Exhibit No.: 1064 Issues: Aries Unit

Witness: Sponsoring Party: Case No.:

Mark L. Oligschlaeger MoPSC Staff Type of Exhibit: Direct Testimony ER-2004-0034

December 9, 2003 as modified February 27, 2004 Date Testimony Prepared:

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

UTILITY SERVICES DIVISION

FILED² FEB 2 7 2004 Missouri Public Service Commission

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

MARK L. OLIGSCHLAEGER

AQUILA, INC. d/b/a AQUILA NETWORKS-MPS (Electric)

CASE NO. ER-2004-0034

Jefferson City, Missouri December 2003

NP

Denotes Highly Confidential Information

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION **OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

In the matter of Aquila, Inc. d/b/a Aquila Networks) L&P and Aquila Networks MPS to implement a) Case No. ER-2004-0034 general rate increase in electricity.

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK L. OLIGSCHLAEGER

STATE OF MISSOURI)	
)	SS.
COUNTY OF COLE)	

Mark L. Oligschlaeger, of lawful age, on his oath states: that he has participated in the preparation of the following direct testimony as modified on February 27, 2004, in question and answer form, consisting of <u>A5</u> pages to be presented in the above case; that the answers in the following direct testimony as modified on February 27, 2004, were given by him; that he has knowledge of the matters set forth in such answers; and that such matters are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Mark L. Oligschlaeger

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 day of February 2004.



Notary Public

TONI M. CHARLTON NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF MISSOURI COUNTY OF COLE My Commission Expires December 28, 2004

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6	CASE NO. ER-2004-0034
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8	Q. Please state your name and business address.
9	A. Mark L. Oligschlaeger, P.O. Box 360, Suite 440, Jefferson City, MO
10	65102.
11	Q. Please describe your educational background and work experience.
12	A. I attended Rockhurst College in Kansas City, MO, and received a
13	Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration with a major in Accounting in
14	1981. I have been employed by the Missouri Public Service Commission (Commission
15	or MPSC) since September 1981 within the Auditing Department. In November 1981,
16	I passed the Uniform Certified Public Accountant (CPA) examination and, since
17	February 1989, have been licensed in the state of Missouri as a CPA.
18	Q. Have you previously filed testimony before this Commission?
19	A. Yes, numerous times. A listing of the cases in which I have previously
20	filed testimony before this Commission is given in Schedule 1, attached to this direct
21	testimony. A listing of the issues I have addressed in filed testimony in dockets before
22	the Commission since 1990 is provided in Schedule 2 to this testimony.

- Q. What knowledge, skills, experience, training or education do you have in
 these areas of which you testifying as an expert witness?
- A. I have been employed by this Commission as a Regulatory Auditor for
 over 20 years, and have submitted testimony on ratemaking matters numerous times
 before the Commission. I have also been responsible for the supervision of other
 Commission employees in rate cases and other regulatory proceedings numerous times.
 I have received training at in-house and outside seminars on technical ratemaking matters
 since I began my employment with the Commission.
- 9 Q. With reference to Case No. ER-2004-0034, the Application by 10 Aquila, Inc. (Aquila/UtiliCorp or Company) d/b/a Aquila Networks - MPS (MPS)
- 11 , to increase rates charged to their electric customers, have
- 12 you examined the books and records of Aquila/UtiliCorp pertaining to MPS?
- A. Yes, with the assistance of other members of the Commission
 Staff (Staff).
- 15

Q. Has Aquila, Inc. been known by other corporate names?

A. Yes. Prior to March 2002, Aquila was known as UtiliCorp United, Inc.
In this testimony, to avoid confusion when referring to actions or events involving Aquila
prior to or after March 2002, I will refer to the Company generically throughout its entire
history as "Aquila/UtiliCorp." MPS are divisions of Aquila/UtiliCorp.

- 20
- Q. What is the purpose of your direct testimony?
- A. The purpose of this testimony is to sponsor the rationale for the Staff's
 adjustment to MPS's test year purchased power expenses to remove the portion of the
 Aries unit expenses above the actual cost of the capacity supplied to the MPS customers.

My testimony will describe Aquila/UtiliCorp's decision to have its MPS division acquire
 capacity from the Aries generating unit through a purchased power agreement (PPA, or
 Power Sales Agreement/PSA) with an affiliated entity to increase Aquila/UtiliCorp's
 overall profits.

6

5

Q. How did the Staff obtain evidence to support its positions on the issues
addressed in this testimony?

9 A. The Staff obtained the evidence to support its positions on the issues 10 I address in this direct testimony through issuances of Staff data requests and interviews 11 of Company employees, both during the course of this rate case audit and also in the 12 Staff's audit of MPS' last Missouri electric rate proceeding, Case No. ER-2001-672. In the matter of the Aries unit issue, the Staff conducted an interview with 13 14 Mr. Robert Holzwarth and Mr. Frank DeBacker on October 28, 2003, and an interview 15 with Mr. Max Sherman on October 29, 2003. Mr. Holzwarth, Mr. DeBacker and 16 Mr. Sherman are all current or former employees of Aquila. The Staff also interviewed 17 Mr. Terry Hedrick, Aquila/UtiliCorp's Director of Generation Services, on November 14, 18 2003. After these interviews, through Staff data requests, the Staff submitted its notes of 19 the meetings to Aquila for verification, which gave these interviewees the opportunity to 20 revise the meeting notes so that the notes accurately reflect what was stated at these 21 meetings.

- 22 ARIES UNIT
- 23
- Q. Please describe the Aries generating unit.

A. The Aries unit is a 585 megawatt (MW) combined cycle generating unit
 located near Pleasant Hill, MO. The unit is effectively owned equally by Calpine
 Corporation (Calpine) and Aquila/UtiliCorp. Both Aquila/UtiliCorp's and Calpine's
 shares of the Aries plant are held by a jointly owned limited liability corporation named
 Merchant Energy Partners – Pleasant Hill (MEPPH). The Aries unit began providing
 power in simple-cycle mode in the summer of 2001, and started operating in combined cycle mode in February 2002.

8

Q. Who owns the Aries unit?

9 A. Cass County, MO holds legal title to the Aries unit, but has no authority to
10 operate the plant as a business. Cass County is leasing the plant to subsidiaries of Calpine
11 and Aquila/UtiliCorp.

12

Q. Please discuss the ownership structure of the Aries unit.

13 A. The Aries unit is being leased by Cass County through two separate 14 leases; a capital lease and an operating lease. According to the response to Staff 15 Data Request No. 507 from Case No. ER-2001-672, the capital lease involves 16 Cass County as the lessor and two banks (Union Bank of California and Bank One) as the 17 lessees. According to the response to Staff Data Request No. 429 in Case 18 No. ER-2001-672, the operating lease has Cass County as the lessor, with a fully owned 19 subsidiary of Aquila/UtiliCorp and a fully owned subsidiary of Calpine, the two partners 20 within MEPPH, as lessees. These lessees then convey power from the Aries unit through 21 their affiliate, MEPPH, to MPS, the regulated entity.

22

Q. Why are two leases required for the Aries unit?

A. According to the response to Staff Data Request No. 511 from Case
 No. ER-2001-672, "the capital lease between Cass County and Lessors A & B supports
 the requirements of the Chapter 100 Bond financing required under Missouri statutes.
 The Operating Lease between Lessors A & B and MEPPH supports the financing of the
 plant."

6

Q. How has Cass County financed the construction of the Aries unit?

A. Cass County has issued one bond for the construction of this unit, which
MEPPH purchased. Therefore, MEPPH's owners, Aquila/UtiliCorp and Calpine, have
put up the money to finance 100% of the Aries unit.

10 Q. Is the Aries unit producing power for Missouri jurisdictional electric11 customers?

A. Yes. Aries began its production of electricity in the spring of 2001 when
the unit operated two combustion turbines in simple cycle mode during its testing phase.
The two units began operating in June 2001, and continued through the summer of 2001.
During the fall of 2001 and early winter 2002, the Aries partners completed the combined
cycle unit and start production of electricity in the test phase. The combined cycle unit
began full production in late February 2002.

18

Q. Is there an agreement for the purchase of Aries power?

A. Yes. MPS and MEPPH have signed an agreement that reserves a portion
of the power produced by the Aries unit for customers of MPS from 2001 through 2005.
The power to be provided during the simple cycle phase of the unit's operation was
320 MW for the period of June September 2001. When the combined cycle unit became
operational in early 2002, the agreement provided for a maximum of 500 MW over the

1	peak periods in the remaining years 2002-2005 (April-September of each year), and a
2	maximum of 200 MW during non-peak periods (October-March of each year).
3	Q. Why did MPS agree to take power from the Aries unit?
4	A. MPS did not make an independent decision to enter into the PPA.
5	Aquila/UtiliCorp made the decision on behalf of its MPS division. MPS had need for
6	increased capacity, both as a result of load growth and the expiration of several long-term
7	PPAs it had entered into earlier with other regional utilities.
8	Q. When did Aquila/UtiliCorp decide to obtain power from its affiliated
9	company, MEPPH, to supply the power needs for Aquila's MPS division?
10	A. Aquila/UtiliCorp signed a contract with its affiliate, MEPPH, in February
11	1999. The Aquila/UtiliCorp-MEPPH purchased power contract for the MPS division
12	needs is an affiliated transaction as defined under the Commission's current rules. These
13	rules define an "affiliated transaction" as:
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	any transaction for the provision, purchase or sale of any information, asset, product or service, or portion of any product or service, between a regulated electrical corporation and an affiliated entity, and shall include all transactions carried out between any unregulated business operation of a regulated electrical corporation and the regulated business operations of an electrical corporation. 4 CSR 240-20.015(1)(B)
21	MEPPH is an affiliated entity with MPS in that it is a corporate subsidiary of
22	Aquila/UtiliCorp which, through an intermediary, is under common control with the
23	regulated electrical corporation.
24	Q. How is MEPPH an affiliate of MPS?
25	A. Aquila/UtiliCorp wholly owns Aquila Merchant Services which in turn
26	has, through its Capacity Services segment, a 50% ownership of MEPPH.
27	Aquila/UtiliCorp owns all of the assets of MPS that operates as a division of

Aquila/UtiliCorp. When the original agreement was signed on February 22, 1999 with
 MEPPH to supply power to MPS starting in the summer of 2001, Aquila/UtiliCorp
 signed the PPA for MPS.

4 Q. What is the Staff's position on appropriate ratemaking treatment of5 affiliated transactions?

A. The Staff believes that affiliated transactions in which a regulated entity
receives goods or services from an unregulated affiliate should be valued for ratemaking
purposes at the lower of the fully distributed cost or market price of the goods and
services. This has long been the position of the Staff, and recently this policy was
codified in rules adopted by the Commission in 1999 concerning affiliated transactions,
4 CSR 240-20.015.

Q. Why is a "lower of fully distributed cost or market price" policy
appropriate for goods and services obtained by utilities from affiliated entities?

A. This policy is appropriate in order to avoid affiliate abuse. Affiliate abuse is the phenomenon when a regulated utility makes a decision based not on the best interests of its customers, but on the best interests of an affiliated entity or the regulated utility's corporate parent. Another way of stating this is that affiliate abuse occurs when a regulated utility enters into a transaction with an affiliated entity that will maximize corporate profits at the expense of its customers when another course of action would have been more economical for its customers.

Q. Given Aquila Merchant/MEPPH's affiliation to Aquila/UtiliCorp's MPS
division, does the Staff believe that Aquila/UtiliCorp's selection of MEPPH to supply the
future power needs for its MPS division to be reasonable?

1	A. Yes, if the MPS division is charged a fair portion of the costs incurred to
2	to serve its power needs. In early 1999, in Case No. EO-99-369, Aquila/UtiliCorp
3	applied to the Commission for certain determinations required to be made by the
4	Missouri PSC under Section 32(k) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
5	of 1935 (PUHCA) respecting its contract with MEPPH for supply of power from the
6	Aries unit. As part of its analysis of the Case No. EO-99-369 application, the Staff
7	reviewed the bidding process used by MPS as well as its decision to choose MEPPH as
8	the supplier of power. Based upon that review, the Staff concluded that MEPPH's bid
9	was a reasonable selection when compared to the other bids received.
10	Q. Why was the Commission asked to make certain determinations
11	respecting the PPA between MPS and MEPPH in Case No. EO-99-369?
12	A. Certain determinations by the Commission were necessary because
13	MEPPH is an affiliated exempt wholesale generator (EWG).
14	Q. What is an exempt wholesale generator?
15	A. An EWG is a non-regulated affiliate of a regulated electric utility that is
16	exclusively in the business of owning or operating, or both owning and operating, all or
17	part of an "eligible facility" and selling electric energy at wholesale. EWGs came into
18	existence as a result of Section 711 of the Electric Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992
19	(Section 32 of PUHCA). Under EPAct, regulated electric utilities are allowed to enter
20	into purchased power agreements with affiliated EWGs as long as certain determinations
21	are made by their state regulatory commissions.
22	Aquila/UtiliCorp filed Case No. EO-99-369 to obtain the necessary
23	determinations from the Missouri PSC regarding the PPA between MPS and MEPPH.

Q. Did the Commission make the requested determinations for
 Aquila/UtiliCorp in that proceeding?

3 A. Yes, it did. However, on page 4 of the Commission's April 22, 1999 4 Order Regarding Power Sales Agreement, in that case stated the following: "[t]his order 5 is in no way binding on the Commission or any party regarding a future rate or earnings 6 complaint case to contest the ratemaking treatment to be afforded the Power Sales 7 Agreement." Thus, any and all ratemaking determinations concerning the Aries unit PPA 8 were left to rate proceedings, such as this one. The terms of the PPA was not deemed to 9 be reasonable for purposes of determining the costs of this power to be included in the 10 rates to be charged to the MPS's customers. This issue was deferred to the rate case in 11 which Aquila/UtiliCorp sought to recover the costs for the capacity and energy from the 12 Aries unit in the rates in charged to its customers.

Q. Did the Staff recommend that the Commission make the necessarydeterminations respecting the PPA?

15 A. Yes, with conditions that included that the costs for this power to be 16 included in rates would be decided in a future rate case. The Staff did not support the 17 inclusion in rates the costs developed by the PPA. The Staff would not have proposed 18 that the Commission make the determinations required under Section 32(k) of PUHCA in 19 order for the transaction to proceed forward if the Company had required, or otherwise 20 made part of the application seeking this approval, that such an approval would have 21 included a ratemaking decision to include the costs determined by the PPA in the rates 22 charged to MPS division consumers. The Staff review of this Application was abbreviated since Aquila/UtiliCorp requested, and was granted, an expedited procedural
 schedule for processing of the Application.

Q. Did Aquila/UtiliCorp consider the option of allowing its MPS division to
construct and operate a regulated generating unit to meet the MPS division power needs
in the 2001-2005 period?

6 A. No. By 1998, Aquila/UtiliCorp was operating under a policy of not even 7 considering the use of regulated generating units as an option for meeting the power 8 supply needs of its regulated electrical divisions. As a result of this policy, 9 Aquila/UtiliCorp decided to enter into a PPA to price power to its MPS division from the 10 Aries unit at a cost greater than the cost to the MPS division of providing this power to 11 itself. This practice has violated any appropriate policy governing pricing between 12 affiliated interests.

Q. Why was the short-term nature of the Aries PPA not been in the bestinterests of the Company's customers?

A. The short term of the PPA (five years) exposes MPS customers to greater
risks associated with future market based pricing of power than would be the situation if
MPS owned the Aries unit.

Aquila/UtiliCorp's overall corporate strategy since at least the late 1990s has been to construct merchant generating units to capture the value of its expectation of increased electric power prices. This strategy was pursued both by selling power from merchant generating units to non-native load customers via opportunities available through electric restructuring initiatives, and also by selling power at higher prices to its native load customers in Missouri through non-regulated generating units. This strategy is not

appropriate in relation to Aquila/UtiliCorp's obligation to its MPS division customers to
 make decisions that best protect their interests, and constitutes affiliate abuse.

3

Q. Is the MPS-MEPPH PPA an example of affiliate abuse?

A. Yes. The terms of the Aries unit PPA illustrates that Aquila/UtiliCorp did
not act in the best interests of its MPS divisions in entering into this PPA. The terms of
the Aries PPA was based upon a goal of maximizing profits for Aquila/UtiliCorp, its
corporate parent. The Aries PPA terms resulted in charging the MPS division amounts
far in excess of the costs to supply the power to the MPS division.

9 Q. What is the cost of Aries capacity supplied to the MPS division under the
10 terms of the MPS-MEPPH PPA?

11 A. The annual payments due to Cass County, the owner of the Aries unit, 12 under the operating lease with Aquila/UtiliCorp and Calpine, represent an appropriate starting point for determining the cost of the Aries capacity. The response to Staff Data 13 14 Request No. 429 (amended response) from Case No. ER-2001-672, received 15 December 3, 2001, provided a list of annual "total project" lease payments due to 16 Cass County, the owner of the Aries unit, for the years 2002-2032. (This response is 17 attached as Highly Confidential Schedule 3 to this direct testimony.) During the 18 years 2002-2004 (the only full calendar years of the MPS-MEPPH PPA), the amounts to 19 be paid to Cass County under the lease agreement and the amounts MPS must pay 20 pursuant to the purchased power contract (from the Response to Staff Data Request 21 No. 55 in Case No. ER-2001-672) are as follows:

1	Year	Payment to Cass	Co.	MPS PPA Contra	ct Payment
2	2002	**	**	**	**
3	2003	**	**	**	**
4	2004	**	**	**	**

5 On its face, in comparison to the Cass County annual lease payments, the capacity 6 charges to be paid by MPS for power from the Aries unit do not appear to be reasonable. For example, Cass County was scheduled to receive a total of ** _____ ** in 7 capacity payments under its lease for the entire 585 megawatt unit in 2002, while MPS 8 was contractually obligated to pay ** ** for an average of 350 MW 9 throughout that year (200 MW for January-March, 500 MW for April-September, and 10 11 200 MW for October-December). The same general relationship between the capital 12 lease payment and the MPS capacity payment exists for 2003 and 2004. Therefore, based 13 upon this information, it appears that a regulated entity, MPS, is being required to pay for 14 almost all of the costs of the Aries unit, even though it is not entitled to a proportional 15 amount of the unit's capacity. Meanwhile, MPS will not receive any benefit from any 16 power sales from Aries unit capacity above the contractual commitment to MPS. The 17 proceeds of any sales made to other entities will go directly to the Aries partners and not 18 to MPS. The MPS division is being charged costs related to the non-regulated sales of 19 the Aries unit not committed to the MPS division under the PPA. The PPA is an example 20 of affiliate abuse.

In short, MEPPH and Cass County are essentially recovering all of the capacity
costs for the entire Aries unit from MPS, even though MPS has not contracted to receive
the benefit of all of the Aries unit's capacity. Out of a total capacity of at least 585 MWs,

MPS has contracted to receive 200 MWs year round, with another 300 MWs from April
 to September. A comparison of the amounts due to Cass County from MEPPH and the
 amounts MEPPH will receive from MPS suggest that MPS's required payments for
 capacity are far in excess of the cost of capacity from the Aries unit.

5

Q. Please explain.

6 A. It is reasonable to assume that the lease agreements allow Cass County to 7 at least recover its fixed costs related to ownership of the Aries unit. That cost, between ** ____** annually from 2002-2004 for a 585 MW generating unit, should be 8 compared to the "market value" of Aries power to MPS of ** ** in the 9 10 same time period for an average of 350 MW of unit capacity annually. On average, MPS 11 has only contracted for approximately 60% of Aries unit capacity on an annual basis over 12 the term of the PPA, yet it has contracted to pay essentially 100% of the capacity costs of the unit. 13

Q. Since MPS is only contracting for 350 MW of Aries capacity annually, on
average, who receives the benefit of the Aries unit capacity in excess of 350 MW?

A. If MEPPH can sell power from the Aries unit in excess of amounts
contracted for by MPS, MEPPH will essentially retain all of these sales proceeds. Again,
this is because the payment MEPPH will receive from MPS essentially equals MEPPH's
required payment to Cass County for all of the Aries unit capacity.

- Q. Should the difference between the cost of Aries unit power and the
 "market" price charged MPS for that power be of concern to the Commission?
- A. Yes, among other reasons, because of the affiliated nature of theMPS-MEPPH PPA.

Q. Is the actual cost of Aries power to MEPPH under the Cass County lease
 an appropriate valuation for cost under the "lower of cost or market" price position of the
 Staff?

4 A. Yes. Aquila/UtiliCorp could have entered into the same financial 5 arrangements with Cass County for its MPS division that it did for its affiliated company 6 MEPPH, and thereby achieve the same cost levels for this power that MEPPH received 7 from these transactions. Even before its transformation into Aquila/UtiliCorp in the 1980s, MPS has a long history of constructing and financing power plants. The fact that 8 9 unregulated affiliate companies of MPS handled the Aries unit project was not based 10 upon MPS's inability to do so; rather, it was based upon a deliberate corporate policy of 11 Aquila/UtiliCorp to no longer have its regulated electric utilities build and own 12 generation. This policy provides an opportunity for Aquila/UtiliCorp to make additional profits through sales of power by nonregulated affiliates to regulated affiliates that would 13 14 not be possible under traditional utility practices.

Q. Was MPS capable of negotiating the same deals with Cass County on the
Aries unit that MEPPH did?

A. Yes. In fact, it is MPS that has the long history of plant operations in
Cass County and Pleasant Hill, Missouri, not MEPPH, Aquila Merchant or Calpine. This
relationship with Cass County predates the transformation of MPS from a stand-alone
utility to a division of Aquila/UtiliCorp in the mid-1980s. MPS has been operating in
Pleasant Hill and the surrounding communities in Cass County for many decades. MPS's
first power production facility was located in Pleasant Hill at the site that continues to be
used today for Ralph Green 3, a combustion turbine. The Aries Combined Cycle unit is

built on land that bounds an MPS substation and land that was once owned by MPS.
MPS sold part of the land in 1993 and Aquila/UtiliCorp reacquired the land to construct
Aries. Clearly, the MPS division of Aquila/UtiliCorp has more of the name recognition
in Cass County than do its affiliate companies, and that would be an advantage in
obtaining the type of "special" financing arrangements that has been entered into for the
construction of the Aries unit.

7

Q. How is the Aries PPA an example of affiliate abuse?

8 A. As previously stated, Aquila/UtiliCorp established the terms of the PPA 9 transaction so that it, in essence, recovers the entire cost for capacity of the Aries unit 10 from its captive MPS division customers. But, the MPS division has not contracted for 11 all of the Aries capacity during the period of the PPA, MEPPH is free to sell the power 12 not committed to MPS in the interchange market during the term of the PPA, and retain 13 all of these profits for itself without the burden of the capacity costs for the power it sells. 14 If Aquila/UtiliCorp had contracted directly with Cass County for the entire capacity 15 output of Aries and entered into the same financial arrangements with Cass County for its 16 MPS division that it did for the MEPPH affiliate, the MPS division would have the 17 excess capacity and energy available to sell in the interchange market, with the proceeds 18 of these off-system sales from Aries to other entities being used to offset the capacity 19 costs MPS division is being charged under the PPA for capacity to serve MPS's native 20 load customers when needed. But, if that course of action had been taken, the result 21 would have been lower rates for MPS customers instead of greater profits for 22 Aquila/UtiliCorp. Aquila/UtiliCorp having chosen a course of action respecting the Aries 23 PPA that maximizes its profits at the expense of MPS electric customers makes the Aries

unit PPA an excellent example of affiliate abuse. This is why the ratemaking terms of the
 PPA were not approved for ratemaking purposes in Case No. EO-99-369. These terms, if
 adopted for ratemaking, would not support a finding that PPA was in the best interests of
 consumers.

Q. Based on these facts, how does the Staff recommend that the Commission
treat the Aries PPA for ratemaking purposes?

A. The Staff recommends that the Commission price capacity from the Aries unit on the basis of its cost, not the market value of capacity, since it is clear that the cost of Aries power is lower than the market value of that power. The Commission should consider the MEPPH capacity payments to Cass County as being a reasonable estimate of the cost of Aries power, and prorate that cost to represent the share of the Aries unit committed to MPS under the PPA.

Q. How did the Staff determine the appropriate portion of Aries unit costs to
be associated with the portion of the Aries unit being used to serve MPS's customers?

15 A. The Staff used the 2002 MEPPH payment to Cass County as the 16 applicable cost of all of the capacity of the 585 MW Aries unit. This payment was ** **. MPS receives an average of 350 MWs of capacity annually 17 18 (500 MWs from April to September, 200 MWs from October to March) of the 585 MWs of capacity at the Aries unit. Staff developed a factor of 59.83% (derived by dividing 19 350 MWs by 585 MWs). This factor was applied to the ** ______ ** of costs for 20 the total Aries unit resulting in ** _____ ** being associated with MPS annual 21 22 power needs of the cost of Aries unit.

23

Q. Are there alternative ways of assigning the cost of Aries power to MPS?

1 A. Yes. It can be argued that the additional power MPS purchases in the 2 peak months under the MEPPH PPA is more valuable than the 200 MWs MPS purchases Schedule 4 attached to this direct testimony represents an 3 on a year round basis. 4 alternative valuation of the MPS Aries PPA that follows this approach. Basically, 5 Schedule 4 assumes that the 385 MWs of Aries that MPS does not reserve from October to March of each year can be sold to other entities at ** */KW-month, the same 6 7 price MPS pays for its 200 MW of power during this six-month off-peak period. Schedule 4 also assumes that the 85 MW of Aries capacity MPS does not reserve in the 8 peak months can be sold to third parties at ** _____ **/KW-month from April to 9 10 September, the same price MPS pays for capacity during the six-month peak period. Under this scenario, Schedule 4 shows that MPS should be responsible for 61.31% of the 11 cost of Aries capacity. Applying this factor to ** ______ **, the capacity payment 12 to Cass County, the result would be an assignment of ** _____ ** of capacity 13 14 cost to MPS for ratemaking purposes. 15 Q. What amount does the Staff recommend that the Commission use for

16 setting rates for the MPS division of Aquila/UtiliCorp in this proceeding?

A. To be conservative, the Staff recommends that the Commission utilize the
valuation presented in Schedule 4 of this testimony: ** ______** (total
Company) on an annual basis.

20 Q. Are you sponsoring the Aries unit PPA adjustment to the income21 statement?

A. No. I provided these amounts to Staff Auditing witness
Graham A. Vesely to incorporate into the Staff's overall adjustment to MPS' test year

1	purchased power expense. However, I am responsible for defending the rationale for this
2	Staff adjustment in this rate proceeding.
3	Q. Did the Staff propose a similar adjustment relating to the Aries PPA in the
4	last MPS general rate proceeding in Missouri, Case No. ER-2001-672?
5	A. Yes, it did.
6	Q. Have their been significant changes in the financing and ownership
7	structure of the Aries unit since that rate proceeding?
8	A. Yes, there have been several.
9	**
0	
1	
2	
3	
4	**.
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7	**.
8	The Staff does not believe these two events change in any way the rationale for its
)	proposed adjustment to MPS's test year purchased power costs under the Aries PPA.
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	Direct Testimony of Mark L. Oligschlaeger
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18	Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?
19	A. Yes, it does.
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MARK L. OLIGSCHLAEGER

CASE NO. COMPANY Kansas City Power and Light Company ER-82-66 Kansas City Power and Light Company HR-82-67 Southwestern Bell Telephone Company TR-82-199 Missouri Public Service Company ER-83-40 Kansas City Power and Light Company ER-83-49 Southwestern Bell Telephone Company TR-83-253 Kansas City Power and Light Company EO-84-4 Kansas City Power and Light Company ER-85-128 & EO-85-185 **KPL Gas Service Company** GR-86-76 Kansas City Power and Light Company HO-86-139 Southwestern Bell Telephone Company TC-89-14 Western Resources GR-90-40 & GR-91-149 Missouri-American Water Company WR-91-211 UtiliCorp United Inc. / Missouri Public Service EO-91-358 & EO-91-360 Generic: Expanded Calling Scopes TO-92-306 Generic: Energy Policy Act of 1992 EO-93-218 Western Resources, Inc./Southern Union Company GM-94-40 St. Louis County Water Company WR-95-145 EM-96-149 Union Electric Company St. Louis County Water Company WR-96-263 Missouri Gas Energy GR-96-285 The Empire District Electric Company ER-97-82 UtiliCorp United, Inc./Missouri Public Service ER-97-394 Western Resources, Inc./Kansas City Power & Light Company EM-97-515 United Water Missouri, Inc. WA-98-187 WM-2000-222 Missouri-American Water Company

MARK L. OLIGSCHLAEGER

CASE NO.

UtiliCorp United Inc. / St. Joseph Light & Power Company EM-2000-292 UtiliCorp United Inc. / The Empire District Electric Company EM-2000-369 Green Hills Telephone Corporation TT-2001-115 IAMO Telephone Company TT-2001-116 Ozark Telephone Company TT-2001-117 Peace Valley Telephone Company, Inc. TT-2001-118 Holway Telephone Company TT-2001-119 KLM Telephone Company TT-2001-120 Missouri Gas Energy GR-2001-292 The Empire District Electric Company ER-2001-299 Oregon Farmers Mutual Telephone Company TT-2001-328 Ozark Telephone Company TC-2001-402 Gateway Pipeline Company, Inc. GM-2001-585 Missouri Public Service ER-2001-672 Union Electric, d/b/a AmerenUE EC-2002-1 GA-2002-429 Laclede Gas Company

COMPANY

MARK L. OLIGSCHLAEGER

Company Name	Case Number	Issues
Western Resources	GR-90-40 and GR-91-149	Take-Or-Pay Costs
Missouri-American Water	WR-91-211	True-up; Known and Measurable
Missouri Public Service	EO-91-358 and EO-91-360	AAO
Generic Telephone	TO-92-306	Revenue Neutrality; Accounting Classification
Generic Electric	EO-93-218	Preapproval
Western Resources & Southern Union Company	GM-94-40	Regulatory Asset Transfer
St. Louis County Water	WR-95-145	Policy
Union Electric Company	EM-96-149	Merger Savings; Transmission Policy
St. Louis County Water	WR-96-263	Future Plant
Missouri Gas Energy	GR-96-285	Riders; Savings Sharing
Empire District Electric	ER-97-82	Policy
Missouri Public Service	ER-97-394	Stranded/Transition Costs; Regulatory Asset Amortization; Performance Based Regulation
Western Resources & Kansas City Power & Light	EM-97-515	Regulatory Plan; Ratemaking Recommendations; Stranded Costs
United Water Missouri	WA-98-187	FAS 106 Deferrals
Missouri-American Water	WM-2000-222	Conditions
UtiliCorp United & St. Joseph Light & Power	EM-2000-292	Staff Overall Recommendations
Utilicorp United & Empire District Electric	EM-2000-369	Overall Recommendations
Green Hills Telephone	TT-2001-115	Policy
IAMO Telephone Company	TT-2001-116	Policy

Company Name	Case Number	Issues
Ozark Telephone Company	TT-2001-117	Policy
Peace Valley Telephone	TT-2001-118	Policy
Holway Telephone Company	TT-2001-119	Policy
KLM Telephone Company	TT-2002-120	Policy
Missouri Gas Energy	GR-2001-292	SLRP Deferrals; Y2K Deferrals; Deferred Taxes; SLRP and Y2K CSE/GSIP
Empire District Electric	ER-2001-299	Prudence/State Line Construction/Capital Costs
Ozark Telephone Company	TC-2001-402	Interim Rate Refund
Gateway Pipeline Company	GM-2001-585	Financial Statements
Missouri Public Service	ER-2001-672	Purchased Power Agreement; Merger Savings/Acquisition Adjustment
Union Electric Company	EC-2002-1	Merger Savings; Criticisms of Staff's Case; Injuries and Damages; Uncollectibles
Laclede Gas Company	GA-2002-429	AAO Request

SCHEDULES 3 AND 4

ARE

DEEMED

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL