Exhibit No.:

Issues: Price Stabilization

Fund

Witness: James A. Busch
Sponsoring Party: MoPSC Staff
Type of Exhibit: Rebuttal Testimony
Case No.: GO-98-484

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION UTILITY SERVICES DIVISION

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

JAMES A. BUSCH

FILED JUL 3 0 1998

Missouri Public Service Commission

LACLEDE GAS COMPANY

CASE NO. GO-98-484

Jefferson City, Missouri July 1998

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**Denotes Highly Confidential Information **

| 1 | REBUTTAL TESTIMONY |
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| 2 | OF |
| 3 | JAMES A. BUSCH |
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| 5 | LACLEDE GAS COMPANY |
| 6 | CASE NO. GO-98-484 |
| 7 | |
| 8 | Q. Please state your name and business address. |
| 9 | A. James A. Busch, P.O. Box 360, Jefferson City, |
| 10 | Missouri 65102. |
| 11 | Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity? |
| 12 | A. I am a Regulatory Economist with the Missouri Public |
| 13 | Service Commission (Commission). |
| 14 | Q. Please describe your educational and professional |
| 15 | background. |
| 16 | A. In June 1993, I received a Bachelor of Science |
| 17 | degree in Economics from Southern Illinois University at |
| 18 | Edwardsville (SIUE), Edwardsville, Illinois. In May 1995, I |
| 19 | received a Master of Science degree in Economics from SIUE. |
| 20 | While in Graduate school, I was the tutor for the Economics |
| 21 | Department for both undergraduate students and MBA candidates. |
| 22 | Upon graduation, I was co-recipient of the Outstanding |
| 23 | Graduate Student Award in Economics as determined by the |
| 24 | faculty of the Economics Department. In April 1996, I |
| 25 | accepted a position as a Research Analyst II at the Missouri |
| | |

economic honor society.

Department of Economic Development. While there, my main focus was to keep track of the economy of the state of Missouri and to prepare the State of Missouri Quarterly Economic Report. In April 1997, I accepted my current position at the Commission. I am currently a member of the American Economic Association and Omicron Delta Epsilon, an

- Q. What has been the nature of your duties at the Commission?
- A. The main nature of my duties at the Commission has been to track the natural gas industry. This includes following the futures and option markets for the natural gas industry at both the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT). I also am involved with studying other forms of regulation. These include incentive mechanisms and unbundling.
- Q. Have you previously filed testimony before this Commission?
- A. Yes, I have previously filed testimony before this Commission in Union Electric Company, Case No. GR-97-393, and Missouri Gas Energy, A Division of Southern Union Company, Case No. GR-98-140.
 - O. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?

A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to the direct testimony filed by Laclede Gas Company (Laclede or Company) witnesses Scott E. Jaskowiak and Kenneth J. Neises. I will do this by first discussing Laclede's current experimental price stabilization program (PSP). Then, I will respond to Mr. Neises' direct testimony and Mr. Jaskowiak's direct testimony. I will then summarize my testimony and give Staff's opinion on hedging.

CURRENT PROGRAM

- Q. What is the objective of Laclede's current program?
- A. The objective of the current experimental price stabilization program is to provide price protection to Laclede's ratepayers against severe upward price spikes in natural gas during the winter heating season, which is the months of November through March.
 - Q. How does Laclede accomplish this objective?
 - A. Laclede accomplishes this objective by hedging

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- Q. What is hedging?
- A. Hedging is the taking of a position, which is purchasing or selling a financial instrument, in a financial market to protect against adverse price movements in the cash market.



in his rebuttal testimony.

Q.

A. Currently, Laclede generally purchases gas which is priced based on an index, which is determined on the first of every month. This cost is then passed on to their customers. There is no upper limit on the price. By hedging, Laclede can purchase financial instruments that limit the exposure of their ratepayers to this unlimited price increases. Staff witness Sommerer discusses this concept in much greater detail

How does hedging protect Laclede and its customers?

Q. How is price protection accomplished?

| A. Laclede accomplishes this price protection as |
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| follows. Laclede has been authorized to spend ** |
| |
| **. The purchase of |
| these instruments is solely at the discretion of Laclede, as |
| long as ***. Laclede can make |
| these purchases at anytime after they received Commission |
| approval. They then hold these instruments until ** |
| **. At that time, Laclede can |
| either ** |
| |
| **. |

Why were **____** chosen?

| 1 | A. Depending on the reason the hedge is needed, there |
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| 2 | are three principal financial instruments that can be used for |
| 3 | hedging purposes. The first hedging tool is a futures |
| 4 | contract. This locks the price at the specific contract level |
| 5 | and is expensive. The second type is a call option. This |
| 6 | caps the price at the strike price purchased, but allows the |
| 7 | purchaser to participate in downward movements. The final |
| 8 | financial instrument is a put option. This is similar to a |
| 9 | call option except it protects against downward movements |
| 10 | while allowing the purchaser to participate in upward |
| 11 | movements. Therefore, ** |
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| 16 | **. |
| 17 | Q. What is a ****? |
| 18 | A. A ** |
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| Rebuttal James A. | Testimony of Busch | | |
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| Q. | How does this accomplish the objective: | ? | |
| A. | By purchasing ****, the | Company | has |
| guarante | eed that ** | | |
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| example, | ** | | |
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| Q. | Has the current program been changed fr | om the f | irst |
| year? | | | |
| A. | Yes. The current program has two added | d change | s as |
| pointed | out in Laclede witness Neises' testimony | . The f | irst |
| caveat a | added ****. | The se | cond |
| change v | vas ** | | |
| | | * | * . |
| Q. | Based on this information, was the first | : year of | the |
| Experime | ental Price Stabilization a success? | | |

| | Rebuttal Testimony of James A. Busch |
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| 1 | A. Yes it was. The Company was able to procure ** |
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| 3 | **. |
| 4 | Q. Do you agree with Mr. Neises' description of the |
| 5 | result of the program as answered on page 4, lines 4-6 of his |
| 6 | direct testimony when he states, ** |
| 7 | **? |
| 8 | A. No, I disagree with Mr. Neises' viewpoint. ** |
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| 18 | **. |
| 19 | LACLEDE'S PROPOSAL |
| 20 | Q. In Laclede's proposal, they ask for a three-year |
| 21 | program. Is this a good idea? |
| 22 | A. No, it is not. The program that Laclede has |
| 23 | proposed is very complex and vague. They have not |
| 24 | demonstrated how their proposed plan will work. ** |

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| | Rebuttal Testimony of James A. Busch |
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| 4 | **. |
| 5 | Q. What is paper trading? |
| 6 | A. Basically, paper trading is where a hedger will look |
| 7 | at the current situation in the market and make paper or |
| 8 | simulated trades based upon the information available. |
| 9 | Q. Why does Staff feel paper trading was important? |
| 10 | A. ** |
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| 13 | <u> </u> |
| 14 | Q. ** |
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| 16 | **? |
| 17 | A. ** |
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Q. Are there any other reasons why the program should not be for three years?

A. Yes. We do not know what the future will bring. The ability to review the program by both Staff and Laclede and make necessary alterations is a more prudent course of action. If either the Commission or Laclede determines after one year that the program operates unexpectedly, that party should have the ability to get out of the program or alter it. Staff lacks the confidence to commit to Laclede's new proposal for three years.

- Q. By buying low and selling high, would not the Company be able to make money which could ultimately lower the overall cost of the program, or allow for cheaper prices?
- A. In theory, yes, it does seem like a good idea. The problem arises when the Company gets out of their positions, or sells its profitable **_____**. At this time, the Company, and ultimately, the ratepayers, is unhedged and vulnerable to unlimited adverse price movements. This situations is exactly what the program was designed to avoid. No where in Laclede's testimony or any of their responses has the Company shown how they would be able to remain hedged

while taking advantage of these potential money making opportunities. They have only indicated that in theory they would reenter the market at a later date if prices fall.

- Q. What is wrong with that approach?
- A. The problem with this approach is that the price may not fall. If that happens, there will be one of two scenarios. One, the ratepayers get nothing for their **_____**. That is, Laclede spends all of the money, and the ratepayers end up with no price protection. Or secondly, the Company has to pay for their wrong guess and guarantee a certain capped level for their ratepayers. This is the only fair way.
- Q. Does the Company's new proposal mitigate the ratepayers' risk?
- A. No. The way the company has set up their program could increase the risk to the ratepayer. It is very conceivable that the ratepayers could lose the **_____** they initially gave to the Company to acquire protection, and receive no protection.
- Q. But if the Company accepts 50% of the responsibility, doesn't that provide a risk free deal for the ratepayers?
- A. No. First of all, the Company has asked for a 90-day window of opportunity to avoid responsibility for price

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protection if the market moves against them. Second, 50% of infinite upward price exposure is still infinity.

Do you agree with Mr. Neises' answer on pages 9 and

10, lines 15-26, and 1-10, when he suggests that the current program is speculative and the Company was force to utilize only a single point-in-time decision to enter the market?

A. No, I do not. Mr. Neises claims on page 9 line 17 that there is inherent speculation in the current program.

There is less speculation, if any, in the current program than in Laclede's proposal. Currently, the only "speculation" involved is deciding when to enter, and that can hardly be considered speculation. It is not considered speculation because Laclede is simply establishing a position, they are not trying to profit off any price movement. In contrast to Mr. Neises statement on page 9, lines 20-25, the Company does not have to, and did not, "rely on a single, point-in-time, judgment of the relative economic merits of a particular" purchase. **

**. Their current proposal requires a substantial amount of speculation and good luck in order for it to work to the ratepayers advantage.

Q. What do you mean by a "substantial amount of speculation?" Isn't this supposed to be a hedging program?

A. Yes, it is supposed to be a hedging program. Speculation is the essence of their proposal. They now will not only have to speculate on when would be the right time to initially enter the market, but they will also have to speculate on when would be the best time to exit the market, and speculate again as to the best time to reenter the market. This is a lot of speculation, and much harder to do than a buy and hold strategy. If their guess is wrong, and guess is all they can do, they could harm both the ratepayers and themselves. Under the current program, the ratepayers are paying **______** for price protection. If that protection is lost due to the Company's attempt to profit, the Company should be held responsible.

- Q. But on page 9, line 26, Mr. Neises claims their "approach represents a way of reducing risk."
- A. I do not agree with Mr. Neises' statement . Their proposal imposes much greater risk on the ratepayer. It increases the number of times the ratepayers are exposed to adverse price movements, as well as the risks of losing the previous level of price protections. Paying **_____** and having no protection is a real possibility. This is far greater risk for Laclede's ratepayers than it is to any other LDCs ratepayers.

| | Rebuttal Testimony of James A. Busch |
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| 1 | Q. In Company witness Jaskowiak's direct testimony, he |
| 2 | mentions on page 3, lines 11 and 12, that "It would also be |
| 3 | permitted to purchase **** for other months." What |
| 4 | exactly is he saying? |
| 5 | A. Mr. Jaskowiak is stating that Laclede should be |
| 6 | allowed to purchase **** for the months April - |
| 7 | October. |
| 8 | Q. Why does Laclede want to purchase **** for |
| 9 | those months? |
| 10 | A. Laclede feels that they might be able to profit from |
| 11 | price movements in months that are not included in the winter |
| 12 | heating season. |
| 13 | Q. How does purchasing **** for the summer |
| 14 | months help the Company hedge its winter flowing supplies? |
| 15 | A. It does not help the Company hedge its winter |
| 16 | flowing supplies. It is purely a speculative entry into the |
| 17 | market. They would be betting with ratepayer money that they |
| 18 | will guess right on summer price movements. |
| 19 | Q. Where would Laclede get the money for such |



They would simply use some of the

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purchases?

| | Rebuttal Testimony of James A. Busch |
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| 1 | Q. If Laclede uses some of the ** |
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| 4 | A. Yes, they will have less money available to purchase |
| 5 | the protection outlined in the objectives. Therefore, the |
| 6 | ratepayers may end up losing some of their **** and |
| 7 | having less protection. |
| 8 | Q. Later in Mr. Jaskowiak's testimony he discusses the |
| 9 | Company's ability to be able to purchase ****? |
| 10 | Why? |
| 11 | A. Again, the Company is asking to be allowed to use |
| 12 | ratepayer money to speculate in the market. They are hoping |
| 13 | to make money on **** in the market. |
| 14 | The problem here is twofold. The first problem is exactly as |
| 15 | described above with the ** |
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| | Rebuttal Testimony of James A. Busch |
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| 1 | Q. So, do these two added wrinkles help the Company |
| 2 | achieve their objective of providing price protection for |
| 3 | their ratepayers? |
| 4 | A. No, they do not. They only allow the Company to |
| 5 | speculate with the ratepayers money. Keep in mind that if the |
| 6 | Company wishes to risk shareholder money to buy these |
| 7 | instruments, they have that right. Then the potential loss |
| 8 | remains where it should. |
| 9 | Q. The Company's testimony uses the terms "TSP" and |
| 10 | "CPL." What exactly are these and what do they represent? |
| 11 | A. The TSP is the ** |
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spent by the ratepayers.

| | Rebuttal Testimony of James A. Busch |
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| 1 | Q. Would you give an example? |
| 2 | A. Certainly. Let's assume that by trading in and out |
| 3 | of their positions, Laclede is able to reduce the overall cost |
| 4 | of the program by \$1 million. ** |
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| | Q. The ratepayers have their price protection and still |
| , | ended up paying less. What is wrong with that? |
| , | A. A number of things. ** |
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| Q. Please explain the two additional factors. |
| A. Certainly. ** |
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| | Rebuttal Testimony of James A. Busch |
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| | Rebuttal Testimony of James A. Busch |
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| 1 | Q. The Company says the most the ratepayers will pay is |
| 2 | ****? Why do you claim it will cost them more? |
| 3 | A. According to the program, the most the ratepayers |
| 4 | will pay for ****. That is correct. |
| 5 | The problem is that the ratepayers could end up paying more |
| 6 | for gas then what the original protection was bought for. |
| 7 | This could cause real losses to the ratepayers in the millions |
| 8 | to tens of millions of dollars, exactly what the program is |
| 9 | supposed to prevent. |
| 10 | Q. Isn't the Company guaranteeing a ****? |
| 11 | A. No, they are not guaranteeing a ****. |
| 12 | ** |
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| | Rebuttal Testimony of James A. Busch |
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| 3 | Q. What does this 90-day window mean? |
| 4 | A. It means that if Laclede is not hedged 90 days after |
| 5 | the TSP is set, and current market prices are above this |
| 6 | level, Laclede will not be responsible if high prices ensue. |
| 7 | This means that the protection, or ****, that was the main |
| 8 | focus of the program is gone. |
| 9 | Q. ** |
| 10 | |
| 11 | **? |
| 12 | A. ** |
| 13 | |
| 14 | |
| 15 | **. |
| 16 | Q. Doesn't the Company claim that obtaining low |
| 17 | **** is one of the major components of their |
| 18 | proposal? |
| 19 | A. It is one of their claims, but under the sharing |
| 20 | mechanisms described, it is counterintuitive for the company |
| 21 | to do anything but try to lower the overall cost of the |
| 22 | program by ** |
| 23 | **. |
| 24 | O Dleage explain |



| | | Testimo Busch | ,,, , | <i>.</i> | | | | |
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| | Q. | Could | you | please | provide | an | illustrative e | example? |
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| Rebuttal Tames A. | l Testimony of . Busch |
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| Q. | Could you give a numerical example? |
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| | Rebuttal Testimony of James A. Busch |
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| | <u>SUMMARY</u> |
| 16 | Q. Are there any positives to any hedging program? |
| 17 | A. Yes there are. As noted above, a simple hedging |
| 18 | program of buy and hold is very beneficial to the ratepayers |
| 19 | and the Company. It **** at some level, protecting |
| 20 | against adverse price spikes. |
| 21 | Q. Are you suggesting that the only hedging program |
| 22 | should be buy and hold? |
| 23 | A. No. There may be alternatives that could be |
| 24 | utilized that may be better than buy and hold. Unfortunately, |



available at this time.

Laclede's new proposal does not qualify as one of those programs. Therefore, a buy and hold strategy is the best plan

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Under this buy and hold strategy, should the Company Ο. simply, upon approval, acquire all the protection needed at the going market rate?

- No. To help Laclede gain more market expertise, they would be better served by entering the market in a more piecemeal manner.
 - What do you mean by piecemeal?
- What I mean, is that they should enter throughout the year, trying to take advantage of dips in the market. This would benefit both the ratepayers and the Company. ratepayers would receive lower strike prices. The Company will gain market experience and the positive image benefit of acquiring lower priced gas for the ratepayers. They would be able to show how they were able to protect the interests of the ratepayers without exposing them to all the risks associated with the Company's new proposal.
 - Q. Could you please briefly summarize your testimony?
- The Company has asked the Commission to give them permission to **_____ This would allow the Company to profit from the use of ratepayers' At this time, the Company has not proven with any



amount of certainty that their new proposal can work, or benefit the ratepayers. Staff has serious concerns with their logic. Some of their proposals are clearly defined to benefit the Company at the expense of the ratepayer. No program should be approved that is not fair to both the Company and the ratepayers.

- Q. What is Staff's opinion of hedging and hedging programs in general?
- A. Staff strongly favors hedging programs, and believes it is necessary in the ever changing natural gas industry. Staff is also aware that there is the potential to make profit in the financial markets, but warns that any attempt at making money is fraught with vast amounts of risk, not only to the ratepayers, but to the Company as well. These risks need to be considered carefully. Staff is always open to new ideas and will gladly work with any Company attempt to find better ways to protect ratepayers from abnormally high gas prices.
 - Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?
 - A. Yes it does.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

| In the Matter of Laclede Gas Company's) Tariff Sheets Designed to extend) Case No. GO-98-484 for an additional period the) Experimental Price Stabilization Fund. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES A. BUSCH |
| STATE OF MISSOURI)) ss. COUNTY OF COLE) |
| James A. Busch, of lawful age, on his oath states: that he has participated in the preparation of the foregoing Rebuttal Testimony in question and answer form, consisting of _2'/_ pages to be presented in the above case; that the answers in the foregoing Rebuttal Testimony were given by him; that he has knowledge of the matters set forth in such answers; and that such matters are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. |
| NOTARY SEAL NOTARY PUBLIC JAMES A. BUSCH |
| Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of July, 1998. |
| Rotary Public |
| Randall Z. Wright Notary Public, State of Missouri My Commission Expires: County of Cole My Commission Exp. 01/02/2001 |