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MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

UTILITY SERVICES DIVISION

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

DAVID M. SOMMERER

ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION

CASE NO. GR-2008-0364

Jefferson City, Missouri December, 2010

** Denotes Highly Confidential Information **



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1	SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY
2	OF
3	DAVID M. SOMMERER
4	ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION
5	CASE NO. GR-2008-0364
6	Q. Please state your name and business address.
7	A. David M. Sommerer, P.O. Box 360, Jefferson City, MO. 65102.
8	Q. Are you the same David M. Sommerer who filed direct testimony in this case?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?
11	A. The purpose of my surrebuttal testimony is to address the rebuttal testimony of
12	Atmos Energy Corporation (AEC, Atmos or Company) witness Rebecca Buchanan.
13	(References to AEC refer specifically to the regulated Local Distribution Company or LDC).
14	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15	Q. Please provide an executive summary of your surrebuttal testimony.
16	A. The Company provided an inaccurate assessment of Atmos Energy
17	Marketing's (AEM or Affiliate) profit/losses associated with the affiliate transaction. In the
18	final analysis, the Company was unable or unwilling to produce accurate records of AEM's
19	cost of gas related to the affiliated transaction. **
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5	** This could have been avoided had AEC
6	taken reasonable and prudent precautions to ensure reliability and continuity of its gas
7	supplies.
8	RESPONSE TO COMPANY REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
9	Q. Ms. Buchanan states on page 1 lines 16 and 17 that "Mr. Sommerer's
10	testimony has not raised any serious doubts about the prudency of the actual gas costs
11	incurred. Do you agree?
12	A. No. Items that raise serious doubt about the prudence of these transactions
13	include:
14	1) Atmos' transaction was with an unregulated affiliate. Although not prohibited,
15	the Commission's Affiliate Transactions Rule was created because of the inherent conflicts of
16	interest that may arise from the opportunity and incentive for self-dealing.
17	2) Atmos' incentive pay structure is driven by Earnings Per Share. AEM profits
18	flow to Company earnings and reward Atmos employees who develop and implement the
19	RFPs.
20	3) **
21	
22	**
23	4) Atmos had opposed efforts to review and explain AEM's documentation.

3

4 _____ ** Did Atmos hold its affiliate accountable for additional costs and penalties
5 caused by the non-delivery of nominated supplies? Self-dealing among affiliates at less than
6 "arms length" creates both opportunity and incentive for forgiveness.

Q. Ms. Buchanan discusses on page 3 of her rebuttal testimony that "the rules do
not specify that a profit constitutes a financial advantage". Do you agree?

9 A. Yes. However, I consider a marketing affiliate's use of interruptible supply or 10 use of interruptible transportation to fulfill a firm obligation to be the same as giving a financial advantage to the affiliate. It is self-evident that an affiliate may, under certain 11 12 circumstances, take risks not contemplated or reasonably available to a third party unaffiliated supplier. If an independent unaffiliated supplier assumes the risk of offering firm 13 14 service backed only by interruptible sources, it may do so undetected for a time, but over the 15 long-term it will suffer occasions when it loses its interruptible supplies that it had promised 16 as firm, causing the supplier to lose its reputation in the market as a provider of firm service. 17 The Staff's position in this case, is NOT to capture the profits of an affiliated marketer, like 18 AEM, solely because profits were made on the deal. Staff's concern grows when the 19 marketing affiliate fails to disclose relevant supply contracts, invoices, and supporting 20 documentation needed for Staff to scrutinize the transaction. When the unregulated marketing 21 affiliate fails to disclose supporting documentation, it is reasonable and proper for Staff to 22 take the position that the affiliate's full market value is the same as the LDC's fair market 23 value. Although AEM would have some administrative overhead in obtaining the fair market Q. Ms. Buchanan discusses the Company's decision to use a bidding process to acquire all gas supplies on the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4 of her rebuttal testimony. Do you agree with her characterization that Atmos does not have the personnel with the inhouse expertise to perform gas buying services?

7 A. Ms. Buchanan's discussion is made within the context of whether the No. 8 Company has "explained' the fully distributed cost to provide those gas supplies to itself. 9 Based on this discussion, Ms. Buchanan appears to limit the way Atmos can buy gas by 10 requesting the entire requirements of a specific service area (i.e. Hannibal) be limited within a 11 single formal RFP. Ms. Buchanan asserts in her discussion that AEM brings to bear some 12 special skills, access to gas markets, and a unique scope of operation not found in Atmos' gas 13 supply department. When viewed in the context of the services AEM actually did perform for 14 its LDC affiliate, Ms Buchanan's conclusion that the LDC by itself doesn't possess sufficient 15 skills and experience to access the gas markets and to buy gas for its captive ratepayers is not believable. 16

17

Q. Please explain.

A. The LDC knows the amount of its monthly requirements from the reviews it
conducts of its supply requirements. The LDC has the expertise to reasonably estimate
baseload supply needs for each month and to estimate the contractual volumes and flexibility
it requires from storage injections and withdrawals and swing and daily flowing supply for
various months and weather conditions. Thus, the LDC could reasonably acquire the
baseload volumes and swing volumes through direct contact with potential bidders or through

1	a more formal RFP process similar to that used to award its requirements to AEM. Indeed,
2	AEM's knowledge of Atmos's requirements can be no greater than Atmos' own knowledge of
3	its requirements. Smaller LDCs in Missouri order their own gas. AEC personnel assigned to
4	Missouri are part of the East Region and also manage gas supplies for other states. AEC may
5	not have access to gas buying platforms such as ICE (International Commodities Exchange)
6	because of the cost or the flexibility to bundle supply requirements of multiple parties, but
7	Atmos does have the expertise to issue RFP's, and to conduct phone or email bids.
8	Q. Ms. Buchanan believes that AEM brought special capabilities and knowledge
9	to this supply transaction. Do you agree?
10	A. Not in this transaction.
11	Q. Please explain.
12	For this ACA period, **
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8	Although the winter contracts between AEM and AEC clearly stated that the gas was
9	to be **
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17	**
18	AEM also had significant supply issues that created a critical reliability problem for
19	AEC. As noted later in my Surrebuttal, **
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1 2 3 4 5 6 ** 7 Do you agree that Ms. Buchanan's discussion on page 4, lines 13 through 20 of Q. 8 her rebuttal testimony has correctly characterized my testimony? 9 A. No. Ms. Buchanan states that I believe that fully distributed cost is less than 10 fair market price. The focus of my testimony has been on the fair market value of the service provided by AEM to AEC. The statements made by Ms. Buchanan on page 5, lines 1 11 12 through 8, show her understanding that there exists a discrete cost that reflects AEM's fair market value. In discussing AEM's fair market value she attributes to AEM some measure of 13 14 greater purchasing power and bundling of purchases (that may include non-utility customers) 15 or similar scale efficiencies. According to Ms. Buchanan, it is possible that AEM's fair 16 market value could be less than that of AEC. One possibility why AEM's fair market value 17 may be less than AEC's is that AEM obtains riskier supply. Or, AEM may have special 18 access to markets that AEC does not have. AEM's fair market value may be less than AEC's 19 because AEM is willing to take on far greater risks than AEC. Or, AEM's fair market value 20 may be less because it has expertise that does not reside in the smaller AEC gas supply 21 department. It may be that AEM's fair market value is less than AEC's because it has unique 22 access to upstream markets that are not readily available to AEC. All these factors may create 23 a difference in fair market value between AEM and AEC.

1	However, Staff has found that the one big reason explaining why AEM's fair market
2	**
3	
4	** Ultimately through
5	the course of discovery, AEM and AEC did not provide Staff with any documentation that
6	would explain Atmos' contention that AEM did not exploit AEC for greater profit as a result
7	** ** This
8	reliability concern will be described in detail later in this testimony.
9	Q. On page 5 lines 18 though 23 and page 6 lines 1 and 2 Ms. Buchanan discusses
10	the concept that additional overhead would be necessary if the LDC were to buy "such gas
11	supply" itself. What is your response to this discussion?
12	A. Atmos already has a gas supply department and the cost of the gas supply
13	function is built into general rates. I believe Ms. Buchanan is again referring to her assertion
14	that the service provided by AEM was of such a unique nature that a small LDC such as
15	Atmos could not replicate AEM's purchase of "such gas supply" on its own. Ms. Buchanan's
16	assertion sounds an alarm with Staff because it is based on the idea that Atmos, but for AEM,
17	has no extensive trading operations, no risk management operations, no access to more
18	diverse markets, no skills in aggregating supply, and no gas traders with expertise in
19	optimizing natural gas assets. Atmos' self professed inability to perform even the simplest
20	gas supply functions is a big reason why Staff sought AEM documents explaining the nature
21	of the service that AEM sold to Atmos. To date, Atmos has not provided
22	sufficient documentation to explain the value that AEM supposedly brought to the deal.

1	Nor has AEM provided any documentation of the overhead costs it has incurred to provide
2	this service to the LDC.
3	During the course of Staff's arduous discovery, it became apparent that AEM did not,
4	or would not, produce: **
5	
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8	** Some of the contract documents provided to Staff by AEM were
9	inconsistent with previous **
10	**
11	Based upon the documents that AEM did provide, it is apparent that AEM
12	bought **
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18	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
19	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
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21	** AEM rationalized this
22	practice by theorizing that the **
23	

1 2 3 4 5 ** AEM did not take this precaution. 6 On page 7, lines 8 through 16 of her rebuttal testimony, Ms. Buchanan Q. 7 discussion concludes that the "utility's open and competitive bidding process, as approved by 8 the Commission, supplies the conditions required for competitive free-market dealings." 9 What is your response? 10 A. There is a benefit in having services subject to an open bidding process when dealing with independent third party suppliers. However, Staff's inquiry does not stop at the 11 12 RFP. A supply bid process and the resulting supply contracts must contain sufficient terms and conditions to assure firm supply, except in specific situations where the LDC may not 13 14 require firm supplies, and must provide detailed explanation of penalties and consequences of 15 If an unaffiliated supplier defaults, Atmos can seek and recover failure to perform. 16 compensation for any resulting financial losses. But if an affiliated supplier, AEM, defaults 17 (gas supplies do not show up per contract), the availability of a dollar remedy is questionable 18 because the non-defaulting party, Atmos the LDC, would be put in a position of collecting 19 from itself because AEM is a subsidiary of Atmos. Moreover, the incentive for the 20 corporation is to hold its shareholder harmless. Additionally, when an LDC deals with its 21 affiliate, the LDC must have clear assurances that its affiliate provides the same high level of 22 service that is expected from non-affiliates. Equally as important, the LDC must take

appropriate action for an affiliate's non-performance, including the seeking of penalties that
 would hold captive ratepayers harmless.

Q. Ms. Buchanan discusses the concept of an "arm's-length" transaction on page 7 of her rebuttal testimony and she takes issue with Staff's statement that AEM and AEC share limited credit resources on access to liquidity and counterparty credit exposures. What is your response?

7 A. Any supplier to Atmos will have only a limited amount of financial authority 8 to enter into transactions with Atmos because Atmos and its subsidiary affiliates are viewed 9 as a single business entity. My observation is that if AEM has already executed the total 10 amount of business that counterparty is authorized to conduct with Atmos, then the available 11 pool of suppliers for the LDC will be limited. For example if producer ABC is limited to 12 \$1,000,000 of trades with Atmos as an entity, and if AEM has already acquired producer 13 ABC's business, then the pool of suppliers available to the LDC is reduced by supplier ABC 14 because AEM has swallowed all the available financial resources of that supplier.

Q. On page 8 of Ms. Buchanan's rebuttal testimony, Ms. Buchanan observes that the profits related to this particular Missouri area are so small in relation to AEC's overall earnings, their impact on any incentive compensation should be disregarded What is your response?

A. Staff's point is that if AEM does well, then the employees responsible for
buying the gas at the LDC also stand to do well. If AEM suffered significant overall losses
that drive Atmos' EPS to zero, it is unlikely that bonuses would be paid to anyone in the
Atmos organization. It is the cumulative and additive effect of AEM's financial successes in

1	many different jurisdictions that materially impact the entire enterprise's EPS, not just
2	Hannibal/Bowling Green alone.
3	Q. Ms. Buchanan states on page 2 lines 10 through 12 that "Mr. Sommerer does
4	not demonstrate how these hypothetical situations are more likely to occur with respect to an
5	affiliated gas suppler than a non-affiliated gas supplier". Have you done so or do you have
6	information to explain your assertions?
7	A. In my Direct testimony, page 10, lines 3 through 8, I stated:
8 9 10 11 12 13 14	The chief reason why Staff has inquired into the fair market value of the gas supplies that AEM provide to Atmos (the LDC) is that it is possible for AEM to use high risk interruptible or spot gas, in addition to interruptible transportation, to fulfill its firm service obligation with Atmos the LDC. Staff cannot discern from AEM's analysis whether AEM's obligations to Atmos were fulfilled by firm or interruptible supplies to the LDC.
15	For the winter of 2007/2008, Atmos did not receive the entire **
16	** and this created higher costs for
17	** and this created higher costs for customers in the Consolidated area of Hannibal, Canton, Palmyra and Bowling Green.
17 18	customers in the Consolidated area of Hannibal, Canton, Palmyra and Bowling Green.
17 18 19	customers in the Consolidated area of Hannibal, Canton, Palmyra and Bowling Green. **
 16 17 18 19 20 21 	customers in the Consolidated area of Hannibal, Canton, Palmyra and Bowling Green. **
17 18 19 20	customers in the Consolidated area of Hannibal, Canton, Palmyra and Bowling Green. **
 17 18 19 20 21 	customers in the Consolidated area of Hannibal, Canton, Palmyra and Bowling Green. **
 17 18 19 20 21 22 	customers in the Consolidated area of Hannibal, Canton, Palmyra and Bowling Green. **
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	customers in the Consolidated area of Hannibal, Canton, Palmyra and Bowling Green. ***
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	customers in the Consolidated area of Hannibal, Canton, Palmyra and Bowling Green. ***



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9	INFORMATION REQUESTED BY COMMMISSION ORDER
10	Q. Do you have the information requested in the Commission Order dated
11	November 15, 2010?
12	A. Yes. The Commission Order states, "Staff shall prepare an impartial analysis
13	comparing the projected cost of the natural gas used in the bid evaluation of Atmos Energy
14	Marketing with the price actually paid by Atmos Energy Corporation to Atmos Energy
15	Marketing under the contract, and shall file that analysis as part of its surrebuttal testimony."
16	The actual price paid by AEC to AEM is summarized in Schedule 6. The ACA period
17	in this case is September 2007 through August 2008. There were two RFP's issued that cover
18	this ACA period. One was for supply for the months of April 2007 through March 2008 and
19	the other is for supply for the months of April 2008 through March 2009. The volumes
20	considered by Atmos in its bid evaluations, the summary of the bids, and the Atmos review of
21	the total costs and rankings of the RFP bid responses are attached as Schedule 7. In both bid
22	evaluations, **
23	************

1	There are several potential flaws in the Atmos' bid evaluation. Atmos' bid evaluation
2	assumes that the LDC will **
3	** as summarized in Table 1.
4	Table 1: Atmos Hannibal, Canton, Palmyra and Bowling Green, Winter Month RFP
5	Baseload Volumes Compared to Normal Requirements
6	**
7	**
8	Because storage is nearly full at the beginning of November (planned to be 94% full)
9	and is planned to be 85% full at the end of November, **
10	** If weather was
11	warm, Atmos would not want to baseload more supply than it could reasonably use or inject
12	in storage. A summary of monthly winter normal heating degree days (HDD), warmest
12	in storage. At summary of montally whiter normal heating degree days (1100), warmest
13	month HDD, and coldest month HDD is shown in Table 2.
1 4	Table 2. Hansibal MO Harting Dama Dama
14	Table 2: Hannibal, MO Heating Degree Days
	1971 - 2000 NOAA HDD, Hannibal, MO
	Warmest Coldest Warmest Coldest
	Normal Month Month as % Month as %
	Month HDD HDD HDD of Normal of Normal
	November 684.4 405.1 906.0 59.2% 132.4% Desember 1.104.0 260.0 1.1552.1 70.0% 1.44.0%
	December 1,101.8 868.0 1,553.1 78.8% 141.0% January 1.354.0 847.5 1.680.5 67.6% 1.24.7%
	January1,254.0847.51,689.567.6%134.7%February980.0716.81,352.473.1%138.0%
	March 734.9 509.5 982.7 69.3% 133.7%

15

1	A review of the recent actual baseload nominations for November and December 2006 and
2	2007, as shown in Chart 1, supports that Atmos had not **
3	** with the exception of
4	December 2006. Also because of end of winter requirements for some of its storage contracts
5	that contain a **
6	** Thus, if
7	Atmos would not normally nominate its normal requirements for baseload in some months,
8	its bid evaluation should not make **
9	**
10	Chart 1: Baseload Nominations as % of Planned Normal Requirements
11	**
12	
12	**
13	

1	Further, the Staff notes that because Atmos considers swing volumes as part of a
2	bundled baseload and swing agreement, **
3	** Given how AEM priced
4	its bid to Atmos with a **
5	
6	** This describes
7	the structure of the demand charge. With regard to the magnitude of the demand charge
8	adder, it is likely recognition by the supplier that it must transport the gas (baseload or swing)
9	on a firm basis to HAVEN. **
10	
11	
12	** This distinction perfectly illustrates the extra permissiveness that
13	Atmos granted to AEM by allowing AEM to **
14	** Atmos shows further deference to AEM by its easy willingness to make
15	** ** It is doubtful Atmos would have
16	so favored an independent third party supplier the way it favored AEM.
17	An additional concern about Atmos' Hannibal RFP that exists with or without an
18	affiliate is that the RFP process for the Hannibal system is **
19	** (See Ms. Buchanan's Direct Schedule 2) A comparison of Butler
20	RFP results against Hannibal RFP results reveals **
21	**
22	Q. Ms. Buchanan's rebuttal testimony criticizes your reliance on AEM's P&L
23	document. What is your response?

1	A. The Company was originally asked to provide the profit & loss of AEM that
2	was associated with the affiliate transaction. The Staff was seeking an actual AEM document
3	that would have captured AEM's gross revenues and AEM's cost of gas directly related to the
4	transaction with its LDC affiliate. **
5	
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7	
8	
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10	
11	** These inquires were met with staunch
12	resistance by AEC. **
13	
14	** The Staff concludes, based on the information provided by Atmos,
15	that **
16	
17	** The disallowance
18	based upon AEM's fair market value of gas supply is approximately \$308,000. Butler is no
19	longer included in this disallowance based upon the additional information provided by AEC
20	and AEM. See attached Schedule 8.
21	Q. In what respects do you believe the Company to be imprudent?
22	A. The Company has not provided any support that its December 2007 actions
23	were reasonable. Its first-of-month baseload nominations were **

	**
During the discovery process the Company has not cooperated with Staff's	s efforts to uncove
the actual facts and circumstances surrounding the affiliate transaction.	**
	_ ** Atmos has
repeatedly stated that AEM performed in every respect, providing firm gas	s without fail. The
facts showed otherwise.	
Q. Have you considered the level of damages from the Cor	npany's imprudent
Q. Have you considered the level of damages from the Cordecision of ** **	npany's imprudent
decision of ** **	
decision of ** ** A. Yes. The Staff evaluated the impact of Atmos **	
decision of ** ** A. Yes. The Staff evaluated the impact of Atmos **	
decision of ** ** A. Yes. The Staff evaluated the impact of Atmos **	
decision of ** ** A. Yes. The Staff evaluated the impact of Atmos **	that the Company
decision of ** ** A. Yes. The Staff evaluated the impact of Atmos **	that the Company
decision of ** ** A. Yes. The Staff evaluated the impact of Atmos **	that the Company
decision of ** ** A. Yes. The Staff evaluated the impact of Atmos **	that the Company on of damages uses

1	The Staff also calculated another scenario that reasonably assumed an increase over
2	actual ** ** yielded a
3	disallowance of \$85,775. This second scenario takes the a conservative approach that
4	assumes AEC would have recognized that **
5	
6	
7	
8	** This is important
9	because a more reasonable baseload nomination allows the Company greater flexibility in the
10	event there are supply issues later in the winter or gas prices rise later in the winter.
11	Both scenarios assume that the Company could reasonably have **
12	** In summary,
13	Scenario 1 develops this ** **
14	Scenario 2 develops this amount by covering **
15	
16	**
17	Q. Ms. Buchanan has repeatedly stated in both her direct and rebuttal testimony
18	that there were not any supply issues with AEM, and that AEC experienced no interruptions
19	from AEM. Do you believe this?
20	A. No. Based upon **
21	
22	
23	



- 1 Q. Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?
 - A. Yes, it does.

3 List of Schedules

2

- 4 Schedule 1: Transaction Confirmations HC
- 5 Schedule 2: Preliminary Transaction Confirmation HC
- 6 Schedule 3: Atmos records of cuts HC
- 7 Schedule 4: Atmos Explanation of Planned and Actual Nominations, DR No. 132.1 HC
- 8 Schedule 5: DR No. 132.2 Excerpts HC
- 9 Schedule 6: Actual price paid by AEC to AEM- HC
- 10 Schedule 7: Volumes considered by Atmos in its bid evaluations, the summary of the bids,
- 11 and the Atmos review of the total costs and rankings of the RFP bid responses HC
- 12 Schedule 8: AEM Profit and Loss Adjustment HC
- 13 Schedule 9: PEPL list of customers filed with the FERC Public

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

)

In the Matter of PGA/ACA filing of Atmos Energy Corporation for the West Area (Old Butler), West Area (Old Greeley), Southeastern Area (Old SEMO), Southeastern Area (Old Neelyville), Kirksville Area, and in the Northeastern Area

Case No. GR-2008-0364

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID M. SOMMERER

STATE OF MISSOURI)		
)	SS.	
COUNTY OF COLE)		

David M. Sommerer, of lawful age, on his oath states: that he has participated in the preparation of the foregoing Surrebuttal Testimony in question and answer form, consisting of 22 pages to be presented in the above case; that the answers in the foregoing Surrebuttal Testimony were given by him; that he has knowledge of the matters set forth in such answers; and that such matters are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

David M. Sommerer

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of December, 2010.

D. SUZIE MANKIN Notary Public - Notary Seal State of Missouri Commissioned for Cole County My Commission Expires: December 08, 2012 Commission Number: 08412071

Notary Public