:20 232:7
183:13 188:25	229:15 230:18,22	206:16 220:6	160:16	233:6,14 243:22
191:3 231:8	230:25 232:18,21	pipeline 175:17	preceding 247:14	priced 175:12
parts 135:8 229:5	234;18 235:11,15	176:4,4 183:8	preclude 178:12	181:17 204:7
party 144:5,9 145:6	236:22,23 237:2	208:13 209:5	precluded 172:13	221:2 226:24
146:2,6 152:19	238:14,21 239:3,6	pipelines 231:6	172:15	229:23 232:5,12
153:13,16 163:24	239:8 240:4,10	place 141:6 162:3	prepped 159:14	232:13,15,22
173:18 231:10	242:3,7,8 243:4	163:4 167:16	present 170:15	prices 187:3 188:16
pass 216:14	244:12	192:9,11 210:10	247:10	197:9 206:18
passed 124:13	Pendergast's	212:21 232:2	presentations	208:2 212:24
passes 209:7	142:18 180:21	234:25	244:10	213:17 217:4
	239:18			229:24 230:9
passing 173:10		places 186:8	Presiding 121:13	
past 206:11,13	people 124:19 177:8	pleading 199:17	presumably 169:5	231:12 232:8
patently 164:23	188:13 202:8	pleadings 127:2	182:18	pricing 141:12
173:23 177:9	209:17 214:22	please 124:1 127:10	presumed 145:7	163:9 171:8
222:7	215:3 216:22	plenty 168:2 176:5	presumes 200:12	181:10 188:3
pay 124:19 136:15	217:1 218:17	plowing 227:21	222:23	207:25 213:7
138:13,16 144:6	219:24 226:9	point 123:6 125:15	presumption	220:13 222:23,24
173:16 205:4	232:9 237:11,23	131:23 132:1,7,8	144:11 145:9,11	226:6 232:14
214:1 239:16	240:16	141:20 180:9	228:7,8	primarily 200:4
paying 153:9	per 131:18,18 134:5	193:22 194:13	pretext 170:2	primary 129:23
158:21 206:24	206:14	215:8 221:23	198:20	130:1 135:13
213:19 215:17,21	percent 145:17,19	241:5,6,18,19	pretty 169:17 185:5	138:2
216:4 226:14	145:20 155:3,3,5	pointed 139:11	213:9,18	prior 159:19
229:24	168:21,22 169:19	201:10,11	prevent 157:14	probably 132:6
penalized 190:21	169:20 170:4	policy 242:14,23	201:10 236:19	139:3 190:5,5
Pendergast 122:13	181:4 183:12	244:25 245:13	price 126:6 128:16	205:6 235:5
123:23,23 148:12	194:23 237:2	portfolio 142:21,23	128:24 129:9,17	problem 150:20
154:14 159:6,16	percentage 168:22	164:5,13,14 166:5	131:18,18,19	163:18 166:7
159:17 165:2	perfectly 239:2	166:5,14,17 167:4	132:4,10,10	180:16 208:17
172:15 173:13	performance	176:22 179:12	133:23,24,24	218:15 241:3,15
	209:16 235:4			243:2
174:8,17,24 175:1	• ·	182:10,12 186:1	134:1,1,3,3,8,8,20	
176:13 177:1	performing 139:16	196:6 202:16	136:9,13,14	problems 213:2
178:11,21 179:22	perhaps 196:22	205:10 235:21	138:13,22 144:1,9	procedure 222:14
179:25 182:8,14	216:2 230:15	portion 155:19	144:20,21,23,24	procedures 160:16
182:19,22 183:4	period 124:16	234:6	144:25 145:1,2	162:7
183:23 184:2,21	185:16 195:5	posed 142:8	147:11,24 153:10	proceeding 170:9
185:5,25 187:21	197:10,12 205:17	position 133:10	162:14 163:14,15	170:13 172:13,14
187:24 188:23	210:12 240:22	153:15 203:3,11	163:20,24 164:2	proceedings 121:3
189:2,14,18,22	241:5	204:11 207:22	165:5,22,24 166:2	203:8 212:21
190:2,5,10 191:1	periods 168:23	217:21 222:20	166:16 167:8	246:3 247:10,12
191:17,21,25	permit 151:11	223:22 240:12,19	179:14 181:19	process 124:14
193:13,20,25	165:19 173:22	241:10	182:11 184:4,13	160:3 171:13,13
194:5,11,15 195:4	234:21	possible 132:13	185:1,3 186:11,11	180:17 190:24
196:1,4,15,22	permits 167:6,15	133:14 152:1	187:6,11,12,19,22	211:3 221:7
190:1,4,13,22	person 131:24	236:3	188:15 196:9	230:10 236:6,13
199:5,13,16 200:9	217:20	possibly 186:12	197:15,15,24	237:24
200:24 201:8	personally 247:10	190:16	201:1,3 204:13	produce 127:8
202:6 203:4,13,19	personnel 146:10	post 236:10 237:16	205:3,12 206:21	145:23 153:8
203:24 204:16	162:8 235:1,2	Poston 122:8	207:8,11 208:16	producer 231:4
207:4,23 208:12	person's 209:7	123:20,20 155:12	209:14 211:8,12	Professional 247:8
	l		•	1

MIDWEST LITIGATION SERVICES Phone: 1.800.280.3376

247:22	243:8	purchasers 184:5	186:13,23 187:14	160:23 176:4
profit 132:11	prudence 125:10,22	purchases 128:20	189:21 194:2	184:24 194:9
164:15 165:9,13	125:24 132:8,9,25	128:23 137:12	197:3 202:2	243:24
167:9 196:6 224:3	135:8,24 136:23	151:20 156:9	206:25 211:19	rating 229:11
profits 167:12	136:24 137:15,19	166:1,3 169:16,22	213:23,24,25	ratings 229:11
205:11 234:11	144:11,22 145:9	182:24,25 183:2,5	215:14 218:25	rational 167:6
promulgate 240:25	145:12 151:18	184:24 185:3,12	225:16 235:12,24	rationale 199:12
proper 201:1	152:3 153:23	185:18 187:16	238:17	ге 191:23
properly 127:18	154:22 156:17	188:12 197:6	questions 126:15,18	reaching 243:17
proposal 239:17,17	157:6,7 158:5,6	198:14 204:3	126:22 134:22	read 141:18 142:13
239:18	158:10 159:2	211:16 213:6	153:20 159:5,6,9	150:25 164:6,7
proposals 239:12	175:13,22,25	229:19,22,23	172:1,4 216:1	192:18 193:13,18
proposed 162:3	176:18 177:15	230:4,10,21,21	224:6 230:14	193:22
166:21,22 192:20	178:19,22 180:3,5	231:21 235:16	244:2,5,9	reading 127:13,14
198:16 199:19	180:11,24 181:1,1	purchasing 127:16	quickly 124:7	179:20
202:20 239:16	181:4 184:20	163:9 189:8	160:23 236:7	real 167:20 213:2
proposition 174:21	191:10 193:16	215:16 236:1	quite 159:21 164:22	213:21
propriety 163:3	195:15 197:19	purpose 129:23	180:2,2 185:25	really 151:16
protect 161:18	200:17,21 201:19	130:1 135:13	192:23 199:9	154:19 158:2
192:17,21 201:17	201:25 202:3,11	136:1 138:2,2	202:6 204:20	160:10,14 161:10
220:18	202:12 211:20,23	157:13,14 158:13	224:16,16 229:7	171:2,2 175:5
protected 162:15,21	215:22 216:8,9	196:4 223:7	238:2 245:2	194:1 195:9
201:14 213:16	228:4,7,8,20,20	purposeful 202:8	guo 245 :10	202:15 212:2,11
protections 210:10	228:24 229:14	purposes 128:12	quote 225:7	217:18 220:9
protects 171:12	233:11,18 240:22	132:25 133:12	quoted 128:10,10	221:14 231:23
prove 153:7,14	240:24 241:12	186:7 190:24		233:11,19 237:10
164:19,23 165:16	prudency 155:22	200:4 201:6,8,25	<u> </u>	243:11
177:5 198:21,22	prudent 124:23	212:8 223:8	R 122:1 123:1	reason 164:8 171:3
204:2 223:18	125:14 136:17	pursuant 176:14	Rackers 161:24	171:14 183:6
proven 201:4	137:4,12 138:20	183:16 186:4	192:20 201:12	184:16 197:21
provide 125:19	138:24 144:3	202:23 222:22	raised 181:14	207:14 208:21
128:14,18 131:11	145:7 151:20	pursue 164:23	220:14	209:11
147:15,16,20	153:10 155:2	171:15 172:23	raises 145:9	reasonable 153:9
150:7,8,12 154:9	174:23 197:6	173:18 177:3,25	rate 124:10 125:8	155:10,11,17,21
154:13 157:25	216:12,15 217:13	221:23	145:7 158:19	155:23 156:2
158:15 188:5	220:7 228:4,23	purview 154:21	193:12 205:1,6	158:19,21 159:1
190:3,8 196:8	230:21 232:16,23	put 142:17 152:21	238:16 243:5,6	171:12 174:18
199:18 202:22	public 121:1 122:2	169:14 177:22	ratepayer 213:16	189:4 193:10,16
214:20	122:4,7,7,9	178:3,5 188:13	213:19 218:14	195:16 200:18
provided 125:23	123;18,19,21,21	219:19 222:10	ratepayers 124:25	208:2 209:7
130:22 132:2	154:2 157:19,25	236:4	132:11 161:18,18	214:21,25 215:16
147:21 148:15	158:15,20 236:4	putting 173:3 177:8 178:17,18	162:1,15,21	217:1,19,22,25
154:12 162:18 163:5,12,17 164:1	237:6 239:15 240:8 243:6 247:8	pyramid 234:24	167:18 192:17,21 201:13,17 205:7	218:7,10,20,22,24 219:15 220:22
165:25 183:7	purchase 140:12	pyramid 234:24 p.m 246:3	210:22 218:4,11	219:15 220:22
184:8,8 188:11	142:1 148:10	P.O 122:5 ,10	220:19 234:11	223:3 225:12,20
189:2,16 204:3	153:4 165:23	1.0 122.5,10	239:23	229:17 231:11
209:16,16,23	168:3 185:15	- Q	rates 124:8 145:18	
provides 129:5	189:4 201:1	quality 244:11	155:16 156:2	234:3,9 238:16,21 242:21 245:15
140:7 141:22	212:12 216:15	quantity 132:3	157:25 158:15,21	reasonableness
165:22 190:14	231:2,3,10 232:16	question 132:20,23	158:24 159:1	160:9 230:12
231:23,24	231:2,5,10 232:16	133:4,6,16,17	168:1 193:16	234:9
providing 150:18	purchased 121:10	134:7 140:2 144:3	195:16 200:18	reasonably 204:7
183:8	123:4 134:10	145:10 146:7,17	234:3	222:14 223:23
provision 243:5	144:5 153:4 183:8	147:1 154:11	rate-making 155:15	receipts 241:22
provisions 141:12	185:11 186:9	158:10 164:24	156:1	242:2,9,11
155:8 166:23	189:6 197:23	172:8 173:5 176:9	rate-paying 240:8	received 147:21
192:20,22 220:13	205:7	176:15 180:23	rather 144:4 160:3	recollection 227:14
172.20,22 220.15	200.7	170,10 100,25	100.3	100000000000000000000000000000000000000
			<u> </u>	

recommendation	178:24	147:16 157:18	136:18 137:21,21	154:20,24 155:7
163:1 172:17,18	rehearse 124:7	193:14 238:18	137:22 138:9,17	155:19 156:13
221:16	rejigger 195:17	requires 154:4	139:7,10,22 140:1	157:5,14,17,24
recommendations	relationship 139:23	requiring 158:22	140:9,13 141:23	158:2,3,4,6,11,14
173:7	224:2	rescind 159:19	142:2,12 147:3,18	161:2,5,13 163:7
reconciled 200:14	release 168:17	reserve 142:12	147:25 148:1,3,16	163:20 164:7,20
reconsider 194:10	205:6 208:13	resolved 160:12	149:3 154:6,18	165:17,21 166:6,8
reconsideration	209:4,13	resources 125:11	156:11,14,21	166:9,24 167:3,16
159:23	released 130:5	168:3	157:9 158:9 159:4	170:17 172:22
record 123:2	135:15 183:15	respect 142:4	159:5 170:1 174:2	174:7,10,11,19,22
159:24 171:1	releases 204:25	240:12	178:2 182:18,19	177:6,14 178:8,12
224:10 244:16,18	208:14	respond 126:21	182:21,22 186:1	180:24 181:2,5,13
records 147:23	releasing 204:24	207:4 224:23	190:4,20 191:24	181:14,15,20
150:1,6,6,9 151:8	relevance 179:10	response 180:21	194:11 195:6	182:1 184:9
151:10,11 170:3	relevancy 179:7	238:12	196:23 197:3,13	188:20,22 189:1
175:24 176:3,5	192:7	restate 185:4 196:2	200:19 201:7	190:1,3,9,25
194:18,19	relevant 123:9	217:10,10	206:23 208:8,10	191:3,16 193:23
record-keeping	126:12 137:19	restructuring 162:3	208:11 209:18	195:14,24 197:22
147:15 157:18	178:19.22 179:17	192:8,11	210:14 213:17,20	198:6,8,18 199:3
recover 125:7	184:9,10 186:12	result 243:5	214:10 216:16	199:4 200:8,11,22
red 219:20 224:9	186:17 189:25	retroactive 193:7	217:17 218:23	201:7,9 202:4,9
reduces 145:18	197:18,20,21	retroactively	224:4 226:22	202:23 203:23
reducing 237:19	217:20 222:15	235:10	227:10 228:14	202:23 203:23
reducing 237:19	217:20 222:15	retrospective 212:4	230:18,24 235:11	220:12,15 231:23
	245:3,4	revenue 168:2		233:10 234:7
red-headed 223:15			240:14,18,23,23 241:14	235:7,8,9 238:8
223:20 Reed 137:22 138:4	reliable 168:5 reliance 169:13	210:6 revenues 169:4	rigors 170:20	235:7,8,9 238:8
	relied 173:21	211:9	risk 196:6 212:9,14	rules 125:18 127:17
141:14,23 142:2,6 142:7 162:17	199:25	reverse 129:5	213:13	141:6,17 142:11
		review 125:10,22	risks 218:18	144:17 154:15
reference 139:12	religiously 173:20 189:6	125:24 128:1	road 211:22	155:2,20 160:16
referenced 199:17			ROBERT 121:14	
referring 127:5	relying 178:13	132:25 136:23,24		165:19 167:5
129:21	remained 192:1	137:15 144:22	121:15	171:17 173:14,20
reflect 185:11	remit 205:11	146:21 147:4	robust 230:5 235:5	176:15 180:4,17
reflected 160:1	renegotiate 213:1	154:22 157:6,7	237:24	180:18 182:15
refusing 150:7,8,12	reorganization	158:5,6,7,11	rolling 124:24	183:17 184:15,16
regard 123:7	161:1	159:2 178:20,22	room 124:4	191:8,9 192:13
157:21 174:15	repeating 165:21	179:21 180:5	rotten 170:18	193:4,14 200:13
245:11	report 154:15	190:24 191:10	177:19	201:2 202:21,24
regarding 147:23	REPORTED	193:24 197:18	rough-shod 160:18	203:18 205:21
regardless 166:16	121:19	200:17,21 201:25	Rowdy 207:12	207:25 208:4
186:3	Reporter 203:5	202:3 212:4	RPR 121:19	209:12 220:16,17
Registered 247:7,22	247:6,7,8,22	215:22 240:22,24	RSMO 157:22	220:17,20,21,23
regulated 125:15,19	REPORTER'S	241:12 244:22	rubric 201:19	220:24 221:6,8,24
128:13,17,25	247:1	reviewed 149:1	ruckus 196:24	221:25 222:2,5,25
129:10 130:22	reports 149:21,23	reviews 159:2 180:3	rule 125:18 128:9	223:5,6 234:21
131:12,16 132:14	request 123:10	reward 190:18	128:13 129:16	237:10 238:2,4,15
133:2,10 134:5,9	125:9 156:25	rewarded 189:19	130:8,11,19,21	238:17 239:16
135:1,5 139:5,17	222:20 244:25	209:25 210:1	131:3 133:3,11	243:17 245:11
150:16 151:2,3,20	requests 223:22	rewrite 235:8	134:2,4 136:22	run 160:17 237:9
156:9 157:15,19	require 149:16	RFP 230:10 236:5	137:7 139:8,12,24	
168:25 169:7,9	158:23 179:1	236:25 237:24	140:16,22 141:13	<u> </u>
179:2,4,8 184:14	required 127:7	RFPs 230:6	142:4 144:22	S 121:15,19 122:1
209:22 210:22	132:2 141:13	rhetorically 194:2	147:15 149:8,14	123:1 247:6,21
regulating 242:4	147:6 152:9 190:3	Rick 122:16 123:23	149:18 150:1	sake 198:10
regulations 137:9	190:9,12 200:7,10	right 126:24 128:4	151:13,16,24	sale 140:12 142:1
207:18	200:11 202:22	128:20 129:15	152:2 153:8,22,22	145:20 146:4,5,24
regulatory 121:13	requirements	130:24 131:6	153:23 154:2,7,11	146:25 147:2,7,9
1 cguatory 121.15	requirements	150.24 151.0	155.25 154.2,7,11	170.23 177.2,7,7
				L

MIDWEST LITIGATION SERVICES Phone: 1.800.280.3376 ٦.

.....

147:10 153:5	201:3,5 202:9,10	225:13 237:14	143:10,12 144:23	172:6 241:12,19
164:16 165:4,8,9	209:3	selling 139:20,20	146:22 147:5,19	since 149:21 159:20
165:23 194:22	scenario 132:17	163:10 198:2	148:2,4,7,11,17	160:25 161:2
196:8,9 207:5	scheduled 160:5	206:19 208:24	148:21,23 149:1,4	169:1 210:20
sales 145:16,17	scheduling 160:3	211:12 214:23	149:12,15,19,22	243:10
146:9,12 163:15	school 188:12	215:7 217:1	150:4,8 151:8,14	sir 127:21,23
165:3,3,25 168:8	230:10	219:23 224:24	151:17 152:1	128:22 129:11,14
			154:3,9,21 156:15	130:15,25 135:11
168:11,12,25	schools 188:14,17	226:10 230:8	154:5,9,21 156:15	135:17 136:6
169:9,13,15,18	188:17 230:6	sells 131:15 139:21		
183:12 184:23,24	scope 156:25 158:3	182:20 208:15	159:11 184:19	138:14 139:9
185:3 188:24	189:17 192:3	send 219:21	185:20 186:18	143:1,5,7 150:4
189:24 190:1	193:24	sending 219:18	187:4,5,17,19,22	150:21 156:23
194:18,23 205:16	scope-wise 194:25	SENIOR 121:13	188:5 193:9	157:2 196:14
206:2,3 209:21,24	scrutiny 139:4	sense 236:21,23	195:23 205:25	206:16 217:8
210:2,6,12 211:16	207:16 220:11	237:3	206:4,6,20,24	219:13 228:25
214:8,9,16,16	seal 247:17	sensible 137:4	215:10,13 223:21	242:12,25 245:12
same 132:15,20,23	second 128:12	sentence 128:11,12	227:25 228:3,14	245:23,24
132:25 138:25	175:16 186:15	separate 124:11	228:19,25 229:2	sit 177:6 234:20
139:17 141:12	208:13	136:22 139:19	238:14,24 245:24	235:17 237:25
145:25 146:1	secondarily 172:9	156:19 191:25	Shemwell's 163:12	238:1 239:5
163:6,25 165:2	secondly 210:3	192:1 203:22	shifted 146:14	243:12
169:21 172:4	second-guess	230:20	Shorthand 247:6	sitting 237:5 238:6
180:24 184:6	175:22	separated 235:1	show 134:20 135:24	243:7
188:1,4 205:8	Section 157:22	September 194:8	145:1,23,24	situation 128:21
207:1,21 211:7,8	see 144:18 147:12	serve 175:8 184:11	146:17 152:8,11	situations 235:7
213:5,7 214:23	152:21 153:9	208:22 230:1	153:17 155:6	six 146:25 161:1
217:4,23 228:1	161:21 167:3	service 121:1 122:2	165:25 167:19	162:16,19 173:21
229:23 231:20	168:25 169:18	122:4 123:18	170:7 179:9	180:13 190:13
sat 169:6	170:24 171:9,24	139:17 157:19	186:10 188:2	241:1
satisfactory 243:9	173:1 179:13	158:23	189:9 198:1 204:4	slew 147:16
satisfied 229:25	182:4 183:11,12	services 121:20	234:6,9	slice 210:23
satisfy 190:12	183:14 184:1	128:16,18 129:8	showed 189:3	slightly 132:20
saying 126:8 131:2	186:6 189:12,14	147:21 157:22	205:16	slim 154:23,25
132:17 134:12	190:19 194:17	set 181:25 189:10	showing 152:3	slipping 153:21
137:24 146:3	198:4 212:5 216:3	190:25 199:12	163:13,17 179:7	small 169:25 170:1
150:5 151:25	223:14 232:6	200:22 206:21	182:24 183:7	211:16 235:16
152:5,24 162:18	seek 126:12 145:1	230:5 247:10,14	shown 184:3 210:11	sold 146:23 153:11
165:3 166:18	seeking 126:10	247:16	235:15	153:12,12 179:14
173:16 174:4	129:24 164:19	sets 157:17 163:7	shows 152:22 164:2	182:25 183:2
176:20 192:7,24	165:16 175:15	settled 191:20	209:17	185:2,7,12,13,18
193:15,15 199:2,5	196:14 241:13	seven 161:1 162:16	side 165:3,3 168:25	188:3 197:15
200:6,9,16,17	seeks 126:5 203:15	162:19 173:21	169:7,9 237:21,22	202:17 207:7
202:11 209:10	seem 212:13 238:4	180:13 189:7	sign 212:12	214:3
212:16 215:2	245:15	201:12 219:6	signed 211:21 228:1	sole 138:2 181:10
221:22 222:3	seemed 234:15	238:3	228:16	solve 241:2 243:2,2
228:17,19 231:14	seems 133:22	several 195:5	significant 164:1	solved 241:16
232:5,11,22,25	142:15 181:24	sewer 124:10	significantly 169:8	some 126:15 138:15
233:1,3,4,11,14	182:3 183:24	share 145:16	207:6 225:21	139:1 149:23,24
233:15 240:24	186:25 202:4	shared 146:16	signing 228:17	152:12,20 159:6
241:21 245:7	206:10 225:6,8	234:22	silence 245:9	160:18 167:24
says 128:12 135:1	seen 154:15,16	sheet 247:11	similar 145:25	168:16,19 169:3
140:8,11,11,22	163:2 206:10	Shemwell 122:3	146:5,24 217:21	171:13 172:4
140.8,11,11,22	sell 131:25 164:11	123:17 126:21	227:13	173:6 180:9,25
				1 · · ·
149:8,14 154:14	164:12,12 165:11	127:9 128:8 132:5	simple 125:21	181:1 182:20,21
158:14,24 162:12	165:12 167:5,11	134:24 135:23	160:11,11 198:25	189:9 191:13
166:9 176:21	196:11 204:6	139:14,25 140:17	213:18	193:15 194:13
178:14,25 191:3	205:12 209:13	140:18,21 141:1,4	simply 125:22	207:9 214:2 222:8
			10/ 10 107 07	000 10 11001
191:22 192:2	214:22 216:22	141:10,16 142:5,7	126:10 127:25	223:13,14 224:17

224:19 225:14	228:12	229:20,25 230:22	204:7 235:20	201:11
227:12 230:2	speaks 159:6	232:10 237:6	stands 154:14	subsidizing 157:15
233:3 234:16	special 220:13	240:16 243:6,20	start 123:13,25	substance 170:24
239:12,12	specific 123:7	Staff's 133:9 164:18	215:2,2 227:21	171:9
somebody 180:10	141:21 179:6	166:21,25 167:9	231:14 238:1,11	substantial 145:9
183:2 184:12	193:13,14,14	167:17 171:22	245:18	146:6
196:11 202:17	199:12 202:14	181:6,21 184:18	starting 129:24	substantially 162:4
227:15 233:2	226:12 232:16	192:14,19 212:2	140:6	195:10 237:19
234:24 237:22	234:25 238:18	221:10,12 222:20	starts 140:6	substitutes 152:12
somehow 156:7	specifically 127:2	230:19 232:14	state 121:1 134:16	152:12
202:12	181:13	239:17 240:19,20	217:11 247:3,9	subtle 169:5 232:19
someone 145:9	specifics 193:17	241:10	stated 129:22	succeeding 241:5
149:2 207:3	specifies 131:17	stamp 178:17	161:25	success 167:24
227:20	specify 223:5	standard 125:18	statement 163:12	successful 211:10
someplace 165:8	speculate 218:17	128:10,11 129:16	191:16 234:16	suddenly 201:16
184:10 196:10	spell 238:8	130:10,11 142:19	statements 174:1	sufficient 151:11
207:7 231:17	spend 181:7 236:16	142:22 143:9	stating 135:23	215:17,19
233:16	spent 185:7 236:17		stations 239:16	
	spirit 151:24	162:9 163:19		suggest 143:12
something 129:6 134:24 135:19	Spongeable 185:20	164:3,4,7,8,18,24 165:15 166:21,22	status 245:10 statute 134:25	149:22 169:23 170:6 171:17
155:4,12 162:21	spread 206:11	166:22 167:15,17	135:8 139:12	170:0 171:17
163:1,1,2 166:15	spread 200:11 ss 247:3	173:11 176:14,20	154:3 238:15	suggested 234:19
167:7,11 169:2	st 122:15,18 187:20	176:21,25 177:3,5	statutes 158:22,23	suggesting 151:17
171:19 177:18,18	187:22 188:6,8,10	176:21,25 177:3,5	stenotype 247:12	152:6
190:2 191:9,10	189:25 226:20,23	179:10,11,12,16	steps 178:16 234:25	
190.2 191.9,10	230:2,4,16 232:13	179:16 180:6,11	Steve 192:20	suggestions 162:5 192:19 245:1,13
212:22 216:2	stability 138:16	183:17 184:18,20	Steven 161:24	sui 223:1
236:18 239:6	staff 122;2 123:10	184:22 186:4	still 131:3 133:11	Suite 121:20 122:17
242:17 243:15	123:13,15,17,25	192:13,14,25	151:24 153:24,24	sum 157:7 241:11
sometimes 236:7	124:23 125:13,24	192:13,14,25	154:24 155:20	summaries 239:12
somewhat 124:8	126:5,7,20 127:4	195:13,21,24,25	156:16 175:13	summarize 127:13
225:2	127:7,15,18	196:13,16,18	194:20 206:15	summed 165:20
somewhere 138:23	129:22,23 132:24	197:5 198:7,20,22	216:14 226:1	summer 202:20
185:24 207:1	140:8 142:18,20	200:12 202:16,19	238:20 240:22	Sundays 190:14
227:2 232:2	143:12 147:23	204:22 209:7	241:7 244:17	Supp 157:22
sooner 243:24	149:20 150:5	211:24 217:19	stipulation 161:22	supplement 180:21
sorry 133:21 134:21	158:10 159:7,9	218:15,16 219:9	191:18,19,22	213:11
191:10 195:23	161:17,24 162:5	219:14 220:22	stop 240:2,5	supplied 229:8
201:15 208:7,9	162:11,17 164:2,3	221:4,19,23 222:4	storage 229:6	supplier 168:5
242:8	166:3 168:15	222:7,11,13,23,23	strategy 240:6	187:10 188:4
sort 177:12 222:9	169:11 170:1,10	222:23 223:18	Street 122:4,9,14,17	231:19,20 235:20
222:10	170:14 171:6,16	225:2 226:12	strong 145:21	suppliers 166:10,11
sorts 232:7	172:17 173:6,11	233:23 234:1,2	structure 215:4	184:5 186:10
sought 125:24	174:15 175:5,14	238:22	study 142:13	213:4 229:5,8
162:5 225:20	177:2,15,22 178:9	standards 139:8	studying 224:15,16	235:21
sound 127:22	178:13,18 179:9	157:17,17 160:20	stuff 163:21	supplies 168:3,4
169:23 211:2	180:10,18 181:24	160:24 161:14	stupid 242:17	231:7
213:13	182:2 3 184:19,22	163:8 170:3	subject 207:15	supply 163:22
sounds 149:15	188:11 189:3,7	171:21 173:15,24	238:25	168:7,18 186:1
156:7 202:2	190:12 192:20,24	180:7,12 181:25	subjected 170:20	196:5,7 204:10
source 154:17 168:1	194:13,15 195:20	193:14 195:17	submit 167:19	208:21 209:17
183:6 188:9 226:4	196:14 197:4	198:17 200:14,18	171:11	210:8 230:7 235:1
sources 126:1 186:1	202:20 203:15	202:10 207:25	submitted 140:25	supplying 153:2
Southern 227:12,14	204:22 206:1	218:2 220:24	141:1,5,7,8,11	support 161:22
228:12,22 229:3	209:23 210:18	221:1,24,25	149:6 162:1	192:19 221:3
229:12	211:3,10 213:25	222:24	199:19	supported 146:13
speak 140:18,21	220:6,14 221:15	standing 170:22	subsid 131:13	204:18
speaking 209:3	221:22 225:15	standpoint 194:17	subsidization	supporting 151:11

www.midwestlitigation.com

······································				
suppose 131:12,12	240:15,21 244:13	238:20	230:13,23,25	190:23 207:15
131:14,17,20	talked 161:14,23	Theirs 166:8	232:5 234:1,4,12	thought 170:11
142:8	195:13 243:6	themselves 153:11	235:6,9,19 237:3	211:3 229:24
supposed 163:8	talking 137:9	230:21	237:11,18,24	thousands 148:12
170:10 192:2	139:23 158:2	theory 171:7 173:7	238:6 239:8,23	148:12 163:13
202:25 242:4	170:22 191:12,21	they'd 152:20	240:3 242:19	three 159:21 199:6
supposedly 205:17	196:21,25 197:2	thing 124:15 132:21	243:14,14,16,23	211:22
210:13	208:24,25 233:11	139:4 144:21,22	243:23 245:3	through 123:11
Supreme 144:12,16	237:6,6,8	163:6,25 165:2	thinking 178:4,15	124:14,14 127:1
145:12 228:9	talks 129:5 238:14	169:21 170:12	210:25	132:24 172:13
			thinks 171:8 219:3	177:12 191:23
sure 126:19 127:23	technically 142:10	171:6,11,12		
136:21 139:3	tell 139:3 149:4	175:23 195:12	third 144:5,9 145:5	227:18,21 243:7
155:13 156:5	150:11 155:4	217:4 232:25	146:2,6 152:18	throughout 167:1,2
159:5 161:13,18	162:24,25 166:12	233:2 243:10	153:13,16 163:24	210:12
162:21 168:2	174:12,19 177:2	things 139:25	170:5 179:6	throwing 202:11
169:8 180:22	180:2,16 181:5	140:14 152:15,16	188:24 231:7,10	tie 202:18
182:17 196:4	186:15 187:24	158:20 160:5	Thompson 122:3	tight 167:23
202:5 203:10,13	207:8 209:8,8	177:13 211:12	123:16,17 124:1	time 124:2,17 137:5
206:15 208:1	210:5 212:25	223:6 227:21	126:19,21,25	146:23 147:8
209:6 210:5,6	213:15 234:20	229:13 237:4,12	127:21,23 128:22	148:13 152:16
212:10 213:19	telling 198:8 206:1	238:7	129:3,11,14,19	160:13 161:8,16
219:18 220:1	226:2,3	think 124:16 132:20	130:6,12,15,18,25	164:12 165:6
224:18 227:7	tells 149:5,6 181:15	133:6,7,13,13	131:4,7,11 132:7	168:22 171:16,22
234:25 235:22	181:16 213:15	134:24 135:23	133:5,13,19,22	177:22 184:3,3,6
239:10	ten 136:13 212:22	136:3 138:1 139:1	134:12 135:11	186:10 194:7
surprised 238:21	213:13,24 219:5	139:4 144:23	136:3,6,13,24	195:3 196:9
surrendering	227:15,17 228:16	149:7,13 151:17	137:14,20,25	197:11,12 201:18
240:11	term 137:11	151:22 152:1	138:4,14,17,20	204:22 205:2,4
survive 235:22	terms 186:9 203:11	153:19 154:22	139:1,9,11 140:18	206:7 207:8
suspect 148:11	TERRY 121:15	155:21,24 156:7	142:25 143:5,7,11	211:21,25 212:5
suspenders 190:14	test 160:15,15	158:4,4 159:4	148:1 150:13,21	213:5,6 217:3,10
swings 125:7	177:23 204:17,18	160:14,21,21	150:24 151:23	217:14,15 219:10
switch 208:11	214:19 216:6,7,8	161:7 164:3	156:11,14,18,21	220:7,23 224:17
system 145:15,17	216:9,14 231:25	165:21 168:16	156:23 157:3,8	225:8 228:1 230:4
146:4 168:8 210:2	testified 201:12	169:3,16 170:15	158:4,12 164:3	231:13 242:17,21
210:12 220:2	testimony 161:25	170:16 171:16,22	178:23 182:14	244:6,22 247:12
224:2 237:8	Texas 185:22	172:19,21 173:22	185:6,14,19,21,25	today 123:9,12
224.2 237.0	th 161:11	173:23 174:2,9,13	196:13,20 197:1,8	126:8 137:24
T	thank 123:16	175:13 177:5,7,20	197:12,14 206:16	160:2,9,10,14
T 137:8	126:13,24 157:11	177:21 178:21,22	215:10,11,20	161:14 164:4
take 123:14 140:15	159:11,12,15,17	181:23 185:5,14	216:8,11,16 217:7	172:6,14 177:5,11
162:3 167:12,16	171:25 172:3	186:22 188:20	217:12,17,22	180:19 195:14
168:14,15 169:11	203:4 224:5	190:17,20 191:1	218:2,3,6,10,15	199:8,25 211:8
170:8 175:18	203.4 224.5 242:12 244:8,12	193:2 195:4,13	218:2,5,0,10,15	227:23 238:1
•				240:13 242:19
178:23 195:4	245:25	196:3 198:15,25	219:21 223:21,25	•
196:10 208:19	Thanks 157:10	201:22,23 202:6,7	225:4,9,12 226:1	244:14 245:14
218:18 220:2	159:10	202:8 203:2 204:2	226:13,18,23	today's 143:24
taken 137:2,4,5	their 132:2 141:11	204:8,16,17	227:1,6,7,10	together 123:7
163:4 216:12	150:9 155:10,11	205:19 208:18	239:5,25 240:9,15	193:19 242:24
217:14 220:8	157:15,25 158:15	209:8,12,15 210:3	240:19 241:9,17	token 205:8
takes 201:17	173:19,20 179:2	210:20 211:9,23	241:25 242:5,7,9	tomorrow 238:11
taking 148:16	179:25 182:2,2	212:2,3,4 214:17	242:12,16,25	top 227:19
168:11 213:13	196:15,18 198:4	214:17 215:7	245:12,20,23	total 148:2,2,17,17
talk 127:3 160:20	204:24 206:21	217:22 218:1	Thompson's 225:2	148:18,20,21
206:11 208:12	210:24 211:17	219:24 221:22	THOMSON 135:17	156:25 157:6
212:24 221:7	214:4 215:4,5	222:5,13 223:6	though 154:22	241:11
230:13 233:18,23	219:12,15 220:2	224:19 225:15	158:13 173:5	totally 192:25
234:20 240:9,13	224:1 235:3	227:22 229:17	175:18 189:13	totals 149:11

www.midwestlitigation.com

toward 162:20	181:22 183:13,20	218:1 220:1	182:6,9,17	utilized 199:20
towards 154:11	184:4,6 192:18	230:24 231:1	understands 167:22	
track 243:18	194:18 195:19,24	236:16	225:15	<u> </u>
tracked 125:3	198:9,12 200:15	two-year 185:15	understood 151:22	vague 180:11
traded 131:20	207:16,17 212:20	typical 172:16	undertake 156:17	validity 170:24
traditional 125:8	215:23,24,25	typically 139:15	undertaken 149:10	171:24,25
178:6	219:25 220:23		196:7	value 140:12 142:1
trans 145:25	221:2 223:12	U	underwritten	142:19,22 143:9
transaction 125:18	226:5,6 234:10,14	ultimate 184:24	210:21	143:13,16,19,19
126:2 127:17	234:17 235:1	ultimately 160:1	unduly 176:11	143:20 145:5
128:9 130:19	236:1 238:10	161:23 172:16	unfair 220:2	146:18 147:6,7,8
133:3,11 136:22	241:10 243:18	173:9 182:25	unfortunate 199:18	147:9 151:9 152:8
137:7 139:5 141:6	transcribed 247:13	185:2,11,13,18	235:19 237:4	152:10,11,13,15
143:14,15,17	transcript 121:3	210:25 213:2	unit 131:18,18	152:18,19,22
144:4,9,10,22	128:5,5,6 129:22	240:3,7	134:5	153:5,6,8,10
145:4,6 146:1,7	140:5 244:21	unaffiliated 163:16	universe 130:20	186:19,19 187:9
146:19 152:23	transfers 129:7	166:11 184:5,5	unjust 158:24	187:14 204:4,13
155:18,25 156:12	transparent 236:6	186:10 188:4,12	unlawful 164:24	various 206:18
157:5,14 161:2,4	236:13	231:20 232:8	170:2 173:23	vary 124:17
161:13 163:7,20	treat 166:18	unauthorized 170:2	183:17 198:20	veil 231:13
164:7,20 165:17	treated 124:8	183:17 198:20	222:7	vendor 208:19
167:2 170:17	treating 198:5,7	222:7	unlikely 154:25	vendors 163:16
172:21 174:7,12	208:6 233:8	uncontemplated	unnecessarily	198:1
174:21 177:14	tremendously	201:18	132:12	verdict 240:3
178:8,12 180:4,24	205:17	under 129:16	unreasonable	verification 151:12
181:2,5,11,20	tried 204:22 211:10	130:11 131:15	158:24 177:9	versa 130:23
182:1,5 184:9	troubling 224:25	132:25 134:25,25	223:4 234:14	versns 217:25
188:22,25 190:1,3	true 163:6 165:2	135:8 137:8	unregulated 131:13	very 142:7 145:25
190:9,13,25 191:3	169:21 178:25	138:18,21,23	131:15,21 132:15	149:23 152:8
191:8,9,15 192:13	217:4	139:24 144:21,22	133:24 135:6	154:25 160:6
193:4,23 197:22	true-up 124:23	151:8 153:8 155:8	139:6 171:4 177:4	167:23,23,23,23
198:18 199:3	truly 234:13 239:22	155:23 157:13	179:2,6 180:1	169:5 175:1,17
200:8,11,22 201:7	Truman 121:20	160:24 163:4	194:21	192:1 194:20
201:9 202:4,9	try 142:17 169:7	164:10,16 165:14	unsupported 177:2	210:15 211:16
203:17,23 204:1	177:4 189:9	167:9,13 184:17	until 124:19 145:9	220:14 224:25
204:19 207:21,22	198:21	187:5 188:20	162:25 183:25	229:2,9 230:4,5
207:24 211:7	trying 144:25	190:3,9 192:5,24	use 168:2,12,18	237:7 244:10,12
220:12 228:6,8	151:18 171:17	197:22,22 198:7	182:12 196:10	vice 130:23
233:10 234:7	178:5 180:18	200:22 201:20 204:8 205:8	211:11 222:13	view 125:15 131:23
237:16,21,23	182:3 184:18,19		226:20 237:18 used 124:22 125:3	132:1,8,8 159:22 177:13,14
238:8 243:22	184:25 185:3,6,10	211:23 212:20 216:21 217:19		-
transactions 125:12	185:14 186:18,22		126:1 152:10	viewed 138:20
125:13,14 130:20	193:8 197:4,5,8	218:15 219:15	168:6 186:10	violate 133:2
134:14 137:10,16	198:19 199:15	222:15 230:6	200:15 uses 222:12	134:11 violated 154:19
137:18 144:17	202:8 219:17	234:3 238:2		violation 134:2,4
145:2 147:24	221:10,23 226:11	underlying 182:24 183:1,5 185:9	using 170:1 182:11 192:9,14 207:18	157:5
148:16,21,25	240:5 241:15	185:1,5 185:9	219:15	violations 127:17
149:5,9,10 150:9	242:13 243:8			
150:14 151:2,6	turn 133:22 209:5	214:15 understand 131:10	Utilicorp 204:24 utilities 157:15	Vol 128:5 140:5 volatility 125:4
153:15 157:20	turns 146:4 208:15 230:8	133:4,5 148:19	227:13 228:2	Volume 121:7
158:7 159:3				129:22
161:19 162:2,14	twelve 194:17	157:10 203:2	utility 131:2 135:1	
162:14 163:9,11	twice 175:4,12	212:8 216:21	135:5 144:11,14	voted 159:22
164:10 165:19	two 125:12 133:7	218:13,16 225:13	163:10,10,25	
167:6,13,16 170:4	140:14 174:1	225:14 227:3,4	173:20 191:25	
170:11,15 177:15	178:16 194:16	236:7 242:10	192:1 210:22	W 121:20
179:3,5,7 180:9	195:6 196:24	understanding	213:16	wad 219:19
180:15 181:17,19	201:12 212:20	144:20 151:7	utility's 158:1,16	wait 217:16 219:3
L				

www.midwestlitigation.com

MIDWEST LITIGATION SERVICES Phone: 1.800.280.3376 F

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
244:21	136:8,11,13,24	Westline 189:3	202:20 247:16	·
want 127:3 128:9	138:4,21 143:2	213:10 229:20,22	wondering 236:18	#0538 247:7
128:11 136:21	145:13 149:15	we'll 123:13 154:11	word 168:15 170:8	#0539 247:21
138:5 143:25	151:1 152:1	166:15 170:20,23	202:11	10009 211.21
155:4 160:6	157:12 161:17	195:4 196:18	words 142:17	0
162:22 164:25	164:6,25 165:4	we're 126:10	216:11 225:18	08 127:11 194:8,9
165:8,13 176:18	166:12,15 168:10	134:17,19 135:3	work 195:8 235:2	00127.111194.0,9
177:24 178:3,18	168:14,23 169:6	135:23 139:23	236:2 239:6,11	1
180:6 182:9,12	172:15 173:4,25	144:8,25 145:23	working 227:20	1 121:6 128:15
183:14,16 186:14	176:3 177:1,18	146:3 147:5	238:11	141:24 150:13,22
190:19 193:3,4	180:4,10 185:19	151:17,18 152:5,6	world 124:8 164:15	169:20 209:12
194:20,20,22	188:10 189:11	152:7,10,16,24	171:14	246:4
195:13 196:12,24	190:19 194:16	153:7,14 154:13	worse 205:7	1st 242:19
197:14 198:3,11	196:15,22 200:17	154:16,17 160:6	worthy 243:23	1:45 246:3
202:5 203:10	202:11 206:8	163:3,21 166:12	wouldn't 138:10	10 169:19 187:6
207:10 212:4	209:3 211:2 214:2	166:18 167:11	147:1,3 160:2	206:14,22 212:13
213:19 217:11	214:17 215:2	169:9 172:6,13	174:10,11 205:6	212:17 226:25
219:18 220:5,20	217:4 218:3,19	173:9,16,17	205:18,20 207:20	227:1
221:6 222:3	219:5,7 223:17	176:24,24 185:6	211:8 225:13	100 145:20 155:3,5
223:13,14,17,21	229:25 230:25	185:14 186:18	228:23 241:6	181:4 237:2
224:9,11 225:3,4	231:6 233:11	190:12 192:9	wound 185:23,24	13 236:17 243:11
225:7 226:13	238:24 241:17	195:17 197:8,8	woven 161:12	15 136:14
231:25 232: t	242:5,18,25	208:23,24,25	wrap 201:18	15150.14 15th 147:17
234:18 235:8,8	244:24 245:2,2	210:4 215:23,24	wrapped 182:3	1524 122:17
237:14,14 238:9	wells 163:23,23	218:6,6,13 221:13	wrong 130:14 142:6	1998 157:22
239:10 241:20	went 141:6 159:20	221:14,18 223:1,8	151;7 156:7 209:9	1570 157.22
242:1,9,11,17	165:6,7 183:15	233:5,11 234:19	232:11	2
245:6,19	188:1 194:15	236:11,15,17	wrote 178:24	2 129:4,22,24
wanted 142:20	231:15	239:11 240:11,12	192:20	137:23 209:15
183:10,11,12	were 125:2,14	240:20 241:13,19		20 145:19
195:3 204:23	128:1 132:3	244:15,17,21	<u> </u>	200 122:4,9
213:1 223:11	134:12,13 137:2,3	246:1	yeah 155:24 188:23	2000 191:22
wanting 159:13	137:4,4,5,12	we've 154:14	189:20 191:19	2001 141:10 180:7
183:21 194:17	150:18 153:9	160:24 168:6,23	194:5,25 203:24	2003 149:19,21
wants 143:13 166:4	155:17 159:21	188:5 189:18,19	212:19 222:18	169:1
173:18 178:14	162:1,5 163:16	192:23 195:13,18	242:18	2004-2005 121:10
192:25	166:1 167:22	199:13,16,17	year 124:21 125:2	123:5 168:23
wasn't 136:18	169:20 170:11	202:2,12 208:3	147:17 152:16	2005-2006 123:5
142:19,25 160:1	179:20 183:5,8	224:15,16 236:16	181:7 195:9	20050-2006 168:24
211:13 225:14	188:4 189:24,25	237:5 238:2	212:23 219:1	2006 127:5 128:6
232:23	190:2 191:23	WHEREOF 247:16	236:16 240:4	2008 127:4 169:20
waste 124:2	192:7,18 195:22	while 126:20 127:12	years 160:25 161:1	2009 121:6 246:4
water 124:10	197:6 198:2	154:22 185:23	161:1 162:16,19	247:17
way 127:5 141:21	201:20 202:25	195:18 244:9,17	169:15 173:21	207 121:20
147:6 149:23	204:5 205:17	whoa 186:14,14	180:13 189:7	21 140:6
152:3,8 154:11	206:6,18 210:13	whole 147:16	201:12,21 211:22	2230 122:10
156:8 160:12	211:25 212:21	212:14 224:23,24	238:3 239:4	240-40.015 157:13
161:13 164:21	213:4,6 215:3,5,6	243:10		25th 127:4,11
169:24 183:25	216:11,22,24	wholesale 163:21		26th 128:4 129:21
195:8 204:12	217:1,13,13 220:7	wholly 228:18	Zucker 122:16	27th 199:7
211:19 215:15	220:7,24,24 221:1	willing 188:5 190:7	123:24 180:20,23	280 188:17
216:3 220:2 226:2	226:14 228:1	204:5 205:10	200:24 213:11	
231:2 234:10	229:19,24 230:6	214:22,23 216:22	214:10,13 225:24	3
ways 171:17 190:13	230:21 231:12,12	234:19 240:21	¢	3 161:21
weighted 186:16	231:21 232:4,8	wipe 233:10	<u>\$</u>	30 245:8
well 130:21 131:24	236:10 237:23	withstanding	\$2 147:11	300 188:17
132:2 134:3,8,10	246:3	172:20	\$3 218:23	309 122:5
134:25 135:21	weren't 194:24	witness 161:24	\$7 219:1,2	314 122:15,18

.

......

www.midwestlitigation.com

342-0532 122:15			
342-0533 122:18			
3432 121:20			
386.754 157:22			
393.130 155:24			
158:25 193:10			
234:3			
393.140 155:8			
393.140(12) 135:1			
			5
4			
• · · · • — · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
4 121:7 157:13			
47 128:7 129:21,25			
135:10 137:23			
49 140:6 141:19			
42 110.0 111.12			
5			
5 150:6 247:17			
50 140:10 141:19,24			
148:24 168:22			
573 121:21 122:6,11			
6			
63101 122:15,18			
636-7551 121:21			
65102 122:5,10			
65109 121:21			
7			
70 168:21			
720 122:14,17			
751-5558 122:11			
751-6514 122:6			
8			
80 145:17			
9			
90s 204:23			
95 170:4 183:12			
194:23			
	l		ł