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MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CASE NO. _____

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

VERN J. SIEMEK

ON BEHALF OF

**AQUILA, INC.
d/b/a
AQUILA NETWORKS – MPS
and
AQUILA NETWORKS – L&P**

**Omaha, Nebraska
August, 2003**

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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF VERN J. SIEMEK

1 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

2 A. My name is Vern J. Siemek. My business address is Aquila, Inc., 1815 Capitol
3 Avenue, Omaha, Nebraska, 68102-4914.

4 **Q. BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?**

5 A. I am currently employed by Aquila, Inc. ("Aquila" or "Company") as Financial
6 Manager for the Nebraska Networks with responsibilities for financial management.

7

8 **Q. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND**
9 **EMPLOYMENT HISTORY.**

10 A. I earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration with Distinction
11 from the University of Nebraska at Lincoln in 1973 and am now a Certified Public
12 Accountant in Nebraska.

13 I was named to my current position in July 2002.

14 From 1994 to 2002, I held the positions of Director and Senior Director of Business
15 Services for the utility network of Aquila in the United States and was based in
16 Kansas City, Missouri. My responsibilities included analysis of utility acquisitions,
17 including the St. Joseph Light & Power Company ("L&P") acquisition.

18

19 From 1987 to 1994, I held the position of Manager of Business Development for
20 Peoples Natural Gas ("Peoples") in Omaha, Nebraska, an Aquila division with

1 operations in Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska and Minnesota. From 1984 to
2 1987, I was in charge of the Regulatory Affairs group for Peoples.

3 Before joining Peoples, I was employed for eleven years in the Regulated Industries
4 division of an international accounting firm in various capacities, including five years
5 as an audit manager. As part of my responsibilities, I supervised the audits of
6 regulated companies and the reviews of annual reports to the Federal Energy
7 Regulatory Commission.

8 **Q. HAVE YOU EVER TESTIFIED BEFORE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS?**

9 A. Yes. I have testified before the Kansas Corporation Commission, the Iowa Utilities
10 Board, the Missouri Public Service Commission ("Commission"), the Arkansas
11 Public Service Commission, and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission.

12
13 **PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

14 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

15 A. My testimony will summarize how the acquisition of L&P created substantial savings
16 from economies of scale for Missouri Public Service ("MPS"). Economies of scale
17 created savings for MPS by spreading Aquila's fixed support costs over the larger
18 base of operations and customers, which reduced support costs significantly for
19 MPS. Savings in support costs were not realized at L&P because support costs
20 allocated to L&P by Aquila replaced support costs of the standalone L&P
21 operations.

1 My testimony will also support Aquila retaining 50% of the acquisition-related
2 savings to benefit shareholders for creating those savings, of which half would be
3 used to establish a low income assistance program. I will also address our
4 proposal for the low income assistance program.

5 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY.**

6 A. My testimony can be summarized as follows:

- 7 1) There are considerable savings to MPS from spreading Aquila support costs over
8 a larger customer base.
- 9 2) The normal procedures for allocating Aquila costs give 100% of the MPS portion
10 of those merger-related savings from economies of scale to MPS customers.
- 11 3) It is equitable for Aquila to retain 50% of those benefits both as an incentive for
12 creating the savings and in lieu of recovering the costs of creating the acquisition
13 that are not now reflected in MPS or L&P costs. Retaining benefits from the
14 savings created by mergers is generally superior to recovering the costs of an
15 acquisition because it limits the impact on customers to the savings actually
16 created by the merger.
- 17 4) Aquila has not yet realized any of the benefits of the savings from the merger.
18 Cost increases and industry conditions unrelated to the merger have thus far
19 prevented Aquila from realizing those benefits.
- 20 5) Sharing in the savings created by the merger provides an incentive for companies
21 to create such savings for customers by encouraging future mergers.

22 **Q. HAVE YOU ATTACHED ANY SCHEDULES TO YOUR TESTIMONY?**

1 A. Yes. Schedule VJS-1 is an illustration of how the savings in support costs to MPS
2 customers are created by merger-created economies of scale.
3 Schedule VJS-2 is an illustration of the calculation of the support savings created for
4 MPS customers in the test period.
5
6

7 **SAVINGS CREATED BY THE MERGER IN OPERATING SUPPORT COSTS**

8 **Q. HOW ARE THE SAVINGS FROM ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN OPERATING**
9 **COSTS REALIZED BY MPS CUSTOMERS?**

10 A. MPS customers realize these savings by the reduced cost allocations (including
11 returns and depreciation on common plant) from Aquila support departments. The
12 post-merger support costs of Aquila are smaller than the pre-merger support costs
13 of the two standalone entities. The larger post-merger organization generally can
14 provide needed support for both organizations that is more efficient than either
15 organization by itself. For MPS, the specific savings result from allocating Aquila
16 support departments to the new L&P business unit. New allocation drivers reduce
17 the costs to be allocated to MPS. Schedule VJS-1 illustrates this later in this
18 testimony.

19 **Q. CAN YOU EXPLAIN IN MORE DETAIL HOW THIS ECONOMY OF SCALE**
20 **OPERATES?**

21 A. Yes. Within economy of scale, there are two major reasons that the combined
22 support costs are more cost-efficient. The first major reason is that Aquila was able

1 to eliminate activities from L&P as a stand-alone entity that are no longer needed
2 separately with L&P operating as a division of Aquila. As a result, the combined
3 Aquila support costs for those activities are virtually the same as before the
4 acquisition. Examples of this type of economy of scale synergy are:

5 -External financial reporting (financial officers, audit fees and L&P-specific
6 annual and quarterly reports);

7 -Treasury functions like raising capital and L&P-specific shareholder
8 communications;

9 -Human Resources functions like developing and managing L&P-specific
10 benefits plans; and

11 -Information Systems for billing, financial reporting and managing operations.

12 The second major area is from reduced management and supervision costs
13 needed for a standalone function at L&P. Aquila needed to add only the personnel
14 required to actually process L&P-related work, and could eliminate the layers of
15 management and supervision needed at L&P. Existing Aquila management and
16 supervision were capable of overseeing the relatively minor additional L&P
17 functions. Some examples of these areas are:

18 -Disbursements;

19 -Payroll processing;

20 -Benefits administration; and

21 -Engineering standards.

1 In other words, because of the existing support structure at Aquila, Aquila's support
2 organization was able to handle the increased workload from L&P with the addition
3 of only minor incremental costs.

4
5 *ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF MERGER SAVINGS IN SUPPORT COSTS*

6 **Q. CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE HOW MPS CUSTOMERS BENEFIT FROM THE**
7 **MERGER BY AQUILA'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT L&P'S NEEDS WITH ONLY**
8 **MINOR INCREMENTAL COSTS?**

9 **A** Yes. Schedule VJS-1 illustrates conceptually how MPS customers benefit from the
10 economies of scale produced by the L&P merger. This example has been
11 simplified to MPS and L&P only in order to more readily illustrate the impact on
12 these two operating units.

13 **Column A and Bar A** show the pre-merger support costs of MPS and L&P
14 that total \$60 million.

15 **Column C and Bar C** each show the costs after the Merger and Allocations.
16 The combined cost of MPS and L&P are reduced from the combined cost of \$60
17 million to \$52 million solely because there is very little incremental cost to Aquila to
18 support L&P. That economy of scale results in total cost savings of \$8 million from
19 the \$60 million pre-merger costs.

20 **Column E and Bar E** illustrate how the lower combined costs are now
21 allocated based on the allocation drivers within Aquila. MPS is now allocated costs

1 of \$42.12 million and L&P is allocated costs of \$9.88 from the new total costs of
2 \$52 million.

3 **Column F and Bar F** calculate the savings in support costs realized by
4 each of the units. The pre-merger costs in Column A are compared to the post-
5 merger support costs in Column E for each division. Economies of scale created
6 savings for L&P of \$.12 million (\$10.0 million less post-merger costs of \$9.88
7 million). MPS realized savings of \$7.88 million (\$50.0 million less post-merger
8 \$42.12 million).

9 Both MPS and L&P benefit from this ability to leverage existing Aquila
10 support functions. Even after factoring in the incremental support costs for L&P,
11 support costs allocated to MPS are clearly reduced by the new allocation drivers
12 that include L&P. This saves MPS significant support costs. At the same time,
13 support costs allocated to L&P are somewhat less than the premerger level. This
14 illustration indicates how the L&P standalone costs are essentially replaced entirely
15 by the allocated support costs, resulting in small savings to L&P. Most of the
16 savings are realized by the existing Aquila divisions like MPS whose costs are
17 lowered from pre-merger levels since the L&P costs were replaced by support
18 costs formerly allocated to divisions like MPS.

19
20 *ILLUSTRATIVE CALCULATION OF ADJUSTMENT*

21 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW THIS MERGER SAVINGS ADJUSTMENT IS**
22 **CALCULATED.**

1 A. Schedule VJS-2 illustrates the calculation of the adjustment. Schedule VJS-2 is
2 based on the same conceptual framework as Schedule VJS-1. Schedule VJS-2
3 illustrates the steps to calculate the merger-related savings within the context of this
4 rate proceeding:

- 5 1) Determine the allocated support costs after all proposed adjustments,
6 including the allocation of cost to MPS with L&P included in the allocations.
7 (The \$52 million on Line 1)
- 8 2) Reduce support costs by the incremental costs to support L&P to determine
9 pre-merger support costs had the merger not occurred. (The \$2 million on
10 Line 2)
- 11 3) Remove the L&P drivers from the allocation process so that none of the pre-
12 merger support costs are being allocated to or absorbed by L&P. (Under
13 the MPS % on Line 4)
- 14 4) Recalculate the support cost allocations to MPS with L&P eliminated.
15 (Under the MPS column of Line 4)
- 16 5) Compare the original allocated cost to MPS to the recalculated support cost
17 with L&P eliminated. (Line 5) The difference is the savings that MPS
18 receives from the merger.

19 In the illustrative example on Schedule VJS-2, the synergies to MPS are
20 calculated as \$7,880,000, the same as calculated in Schedule VJS-1.

21 **Q. IS THAT THE AMOUNT OF THE SAVINGS YOU ARE PROPOSING IN THIS**
22 **CASE?**

1 A. No, Schedule VJS-2 simply illustrates how the savings are calculated in an example
2 that includes only MPS and L&P. The actual calculation is much more complicated
3 due to the number of Aquila operating divisions. Company witness Beverlee Agut
4 is sponsoring testimony in which she has quantified the actual savings.

5

6 **ADJUSTMENT FOR MERGER SAVINGS IN OPERATING SUPPORT COSTS**

7 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE MERGER SAVINGS ADJUSTMENT.**

8 A. A pro forma adjustment is necessary to remove the savings that would otherwise be
9 reflected 100% in the test period. Company witness Beverlee Agut calculated the
10 savings to MPS costs. Company witness Agut also calculated the pro forma
11 adjustment (CS-17). The calculation assigns 50% of the merger-related savings to
12 Aquila, of which half is directed to the low income assistance program. The
13 remaining 50% of the savings remains in the test period to benefit all MPS
14 customers.

15

16 **SAVINGS CREATED BY THE MERGER IN RATE BASE SUPPORT COSTS**

17 **Q. ARE THERE SIMILAR SAVINGS FROM REDUCED ALLOCATIONS OF**
18 **COMMON SUPPORT ASSETS (“SHARED ASSETS”)?**

19 A. Yes, those savings arise from spreading the costs of Shared Assets over a larger
20 customer base as a result of the merger.

21 **Q. WHAT ARE THOSE SHARED ASSETS?**

1 A. Shared Assets include general plant investments for call center equipment and for
2 software development costs for computer applications such as Customer
3 Information Systems (billing) and automated mapping.
4

5 **MERGER SAVINGS ADJUSTMENT FOR SHARED ASSETS**

6 **Q. WHAT ARE THE SAVINGS CREATED FROM SHARED ASSETS FOR MPS?**

7 A. There are actually two related types of savings. The first is the reduced allocation of
8 the total Shared Assets to MPS. This includes plant, net of accumulated
9 depreciation and related accumulated deferred taxes. That saving to MPS rate
10 base should be treated similarly as the operational savings.

11 **Q. IS THERE A MERGER-RELATED SAVINGS ADJUSTMENT FOR SHARED
12 ASSETS?**

13 A. Yes. This adjustment reflects the sharing by MPS of the MPS/L&P merger related
14 rate base synergies arising from centralized support functions. RB-70 calculates
15 the reduction to corporate shared assets to determine the rate base savings to
16 MPS created by the merger. The adjustment to MPS rate base, including plant and
17 accumulated depreciation reserve, totaled \$143,956, which also reflects the
18 depreciation reserve at September 30, 2003. This adjustment adds back 50% of
19 rate base savings from shared assets to Aquila, of which half is directed to the low
20 income assistance program. The remaining 50% of the savings remains in the test
21 period to benefit MPS customers.

1 **Q. IS THERE A RELATED ADJUSTMENT TO THE RESERVE FOR DEFERRED**
2 **TAXES DUE TO THE SHARED ASSETS ADJUSTMENT RB-70?**

3 A. Yes. This adjustment (Rate Base Other Adjustment RBO-60) reflects the sharing by
4 MPS of the MPS/L&P merger related rate base synergies, and their related reserve
5 for deferred income tax savings. RBO-60 calculates the increase to the deferred
6 income taxes on the corporate shared assets from adding back 50% of the merger-
7 created savings in plant and depreciation reserves to MPS in RB-70. The
8 adjustment to MPS for deferred income taxes is \$68,917. This adjustment reflects
9 50% of rate base savings from the deferred taxes on the shared assets to Aquila, of
10 which half is directed to the low-income assistance program. The remaining 50% of
11 the savings remains in the test period to the benefit of all MPS customers.

12 **Q. WHAT IS THE SECOND TYPE OF SAVING RELATED TO SHARED ASSETS?**

13 A. The second type of saving is from the depreciation expense on the common assets
14 calculated above. That saving has already been reflected in the pro forma
15 adjustment for operating support cost, so no additional adjustment is required.

16

17 **EQUITY OF RETAINING MERGER SAVINGS**

18 **Q. YOU HAVE EXPLAINED IN DETAIL THE SEVERAL TYPES AND SOURCES**
19 **OF SAVINGS FROM THE L&P MERGER TO MPS AND L&P COSTS. IF SOME**
20 **PORTION OF THOSE SAVINGS WERE TO BE RETAINED BY AQUILA**
21 **INSTEAD OF BEING PASSED ON TO BENEFIT MPS AND L&P, HOW**
22 **WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THIS SITUATION?**

1 A. It would be equitable for Aquila to retain at least a portion of those savings because
2 the shareholders of Aquila created those savings by bringing about the acquisition
3 and they should benefit from those savings.

4 **Q. ARE THERE PRECEDENTS FOR SHARING MERGER AND ACQUISITION-**
5 **RELATED SAVINGS?**

6 A. Yes, there are many recent precedents for sharing the savings from mergers or
7 acquisitions. Many are simpler than this proposal because the acquisitions
8 occurred in a single regulatory jurisdiction. All acknowledge that the savings
9 created by acquisitions are equitably shared in some ratio between the customers
10 and the shareholders that created the savings.

11 **Q. WHAT RATIO OF SAVINGS IS TYPICALLY SHARED BY THE**
12 **SHAREHOLDERS?**

13 A. The sharing for shareholders varies from 25% to 100%.

14 **Q. WHAT RATIO OF SAVINGS HAS AQUILA PROPOSED TO RETAIN?**

15 A. Aquila proposes to retain 50% of the savings and direct half of that to the low
16 income assistance program described later in my testimony.

17 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PRECEDENTS WHERE UTILITIES HAVE**
18 **RETAINED A SHARE OF THE SAVINGS, WITH RELATED CITATIONS.**

19 A. Certainly. Some of the precedents where commissions have allowed the sharing of
20 acquisition-related savings to offset merger-related costs are as follows:

21 1. California Public Utilities Commission- RE GTE Corporation A.90-09-043,
22 Decision 96-04-053, 169 PUR 4th 358 dated April 10, 1996 "We conclude
23 that ... a 50-50 sharing of the forecasted economic savings is equitable.."
24

- 1 2. District of Columbia Public Service Commission- Re Baltimore Gas and
2 Electric Company –Formal Case No. 951, Order No 11075, 180 PUR 4th
3 393 dated October 20,1997 “We believe that the public interest ... will best
4 be served by ... ratepayers to recover ... 75% ... of the net merger
5 savings...”
6
- 7 3. Louisiana Public Service Commission –Re Entergy Corporation – Docket
8 No. U-19904, Order No. U-19904, 146 PUR 4th 292 dated May 3, 1993 “
9 The plan to allow shareholders to keep 60 percent of O&M cost savings
10 allows them a reasonable opportunity to recover the premium included in
11 their investment... without which there would be no merger savings.”
12
- 13 4. Nevada Public Utilities Commission –Re Nevada Power Company- Docket
14 No. 98-7023, 191 PUR 4th 1 dated January 4, 1999. “... The commission
15 therefore will establish a procedure that affords the shareholders a
16 reasonable opportunity to recover these [merger] costs, upon a showing that
17 merger savings are sufficient to justify these costs.” This effectively assigned
18 100% of the savings to shareholders up to the level of costs incurred.
19
- 20 5. Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy- Re Eastern
21 Enterprises- D.P.U./D.T.E. 98-27 –188 PUR 4th 225 – Dated September 17,
22 1998 “...Eastern will have an opportunity to recoup the [premium or other
23 merger transaction] costs by seeking to capture merger related
24 efficiencies...” This implies that 100% of the savings be assigned to
25 shareholders up to the level of costs incurred.
26
- 27 6. Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy- Re
28 Massachusetts Electric Company – D.T.E. 99-47 PUR 4th – Dated March
29 14, 2000 “...any recovery of ... costs will depend entirely on actual cost
30 savings achieved..” This effectively assigned 100% of the savings to
31 shareholders up to the level of costs incurred.
32
- 33 7. Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy- Re Boston
34 Edison Company- D.T.E. 99-19 195 PUR 4th 347, Dated July 27, 1999
35 “Following the expiration of the rate freeze, distribution rates established by
36 the department in any base rate proceeding would account for savings
37 gained as a result of the merger, net of the recovery of merger-related costs,
38 including an estimated \$500 million acquisition premium.” This effectively
39 assigned 100% of the savings to shareholders up to the level of costs
40 incurred.
41
- 42 8. Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy- Re Colonial
43 Gas Company – D.T.E. 98-128, 195 PUR 4th 297 Dated July 15, 1999
44 “...during the next 30 years, recovery of the acquisition premium must be
45 supported by demonstrated savings.”

- 1
2 9. Kansas Corporation Commission –UtiliCorp United, Docket No. 99-WPEE-
3 818 RTS. “The Commission finds that the Applicant should be allowed to
4 recover...to the extent that there are demonstrable savings created by the
5 acquisition...” This effectively assigned 100% of the savings to shareholders.
6
- 7 10. Illinois Commerce Commission- Re Illinois-American Water Company – 00-
8 0476, 210 PU4th 259 Dated May 15, 2001 “The Commission believes that
9 a fair treatment in this case of the savings attributable solely to the
10 Acquisition is a 50/50 sharing between shareholders and ratepayers.”
11
- 12 11. New York Public Service Commission –Re Niagara Mohawk Holdings, Inc –
13 Case 01-M-0075, Opinion No. 01-6 PUR 4th dated December 3, 2001 The
14 Commission supported a plan “...which assigns to customers 50% of the
15 additional synergies (net of cost to achieve)..”
16
- 17 12. Kentucky Public Service Commission – RE Kentucky Utility Company- Case
18 No. 98-474, PUR 4th, January 7, 2002 “...the sharing mechanism will be 60
19 percent KU and 40 percent ratepayers...”
20
- 21 13. Iowa Utilities Board –RE IPS Electric - Docket RPU-91-6, issued June 1,
22 1992. The Board awarded an incentive management award estimated at
23 \$1,000,000 annually using a 30-basis point adjustment to the equity rate of
24 return under the Management Efficiency statutes and the Board’s rule
25 implementing that statute. The discussion relating to that finding was that
26 the merger of Iowa Resources and Midwest Energy would result in significant
27 tangible financial benefit to ratepayers. The incentive management award
28 effectively gave IPS Electric a means to share in the synergies created by
29 the merger via a higher return on equity. The Order itself references an
30 earlier 50 basis point award to Midwest Gas for its effort in the merger. The
31 order also allowed the recovery of those costs over a three-year period
32 separately from the incentive
33
34

35 Clearly, many jurisdictions have realized the equity of sharing acquisition-related
36 savings with shareholders to reward the companies and to help offset the costs of
37 accomplishing the transactions that created the savings.
38

1 **RECOVERY OF ACQUISITION-RELATED COSTS**

2 **Q. SEVERAL OF THE CITED ORDERS ALLOW THE RECOVERY OF**
3 **ACQUISITION ADJUSTMENT COSTS. IS AQUILA SEEKING SPECIFIC**
4 **RECOVERY OF ANY ACQUISITION ADJUSTMENT OR PREMIUM?**

5 A. No. Aquila's proposal seeks only to share the savings created by the acquisition,
6 and does not seek specific recovery of any of the costs, including premium.

7 **Q. DOES YOUR PROPOSAL REQUEST RECOVERY OF THE COSTS TO**
8 **ACHIEVE THESE SAVINGS?**

9 A. No. Our proposal to share the savings eliminates the need to request recovery of
10 the costs. No specific costs to achieve the savings are requested, so that those
11 costs are only recoverable from the shareholder portion of the savings.

12 **Q. DID THE ACQUISITION CREATE RELATED COSTS TO SHAREHOLDERS**
13 **OF AQUILA?**

14 A. Yes, Aquila shareholders incurred costs and assumed risks in bringing about the
15 acquisition. The acquisition ultimately needs to provide shareholder benefits in
16 order to be successful.

17 **Q. WHAT COSTS HAS AQUILA INCURRED TO ACCOMPLISH THE**
18 **ACQUISITION?**

19 A. Aquila incurred costs to transition data from old computer systems to Aquila's
20 systems, to transition acquired personnel to other positions, and to transition
21 acquired personnel to Aquila benefit plans.

1 **Q. WHAT HAPPENS IF 100% OF THE MERGER-RELATED SAVINGS ARE**
2 **UTILIZED TO REDUCE THE COSTS OF MPS?**

3 A. Economically, shareholders end up absorbing the costs that produced the savings
4 for the customers. This is clearly not equitable since the parties benefiting from the
5 cost savings do not share the costs. Passing on all of the savings to customers will
6 deter future acquisitions and the savings created by them. Retaining 50% of the
7 savings for Aquila is a reasonable allocation of the savings. Half of that savings is
8 directed to the low income assistance program.

9 **Q. WHAT HAPPENS TO THE REMAINING SAVINGS?**

10 A. Aquila's proposal is to assign 25% of the total savings to a low income assistance
11 program (half of Aquila's retained 50% of the merger savings). MPS customers will
12 realize the remaining 50% in general.

13 **Q. WHAT RISKS HAVE AQUILA SHAREHOLDERS ASSUMED AS A RESULT**
14 **OF THIS ACQUISITION?**

15 A. Considerable financial risk has been incurred. Aquila must convince its
16 shareholders and the financial markets that the savings resulting from the
17 acquisition are adequate to sustain the additional capital costs incurred to
18 accomplish the merger. Failure to do so injures shareholder value. It is not enough
19 to demonstrate that the savings have been created. Those savings must be
20 retained by shareholders to offset the added capital costs of the transaction. The
21 savings method chosen ensures that customers will not be burdened with those
22 additional costs unless the savings are demonstrable. It also provides a strong

1 signal to management and investors to create current and future savings that will
2 benefit both customers and shareholders.

3
4 **SAVINGS REALIZED SINCE THE MERGER**

5 **Q. HASN'T AQUILA BENEFITED FROM THESE SAVINGS SINCE THE MERGER**
6 **WAS CONSUMMATED ON JANUARY 1, 2001?**

7 A. No. Aquila has realized little, if any, benefit from those merger savings to date. The
8 first year of integration was 2001. The full integration of L&P into Aquila required
9 methodical conversions of Information Systems technology such as billing to provide
10 a seamless transition to L&P customers. Some internal applications had to be
11 modified to provide the proper information. Integration also required completing
12 year-end report preparation for both Commission and Securities and Exchange
13 reporting. The new Aquila personnel taking over responsibility for L&P customers
14 also needed to be familiarized with the L&P records and procedures. Tariffs had to
15 be adopted or modifications requested to accommodate differences between the
16 approved tariffs of the two companies. The first year of integration resulted in
17 relatively few savings.

18 **Q. BECAUSE NO MPS RATE CASE WAS FILED IN 2001 OR 2002, DOES THAT**
19 **MEAN AQUILA WAS ABLE TO REALIZE ANY MERGER-RELATED SAVINGS**
20 **THAT YEAR?**

21 A. No. Earnings were inadequate in MPS for several years. However, rapid changes
22 in personnel and cost levels precluded the significant effort and level of accuracy of

1 costs needed to pursue rate relief. Now that those changes have been implemented
2 and are in place, it is very clear that current costs in Missouri have prevented any
3 effective realization by Aquila of the merger savings.

4 **PROVIDING BENEFITS TO CUSTOMERS**

5 **Q. HOW DO CUSTOMERS BENEFIT IF THE SHAREHOLDERS RETAIN ANY**
6 **ACQUISITION SAVINGS?**

7 A. Currently, under the Company proposal, all customers will benefit from the 50% of
8 total merger-related savings still reflected in the test period. The customers helped
9 by the low income assistance program will also benefit from the 25% of the savings
10 assigned to that program. The customers share in those savings despite not
11 contributing to their creation. If the shareholders do not retain some portion of
12 merger savings, companies will be less likely to pursue mergers that could
13 ultimately benefit customers by lowering their costs. Customers receive no such
14 savings if no mergers occur, so allowing the shareholders to retain a portion of the
15 savings is a reasonable and equitable method to lower costs to customers.

16 **Q. HAS THE COMMISSION OR COMMISSION STAFF ENUNCIATED ANY**
17 **CRITERIA IN DETERMINING WHETHER SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD**
18 **RETAIN MERGER-RELATED SYNERGIES?**

19 A. Yes. In the UtiliCorp (now Aquila)/L&P merger Case No. EM-2000-292, Staff
20 indicated a strong preference for regulatory lag as the preferred approach to
21 sharing merger-related savings. Aquila's proposal in this case to retain the merger-
22 related savings is essentially a regulatory lag-based approach.

1 **Q. HOW DOES THIS PROPOSAL CONFORM TO A REGULATORY LAG**
2 **APPROACH?**

3 A. It answers the two basic questions about the savings being retained:

4 1. Are the savings merger related? The Company's testimony clearly lays out
5 the direct connection of the savings to the merger, so that answer is YES.

6 2. Has there been a reasonable time for Aquila to realize and retain those
7 savings? That answer is clearly no. MPS results in recent years have made
8 it abundantly clear that few savings from the merger have been realized to
9 date for reasons unrelated to the merger.

10 **Q WHAT IS THE LIKELY IMPACT IF THE COMMISSION ADOPTS AQUILA'S**
11 **POSITION?**

12 A. MPS customers, including customers helped by the low income assistance
13 program, will realize a significant share of the savings created by this merger.
14 Companies will be encouraged to pursue merger transactions that will ultimately
15 provide additional economic benefits to customers, knowing that shareholders will
16 also share in the economic benefits. Shareholders will be much more likely to
17 accept the costs and risks of merger transactions if it is clear that the savings have
18 an economic value to the shareholders as well as the customers. Adopting Aquila's
19 proposal sends a clear signal to utilities currently operating in Missouri that mergers
20 that make economic sense will not be prevented or made less economic by
21 regulatory actions.

LOW INCOME ASSISTANCE PROPOSAL

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Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PROPOSAL TO BENEFIT LOW INCOME CUSTOMERS.

A. Aquila is proposing a 50/50 sharing of the merger synergies with our customers. The customer portion of these synergy savings would be immediately flowed back to all customers through a reduction in revenue requirements in the current case. In addition, one-half of the Company's share of these savings would be set aside to establish a low-income assistance program. This program would be administered by an outside third party for the payment of past due and at risk accounts of both low-income electric and gas customers.

Q. WHAT CONTROL WOULD AQUILA RETAIN OVER ADMINISTRATION OF THIS PROGRAM?

A. Essentially none. Aquila would continue to set aside funds for the low income-sharing program as long as the synergy savings from the acquisition are embedded in rates. An outside agency, such as the United Way or other organizations that have administered LIHEAP programs, would be selected to establish criteria for identification of low-income customers, determine the level of need and administer credits to their accounts.

CONCLUSION

Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION?

A. Aquila's acquisition has created significant savings to MPS from economies of scale for support costs. Those savings were created by Aquila with considerable

1 effort, cost and risk. It is fair and equitable that Aquila retain 50% of the savings
2 created from that acquisition to both reward and compensate Aquila for creating the
3 savings. Half of those retained savings would be directed to the low income
4 assistance program. The retention should be accomplished by reflecting MPS pro
5 forma adjustments retaining a portion of the savings.

6 **Q DOES THAT CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?**

7 A. Yes.