

Exhibit No.:  
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Witness: Blake A. Mertens  
Type of Exhibit: Surrebuttal Testimony  
Sponsoring Party: Empire District Electric  
Case No. ER-2016-0023  
Date Testimony Prepared: May 2016

**Before the Public Service Commission  
of the State of Missouri**

**Surrebuttal Testimony  
of  
Blake A. Mertens**

**May 2016**



SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY  
OF  
BLAKE A. MERTENS  
THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY  
BEFORE THE  
MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION  
CASE NO. ER-2016-0023

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

3 A. Blake A. Mertens. My business address is 602 South Joplin Avenue, Joplin,  
4 Missouri.

5 **Q. BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?**

6 A. The Empire District Electric Company (“Empire” or “Company”). I am Vice  
7 President Energy Supply and Delivery Operations.

8 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND.**

9 A. I graduated from Kansas State University in 2000 with a Bachelor of Science Degree  
10 in Chemical Engineering and a minor in Business. I received a Masters Degree in  
11 Business Administration from Missouri State University in December 2007. I am  
12 also a professionally licensed engineer in the state of Kansas.

13 **Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED TESTIMONY BEFORE THE**  
14 **MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION (“COMMISSION”)?**

15 A. Yes. I have presented testimony in several Empire rate cases.

16 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY IN**  
17 **THIS CASE?**

18 A. I respond to the assessment and assertions made by Office of Public Council (OPC)  
19 witness John S. Riley regarding Empire’s fuel hedging practices and demonstrate why

1 Mr. Riley’s recommendation that Empire “cease its current natural gas hedging  
2 policy” is unfounded.

3 **Q. DOES EMPIRE HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE HEDGING POLICY IN**  
4 **PLACE?**

5 A. Yes. Empire first implemented its Energy Risk Management Policy (“RMP”) in 2001.  
6 While slight modifications have been made throughout the years largely to update  
7 organizational or nomenclature changes, the most substantive of which was prior to  
8 the SPP IM going live to reflect changes in daily processes and reflect transmission  
9 congestion rights procurement practices, our natural gas hedging policy and practices  
10 have remained consistent.

11 **Q. HAS THE COMMISSION BEEN INVOLVED WITH THE HEDGING**  
12 **PROGRAMS OF MISSOURI’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES?**

13 A. Yes. By order issued September 5, 2012, the Commission opened an investigatory  
14 docket, File No. EW-2013-0101, to review the hedging policies and procedures of  
15 Missouri’s electric utilities “to assist the utilities with developing effective hedging  
16 programs that serve the public interest by mitigating the rising costs of fuel.” As part  
17 of that docket, Staff presented 12 questions to the utilities. Empire provided its  
18 responses on July 3, 2013.

19 **Q. DID THE COMMISSION REACH ANY CONCLUSIONS IN FILE NO. EW-**  
20 **2013-0101?**

21 A. In its Order Closing File issued on April 16, 2014, the Commission stated that there is  
22 no broad agreement about how to evaluate whether an electric utility’s gas hedging  
23 program is cost effective and noted the challenges of judging a hedging program.

1 **Q. DO YOU BELIEVE EMPIRE’S RMP IS A PROPER ISSUE FOR THIS RATE**  
2 **CASE?**

3 A. No. Empire’s RMP is a complex and lengthy document and would be better  
4 addressed in a docket devoted exclusively to hedging strategy. Also, the prudence of  
5 Empire’s fuel costs (including hedging costs) has been the topic of five fuel prudence  
6 reviews.<sup>1</sup>

7 **Q. WHAT ELSE HAS EMPIRE DONE TO KEEP INTERESTED PARTIES**  
8 **APPRISED OF THE COMPANY’S NATURAL GAS HEDGING**  
9 **ACTIVITIES?**

10 A. Empire submits triennial Integrated Resource Planning filings and annual updates,  
11 which discuss natural gas forecast and hedged volumes, and Empire participated in  
12 Commission File No. EW-2013-0101, discussed above. Empire also included natural  
13 gas hedging strategy updates in its SPP Integrated Marketplace presentations,  
14 provided responses to data requests regarding fuel costs, and provided accounting  
15 schedules during the various general rate cases. Lastly, Empire provides Staff copies  
16 of the RMP as it is updated.

17 **Q. HAS STAFF OR OPC SUGGESTED IMPRUDENCE IN EMPIRE’S**  
18 **HEDGING PRACTICES IN ANY OF THESE PROCEEDINGS?**

19 A. No. That is what makes OPC’s witness Mr. Riley’s rebuttal testimony so  
20 confounding. Instead of bringing forth any potential concerns in these various  
21 dockets and working cooperatively with Empire to address any concerns, OPC seems  
22 to have waited to suggest “imprudence” in a rate case simply because Empire’s

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<sup>1</sup> File Nos. EO-2010-0084, EO-2011-0285, EO-2013-0114, EO-2014-0057, and EO-2015-0214.

1 hedged gas prices are higher than the lowest spot natural gas prices seen in the market  
2 in 15-plus years.

3 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW THE STRATEGIES SET FORTH IN EMPIRE'S**  
4 **RMP ARE MISREPRESENTED IN MR. RILEY'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY.**

5 A. On page 4 of his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Riley states that the "sole purpose of  
6 Empire's natural gas hedging policy is to mitigate price volatility." This is blatantly  
7 false. Also, on page 6 of Mr. Riley's testimony, he states "OPC has received Empire's  
8 hedging policies and seen no indication reducing fuel costs through its hedging plan  
9 is even contemplated." Although Empire's RMP indicates the primary focus of its  
10 hedging strategy is price mitigation, protecting against upward price trends is also  
11 emphasized in the document. Specifically, Empire's RMP references balancing  
12 market risk with "minimizing costs and volatility" and "providing tools to mitigate  
13 adverse impacts associated with changing natural gas [prices]". As mentioned in the  
14 RMP, Empire uses a "progressive dollar cost averaging approach" for its hedging  
15 practice. This strategy provides the annual procurement boundaries with a focus on  
16 price volatility mitigation. However, within this strategy, Empire has attempted to  
17 take advantage of the lowest costs possible when procuring these hedges, by engaging  
18 in seasonal purchases when natural gas costs are historically lower. For example, the  
19 swaps Empire purchased in 2015 for delivery in years 2016-2019 were primarily  
20 (~96%) purchased in October and November which, according to the Henry Hub  
21 Natural Gas Spot Price table supplied on page 9 of Mr. Riley's rebuttal testimony,  
22 were two of the three lowest natural gas price months of the year. Although Mr. Riley  
23 endorses a price mitigation strategy with an additional focus on minimizing costs,  
24 referencing testimony from Kansas City Power & Light Company-Greater Missouri

1 Operations (“GMO”), he fails to acknowledge that Empire’s RMP also recommends  
2 that strategy and that this strategy is reflected in Empire’s procurement practices.

3 **Q. HOW DOES MR. RILEY INDEPENDENTLY DEFINE “PRUDENTLY**  
4 **INCURRED HEDGING POLICIES”?**

5 A. On page 5 of his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Riley states that “OPC defines ‘prudently  
6 incurred hedging policies’ as ‘policies that seek to both reduce significant price  
7 volatility and upward energy price risk.’” As best as I can tell, Mr. Riley is providing  
8 a definition that was generated within the OPC and is attempting to use this as the  
9 yardstick with which hedging policies should be evaluated with regard to fuel  
10 adjustment prudence. However, “prudently incurred hedging policies” are never  
11 mentioned in the 4 CSR 240-20 as criteria for inclusion in a fuel adjustment clause. 4  
12 CSR 240-20.090 specifically mentions “prudently incurred costs” and goes on to  
13 define those as costs those that “...do not include any increased costs resulting from  
14 negligent or wrongful acts or omissions by the utility.” Empire’s hedging policy has  
15 been consistent, and the Company’s procurement efforts have never led to increased  
16 costs due to negligence, wrongful acts, or omissions.

17 **Q. IS EMPIRE’S HEDGING POLICY PRUDENT ACCORDING TO MR.**  
18 **RILEY’S DEFINITION?**

19 A. Yes. Empire’s hedging policy seeks to “both reduce significant price volatility and  
20 and upward energy price risk.”

21 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. RILEY’S DEFINITION OF PRUDENTLY**  
22 **INCURRED HEDGING POLICIES?**

23 A. No, although I certainly agree that a prudent hedging policy should *include* the goals  
24 of reducing significant price volatility and guarding against upward energy price risk.

1 First of all, I believe that Mr. Riley has attempted to redefine the criteria for which  
2 hedging prudence must be scrutinized because he incorrectly believes he has  
3 discovered imprudence in Empire’s hedging policy. Mr. Riley then attempts to use  
4 the alleged imprudence as a reason for recommending a disallowance of hedging  
5 losses in the fuel adjustment clause. Secondly, narrowly defining a hedging policy as  
6 prudent if it seeks only to reduce upward price risk and significant volatility would be  
7 ill conceived. This narrow definition of a “prudent hedging policy” would not view a  
8 policy as imprudent if it failed to take into account creditworthiness of a counterparty  
9 or failed to require accompanying fuel runs to determine volumetric risk. In short,  
10 Mr. Riley is taking a term that is not included in the Missouri CSR regarding fuel  
11 prudence, creating his own narrow definition of that term, and then applying it to a  
12 misinterpretation of Empire’s hedging policy.

13 **Q. HOW DOES MR. RILEY’S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY MISAPPLY OTHER**  
14 **COMMISSION LANGUAGE FROM THE MISSOURI CODE OF STATE**  
15 **REGULATIONS?**

16 A. On page 5 of his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Riley quotes language from the Missouri  
17 CSR regarding a “...prudent effort to mitigate upward natural gas price volatility.”  
18 The issue with including this language as it relates to an electric company’s hedging  
19 prudence is it is pulled from chapter 40 - Gas Utilities and Gas Safety Standards. In  
20 Mr. Riley’s efforts to lend some credence to his own definition of “prudence,” he  
21 sought to use any language from the Missouri CSR, regardless of whether it was  
22 relevant to the existence of Empire’s FAC. Further, on page 6, Mr. Riley references 4  
23 CSR 240-3.161(3)(R) which states “Information that shows that the electric utility has  
24 in place a long-term resource planning process, important objectives which are to

1 minimize overall delivered costs of energy.” Although Mr. Riley is now in the  
2 correct chapter of the CSR, he is misrepresenting the intent of the language, as it is  
3 very clearly discussing minimizing overall delivered energy costs as it refers to long-  
4 term resource planning. Mr. Riley’s quote is one of the 19 requirements for when an  
5 electric utility seeks to establish a RAM as described in 4 CSR 240-20.090(2).  
6 Although Empire clearly takes into account minimizing overall energy costs as a part  
7 of its hedging strategy, Mr. Riley’s misapplication of passages from the CSR for the  
8 purpose of framing his criticism of Empire’s hedging policy only seeks to add  
9 confusion to the objectives and requirements of procuring prudent fuel and purchased  
10 power costs.

11 **Q. DOES EMPIRE AGREE WITH MR. RILEY’S CONCLUSION THAT**  
12 **EMPIRE’S HEDGING PROGRAM DOES NOT CONSIDER NATURAL GAS**  
13 **PRICE REDUCTION?**

14 A. No. Mr. Riley’s unsupported conclusion on page 10 of his rebuttal testimony that  
15 Empire has “...eliminated any focus of its hedging program on natural gas price  
16 reduction” is of particular concern. Mr. Riley has constructed a logical fallacy to  
17 suggest that the existence of Empire’s FAC, which to some extent insulates the  
18 Company from hedging losses, has led Empire to adopt imprudent hedging practices.  
19 Mr. Riley’s rebuttal testimony references a Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price table  
20 (on page 9) that illustrates a downward trend in the cost of natural gas. Mr. Riley then  
21 erroneously uses this table to imply that Empire’s hedging policy is not prudent due  
22 to the losses it has incurred, without acknowledging the fact that in a declining market  
23 such losses are to be expected and are more than offset by the potential risk that has  
24 been eliminated. The table below shows that while Empire’s hedging practices do not



1 guarantee the lowest possible natural gas prices will be secured (no hedging policy  
2 does nor should purport to), it does mitigate risks associated with high natural gas  
3 prices that are seen in the spot market.


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TABLE 1

6

Historical Natural Gas Prices



7

8 **Q. PLEASE EXPOUND FURTHER ON WHAT THE ABOVE TABLE DEPICTS.**

9 A. The line depicting Empire's Annual Incurred Price shows the dollar per decatherm  
10 (\$/DTh) price Empire has incurred for natural gas historically on an average annual  
11 basis. The Maximum Annual Avg Spot Price line shows the maximum daily average  
12 spot price that occurred throughout the year. Finally, the line depicting the Average

1 Daily Spot Price is self explanatory but shows the annual average daily spot price.  
2 Clearly, the line graph shows Empire’s average incurred natural gas price hovers near  
3 the average spot price, while offsetting risk associated with the highs seen in the  
4 market.

5 **Q. DOES OPC POINT TO ANY SPECIFIC ALLEGED IMPRUDENCE ON THE**  
6 **PART OF EMPIRE?**

7 A. No. OPC does not point to any specific activities on the part of Empire that OPC  
8 alleges are imprudent. Instead, OPC questions whether it is prudent to engage in  
9 hedging at all and asserts that Empire should cease its current natural gas hedging  
10 policy “unless Empire can show that it is prudent and reasonable to continue to hedge  
11 natural gas prices in a non-volatile natural gas market” and that all gas hedging costs  
12 should be excluded from Empire’s FAC “until Empire demonstrates its natural gas  
13 hedging policy and its hedging costs are prudent and reasonable.” (Riley rebuttal, p.  
14 4)

15 **Q. DOES EMPIRE AGREE THAT THERE IS A “NON-VOLATILE NATURAL**  
16 **GAS MARKET,” AS ASSERTED BY OPC?**

17 A. Empire agrees that the price of natural gas has declined over the last few years and is  
18 at lows that would not have been predicted five years ago; however, the past does not  
19 predict the future. There are many market factors that could cause a market  
20 disruption (pipeline infrastructure issues, fracking bans, regulatory or political  
21 changes, etc.) and greatly impact the price of natural gas and create volatility, thus the  
22 reason for a hedging policy to be in place.

1 **Q. OPC RECOMMENDS THAT EMPIRE STOP USING ITS CURRENT**  
2 **NATURAL GAS HEDGING POLICY. DOES OPC PRESENT ANY**  
3 **ALTERNATIVE HEDGING POLICY?**

4 A. No. As noted above, OPC simply questions whether it is prudent to engage in natural  
5 gas hedging at all.

6 **Q. IS EMPIRE’S HEDGING STRATEGY PRUDENT, AND HAS EMPIRE BEEN**  
7 **PRUDENT IN EXECUTING ITS HEDGING STRATEGY?**

8 A. Yes. It is Empire’s belief that any prudent hedging program’s primary function  
9 should be risk management, rather than market gains. However, within its framework  
10 of achieving risk management, Empire has also put a focus on avoiding the adverse  
11 impacts of rising prices when possible. An example of how Empire is achieving this  
12 balance is found when looking at the amounts hedged in the December 31, 2015 Gas  
13 Position Summary (“position report”). The volumes hedged in the position report for  
14 years 2017, 2018, 2019, & 2020 are nearly at the minimum requirements as required  
15 by the RMP. If Empire’s strategy was solely to create “price predictability” as Mr.  
16 Riley alleges on page 6 of his rebuttal testimony, our end of the year 2015 hedge  
17 percentages would not be hugging the minimum guidelines as denoted in our RMP.  
18 Empire has recognized that the market was trending downward and made a conscious  
19 effort to react to the market while still remaining within the RMP guidelines, thereby  
20 ensuring a price mitigation strategy with an additional focus on minimizing cost.

21 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. RILEY’S SUMMATION THAT EMPIRE’S**  
22 **HEDGING POLICY IS NOT PRUDENT AND REASONABLE AND THUS**  
23 **ANY HEDGING GAINS AND LOSSES OUGHT TO BE EXCLUDED FROM**  
24 **FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE RECOVERY?**

1 A. No. Empire has been found to be prudent in ALL five of its FAC audits<sup>2</sup>. The overall  
2 policies and practices governing Empire's fuel hedging program have remained  
3 consistent since these reviews.

4 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

5 A. Yes, it does.

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<sup>2</sup> File Nos. EO-2010-0084, EO-2011-0285, EO-2013-0114, EO-2014-0057, and EO-2015-0214.

**AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE A. MERTENS**

STATE OF MISSOURI )  
  ) ss  
COUNTY OF JASPER )


On the   13th   day of May, 2016, before me appeared Blake A. Mertens, to me personally known, who, being by me first duly sworn, states that he is Vice President – Energy Supply of The Empire District Electric Company and acknowledges that he has read the above and foregoing document and believes that the statements therein are true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Blake A. Mertens

Subscribed and sworn to before me this   13th   day of May, 2015.



JANET L. HUNLEY  
My Commission Expires  
September 20, 2019  
Jasper County  
Commission #15243846

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public

My commission expires: Sept 20, 2019.