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12	In the Matter of the Determination)
	of Prices, Terms, and Conditions)
13	of Certain Unbundled Network
	Elements: Consideration Upon) Case No. TO-2005-0037
14	Remand from the United States)
	District Court)
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_ 0	MORRIS L. WOODRUFF, Presiding,
17	SENIOR REGULATORY LAW JUDGE.
18	CONNIE MURRAY,
	ROBERT M. CLAYTON III,
19	LINWARD "LIN" APPLING,
10	COMMISSIONERS.
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	REPORTED BY:
23	KELLENE K. FEDDERSEN, CSR, RPR, CCR
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0011	APPEARANCES:
2	PAUL G. LANE, General Counsel - Missouri LEO J. BUB, Senior Counsel
3	SBC Missouri One SBC Center, Room 3520
4	St. Louis, MO 63101 (314)235-4300
5	
6	FOR: Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP d/b/a SBC Missouri. CARL J. LUMLEY, Attorney at Law
7	Curtis, Oetting, Heinz, Garrett & O'Keefe 130 South Bemiston, Suite 200
8	Clayton, MO 63105-1913 (314)725-8788
9	
10	FOR: NuVox. XO.
	Allegiance.
11	MCI WorldCom MCI Metro.
12	AT&T. TCG Kansas City.
13	TCG St. Louis. Covad.
14	
15	MARY ANN (GARR) YOUNG, Attorney at Law William D. Steinmeier, P.C. 2031 Tower Drive
16	P.O. Box 104595
1.0	Jefferson City, MO 65110
17 18	(573)734-8109 FOR: McLeod USA Telecom Services, Inc.
19	WILLIAM K. HAAS, Deputy General Counsel P.O. Box 360
20	200 Madison Street
0.1	Jefferson City, MO 65102
21 22	(573)751-3234 FOR: Staff of the Missouri Public
	Service Commission.
23 24	
24 25	

0012 PROCEEDINGS 1 2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Good morning, everyone. We're here for oral argument today in Case 4 No. TO-2005-0037, which is concerning the determination of 5 prices, terms and conditions of certain unbundled network 6 elements: Consideration upon remand from the United States District Court. 8 We've brought you here today to set oral 9 argument. We'll begin with entries of appearance. For 10 Southwestern Bell? 11 MR. BUB: Thank you, your Honor. Leo Bub 12 for SBC Missouri. Our address is One SBC Center, 13 St. Louis, Missouri 63101. 14 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. For Staff? 15 MR. HAAS: Good morning. William K. Haas 16 appearing on behalf of the Staff of the Public Service 17 Commission. My address is Post Office Box 360, 18 Jefferson City, Missouri 65102. 19 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. I don't see anyone 20 here for Public Counsel. Any of the CLECs represented? 21 Ms. Young? 22 MS. YOUNG: Thank you, Judge. Mary Ann Young with William D. Steinmeier, P.C, P.O. Box 104595, 23 24 Jefferson City, Missouri, appearing today on behalf of McLeod USA Telecom Services, Inc. 25

JUDGE WOODRUFF: I don't see any other attorneys in the room. If anyone comes in late, we'll make a notation on the record at that time.

What I had planned to do today is allow the parties to give us about a 10-minute opening statement, stating your position on how the Commission should proceed in this case as to whether or not we need to hear additional evidence or whether we can make a decision based on the evidence that's already on the record. After you've each had your chance to make your opening statements, then I'll turn it over to questions from the Commissioners and we'll give you a chance to make a brief closing at that time if you wish.

We'll begin with Southwestern Bell. Come up to the podium, please.

MR. BUB: Thank you, your Honor. Good morning, Commissioners.

In your September 24th Order Scheduling Oral Argument, you asked us to address the question of whether the Commission should accept new evidence regarding SBC's cost capital structure and other aspects of the company's weighted cost of capital.

As you know, cost of capital is only one of a myriad of different inputs into the complex financial costing models that generated the rates in this

proceeding. In all, there were well over 30 different cost studies prepared in 2001 for this case. In these studies, in addition to the cost of capital input, you'd find inputs like labor rates for our various employees, you'd find vendor prices for equipment that's directly assigned to the cost object, you'd find values for assets that are not directly assigned to a cost object. Those are things that are known as support assets, things like land, buildings, furniture, office equipment, motor vehicles.

You'd also find inflation factors, and in this case the CLECs offered productivity factors. There were maintenance factors, depreciation factors and taxes, and those were all considered in these complex financial models that generated the rates in this proceeding.

Much evidence was presented by the parties on these diverse factors, and the Commission was called on to make specific determinations on many of these factors. But here this remand proceeding focuses one component of one factor, and that one component is the capital structure element.

As you know, the cost of capital input has three components. The first is the cost of debt element, the second is the cost of equity element, and then the third is the weighting between the two, and that's known

as the capital structure element. But only the Commission's capital structure element determination was appealed. Only that determination was vacated and remanded by the District Court.

The District Court's Order specifically states, and this is a quote, the case is remanded to the MPSC for reconsideration of the appropriate capital structure and resulting rates.

The question you have now is, what do we do now? Well, let's look at the options that the parties are suggesting that you have. First, you can just go back into your deliberations and render a new capital structure determination. You should note that no party claims that you don't fundamentally have this option. Why? Well, that's what the District Court specifically gave you in its Remand Order.

Well settled law is that on remand you only have the authority granted by the reviewing court, and here the District Court found that the Commission applied an incorrect legal standard to the evidence on capital structure. And it confirmed, the court confirmed what the appropriate standard was under the FCC's TELRIC standard, the costing standard the FCC has set out in its orders.

Your going back and applying that standard to the evidence in this case is squarely within the

authority granted by the District Court. Here SBC Missouri has suggested a traditional round of briefing to accompany this option. We think it would be helpful to you in your deliberations. For example, it would provide the specific ratio, the capital structure ratio that would be advocated by each party. Briefs could contain each party's rationale for the various capital structures that they propose, and would also provide specific citations to the record.

In our view, this approach is consistent with the District Court's Remand Order. But The CLECs and Staff recommend additional hearings to present new evidence. We strongly oppose this and believe it's beyond the authority that has been granted to you by the District Court. The District Court in their Order, they didn't authorize further hearings. They didn't authorize the gathering of additional evidence.

You need to contrast that with a recent opinion that was handed down by the Missouri Court of Appeals. That's WD-63075, and this is the Court of Appeals decision that was recently issued in the competitive classification of SBC Missouri. In that particular case, they affirmed part of it and then they remanded part of it, and in their Order they specifically say, in remanding we ask the Commission to reexamine the

competitive status of particular services by applying the effective competition factors to the evidence the Commission has already accumulated.

They indicate they reverse the Commission's findings and remand to the Commission -- this is on the last page, on page 23 -- we reverse the Commission's finding and remand for the Commission to analyze the evidence it already has available in order to determine whether effective competition for these services currently exists.

Then they say, if the Commission deems it necessary, the Commission may receive additional evidence to determine the issues in question. In this Court of Appeals Order they specifically authorize you to gather additional evidence. That was not the authority that was granted to you in the District Court's Order here in this case.

Here what the District Court did was they outlined the correct legal standard and ordered the Commission to reconsideration the appropriate capital structure and the resulting rates. And now that the Commission has the appropriate legal standard, it's bound to apply it to the evidence that's already in the record.

The capital structure issue was fully litigated before the Commission, and no party has any

right to present any new evidence that could have or should have been presented in the initial case.

Here you'll notice from the Briefs that the CLECs also claim that the Commission not only must reconsider its capital structure element determination, but they must also reconsider its determination on the other two elements of cost of capital, the cost of debt element and the cost of equity element. And you'll also note that this proposal is also opposed by not only SBC Missouri but Staff.

This proposal that the CLECs are making here to go beyond and consider these two other elements that weren't vacated, that weren't remanded, is clearly beyond the District Court's mandate. Remember, all that was vacated was the capital structure element. The debt and equity elements were not vacated. They weren't remanded. The District Court simply didn't authorize a second bite at the apple on these two elements.

Now, that should be the end of the proposal, but I think we ought to go a little bit further and look at the reasons that were given to support the CLECs' proposal to look at these two extra elements. They say that the cost of debt and the cost of equity along with the capital structure are part of an integrated formula and that they're a closely related input, so then

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you have to do them altogether.

Let's step back. Again, we talked about all the different inputs that went into these cost models. All of these elements are part of an even larger formula, and these elements are all integrated into a large cost model, and this cost model with all the integrated elements, not just the cost of capital but taxes, inflation, depreciation, those are all used on an integrated basis to produce individual rates.

The second reason that they give is that the cost of debt and cost of equity and the capital structure, they're old, and that we somehow need to have contemporary information. But doing so would cause a very serious mismatch with all the other inputs that were in the cost models that weren't appealed.

All these different cost models -- all the cost studies, excuse me, they were prepared in early 2001, and they used 1999 or 2000 year data. As we indicated, these studies incorporated things like labor rates and tax rates and inflation rates and equipment prices, and all those things change over time, and it's important when you present these models that you have consistency in data periods.

And I believe in our Brief one thing I 25 cited was the CLECs in the case itself criticized us for a

mismatch in data periods on one of the factors that we have produced where we didn't have an exact match of data. I think we were proposing to use 1999 data in with a year 2000 factor, and they criticized us for that mismatch.

Here the District Court's Order just didn't contemplate redoing these and the other factors. All they -- all the Order contemplated was reconsidering capital structure element.

A third reason that the CLECs give for looking at the extra elements is that they say that these rates can only have a prospective effect, so you need to have new data on all the elements to come up with the forward-looking cost of capital.

Ordinarily I would agree that rates apply only prospectively. That's the ordinary rule in ratemaking procedures, but that's not quite accurate here. Sure there's going to be some prospective application of these rates. These rates were designed to go into the M2A, and the M2A still has a little bit of life left into it, but it's going to expire soon. It expires in March of 2005, this coming March, and there's a provision in there that it can be extended for an additional 130 days, I believe, to allow the parties to negotiate and conduct and perhaps even arbitrate to reach a new replacement

agreement. So there is some life left in the M2A. Going

to have some -- these rates will have some prospective application, but it will be very finite, very limited.

And where these rates diverge from the normal rule is that they've also to have some retroactive. When you see that in the contract language in the M2A, it calls for a six-month retroactive true-up, and so does the Order -- Missouri Commission's Order approving the M2A. Remember that this M2A and this UNE pricing case, it arose from our Section 271 long distance case. That M2A and that Missouri 271 agreement initially contained interim rates that had not been reviewed for compliance with TELRIC.

But we were relying on that 271 agreement with the interim rates, and the Commission approved it and presented it to the FCC with those interim rates, and under the FCC law that's okay under certain conditions. Interim rates in 271 agreements are okay with the FCC if the state commission commits to replacing them with TELRIC-compliant rates and provides for a true-up mechanism.

The Missouri Public Service Commission Order approving the M2A with the interim rates contained that commitment. The Commission filed that Order with the FCC to show its commitment to review the rates for compliance with TELRIC and to have a true-up mechanism.

0022 1 The UNE pricing case underlying --2 underlies this remand was the Commission's process for fulfilling its commitment to the FCC and to the parties. 4 Now, just because the District Court 5 vacated and remanded one of the Commission's 6 determinations doesn't mean that the resulting remand is not part of the process for replacing the interim rates. It is part of the process. And the process is not 8 9 complete until the Commission has set appropriate 10 TELRIC-compliant rates. 11 So what the Commission needs to do here is 12 go back, look at the one element that the District Court 13 ordered to be reconsidered, set it, give to the parties. 14 We'll recalculate the rates, and those will be the permanent rates going forward for the M2A. 15 16 Thank you. JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you, Mr. Bub. 17 18 For Staff? 19 MR. HAAS: May it please the Commission? 20 My name again is William Haas, and I represent the Staff of the Commission in this matter. 21 22 As Mr. Bub has stated, the final sentence 23 of the Federal Court's Order reads, the case is remanded 24 to the MPSC for reconsideration of the appropriate capital 25 structure and resulting rates. The question before the

Commission is whether the Commission may admit addition evidence on remand. That answer is yes.

I would briefly discuss two cases that discuss the question of hearing additional evidence on remand. The first of those cases is State Industries vs. Moreflow Industries. That case is reported at 948 Federal 2nd 1573. That case involved an infringement of patents. The case had been tried by the federal trial court. It went up on appeal. The Court of Appeals remanded further reconsideration. The trial court reopened the record, made a new judgment, and the case is now on its second appeal.

In that case, the Court of Appeals on the second appeal stated, there is no basis for State Industries' argument that reopening the record to hear new evidence was not permitted by our decision in which we stated that we remand to the District Court to reconsider willfulness and enhanced damages. While we did not explicitly order the court to conduct a new hearing, we certainly did not forbid it.

Absent contrary instructions, a remand for reconsideration leaves the precise manner of reconsideration, whether on the existing record or with additional testimony or other evidence, to the sound discretion of the trial court.

The second case that I would like to refer to is United States vs. Bell Petroleum Services. In that case, the government brought an action to recover response costs for its cleanup of a contaminated aquifer. Like the first case, this case had been tried in the District Court, had gone up on appeal, had been remanded for further reconsideration. The District Court on remand determined that the appellate court's earlier opinion precluded consideration of additional evidence. So the trial court refused to hear additional evidence.

The case is now back up on appeal again where the Court of Appeals says, where further proceedings are contemplated by an appellate opinion, the District Court retains the discretion to admit addition evidence. Where we remand for further findings but also note that additional proceedings may be involved, our mandate does not tie the lower court's hands to a bedpost, forcing it to stare only at the record before it.

The Court of Appeals therefore reversed and remanded to the District Court to exercise its discretion to admit and consideration further evidence.

In the present case, the Staff would ask the Commission to exercise its discretion to admit additional evidence on the question of capital structure. The parties, as you have heard, disagree as to the scope

 of what that additional evidence would be.

The court order remanding this case to the Commission at page 5 notes that there are three elements to determine a cost of capital. Those three are cost of debt, cost of equity and capital structure. However, the court's order directing the Commission to reconsider this case directs it to reconsider capital structure only. It does not direct the Commission to reconsider the cost of debt and the cost of equity. Therefore, it has limited the Commission's reconsideration to the one element.

To conclude my comments, again the Staff would request that the Commission take additional evidence related to the capital structure issue only. Thank you.

JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you, Mr. Haas.

Ms. Young?

MS. YOUNG: Thank you, Judge. I certainly didn't anticipate being the leadoff for the CLECs this morning in Mr. Lumley's absence. But I just want to make a few brief points on behalf of McLeod USA.

First of all, we concur with the Staff that the Commission does have the authority to take additional evidence in this case, and we also believe that they should take additional evidence. I think it's kind of telling that Mr. Bub made a statement to the effect that now the Commission has the appropriate legal standard,

indicating perhaps before we didn't all have that appropriate legal standard before us when we put together our cases to present to the Commission. And now that the parties also have the appropriate legal standard, we think it is incumbent upon the Commission to take additional testimony on the issue that was sent back to them by the Court of Appeals.

And finally, we feel very strongly that no retroactive changes are permitted under the terms of the M2A, that we've had the six-month true-up, that any changes now need to be prospective only. Thank you.

JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you, Ms. Young. Those are all the parties who are here today. Carl Lumley is representing the bulk of the CLECs and he's not here today, and from -- has any of the other parties heard from Mr. Lumley?

(No response.)

All right. I do want to make one other note. Mr. Mark Comley contacted the Commission on Friday of last week on behalf of Birch Telecom indicating that he would like to be excused from this proceeding today, and he has -- he will be excused. We've not heard anything from Mr. Lumley.

So we'll go ahead and turn this over for questions from the Commissioners, if you'd just like to

ask any questions to any -- if you have a specific question for a specific attorney or else just ask a general question to be responded as appropriate.

So we'll begin with Commissioner Murray.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Thank you. I will ask Mr. Haas a question first. I tend to agree with you that we have the discretion, but my question is, why should we exercise that discretion? What would we get out of that in that the court has told us that we should determine capital structure absent a consideration of embedded cost? And we took the Staff's testimony, the Staff's evidence last time and applied an embedded cost analysis to it. What more are we going to get from taking additional evidence?

 $\,$ JUDGE WOODRUFF: You can respond from the table if you like.

MR. HAAS: As the record now stands, the Commission would have evidence from the CLECs who would be charged with paying these rates, and you would have the evidence from Southwestern Bell who would be collecting these rates, but you would not have heard from the Staff, a neutral party, as to what the appropriate rates would be using the standard which was enunciated by the Federal District Court.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: So you're saying that

0028 1 the Staff would present different evidence if it had to apply a different legal standard? MR. HAAS: Yes, Commissioner. The Western District Court said that the Staff could not start --5 could not even use the booked capital structure as a 6 starting point, so yes, we would have to provide additional and different testimony. 8 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: And what would you 9 use as a starting point, then? How would that differ? 10 MR. HAAS: We have not brought our consultant on yet, haven't made that determination. 11 12 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Why wouldn't we just 13 take the evidence that is before us that was presented by 14 all of the parties and just make the determination absent any consideration of embedded cost? 15 16 MR. HAAS: That is certainly an option that 17 the Commission could do in the exercise of its discretion, 18 but once again I would ask that the Staff be given the 19 opportunity to present a third party's opinion on this. 20 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: And I'm trying to 21 understand how you would come up with any different 22 capital structure information knowing that embedded costs could not be applied to your analysis. Wouldn't you have 23 24 the same numbers that you'd be using, just your analysis would be different and we could take those -- we could 25

0029 1 take the numbers that we have and just apply the correct legal analysis to them, it seems to me. MR. HAAS: New testimony from the Staff 4 would have to have a new starting base. As I understand 5 from the previous record, both the Bell witness and the 6 CLEC witness did use something other than the embedded capital structures as their starting points. 8 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: And why is it not 9 appropriate for us to use that evidence? 10 MR. HAAS: Again, that would be 11 appropriate. It's within the Commission's discretion to 12 use -- to use that evidence. 13 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: And is this -- is it 14 my under-- I mean, do I understand you correctly that the 15 Staff doesn't know right now whether you would come up with some kind of different numbers if you used -- if you 16 17 started at a different point in time or a different -- if 18 you started without using embedded cost? 19 MR. HAAS: We can only assume that, but we, 20 as I mentioned, haven't brought our consultant on yet. 21 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Ms. Young, I believe 22 you indicated that you thought there should be new 23 evidence taken because all of the parties didn't have -didn't know the appropriate legal standard at the time 25 that we had the hearing; is that correct?

0030 1 MS. YOUNG: Yes, Judge, in terms --2 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Ms. Young, you need to use 3 your microphone. 4 MS. YOUNG: The parties did not have the 5 benefit of the Court's guidance at that time. I mean, we 6 had the general legal standard, but not this guidance from the Court of Appeals. 8 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: And how would that 9 guidance, knowing that you don't start with embedded cost, how would that change the numbers that you would come up 10 11 with? 12 MS. YOUNG: We're essentially the same 13 position as Staff, I believe, to the extent the CLECs 14 would provide additional testimony, the consultant that 15 would be utilized has not, I don't think, been identified 16 and retained. COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Thank you. 17 18 Mr. Bub, the evidence that was presented 19 previously was presented without -- from SBC and from the 20 CLECs I understand was presented without reference to 21 embedded cost; is that right? 22 MR. BUB: That's exactly right with SBC. With the CLECs, what they did was they had two capital 23 24 structures that they had evidence on. One was a 25 market-based capital structure, which was very close to

what we had proposed, and then they also had a book value capital structure. What they did is they averaged the two.

I think the position that you're in right now is the same position that the FCC was in in the Verizon Virginia arbitration. In that position Staff was not a party, they didn't present any evidence, and they had evidence from the CLECs, from AT&T and WorldCom, and then they had Verizon Virginia. And Verizon Virginia proposed a market value capital structure, and then AT&T WorldCom made a proposal that was nearly identical to what we have.

They proposed a, what the FCC described as a weighted average cost of capital formula using book and market average rates. And the FCC rule, and for the reasons they describe above, which was similar to the District Court's Order rejecting book value, we give no weight to the portion of AT&T WorldCom's proposal that is based on incumbent LEC's book value capital structure. And then they go on to make some adjustments to the market value capital structure, and they came out to 80 percent/20 percent equity/debt ratio.

So you're in a very similar position to what the FCC was where you have two competing proposals, one was straight in line with the FCC's rules, and the

0032 1 other had two parts, one was in line and the other wasn't. And they disregarded the part that wasn't in line and used the two pieces of evidence, one from Verizon Virginia and the other from the CLECs based on the market value. 5 We have the same information here. The 6 CLECs have market value capital structure evidence that they presented through their witness, Mr. Hershlager. 8 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: So we have market 9 value capital structure in evidence from both the CLECs 10 and from SBC; is that right? 11 MR. BUB: Yes, your Honor, both from 12 companies that will be paying and receiving, the parties 13 in interest. 14 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: And Mr. Haas, why would that market-based capital structure change from that 15 proceeding to this proceeding? 16 17 MR. HAAS: Commissioner, each witness is 18 going to look at the question differently. Bell's witness 19 and the CLECs' witness did not come up with the same 20 market capital structure. It's possible, if not reasonable, to expect that a third financial analyst would 21 22 come up with a third market capital structure. COMMISSIONER MURRAY: But at this pint we 23 24 do have two to choose from; is that correct? 25 MR.. HAAS: Yes, that's correct.

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JUDGE WOODRUFF: If I can interrupt for a moment. Mr. Lumley has joined us, if you'd like to enter your appearance.

MR. LUMLEY: Yes, sir. I apologize. Carl Lumley appearing on behalf of NuVox, XO, Allegiance, MCI WorldCom, MCImetro, AT&T, TCG Kansas City, TCG St. Louis, and Covad.

JUDGE WOODRUFF: Just to fill you in on what's happened, we've taken opening statements from the other parties and we've gone to questions from the Commissioners.

Commissioner Murray, you can go ahead. COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Mr. Haas, in that 14 there is the six-month true-up period in the M2A, is it not to SBC's further disadvantage to delay this proceeding by taking additional evidence? In other words, doesn't that further delay the point in time at which they would receive rates based on the appropriate capital structure calculation?

MR.. HAAS: Whether there will be another true-up is one of the questions that is for the Commission. I would anticipate that being a later question. Part of the question turns on what did the earlier order in the M2A mean when they talked about a true-up following the final rate or a permanent rate, when

does that rate kick in? And that question hasn't been answered yet.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: So if everyone is successful in delaying this, then at most SBC can probably hope for a six-month true-up because the time period for the M2A to run is -- we're within six months of that at this point. Is that -- do you think that's realistic to assume that this proceeding would be delayed long enough that at most SBC would be able to receive the six-month true-up?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ HAAS: If the Commission makes that decision that there is to be another true-up, yes. I mean, we are looking at the time period of the M2A running out in March.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: And if we decide that there is no true-up, then perhaps even though the rates were inappropriately set because the capital structure was based on an improper legal analysis, then SBC just loses that for the entire period; is that your understanding?

MR. HAAS: If you decide, if the Commission decides that any changes are prospective only, then whether the rates go up or down, they would only be in effect for some short period of time.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: How likely is it that a result of a recount -- a reexamination of capital

0035 1 structure omitting embedded cost would create a rate reduction? MR. HAAS: It depends, I suppose, on 4 whether the Commission decides to use a 1999 capital 5 structure and cost of debt and cost of equity or a 2004 6 capital structure and cost of debt and cost of equity. 7 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: When we're 8 considering a case that was remanded that was decided 9 in -- was the date of this decision? 10 MR. HAAS: It was dated June 17, 2004. 11 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: No. I'm talking 12 about the original proceeding that was remanded. 13 MR. LUMLEY: August 2nd, 2002. 14 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Thank you. And so 15 the time period that was examined in that proceeding where 16 all of the costs were considered and the rates were set 17 based upon that entire consideration of all of the 18 relevant factors, what time period was that? 19 MR. HAAS: The data was from 1999 and 2000. 20 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: So what would make --21 what would even arguably allow us to apply cost of capital 22 based on a different time period, or capital structure I mean, based on a different time period? 23 24 MR. HAAS: That question is probably better answered by Mr. Lumley. The Staff's proposal was that we 25

would develop a market-based 1999 or 2000 capital
structure.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: So it's your position that we would not look at a different time period than was considered for the rest of the case; is that right?

MR. HAAS: Yes, that's correct.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Now, Mr. Lumley, why would you have any basis to argue that we should look at a different time period when looking at only one issue that was remanded out of that entire case?

MR. LUMLEY: Well, and that's the problem that the Commission faces is that you made a very complex decision, as you've already indicated, covering a wide range of factors, and even that decision alone was focused on just a subset of rates. It was that specific set of interim rates as opposed to all the rates in the agreement. 19

But nonetheless, as you have -- you know, that was a 350-some-odd issue case. It was an extremely complicated case. The appeal that was taken was focused on only a couple of issues, and only one of those now still survives for any consideration. In a normal course of events when the Commission is making a rate-setting decision, whatever your decision may be, it then carries on for some indefinite period of time until someone comes

forward and says, we need to do a rate case, someone files a complaint or a company comes forward and says there's been a change in circumstances and we need a new set of rates.

In this particular case, we're dealing with a very unique situation where the Commission pursuant to its role in the 271 process accepted SBC's proposal of a model interconnection agreement that had a specific lifetime to it, and indeed that model agreement, as you've noted, expires next March.

Separate and apart from contracts that are based on that agreement, which actually could go another 135 days past that pursuant to the renegotiation sections, but certainly the model itself would not be available for adoption after March 5th and one would think practically sometime before that as well.

When the appeal was taken, no steps were taken whatsoever for any kind of a stay or anything like that. So when your decision came out and there, as you'll recall, was a fairly complicated process. After your August 2002 decision, it took quite a will for rates to actually be submitted.

There was arguments about whether -- because your initial decision did not say, here's the final rate. You said, here's our decision on these

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issues. And there was a long, drawn-out process interpreting your results into rates.

But finally in June of 2003, if I have my date correct, the Commission approved the rates in the model contract. And then after that, those rates were imported into the actual adopted agreements that were in effect, and then certainly down the road other companies have adopted the model agreement with those rates already in it as well.

So we have this unusual situation where you're operating with your limited authority to only change rates on a prospective basis, and in an environment where the process has taken quite a long time, and certainly much longer than you would have anticipated, I'm sure, when you were making your decision in the 99-227 case that we're going to have these interim rates imported into the model.

And it just so happens now that the time is running out. Now, the Federal Court itself emphasized this point in one of its footnotes, I think the first footnote where the court itself said, you know, our decision on review may well be moot by all the changes that are occurring in the time frame involved.

And that's -- we feel that's beyond our control. What we do feel is in our control is our legal 25

rights, and as this Commission noted in the 99-227 proceeding, you specifically understood that CLECs could not operate in an environment of unknown rates. They would not be able to make business plans. And that's why specifically in your language you said there would be one six-month true-up.

Well, here we are now, you know, years later. We've paid these rates. We've billed our customers based on these rates. And as I said, it just so happens that now there's only about six months left, as you've noted, on the life of the model agreement and roughly the same time period on the actual contract.

So we look at the fact that you're limited to a prospective action, and then we say what's the right answer? Well, from our perspective, to have an Order that would pass muster again or pass muster with the federal courts, it would have to be TELRIC compliant. And to say that you could set forward-looking rates in a decision today based on information that's as much as five years old we don't believe would pass scrutiny.

I fully understand the artificial constraints that are placed on you by this expiration date, but it's just a matter of how much time is passed throughout this process. We don't feel that that's -- that's reason to try and have either an unlawful

 retroactive decision or a non-TELRIC-compliant decision that says, okay, we're going to have -- we're going to set new rates today based on extremely old data.

But I would say that from our perspective the most important point is that this can only be a prospective decision. It's a -- it's a closer question in terms of the age of the data, but we still firmly believe that a court would look at it and say, you're making your decision today, and under the rules that apply you're supposed to be setting the prospective rate and, therefore, using the old data doesn't make sense.

Once you make that decision on capital structure, then everything else kind of hangs from that because the weighted average cost of capital calculation is such an integrated unit. I believe Staff agrees with us on this point, that you shouldn't mix different components.

They just have -- they have a different view on what the total set of those components should be, but I think they agree with us that you don't mix and match cost of equity from one period of time and capital structure from another. You're not -- when you're doing a math equation, you're supposed to be plugging in numbers that have a relationship.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Let me clarify. Is

your position that we ought to be taking new evidence on current cost of debt and equity and coming up with a capital structure based on today versus based on the time period in which this decision was made?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ LUMLEY: I think I lost you. When you say this, you mean the former decision? I'm sorry.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Former decision, Commission's decision.

MR. LUMLEY: Yes. It's our position that this is an integrated calculation, and that the court referred back to you the issue of capital structure and the issue of appropriate resulting rates. And we do not believe that it would be appropriate to identify a 2004 capital structure and plug it into an equation with 1999 cost of equity and cost of debt.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Let me ask you this: Do you think that the language that the Commission used, and I recall that language and I recall our discussions when we put that language in, that there would be a six-month true-up period, do you think that language was meaningless?

MR. LUMLEY: No, ma'am. A six-month true-up was implemented.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Do you think it was meaningless as to any other changes that would be court

0042 1 ordered? MR. LUMLEY: There was no provision whatsoever for any further true-up based on whether or not 4 any party chose to appeal any aspect of your decision. I 5 wouldn't say that the language was meaningless. I would 6 say the language has no application to the circumstance of some party choosing to appeal that decision. 7 8 The language was clearly tied to the 9 effective date of your rate order, and that's confirmed by 10 the conduct of the parties, because immediately after you approved the rates the true-up was implemented. If, in 11 12 fact, the intent had been to await the court process, then 13 there should have been a stay of your rate decision and 14 there should have been no implementation of that true-up. 15 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Well, I think the --16 you mentioned earlier that the Commission had stated that 17 CLECs had to have some certainty in terms of the rates they would be paying, and that's why the Commission chose 18 19 to limit that true-up period to a six-month true-up period 20 rather than saying at any time there was a change in law 21 from a court appeal or an FCC decision or whatever, that 22 we wouldn't true-up further back than six months. And I 23 have trouble seeing why that true-up does not apply here. 24 MR. LUMLEY: Well, it's our understanding of that contract language that it called for a single 25

0043 true-up and that that true-up has occurred. So --COMMISSIONER MURRAY: You're just basing it on the fact that you think it just was limited to one? MR. LUMLEY: That's correct. 4 5 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: I may have some 6 further questions, but I'll pass right now. Thank you. 7 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Before we move on to the 8 next Commissioner, I just want to deal with one issue 9 that's come up here. Some of you are standing up to 10 answer questions; some of you aren't. It seems to work 11 better with the microphones if you go ahead and remain 12 seated. We won't consider that to be a sign of 13 disrespect. 14 We'll come over to Commissioner Clayton. 15 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Since I've only been 16 in the room recently due to a child that's been up all 17 night, and I walked out without my jacket, so I apologize 18 to all the participants. 19 If Mr. Lumley wants to make his opening 20 statement or if he has any statement that he wants to add, 21 I don't have a problem allowing him to do that and then 22 I'll just have a few questions for the parties. He may 23 not have anything else, but --24 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Would you like to make an 25 opening statement, Mr. Lumley?

 MR. LUMLEY: I would like to touch on a few points, Judge. I did cover some of it in response to Commissioner Murray's question, which I appreciated her giving me that opportunity.

Overall, the point that I wanted to make to the Commission this morning is that you need to make a decision where you're trying to go before you decide how to get there, and you need to know how the results of this case will be used and how the appropriate resulting rates, as the court has directed you to establish, are going to apply.

And as I indicated in my response to Commissioner Murray's question, we believe that you have no option but to apply those rates on a prospective basis. We don't see any basis in law or in the contract that would allow you to do it retroactively. The model M2A and the M2A-based contracts, as I just indicated, call for a single six-month retroactive true-up, which occurred over a year ago and which was tied to the effective date of your rate-setting order back at that time.

And specifically there's no basis for trying to turn that into a second 24-month true-up, which was our understanding of what SBC proposed when we were last here in front of the Judge. My clients certainly do not contractually accept that kind of retroactive change

1 in their rates.

I also wanted to make the point that there is an important distinction between the model M2A, which is still before you in this case, and the numerous M2A-based contracts that are not before you in this case. And specifically, even though I represent 11 different CLECs, that is nowhere near all of the CLECs that have adopted the M2A in this state.

To the extent that you change the rates in the model, that will have a direct impact on anyone that adopts the model between now and next March, and certainly at least one company just adopted it in September. So companies are still examining it as a market entry tool, albeit now with a fairly short life to it.

But that's the end of this case is your impact on the model. The M2A-based agreements, however, do have change in law provisions, and when this Commission makes a decision in this proceeding that changes the model rates, then those procedures would kick in, and the rates could be imported prospectively into the contracts, but there's procedures for how that happens.

We also observe the possibility of prospective application not only outside the confines of this case, but also outside the confines of the M2A-based agreements under their change in law provisions. And we

have significant policy concerns about that.

I think the Commission is well aware over the years that it's been very difficult given the time frames imposed by Section 252 for you to tackle these cost and rate issues. We've run into this problem in a number of arbitrations where the Commission just has not felt that it's had adequate time to handle these difficult issues.

We have a concern about what you will do with a new weighted average cost of capital figure for Southwestern Bell that you may strike in this case. In particular, if you revisit it using the old data from 1999 or some mix of old and new data, we would have very strong concerns about then any long-term application of that number outside the confines of the M2A model and the M2A-based contracts.

On the other hand, if you take this opportunity to have an in-depth examination of a forward-looking weighted average cost of capital for SBC, then we could see that figure having prospective application after the expiration of the M2A model and the M2A-based agreements because you would have set a new forward-looking number.

Obviously it's an extremely important cost factor that has an impact on virtually every rate on a

long-term basis. Now, in the confines of this discussion, the scope of that impact is only on those rates that were interim at the time you undertook the 438 proceeding, but nonetheless it's an extremely important cost factor. And then just to touch on this again, from our view, because it's a prospective decision, and because you have to comply with TELRIC standards, you should be using forward-looking data. The data should match up so that all the inputs to the weighted average cost of capital calculation are from the same time period. And we believe that all of that dictates the holding of new hearings. And we certainly have a

the holding of new hearings. And we certainly have a concern about this sort of slice and dice approach where witnesses who testified several years ago with the assumption that all aspects of their testimony would be considered, that suddenly we would just pull out pieces of those testimony and purport to understand what the witness would have said if this part is erased and that part is erased when they were presenting their testimony as a whole.

And that's why we certainly agree with Staff that it's not a fair interpretation of prior testimony to try and pick out isolated pieces of it.

Finally, very briefly, we don't believe

that there are any impediments to this approach. We don't

 believe that the Court's mandate was as specific as SBC suggests. The Court said you did this one thing wrong and you need to give us new appropriate resulting rates, and rates is a very broad category that you have to make certain that the end result is correct.

We believe it was referred to your discretion in terms of how to proceed, that the Court did not say do this without further hearings, do this without taking new evidence. And because this is a prospective decision, we don't believe that you're bound by any theory of the law of the case, that you can look at this anew. And I appreciate the accommodation.

JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you. Go ahead. COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Thank you. I've got a number of questions here that may come off a little jumbled. I've been taking notes as we're flowing along here.

I first want to ask Southwestern Bell, since I missed part of your opening statement, if you could answer the question, what is your position on the timing of a new rate that would be established once the capital structure issue is determined? Mr. Lumley's been talking about working forward on a prospective basis. Did you state Bell's position on our power in determining these rates?

0049 1 MR. BUB: I did, your Honor, and I can run over that one more time. COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Just briefly, if you 4 would. 5 MR. BUB: We see it having a limited prospective application, because what the interim rates 6 7 would do, they were in our M2A, and this whole underling 8 UNE pricing decision, the purpose was to place those 9 interim rates in the M2A. Once the M2A expires, so do those rates. So as far as this capital structure 10 determination that you need to make now applying forever 11 12 into the future, we only see it impacting the rates for the life of the M2A. 13 14 As Mr. Lumley pointed out and we discussed earlier, the M2A does expire in March of this year. Plus 15 16 there is a provision for 130, 135-day extension to 17 accommodate negotiations and arbitration for a new agreement. And in that agreement we will be presenting --18 19 I'm sure the CLECs will as well -- current cost of capital 20 to apply for the future agreement. 21 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Is there any dispute 22 that, any decision that we make, that the rates going 23 backward will not be affected? 24 MR. BUB: Yes.

COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: I was confused. Is

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0050 1 there a dispute as to that? MR. BUB: Yes, we do have a dispute. COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Okay. I think 4 that's what I was trying to ask about. Rather than 5 looking forwarded and the 135 day life and what happens 6 after that, I'm talking about what is your position in 7 going back in affecting rates in the past and how that 8 would be corrected? 9 MR. BUB: Normally with a Commission rate 10 determination, they are prospective only. Here it's different, because not only do we have a contractual 11 12 provision that calls for a true-up, we also have 13 Commission's order approving the M2A. You have to step 14 back and look at what the M2A was all about. The M2A was 15 the interconnection agreement, the Missouri 271 16 interconnection agreement that set out all the terms under which we would interconnect with our competitors in the 17 18 context -- and that agreement's presented in the context 19 of our long distance authority case. 20 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: And what is that 21 time period? Is it six months? 22 MR. BUB: The agreement calls for six-month 23 true-up. 24 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: And Mr. Lumley said 25 that he -- it's their argument that the true-up has

already occurred. So obviously you would disagree with that. Tell me why.

MR. BUB: There has been an initial true-up, and I think you have to look at what the -- this whole thing is a process, and what the -- this goes back to the FCC law in looking at the 271 type agreements with interim rates. And if you look at the Commission's Order approving the M2A, it was its Order issued March 15, 2001. Title is Order Regarding Recommendation on 271 Application Pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of '96 and Approving Missouri Interconnection Agreement M2A.

It says, the fact that the M2A contains interim rates is no barrier to our approval. The FCC has made clear that the mere presence of interim rates -- and this is a quote from the FCC Order -- the mere presence of interim rates will not generally threaten the Section 271 application so long as an interim solution to a particular rate dispute is reasonable under the circumstances, the state commission has demonstrated its commitment to our pricing rules, and provision is made for refunds or true-up once permanent rates are set. And that's the cite to the Texas order, paragraph 88.

And your order has a parenthetical approving SWBT's Texas application despite interim rates for interconnection. The Missouri Commission goes on to

 say that the Commission finds that the M2A reflects a reasonable effort under the circumstances to set interim rates in accordance with the Act and the FCC's rules. The interim solution is reasonable because the rates are cost based. This Commission has initiated cost proceedings that will be completed expeditiously in Case No. TO-2001-438, which is the underlying case in our remand proceeding. There's two other case numbers. And SWBT has agreed to abide by the Staff's true-up mechanism.

This whole true-up process is part of the process that was outlined in the Order and in the Commission's -- and in our 271 agreement. Just because one part of the Commission's Order in which it set the final rates was reversed doesn't mean that the process is over

What we have right now are rates that have been declared unlawful because the District Court has found that the cost of -- that the capital structure element is noncompliant with TELRIC. So the rates we have in effect right now are not lawful. They've been sent back to further determine the capital structure, and once that capital structure determination is made, then you get back to us, we run it through our cost model and that will produce all the rates.

The rates, even though you issued them as

0053 1 final rates, they didn't become permanent because they were on appeal, and that one element has been reversed. COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: So if there had not 4 been an appeal, then the true-up would be satisfied and 5 the rates would be final? 6 MR. BUB: We'd be done. COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: So your argument, 7 8 the Order that was referenced, it didn't make any 9 reference to an appeal, did it, or any legal action? 10 MR. BUB: No, it did not. 11 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Or a future court 12 action making a finding? 13 MR. BUB: No. 14 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Is there anything in 15 the interconnection agreement or any other contract that 16 makes reference to changes in orders by a higher court or 17 something like it? 18 MR. BUB: I want to say change of law 19 provision. It's not really a change of law. This isn't 20 really a change of law. If I somehow wrongly conveyed the 21 impression that the District Court changed the law, that 22 was not the case. 23 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: And so according to 24 your theory that the rates would remain interim rates until there's a final order issued by this Commission 25

0054 after all appeals are final, is that what you're saying? MR. BUB: Well, certainly we don't have permanent rates that would trigger --COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Did I say rates or 4 5 rules? I may have said rules. 6 MR. BUB: I thought rates. 7 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: I meant rates. 8 MR. BUB: Certainly we don't have permanent 9 rates until this remand proceeding is completed and you 10 give us the capital structure number and that's run 11 through, then we will have permanent rates. 12 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: So what would be the 13 time period if we were to -- I suppose we have to change 14 the capital structure, but we issue our Order and let's 15 just assume nobody appeals. Okay? I know that's a great leap of faith, but let's say no one appeals, we have a 16 final Order. What is the time period going back that SBC 17 would -- that the rates would have to be modified looking 18 19 backward? 20 MR. BUB: Looking backward, our view is 21 that the initial true-up that we did, I believe it was around -- I think we went back to December '02, something 22 23 in that nature, and the rates we trued up to turned out as 24 a result of this District Court opinion to have been 25 unlawful.

0055 1 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: So to --MR. BUB: We believe that the true-up should go back to correct the true-up that --COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Two years? 4 5 MR. BUB: Yes. 6 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Okay. And that 7 would be whether the rate is increased or decreased 8 depending on the result, it would be subject to refund or 9 there would be an increase? 10 MR. BUB: Yes. 11 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: How would that be 12 handled in the contract between SBC and CLECs? Does the new rate include a factor that would try to make that up 13 14 in a six-month period? Would it look beyond that, or is 15 this even a fair question to ask? 16 MR. BUB: That's something that could 17 probably be handled through negotiation with the parties. 18 I know when we did our initial true-up, when we did the 19 calculations we shared them with the CLECs individually, 20 what we thought the true-up amount would be, and where we 21 were owed money, I think we issued credits that would 22 apply over time. 23 And whatever the true-up amount would be 24 now, I think the parties can probably negotiate the actual 25 mechanism.

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COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: So that would be subject to negotiation if, absent some settlement, then the commission could have the responsibility of deciding whether it was reflected in rates or whether the parties paid, what, a lump sum amount or periodic payments or got a payment back and had to send in the payments. Okay. Is there any way to assess a value or quantify in a dollar amount the value of this single issue out of a 30-issue case -- and I'll ask this question to all the parties -- with a change to the various positions that are proposed, what that dollar change is or could be? I guess I'll start with you, Leo. MR. BUB: I don't know if anyone's run the numbers specifically. It would really depend on the

number you come out with on capital structure. I can tell you that there's certain major drivers in a cost study. One of them's depreciation. To a large extent there's capital structure -- I'm sorry -- the cost of capital itself, but remember we're only dealing with one element. COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Well, if we make the assumption there are, I think, only two positions left. If one position was tossed out, then we have two positions

left. There's no evidence as to what the -- what that dollar amount in change from the current set of rates and 24 25 the current capital structure would be versus the CLEC

0057 1 position or versus the SBC position? MR. BUB: I don't think so, because when we actually crunched numbers and produced the rates, there 4 was a lot of variables as you pointed out, and to isolate 5 how one would change, I don't think that could be done 6 without another study. 7 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Okay. What is the 8 rate that was actually set after crunching all the 9 numbers? 10 MR. LUMLEY: 10.32 was the weighted average 11 cost of capital. 12 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Forgive me. \$10.32? 13 No. 14 MR. LUMLEY: No. 10.32 percent. Sorry. 15 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Okay. Mr. Lumley, 16 is it your position that -- does the record as it exists right now have a sufficient amount of evidence to support 17 your position at the hearing on the capital structure 18 19 issue? 20 MR. LUMLEY: Well, no, because our position 21 is that you need current data, and there would be 22 absolutely no evidence of that. 23 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: If we were to decide 24 that we're going to use the old data? MR. LUMLEY: Then we would still agree with 25

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Staff that witnesses should be allowed to restate their position in light of the Court's decision, and that we shouldn't arbitrarily try to cut out pieces of someone's prior testimony and purport to try and understand what they would have said had they known something that they didn't know.

COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: What would happen -- not that cases take a long time to work their way through the process here, but say we were not to issue a decision until right up on the edge of this March 2005 ending point. What happens? Anything?

MR. LUMLEY: We believe that it would be a moot decision.

COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Would be moot at

15 that point?
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MR. BUB: We believe we'd have to true back

17 up.

COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: True back up and then you-all would seek to -- okay. Bill? I know you're wanting to get in on this.

MR. HAAS: No, your Honor, the Staff hasn't taken a position on that question yet.

23 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Okay. Does Staff 24 have a position on the rate looking backward and forward? 25 Does Staff agree with the position of SBC or the position 0059 1 of the CLECs or does Staff have its own position on the timing of a potential change in rates? MR. HAAS: I'm not sure I followed the 4 question. Sorry. 5 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Well, as I 6 understand SBC's position is that if we make a change --7 if we make a change in the capital structure, let's say 8 that it increases the rate, that SBC believes that that 9 rate should be applied looking back to December 2002, 10 correct? 11 MR. BUB: Yes. 12 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: So not only we'd be 13 looking at a change in a rate on a prospective basis 14 looking forward, we would have to go back and have a 15 true-up for a two-year period on the change in the rate. 16 Now, if I'm misstating this, somebody correct me. Okay. Mr. Lumley has stated that the 17 18 timing of the rate, if we were to change it and it would 19 go up, or down I'm assuming, that it would take place on 20 the date of the decision looking forward, that there would 21 only be a change in the rates moving forward. What is the 22 position of Staff? 23 MR. HAAS: The Staff hasn't developed a 24 position on that question yet. 25 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: To develop a

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0060 position on that, there wouldn't be a need for evidence, that would be a legal decision, would it not? Or that's not a factual determination. 4 Okay. Thank you-all very much. 5 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Appling? 6 COMMISSIONER APPLING: A couple of 7 questions. 8 Mr. Bub, what is SBC asking the Commission 9 to decide in this case here? I want you to collect your 10 thoughts there for a few minutes while I ask a couple questions to Mr. Haas if you don't mind. Okay? 11 12 Mr. Haas, following up on a question that 13 Commissioner Clayton asked, do you think that reviewing 14 the capital structure must result in a change of the UNE 15 rates? If we reviewed it again, would that require a 16 change in the UNE rates? MR. HAAS: I think the answer would be yes, 17 18 because I don't see how the Commission could arrive at the same capital structure as it did in the previous case. 19 20 COMMISSIONER APPLING: Okay. Everybody's 21 advocating that we have the authority to admit additional 22 evidence. What would be the minimum amount of evidence 23 that we would be allowed to admit? 24 MR. HAAS: The question of how much

additional evidence to admit is within the Commission's

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discretion, but I guess the minimum would be what was an appropriate market-based capital structure for 1999 or 2000.

COMMISSIONER APPLING: This is a very complicated case, specifically with the timing, and more specifically is that only two people was here during that, two of the Commissioners was here during the time you first heard it.

But last question for you. Do you see any possibility of a settlement in this case?

MR. HAAS: That's a better question for the CLECs and Southwestern Bell.

COMMISSIONER APPLING: Okay. Thank you. Let's go back to Southwestern Bell. Tell me, what do you want this Commission to decide?

MR. BUB: Your Honor, we would like an expeditious capital structure determination. It has taken a long time to get to permanent rates, and frankly, the true-up that we made back in December 2002 we wound up giving back more money than we should have, and the longer this drags out increases the risk that we'll never get an appropriate true-up.

So we would first ask that a capital 24 structure determination be made expeditiously. We don't think a hearing's necessary. We think that there's

 sufficient evidence in the record now, both from the ones to collect the rates, SBC Missouri, and those that pay it, the CLECs.

In the case their witness Mr. Hershlanger introduced -- and this may be plowing over some ground that was discussed earlier -- he introduced two different capital structure figures. One was a book value capital structure, the other was a market-based capital structure.

As I indicated before, I think you guys are in the very similar position that the FCC was in the Verizon Virginia decision. There are some differences. Staff wasn't a party there. What the FCC did is they looked at the evidence that was presented by Verizon on the LEC, and they went with the straight market-based capital structure just like we do.

The CLECs in that case, I believe it was AT&T and WorldCom, they took a similar approach to the CLECs in this case. They had a market-based and a book-based capital structure, and then they averaged the two. What the FCC did is they said that we can't use book value in determining capital structure, so they disregarded that evidence and based their decision on what the incumbent LEC Verizon had presented on market value capital structure and what the CLECs had provided on market value capital structure and made a determination.

 Now, they didn't pick one or the other. I think they made some minor adjustments to make something else -- to square something else, but they did what we're advocating here is using the evidence that's already in the record of market-based capital structure presented by SBC Missouri and the CLECs.

On the issue of true-up, we believe that a true-up needs to be made to correct the initial true-up that was made. As far as whether or not you need to make that decision now, I don't know if that one's a critical decision that you need to make now.

I think what's critical is to get a determination, and once we have your determination we'd be able to figure out what the rates are, we'll be able to figure out what the impact is. Standing here, I can't tell you. I don't know if Mr. Lumley's clients have done the calculations to determine impact, but standing here I can't tell you how much of an impact.

If we see that it's going to be a big number, we may have one set of circumstances; if it's a small one, another. And given the limited time of the M2A, there may be some possibility when we get back together as carriers and maybe we might at that time be able to resolve the true-up mechanism. But at this point, without knowing the actual dollar amount, it's kind of

0064 1 hard to determine how things will go in the future. I think what's important is to get a new 3 capital structure number in so that we can crank the 4 rates, and then at that point if it's a material number, 5 you know, maybe we do what we want on the true-up, but 6 from our perspective what's important now is to get the 7 new rates. 8 COMMISSIONER APPLING: Mr. Bub, looking 9 into SBC's crystal ball, do you see any possibility of a 10 settlement of this case? MR. BUB: I think it would depend on what 11 12 the magnitude of the rate change would be, and we're not 13 going to know that until we find out what the capital 14 structure is. Once we get that, we'll put it through our 15 cost models, all 30-something of them, and crank out new 16 rates and then we'll be able to see what the difference 17 is. If it's small, it may not be worth changing all sorts 18 of rate tables because there are business costs involved in implementing a rate change. It may be something we 19 20 could reach settlement on. 21 COMMISSIONER APPLING: Mr. Lumley, would 22 you like to comment on it? 23 MR. LUMLEY: In terms of the settlement 24 question?

COMMISSIONER APPLING: Yes, sir.

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MR. LUMLEY: We believe because of the limited time period that we think this Commission can impact in a lawful order that the case certainly should settle. This is a very unique situation where a court has sent something back to you, but it has such a limited life to it that we do believe that the parties should be able to resolve this.

However, right now it's complicated by this idea that somehow we're suddenly exposed to a two-month -- I mean a two-year retroactive change in all the dollars we've paid.

And no, we have not been able to quantify this, and frankly it's extremely difficult because most of these rates have usage components to them, and so every single CLEC has different usage characteristics and uses different UNEs in different ways, and to try to come up with an estimate, I'm sure it's possible if someone retained an expert to run the numbers, but I don't think anybody's done that. So I wish I could tell you that we have.

But notwithstanding that, because of the limited amount of time that we believe can be impacted here, we do think that the parties should be able to resolve this by settlement.

25 COMMISSIONER APPLING: Ma'am, any comments?

 MS. YOUNG: I think generally I agree with what Mr. Lumley said, and the uncertainty of whether the Commission will determine the rates to be applied retroactively or prospectively is one that would prevent any real settlement discussions at this point, and also the uncertainty of what the extent of the evidence, additional evidence the Commission may permit the parties to provide, those two factors.

I mean, essentially we can't engage in negotiations at this point that would be meaningful and likely to result in a settlement.

COMMISSIONER APPLING: Thank you very much.

JUDGE WOODRUFF: I have a question, then
I'll come back to Commissioners for further questions as
well. It's to you, Mr. Lumley, and it's follow-up on what
Mr. Bub had indicated in discussing the true-up proposal.
Correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Bub, but I understood that
SBC's position was the Commission does not need to make a
decision on the true-up question at this time, that that
would be a decision to follow. Mr. Lumley, do you agree
with that?

MR. LUMLEY: No. That's the exact opposite message. My message was you need to know where you're going before you decide how to get there. And if you don't do that, if you don't decide, you know, right or

0067 1 wrong and whether I'm going to agree with you or disagree with you, whether I'm going to appeal your decision or not, if you don't make a decision first what it is you're going to do with your results, I don't see how you decide 4 5 what's the appropriate procedure for making your decision. 6 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Okay. And your position 7 is that there would be no further true-up? 8 MR. LUMLEY: That's correct. 9 JUDGE WOODRUFF: And Mr. Bub, can you 10 explain to me again what your true-up position is? I understand you're not asking for a new six-month true-up, 11 12 you're asking the Commission to go back and correct the 13 true-up that was done two years ago? 14 MR. BUB: Yes, your Honor. 15 JUDGE WOODRUFF: So in effect it would be a two year and six month true-up, is that --16 17 MR. BUB: Yes, if that's the correct number 18 of months. 19 JUDGE WOODRUFF: I'm just going on 20 approximate numbers. 21 All right. We'll go back to questions 22 from -- any further questions from the Commissioners? 23 Commissioner Murray? 24 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Thank you. Yes. 25 This true-up issue, I was confused as to what was being

requested here or being proposed. Mr. Bub, how does that -- if we trued this up back to the point in time that we set permanent rates in Case No. 438, how would that differ from any rate case that we would have decided and that went up on appeal without a stay, was remanded back to us to determine a specific issue and we don't go back and retroactively change rates even though a company may have been suffering under rates that were unlawful according to the court because the Commission didn't apply something correctly? How does this differ from a typical rate case where we don't go back and retroactively set rates?

MR. BUB: This differs because in the M2A agreement itself we have a retroactive true-up provision. In an order approving the M2A there is, you know, specific language approving a retroactive true-up, and it's all based out of the FCC's law of using and incorporating interim rates into a 271 agreement.

What they talked about, and this is in your Order approving the M2A -- this is your Order -- the FCC has made clear that, quote, the mere presence of interim rates will not generally threaten the Section 271 application so long as an interim solution to a particular rate dispute is reasonable under the circumstances, the state commission has demonstrated its commitment to our

pricing rules, a provision is made for refund or true-up once permanent rates are set.

So we believe this differs from a rate case because there's specific provisions both under the FCC law and the Commission's laws expressed in its Order approving the M2A and our agreement providing for a retroactive application of the rate and true-up.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: At the time permanent rates are set, and we did set permanent rates in 438, did we not?

MR. BUB: Yes.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Just like we set rates in a rate case that may get appealed?

MR. BUB: Yes, but there's nothing in the agreement, and this is maybe one point where I disagree with Mr. Lumley as far as setting the date you issued that Order. It would be our view that the rates, because of our appeal they weren't final permanent rates because it turned out they were unlawful because of the capital structure.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Okay. Let me interrupt you, because in a rate case you could argue the same thing. We decide rates. Somebody appeals. We get the case remanded based on one issue. You could still argue those weren't permanent rates because it was on

appeal, but if you didn't ask for a stay and get a stay, we still don't go back and redo those rates, do we?

MR. BUB: Not in a normal rate case because rates under state law apply only prospectively, and in this case we're going not only by the laws expressed in your Order but also under the FCC's Orders that provide for retroactive true-up. So that's the difference.

Now, I agree that there is an issue that we have on how long the true-up should be. Now, I agree that we did not ask for a stay. That's a legal question that you're going to have to determine the length of the true-up. But as far as the entitlement to a true-up, that comes from the M2A, the Order approving it and the FCC's decisions concerning the use of interim rates in a 271 agreement.

Those three things don't exist in a normal rate case, and under state law rates in a normal rate case proceeding are only prospective.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Okay. Mr. Lumley, are you -- you've indicated something earlier about you have concerns about picking out isolated pieces from the testimony because the parties didn't necessarily know what the witnesses would have said if they had known what the Court was going to say. Is that somewhat accurate?

MR. LUMLEY: Yes, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Are you saying that the CLECs and Staff would have -- witnesses would have come up with different market-based capital structures had they known that those capital -- those market-based capital structures would have been applied?

MR. LUMLEY: If I understand your question correctly, not the specific figure, but what SBC's trying to argue is, our witness came forward and said, I've achieved a rate by looking at a high and a low, okay, and achieved a capital structure in between. And what he's now arguing is, because the court threw out the low, therefore you must assume that my witness would have endorsed the high figure, and --

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: But the high figure was what your witness said was the market-based capital structure, was it not?

MR. LUMLEY: No. He said it -- and I don't have the testimony specifically in front of me, but he did not endorse it as the forward-looking market-based capital structure for SBC. He identified it as a high water mark, he identified a low water mark, and he identified a number in between those as the figure he was endorsing to you.

And they're trying to say you have to ignore everything except this one number that he happened to have in his testimony, and we don't think that's a fair

 way of interpreting someone's testimony when they don't have the opportunity to explain themselves in light of a change in circumstances.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: When I hear that, it sounds as if you're saying that the calculations of the market-based capital structure would be result-oriented rather than looking for what is a true market-based capital structure.

MR. LUMLEY: No. I'm saying that a witness had a particular approach that was an accepted approach across the country, and in a surprise move a single Federal District Court has said you have to put blinders on and you have to ignore a certain piece of evidence. And we don't know what our witness would say under those circumstances.

COMMISSIONER MURRAY: But it sounds as if you're saying your witness would say the market-based capital structure is different under those circumstances. Why would it be any different if the witness knew?

Why would it be any different if the witness knew?

MR. LUMLEY: I'm not saying that his high water mark would be different. What I'm saying is you can't ignore the fact that he didn't endorse the high water mark to you, and he should be allowed to explain in light of the court's order where he believes the appropriate result is.

0073 1 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Did the witnesses state that the high water mark was the market-based capital structure? 4 MR. LUMLEY: I don't believe they described 5 it that way, but I don't have the testimony in front of 6 me. I believe they described their result as the 7 market-based. 8 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: Okay. Staff did not 9 present any market-based capital structure; is that right? 10 MR. HAAS: The Staff -- the Staff presented 11 what it thought was a market-based capital structure, but 12 it used the booked capital structure to achieve that, and 13 the court said you can't use the booked capital structure 14 even as a starting point. 15 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: So it's accurate to 16 say that Staff didn't do a market-based capital structure analysis absent any reference to embedded costs? 17 18 MR. HAAS: Yes, that's correct. 19 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: And Mr. Lumley, I 20 believe you said that you had a concern about what we 21 would do with a new weighted cost of capital. I'm not 22 sure that I understand that as a valid concern, because in 23 this particular proceeding that was remanded to us, it would apply only to this proceeding as I understand it, 24 25 and the M2A as long as it's in existence.

0074 1 MR. LUMLEY: If that's the scope of the Commission's decision, I would agree with you. You would be eliminating our concern. What our concern is is that 4 there's a history here at the Commission of saying in 5 subsequent arbitration proceedings we just looked at a 6 certain rate question recently, and so we're just going to 7 import that decision into this new case. And that's what 8 we're worried about. I'm not saying you will do that. 9 It's an issue that we've identified as a point of concern. 10 I would agree with you that if the Commission definitively said we're only making a decision 11 12 for the purposes of closing out the M2A and we're not 13 going to rely on it in the future, you would have 14 eliminated that concern for us, I agree. 15 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: And I can see for 16 anything beyond the M2A that it would be outdated data 17 just as all the other data that was used in the M2A would be outdated. 18 19 MR. LUMLEY: That's part of our concern. 20 COMMISSIONER MURRAY: I think that's all. 21 Thank you, Judge. 22 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Clayton? 23 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: It seems like this

whole true-up question is a bigger issue than the actual

capital structure issue in terms of dollars, isn't it?

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0075 1 MR. LUMLEY: Yes. 2 MR. BUB: For us it'll depend on what the rates are. 4 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Well, still it would 5 be whether we pick -- if we go from 55/45 to 60/40, 65/35, 6 or even 84/16 or whatever Bell's position is, regardless 7 of what that is, in terms of dollars the true-up value is 8 vastly larger than what -- I mean, because you're looking at rates over a six-year period versus rates over -- rates 9 10 over a two-year period versus six months, correct? 11 MR. LUMLEY: Yes. 12 MR. BUB: Yes. From that perspective, yes. 13 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Okay. So that's a 14 huge issue in this case. 15 MR. BUB: And there is the issue of whether 16 it's a six-month or the two-year true-up. Certainly under 17 the language of the M2A it talks about six months, and we did not ask for a true-up. I think there is a legal issue 18 19 of whether we can go back and correct the true-up. That's 20 our position, at the very least there ought to be a 21 six-month true-up from the setting of permanent rates. 22 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: So that's an 23 alternative position? 24 MR. BUB: No, no, no, 25 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: I'm sorry.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ BUB: Our view is that the true-up that was made needs to be corrected.

COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: So two years looking back and forward while everyone else would -- the rates would only change looking prospectively, correct?

Okay. Teaming up the issues that we will have to take upstairs to agenda and go over, the first question is, A, whether or not we take new evidence, and if we say yes to that, it's what amount of evidence and what issues that we're going to determine.

No. 2, we actually have to make the determination of what the hypothetical capital structure would be. And then No. 3, we have to decide this issue of retroactivity versus prospective assessments of the rates.

MR. BUB: And how long that period would

16 be.

COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: Frankly, if we were -- since that's a legal issue, we should be able to decide that without any evidence. That would probably give you-all quite a bit of guidance in resolving this, wouldn't it? Maybe; maybe not.

Okay. Mr. Bub, true-up looking backward is looking back the two-year period. Would that be only a true-up with a modification of the capital structure or would that involve a true-up of other issues that have

0077 occurred, other factual issues that have occurred over 1 that two-year period? MR. BUB: Capital structure only. 4 COMMISSIONER CLAYTON: All right. 5 you, Judge. 6 JUDGE WOODRUFF: Commissioner Appling? 7 COMMISSIONER APPLING: No further 8 questions. 9 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. I don't have 10 any further questions. I'm going to give the parties a chance to give me about five minutes if they wish to make 11 12 sort of a closing statement, beginning with SBC. 13 MR. BUB: Thank you, your Honor. At this 14 time I'd just like to emphasize the importance of the 15 Commission issuing an expeditious decision on the capital 16 structure issue. Once we get that, we'll know what the 17 rate impact is, and if it is a very small impact, it may 18 be that business costs in changing rate tables, trying to 19 figure out what the true-up may outweigh the actual cost. 20 We're not going to know that until we get a 21 number. And once we get that number and can determine the 22 impact, at least from our perspective that will help guide 23 us in whether we might be able to work a settlement or 24 resolution with the CLECs in this case. 25 We don't believe a hearing is necessary.

We think you have all the evidence here that you need both to make a determination on what the capital structure should be and how long and whether or not a true-up should occur and how long it should be.

We think the only issue that you can consider is the one that was specifically remanded to you from the District Court, and that's the capital structure. I think you'd be going beyond the mandate by considering other elements, cost of debt, cost of equity.

There are a whole host of other elements and inputs into these cost studies that also were not appealed. They're not subject to change. They weren't vacated. They weren't remanded. The only thing remanded was the capital structure issue, and that's all that can be redetermined on this remand.

JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. For Staff?
MR. HAAS: Thank you. This case was
remanded to the Commission for reconsideration of the
appropriate capital structure and resulting rates. The
Staff would ask the Commission to use its discretion to
hear additional testimony on the appropriate capital
structure.

The question of whether there should be a true-up or not, although related to this case, was not part of the Commission -- pardon me -- part of the Court's

remand, and once the Commission makes this decision on the appropriate capital structure, it may be that at that point one of the parties, one of the CLECs or Southwestern Bell would make their arguments at that time as to whether there should be a true-up.

I don't want to make things more difficult than they already are, but there's the possibility that the question of whether there should be a true-up is more than a legal issue where you have a contractual term such as what is a final rate, what is a permanent rate. Where there's ambiguity you may need or want to hear testimony from witnesses who were saying we helped write that, we helped negotiate that, here is what we understood the term to mean.

But at the current time we would ask the Commission to hear additional evidence on appropriate capital structure. Thank you.

JUDGE WOODRUFF: Ms. Young?

MS. YOUNG: I would be happy to defer to

20 Mr. Lumley to go first if that's all right. 21 JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right.

JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Mr. Lumley?

MR. LUMLEY: Thank you, Judge.

23 First of all, we disagree that only one

issue has been remanded. Two issues were remanded. The first is the capital structure. The second is, what are

 the appropriate resulting rates at this time? And you have to wrestle with both of those. And as occurred in the 438 proceeding, once you make a decision on this cost study input, whether you do it solely looking at capital structure or whether you look at the full calculation of weighted average cost of capital, it's going to have to be run through cost studies. Resulting rates are going to have to be presented to you and be approved.

So all that's in front of you again. It's just the nature of using these cost studies and trying to get rates to them. You're not pulling single rates out of the air. You're changing very complicated mathematical equations and trying to verify the results, and the results have to be appropriate and that means they have to be TELRIC compliant.

Furthermore, Exhibit 1 to appendix pricing UNE of the M2A has the paragraph that discusses the one-time six-month true-up. And we can kind of get lost in labels like interim and permanent. We all know there's no such thing as a totally permanent rate. The point the Commission made was certain rates were interim because they had not been fully examined. They were interim because they were going to be subject to a one-time six-month retroactive true-up.

And retroactive price changes are very

 unusual, but you have done them on that kind of a basis. You then issued an Order that said permanent rates, and it triggered the one-time six-month interim true-up and that occurred. And that was the end of that, and we're only looking prospectively. And I just can't emphasize enough, I think it's important for you to understand how your results are going to be used so that you can make an appropriate decision how to proceed.

As Commissioner Clayton has noted, this true-up issue is the big issue. You could wrestle with capital structure and the accompanying issues and have hearings and make a decision on March the 5th of 2005 and it won't have any impact under our view, but under SBC's view we would still be subject to then a two and a half year true-up, which there's just no legal or contractual basis for.

Thank you.

JUDGE WOODRUFF: Thank you, Mr. Lumley.

Ms. Young, anything to add?

MS. YOUNG: Just very briefly. I would generally concur in Mr. Lumley's statements and especially emphasize that we do consider the question of whether the changes will be applied retroactively or prospectively as crucial. We feel that the parties should be given the benefit of the bargain for certainty that was entered into

at that time. I'd also like to correct my earlier references in my opening statement to the Court of Appeals. Too long a history of not dealing with the Federal District Court over the years. Those should have been to the Federal District Court. Thank you. JUDGE WOODRUFF: All right. Thank you very much for coming this morning. I will ask the court reporter to expedite the transcript so that we have this by this Friday, which will be October 22nd. And with that, then, we are adjourned. Thank you. WHEREUPON, the oral argument was concluded.