- 1 to pages 24 through 39 -- or let's start with 24.
- 2 There on 24 is there a -- did you include a heading in
- 3 your testimony?

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- A. Yes.
- Q. On line 9 what does that read?
- A. July 18, 2008 Alstom Unit 1 Settlement 7 Agreement.
- Q. And if the Commission wanted to understand more of the details about that settlement agreement, would they refer to pages 24 through 39 of your rebuttal testimony?
- 12 A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. And then on 39 you've included another heading on line 4 and what does that say?
- 15 A. Unit 2 Alstom Settlement.
- Q. And if the Commission wanted to understand more about the details of that settlement, would they refer to page 39 through 47?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Now, you also attached some schedules, I notice. And could you turn in your direct testimony to Schedule WHD2010-6? I'm on your rebuttal still.
- 23 A. The R&O opportunity analysis sheet?
- Q. Yes. And -- now, you saw some of these
 in your direct testimony. And I believe there was

analysis made of it ahead of time to assess potential

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cost impacts on the project.

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- Okay. So the risk and opportunity 2 ο. analysis sheets, Exhibits 254 and several schedules, 3 how do those risk and opportunity analysis 4 spreadsheets relate to Kansas City Power and Light's 5 commitment to identify and explain any cost overruns, 6 7 if at all?
 - Well, they -- they do. They're an early Α. signal of a potential claim and ultimately -- or a potential cost. And ultimately we can see through change orders and purchase orders and -- and such to the extent to which these become realized. They are an early warning and a trail and a track that ultimately you can follow through to see what occurred.
- All right. So just to make sure we Q. 17 understand that, Exhibit 254, you were going through with Commissioner Kenney that has the PowerPoint, et cetera?
 - Right. Α.
 - Up at the top it says, R&O Item No. 360. 0. Now, you've seen this document before. I think we covered that.
- 24 Α. Yes.
 - And it says, Reforecasted costs, 3 point Q.

something. I got to take my own advice and not start saying numbers out loud. Sorry about that.

There's a reforecasted cost up there. Is it your understanding that is the expected cost over and above the control budget estimate?

A. Yes.

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- Q. All right. So from that we can identify -- you tell me. Can we identify how much the JLG incident is going to cost over and above the control budget estimate also sometimes referred to as the definitive estimate from that number there, reforecasted cost?
- A. Well, this -- this suggests that initiating event that -- the JLG. And this would be a potential cost for some work that's attendant to that incident.
- Q. Right. So this is the potential cost over and above?
- 19 A. Right.
- Q. Okay. Thank you for that clarification.

 21 I should have said it better.

And then it has these reasons down here.

And I remember the other day when you were talking to

Mr. Mills about possible reasons for cost overruns.

Are these similar to the reasons that you discussed

- with Mr. Mills? You see where I am; price, permit,
 regulatory, design maturation?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. All right. And then there's a section called Analysis on these. And what -- how does the analysis relate to the company's commitment to identify and explain cost overruns?
- A. Well, I think it very clearly explains the -- the event that initiated this risk, the circumstances, efforts that were going to be undertaken and why and projects then up above what it might cost. So this is the analysis of the reason and -- and steps that have to be taken.
- Q. All right. And you -- you refer to "projects." So these -- these risk and opportunities are what would we -- a looking-forward analysis of potential costs; is that right?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. Let's look at Exhibit 254 a little
 bit more. I think you mentioned to Commissioner

 Kenney that it explains -- or that it includes both
 Alstom's position and KCP&L's position; is that right?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. If you can kind of flip back into the
 PowerPoint presentation just a few pages, do you see

on both cases.

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Maybe at the bottom.

Yes.

Α.

1	Q. All right. So if you would turn to the
2	Alstom portion of course, they helpfully did not
3	number theirs oh, no, it is. It's over on the left
4	side, I guess. You see where I am? It says
5	December 10, 2007 bottom left and then it will have a
6	page number.
7	A. Mine are, unfortunately, stapled on the
8	bottom left.
9	Q. Well, some are, some aren't. Well,
10	there's a page 2.
11	A. What does it say at the top of page 2?
12	Q. Soil Stabilization Project Overview.
13	A. I'm there, yes. I'm there.
14	Q. So is it is this reflecting that
15	Alstom claimed that they had been delayed by
16	25 calendar days?
17	A. Yes.
18	Q. And are there other documents if we were
19	to go through this, which I'd rather not do, that lay
20	out Alstom's claim that they were delayed?
21	A. Yes.
22	Q. And then if you will go to at some
23	point the page numbering changes and we're into the
24	KCPL part. There's one that has a picture of
25	conceptualization of the plant with only one chimney

Here, let me just hand you. We'll get to 1 Q. the right page. Nathan's helpfully -- just take that. 2 3 Α. Jeez. All right. So on this page, page 3 of 4 Q. the -- is this a summary of what Alstom's claiming --5 or was claiming at the time, I should have said? 6 7 Α. Yes. And so does this accurately summarize 8 0. that at the time you were having these settlement 9 discussions, Alstom was asserting that Kansas City 10 Power and Light was responsible for the incident and 11 should pay for half of the costs to repair the crane? 12 That's correct. 13 Α. And that the schedule was negatively 14 Q. impacted and that KCPL is solely responsible for this 15 delay? 16 17 Yes. Α. And that the erection schedule was 18 Q. negatively impacted and KCPL is solely responsible for 19 this delay? 20 That's correct. 21 So they said you were responsible and you 22 Q. said, no, we're not. Right? 23 24 Α. That's correct. And that's how you went into mediation? 25 Q.

A. Yes.

- Q. And that's what these documents reflect as the positions as you went into mediation?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. All right. Thank you. Now, if we could look at this other -- these other R&Os on your testimony. Put that one away. I got you confused enough about page numbers, I think. Now, you had some discussions with both Mr. Williams I think -- could be wrong and with Commissioner Kenney about the ALSTOM settlements. And again just to be clear on this, is there another witness we haven't heard from yet who was also involved in the Alstom settlement discussions?
- A. Well, Mr. Roberts would have been involved in the settlement discussions.
- Q. All right. Now, as relates to your rebuttal testimony -- oh, I know what we need to do. Earlier when we were talking through these, you referred to needing to look at your cheat sheet. Do you recall that?
 - A. I did.
- Q. And what is it that you needed to refer to?
 - A. Well, there are so many dates over the

1 five years, that I asked that a time line of key
2 events and decisions be put together and -- and that's

3 what I was referring to.

4 MR. HATFIELD: Judge, may we mark an

5 exhibit?

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JUDGE PRIDGIN: You may. I believe I would be up to 74 for KCP&L.

(KCP&L Exhibit No. 74 was marked for identification.)

MR. HATFIELD: Judge, it might help to 11 have for the Commissioners.

12 BY MR. HATFIELD:

- Q. So, Mr. Downey, you started to explain, but what -- what is it you were trying to accomplish by constructing Exhibit 74 to be created?
- A. Sort of the life of the project, which goes back into 2004. There have been many events that have occurred and I have a bit of difficulty keeping them all straight. So this at least gives me a document to try to follow key dates and when things happened and helps me at least keep -- keep the right order of things.
- Q. And so have you had an opportunity to review Exhibit 6-- 74?

JUDGE PRIDGIN: Yes.

Q.

And then quite some time until we got to

a next -- what we sometimes call the unit 2 1 2 settlement. Right? That's correct. 3 Α. And do you recall approximately when that 4 Q. 5 was or precisely when that was? As soon as I can find it, I will. On 6 November 17th of 2009 we reached agreement with Alstom 7 on the term sheet for the settlement on unit 2. 8 All right. So different -- different 9 0. settlement agreements we were talking about earlier. 10 There's more than one, in other words? 11 12 Α. Yes. And -- and you've -- now, back to your 13 Q. direct testimony, you've included testimony on all of 14 the Alstom settlements and -- and delineated it out 15 separately in your direct testimony? 16 Yes. The unit 1 settlement and the 17 Α. unit 2 settlement. 18 All right. And then Schedule William --19 Q. WHD2010-6 is an R&O. Correct? 20 21 Α. Yes. And that has to do with a delay claim; is 22 Q. 23 that right? 24 Α. That's correct. And then Schedule WHD2010-6 has to do 25 Q.

- somewhat with a liquidated damages claim; is that
 right?
 - A. The same -- you're referring to the same R&O? No, a different one.
 - Q. I said 6. There's actually two different ones that both have 6 on them. So there's 367A -- an R&O labeled 367A and then another R&O labeled 367B and they're all part of Exhibit 6 apparently.
 - A. There might even be one labeled C.
- Q. I believe there is. Let's talk about B

 11 for just a minute if you can get it.
- 12 A. I've got it.
- Q. All right. So 367B -- we talked about before what an R&O is. Right?
- 15 A. Yes.

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- Q. And so this an analysis of a potential cost to the project. Right?
- 18 A. Yes.
- Q. And by the way, Mr. Schwarz isn't sure what LDs are, so you might explain that.
 - A. Liquidated damages. These are actual cash payments for failure to meet certain key --
 - Q. And in fairness to him, I think he knows what a liquidated damages are. He just didn't know -- sorry, Tim. He wasn't sure what an LD was, so I just

wanted to make sure for the record when you say LDs, 1 2 you're referring to liquidated --3 Α. Liquidated damages. 4 -- damages; is that right? Q. 5 Yes. Α. All right. So let's talk about 6 0. Yes. You talked with Commissioner Kenney about the 7 this. liquidated damages issue a little bit. 8 analysis section there, which I think we talked about 9 is an attempt to explain the potential cost impact, 10 there's a two with a parenthesis next to it. Is that 11 12 discussing liquidated damages? 13 Α. Yes. And it -- I'm going to stop at the right 14 0. place. It says, Potential liquidated damages in the 15 range of -- and then it gives a range -- are believed 16 due KCPL if Alstom continues to fall further behind 17 rather than comply with the Tiger Team 1 schedule. 18 19 Do you see where that is? 20 Α. Yes, I do. Now, have you read the Staff's 21 Q. 22 construction audit and prudence report in this case? 23 I have. Α. And they indicate that KCPL should not 24 Q. have waived or foregone those liquidated damages. 251

1	they rely in part on this risk and opportunities
2	sheet. Is that your understanding?
3	A. Yes.
4	Q. And so when it says that if Alstom
5	continues to fall farther behind the Tiger Team 1
6	schedule you might be entitled to liquidated damages,
7	did Alstom, in fact, continue to fall behind the Tiger
8	Team 1 schedule?
9	A. No, they did not. In fact, they met the
10	milestones in the Tiger Team schedule.
11	Q. So based just on this analysis, since
12	they did not fall behind the Tiger Team 1 schedule,
13	you weren't entitled to liquidated damages; is that
14	right?
15	MR. WILLIAMS: Judge, I'm going to object
16	at this point. I think he's going beyond the cross of
17	scope and Commissioner questions with this line.
18	JUDGE PRIDGIN: Mr. Hatfield?
19	MR. HATFIELD: I think he and
20	Commissioner Kenney actually talked at some length and
21	there was some cross about why did you agree to forego
22	the LDs. Commissioner Kenney asked him why did you
23	not collect the LDs or the liq liquidated damages.
24	JUDGE PRIDGIN: That's my recollection so
25	I'll overrule.

BY MR. HATFIELD:

- Q. So under this analysis here, you weren't entitled to liquidated damages because they did, in fact, meet the Tiger Team 1 schedule; is that correct?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. All right. Now, okay. Now, on these -let me just finish up on these R&Os briefly, these
 risk and opportunity analysis. You -- you -- I think
 you were correcting me when I was discussing what they
 would be used for. Why were R&Os -- maybe you already
 said. Why were R&Os prepared?
- A. They were prepared as -- as indicators to the project team and management team that there were risks out there that were not -- were above and beyond what we had contemplated in the control budget.
- Q. All right. And now how did you use R&Os in your management -- in your role in managing the project?
- A. Well, they -- they identified risks to the project and -- which we looked for mitigation to -- to minimize those risks or to eliminate them, if we could. They also gave us signals with regard to cost reforecasts that we would do periodically through the course of the project. So they were early warning signs around costs and schedule for that matter.

- Q. All right. And let's talk about the reforecast for a minute. I'm going to take you way back now, three, four days ago when we started your questioning. Mr. Mills I think got us all started with a discussion about the cost overruns and -- and through some calculations brought you to a number of I think it was 500 million in cost overruns.
 - A. Right.
 - Q. Do you recall all of that?
- 10 A. I do.

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- Q. And he asked you if you could explain that and you gave him some general categories; is that right?
 - A. I did.
 - Q. Now, at the time you were managing this project back three years ago, two years ago, et cetera, what were you using to understand where cost overruns were occurring and why?
 - A. Well, the cost control system and the K-Report, the monthly report. I mean we would sit -- I was up there every week we would go through in detail. But then at the end of the month, we would go through the K-Report and where we stood. From my point of view, I didn't need to know everything in between, but I needed to know the bottom line on where

we were heading.

And then when the team began to assemble these risk and opportunity analysis statements, it took you from looking at what happened last month and where you were relative to the budget to projecting forward as to things that might occur, which would later be confirmed in the — in the monthly budget review processes.

- Q. Okay. So once that control budget estimate, definitive estimate you and Mr. Mills talked about was established, who needed to approve any expenses over and above that estimate?
- A. Well, you can see signature pages on these. And depending on the dollar value, that approval would -- would grow from department heads to Brent to the vice president, to me.
- Q. All right. And -- and you talked about the reforecast. At some point did you look at all the R&Os in a reforecast format?
- A. Yes, we did. I mean, 2008 was the initial cost reforecast. And it was triggered by the fact that we were at a -- at a 70 percent engineered level, but also by these kind of signals from the project leadership team.
 - Q. Okay. And so in the reforecast then

did -- did -- did you take some action with respect to
the reforecast yourself?

A. Well, I personally -- that was about the time we had -- Mr. Price left and we had an interim of about three or four months before Mr. Churchman came on board. And I asked Mr. Easley to take over day-to-day authority for day-to-day operations in the construction site. And I personally took responsibility for making sure this initial reforecast was appropriate and -- and fully vetted where we were and what we were going to do.

- Q. And then did the board at some point approve reforecast?
- A. Yes, they did. They -- we -- this reforecast was done by our own staff. It was vetted by Schiff Hardin through Dan Meyer who can talk about these reforecasts in great detail when he's up. We did our own independent reforecast, Schiff did theirs, we compared them, we presented them to the oversight committee, we presented them to senior -- all the senior management, ultimately to the board in the form of a single cost estimate, new -- new projected cost at completion for the --
- Q. Right. I want to talk about that because I want to make sure that -- that we let the Commission

1	understand what you were doing as senior management to
2	understand the budgets. So there was a control budget
3	estimate approved by the board?
4	A. That's correct.
5	Q. And then in order for expenses to exceed
6	that estimate, you had to establish a new budget.
7	Correct?
8	A. That's correct.
9	Q. And that was the reforecast process; is
10	that right?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. And there were formal documents created
13	to establish the reforecast budget. Right?
14	A. That's correct.
15	Q. And are those attached to witness Forrest
16	Archibald's testimony?
17	A. I believe so.
18	Q. And I think we've looked at these once
19	before, but just to make sure, Iatan 1 and 2 cost
20	reforecast dated April 25th, 2008. Is that generally
21	what you've referred to?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. And now Mr. Mills asked you a little bit
24	about what led to those what led to those overruns
25	and I think you discussed you discussed some of the

things that drove those. Did you -- at the time you
were making the decisions, did you have documents in
front of you that identified the drivers for any
expenses over and above the controlled budget
estimate?

A. Yes.

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- Q. And at the time did you have documents in front of you that included specific risk and opportunity items by dollar amounts that would show you how -- the amount of additional cost that needed to be incurred over and above the control budget estimate?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. And it showed you by category such as indirects or fuel and test run energy. Right?
- 16 A. That's correct.
 - Q. And at the time did you have in front of you documents that gave you by percentages where the cost overruns were occurring?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. And so at the time you made the decision to authorize expenses above the control budget estimate back in 2008, did you know what percentage of those costs were being caused by, for example, design maturation?

1	A. Yes. We spent a good bit of time
2	defining these categories and understanding them.
3	Q. And did you also have in front of you
4	detailed information about contingency logs and
5	contingency commitments?
6	A. Yes. These were decisions made
7	discretely every day by the cost control group and
8	then ultimately summarized and are part of the whole
9	story on cost increases.
LO	Q. And then attached to those that
L1	reforecast you had did you have these risk and
L2	opportunity sheets we've been going through?
L3	A. Yes.
L4	Q. And so the board would see each and every
L5	risk and opportunity sheet?
L6	A. At a high level, yes.
17	Q. Well, and that's a good question. So was
18	every risk and opportunity sheet that was prepared
19	submitted to the board?
20	A. No.
21	Q. And why was that?
22	A. Well, dollar level, extent of importance
23	to the overall impact on the project.
24	Q. And were some risk and opportunities
25	rejected at a level helow the hoard?

by category, but -- or wait. What were you --

well, you said the board approved by 1 Α. 2 category. Right. They saw it by category? 3 Q. They saw it by category, they approved 4 Α. 5 the total number. Exactly. They approved the gross amount, 6 0. if you will of the budget? 7 Right. 8 Α. we've looked at some numbers here --9 Q. 10 Α. Right. -- the overall budget amount? 11 Q. 12 Α. Right. But they had these risk and opportunity 13 Q. sheets as part of the presentation. I guess that's 14 what I was getting at. 15 well, they -- they might not have this 16 specific sheet, but they would understand the risks. 17 We would present the risks. 18 And if we need more detail -- if the 19 0. Commission wants more detail about the reforecast 20 21 process and how the -- how the board authorized expenses over the CBE, which witness would that be? 22 Mr. Archibald, Mr. Meyer. This document 23 Α. you've had up on the screen is I'm sure the very same 24

document that we would have also then brought over and

presented to the Staff.

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- Q. And I think we might have covered it,

 but -- so just -- if you don't have anything to add,

 tell me, but Commissioner Jarrett asked you some

 questions about your K filings and -- and I think

 there was some discussions about your disclosure, that

 the estimates may differ materially. Do you recall

 that?
 - A. The SEC disclosures?
 - Q. SEC disclosures.
- 11 A. Yes.
 - Q. And I guess just generally related to that, tell us how much management used the control budget estimate to manage the project.
 - A. Well, I mean every month we were looking at this. These -- these are stakes in the ground to which you try to manage to. You set goals, whether they're financial or otherwise, and you manage to them. So we would -- we met weekly for the morning on the project to look at schedule, to look at the drivers. And then monthly we would get a look at the K-Report and -- and update that.

And then when we got into those cost reforecasts and in 8 and 9, those were major events and it gave us a total backward look and forward look

and -- and would -- would further reinforce whether we were on budget or not and where the costs were going and what was driving them. So that it -- it was the daily and the weekly and monthly run-up and management process by which we managed the costs on the project.

- Q. Okay. Now, you just -- just to make sure we're on the same page, you just mentioned the K-Reports. I'm going to show you Forrest Archibald Exhibit 1. This is a pretty small copy so I'm going to zoom in a little bit here. This is Forrest Archibald Exhibit 1. So is this the document you were just referring to?
- A. It is.

- Q. And it's going to be hard for me to -generally what -- what did this document tell you as
 you were managing the process?
- A. Well, it -- it broke down by significant categories the spend. This column (indicating) is actually the control -- the original control budget estimate going back to December 2006.
- Q. Labeled up at the top it's referring to column A?
- 23 A. It says Control Budget.
- Q. Let's see if I can do this. Look at this. So Column A is the original control budget of

LY	IDENTIART HEARING VOL. 21 ER-2010 0333 & 0330 GT 21 2011
1	2006?
2	A. And then the next two columns show
3	adjustments, corporate budget change, internal budget
4	transfers, bringing us to the current budget which
5	would be the reforecasted budget so
6	Q. So without even getting into what the
7	lines are, so on that line 1 there, the control
8	budget, your current your reforecast actually
9	dropped that that number below the 2006; is that
10	right?
11	A. This are you talking about this number
12	(indicating)?
13	Q. Yes.
14	A. Well, and it's a category. It's only one
15	line item of cost.
16	Q. Right. Let me make sure we can look at
17	this here.
18	A. So so that's in the procurement area
19	and it's mechanical systems and that happens to be the
20	ash handling system.
21	Q. Well, and actually let's talk about all
22	of those. So there we've got I don't know if we
23	can read that.
24	MR. HATFIELD: But again, Commissioners,

25 it's Exhibit 1 to the Forrest Archibald testimony if

- 1 you want to look at this later as you're reading.
 2 BY MR. HATFIELD:
- Q. We see there an ash handler, a balance of plant piping and economizer. Right? And then permanent aux boiler?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. Are we in the same spot?
- A. Uh-huh.
- Q. So can you tell by looking at that which of those items was in the original control budget estimate and which were not?
- 12 A. Yes.
 - Q. Which ones of -- just in the procurement section, were not included in the control budget?
 - A. The ash handling system and the balance of plant piping were in the original budget, and the economizer and the permanent aux boiler were not.
 - Q. I think it's obvious, but how can you tell that?
- A. well, these two have numbers and these don't (indicating).
 - Q. All right. So then you can tell that -can you tell that at some point those items were
 authorized?
- A. Well, this would indicate corporate

- budget changes on the economizer, for example (indicating).
 - Q. Okay.

- A. And it would relate to the date on the monthly budget.
- Q. So if a cost overrun is a cost in excess of the control budget estimate, can you tell -- can you identify by looking at this where a cost overrun occurs?
- A. Yes. You can identify it pretty much by systems and -- you have to then go to the detail to get to the R&O, the analysis sheets and the change orders and work orders. But this is a road map to any costs in excess of the original control budget estimate.
- Q. And -- and so in identifying it there, can you -- can you go all the way down through and -- I'm not asking you to do it right now, but is it possible to go all the way down through and identify from this one sheet, the K-1 Report where cost overruns were occurring?
 - A. Absolutely.
 - Q. And how often did you get this document?
- 24 A. Monthly.
 - Q. All right. And then for -- I think you

A. You would -- you would have to go and -- you'd have to go into the -- the change orders, purchase orders, the contingency log where we allocated contingency if we -- we overran.

And then you could go to the -- the original R&Os or subsequent to the first reforecast, we then developed a more extensive system called -- which we call cost portfolios where you could look at those in detail as we did the reforecasts. And they would track these categories in more detail and look forward again too.

- Q. So as the president and COO, I assume you weren't going through every change order. What -- what document did you use to explain a cost overrun?
- A. Well, this document. And we would vet this with the -- the Staff and -- in the weekly meetings, but we would bring it forward to the executive oversight committee as well monthly.
- Q. And did you require the project team to explain cost overruns to you?
 - A. Absolutely.
- Q. And -- and how did you require them to do that? What process did you use?

- well, we used those reporting meetings, Α. 1 either the weekly ones or -- and then we would ask for 2 major explanations in the executive oversight. 3 wouldn't try to go through every -- every one of them, 4 5 but we'd look at the big picture. And did they document their explanations 6 0. 7 in those meetings? They -- we knew the source documents for 8 Α. I mean it was -- this was a systematic 9 these. ves. process that we set up so that we would, first of all, 10 have the right process in place, and then use it and 11 do the analysis which led to actions and decisions. 12 I mean, it was -- there was -- this was a very 13 rigorous process set up at the very beginning. 14 15 And then, of course, we were reporting not only to ourselves and to our board, but to all of 16 the external audiences; our partners, the Commission 17 Staff. This information was provided I believe 18 month-- I think the K-Reports were provided monthly 19 and certainly then this was summarized at a high level 20 in the quarterly reports. 21 So last question on this. So then as the 22 0. president of Kansas City Power and Light, were you 23
 - able to identify and explain the cost overruns on the Iatan projects?

- 1 Yes. Α. 2 Now, let me ask you just a couple of Q. 3 clean-up questions. Commissioner Jarrett also asked 4 you a little bit about the decision to use multi-prime 5 versus EPC. Do you recall that? I do. 6 Α. And if Commissioner Jarrett wanted to 7 0. learn more about that process, is that explained in 8 your direct testimony? 9 10 Α. Yes. Would you turn to page 55 of your 11 Q. rebuttal testimony, please. Beginning with a question 12 I believe on line 14 there, do you discuss the **1**3 decision to use multi-prime approach as --14 l You said rebuttal. You meant direct 15 Α. testimonv? 16 17 No, I think I meant rebuttal. Page 55, 0. line 14, Mr. Drabinski appears to be saying. 18 19 Α. Yes. 20 Q. Yes. 21 Α. Okay. So beginning on line 14 there, do you 22 Q. 23
 - Q. So beginning on line 14 there, do you discuss the decision to use a multi-prime rather than contracting with a single vendor for EPC?

And does that discussion go on through 1 Q. 2 page 61 of your direct testimony? MR. WILLIAMS: That would be rebuttal, 3 wouldn't it? 4 BY MR. HATFIELD: 5 Rebuttal. See you got me doing it. Your 6 0. rebuttal testimony? 7 8 Α. Yes. Thank you. And is there another -- I may 9 Q. have already asked you this. Is there another witness 10 coming up who could also discuss the decision to use 11 12 multi-prime? 13 Mr. Roberts. Α. All right. And also attached to your --14 Q. you also had a discussion I think maybe with 15 Commissioner Gunn, but I can't recall, about -- how do 16 l we say it -- what I'm going to call pulsing the market 17 l or looking around to see if there were EPC contractors 18 available. Do you recall that? 19 20 Α. I do. Might have been with Mr. Schwarz 21 Q. 22 actually. Can you look at Schedule 10 of your rebuttal testimony. And it's only one page so don't 231 24 miss it.

That's correct. I've got it.

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Α.

Q. Okay. Can you explain for the Commission a little bit what the purpose of Schedule 10 is?

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A. Well, this reflects a memo from Steve
Jones who was heading purchasing at the time. It's
dated May 24th, 2006. And it discusses a phone
conversation he had with the head of marketing for The
Washington Group, one of the large vendors; in fact, I
believe as was mentioned.

And it was the basis for some of the comments that I made that said basically it was a heated market and The Washington Group was doing business with their close allies and relationships that already existed and that we were going to be challenged trying to find interest for the balance of plant construction for Iatan 2 given the overheated market.

- Q. Okay. And when was this memo prepared?
- A. Well, it's dated May 24th, 2006. They declined interest in -- in -- in this conversation and we were asking them if they would be interested in working with us.
- Q. Well, and now I've got something just -I don't remember what the context is exactly, but you
 had a discussion about the board minutes that
 contained the control budget estimate for 2006. And I

think you said perhaps to Mr. Schwarz that you had some -- I wrote down trouble with the number for Schiff Hardin?

A. Yes.

- Q. And is there another witness still scheduled to testify who could provide some more detail about the control budget estimate for Schiff Hardin?
- A. Yes. Forrest Archibald, who's in charge of our cost area, who's -- will be a witness and who had similar trouble with that number.
- Q. There's a pen up here somebody got from a vendor that doesn't work. So I don't know if that's a violation of policy or -- I just want to disclose, put it right there.

Okay. I guess -- other detail -- you and Mr. Williams had a discussion about the filing of the control budget estimate or the definitive estimate and I don't recall whether you said filing or not, but whether you did, I want to be clear on something. Was there ever a filing -- formal filing with the Missouri Public Service Commission where you said --

- A. No.
- Q. -- we're filing our budget?
- 25 A. If I used filing, it certainly wasn't in

a regulatory sense. I did say that we presented the 1 2 control budget estimate to the Staff Jan-- in January -- January 22nd of 2007. 3 4 Q. All right. But there was no formal 5 filing --Not that I'm --6 Α. -- in the sense of a regulatory filing 7 0. with the Commission? 8 Not that I'm aware of. 9 Okay. All right. I know you want to 10 Q. spend some more time talking about gift policy and 11 Schiff Hardin so -- somebody, I believe it was 12 Commissioner Gunn, asked you about coming up with the 13 idea to hire Schiff. Do you -- who came up with that 14 idea and you explained that. 15 16 Α. Yes. 17 Do you -- were you here the other day Q. when Mr. Giles testified? 18 19 Α. Yes. And I'm paraphrasing. I remember 20 0. Mr. Giles saying that in the old days, you said to the 21 construction guys, Go build a project. And whatever 22 it came back at, that's what it was and you hoped you 23 could recover your cost. Is that your understanding 24

of how the industry used to work?

A. Pretty much.

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- Q. And I remember him saying, Mr. Downey didn't want that to happen. He wanted to manage the process actively.
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. And is that -- have you already explained to the Commission that -- that that was the purpose of having independent oversight?
 - A. I -- I made that attempt to explain that.
- Q. Well, we won't have you do it again. But in some of the -- you used the word "independent" a couple of times "independent entity." And I think Commissioner Gunn used it as well. I notice that in some of Staff's testimony, maybe it's in Mr. Hyneman's testimony, he has concerns with the use of the word "independent."

So just to be clear -- and I think we've done it, but can you explain for us what you mean when you say Schiff provided independent analysis?

A. Well, they -- they -- they clearly still work for the company, but they have a separate track and separate voice up to senior management. If you're a part of the line organization, which I've referred to and you report up through the project executives, you are not independent -- you do not have an

independent track of reporting to senior management.

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You report up through your corporate vice president. In the case of Schiff, we specifically provided for an independent reporting track up to senior management so that we could hear from multiple voices and multiple views of how the project was

progressing, different point of views on issues that

were under discussion or debate.

When we got into very difficult decisions, management is making decisions in the face of uncertainty and the more information you can provide and the more points of view you can get on -on an issue, the more probability you have of reducing the uncertainty when you do have to make decisions.

- So was Schiff independent of the project Q. team then?
- They had the ability to report separately Α. from the project team. They worked very closely with the project team. They were an ally, they were on the ground every day, but they did have the ability to go around the senior project executives to senior management of the company. That's not an easy thing to manage, it's quite challenging, but very essential and I think fairly common in business today.
 - And so did you set it up that way on Q.

purpose?

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- A. Yes. Absolutely.
- Q. All right. Now, Commissioner Gunn I also believe asked you a little bit about competitive process, rate negotiation, et cetera. Did -- Schiff Hardin had a written contract; isn't that right?
- A. They did. They had an initial letter of engagement, but then in 2007 I think beginning of the year we had a written contract.
- Q. And I believe the -- there's a copy of a contract at least attached to Staff Witness Hyneman's testimony. Do you recall that?
 - A. I believe so.
- Q. And that document indicates that Schiff was agreeing to charge only its regularly -- regular hourly rates. Was that your understanding of what you were charged?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Make sure I don't have any more on that.

 All right. Okay. Let's talk briefly about -- we're almost done, believe it or not -- about the gift policy or the code of conduct. And I want to -- I want to try to clarify something. Luckily for me, Commissioner Gunn's not in the room. Commissioner Gunn said there's an outright ban on gifts. That's a

line he used. Is that true?

A. No, it's not true. And I didn't quite have the policy in total memory and it was refreshed for me. No, there -- gifts are contemplated, nominal value. And when you talk about sports events, there's a particular carve-out that allows those events to occur. And an encouragement of reciprocity. And in the case of travel, as we talked about in the events, it -- it is either we pay our own way or we have the approval of the president of the company or higher.

- Q. So does -- talk about reciprocity for a minute. I -- I had a little trouble understanding that. So does Kansas City Power and Light have events where it invites vendors?
- 15 A. Yes.
 - Q. And you pay for those?
- 17 A. That's correct.
 - Q. All right. And -- so we've got the policy I think in evidence, but just to make sure, you were saying that sporting events are acceptable under the policy?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And then let me -- let me read you a
 portion here that I think is related to the discussion
 we had about your personal travel. The policy, as I

1	understand it, says, Invitations to functions that
2	involve travel or overnight stays that are in the best
3	interest of the company will either be paid for by the
4	company or be approved in advance by the president of
5	the applicable company.
6	And is that the section you were saying
7	you believe you did comply with?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. And you did that by obtaining approval of
LO	the president of the applicable company?
۱1	A. Our chairman.
L2	Q. All right.
13	A. I would approve people below me, but he
L4	and I are the only two that can approve those trips.
15	Q. Now, kind of going backwards here, but
16	early in the discussion I think it may have been with
17	Mr. Schwarz, you were asked about personnel analysis
18	or a year-end review. Do you recall that?
19	A. I do.
20	Q. And just to give that context, can you
21	tell the Commission, was that a regular process at
22	Kansas City Power and Light to do reviews of
23	management employees?
24	Δ Yes. It is a regular process for all of

our management employees. We do a mid-year and then a

year-end review for all management employees.

- And why do you do that? Ο.
- It's a very proactive way to deal with Α. our people. We set goals, we have expectations and we -- of our management people and we follow up in a regular consistent way to talk with them about their performance, to talk about areas of -- of -- that -where they're doing well and areas for improvement. 8 when we have challenges with people, we set up action plans which they have to develop themselves for 10 self-improvement. And it -- it's just a regular 11 systematic way in which we manage our people --12
 - Okay. Q.

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- -- and grow them. 14 Α.
 - Thank you. And do you -- okay. I think Q. the document we looked at was marked as 73-HC. don't guess you have that there. It's an evaluation of Mr. Grimwade.
 - I don't believe I have it. Α.
 - Okay. Now, I think you went through that Q. with Mr. Williams perhaps and you read some sections of it. How many years of -- of evaluations of Mr. Grimwade does that document actually contain?
- This is one year from January 1 of 2006 24 Α. to December 31st of 2006. 25

JUDGE PRIDGIN: You're welcome. We are 1 2 back in public forum. WILLIAM DOWNEY testified as follows: 3 4 BY MR. HATFIELD: So now again, trying to revert back into 5 Q. next week -- next week -- last week, you were asked 6 some questions about the PEP -- actually maybe that 7 was this morning. Seems like last week. About the 8 PEP and the criteria for success in the PEP. Do you 9 recall that? 10 T do. 11 Α. 12 Q. And do you have a copy of the PEP still up there in front of you? 13 I don't think so. 14 Α. All right. I believe it's Exhibit 251. 15 Q. Wait. I think I do. 16 Α. And this is the one that has page numbers 17 0. down at the bottom. 18 19 Right. Α. They're sort of in a -- right. So we 20 Q. were talking about -- well, first of all, this 21 22 document was created when? 23 Well, this was issued June of 2007. Α. And do we have that on -- is that on your 24 Q. time line? We -- I don't know that it is. 25

- initiatives to mitigate them.
- And so does the mitigation over there Q. then explain things you can do to attempt to minimize threats to success? Is that fair to say?

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1	A. Yes, it is.
2	Q. And did Kansas City Power and Light
3	follow the mitigation plans there?
4	A. We did.
5	MR. HATFIELD: I have no further
6	questions, Judge.
7	JUDGE PRIDGIN: All right. Thank you
8	very much. Mr. Downey, thank you, sir. You may step
9	down.
10	Anything further from counsel before we
11	go on to Mr. Drabinski?
12	MR. FISCHER: Judge, could I request
13	about a five-minute break to change out counsel table
14	here and move some documents?
15	MR. SCHWARZ: I need to move some
16	documents too.
17	JUDGE PRIDGIN: That will be fine. Let's
18	go off the record. We'll take about ten minutes
19	actually. We'll come back after 10 after 5:00.
20	(A recess was taken.)
21	JUDGE PRIDGIN: All right. We're back on
22	the record. All right. Mr. Drabinski has taken the
23	stand. I need to administer an oath. Is there
24	anything further from counsel before I swear him in?
25	MR. FISCHER: Yes, Judge. Before we go