Exhibit No.

Issue: Payroll, Vegetation
Witness: Kelly S. Walters
Type of Exhibit: Rebuttal Testimony
Sponsoring Party: Empire District Electric Case No. ER-2012-0345
Date Testimony Prepared: January 2013

# Before the Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri 

## Rebuttal Testimony

of
Kelly S. Walters

January 2013


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REBUTTAL TESTIMONY<br>OF<br>KELLY S. WALTERS<br>THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY<br>BEFORE THE<br>MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION<br>CASE NO. ER-2012-0345

## INTRODUCTION

## Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

A. Kelly S. Walters, 602 Joplin Avenue, Joplin, MO 64801.

## Q. WHO IS YOUR EMPLOYER AND WHAT POSITION DO YOU HOLD?

A. My employer is The Empire District Electric Company ("Empire" or "Company"). I hold the position of Vice President-Chief Operating OfficerElectric.
Q. ARE YOU THE SAME KELLY S. WALTERS THAT PREVIOUSLY FILED DIRECT TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE?
A. Yes.

## Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

A. I have prepared this rebuttal testimony to respond to the Missouri Public Service Commission Staff ("Staff") and Missouri Energy Users Association ("MEUA") recommendations to exclude a significant portion of Empire's ongoing compensation levels from the cost of service in this case. My rebuttal testimony will explain how Empire's executive compensation program is designed and how Empire's approach is similar to the approach utilized by companies comparable to Empire. Further, I will explain how the overall executive compensation program in place at Empire is reasonable and quite conservative when compared to the

Company's peers within the industry and to the national marketplace as well, and why all components of executive compensation should be included in Empire's test year expense. Lastly, I will explain Empire's incentive compensation approach for non-executive salaried employees and how certain amounts Staff recommends be excluded from test year expense should properly be included. I will also address Empire's reaction to the position taken by Staff on vegetation management costs and the vegetation management tracker.

## INCENTIVE COMPENSATION

## Q. HOW IS THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PROGRAM AT EMPIRE DESIGNED?

A. Empire's executive compensation is determined and administered by the Compensation Committee of Empire's Board of Directors. The Compensation Committee is made up of five non-employee independent Empire Board members. Empire's executive compensation program is designed to provide a competitive compensation package that will enable the Company to attract and retain highly talented individuals for key positions and promote the accomplishment of our performance objectives. Empire's compensation objective is to be consistent with our industry peers while providing compensation which is conservative when compared to the same peer group. Empire's compensation program provides a base salary coupled with the opportunity to earn a higher level of total compensation utilizing incentive programs that link compensation to individual and Company performance factors. The Company targets total compensation, base and incentive pay, at the $25^{\text {th }}$ percentile of an industry specific
peer group. As explained below, the appropriate total compensation amount is determined and then a certain portion of the compensation package is put at risk. Empire's executive compensation program includes three basic compensation elements: (1) base salary; (2) annual (short-term) cash incentives based on threshold (minimum expected); target, and maximum performance measures; and, (3) long-term incentives.

## Q. WHAT PROCESS DOES THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE USE TO ESTABLISH COMPENSATION?

A. The Compensation Committee retains an independent third-party consultant to provide guidance on best practices within executive compensation as well as to provide recommendations for the establishment of a peer group and compensation levels. The Committee completed the last study with the consultant, Hay Group, in October 2012.

Attached to my rebuttal testimony as Schedule KSW-1 is the Appendix from the latest Hay Group study. Page 1 of Schedule KSW-1 provides a list of the most recently adopted industry-specific peer group. The peer group consists of sixteen regulated electric, water, and natural gas investor-owned utilities that are similar to Empire in revenue and market capitalization.

## Q. HOW DOES EMPIRE'S EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION APPROACH COMPARE TO SIMILAR COMPANIES?

A. As communicated by Hay Group, companies similar to Empire typically utilize the same approach as Empire by incorporating a mix of base salary, short-term, and long-term incentives into a total executive compensation package. This
reflects a "best practices" approach used by companies both inside and outside the utility industry. Rather than relying solely on fixed compensation in the form of base salary, this best practices approach also includes a considerable measure of variable (at risk) compensation in the total compensation package. This approach is a key factor in ensuring the alignment of an executive's performance with the interests of customers and shareholders. The approach is utilized by all but one of the peer-group companies as well as all investor owned electric utilities operating in Missouri.

## Q. ACCORDING TO YOUR UNDERSTANDING, HOW DOES EMPIRE'S EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PHILOSOPHY COMPARE WITH THE COMPENSATION PHILOSOPHY OF OTHER COMPANIES?

A. Although Empire's approach to executive compensation is similar to other companies, the philosophy behind the Company's approach is much more conservative. The Compensation Committee has targeted the base salary at the 25th percentile of the industry specific peer group discussed above for similarly situated executives. In so doing, the Compensation Committee has set target base salary levels significantly lower than the median base salary levels of our peer group. As indicated by the accompanying Rebuttal Schedule KSW-1 (developed by Hay Group through analysis of the executive compensation section of the 2011 proxy statements of the peer group), actual and target total compensation for Empire executives is significantly below both the 25th percentile target set by the Compensation Committee and the peer group median (Column M and N , pages 27). As can be seen on page 2-7, Column D of Rebuttal Schedule KSW-1,

Empire's actual base salary for every executive officer lies significantly lower than every company in our peer group. In fact, on the page of the Hay Group report attached as Rebuttal Schedule KSW-2, it is noted that actual base salaries are $27 \%$ below even the Compensation Committee's 25th percentile peer group target.

The Compensation Committee has also established short- and long-term incentive target levels for Empire's executives that are consistent with and below those of the peer group companies. In terms of total compensation, the Compensation Committee has set a target level for Empire executives that also approximates the $25^{\text {th }}$ percentile. Again looking at pages 2-7, Column M \& N of Rebuttal Schedule KSW-1, you will note that the Empire executives were the lowest compensated in the entire peer group by a significant amount for both actual and target compensation.

## Q. HOW DOES EMPIRE'S EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PHILOSOPHY IMPACT COMPENSATION AWARDS AS COMPARED TO THE COMPARATOR COMPANIES?

A. Because of Empire's conservative compensation philosophy, the Company's overall compensation awards are significantly less than similar awards of the peer group. As indicated by Rebuttal Schedule KSW-1, page 2, Column D, the base salary of Empire's CEO is only $54 \%$ of the peer group median CEO base salary. The long term incentive (stock compensation) and target non-equity incentive compensation awarded to Empire's CEO are 35\% (Column K) and 42\% (Column G) of the peer group medians, respectively. Finally, target total compensation
awarded to Empire's CEO, as reported in the Hay Group report, is only 44\% of median total compensation awarded to peer group CEOs. In fact, total target compensation is only $80 \%$ of the second lowest in the peer group, (Column N ).

The same types of observations can be made with regard to compensation paid to other Named Executive Officers ("NEOs") listed in the Company's proxy statement. As can be shown on Rebuttal Schedule KSW-2, the average base salary of Empire's NEO's, other than the CEO, is only 76\% of the peer group target. Again looking at pages 2-7 of Rebuttal Schedule KSW-1, total compensation of every NEO is the lowest of any company in the peer group.

## Q. WHAT ADJUSTMENT IS STAFF WITNESS, CASEY WOLFE , PROPOSING TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION?

A. Despite the fact that Empire's compensation philosophy is conservative $\left(25^{\text {th }}\right.$ percentile of a regulated industry specific peer group) and despite the fact that the executives are currently not compensated at the conservative target, Ms. Wolfe still recommends the removal of several components of Empire's total compensation package from test year expense, namely those that constitute the variable, equity, or at risk portions of executive compensation. Additionally, the Staff is recommending removal of compensation associated with the Management Incentive Compensation Plan ("MIP"), Lightning Bolts, which are generally lump sum cash payments to individual employees.

## Q. HOW DO YOU CHARACTERIZE THESE STAFF ADJUSTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION?

A. They are unreasonable.

## Q. WHY?

A. Total target compensation for Empire is significantly below the peer group median, and in fact is the lowest in the peer group. Our program is designed with consideration of best industry practices such that the cash incentive (at risk) compensation expense associated with the performance measures discussed above is properly includable in cost of service.

No cash incentive awards are payable to an executive officer unless performance is above the threshold, or minimum, level of expected performance as approved by the Compensation Committee. In the case of each of the disallowed amounts discussed above, performance exceeded the threshold level of expected performance.

Further, there is no doubt Empire's customers benefit directly from high levels of executive performance with regard to securing adequate low-cost capital to fund our capital expenditures and the oversight of jointly-owned plant through joint ownership meetings.

In addition, the Staff recommends removal of the full amounts of the equity compensation (performance-based restricted stock and stock options) associated with the long-term incentive award.

## Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE STAFF'S RECOMMENDATION TO REMOVE SUCH FORMS OF VARIABLE OR AT-RISK COMPENSATION FROM TEST YEAR EXPENSE?

A. No. The elimination of the variable or at-risk compensation incorrectly assumes such awards are not part of total compensation, but, instead, are in addition to
total compensation developed by Empire, and therefore constitute additional compensation without a corresponding benefit to Empire and its customers. Each component of variable compensation is essential to complete the executive's total compensation package. Variable compensation is "at risk", and standards, in the form of performance criteria, are necessary in order to determine what portion of the compensation is earned. The Compensation Committee has developed such performance criteria as a function of placing a substantial portion of an executive's total compensation in variable rather than fixed vehicles in order to encourage high levels of performance. This approach is consistent with the approach utilized by the peer group and the utility industry in general.

## Q. WHAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF FOLLOWING STAFF'S RECOMMENDED ADJUSTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION?

A. Staff's position tends to undermine the overall objectives of Empire's Compensation Committee by shifting more of the emphasis to base compensation to ensure cost recovery through rates. The Compensation Committee could design an executive compensation program that includes all short- and long-term incentive compensation amounts in base salary, (like what was done at California Water Services as displayed in the Hay Group Study). However, the Compensation Committee doesn't believe such a design philosophy serves the customer or shareholder as well as the design of the compensation program currently in place. Consistent with the Compensation Committee's philosophy, which I discussed earlier, whereby each executive's total compensation package consists of a considerable measure of variable (at risk) compensation, it is
necessary for the Compensation Committee to establish a set of standards, or performance criteria, to determine what portion of variable pay is earned. The performance criteria for each executive are tied to the Company's vision, and goals established at the beginning of each performance year. These performance criteria are different than those that might be determined for other non-executive employees, but these criteria form the core of each executive's responsibility and are not simply accomplishments that are above regular job duties. Accomplishment of executive performance criteria has a significant positive impact on the operational and financial condition of the Company. Conversely, non-accomplishment of such performance criteria has a negative impact on the Company. The degree, or lack thereof, of accomplishment is reflected in the variable nature of the associated compensation award.

The Staff's recommended adjustment which removes from test year expense the variable compensation expense related to short- and long-term components of the executive compensation package, does not recognize the compensation awarded each executive for accomplishment of the core responsibilities of his or her position and the benefits those accomplishments bring to Empire and its electric customers. In addition, the Staff's recommendation ignores the overall conservative nature of Empire's compensation program. Therefore, all elements of executive compensation should properly be included in test year expense.

## Q. HOW DOES EMPIRE APPROACH COMPENSATION WHEN IT INVOLVES ITS NON-EXECUTIVE SALARIED EMPLOYEES AND

KELLY S. WALTERS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

## HOW DOES THAT APPROACH COMPARE WITH BEST PRACTICES IN THE COMPENSATION FIELD?

A. Empire follows best practices in its compensation structure for non-executive salaried employees by linking the Company's performance management systems with how employees are paid. This is achieved by allocating a percentage, or fixed amount, of an employee's compensation to a variable pay program tied directly to the attainment of goals and objectives set forth by management and aligned with Empire's overall vision, goals and key business strategies. These goals and objectives are above the regularly expected results of the non-executive salaried employee's position, and, when achieved, add benefit not only to the Company but to its customers as well.

## Q. DID THE STAFF PROPOSE ADJUSTMENTS TO NON-EXECUTIVE SALARIED COMPENSATION EXPENSE FOR THE TEST YEAR?

A. Yes. The Staff included the amount of non-executive salaried-compensation in test year expense for non-executive salaried employees who were compensated in cash. However, during the test year each department head's salary was reduced from normal levels due to the financial impact of the restoration of our customers back to service after the May, 2011 tornado. Going forward, the Company is recommending an adjustment to increase the level of payroll for our nonexecutive salaried employees to a normal level.

## Q. DOES THE STAFF RECOMMEND ADJUSTMENTS TO ANY OTHER FORMS OF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION?

A. Yes. Ms. Wolfe recommends removal of Lightning Bolt cost from test year expense. This amount represents the entire amount of compensation awarded through the program during the test year.

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THIS PROGRAM.

A. The Lightning Bolt program is not an incentive program. Through this program, the Company provides cash awards to individuals who deliver results beyond those normally associated with their position, often involving protracted time beyond normal work hours spent on special projects. In no way does the Lightning Bolt program fully compensate the non-executive salaried individual for the additional effort they put forth. However, it is a vehicle available to the Company to show appreciation to salaried individuals who do not earn overtime for working beyond their normal hours during prolonged projects. Payments made under the Lightning Bolt program are closely related to Empire's cost of service, and should properly be included in test year expense. During the test year in this case, most of the Lightning Bolt awards were related to the extraordinary efforts of our employees during the restoration of electric service following the May 2011 tornado.

## Q. WHAT IS EMPIRE'S RESPONSE TO THE POSITION TAKEN BY MEUA ON INCENTIVE COMPENSATION?

A. Empire disagrees with the MEUA incentive compensation disallowances. MEUA has essentially eliminated many of the same items as Staff, and the same arguments against Staff disallowances also apply to MEUA. For example, MEUA has eliminated Lightning Bolt awards and discretionary awards for

Empire's executives. Due to the tornado and subsequent dividend suspension, no short term or long term incentives were granted, thus further reducing compensation even further below market based levels. The Compensation Committee awarded a total of $\$ 250,000$ to existing executives to recognize both recovery from the tornado and financial recovery allowing for dividend reinstatement. As I noted above, Empire's overall compensation package is designed to reflect total compensation and a portion of the total is put at risk. The MEUA and Staff positions in this area are at odds with the industry standards on the design of compensation packages.

## VEGETATION MANAGEMENT

## Q. WHAT IS EMPIRE'S RESPONSE TO THE POSITION TAKEN BY STAFF ON GOING LEVEL VEGETATION MANAGEMENT COSTS AND THE VEGETATION MANAGEMENT TRACKER?

A. Empire can agree with Staff's level of normalized vegetation management costs as long as the current tracker mechanism will remain in place. If the vegetation management tracker mechanism is eliminated, Empire's annual vegetation management costs need to be increased to $\$ 13.2$ million on a Missouri jurisdictional basis to establish a normalized level of ongoing vegetation management expenses to be recovered in base rates.

## Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

A. Yes, it does.

## Revised peer group - financial performance

| Company ( $\mathrm{N}=16$ ) | Sales | Net <br> Income <br> (Loss) | Market Value | \# EE's | Assets | TSR |  | Sales CAGR |  | NI CAGR |  | ROA |  | ROE |  | ROI |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 Yr | 3 Yr | 1 Yr | 3 Yr | 1 Yr | 3 Yr | 1 Yr | 3 Yr | 1 Yr | 3 Yr | 1 Yr | 3 Yr |
| ALLETE | \$928 | \$94 | \$1,591 | 1,371 | \$2,876 | 18\% | 15\% | 2\% | 5\% | 25\% | 4\% | 3\% | 3\% | 9\% | 8\% | 5\% | 4\% |
| American States Water | \$419 | \$46 | \$825 | 732 | \$1,238 | 4\% | 5\% | 5\% | 10\% | 38\% | 28\% | 3\% | 3\% | 10\% | 9\% | 6\% | 5\% |
| Aqua America | \$712 | \$143 | \$3,493 | 1,615 | \$4,348 | 1\% | 5\% | -2\% | 4\% | 15\% | 13\% | 3\% | 3\% | 12\% | 11\% | 5\% | 5\% |
| Black Hills | \$1,272 | \$50 | \$1,511 | 2,030 | \$4,127 | 17\% | 13\% | -3\% | 8\% | -28\% | -22\% | 1\% | 2\% | 3\% | 6\% | 2\% | 3\% |
| California Water Svcs | \$502 | \$38 | \$767 | 1,132 | \$1,855 | 1\% | -5\% | 9\% | 7\% | 0\% | -2\% | 2\% | 2\% | 8\% | 9\% | 4\% | 4\% |
| Chesapeake Utilities | \$418 | \$28 | \$449 | 711 | \$709 | 8\% | 15\% | -2\% | 13\% | 6\% | 27\% | 4\% | 3\% | 11\% | 10\% | 8\% | 7\% |
| Cleco | \$1,117 | \$196 | \$2,485 | 1,234 | \$4,050 | 28\% | 23\% | -3\% | 1\% | -23\% | 24\% | 5\% | 5\% | 14\% | 14\% | 7\% | 7\% |
| El Paso Electric | \$914 | \$104 | \$1,327 | 1,000 | \$2,397 | 28\% | 25\% | 4\% | -4\% | 3\% | 10\% | 4\% | 4\% | 14\% | 11\% | 7\% | 5\% |
| Idacorp | \$1,027 | \$167 | \$2,079 | 2,058 | \$4,961 | 18\% | 17\% | -1\% | 2\% | 17\% | 19\% | 3\% | 3\% | 10\% | 9\% | 5\% | 5\% |
| MGE Energy | \$546 | \$61 | \$1,143 | 712 | \$1,459 | 13\% | 17\% | 3\% | -3\% | 6\% | 5\% | 4\% | 4\% | 11\% | 11\% | 7\% | 7\% |
| Northwestern | \$1,117 | \$93 | \$1,362 | 1,400 | \$3,210 | 30\% | 21\% | 1\% | -4\% | 20\% | 11\% | 3\% | 3\% | 11\% | 10\% | 5\% | 4\% |
| Northwestern Natural Gas | \$849 | \$64 | \$1,319 | 1,050 | \$2,747 | 7\% | 7\% | 5\% | -6\% | -12\% | -3\% | 2\% | 3\% | 9\% | 10\% | 5\% | 5\% |
| Otter Tail | \$1,078 | (\$13) | \$819 | 3,155 | \$1,701 | 3\% | 4\% | -4\% | -6\% | N/A | N/A | 1\% | 1\% | 3\% | 2\% | 2\% | 1\% |
| South Jersey Ind | \$829 | \$89 | \$1,562 | 675 | \$2,248 | 11\% | 16\% | -10\% | -5\% | 34\% | 5\% | 4\% | 4\% | 14\% | 12\% | 8\% | 8\% |
| Unitil | \$353 | \$16 | \$363 | 454 | \$800 | 32\% | 18\% | -2\% | 7\% | 71\% | 19\% | 2\% | 2\% | 9\% | 6\% | 3\% | 3\% |
| UNS Energy | \$1,510 | \$110 | \$1,653 | 2,004 | \$3,985 | 8\% | 13\% | 4\% | 3\% | -1\% | 99\% | 3\% | 3\% | 12\% | 13\% | 4\% | 4\% |
| 75th Percentile | \$1,088 | \$105 | \$1,607 | 1,712 | \$4,001 | 21\% | 17\% | 4\% | 7\% | 22\% | 22\% | 4\% | 3\% | 12\% | 11\% | 7\% | 6\% |
| Median | \$881 | \$77 | \$1,344 | 1,183 | \$2,572 | 12\% | 15\% | 0\% | 2\% | 6\% | 11\% | 3\% | 3\% | 11\% | 10\% | 5\% | 5\% |
| 25th Percentile | \$535 | \$44 | \$823 | 727 | \$1,640 | 6\% | 6\% | -2\% | -4\% | -1\% | 5\% | 2\% | 3\% | 9\% | 9\% | 4\% | 4\% |
| Empire District | \$577 | \$55 | \$894 | 746 | \$2,022 | -2\% | 13\% | 7\% | 4\% | 16\% | 11\% | 3\% | 2\% | 8\% | 7\% | 4\% | 4\% |
| Percent Rank | 28\% | 36\% | 28\% | 27\% | 36\% | N/A | 33\% | 96\% | 57\% | 60\% | 51\% | 33\% | 23\% | 13\% | 19\% | 20\% | 17\% |

SCHEDULE KSW-1

## CEO

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ( $\mathbf{\$ 0 0 0}$ ) ${ }^{\text {a }}$ ( Actual Bonus $\quad$ Target Bonus Cash Compensation Long-Term Incentives Total Compensation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Company | Executive | Title | Base <br> Salary | \$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \% \text { of } \\ \text { Salary } \end{gathered}$ | \$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \% \text { of } \\ \text { Salary } \end{gathered}$ | Actual | Target | Present Value | $\begin{aligned} & \text { \% of } \\ & \text { Salary } \end{aligned}$ | Actual | Target |
| ALLETE | Alan Hodnik | COB, Pres, CEO | \$495 | \$563 | 114\% | \$297 | 60\% | \$1,058 | \$793 | \$447 | 90\% | \$1,505 | \$1,240 |
| American States Water | Robert Sprowls | President, CEO | \$549 | \$155 | 28\% | \$165 | 30\% | \$703 | \$713 | \$410 | 75\% | \$1,113 | \$1,123 |
| Aqua America | Nicholas DeBenedictis | CEO | \$599 | \$729 | 122\% | \$450 | 75\% | \$1,328 | \$1,049 | \$1,948 | 325\% | \$3,276 | \$2,997 |
| Black Hills | David Emery | COB, Pres, CEO | \$638 | \$342 | 54\% | \$511 | 80\% | \$980 | \$1,149 | \$799 | 125\% | \$1,779 | \$1,948 |
| California Water Services | Peter Nelson | Pres, CEO | \$995 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | \$995 | \$995 | \$340 | 34\% | \$1,335 | \$1,335 |
| Chesapeake Utilities | Michael McMasters | Pres, CEO | \$350 | \$206 | 59\% | \$140 | 40\% | \$556 | \$490 | \$432 | 123\% | \$988 | \$922 |
| Cleco | Bruce Williamson | Pres, CEO | \$700 | \$578 | 83\% | \$700 | 100\% | \$1,278 | \$1,400 | \$2,326 | 332\% | \$3,604 | \$3,726 |
| El Paso Electric | David Stevens | CEO | \$597 | \$576 | 97\% | \$418 | 70\% | \$1,173 | \$1,015 | \$993 | 166\% | \$2,166 | \$2,008 |
| Idacorp | J. LaMont Keen | Pres, CEO | \$635 | \$942 | 148\% | \$508 | 80\% | \$1,577 | \$1,143 | \$715 | 113\% | \$2,292 | \$1,858 |
| MGE Energy | Gary Wolter | COB, Pres, CEO | \$495 | \$316 | 64\% | \$247 | 50\% | \$810 | \$742 | \$145 | 29\% | \$956 | \$887 |
| Northwestern | Robert Rowe | Pres, CEO | \$514 | \$415 | 81\% | \$411 | 80\% | \$929 | \$925 | \$493 | 96\% | \$1,422 | \$1,418 |
| Northwestern Natural Gas | Gregg Kantor | Pres, CEO | \$466 | \$359 | 77\% | \$396 | 85\% | \$825 | \$862 | \$581 | 125\% | \$1,406 | \$1,443 |
| Otter Tail | Edward McIntyre | Pres \& CEO | \$600 | \$480 | 80\% | \$480 | 80\% | \$1,080 | \$1,080 | \$930 | 155\% | \$2,010 | \$2,010 |
| South Jersey Ind | Edward Graham | COB, Pres, CEO | \$659 | \$554 | 84\% | \$495 | 75\% | \$1,214 | \$1,154 | \$621 | 94\% | \$1,835 | \$1,775 |
| Unitil | Robert Schoenberger | COB, Pres, CEO | \$525 | \$318 | 60\% | \$263 | 50\% | \$843 | \$788 | \$202 | 38\% | \$1,044 | \$989 |
| UNS Energy | Paul Bonavia | COB \& CEO | \$624 | \$527 | 84\% | \$502 | 80\% | \$1,151 | \$1,126 | \$941 | 151\% | \$2,092 | \$2,066 |
| 75th Percentile |  |  | \$636 | \$569 | 90\% | \$498 | 80\% | \$1,183 | \$1,130 | \$933 | 152\% | \$2,110 | \$2,008 |
| Median |  |  | \$598 | \$480 | 81\% | \$418 | 75\% | \$1,026 | \$1,005 | \$601 | 118\% | \$1,642 | \$1,609 |
| 25th Percentile |  |  | \$509 | \$330 | 62\% | \$280 | 55\% | \$838 | \$791 | \$426 | 86\% | \$1,279 | \$1,211 |
| Empire District | Bradley Beecher | Pres \& CEO | \$324 | \$60 | 19\% | \$178 | 55\% | \$384 | \$502 | \$210 | 65\% | \$595 | \$712 |
| Percentile Rank |  |  | Min | Min | Min | 8\% | 25\% | Min | 0\% | 7\% | 18\% | Min | Min |
| 75th Percentile |  |  | \$645 |  |  |  |  | \$1,028 | \$908 |  |  | \$1,718 | \$1,642 |
| Median | Regressed Proxy |  | \$555 |  |  |  |  | \$892 | \$801 |  |  | \$1,382 | \$1,309 |
| 25th Percentile |  |  | \$477 |  |  |  |  | \$775 | \$708 |  |  | \$1,112 | \$1,044 |
| Empire District | Bradley Beecher | Pres \& CEO | \$324 |  |  |  |  | \$384 | \$502 |  |  | \$595 | \$712 |

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SCHEDULE KSW-1

## CFO

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (\$000s) |  |  |  | Actu | onus |  | onus | Cash Co | ensation | Long-Ter | ncentives | Total Com | ensation |
| Company | Executive | Title | Base <br> Salary | \$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \% \text { of } \\ & \text { Salary } \end{aligned}$ | \$ | \% of Salary | Actual | Target | Present Value | $\begin{gathered} \hline \% \text { of } \\ \text { Salary } \end{gathered}$ | Actual | Target |
| ALLETE | Mark Schober | SVP, CFO | \$292 | \$239 | 82\% | \$131 | 45\% | \$531 | \$423 | \$174 | 60\% | \$705 | \$597 |
| American States Water | Eva Tang | SVP, CFO, Sec, Treas | \$320 | \$60 | 19\% | \$64 | 20\% | \$380 | \$384 | \$98 | 31\% | \$478 | \$482 |
| Aqua America | David Smeltzer | EVP, CFO | \$304 | \$182 | 60\% | \$137 | 45\% | \$486 | \$441 | \$79 | 26\% | \$565 | \$519 |
| Black Hills | Anthony Cleberg | EVP, CFO | \$337 | \$112 | 33\% | \$202 | 60\% | \$448 | \$538 | \$349 | 104\% | \$798 | \$888 |
| California Water Services | Martin Kropelnicki | VP, CFO, Treas | \$485 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | \$485 | \$485 | \$78 | 16\% | \$563 | \$563 |
| Chesapeake Utilities | Beth Cooper | SVP,CFO, Corp Sec | \$245 | \$90 | 37\% | \$61 | 25\% | \$335 | \$306 | \$213 | 87\% | \$548 | \$520 |
| Cleco | Darren Olagues | SVP, CFO, Treas | \$306 | \$202 | 66\% | \$122 | 40\% | \$508 | \$428 | \$240 | 79\% | \$748 | \$669 |
| El Paso Electric | David Carpenter | SVP, CFO | \$334 | \$246 | 74\% | \$150 | 45\% | \$581 | \$485 | \$277 | 83\% | \$858 | \$762 |
| Idacorp | Darrel Anderson | EVP, CFO, Admin Svcs | \$383 | \$355 | 93\% | \$192 | 50\% | \$738 | \$575 | \$287 | 75\% | \$1,026 | \$862 |
| MGE Energy | Jeffrey Newman | VP, CFO, Sec, Treas | \$260 | \$116 | 45\% | \$91 | 35\% | \$376 | \$351 | \$76 | 29\% | \$452 | \$427 |
| Northwestern | Brian Bird | VP, CFO, Treas | \$337 | \$170 | 50\% | \$169 | 50\% | \$507 | \$506 | \$226 | 67\% | \$733 | \$731 |
| Northwestern Natural Gas | David Anderson | SVP, CFO | \$358 | \$144 | 40\% | \$161 | 45\% | \$502 | \$519 | \$200 | 56\% | \$702 | \$719 |
| Otter Tail | Kevin Moug | SVP, CFO | \$356 | \$82 | 23\% | \$202 | 57\% | \$437 | \$558 | \$332 | 93\% | \$769 | \$890 |
| South Jersey Ind | David Kindlick | VP, CFO | \$283 | \$159 | 56\% | \$142 | 50\% | \$442 | \$425 | \$164 | 58\% | \$606 | \$589 |
| Unitil | Mark Collin | SVP, CFO, Treas | \$255 | \$108 | 42\% | \$89 | 35\% | \$363 | \$345 | \$68 | 26\% | \$431 | \$412 |
| UNS Energy | Kevin Larson | SVP, CFO \& Treas | \$340 | \$185 | 54\% | \$176 | 52\% | \$525 | \$516 | \$342 | 101\% | \$867 | \$858 |
| 75th Percentile |  |  | \$344 | \$193 | 63\% | \$172 | 50\% | \$512 | \$517 | \$280 | 84\% | \$776 | \$786 |
| Median |  |  | \$327 | \$159 | 50\% | \$142 | 45\% | \$486 | \$463 | \$207 | 63\% | \$704 | \$633 |
| 25th Percentile |  |  | \$290 | \$110 | 39\% | \$107 | 38\% | \$423 | \$413 | \$93 | 30\% | \$559 | \$519 |
| Empire District | Laurie Delano | VP, CFO | \$178 | \$21 | 12\% | \$62 | 35\% | \$198 | \$240 | \$27 | 15\% | \$225 | \$267 |
| Percentile Rank |  |  | Min | Min | Min | 2\% | 14\% | Min | Min | Min | Min | Min | Min |
| 75th Percentile |  |  | \$344 |  |  |  |  | \$474 | \$424 |  |  | \$617 | \$586 |
| Median | Regressed Proxy |  | \$308 |  |  |  |  | \$428 | \$395 |  |  | \$566 | \$537 |
| 25th Percentile |  |  | \$275 |  |  |  |  | \$387 | \$367 |  |  | \$520 | \$492 |
| Empire District | Laurie Delano | VP, CFO | \$178 |  |  |  |  | \$198 | \$240 |  |  | \$225 | \$267 |

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## Position 2

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (\$000s) |  |  |  | Actual Bonus |  | Target Bonus |  | Cash Compensation |  | Long-Term Incentives |  | Total Compensation |  |
| Company | Executive | Title | Base <br> Salary | \$ | $\%$ of Salary | \$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { \% of } \\ \text { Salary } \end{gathered}$ | Actual | Target | Present Value | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { \% of } \\ \text { Salary } \end{gathered}$ | Actual | Target |
| ALLETE | Mark Schober | SVP, CFO | \$292 | \$239 | 82\% | \$131 | 45\% | \$531 | \$423 | \$174 | 60\% | \$705 | \$597 |
| American States Water | Denise Kruger | SVP, Reg Utilities | \$339 | \$65 | 19\% | \$68 | 20\% | \$404 | \$407 | \$98 | 29\% | \$502 | \$505 |
| Aqua America | David Smeltzer | EVP, CFO | \$304 | \$182 | 60\% | \$137 | 45\% | \$486 | \$441 | \$79 | 26\% | \$565 | \$519 |
| Black Hills | Linden Evans | Pres, COO Utilities | \$383 | \$154 | 40\% | \$192 | 50\% | \$537 | \$575 | \$399 | 104\% | \$936 | \$974 |
| California Water Services | Martin Kropelnicki | VP, CFO, Treas | \$485 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | \$485 | \$485 | \$78 | 16\% | \$563 | \$563 |
| Chesapeake Utilities | Stephen Thompson | SVP | \$295 | \$111 | 38\% | \$74 | 25\% | \$406 | \$369 | \$213 | 72\% | \$619 | \$582 |
| Cleco | Michael Madison | Fmr Pres, CEO | \$600 | \$842 | 140\% | \$510 | 85\% | \$1,442 | \$1,110 | \$1,328 | 221\% | \$2,770 | \$2,438 |
| El Paso Electric | David Carpenter | SVP, CFO | \$334 | \$246 | 74\% | \$150 | 45\% | \$581 | \$485 | \$277 | 83\% | \$858 | \$762 |
| Idacorp | Darrel Anderson | EVP, CFO, Admin Svcs | \$383 | \$355 | 93\% | \$192 | 50\% | \$738 | \$575 | \$287 | 75\% | \$1,026 | \$862 |
| MGE Energy | Scott Neitzel | VP | \$275 | \$123 | 45\% | \$96 | 35\% | \$397 | \$371 | \$81 | 29\% | \$478 | \$452 |
| Northwestern | Brian Bird | VP, CFO, Treas | \$337 | \$170 | 50\% | \$169 | 50\% | \$507 | \$506 | \$226 | 67\% | \$733 | \$731 |
| Northwestern Natural Gas | David Anderson | SVP, CFO | \$358 | \$144 | 40\% | \$161 | 45\% | \$502 | \$519 | \$200 | 56\% | \$702 | \$719 |
| Otter Tail | Charles MacFarlane | SVP | \$360 | \$266 | 74\% | \$216 | 60\% | \$626 | \$576 | \$231 | 64\% | \$857 | \$807 |
| South Jersey Ind | David Kindlick | VP, CFO | \$283 | \$159 | 56\% | \$142 | 50\% | \$442 | \$425 | \$164 | 58\% | \$606 | \$589 |
| Unitil | Thomas Meissner | SVP, COO | \$258 | \$109 | 42\% | \$90 | 35\% | \$368 | \$349 | \$68 | 26\% | \$435 | \$416 |
| UNS Energy | David Hutchens | President | \$360 | \$189 | 53\% | \$180 | 50\% | \$549 | \$540 | \$360 | 100\% | \$909 | \$900 |
| 75th Percentile |  |  | \$366 | \$243 | 74\% | \$186 | 50\% | \$557 | \$549 | \$280 | 77\% | \$871 | \$821 |
| Median |  |  | \$338 | \$170 | 53\% | \$150 | 45\% | \$505 | \$485 | \$207 | 62\% | \$704 | \$658 |
| 25th Percentile |  |  | \$294 | \$133 | 41\% | \$114 | 40\% | \$433 | \$419 | \$94 | 29\% | \$565 | \$552 |
| Empire District | Kelly Walters | VP, COO - Electric | \$243 | \$46 | 19\% | \$85 | 35\% | \$289 | \$328 | \$36 | 15\% | \$325 | \$364 |
| Percentile Rank |  |  | Min | Min | Min | 12\% | 14\% | Min | Min | Min | Min | Min | Min |
| 75th Percentile |  |  | \$374 |  |  |  |  | \$554 | \$490 |  |  | \$758 | \$712 |
| Median | Regressed Proxy |  | \$326 |  |  |  |  | \$463 | \$423 |  |  | \$605 | \$572 |
| 25th Percentile |  |  | \$283 |  |  |  |  | \$387 | \$366 |  |  | \$483 | \$459 |
| Empire District | Kelly Walters | VP, COO - Electric | \$243 | \$46 | 19\% | \$85 | 35\% | \$289 | \$328 | \$36 | 15\% | \$325 | \$364 |

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## Position 3

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (\$000s) |  |  |  | Actual Bonus |  | Target Bonus |  | Cash Compensation |  | Long-Term Incentives |  | Total Compensation |  |
| Company | Executive | Title | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Base } \\ & \text { Salary } \end{aligned}$ | \$ | $\begin{gathered} \% \text { of } \\ \text { Salarv } \end{gathered}$ | \$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \% \text { of } \\ \text { Salary } \end{gathered}$ | Actual | Target | Present Value | $\begin{gathered} \hline \% \text { of } \\ \text { Salary } \end{gathered}$ | Actual | Target |
| Allete | Deborah Amberg | SVP, GC, Sec | \$273 | \$199 | 73\% | \$109 | 40\% | \$472 | \$382 | \$174 | 64\% | \$646 | \$557 |
| American States Water | McClellan Harris III | SVP, Asst Sec | \$330 | \$57 | 17\% | \$66 | 20\% | \$386 | \$396 | \$98 | 30\% | \$485 | \$494 |
| Aqua America | Roy Stahl | CAO, GC, Sec | \$300 | \$180 | 60\% | \$120 | 40\% | \$480 | \$420 | \$217 | 72\% | \$697 | \$638 |
| Black Hills | Anthony Cleberg | EVP, CFO | \$337 | \$112 | 33\% | \$202 | 60\% | \$448 | \$538 | \$349 | 104\% | \$798 | \$888 |
| California Water Services | Francis Ferraro | VP, Corp Dev | \$401 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | \$401 | \$401 | \$78 | 19\% | \$479 | \$479 |
| Chesapeake Utilities | Beth Cooper | SVP, CFO, Corp Sec | \$245 | \$90 | 37\% | \$61 | 25\% | \$335 | \$306 | \$213 | 87\% | \$548 | \$520 |
| Cleco | Darren Olagues | SVP, CFO, Treas | \$306 | \$202 | 66\% | \$122 | 40\% | \$508 | \$428 | \$240 | 79\% | \$748 | \$669 |
| El Paso Electric | Mary Kipp | SVP, GC, CCO | \$278 | \$182 | 65\% | \$111 | 40\% | \$459 | \$389 | \$137 | 49\% | \$596 | \$526 |
| Idacorp | Daniel Minor | EVP, COO | \$360 | \$334 | 93\% | \$180 | 50\% | \$694 | \$540 | \$270 | 75\% | \$964 | \$810 |
| MGE Energy | Kristine Euclide | VP, GC | \$266 | \$119 | 45\% | \$93 | 35\% | \$384 | \$358 | \$78 | 29\% | \$462 | \$437 |
| Northwestern | Heather Grahame | VP, GC | \$307 | \$124 | 40\% | \$123 | 40\% | \$431 | \$429 | \$153 | 50\% | \$583 | \$582 |
| Northwestern Natural Gas | Margaret Kirkpatric | VP, GC | \$276 | \$86 | 31\% | \$97 | 35\% | \$362 | \$373 | \$125 | 45\% | \$487 | \$497 |
| Otter Tail | Kevin Moug | SVP, CFO | \$356 | \$82 | 23\% | \$202 | 57\% | \$437 | \$558 | \$332 | 93\% | \$769 | \$890 |
| South Jersey Ind | Michael Renna | Pres, coo | \$278 | \$176 | 63\% | \$141 | 51\% | \$455 | \$420 | \$164 | 59\% | \$618 | \$584 |
| Unitil | Mark Collin | SVP, CFO, Treas | \$255 | \$108 | 42\% | \$89 | 35\% | \$363 | \$345 | \$68 | 26\% | \$431 | \$412 |
| UNS Energy | Michael DeConcini | SVP, Ops | \$349 | \$176 | 50\% | \$168 | 48\% | \$525 | \$516 | \$350 | 100\% | \$875 | \$867 |
| 75th Percentile |  |  | \$340 | \$181 | 64\% | \$155 | 49\% | \$474 | \$451 | \$248 | 81\% | \$753 | \$704 |
| Median |  |  | \$303 | \$124 | 45\% | \$120 | 40\% | \$443 | \$410 | \$169 | 61\% | \$607 | \$569 |
| 25th Percentile |  |  | \$275 | \$99 | 35\% | \$95 | 35\% | \$386 | \$380 | \$118 | 41\% | \$486 | \$496 |

## Position 4

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (\$000s) |  |  |  | Actual Bonus |  | Target Bonus |  | Cash Compensation |  | Long-Term Incentives |  | Total Compensation |  |
| Company | Executive | Title | Base <br> Salary | \$ | $\%$ of Salary | \$ | \% of <br> Salary | Actual | Target | Present Value | $\%$ of Salary | Actual | Target |
| ALLETE | David McMillan | SVP, External Affairs | \$250 | \$181 | 72\% | \$100 | 40\% | \$432 | \$351 | \$130 | 52\% | \$561 | \$480 |
| American States Water | Eva Tang | SVP, CFO, Sec, Treas | \$320 | \$60 | 19\% | \$64 | 20\% | \$380 | \$384 | \$98 | 31\% | \$478 | \$482 |
| Aqua America | Karl Kyriss | EVP, Pres, AC Ventures | \$257 | \$114 | 44\% | \$103 | 40\% | \$370 | \$359 | \$148 | 58\% | \$518 | \$508 |
| Black Hills | Robert Myers | SVP, HR | \$292 | \$78 | 27\% | \$117 | 40\% | \$370 | \$409 | \$200 | 68\% | \$569 | \$608 |
| California Water Services | Robert Guzzetta | VP, Ops | \$334 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | \$334 | \$334 | \$78 | 23\% | \$412 | \$412 |
| Chesapeake Utilities | Elaine Bittner | VP | \$195 | \$69 | 36\% | \$49 | 25\% | \$264 | \$244 | \$465 | 238\% | \$729 | \$709 |
| Cleco | George Bausewine | President, COO | \$270 | \$232 | 86\% | \$141 | 52\% | \$502 | \$411 | \$326 | 121\% | \$828 | \$737 |
| El Paso Electric | Rocky Miracle | SVP, Corp PIng \& Dev | \$262 | \$174 | 66\% | \$105 | 40\% | \$436 | \$367 | \$139 | 53\% | \$575 | \$506 |
| Idacorp | Rex Blackburn | SVP, GC | \$270 | \$200 | 74\% | \$108 | 40\% | \$470 | \$378 | \$158 | 58\% | \$628 | \$536 |
| MGE Energy | Jeffrey Newman | VP, CFO, Sec, Treas | \$260 | \$116 | 45\% | \$91 | 35\% | \$376 | \$351 | \$76 | 29\% | \$452 | \$427 |
| Northwestern | Curtis Pohl | VP, Retail Ops | \$241 | \$98 | 40\% | \$97 | 40\% | \$339 | \$338 | \$120 | 50\% | \$459 | \$458 |
| Northwestern Natural Gas | Lea Anne Doolittle | SVP | \$252 | \$81 | 32\% | \$88 | 35\% | \$333 | \$340 | \$90 | 36\% | \$423 | \$431 |
| Otter Tail | Shane Waslaski | SVP, Mftg \& Infrastructure | \$330 | \$83 | 25\% | \$133 | 40\% | \$413 | \$463 | \$128 | 39\% | \$541 | \$591 |
| South Jersey Ind | Jeffrey DuBois | SVP, Ops, COO | \$257 | \$144 | 56\% | \$129 | 50\% | \$401 | \$386 | \$149 | 58\% | \$549 | \$534 |
| Unitil | George Gantz | SVP | \$205 | \$74 | 36\% | \$61 | 30\% | \$279 | \$266 | \$38 | 19\% | \$317 | \$304 |
| UNS Energy | Kevin Larson | SVP, CFO \& Treas | \$340 | \$185 | 54\% | \$176 | 52\% | \$525 | \$516 | \$342 | 101\% | \$867 | \$858 |
| 75th Percentile |  |  | \$299 | \$178 | \$1 | \$123 | \$0 | \$433 | \$391 | \$168 | \$1 | \$588 | \$595 |
| Median |  |  | \$261 | \$114 | \$0 | \$103 | \$0 | \$378 | \$363 | \$134 | \$1 | \$545 | \$507 |
| 25th Percentile |  |  | \$252 | \$79 | \$0 | \$90 | \$0 | \$338 | \$340 | \$96 | \$0 | \$457 | \$451 |
| Empire District | Ronald Gatz | VP, COO - Gas | \$196 | \$39 | 20\% | \$68 | 35\% | \$235 | \$264 | \$29 | 15\% | \$264 | \$294 |
| Percentile Rank |  |  | 0\% | Min | 1\% | 16\% | 21\% | Min | 6\% | Min | Min | Min | Min |
| 75th Percentile |  |  | \$284 |  |  |  |  | \$381 | \$358 |  |  | \$567 | \$553 |
| Median | Regressed Proxy |  | \$256 |  |  |  |  | \$348 | \$328 |  |  | \$488 | \$476 |
| 25th Percentile |  |  | \$231 |  |  |  |  | \$317 | \$301 |  |  | \$419 | \$410 |
| Empire District | Ronald Gatz | VP, COO - Gas | \$196 | \$39 | 20\% | \$68 | 35\% | \$235 | \$264 | \$29 | 15\% | \$264 | \$294 |

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## Position 5

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (\$000s) |  |  |  | Actual Bonus |  | Target Bonus |  | Cash Compensation |  | Long-Term Incentives |  | Total Compensation |  |
| Company | Executive | Title | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Base } \\ & \text { Salary } \end{aligned}$ | \$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \% \text { of } \\ \text { Salary } \end{gathered}$ | \$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { \% of } \\ \text { Salary } \end{gathered}$ | Actual | Target | Present Value | $\%$ of Salary | Actual | Target |
| ALLETE | Robert Adams | VP, Bus Dev, CRO | \$232 | \$126 | 54\% | \$69 | 30\% | \$357 | \$301 | \$75 | 32\% | \$432 | \$376 |
| American States Water | Patrick Scanlon | VP, Water Ops | \$259 | \$37 | 14\% | \$39 | 15\% | \$297 | \$298 | \$78 | 30\% | \$374 | \$376 |
| Aqua America | Christopher Franklin | EVP, Pres, COO, Reg Ops | \$250 | \$136 | 55\% | \$100 | 40\% | \$386 | \$350 | \$145 | 58\% | \$532 | \$495 |
| Black Hills | Steven Helmers | SVP, GC, Sec | \$292 | \$78 | 27\% | \$117 | 40\% | \$369 | \$408 | \$270 | 92\% | \$639 | \$678 |
| California Water Services | Paul Ekstrom | VP, Cust Svc, HR, IT | \$310 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | \$310 | \$310 | \$78 | 25\% | \$388 | \$388 |
| Chesapeake Utilities | Joseph Cummiskey | VP | \$177 | \$0 | 0\% | \$44 | 25\% | \$177 | \$222 | \$171 | 96\% | \$348 | \$392 |
| Cleco | Wade Hoefling | SVP, GC | \$274 | \$203 | 74\% | \$123 | 45\% | \$477 | \$397 | \$209 | 76\% | \$686 | \$606 |
| El Paso Electric | Richard Fleager | SVP, Cust Care \& Ext Affairs | \$247 | \$164 | 66\% | \$99 | 40\% | \$411 | \$346 | \$161 | 65\% | \$572 | \$507 |
| Idacorp | Lisa Grow | SVP | \$240 | \$178 | 74\% | \$96 | 40\% | \$418 | \$336 | \$140 | 58\% | \$558 | \$476 |
| MGE Energy | James Bidlingmaier | VP, Admin, Clo | \$199 | \$85 | 43\% | \$70 | 35\% | \$284 | \$269 | \$59 | 29\% | \$343 | \$328 |
| Northwestern | Bobbi Schroeppel | VP, Cust Care, Comm, HR | \$213 | \$65 | 30\% | \$64 | 30\% | \$278 | \$277 | \$69 | 33\% | \$347 | \$347 |
| Northwestern Natural Gas | J. Keith White | VP, Bus Dev, CSO | \$229 | \$82 | 36\% | \$92 | 40\% | \$311 | \$321 | \$87 | 38\% | \$398 | \$408 |
| Otter Tail | George Koeck | SVP, GC, Corp Sec | \$306 | \$76 | 25\% | \$144 | 47\% | \$381 | \$449 | \$252 | 82\% | \$634 | \$701 |
| South Jersey Ind | Kevin Patrick | VP, R\&D | \$236 | \$115 | 49\% | \$106 | 45\% | \$351 | \$342 | \$114 | 48\% | \$465 | \$456 |
| Unitil | Todd Black | SVP | \$196 | \$71 | 36\% | \$59 | 30\% | \$267 | \$254 | \$38 | 20\% | \$305 | \$293 |
| UNS Energy | Karen Kissinger | VP, Cont \& Compliance | \$268 | \$108 | 40\% | \$103 | 38\% | \$376 | \$370 | \$268 | 100\% | \$644 | \$639 |
| 75th Percentile |  |  | \$269 | \$131 | 54\% | \$105 | 40\% | \$383 | \$355 | \$180 | 78\% | \$588 | \$532 |
| Median |  |  | \$244 | \$85 | 40\% | \$96 | 40\% | \$354 | \$328 | \$127 | 53\% | \$448 | \$432 |
| 25th Percentile |  |  | \$225 | \$73 | 28\% | \$67 | 30\% | \$293 | \$293 | \$77 | 32\% | \$368 | \$376 |
| Empire District | Michael Palmer | VP, TP \& Corp Svcs | \$203 | \$41 | 20\% | \$71 | 35\% | \$244 | \$275 | \$31 | 15\% | \$275 | \$305 |
| Percentile Rank |  |  | 15\% | 8\% | 11\% | 36\% | 36\% | 5\% | 18\% | Min | Min | Min | 2\% |
| 75th Percentile |  |  | \$254 |  |  |  |  | \$336 | \$318 |  |  | \$451 | \$447 |
| Median | Regressed Proxy |  | \$230 |  |  |  |  | \$298 | \$291 |  |  | \$401 | \$392 |
| 25th Percentile |  |  | \$209 |  |  |  |  | \$264 | \$266 |  |  | \$356 | \$344 |
| Empire District | Michael Palmer | VP, TP \& Corp Svcs | \$203 | \$41 | 20\% | \$71 | 35\% | \$244 | \$275 | \$31 | 15\% | \$275 | \$305 |

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## Targeted base salary

## The following table provides base salary levels that target P25 of the peer group:

- In aggregate, current salaries are approximately $27 \%$ below the $25^{\text {th }}$ percentile level of the peer group)

| Incumbent | Current <br> Midpoint | Current <br> Salary | Targeted Base <br> Salary | Current Salary <br> vs. Targeted <br> Base Salary |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| President \& CEO | $\$ 374$ | $\$ 324$ | $\$ 510$ | $63 \%$ |
| VP \& COO Electric | $\$ 280$ | $\$ 243$ | $\$ 295$ | $82 \%$ |
| VP \& CFO | $\$ 205$ | $\$ 178$ | $\$ 290$ | $61 \%$ |
| VP \& COO Gas | $\$ 190$ | $\$ 196$ | $\$ 250$ | $78 \%$ |
| VP Trans Policy \& Corp Svcs | $\$ 190$ | $\$ 203$ | $\$ 225$ | $90 \%$ |
| VP Energy Supply | $\$ 190$ | $\$ 165$ | $\$ 225$ | $73 \%$ |
| VP Commercial Ops | $\$ 190$ | $\$ 165$ | $\$ 225$ | $73 \%$ |

${ }^{1}$ P25 of the proxy peer group market

## AFFIDAVIT OF KELLY S. WALTERS

## STATE OF MISSOURI COUNTY OF JASPER )

On the $\qquad$ day of January, 2013, before me appeared Kelly S. Walters, to me personally known, who, being by me first duly sworn, states that she is Vice President and Chief Operating Officer - Electric of The Empire District Electric Company and acknowledges that she has read the above and foregoing document and believes that the statements therein are true and correct to the best of her information, knowledge and belief.


Subscribed and sworn to before me this $\qquad$ 14th day of January, 2013.


My commission expires: YoU 16,2014

