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**Before the Public Service Commission  
of the State of Missouri**

**Direct Testimony**

**of**

**James H. Vander Weide**

**October 2007**

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OF  
DR. JAMES H VANDER WEIDE  
ON BEHALF OF  
THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY  
BEFORE THE  
MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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DIRECT TESTIMONY  
OF  
DR. JAMES H. VANDER WEIDE  
ON BEHALF OF  
THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY  
BEFORE THE  
MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1   **I.       INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY**

2   **Q.       PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, TITLE, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

3   A.       My name is James H. Vander Weide. I am Research Professor of  
4           Finance and Economics at Duke University, the Fuqua School of  
5           Business. I am also President of Financial Strategy Associates, a firm that  
6           provides strategic and financial consulting services to business clients.  
7           My business address is 3606 Stoneybrook Drive, Durham, North Carolina.

8   **Q.       PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR QUALIFICATIONS.**

9   A.       I received a Bachelor's Degree in Economics from Cornell University and  
10          a Ph.D. in Finance from Northwestern University. After joining the faculty  
11          of the School of Business at Duke University, I was named Assistant  
12          Professor, Associate Professor, and then Professor. I have published  
13          research in the areas of finance and economics, taught courses in these  
14          fields at Duke over the last 35 years, and currently serve as Academic  
15          Program Director for its Advanced Management Program.

16   **Q.       HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED ON FINANCIAL OR ECONOMIC**  
17   **ISSUES?**

1 A. Yes. As an expert on financial and economic theory and practice, I have  
2 participated in more than 370 regulatory and legal proceedings before the  
3 U.S. Congress, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications  
4 Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National  
5 Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Federal Energy  
6 Regulatory Commission, the public service commissions of 40 states, the  
7 insurance commissions of five states, the Iowa State Board of Tax  
8 Review, the National Association of Securities Dealers, and the North  
9 Carolina Property Tax Commission. In addition, I have testified as an  
10 expert witness in proceedings before the U.S. District Court for the District  
11 of Nebraska; the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire; the  
12 U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina; the U.S.  
13 District Court for the Northern District of California; the Superior Court,  
14 North Carolina; the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of  
15 West Virginia; and the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of  
16 Michigan. My resume is shown in Appendix 1.

17 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

18 A. I have been asked by The Empire District Electric Company ("Empire") to  
19 prepare an independent appraisal of Empire's cost of equity, and to  
20 recommend to the Missouri Public Service Commission (the  
21 "Commission") a rate of return on equity for the purpose of ratemaking.

22 **II. SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

23 **Q. HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE EMPIRE'S COST OF EQUITY?**

1 A. I estimated Empire's cost of equity by applying several standard cost of  
2 equity estimation techniques, including the discounted cash flow ("DCF")  
3 model, the risk premium method, and the Capital Asset Pricing Model  
4 ("CAPM") to a large group of comparable companies.

5 **Q. WHY DID YOU APPLY YOUR COST OF EQUITY METHODS TO A**  
6 **LARGE GROUP OF COMPARABLE COMPANIES RATHER THAN**  
7 **SOLELY TO EMPIRE?**

8 A. I applied my cost of equity methods to a large group of comparable  
9 companies because standard cost of equity methodologies such as the  
10 DCF, risk premium, and CAPM require inputs of quantities that are not  
11 easily measured. Since these inputs can only be estimated, there is  
12 naturally some degree of uncertainty surrounding the estimate of the cost  
13 of equity for each company. However, the uncertainty in the estimate of  
14 the cost of equity for an individual company can be greatly reduced by  
15 applying cost of equity methodologies to a large sample of comparable  
16 companies. Intuitively, unusually high estimates for some individual  
17 companies are offset by unusually low estimates for other individual  
18 companies. Thus, financial economists invariably apply cost of equity  
19 methodologies to a group of comparable companies. In utility regulation,  
20 the practice of using a group of comparable companies is further  
21 supported by the United States Supreme Court standard that the utility

1 should be allowed to earn a return on its investment that is commensurate  
2 with returns being earned on other investments of similar risk.<sup>1</sup>

3 **Q. WHAT COST OF EQUITY DO YOU FIND FOR YOUR COMPARABLE**  
4 **COMPANIES IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

5 A. On the basis of my studies, and as summarized in the table below, I find  
6 that the cost of equity for my comparable companies is equal to  
7 11.6 percent.

**TABLE 1**  
**COST OF EQUITY MODEL RESULTS**

Method	Cost of Equity
Discounted Cash Flow	11.3%
Risk Premium	11.0%
CAPM	12.5%
Average	11.6%

8 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION REGARDING EMPIRE'S COST**  
9 **OF EQUITY?**

10 A. I conservatively recommend that Empire be allowed a rate of return on  
11 equity equal to 11.6 percent.

12 **Q. WHY IS YOUR RECOMMENDED COST OF EQUITY CONSERVATIVE?**

13 A. My recommended cost of equity is conservative because: (1) Empire  
14 faces greater business risk than my comparable companies: and (2) the  
15 financial risk of my comparable companies is less than the financial risk  
16 implied by Empire's ratemaking capital structure.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm'n.* 262 U.S. 679, 692 (1923) and *Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. at 603.

1    **Q.    DO YOU HAVE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING YOUR**  
2           **TESTIMONY?**

3    A.    Yes. I have prepared or supervised the preparation of eight schedules and  
4           four appendices that accompany my testimony.

5    **III.    ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES**

6    **Q.    HOW DO ECONOMISTS DEFINE THE REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN,**  
7           **OR COST OF CAPITAL, ASSOCIATED WITH PARTICULAR**  
8           **INVESTMENT DECISIONS SUCH AS THE DECISION TO INVEST IN**  
9           **ELECTRIC GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, AND DISTRIBUTION**  
10          **FACILITIES?**

11   A.    Economists define the cost of capital as the return investors expect to  
12          receive on alternative investments of comparable risk.

13   **Q.    HOW DOES THE COST OF CAPITAL AFFECT A FIRM'S INVESTMENT**  
14          **DECISIONS?**

15   A.    The goal of a firm is to maximize the value of the firm. This goal can be  
16          accomplished by accepting all investments in plant and equipment with an  
17          expected rate of return greater than the cost of capital. Thus, a firm  
18          should continue to invest in plant and equipment only so long as the return  
19          on its investment is greater than or equal to its cost of capital.

20   **Q.    HOW DOES THE COST OF CAPITAL AFFECT INVESTORS'**  
21          **WILLINGNESS TO INVEST IN A COMPANY?**

22   A.    The cost of capital measures the return investors can expect on  
23          investments of comparable risk. The cost of capital also measures the

1 investor's required rate of return on investment because rational investors  
2 will not invest in a particular investment opportunity if the expected return  
3 on that opportunity is less than the cost of capital. Thus, the cost of  
4 capital is a hurdle rate for both investors and the firm.

5 **Q. DO ALL INVESTORS HAVE THE SAME POSITION IN THE FIRM?**

6 A. No. Debt investors have a fixed claim on a firm's assets and income that  
7 must be paid prior to any payment to the firm's equity investors. Since the  
8 firm's equity investors have a residual claim on the firm's assets and  
9 income, equity investments are riskier than debt investments. Thus, the  
10 cost of equity exceeds the cost of debt.

11 **Q. WHAT IS THE OVERALL OR AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL?**

12 A. The overall or average cost of capital is a weighted average of the cost of  
13 debt and cost of equity, where the weights are the percentages of debt  
14 and equity in a firm's capital structure.

15 **Q. CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE THE CALCULATION OF THE OVERALL OR  
16 WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL?**

17 A. Yes. Assume that the cost of debt is 7 percent, the cost of equity is  
18 13 percent, and the percentages of debt and equity in the firm's capital  
19 structure are 50 percent and 50 percent, respectively. Then the weighted  
20 average cost of capital is expressed by .50 times 7 percent plus .50 times  
21 13 percent, or 10.0 percent.

22 **Q. HOW DO ECONOMISTS DEFINE THE COST OF EQUITY?**

1 A. Economists define the cost of equity as the return investors expect to  
2 receive on alternative equity investments of comparable risk. Since the  
3 return on an equity investment of comparable risk is not a contractual  
4 return, the cost of equity is more difficult to measure than the cost of debt.  
5 However, as I have already noted, there is agreement among economists  
6 that the cost of equity is greater than the cost of debt. There is also  
7 agreement among economists that the cost of equity, like the cost of debt,  
8 is both forward looking and market based.

9 **Q. HOW DO ECONOMISTS MEASURE THE PERCENTAGES OF DEBT**  
10 **AND EQUITY IN A FIRM'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE?**

11 A. Economists measure the percentages of debt and equity in a firm's capital  
12 structure by first calculating the market value of the firm's debt and the  
13 market value of its equity. Economists then calculate the percentage of  
14 debt by the ratio of the market value of debt to the combined market value  
15 of debt and equity, and the percentage of equity by the ratio of the market  
16 value of equity to the combined market values of debt and equity. For  
17 example, if a firm's debt has a market value of \$25 million and its equity  
18 has a market value of \$75 million, then its total market capitalization is  
19 \$100 million, and its capital structure contains 25 percent debt and  
20 75 percent equity.

21 **Q. WHY DO ECONOMISTS MEASURE A FIRM'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE**  
22 **IN TERMS OF THE MARKET VALUES OF ITS DEBT AND EQUITY?**

1 A. Economists measure a firm's capital structure in terms of the market  
2 values of its debt and equity because: (1) the weighted average cost of  
3 capital is defined as the return investors expect to earn on a portfolio of  
4 the company's debt and equity securities; (2) investors measure the  
5 expected return on a portfolio of securities using market value weights, not  
6 book value weights; and (3) market values are the best measures of the  
7 amounts of debt and equity investors have invested in the company on a  
8 going forward basis.

9 **Q. WHY DO INVESTORS MEASURE THE EXPECTED RETURN ON THEIR**  
10 **INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS USING MARKET VALUE WEIGHTS**  
11 **RATHER THAN BOOK VALUE WEIGHTS?**

12 A. Investors measure the expected return on their investment portfolios using  
13 market value weights because: (1) the expected return on a portfolio is  
14 calculated by comparing the expected value of the portfolio at the end of  
15 the investment period to its current value; and (2) market values are the  
16 best measure of the current value of the portfolio. From the investor's  
17 point of view, the historical cost, or book value of their investment, is  
18 generally a poor indicator of the portfolio's current value.

19 **Q. IS THE ECONOMIC DEFINITION OF THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST**  
20 **OF CAPITAL CONSISTENT WITH REGULATORS' TRADITIONAL**  
21 **DEFINITION OF THE AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL?**

22 A. No. The economic definition of the weighted average cost of capital is  
23 based on the market costs of debt and equity, the market value

1 percentages of debt and equity in a company's capital structure, and the  
2 future expected risk of investing in the company. In contrast, regulators  
3 have traditionally defined the weighted average cost of capital using the  
4 embedded cost of debt and the book values of debt and equity in a  
5 company's capital structure.

6 **Q. DOES THE REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN ON AN INVESTMENT**  
7 **VARY WITH THE RISK OF THAT INVESTMENT?**

8 A. Yes. Since investors are averse to risk, they require a higher rate of  
9 return on investments with greater risk.

10 **Q. DO ECONOMISTS AND INVESTORS CONSIDER FUTURE INDUSTRY**  
11 **CHANGES WHEN THEY ESTIMATE THE RISK OF A PARTICULAR**  
12 **INVESTMENT?**

13 A. Yes. Economists and investors consider all the risks that a firm might be  
14 exposed to over the future life of the company.

15 **Q. ARE THESE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE FAIR**  
16 **RETURN FOR CAPITAL RECOGNIZED IN ANY SUPREME COURT**  
17 **CASES?**

18 A. Yes. These economic principles, relating to the supply of and demand for  
19 capital, are recognized in two United States Supreme Court cases:  
20 (1) *Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service*  
21 *Comm'n.*; and (2) *Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.* In the  
22 *Bluefield Water Works* case, the Court stated:

23 A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn  
24 a return upon the value of the property which it employs for

1 the convenience of the public equal to that generally being  
2 made at the same time and in the same general part of the  
3 country on investments in other business undertakings which  
4 are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it  
5 has no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or  
6 anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative  
7 ventures. The return should be reasonably sufficient to  
8 assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility,  
9 and should be adequate, under efficient and economical  
10 management, to maintain and support its credit, and enable  
11 it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of  
12 its public duties. [*Bluefield Water Works and Improvement*  
13 *Co. v. Public Service Comm'n.* 262 U.S. 679, 692 (1923)].

14 The Court clearly recognizes here that: (1) a regulated firm cannot  
15 remain financially sound unless the return it is allowed to earn on the  
16 value of its property is at least equal to the cost of capital (the principle  
17 relating to the demand for capital); and (2) a regulated firm will not be able  
18 to attract capital if it does not offer investors an opportunity to earn a  
19 return on their investment equal to the return they expect to earn on other  
20 investments of the same risk (the principle relating to the supply of  
21 capital).

22 In the *Hope Natural Gas* case, the Court reiterates the financial  
23 soundness and capital attraction principles of the *Bluefield* case:

24 From the investor or company point of view it is important  
25 that there be enough revenue not only for operating  
26 expenses but also for the capital costs of the business.  
27 These include service on the debt and dividends on the  
28 stock... By that standard the return to the equity owner  
29 should be commensurate with returns on investments in  
30 other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return,  
31 moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the  
32 financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its  
33 credit and to attract capital. [*Federal Power Comm'n v.*  
34 *Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944)].

1 The Court clearly recognizes that the fair rate of return on equity should  
2 be: (1) comparable to returns investors expect to earn on other  
3 investments of similar risk; (2) sufficient to assure confidence in the  
4 company's financial integrity; and (3) adequate to maintain and support  
5 the company's credit and to attract capital.

6 **IV. BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RISKS IN THE**  
7 **ELECTRIC ENERGY BUSINESS**

8 **Q. WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RISKS**  
9 **FACING ELECTRIC ENERGY COMPANIES SUCH AS EMPIRE?**

10 A. The business and financial risks of investing in electric energy companies  
11 such as Empire include:

12 1. Demand Uncertainty. Demand uncertainty is one of the  
13 primary business risks of investing in electric energy companies such as  
14 Empire. Demand uncertainty is caused by: (a) the strong dependence of  
15 electric demand on the state of the economy and weather patterns;  
16 (b) sensitivity of demand to changes in rates; (c) the ability of customers  
17 to choose alternative forms of energy, such as natural gas or oil; (d) the  
18 ability of some customers to locate facilities in the service areas of  
19 competitors; (e) the ability of some customers to reduce consumption or  
20 produce their own electricity under cogeneration or self-generation  
21 arrangements; and (f) the ability of municipalities to go into the energy  
22 business rather than renew the company's franchise. Demand  
23 uncertainty is a problem for electric companies because of the need to  
24 plan for infrastructure additions many years in advance of demand.

1                   2.    Operating Expense Uncertainty.   The business risk of  
2   electric energy companies is also increased by the inherent uncertainty in  
3   the typical electric energy company's operating expenses. Operating  
4   expense uncertainty arises as a result of: (a) high volatility in fuel prices  
5   or interruptions in fuel supply; (b) uncertainty over plant outages, the cost  
6   of purchased power, and the revenues achieved from off system sales;  
7   (c) variability in maintenance costs and the costs of other materials,  
8   (d) uncertainty over outages of the transmission and distribution systems,  
9   as well as storm-related expenses; and (e) the prospect of increased  
10   expenses for security.

11                   3.    Investment Cost Uncertainty.   The electric energy business  
12   requires very large investments in the generation, transmission, and  
13   distribution facilities required to deliver energy to customers. The future  
14   amounts of required investments in these facilities are highly uncertain as  
15   a result of: (a) demand uncertainty; (b) the changing economics of  
16   alternative generation technologies; (c) uncertainty in environmental  
17   regulations and clean air requirements; (d) uncertainty in the costs of  
18   construction materials and labor; (e) uncertainty regarding the regulatory  
19   and management structure of the electric transmission network; and  
20   (f) uncertainty regarding future decommissioning costs. Furthermore, the  
21   risk of investing in electric energy facilities is increased by the irreversible  
22   nature of the company's investments in generation, transmission, and  
23   distribution facilities. For example, if an electric energy company decides

1 to invest in building a new coal-fired generation plant, and, as a result of  
2 new environmental regulations, energy produced by the plant becomes  
3 uneconomic, the company may not be able to recover its investment.

4 4. High Operating Leverage. The electric energy business  
5 requires a large commitment to fixed costs in relation to the operating  
6 margin on sales, a situation known as high operating leverage. The  
7 relatively high degree of fixed costs in the electric energy business arises  
8 from the average electric energy company's large investment in fixed  
9 generation, transmission, and distribution facilities. High operating  
10 leverage causes the average electric energy company's operating income  
11 to be highly sensitive to revenue fluctuations.

12 5. High Degree of Financial Leverage. The large capital  
13 requirements for building economically efficient electric generation,  
14 transmission, and distribution facilities, along with the traditional regulatory  
15 preference for the use of debt, have encouraged electric utilities to  
16 maintain highly debt-leveraged capital structures as compared to non-  
17 utility firms. High debt leverage is a source of additional risk to utility stock  
18 investors because it increases the percentage of the firm's costs that are  
19 fixed, and the presence of higher fixed costs increases the sensitivity of a  
20 firm's earnings to variations in revenues.

21 6. Regulatory Uncertainty. Investors' perceptions of the  
22 business and financial risks of electric energy companies are strongly  
23 influenced by their views of the quality of regulation. Investors are

1 painfully aware that regulators in some jurisdictions have been unwilling at  
2 times to set rates that allow companies an opportunity to recover their  
3 cost of service and earn a fair and reasonable return on investment. As a  
4 result of the perceived increase in regulatory risk, investors will demand a  
5 higher rate of return for electric energy companies operating in those  
6 states. On the other hand, if investors perceive that regulators will provide  
7 a reasonable opportunity for the company to maintain its financial integrity  
8 and earn a fair rate of return on its investment, investors will view  
9 regulatory risk as minimal.

10 **Q. HAVE ANY OF THESE RISK FACTORS CHANGED IN RECENT**  
11 **YEARS?**

12 A. Yes. In recent years, the risk of investing in electric energy companies  
13 has increased as a result of significantly greater volatility in fuel prices;  
14 greater uncertainty in the cost of satisfying environmental requirements;  
15 increased competition in the industry; more volatile purchased power and  
16 off system sales prices; and greater uncertainty in the expenses  
17 associated with system outages, storm damage, and security. These risks  
18 are exacerbated by the prospect that the typical electric utility will need to  
19 make significant investments in new base load generation facilities over  
20 the next ten years. The Commission should recognize these higher risks  
21 and the correspondingly higher returns required by investors in setting  
22 Empire's allowed rate of return in this proceeding.

1    **Q.    YOU MENTION THE PROSPECT THAT ELECTRIC ENERGY**  
2           **COMPANIES WILL NEED TO MAKE MAJOR INVESTMENTS IN NEW**  
3           **GENERATION FACILITIES OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS. WHY ARE**  
4           **INVESTMENTS IN NEW GENERATION FACILITIES ESPECIALLY**  
5           **RISKY?**

6    A.    Investment in new generation facilities is especially risky because the  
7           required investment is large, illiquid, and irreversible; the investment  
8           horizon is unusually long; the investment and operating costs are highly  
9           uncertain; and environmental regulations may change significantly over  
10          the life of the investment. In addition, there is no consensus on the best  
11          generation option. The natural gas option has a lower investment cost  
12          and shorter investment horizon, but fuel costs are highly volatile. The coal  
13          and nuclear options have significantly lower long run expected operating  
14          costs, but a higher required investment and a longer investment horizon.  
15          Renewable energy, though desirable from an environmental standpoint,  
16          may be more expensive than other alternatives and may not produce  
17          reliable energy in peak periods. The uncertainties associated with all  
18          generation options creates additional risks for electric utilities.

19   **V.    COST OF EQUITY ESTIMATION METHODS**

20   **Q.    WHAT METHODS DID YOU USE TO ESTIMATE EMPIRE'S FAIR RATE**  
21           **OF RETURN ON EQUITY?**

22   A.    I used three generally accepted methods for estimating Empire's fair rate  
23           of return on equity. As noted above, they are the DCF, risk premium, and

1 CAPM methods. The DCF method assumes that the current market price  
2 of a firm's stock is equal to the discounted value of all expected future  
3 cash flows. The risk premium method assumes that the investor's  
4 required return on an equity investment is equal to the interest rate on a  
5 long-term bond plus an additional equity risk premium to compensate the  
6 investor for the risks of investing in equities compared to bonds. The  
7 CAPM assumes that the investor's required rate of return on equity is  
8 equal to a risk-free rate of interest plus the product of a company-specific  
9 risk factor, beta, and the expected risk premium on the market portfolio.

10 **A. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW METHOD**

11 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DCF MODEL.**

12 A. The DCF model is based on the assumption that investors value an asset  
13 on the basis of the future cash flows they expect to receive from owning  
14 the asset. Thus, investors value an investment in a bond because they  
15 expect to receive a sequence of semi-annual coupon payments over the  
16 life of the bond and a terminal payment equal to the bond's face value at  
17 the time the bond matures. Likewise, investors value an investment in a  
18 firm's stock because they expect to receive a sequence of dividend  
19 payments and, perhaps, expect to sell the stock at a higher price  
20 sometime in the future.

21 A second fundamental principle of the DCF method is that investors  
22 value a dollar received in the future less than a dollar received today. A  
23 future dollar is valued less than a current dollar because investors could

1 invest a current dollar in an interest earning account and increase their  
2 wealth. This principle is called the time value of money.

3 Applying the two fundamental DCF principles noted above to an  
4 investment in a bond leads to the conclusion that investors value their  
5 investment in the bond on the basis of the present value of the bond's  
6 future cash flows. Thus, the price of the bond should be equal to:

### EQUATION 1

$$P_B = \frac{C}{(1+i)} + \frac{C}{(1+i)^2} + \dots + \frac{C+F}{(1+i)^n}$$

7 where:

8  $P_B$  = Bond price;  
9  $C$  = Cash value of the coupon payment (assumed for  
10 notational convenience to occur annually rather than  
11 semi-annually);  
12  $F$  = Face value of the bond;  
13  $i$  = The rate of interest the investor could earn by investing  
14 his money in an alternative bond of equal risk; and  
15  $n$  = The number of periods before the bond matures.

16 Applying these same principles to an investment in a firm's stock suggests  
17 that the price of the stock should be equal to:

### EQUATION 2

$$P_s = \frac{D_1}{(1+k)} + \frac{D_2}{(1+k)^2} + \dots + \frac{D_n + P_n}{(1+k)^n}$$

18 where:

1             $P_s$             = Current price of the firm's stock;  
2             $D_1, D_2 \dots D_n$  = Expected annual dividend per share on the firm's stock;  
3             $P_n$             = Price per share of stock at the time the investor expects  
4                            to sell the stock; and  
5             $k$             = Return the investor expects to earn on alternative  
6                            investments of the same risk, i.e., the investor's required  
7                            rate of return.

8            Equation (2) is frequently called the annual discounted cash flow model of  
9            stock valuation. Assuming that dividends grow at a constant annual  
10           rate,  $g$ , this equation can be solved for  $k$ , the cost of equity. The resulting  
11           cost of equity equation is  $k = D_1/P_s + g$ , where  $k$  is the cost of equity,  $D_1$  is  
12           the expected next period annual dividend,  $P_s$  is the current price of the  
13           stock, and  $g$  is the constant annual growth rate in earnings, dividends, and  
14           book value per share. The term  $D_1/P_s$  is called the dividend yield  
15           component of the annual DCF model, and the term  $g$  is called the growth  
16           component of the annual DCF model.

17    **Q.    ARE YOU RECOMMENDING THAT THE ANNUAL DCF MODEL BE**  
18           **USED TO ESTIMATE EMPIRE'S COST OF EQUITY?**

19    A.    No. The DCF model assumes that a company's stock price is equal to the  
20           present discounted value of all expected future dividends. The annual  
21           DCF model is only a correct expression of the present value of future  
22           dividends if dividends are paid annually at the end of each year. Since the  
23           companies in my proxy group all pay dividends quarterly, the current  
24           market price that investors are willing to pay reflects the expected  
25           quarterly receipt of dividends. Therefore, a quarterly DCF model should  
26           be used to estimate the cost of equity for these firms. The quarterly DCF

1 model differs from the annual DCF model in that it expresses a company's  
2 price as the present value of a quarterly stream of dividend payments. A  
3 complete analysis of the implications of the quarterly payment of dividends  
4 on the DCF model is provided in Appendix 2. For the reasons cited there,  
5 I employed the quarterly DCF model throughout my calculations, even  
6 though the results of the quarterly DCF model for my companies are  
7 approximately equal to the results of a properly applied annual DCF  
8 model.

9 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE QUARTERLY DCF MODEL YOU USED.**

10 A. The quarterly DCF model I used is described on Schedule JVW-1 and in  
11 Appendix 2. The quarterly DCF equation shows that the cost of equity is:  
12 the sum of the future expected dividend yield and the growth rate, where  
13 the dividend in the dividend yield is the equivalent future value of the four  
14 quarterly dividends at the end of the year, and the growth rate is the  
15 expected growth in dividends or earnings per share.

16 **Q. HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE THE QUARTERLY DIVIDEND PAYMENTS**  
17 **IN YOUR QUARTERLY DCF MODEL?**

18 A. The quarterly DCF model requires an estimate of the dividends,  $d_1$ ,  $d_2$ ,  $d_3$ ,  
19 and  $d_4$ , investors expect to receive over the next four quarters. I estimated  
20 the next four quarterly dividends by multiplying the previous four quarterly  
21 dividends by the factor,  $(1 + \text{the growth rate}, g)$ .

22 **Q. CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE HOW YOU ESTIMATED THE NEXT FOUR**  
23 **QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS WITH DATA FOR A SPECIFIC COMPANY?**

1 A. Yes. In the case of Ameren, the first company shown in Schedule JVW-1,  
2 the last four quarterly dividends are equal to 0.635. Thus dividends,  $d_1$ ,  
3  $d_2$ ,  $d_3$ , and  $d_4$  are equal to 0.676 [ $0.635 \times (1 + .0642) = 0.676$ ]. (As noted  
4 previously, the logic underlying this procedure is described in Appendix 2.)

5 **Q. HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE THE GROWTH COMPONENT OF THE**  
6 **QUARTERLY DCF MODEL?**

7 A. I used the analysts' estimates of future earnings per share ("EPS") growth  
8 reported by I/B/E/S Thomson Financial.

9 **Q. WHAT ARE THE ANALYSTS' ESTIMATES OF FUTURE EPS**  
10 **GROWTH?**

11 A. As part of their research, financial analysts working at Wall Street firms  
12 periodically estimate EPS growth for each firm they follow. The EPS  
13 forecasts for each firm are then published. Investors who are  
14 contemplating purchasing or selling shares in individual companies review  
15 the forecasts and use them in making stock buy and sell decisions.

16 **Q. WHAT IS I/B/E/S?**

17 A. I/B/E/S is a division of Thomson Financial that reports analysts' EPS  
18 growth forecasts for a broad group of companies. The forecasts are  
19 expressed in terms of a mean forecast and a standard deviation of  
20 forecast for each firm. Investors use the mean forecast as an estimate of  
21 future firm performance.

22 **Q. WHY DID YOU USE THE I/B/E/S GROWTH ESTIMATES?**

1 A. The I/B/E/S growth rates: (1) are widely circulated in the financial  
2 community, (2) include the projections of reputable financial analysts who  
3 develop estimates of future EPS growth, (3) are reported on a timely basis  
4 to investors, and (4) are widely used by institutional and other investors.

5 **Q. WHY DID YOU RELY ON ANALYSTS' PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE**  
6 **EPS GROWTH IN ESTIMATING THE INVESTORS' EXPECTED**  
7 **GROWTH RATE RATHER THAN LOOKING AT PAST HISTORICAL**  
8 **GROWTH RATES?**

9 A. I relied on analysts' projections of future EPS growth because there is  
10 considerable empirical evidence that investors use analysts' forecasts to  
11 estimate future earnings growth.

12 **Q. HAVE YOU PERFORMED ANY STUDIES CONCERNING THE USE OF**  
13 **ANALYSTS' FORECASTS AS AN ESTIMATE OF INVESTORS'**  
14 **EXPECTED GROWTH RATE, G?**

15 A. Yes, I prepared a study in conjunction with Willard T. Carleton, Professor  
16 of Finance at the University of Arizona, on why analysts' forecasts are the  
17 best estimate of investors' expectation of future long-term growth. This  
18 study is described in a paper entitled "Investor Growth Expectations and  
19 Stock Prices: the Analysts versus History," published in the Spring 1988  
20 edition of *The Journal of Portfolio Management*.

21 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF YOUR STUDY.**

22 A. First, we performed a correlation analysis to identify the historically  
23 oriented growth rates which best described a firm's stock price. Then we

1 did a regression study comparing the historical growth rates with the  
2 average I/B/E/S analysts' forecasts. In every case, the regression  
3 equations containing the average of analysts' forecasts statistically  
4 outperformed the regression equations containing the historical growth  
5 estimates. These results are consistent with those found by Cragg and  
6 Malkiel, the early major research in this area (John G. Cragg and Burton  
7 G. Malkiel, *Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices*, University of  
8 Chicago Press, 1982). These results are also consistent with the  
9 hypothesis that investors use analysts' forecasts, rather than historically  
10 oriented growth calculations, in making stock buy and sell decisions. They  
11 provide overwhelming evidence that the analysts' forecasts of future  
12 growth are superior to historically-oriented growth measures in predicting  
13 a firm's stock price.

14 **Q. HAS YOUR STUDY BEEN UPDATED TO INCLUDE MORE RECENT**  
15 **DATA?**

16 A. Yes. Researchers at State Street Financial Advisors updated my study  
17 using data through year-end 2003. Their results continue to confirm that  
18 analysts' growth forecasts are superior to historically-oriented growth  
19 measures in predicting a firm's stock price.

20 **Q. WHAT PRICE DID YOU USE IN YOUR DCF MODEL?**

21 A. I used a simple average of the monthly high and low stock prices for each  
22 firm for the three-month period ending July 2007. These high and low  
23 stock prices were obtained from Thomson Financial.

1   **Q.   WHY DID YOU USE THE THREE-MONTH AVERAGE STOCK PRICE IN**  
2       **APPLYING THE DCF METHOD?**

3   A.   I used the three-month average stock price in applying the DCF method  
4       because stock prices fluctuate daily, while financial analysts' forecasts for  
5       a given company are generally changed less frequently, often on a  
6       quarterly basis. Thus, to match the stock price with an earnings forecast,  
7       it is appropriate to average stock prices over a three-month period.

8   **Q.   DID YOU INCLUDE AN ALLOWANCE FOR FLOTATION COSTS IN**  
9       **YOUR DCF ANALYSIS?**

10  A.   No. Since Empire is seeking to recover its equity flotation costs as an  
11       expense over a five-year period, I have not included an allowance for  
12       flotation costs in my cost of equity calculations.

13  **Q.   HOW DID YOU APPLY THE DCF APPROACH TO OBTAIN THE COST**  
14       **OF EQUITY CAPITAL FOR EMPIRE?**

15  A.   I applied the DCF approach to the Value Line electric companies shown in  
16       Schedule JVW-1.

17  **Q.   HOW DID YOU SELECT YOUR PROXY GROUP OF ELECTRIC**  
18       **COMPANIES?**

19  A.   I selected all the companies in Value Line's groups of electric companies  
20       that: (1) paid dividends during every quarter of the last two years; (2) did  
21       not decrease dividends during any quarter of the past two years; (3) had  
22       at least three analysts included in the I/B/E/S mean growth forecast;  
23       (4) have an investment grade bond rating and a Value Line Safety Rank of

1 1, 2, or 3; and (5) are not the subject of a merger offer that has not been  
2 completed.

3 **Q. WHY DID YOU ELIMINATE COMPANIES THAT HAVE EITHER**  
4 **DECREASED OR ELIMINATED THEIR DIVIDEND IN THE PAST TWO**  
5 **YEARS?**

6 A. The DCF model requires the assumption that dividends will grow at a  
7 constant rate into the indefinite future. If a company has either decreased  
8 or eliminated its dividend in recent years, an assumption that the  
9 company's dividend will grow at the same rate into the indefinite future is  
10 questionable.

11 **Q. WHY DID YOU ELIMINATE COMPANIES THAT HAVE FEWER THAN**  
12 **THREE ANALYSTS INCLUDED IN THE I/B/E/S MEAN FORECASTS?**

13 A. The DCF model also requires a reliable estimate of a company's expected  
14 future growth. For most companies, the I/B/E/S mean growth forecast is  
15 the best available estimate of the growth term in the DCF model.  
16 However, the I/B/E/S estimate may be less reliable if the mean estimate is  
17 based on the inputs of very few analysts. On the basis of my professional  
18 judgment, I believe that at least three analysts' estimates are a reasonable  
19 minimum number.

20 **Q. WHY DID YOU ELIMINATE COMPANIES THAT ARE THE SUBJECT**  
21 **OF A MERGER OFFER THAT HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED?**

22 A. A merger announcement can sometimes have a significant impact on a  
23 company's stock price because of anticipated merger-related cost savings

1 and new market opportunities. Analysts' growth forecasts, on the other  
2 hand, are necessarily related to companies as they currently exist, and do  
3 not reflect investors' views of the potential cost savings and new market  
4 opportunities associated with mergers. The use of a stock price that  
5 includes the value of potential mergers in conjunction with growth  
6 forecasts that do not include the growth enhancing prospects of potential  
7 mergers produces DCF results that tend to distort a company's cost of  
8 equity.

9 **Q. HOW DOES THE RISK OF AN EQUITY INVESTMENT IN YOUR PROXY**  
10 **GROUP COMPARE TO THE RISK OF AN EQUITY INVESTMENT IN**  
11 **EMPIRE?**

12 A. An equity investment in my proxy group is less risky than an equity  
13 investment in Empire. Many investors use the Value Line Safety Rank as  
14 a measure of equity risk. As shown on Schedule JVW-1, the average  
15 Value Line Safety Rank for my proxy group of electric companies is 2, on  
16 a scale where 1 is the most safe and 5 is the least safe, and the Value  
17 Line Safety Rank for Empire is 3. Furthermore, the average S&P bond  
18 rating of the electric companies in my proxy group is approximately BBB+.  
19 The S&P corporate bond rating for Empire is BBB-. Indeed, Empire's  
20 unsecured debt is rated below investment grade.

21 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF YOUR APPLICATION OF**  
22 **THE DCF MODEL TO YOUR PROXY COMPANY GROUP.**

1 A. As shown on Schedule JVW-1, I obtain a DCF result of 11.3 percent for  
2 my proxy company group.

3 **B. RISK PREMIUM METHOD**

4 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RISK PREMIUM METHOD OF ESTIMATING**  
5 **EMPIRE'S COST OF EQUITY.**

6 A. The risk premium method is based on the principle that investors expect to  
7 earn a return on an equity investment in Empire that reflects a "premium"  
8 over and above the return they expect to earn on an investment in a  
9 portfolio of bonds. This equity risk premium compensates equity investors  
10 for the additional risk they bear in making equity investments versus bond  
11 investments.

12 **Q. DOES THE RISK PREMIUM APPROACH SPECIFY WHAT DEBT**  
13 **INSTRUMENT SHOULD BE USED TO ESTIMATE THE INTEREST**  
14 **RATE COMPONENT IN THE METHODOLOGY?**

15 A. No. The risk premium approach can be implemented using virtually any  
16 debt instrument. However, the risk premium approach does require that  
17 the debt instrument used to estimate the risk premium be the same as the  
18 debt instrument used to calculate the interest rate component of the risk  
19 premium approach. For example, if the risk premium on equity is  
20 calculated by comparing the returns on stocks and the returns on A-rated  
21 utility bonds, then the interest rate on A-rated utility bonds must be used to  
22 estimate the interest rate component of the risk premium approach.

1    **Q.    DOES THE RISK PREMIUM APPROACH REQUIRE THAT THE SAME**  
2           **COMPANIES BE USED TO ESTIMATE THE STOCK RETURN AS ARE**  
3           **USED TO ESTIMATE THE BOND RETURN?**

4    A.    No. For example, many analysts apply the risk premium approach by  
5           comparing the return on a portfolio of stocks to the return on Treasury  
6           securities such as long-term Treasury bonds. Clearly, in this widely-  
7           accepted application of the risk premium approach, the same companies  
8           are not used to estimate the stock return as are used to estimate the bond  
9           return, since the U.S. government is not a company.

10   **Q.    HOW DID YOU MEASURE THE REQUIRED RISK PREMIUM ON AN**  
11           **EQUITY INVESTMENT IN EMPIRE?**

12   A.    I used two methods to estimate the required risk premium on an equity  
13           investment in Empire. The first is called the ex ante risk premium method  
14           and the second is called the ex post risk premium method.

15                    **1.    Ex Ante Risk Premium Method**

16   **Q.    PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EX ANTE RISK PREMIUM APPROACH**  
17           **FOR MEASURING THE REQUIRED RISK PREMIUM ON AN EQUITY**  
18           **INVESTMENT IN EMPIRE.**

19   A.    My ex ante risk premium method is based on studies of the DCF expected  
20           return on a proxy group of electric companies compared to the interest  
21           rate on Moody's A-rated utility bonds. Specifically, for each month in my  
22           study period, I calculated the risk premium using the equation,

1 
$$RP_{\text{PROXY}} = DCF_{\text{PROXY}} - I_A$$

2 where:

3  $RP_{\text{PROXY}}$  = the required risk premium on an equity investment in  
4 the proxy group of companies,  
5  $DCF_{\text{PROXY}}$  = average DCF estimated cost of equity on a portfolio of  
6 proxy companies; and  
7  $I_A$  = the yield to maturity on an investment in A-rated utility  
8 bonds.

9 I then performed a regression analysis to determine if there was a  
10 relationship between the calculated risk premium and interest rates.  
11 Finally, I used the results of the regression analysis to estimate the  
12 investors' required risk premium. To estimate the cost of equity, I then  
13 added the required risk premium to the yield to maturity on A-rated utility  
14 bonds. A detailed description of my ex ante risk premium studies is  
15 contained in Appendix 3, and the underlying DCF results and interest  
16 rates are displayed in Schedule JVW-2.

17 **Q. WHY DID YOU ADD THE REQUIRED RISK PREMIUM TO THE**  
18 **CURRENT YIELD TO MATURITY ON A-RATED UTILITY BONDS**  
19 **RATHER THAN THE FORECASTED YIELD TO MATURITY ON THESE**  
20 **BONDS?**

21 A. Although it is appropriate in theory to add the required risk premium to the  
22 forecasted yield to maturity on bonds, I added the current yield because  
23 the current and forecasted yields are approximately equal at the time of  
24 my studies, and the current yield is readily observable.

25 **Q. WHAT COST OF EQUITY DO YOU OBTAIN FROM YOUR EX ANTE**  
26 **RISK PREMIUM METHOD?**

1 A. To estimate the cost of equity using the ex ante risk premium method, one  
2 may add the estimated risk premium over the yield on A-rated utility bonds  
3 to the yield to maturity on A-rated utility bonds.<sup>2</sup> The average yield to  
4 maturity on A-rated utility bonds in July 2007 is 6.25 percent. My analyses  
5 produce an estimated risk premium over the yield on A-rated utility bonds  
6 equal to 4.72 percent. Adding an estimated risk premium of 4.72 percent  
7 to the 6.25 percent average yield to maturity on A-rated utility bonds  
8 produces a cost of equity estimate of 10.97 percent using the ex ante risk  
9 premium method.

10 **2. Ex Post Risk Premium Method**

11 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EX POST RISK PREMIUM METHOD FOR**  
12 **MEASURING THE REQUIRED RISK PREMIUM ON AN EQUITY**  
13 **INVESTMENT IN EMPIRE.**

14 A. I first performed a study of the returns received by bond and stock  
15 investors over the 69 years of my study. I estimated the returns on stock  
16 and bond portfolios, using stock price and dividend yield data on the S&P  
17 500 and bond yield data on Moody's A-rated Utility Bonds. My study  
18 consisted of making an investment of one dollar in the S&P 500 and  
19 Moody's A-rated utility bonds at the beginning of 1937, and reinvesting the  
20 principal plus return each year to 2006. The return associated with each

---

<sup>2</sup> As noted above, one could use the yield to maturity on other debt investments to measure the interest rate component of the risk premium approach as long as one uses the yield on the same debt investment to measure the expected risk premium component of the risk premium approach. I chose to use the yield on A-rated utility bonds because it is a frequently used benchmark for utility bond yields.

1 stock portfolio is the sum of the annual dividend yield and capital gain (or  
2 loss) which accrued to this portfolio during the year(s) in which it was held.  
3 The return associated with the bond portfolio, on the other hand, is the  
4 sum of the annual coupon yield and capital gain (or loss) which accrued to  
5 the bond portfolio during the year(s) in which it was held. The resulting  
6 annual returns on the stock and bond portfolios purchased in each year  
7 between 1937 and 2006 are shown on Schedule JVW-3. The average  
8 annual return on an investment in the S&P 500 stock portfolio was  
9 11.56 percent, while the average annual return on an investment in the  
10 Moody's A-rated utility bond portfolio was 6.47 percent. The risk premium  
11 on the S&P 500 stock portfolio is, therefore, 5.10 percent.

12 I also conducted a second study using stock data on the  
13 S&P Utilities rather than the S&P 500. As shown on Schedule JVW-4, the  
14 S&P Utility stock portfolio showed an average annual return of  
15 10.92 percent per year. Thus, the return on the S&P Utility stock portfolio  
16 exceeded the return on the Moody's A-rated utility bond portfolio by  
17 4.45 percent.

18 **Q. WHY IS IT APPROPRIATE TO PERFORM YOUR EX POST RISK**  
19 **PREMIUM ANALYSIS USING BOTH THE S&P 500 AND THE S&P**  
20 **UTILITIES STOCK INDICES?**

21 **A.** I have performed my ex post risk premium analysis on both the S&P 500  
22 and the S&P Utilities as upper and lower bounds for the required risk  
23 premium on an equity investment in an electric utility such as Empire

1       because I believe electric energy companies today face risks that are  
2       somewhere in between the average risk of the S&P Utilities and the  
3       S&P 500 over the years 1937 to 2006. Specifically, the risk premium on  
4       the S&P Utilities, 4.45 percent, represents a lower bound for the required  
5       risk premium on an equity investment in an electric utility such as Empire  
6       because an investment in the typical electric utility is currently more risky  
7       than an investment in the average utility in the S&P Utilities index over the  
8       entire period 1937 to the present. On the other hand, the risk premium on  
9       the S&P 500, 5.10 percent, represents an upper bound because an  
10      investment in an electric utility such as Empire is less risky than an  
11      investment in the S&P 500 over the period 1937 to the present.  
12      Therefore, I use the average of the two risk premiums as my estimate of  
13      the required risk premium for Empire in my ex post risk premium method.

14   **Q.   WHY DID YOU ANALYZE INVESTORS' EXPERIENCES OVER SUCH A**  
15   **LONG TIME FRAME?**

16   A.   Because day-to-day stock price movements can be somewhat random, it  
17       is inappropriate to rely on short-run movements in stock prices in order to  
18       derive a reliable risk premium. Rather than buying and selling frequently  
19       in anticipation of highly volatile price movements, most investors employ a  
20       strategy of buying and holding a diversified portfolio of stocks. This buy-  
21       and-hold strategy will allow an investor to achieve a much more  
22       predictable long-run return on stock investments and at the same time will  
23       minimize transaction costs. The situation is very similar to the problem of

1 predicting the results of coin tosses. I cannot predict with any reasonable  
2 degree of accuracy the result of a single, or even a few, flips of a balanced  
3 coin; but I can predict with a good deal of confidence that approximately  
4 50 heads will appear in 100 tosses of this coin. Under these  
5 circumstances, it is most appropriate to estimate future experience from  
6 long-run evidence of investment performance.

7 **Q. WOULD YOUR STUDY PROVIDE A DIFFERENT RISK PREMIUM IF**  
8 **YOU STARTED WITH A DIFFERENT TIME PERIOD?**

9 A. Yes. The risk premium results do vary somewhat depending on the  
10 historical time period chosen. My policy was to go back as far in history  
11 as I could get reliable data. I thought it would be most meaningful to begin  
12 after the passage and implementation of the Public Utility Holding  
13 Company Act of 1935. This Act significantly changed the structure of the  
14 public utility industry. Since the Public Utility Holding Company Act of  
15 1935 was not implemented until the beginning of 1937, I felt that numbers  
16 taken from before this date would not be comparable to those taken after.  
17 (The recent repeal of the 1935 Act does not have a material impact on the  
18 structure of the public utility industry; thus, the Act's repeal does not have  
19 any impact on my choice of time period.)

20 **Q. WHY WAS IT NECESSARY TO EXAMINE THE YIELD FROM DEBT**  
21 **INVESTMENTS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE INVESTORS'**  
22 **REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY CAPITAL?**

1 A. As previously explained, investors expect to earn a return on their equity  
2 investment that exceeds currently available bond yields. This is because  
3 the return on equity, being a residual return, is less certain than the yield  
4 on bonds and investors must be compensated for this uncertainty.  
5 Second, the investors' current expectations concerning the amount by  
6 which the return on equity will exceed the bond yield will be strongly  
7 influenced by historical differences in returns to bond and stock investors.  
8 For these reasons, we can estimate investors' current expected returns  
9 from an equity investment from knowledge of current bond yields and past  
10 differences between returns on stocks and bonds.

11 **Q. HAS THERE BEEN ANY SIGNIFICANT TREND IN THE EQUITY RISK**  
12 **PREMIUM OVER THE 1937 TO 2006 TIME PERIOD OF YOUR RISK**  
13 **PREMIUM STUDY?**

14 A. No. Statisticians test for trends in data series by regressing the data  
15 observations against time. I have performed such a time series  
16 regression on my two data sets of historical risk premiums. As shown  
17 below in Tables 1 and 2, there is no statistically significant trend in my risk  
18 premium data. Indeed, the coefficient on the time variable is insignificantly  
19 different from zero (if there were a trend, the coefficient on the time  
20 variable should be significantly different from zero).

**TABLE 2**  
**REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR RISK PREMIUM ON S&P 500**

Line No.		Intercept	Time	Adjusted R Square	F
1	Coefficient	2.350	-0.001	0.005	1.370
2	T Statistic	0.354	-1.171		

**TABLE 3**  
**REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR RISK PREMIUM ON S&P UTILITIES**

Line No.		Intercept	Time	Adjusted R Square	F
1	Coefficient	1.383	-0.001	-0.006	0.564
2	T Statistic	0.776	-0.751		

**Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER EVIDENCE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT TREND IN RISK PREMIUM RESULTS OVER TIME?**

A. Yes. Morningstar's *Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation® 2007 Valuation Edition Yearbook* ("SBBI") (Morningstar has purchased the publication formerly published by Ibbotson Associates) contains an analysis of "trends" in historical risk premium data. Morningstar uses correlation analysis to determine if there is any pattern or "trend" in risk premiums over time. This analysis also demonstrates that there are no trends in risk premiums over time.

**Q. WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HISTORICAL RISK PREMIUMS HAVE NO TREND OR OTHER STATISTICAL PATTERN OVER TIME?**

A. The significance of this evidence is that the average historical risk premium is a reasonable estimate of the future expected risk premium. As noted in SBBI:

The significance of this evidence is that the realized equity risk premium next year will not be dependent on the realized equity risk premium from this year. That is, there is no

1           discernable pattern in the realized equity risk premium—it is  
2           virtually impossible to forecast next year's realized risk  
3           premium based on the premium of the previous year. For  
4           example, if this year's difference between the riskless rate  
5           and the return on the stock market is higher than last year's,  
6           that does not imply that next year's will be higher than this  
7           year's. It is as likely to be higher as it is lower. The best  
8           estimate of the expected value of a variable that has  
9           behaved randomly in the past is the average (or arithmetic  
10          mean) of its past values. [SBBI, page 81.]

11   **Q.    YOU NOTED THAT MORNINGSTAR ALSO PROVIDES RISK PREMIUM**  
12       **DATA.  HOW DO THE MORNINGSTAR RISK PREMIUMS COMPARE**  
13       **TO YOUR RISK PREMIUMS?**

14   A.   Morningstar obtains a 7.1 percent risk premium on the S&P 500 versus  
15       20-year Treasury bonds. Since the yield on 20-year Treasury bonds is  
16       currently approximately 100 basis points less than the yield on A - rated  
17       utility bonds, the Morningstar data indicate an approximate 6.1 percent  
18       risk premium on the S&P 500 over A - rated utility bonds. As shown on  
19       Schedules JVW 3 and 4, my studies produce a risk premium over A -  
20       rated utility bonds in the range of 4.45 percent to 5.10 percent.

21   **Q.    WHAT CONCLUSIONS DO YOU DRAW FROM YOUR EX POST RISK**  
22       **PREMIUM ANALYSES ABOUT THE REQUIRED RETURN ON AN**  
23       **EQUITY INVESTMENT IN EMPIRE?**

24   A.   My studies provide strong evidence that investors today require an equity  
25       return of approximately 4.45 to 5.10 percentage points above the  
26       expected yield on A-rated utility bonds. The July 2007 average interest  
27       rate on Moody's A - rated utility bonds is 6.25 percent. Adding a 4.45 to  
28       5.10 percentage point risk premium to a yield of 6.25 percent on A-rated

1 utility bonds, I obtain an expected return on equity in the range  
2 10.70 percent to 11.35 percent, with a midpoint of 11.02 percent. The  
3 average risk premium cost of equity from my ex post risk premium study,  
4 11.02 percent, and my ex ante risk premium study, 10.97 percent, is  
5 11.0 percent.

6 **C. CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL**

7 **Q. WHAT IS THE CAPM?**

8 A The CAPM is an equilibrium model of the security markets in which the  
9 expected or required return on a given security is equal to the risk-free  
10 rate of interest, plus the company equity "beta," times the market risk  
11 premium:

12 
$$\text{Cost of equity} = \text{Risk-free rate} + \text{Equity beta} \times \text{Market risk premium}$$

13 The risk-free rate in this equation is the expected rate of return on a risk-  
14 free government security, the equity beta is a measure of the company's  
15 risk relative to the market as a whole, and the market risk premium is the  
16 premium investors require to invest in the market basket of all securities  
17 compared to the risk-free security.

18 **Q. HOW DO YOU USE THE CAPM TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF EQUITY**  
19 **FOR YOUR PROXY COMPANIES?**

20 A. The CAPM requires an estimate of the risk-free rate, the company-specific  
21 risk factor or beta, and the expected return on the market portfolio. For  
22 my estimate of the risk-free rate, I use the July 2007 average yield to  
23 maturity on 20-year Treasury bonds, 5.19 percent. For my estimate of the

company-specific risk, or beta, I use the average 0.94 Value Line beta for my proxy electric companies. For my estimate of the expected risk premium on the market portfolio, I use two approaches. First, I estimate the risk premium on the market portfolio from the 7.1 percent difference between the arithmetic mean return on the S&P 500 (12.34 percent) and the income return on 20-year Treasury bonds (5.21 percent), as reported by Morningstar ( $12.34 - 5.21 = 7.1$ ). Second, I estimate the risk premium on the market portfolio from the difference between the DCF cost of equity for the S&P 500, 13.6 percent, and the yield to maturity on 20-year Treasury bonds, 5.19 percent. My second approach produces a risk premium equal to 8.41 percent.

**1. Historical CAPM**

**Q. WHY DO YOU RECOMMEND THAT THE RISK PREMIUM ON THE MARKET PORTFOLIO BE ESTIMATED USING THE ARITHMETIC MEAN RETURN ON THE S&P 500?**

**A.** As explained in SBBI, the arithmetic mean return is the best approach for calculating the return investors expect to receive in the future:

The equity risk premium data presented in this book are arithmetic average risk premia as opposed to geometric average risk premia. The arithmetic average equity risk premium can be demonstrated to be most appropriate when discounting future cash flows. For use as the expected equity risk premium in either the CAPM or the building block approach, the arithmetic mean or the simple difference of the arithmetic means of stock market returns and riskless rates is the relevant number. This is because both the CAPM and the building block approach are additive models, in which the cost of capital is the sum of its parts. The geometric average is more appropriate for reporting past performance, since it

1 represents the compound average return. [SBBI, p. 77.]

2 A discussion of the importance of using arithmetic mean returns in the  
3 context of CAPM or risk premium studies is contained in Schedule JVW-5.

4 **Q. WHY DO YOU RECOMMEND THAT THE RISK PREMIUM ON THE**  
5 **MARKET PORTFOLIO BE MEASURED USING THE INCOME RETURN**  
6 **ON 20-YEAR TREASURY BONDS RATHER THAN THE TOTAL**  
7 **RETURN ON THESE BONDS?**

8 A. As discussed above, the CAPM requires an estimate of the risk-free rate  
9 of interest. When Treasury bonds are issued, the income return on the  
10 bond is risk free, but the total return, which includes both an income and  
11 capital gains or losses, is not. Thus, the income return should be used in  
12 the CAPM because it is only the income return that is risk free.

13 **Q. WHAT CAPM RESULT DO YOU OBTAIN WHEN YOU ESTIMATE THE**  
14 **EXPECTED RISK PREMIUM ON THE MARKET PORTFOLIO FROM**  
15 **THE ARITHMETIC MEAN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RETURN ON**  
16 **THE MARKET AND THE YIELD ON 20-YEAR TREASURY BONDS?**

17 A. I obtain a CAPM cost of equity estimate of 11.9 percent (see Schedule  
18 JVW-6).

19 **2. DCF-Based CAPM**

20 **Q. WHAT CAPM RESULT DO YOU OBTAIN WHEN YOU ESTIMATE THE**  
21 **EXPECTED RETURN ON THE MARKET PORTFOLIO BY APPLYING**  
22 **THE DCF MODEL TO THE S&P 500?**

23 A. I obtain a CAPM result of 13.0 percent (see Schedule JVW-7). The  
24 average cost of equity from my two CAPM studies is 12.5 percent.

1    **Q.    IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT A REASONABLE APPLICATION OF**  
2           **THE CAPM MAY PRODUCE HIGHER COST OF EQUITY RESULTS**  
3           **THAN YOU HAVE JUST REPORTED?**

4    A.    Yes. There is substantial evidence that the CAPM tends to underestimate  
5           the cost of equity for companies whose equity beta is less than 1.0 and to  
6           overestimate the cost of equity for companies whose equity beta is greater  
7           than 1.0.

8    **Q.    WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE THAT THE CAPM TENDS TO**  
9           **UNDERESTIMATE THE COST OF EQUITY FOR COMPANIES WITH**  
10          **BETAS LESS THAN 1.0?**

11   A.    The original evidence that the unadjusted CAPM tends to underestimate  
12          the cost of equity for companies whose equity beta is less than 1.0 and to  
13          overestimate the cost of equity for companies whose equity beta is greater  
14          than 1.0 was presented in a paper by Black, Jensen, and Scholes, "The  
15          Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical Tests." Numerous  
16          subsequent papers have validated the Black, Jensen, and Scholes  
17          findings, including those by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, Banz, Fama  
18          and French, and Fama and MacBeth.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Fischer Black, Michael C. Jensen, and Myron Scholes, "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical Tests," in *Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets*, M. Jensen, ed. New York: Praeger, 1972; Eugene Fama and James MacBeth, "Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests," *Journal of Political Economy* 81 (1973), pp. 607-36; Robert Litzenberger and Krishna Ramaswamy, "The Effect of Personal Taxes and Dividends on Capital Asset Prices: Theory and Empirical Evidence," *Journal of Financial Economics* 7 (1979), pp. 163-95.; Rolf Banz, "The Relationship between Return and Market Value of Common Stocks," *Journal of Financial Economics* (March 1981), pp. 3-18; and Eugene Fama and Kenneth French, "The Cross-Section of Expected Returns," *Journal of Finance* (June 1992), pp. 427-465.

1 VI. FAIR RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY

2 Q. BASED ON YOUR APPLICATION OF SEVERAL COST OF EQUITY  
3 METHODS TO YOUR PROXY COMPANIES, WHAT IS YOUR  
4 CONCLUSION REGARDING YOUR PROXY COMPANIES' COST OF  
5 EQUITY?

6 A. Based on my application of several cost of equity methods to my proxy  
7 companies, I conclude that my proxy companies' cost of equity is  
8 11.6 percent. As shown in Table 4 below, 11.6 percent is the simple  
9 average of the cost of equity results I obtain from my cost of equity  
10 models.

11 TABLE 4  
12 COST OF EQUITY MODEL RESULTS

Method	Cost of Equity
Discounted Cash Flow	11.3%
Risk Premium	11.0%
CAPM	12.5%
Average	11.6%

13 Q. DOES YOUR 11.6 PERCENT COST OF EQUITY CONCLUSION FOR  
14 YOUR PROXY COMPANIES DEPEND ON THE PERCENTAGES OF  
15 DEBT AND EQUITY IN YOUR PROXY COMPANIES' AVERAGE  
16 CAPITAL STRUCTURE?

17 A. Yes. The 11.6 percent cost of equity for my proxy companies reflects the  
18 financial risk associated with my proxy companies' average capital  
19 structures, where the capital structure weights are measured in terms of

1 market values.<sup>4</sup> Since financial leverage, that is, the use of debt financing,  
2 increases the risk of investing in the proxy companies' equity, the cost of  
3 equity would be higher for a capital structure containing more leverage.

4 **Q. WHAT ARE THE AVERAGE PERCENTAGES OF DEBT AND EQUITY**  
5 **IN YOUR PROXY COMPANIES' CAPITAL STRUCTURES?**

6 A. As shown in Schedule JVW-8, my electric company group has an average  
7 capital structure containing 34 percent debt, 1 percent preferred stock,  
8 and 65 percent common equity. I have also examined capital structure  
9 data for a large group of electric companies over the last six years. These  
10 data show that over this period of time, the average capital structure for  
11 this large group of electric utilities contains 40 percent debt, 2 percent  
12 preferred, and 58 percent equity.

13 **Q. HOW DOES EMPIRE'S RATE MAKING CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN THIS**  
14 **PROCEEDING COMPARE TO THE AVERAGE CAPITAL STRUCTURE**  
15 **OF YOUR PROXY COMPANIES?**

16 A. Empire's rate making capital structure contains \*\*\_\_\_\_\_\*\* percent long-  
17 term debt, \*\*\_\_\_\_\_\*\* percent preferred stock, and \*\*\_\_\_\_\_\*\* percent  
18 common equity. Although this capital structure contains an appropriate  
19 mix of debt and equity and is a reasonable capital structure for ratemaking  
20 purposes, from an investor's viewpoint, Empire's ratemaking capital  
21 structure embodies greater financial risk than is reflected in my cost of  
22 equity estimates from my proxy companies.

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<sup>4</sup> See Section III above for a discussion of why investors use market value capital structure weights to assess a company's financial risk.

1   **Q.   YOU NOTED EARLIER THAT THE COST OF EQUITY DEPENDS ON A**  
2       **COMPANY'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE. IS THERE ANY WAY TO**  
3       **ADJUST THE 11.6 PERCENT COST OF EQUITY FOR YOUR PROXY**  
4       **COMPANIES TO REFLECT THE HIGHER FINANCIAL RISK**  
5       **EMBODIED IN EMPIRE'S RATE MAKING CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN**  
6       **THIS PROCEEDING?**

7   A.   Yes. Since my proxy companies are a conservative proxy for the risk of  
8       investing in Empire, Empire should have a weighted average cost of  
9       capital that is equal to or greater than the weighted average cost of capital  
10      for my proxy companies. It is a simple matter to determine what cost of  
11      equity Empire should have in order to satisfy this condition. Since  
12      Empire's ratemaking capital structure contains significantly more leverage  
13      than the average capital structure of my proxy companies, and the cost of  
14      equity increases with leverage, it is evident that such an adjustment would  
15      produce a significantly higher cost of equity for Empire.

16   **Q.   HAVE YOU MADE SUCH AN ADJUSTMENT?**

17   A.   No. Since the Commission did not accept a financial risk adjustment in its  
18      recent AmerenUE decision, Empire has requested that I not make a  
19      financial risk adjustment in this proceeding.

20   **Q.   WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION AS TO A FAIR RATE OF**  
21       **RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY FOR EMPIRE?**

22   A.   I conservatively recommend that Empire be allowed a fair rate of return on  
23      common equity equal to 11.6 percent.

- 1    **Q.     DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR PRE-FILED DIRECT TESTIMONY?**
- 2    **A.     Yes, it does.**

**LIST OF ATTACHMENTS**

Schedule JVW-1	Summary of Discounted Cash Flow Analysis for Electric Energy Companies
Schedule JVW-2	Comparison of the DCF Expected Return on an Investment in Electric Energy Companies to the Interest Rate on Moody's A-Rated Utility Bonds
Schedule JVW-3	Comparative Returns on S&P 500 Stock Index and Moody's A-Rated Bonds 1937—2005
Schedule JVW-4	Comparative Returns on S&P Utility Stock Index and Moody's A-Rated Bonds 1937—2005
Schedule JVW-5	Using the Arithmetic Mean to Estimate the Cost of Equity Capital
Schedule JVW-6	Calculation of Capital Asset Pricing Model Cost of Equity Using the Morningstar 7.1 Percent Risk Premium
Schedule JVW-7	Calculation of Capital Asset Pricing Model Cost of Equity Using DCF Estimate of the Expected Rate of Return on the Market Portfolio
Schedule JVW-8	Average Capital Structure of Electric Company Group
Appendix 1	Qualifications of James H. Vander Weide
Appendix 2	Derivation of the Quarterly DCF Model
Appendix 3	Ex Ante Risk Premium Method
Appendix 4	Ex Post Risk Premium Method

**SCHEDULE JVW-1**  
**SUMMARY OF DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS**  
**FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY COMPANIES**

Line No.	Company	$d_4$	$P_0$	Growth	Cost of Equity
1	Ameren Corp.	0.635	51.487	6.42%	11.9%
2	Amer. Elec. Power	0.390	46.572	5.72%	9.3%
3	Black Hills	0.340	40.205	6.67%	10.4%
4	Constellation Energy	0.435	89.822	13.67%	15.8%
5	Dominion Resources	0.710	86.397	7.17%	10.8%
6	DPL Inc.	0.260	29.497	7.75%	11.6%
7	DTE Energy	0.530	50.625	5.75%	10.3%
8	Consol. Edison	0.580	47.110	3.45%	8.7%
9	Edison Int'l	0.290	56.037	7.54%	9.8%
10	Entergy Corp.	0.540	109.200	9.17%	11.4%
11	Exelon Corp.	0.440	75.127	9.70%	12.3%
12	FirstEnergy Corp.	0.500	66.757	8.29%	11.5%
13	FPL Group	0.410	60.647	9.57%	12.5%
14	G't Plains Energy	0.415	30.152	4.25%	10.2%
15	Hawaiian Elec.	0.310	24.155	4.30%	9.9%
16	IDACORP Inc.	0.300	32.255	5.67%	9.7%
17	Alliant Energy	0.318	41.087	4.83%	8.0%
18	MDU Resources	0.135	29.252	7.35%	9.4%
19	NiSource Inc.	0.230	21.627	3.62%	8.2%
20	NSTAR	0.325	33.695	6.25%	10.4%
21	Northeast Utilities	0.188	29.513	11.00%	14.0%
22	Otter Tail Corp.	0.293	32.155	4.75%	8.7%
23	PG&E Corp.	0.360	47.355	8.63%	11.9%
24	Progress Energy	0.610	48.020	4.36%	9.8%
25	PNM Resources	0.230	28.708	10.47%	14.1%
26	Pinnacle West Capital	0.525	43.178	5.73%	11.0%
27	Pepco Holdings	0.260	28.755	8.00%	12.1%
28	PPL Corp.	0.305	46.467	13.57%	16.6%
29	Puget Energy Inc.	0.250	24.735	5.32%	9.7%
30	SCANA Corp.	0.440	40.520	4.45%	9.0%
31	Southern Co.	0.403	35.373	5.02%	9.8%
32	Sempra Energy	0.310	60.067	7.45%	9.7%
33	Integrus Energy	0.660	53.910	5.33%	10.2%
34	Vectren Corp.	0.315	27.786	3.87%	8.7%
35	Wisconsin Energy	0.250	46.192	8.30%	10.6%
36	Westar Energy	0.270	25.652	5.31%	9.7%
37	Xcel Energy Inc.	0.230	21.885	6.33%	10.9%
38	Market-Wtd. Ave.				11.3%

## Notes:

- $d_0$  = Most recent quarterly dividend.  
 $d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4$  = Next four quarterly dividends, calculated by multiplying the last four quarterly dividends per Value Line by the factor  $(1 + g)$ .  
 $P_0$  = Average of the monthly high and low stock prices during the three months ending July 2007 per Thomson Financial.  
 $g$  = I/B/E/S forecast of future earnings growth July 2007 from Thomson financial.  
 $k$  = Cost of equity using the quarterly version of the DCF model.

$$k = \frac{d_1(1+k)^{.75} + d_2(1+k)^{.50} + d_3(1+k)^{.25} + d_4}{P_0} + g$$

**RISK RATINGS  
OF PROXY ELECTRIC ENERGY COMPANIES**

Line No.	Company	Safety Rank	S&P BOND RATING	S&P BOND RATING (Numerical)
1	Ameren Corp.	2	BBB-	8
2	Amer. Elec. Power	3	BBB	7
3	Black Hills	3	BBB-	8
4	Constellation Energy	2	BBB+	6
5	Dominion Resources	2	BBB	7
6	DPL Inc.	3	BBB	7
7	DTE Energy	3	BBB	7
8	Consol. Edison	1	A	4
9	Edison Int'l	3	BBB-	8
10	Entergy Corp.	2	BBB	7
11	Exelon Corp.	1	BBB+	6
12	FirstEnergy Corp.	2	BBB	7
13	FPL Group	1	A	4
14	G't Plains Energy	2	BBB	7
15	Hawaiian Elec.	2	BBB	7
16	IDACORP Inc.	3	BBB+	6
17	Alliant Energy	3	BBB+	6
18	MDU Resources	1	BBB+	6
19	NiSource Inc.	3	BBB	7
20	NSTAR	1	A+	3
21	Northeast Utilities	3	BBB	7
22	Otter Tail Corp.	2	BBB+	6
23	PG&E Corp.	2	BBB+	6
24	Progress Energy	2	BBB+	6
25	PNM Resources	2	BBB	7
26	Pinnacle West Capital	1	BBB-	8
27	Pepco Holdings	3	BBB	7
28	PPL Corp.	2	BBB	7
29	Puget Energy Inc.	3	BBB-	8
30	SCANA Corp.	2	A-	5
31	Southern Co.	1	A	4
32	Sempra Energy	2	BBB+	6
33	Integrus Energy	2	A-	5
34	Vectren Corp.	2	A-	5
35	Wisconsin Energy	2	BBB+	6
36	Westar Energy	2	BBB-	8
37	Xcel Energy Inc.	2	BBB	7
38	Market-Wtd. Ave.	2	BBB+	6

Source of data: Standard & Poor's August 2007; The Value Line Investment Analyzer August 2007.

**SCHEDULE JVW-2**  
**COMPARISON OF DCF EXPECTED RETURN ON AN INVESTMENT IN ELECTRIC**  
**ENERGY COMPANIES TO THE INTEREST RATE ON MOODY'S A-RATED UTILITY BONDS**

Line No.	Date	DCF	Bond Yield	Risk Premium
1	Sep-99	0.1138	0.0793	0.0345
2	Oct-99	0.1146	0.0806	0.0340
3	Nov-99	0.1176	0.0794	0.0382
4	Dec-99	0.1224	0.0814	0.0410
5	Jan-00	0.1216	0.0835	0.0381
6	Feb-00	0.1259	0.0825	0.0434
7	Mar-00	0.1298	0.0828	0.0470
8	Apr-00	0.1225	0.0829	0.0396
9	May-00	0.1210	0.0870	0.0340
10	Jun-00	0.1234	0.0836	0.0398
11	Jul-00	0.1244	0.0825	0.0419
12	Aug-00	0.1218	0.0813	0.0405
13	Sep-00	0.1154	0.0823	0.0331
14	Oct-00	0.1156	0.0814	0.0342
15	Nov-00	0.1162	0.0811	0.0351
16	Dec-00	0.1145	0.0784	0.0361
17	Jan-01	0.1179	0.0780	0.0399
18	Feb-01	0.1185	0.0774	0.0411
19	Mar-01	0.1190	0.0768	0.0422
20	Apr-01	0.1254	0.0794	0.0460
21	May-01	0.1280	0.0799	0.0481
22	Jun-01	0.1286	0.0785	0.0501
23	Jul-01	0.1299	0.0778	0.0521
24	Aug-01	0.1305	0.0759	0.0546
25	Sep-01	0.1330	0.0775	0.0555
26	Oct-01	0.1307	0.0763	0.0544
27	Nov-01	0.1311	0.0757	0.0554
28	Dec-01	0.1307	0.0783	0.0524
29	Jan-02	0.1288	0.0766	0.0522
30	Feb-02	0.1299	0.0754	0.0545
31	Mar-02	0.1261	0.0776	0.0485
32	Apr-02	0.1225	0.0757	0.0468
33	May-02	0.1232	0.0752	0.0480
34	Jun-02	0.1230	0.0741	0.0489
35	Jul-02	0.1292	0.0731	0.0561
36	Aug-02	0.1241	0.0717	0.0524
37	Sep-02	0.1259	0.0708	0.0551
38	Oct-02	0.1261	0.0723	0.0538
39	Nov-02	0.1208	0.0714	0.0494
40	Dec-02	0.1179	0.0707	0.0472

Line No.	Date	DCF	Bond Yield	Risk Premium
41	Jan-03	0.1144	0.0706	0.0438
42	Feb-03	0.1178	0.0693	0.0485
43	Mar-03	0.1140	0.0679	0.0461
44	Apr-03	0.1101	0.0664	0.0437
45	May-03	0.1045	0.0636	0.0409
46	Jun-03	0.1001	0.0621	0.0380
47	Jul-03	0.1007	0.0657	0.0350
48	Aug-03	0.1007	0.0678	0.0329
49	Sep-03	0.0978	0.0656	0.0322
50	Oct-03	0.0963	0.0643	0.0320
51	Nov-03	0.0951	0.0637	0.0314
52	Dec-03	0.0923	0.0627	0.0296
53	Jan-04	0.0898	0.0615	0.0283
54	Feb-04	0.0895	0.0615	0.0280
55	Mar-04	0.0892	0.0597	0.0295
56	Apr-04	0.0902	0.0635	0.0267
57	May-04	0.0939	0.0662	0.0277
58	Jun-04	0.0941	0.0646	0.0295
59	Jul-04	0.0933	0.0627	0.0306
60	Aug-04	0.0939	0.0614	0.0325
61	Sep-04	0.0931	0.0598	0.0333
62	Oct-04	0.0928	0.0594	0.0334
63	Nov-04	0.0887	0.0597	0.0290
64	Dec-04	0.0907	0.0592	0.0315
65	Jan-05	0.0910	0.0578	0.0332
66	Feb-05	0.0907	0.0561	0.0346
67	Mar-05	0.0902	0.0583	0.0319
68	Apr-05	0.0903	0.0564	0.0339
69	May-05	0.0899	0.0553	0.0346
70	Jun-05	0.0904	0.0540	0.0364
71	Jul-05	0.0892	0.0551	0.0341
72	Aug-05	0.0901	0.0550	0.0351
73	Sep-05	0.0929	0.0552	0.0377
74	Oct-05	0.0940	0.0579	0.0361
75	Nov-05	0.0983	0.0588	0.0395
76	Dec-05	0.0989	0.0580	0.0409
77	Jan-06	0.0993	0.0575	0.0418
78	Feb-06	0.1104	0.0582	0.0522
79	Mar-06	0.1089	0.0598	0.0491
80	Apr-06	0.1099	0.0629	0.0470
81	May-06	0.1094	0.0642	0.0452
82	Jun-06	0.1134	0.0640	0.0494
83	Jul-06	0.1129	0.0637	0.0492
84	Aug-06	0.1111	0.0620	0.0491
85	Sep-06	0.1142	0.0600	0.0542
86	Oct-06	0.1132	0.0598	0.0534
87	Nov-06	0.1137	0.0580	0.0557

Line No.	Date	DCF	Bond Yield	Risk Premium
88	Dec-06	0.1125	0.0581	0.0544
89	Jan-07	0.1100	0.0596	0.0504
90	Feb-07	0.1090	0.0590	0.0500
91	Mar-07	0.1100	0.0585	0.0515
92	Apr-07	0.1055	0.0597	0.0458
93	May-07	0.1089	0.0599	0.0490
94	Jun-07	0.1149	0.0630	0.0519
95	Jul-07	0.1159	0.0625	0.0534
96	Average	0.1105	0.0682	0.0422

Notes: Utility bond yield information from *Mergent Bond Record* (formerly Moody's). See Appendix 3 for a description of my ex ante risk premium approach. DCF results are calculated using a quarterly DCF model as follows:

- $d_0$  = Latest quarterly dividend per Value Line  
 $P_0$  = Average of the monthly high and low stock prices for each month per Thomson Financial  
 $g$  = I/B/E/S forecast of future earnings growth for each month.  
 $k$  = Cost of equity using the quarterly version of the DCF model.

$$k = \left[ \frac{d_0(1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}}}{P_0} + (1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}} \right]^4 - 1$$

**SCHEDULE JVW-3**  
**COMPARATIVE RETURNS ON S&P 500 STOCK INDEX**  
**AND MOODY'S A-RATED UTILITY BONDS 1937 - 2006**

Line No.	Year	S&P 500 Stock Price	Stock Dividend Yield	Stock Return	A-rated Bond Yield	Bond Return
1	2006	\$1,278.72	0.0183		\$75.25	
2	2005	1,181.41	0.0177	10.01%	74.91	5.80%
3	2004	1,132.52	0.0162	5.94%	70.87	11.34%
4	2003	895.84	0.0180	28.22%	62.26	20.27%
5	2002	1,140.21	0.0138	-20.05%	57.44	15.35%
6	2001	1,335.63	0.0116	-13.47%	56.40	8.93%
7	2000	1,425.59	0.0118	-5.13%	52.60	14.82%
8	1999	1,248.77	0.0130	15.46%	63.03	-10.20%
9	1998	963.35	0.0162	31.25%	62.43	7.38%
10	1997	766.22	0.0195	27.68%	56.62	17.32%
11	1996	614.42	0.0231	27.02%	60.91	-0.48%
12	1995	465.25	0.0287	34.93%	50.22	29.26%
13	1994	472.99	0.0269	1.05%	60.01	-9.65%
14	1993	435.23	0.0288	11.56%	53.13	20.48%
15	1992	416.08	0.0290	7.50%	49.56	15.27%
16	1991	325.49	0.0382	31.65%	44.84	19.44%
17	1990	339.97	0.0341	-0.85%	45.60	7.11%
18	1989	285.41	0.0364	22.76%	43.06	15.18%
19	1988	250.48	0.0366	17.61%	40.10	17.36%
20	1987	264.51	0.0317	-2.13%	48.92	-9.84%
21	1986	208.19	0.0390	30.95%	39.98	32.36%
22	1985	171.61	0.0451	25.83%	32.57	35.05%
23	1984	166.39	0.0427	7.41%	31.49	16.12%
24	1983	144.27	0.0479	20.12%	29.41	20.65%
25	1982	117.28	0.0595	28.96%	24.48	36.48%
26	1981	132.97	0.0480	-7.00%	29.37	-3.01%
27	1980	110.87	0.0541	25.34%	34.69	-3.81%
28	1979	99.71	0.0533	16.52%	43.91	-11.89%
29	1978	90.25	0.0532	15.80%	49.09	-2.40%
30	1977	103.80	0.0399	-9.06%	50.95	4.20%
31	1976	96.86	0.0380	10.96%	43.91	25.13%
32	1975	72.56	0.0507	38.56%	41.76	14.75%
33	1974	96.11	0.0364	-20.86%	52.54	-12.91%
34	1973	118.40	0.0269	-16.14%	58.51	-3.37%
35	1972	103.30	0.0296	17.58%	56.47	10.69%
36	1971	93.49	0.0332	13.81%	53.93	12.13%
37	1970	90.31	0.0356	7.08%	50.46	14.81%
38	1969	102.00	0.0306	-8.40%	62.43	-12.76%
39	1968	95.04	0.0313	10.45%	66.97	-0.81%
40	1967	84.45	0.0351	16.05%	78.69	-9.81%
41	1966	93.32	0.0302	-6.48%	86.57	-4.48%
42	1965	86.12	0.0299	11.35%	91.40	-0.91%
43	1964	76.45	0.0305	15.70%	92.01	3.68%
44	1963	65.06	0.0331	20.82%	93.56	2.61%
45	1962	69.07	0.0297	-2.84%	89.60	8.89%
46	1961	59.72	0.0328	18.94%	89.74	4.29%
47	1960	58.03	0.0327	6.18%	84.36	11.13%
48	1959	55.62	0.0324	7.57%	91.55	-3.49%
49	1958	41.12	0.0448	39.74%	101.22	-5.60%

Line No.	Year	S&P 500 Stock Price	Stock Dividend Yield	Stock Return	A-rated Bond Yield	Bond Return
50	1957	45.43	0.0431	-5.18%	100.70	4.49%
51	1956	44.15	0.0424	7.14%	113.00	-7.35%
52	1955	35.60	0.0438	28.40%	116.77	0.20%
53	1954	25.46	0.0569	45.52%	112.79	7.07%
54	1953	26.18	0.0545	2.70%	114.24	2.24%
55	1952	24.19	0.0582	14.05%	113.41	4.26%
56	1951	21.21	0.0634	20.39%	123.44	-4.89%
57	1950	16.88	0.0665	32.30%	125.08	1.89%
58	1949	15.36	0.0620	16.10%	119.82	7.72%
59	1948	14.83	0.0571	9.28%	118.50	4.49%
60	1947	15.21	0.0449	1.99%	126.02	-2.79%
61	1946	18.02	0.0356	-12.03%	126.74	2.59%
62	1945	13.49	0.0460	38.18%	119.82	9.11%
63	1944	11.85	0.0495	18.79%	119.82	3.34%
64	1943	10.09	0.0554	22.98%	118.50	4.49%
65	1942	8.93	0.0788	20.87%	117.63	4.14%
66	1941	10.55	0.0638	-8.98%	116.34	4.55%
67	1940	12.30	0.0458	-9.65%	112.39	7.08%
68	1939	12.50	0.0349	1.89%	105.75	10.05%
69	1938	11.31	0.0784	18.36%	99.83	9.94%
70	1937	17.59	0.0434	-31.36%	103.18	0.63%
Return						
71	1937—2006	Stocks	11.56%			
72		Bonds	6.47%			
73	Risk Premium		5.10%			

Note: See Appendix 4 for an explanation of how stock and bond returns are derived and the source of the data presented.

**SCHEDULE JVW-4**  
**COMPARATIVE RETURNS ON S&P UTILITY STOCK INDEX**  
**AND MOODY'S A-RATED UTILITY BONDS 1937 - 2006**

Line No.	Year	Utility Stock Price	Stock Dividend Yield	Stock Return	A-rated Bond Price	Bond Rate of Return
1	2006	\$198.94	0.0345		\$75.25	
2	2005	167.77	0.0356	22.14%	74.91	5.80%
3	2004	139.79	0.0342	23.44%	70.87	11.34%
4	2003	114.11	0.0508	27.58%	62.26	20.27%
5	2002	142.14	0.0454	-15.18%	57.44	15.35%
6	2002	243.79	0.0362		57.44	
7	2001	307.70	0.0287	-17.90%	56.40	8.93%
8	2000	239.17	0.0413	32.78%	52.60	14.82%
9	1999	253.52	0.0394	-1.72%	63.03	-10.20%
10	1998	228.61	0.0457	15.47%	62.43	7.38%
11	1997	201.14	0.0492	18.58%	56.62	17.32%
12	1996	202.57	0.0454	3.83%	60.91	-0.48%
13	1995	153.87	0.0584	37.49%	50.22	29.26%
14	1994	168.70	0.0496	-3.83%	60.01	-9.65%
15	1993	159.79	0.0537	10.95%	53.13	20.48%
16	1992	149.70	0.0572	12.46%	49.56	15.27%
17	1991	138.38	0.0607	14.25%	44.84	19.44%
18	1990	146.04	0.0558	0.33%	45.60	7.11%
19	1989	114.37	0.0699	34.68%	43.06	15.18%
20	1988	106.13	0.0704	14.80%	40.10	17.36%
21	1987	120.09	0.0588	-5.74%	48.92	-9.84%
22	1986	92.06	0.0742	37.87%	39.98	32.36%
23	1985	75.83	0.0860	30.00%	32.57	35.05%
24	1984	68.50	0.0925	19.95%	31.49	16.12%
25	1983	61.89	0.0948	20.16%	29.41	20.65%
26	1982	51.81	0.1074	30.20%	24.48	36.48%
27	1981	52.01	0.0978	9.40%	29.37	-3.01%
28	1980	50.26	0.0953	13.01%	34.69	-3.81%
29	1979	50.33	0.0893	8.79%	43.91	-11.89%
30	1978	52.40	0.0791	3.96%	49.09	-2.40%
31	1977	54.01	0.0714	4.16%	50.95	4.20%
32	1976	46.99	0.0776	22.70%	43.91	25.13%
33	1975	38.19	0.0920	32.24%	41.76	14.75%
34	1974	48.60	0.0713	-14.29%	52.54	-12.91%
35	1973	60.01	0.0556	-13.45%	58.51	-3.37%
36	1972	60.19	0.0542	5.12%	56.47	10.69%
37	1971	63.43	0.0504	-0.07%	53.93	12.13%
38	1970	55.72	0.0561	19.45%	50.46	14.81%
39	1969	68.65	0.0445	-14.38%	62.43	-12.76%
40	1968	68.02	0.0435	5.28%	66.97	-0.81%
41	1967	70.63	0.0392	0.22%	78.69	-9.81%
42	1966	74.50	0.0347	-1.72%	86.57	-4.48%
43	1965	75.87	0.0315	1.34%	91.40	-0.91%

Line No.	Year	Utility Stock Price	Stock Dividend Yield	Stock Return	A-rated Bond Price	Bond Rate of Return
44	1964	67.26	0.0331	16.11%	92.01	3.68%
45	1963	63.35	0.0330	9.47%	93.56	2.61%
46	1962	62.69	0.0320	4.25%	89.60	8.89%
47	1961	52.73	0.0358	22.47%	89.74	4.29%
48	1960	44.50	0.0403	22.52%	84.36	11.13%
49	1959	43.96	0.0377	5.00%	91.55	-3.49%
50	1958	33.30	0.0487	36.88%	101.22	-5.60%
51	1957	32.32	0.0487	7.90%	100.70	4.49%
52	1956	31.55	0.0472	7.16%	113.00	-7.35%
53	1955	29.89	0.0461	10.16%	116.77	0.20%
54	1954	25.51	0.0520	22.37%	112.79	7.07%
55	1953	24.41	0.0511	9.62%	114.24	2.24%
56	1952	22.22	0.0550	15.36%	113.41	4.26%
57	1951	20.01	0.0606	17.10%	123.44	-4.89%
58	1950	20.20	0.0554	4.60%	125.08	1.89%
59	1949	16.54	0.0570	27.83%	119.82	7.72%
60	1948	16.53	0.0535	5.41%	118.50	4.49%
61	1947	19.21	0.0354	-10.41%	126.02	-2.79%
62	1946	21.34	0.0298	-7.00%	126.74	2.59%
63	1945	13.91	0.0448	57.89%	119.82	9.11%
64	1944	12.10	0.0569	20.65%	119.82	3.34%
65	1943	9.22	0.0621	37.45%	118.50	4.49%
66	1942	8.54	0.0940	17.36%	117.63	4.14%
67	1941	13.25	0.0717	-28.38%	116.34	4.55%
68	1940	16.97	0.0540	-16.52%	112.39	7.08%
69	1939	16.05	0.0553	11.26%	105.75	10.05%
70	1938	14.30	0.0730	19.54%	99.83	9.94%
71	1937	24.34	0.0432	-36.93%	103.18	0.63%
Return 1937—						
72	2006	Stocks	10.92%			
73		Bonds	6.47%			
74	Risk Premium		4.45%			

Note: See Appendix 4 for an explanation of how stock and bond returns are derived and the source of the data presented. In 2002, S&P discontinued its S&P Utilities stock index, and S&P no longer reports dividend yields for electric utilities. Thus, for this study, the utility stock returns beginning in 2002 are computed based on the companies contained in the S&P electric company index, as listed in the *S&P Security Price Record*. The dividend yields for these stocks are the January dividend yields reported by Value Line.

**SCHEDULE JVW-5**  
**USING THE ARITHMETIC MEAN TO ESTIMATE**  
**THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL**

Consider an investment that in a given year generates a return of 30 percent with probability equal to .5 and a return of -10 percent with a probability equal to .5. For each one dollar invested, the possible outcomes of this investment at the end of year one are:

Ending Wealth	Probability
\$1.30	0.50
\$0.90	0.50

At the end of year two, the possible outcomes are:

Ending Wealth		Probability	Value x Probability
(1.30) (1.30)	=	\$1.69 0.25	0.4225
(1.30) (.9)	=	\$1.17 0.50	0.5850
(.9) (.9)	=	\$0.81 0.25	0.2025
Expected Wealth	=		\$1.21

The expected value of this investment at the end of year two is \$1.21. In a competitive capital market, the cost of equity is equal to the expected rate of return on an investment. In the above example, the cost of equity is that rate of return which will make the initial investment of one dollar grow to the expected value of \$1.21 at the end of two years. Thus, the cost of equity is the solution to the equation:

$$1(1+k)^2 = 1.21 \text{ or}$$

$$k = (1.21/1)^{.5} - 1 = 10\%.$$

The arithmetic mean of this investment is:

$$(30\%) (.5) + (-10\%) (.5) = 10\%.$$

Thus, the arithmetic mean is equal to the cost of equity capital.

The geometric mean of this investment is:

$$[(1.3) (.9)]^{.5} - 1 = .082 = 8.2\%.$$

Thus, the geometric mean is not equal to the cost of equity capital. The lesson is obvious: for an investment with an uncertain outcome, the arithmetic mean is the best measure of the cost of equity capital.

**SCHEDULE JVW-6**  
**CALCULATION OF CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL COST OF EQUITY**  
**USING MORNINGSTAR 7.1 PERCENT RISK PREMIUM**

Line			
No	Risk-free Rate	5.19%	20-year Treasury bond yield
1	Beta	0.94	Average Beta Proxy Electric Companies
2	Risk Premium	7.10%	Long-horizon Morningstar risk premium
	Beta x Risk		
3	Premium	6.67%	
	CAPM cost of		
4	equity	11.9%	

Morningstar risk premium from *Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation 2007 Yearbook Valuation Edition*; Value Line beta for proxy companies from Value Line Investment Analyzer August 2007.

## PROXY COMPANY BETAS

Line No.	Company	Beta	Market Cap \$ (Mil)
1	Ameren Corp.	0.75	10,610
2	Amer. Elec. Power	1.35	19,102
3	Black Hills	1.10	1,559
4	Constellation Energy	0.95	15,946
5	Dominion Resources	1.05	31,914
6	DPL Inc.	0.95	3,235
7	DTE Energy	0.75	8,784
8	Consol. Edison	0.75	12,736
9	Edison Int'l	1.10	18,343
10	Entergy Corp.	0.90	20,259
11	Exelon Corp.	0.90	51,200
12	FirstEnergy Corp.	0.85	19,589
13	FPL Group	0.85	25,442
14	G't Plains Energy	0.95	2,527
15	Hawaiian Elec.	0.75	1,847
16	IDACORP Inc.	1.05	1,511
17	Alliant Energy	0.95	4,225
18	MDU Resources	1.00	5,140
19	NiSource Inc.	0.95	5,179
20	NSTAR	0.80	3,511
21	Northeast Utilities	0.90	4,477
22	Otter Tail Corp.	0.65	1,053
23	PG&E Corp.	1.20	16,339
24	Progress Energy	0.95	12,354
25	PNM Resources	0.95	1,837
26	Pinnacle West Capital	1.00	4,084
27	Pepco Holdings	0.90	5,192
28	PPL Corp.	0.95	20,040
29	Puget Energy Inc.	0.85	2,854
30	SCANA Corp.	0.85	4,481
31	Southern Co.	0.70	27,385
32	Sempra Energy	1.05	14,822
33	Integrus Energy	0.85	4,073
34	Vectren Corp.	0.95	2,029
35	Wisconsin Energy	0.80	5,269
36	Westar Energy	0.95	2,324
37	Xcel Energy Inc.	0.90	8,876
38	Market-Wtd. Ave.	0.94	

Data from Value Line Investment Analyzer August 2007.

**SCHEDULE JVW-7**  
**CALCULATION OF CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL COST OF EQUITY**  
**USING DCF ESTIMATE OF THE EXPECTED RATE OF RETURN**  
**ON THE MARKET PORTFOLIO**

Line			
No.	Risk-free rate	5.19%	20-year Treasury bond yield
1	Beta	0.94	Average Beta Proxy Electric Companies
2	DCF S&P 500	13.6%	DCF Cost of Equity S&P 500 (see
3	Risk Premium	8.41%	following)
4	Beta x Risk Premium	7.91%	
5	CAPM cost of equity	13.1%	

## SUMMARY OF DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS FOR S&amp;P 500 COMPANIES

COMPANY	P <sub>0</sub>	D <sub>0</sub>	Growth	Cost of Equity
3M	87.25	1.92	11.13%	13.6%
ABBOTT LABS.	54.77	1.30	12.08%	14.8%
ACE	61.24	1.08	13.23%	15.2%
AIR PRDS.& CHEMS.	81.00	1.52	11.54%	13.6%
ALCOA	40.45	0.68	11.13%	13.0%
ALLSTATE	60.55	1.52	9.02%	11.8%
AMBAC FINANCIAL	85.60	0.84	12.80%	13.9%
AMEREN	51.49	2.54	6.42%	11.8%
AMERICAN EXPRESS	62.56	0.60	12.29%	13.4%
AMERICAN INTL.GP.	69.91	0.80	12.63%	13.9%
AMERIPRISE FINL.	62.62	0.60	11.20%	12.3%
AMERISOURCEBERGEN	48.86	0.19	13.63%	14.1%
APPLERA APPD.BIOS.	30.13	0.17	11.50%	12.1%
ARCHER-DANLS.-MIDL.	35.01	0.46	10.67%	12.1%
AVON PRODUCTS	38.21	0.74	10.94%	13.1%
BALL	53.07	0.40	12.50%	13.4%
BANK OF AMERICA	49.84	2.56	7.48%	13.1%
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON	43.44	0.96	10.71%	13.2%
BARD C R	82.30	0.60	14.22%	15.1%
BAUSCH & LOMB	67.89	0.52	14.00%	14.9%
BAXTER INTL.	56.01	0.67	12.99%	14.3%
BB & T	41.11	1.84	8.92%	13.9%
BEAR STEARNS	143.15	1.28	11.50%	12.5%
BECTON DICKINSON	76.46	0.98	12.68%	14.1%
BEMIS	32.73	0.84	10.67%	13.5%
BROWN-FORMAN 'B'	68.98	1.21	10.74%	12.7%
BRUNSWICK	32.60	0.60	10.17%	12.2%
BURL.NTHN.SANTA FE C	89.29	1.28	13.86%	15.5%
CA	26.17	0.16	11.24%	11.9%
CATERPILLAR	78.81	1.44	12.78%	14.9%
CIGNA	53.41	0.04	12.31%	12.4%
CINTAS	38.51	0.39	12.71%	13.9%
CIT GP.	55.74	1.00	11.58%	13.6%
CITIGROUP	52.14	2.16	9.98%	14.6%
CLEAR CHL.COMMS.	37.26	0.75	11.50%	13.8%
CLOROX	64.97	1.60	10.63%	13.4%
COCA COLA	52.54	1.36	9.13%	12.0%
COLGATE-PALM.	66.98	1.44	10.70%	13.1%
COM.BANC.	35.29	0.52	12.98%	14.7%
COOPER INDS.	54.20	0.84	12.20%	13.9%

COMPANY	$P_0$	$D_0$	Growth	Cost of Equity
COSTCO WHOLESALE	57.63	0.58	12.74%	13.9%
COUNTRYWIDE FINL.	36.50	0.60	11.42%	13.3%
D R HORTON	21.11	0.60	9.75%	12.9%
DARDEN RESTAURANTS	44.06	0.72	11.83%	13.7%
DONNELLEY R R & SONS	42.86	1.04	9.67%	12.4%
DOVER	50.65	0.80	12.67%	14.5%
DOW JONES & CO	53.14	1.00	12.78%	14.9%
EATON	93.89	1.72	11.18%	13.2%
ECOLAB	43.00	0.46	14.25%	15.5%
EMERSON ELECTRIC	48.07	1.05	11.67%	14.1%
ENTERGY	109.20	3.00	9.17%	12.2%
EQUIFAX	42.43	0.16	12.00%	12.4%
ESTEE LAUDER COS.'A'	47.05	0.50	10.75%	11.9%
EXELON	75.13	1.76	9.70%	12.3%
FAMILY DOLLAR STORES	33.13	0.46	12.86%	14.4%
FANNIE MAE	63.63	2.00	9.17%	12.6%
FEDERATED INVRS.'B'	38.42	0.84	12.80%	15.3%
FEDEX	110.65	0.40	15.09%	15.5%
FIDELITY NAT.INFO.SVS.	53.05	0.20	13.99%	14.4%
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP	40.63	1.68	9.39%	14.0%
FIRST DATA	32.44	0.12	12.33%	12.7%
FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL	38.26	1.80	6.71%	11.8%
FORTUNE BRANDS	80.68	1.68	10.06%	12.4%
FPL GROUP	60.65	1.64	9.57%	12.6%
FRANK.RES.	134.31	0.60	13.92%	14.4%
GAP	18.35	0.32	10.54%	12.5%
GENERAL DYNAMICS	80.07	1.16	11.14%	12.8%
GENERAL ELECTRIC	38.23	1.12	10.56%	13.8%
GENUINE PARTS	49.83	1.46	9.33%	12.6%
GENWORTH FINANCIAL	34.74	0.36	10.80%	12.0%
GOLDMAN SACHS GP.	218.09	1.40	13.38%	14.1%
GRAINGER W W	89.26	1.40	12.89%	14.7%
HARLEY-DAVIDSON	61.33	1.00	11.20%	13.0%
HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP.	99.76	2.00	9.65%	11.9%
HASBRO	31.41	0.64	9.93%	12.2%
HEWLETT-PACKARD	45.43	0.32	13.95%	14.8%
HOME DEPOT	38.97	0.90	12.44%	15.1%
HONEYWELL INTL.	57.79	1.00	11.33%	13.3%
HUNTINGTON BCSH.	21.91	1.06	6.75%	12.0%
ILLINOIS TOOL WKS.	54.43	1.12	12.10%	14.4%
IMS HEALTH	31.31	0.12	12.34%	12.8%
INGERSOLL-RAND	51.11	0.72	11.55%	13.1%

COMPANY	$P_0$	$D_0$	Growth	Cost of Equity
INTERNATIONAL BUS.MACH.	106.93	1.60	10.79%	12.5%
JOHNSON CONTROLS	112.85	0.44	13.75%	14.2%
JONES APPAREL GROUP	28.88	0.56	10.86%	13.0%
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO.	49.77	1.52	9.77%	13.2%
KB HOME	41.38	1.00	10.33%	13.0%
KELLOGG	52.69	1.24	9.13%	11.7%
KROGER	28.93	0.30	10.78%	11.9%
L3 COMMUNICATIONS	96.43	1.00	13.80%	15.0%
LEGG MASON	99.27	0.96	14.24%	15.3%
LEHMAN BROS.HDG.	73.88	0.60	11.83%	12.7%
LENNAR 'A'	39.86	0.64	11.17%	13.0%
LINCOLN NAT.	70.09	1.58	10.43%	12.9%
LIZ CLAIBORNE	36.09	0.22	13.50%	14.2%
LOCKHEED MARTIN	97.99	1.40	11.40%	13.0%
MACY'S	40.95	0.52	12.06%	13.5%
MARSH & MCLENNAN	31.18	0.76	9.99%	12.7%
MARSHALL & ILSLEY	47.27	1.24	9.54%	12.4%
MASCO	28.71	0.92	11.25%	14.9%
MATTEL	26.87	0.65	9.38%	12.1%
MBIA	64.15	1.36	10.33%	12.7%
MCCORMICK & CO NV.	36.90	0.80	9.82%	12.2%
MCGRAW-HILL	67.44	0.82	12.47%	13.8%
MCKESSON	60.02	0.24	14.73%	15.2%
MEDTRONIC	52.17	0.50	13.47%	14.6%
MERCK & CO.	51.47	1.52	10.63%	13.9%
MEREDITH	60.67	0.74	11.83%	13.2%
MERRILL LYNCH & CO.	87.04	1.40	11.33%	13.1%
METLIFE	65.31	0.59	10.73%	11.7%
MGIC INVT	57.62	1.00	10.81%	12.7%
MICROSOFT	30.30	0.40	11.54%	13.0%
MOLSON COORS BREWING 'B'	91.67	1.28	11.48%	13.0%
MOODYS	64.79	0.32	13.80%	14.4%
MORGAN STANLEY	70.07	0.90	13.79%	15.3%
MYLAN LABORATORIES	18.95	0.24	13.20%	14.6%
NATIONAL CITY	33.89	1.64	7.12%	12.4%
NATIONAL SEMICON.	27.32	0.16	12.83%	13.5%
NEWELL RUBBERMAID	29.80	0.84	9.20%	12.3%
NEWMONT MINING	40.70	0.40	12.15%	13.3%
NIKE 'B'	56.06	0.74	13.56%	15.1%
NORDSTROM	50.57	0.54	12.62%	13.8%
NORTHERN TRUST	64.30	1.00	12.03%	13.8%
NORTHROP GRUMMAN	76.50	1.48	12.89%	15.1%

COMPANY	P <sub>0</sub>	D <sub>0</sub>	Growth	Cost of Equity
OMNICOM GP.	52.67	0.60	11.86%	13.1%
PACCAR	87.91	1.00	11.67%	12.9%
PALL	44.31	0.48	11.33%	12.5%
PARKER-HANNIFIN	99.70	1.04	11.42%	12.6%
PEPSICO	67.01	1.50	10.96%	13.5%
PERKINELMER	26.33	0.28	14.00%	15.2%
PG & E	47.36	1.44	8.63%	12.0%
PNC FINL.SVS.GP.	72.34	2.52	9.81%	13.7%
PRAXAIR	71.20	1.20	12.90%	14.8%
PRINCIPAL FINL.GP.	59.85	0.80	12.29%	13.8%
PROCTER & GAMBLE	62.55	1.40	11.72%	14.2%
PRUDENTIAL FINL.	97.44	0.95	13.61%	14.7%
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS	51.40	0.40	13.86%	14.7%
REGIONS FINL.NEW	34.16	1.44	7.33%	11.9%
RYDER SYSTEM	53.67	0.84	11.57%	13.3%
SAFECO	62.25	1.60	10.00%	12.9%
SEALED AIR	31.19	0.40	11.50%	12.9%
SNAP-ON	53.20	1.08	10.67%	12.9%
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES	14.93	0.02	14.40%	14.6%
STANLEY WORKS	60.53	1.24	10.80%	13.1%
STATE STREET	68.77	0.88	12.88%	14.3%
SUNTRUST BANKS	87.04	2.92	8.35%	12.0%
SYNOVUS FINL.	31.40	0.82	12.50%	15.5%
T ROWE PRICE GP.	51.35	0.68	13.43%	14.9%
TEKTRONIX	32.07	0.24	13.63%	14.5%
TEXTRON	111.02	0.92	13.00%	13.9%
THE TRAVELERS COS.	53.77	1.16	9.88%	12.3%
TIFFANY & CO	51.25	0.48	11.60%	12.6%
TIME WARNER	20.88	0.25	13.03%	14.4%
TJX COS.	28.16	0.36	12.71%	14.2%
TXU	66.76	1.73	9.33%	12.2%
UNITED PARCEL SER.	73.07	1.68	11.63%	14.2%
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES	71.40	1.28	11.48%	13.5%
UNITEDHEALTH GP.	52.62	0.03	15.41%	15.5%
US BANCORP	33.21	1.60	8.24%	13.5%
V F	90.93	2.20	9.89%	12.6%
VERIZON COMMS.	41.77	1.62	7.86%	12.1%
WACHOVIA	52.81	2.24	8.72%	13.4%
WAL MART STORES	48.22	0.88	12.41%	14.5%
WALT DISNEY	34.62	0.30	13.67%	14.7%
WELLS FARGO & CO	35.38	1.24	10.80%	14.7%
WENDY'S INTL.	38.26	0.50	12.76%	14.2%

NP

COMPANY	P <sub>0</sub>	D <sub>0</sub>	Growth	Cost of Equity
WESTERN UNION	21.38	0.04	12.13%	12.3%
WRIGLEY WILLIAM JR.	57.17	1.16	10.40%	12.7%
XTO EN.	58.49	0.48	14.42%	15.4%
YUM! BRANDS	33.00	0.30	11.83%	12.9%
Market-Weighted Average				13.6%

Notes: In applying the DCF model to the S&P 500, I included in the DCF analysis only those companies in the S&P 500 group which pay a dividend, have a positive growth rate, and have at least three analysts' long-term growth estimates. I also eliminated those 25% of companies with the highest and lowest DCF results, a decision which had no impact on my CAPM estimate of the cost of equity.

D<sub>0</sub> = Current dividend per Thomson Financial.  
P<sub>0</sub> = Average of the monthly high and low stock prices during the three months ending July 2007 per Thomson Financial.  
g = I/B/E/S forecast of future earnings growth July 2007.  
k = Cost of equity using the quarterly version of the DCF model shown below:

$$k = \left[ \frac{d_0 (1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}}}{P_0} + (1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}} \right]^4 - 1$$

**SCHEDULE JVW-8**  
**AVERAGE MARKET VALUE CAPITAL STRUCTURE FOR PROXY COMPANY GROUP**

Line No.	Company	Long-Term Debt	Preferred Equity	Market Cap \$ (Mil)	Total Capital	% Long-term Debt	% Preferred	% Equity
1	Ameren Corp.	5,285	195	10,610	16,090	33%	1%	66%
2	Amer. Elec. Power	12,429	61	19,102	31,592	39%	0%	60%
3	Black Hills	628	0	1,559	2,187	29%	0%	71%
4	Constellation Energy	4,222	190	15,946	20,358	21%	1%	78%
5	Dominion Resources	14,791	257	31,914	46,962	31%	1%	68%
6	DPL Inc.	1,552	23	3,235	4,810	32%	0%	67%
7	DTE Energy	7,474	0	8,784	16,258	46%	0%	54%
8	Consol. Edison	8,298	213	12,736	21,247	39%	1%	60%
9	Edison Int'l	9,101	915	18,343	28,359	32%	3%	65%
10	Entergy Corp.	8,798	355	20,259	29,412	30%	1%	69%
11	Exelon Corp.	11,911	87	51,200	63,198	19%	0%	81%
12	FirstEnergy Corp.	8,535	0	19,589	28,124	30%	0%	70%
13	FPL Group	9,591	0	25,442	35,033	27%	0%	73%
14	G't Plains Energy	608	39	2,527	3,173	19%	1%	80%
15	Hawaiian Elec.	1,123	34	1,847	3,004	37%	1%	61%
16	IDACORP Inc.	929	0	1,511	2,440	38%	0%	62%
17	Alliant Energy	1,323	244	4,225	5,793	23%	4%	73%
18	MDU Resources	1,171	15	5,140	6,326	19%	0%	81%
19	NiSource Inc.	5,146	0	5,179	10,325	50%	0%	50%
20	NSTAR	2,361	43	3,511	5,915	40%	1%	59%
21	Northeast Utilities	4,138	116	4,477	8,731	47%	1%	51%
22	Otter Tail Corp.	255	16	1,053	1,324	19%	1%	80%
23	PG&E Corp.	6,697	252	16,339	23,288	29%	1%	70%
24	Progress Energy	8,835	93	12,354	21,282	42%	0%	58%
25	PNM Resources	1,766	12	1,837	3,614	49%	0%	51%
26	Pinnacle West Capital	3,233	0	4,084	7,316	44%	0%	56%
27	Pepco Holdings	4,367	24	5,192	9,584	46%	0%	54%
28	PPL Corp.	6,728	301	20,040	27,069	25%	1%	74%
29	Puget Energy Inc.	2,646	2	2,854	5,502	48%	0%	52%
30	SCANA Corp.	3,067	114	4,481	7,662	40%	1%	58%
31	Southern Co.	12,503	744	27,385	40,632	31%	2%	67%
32	Sempra Energy	4,525	196	14,822	19,543	23%	1%	76%
33	Integrus Energy	1,287	51	4,073	5,412	24%	1%	75%
34	Vectren Corp.	1,208	0	2,029	3,237	37%	0%	63%
35	Wisconsin Energy	3,073	30	5,269	8,372	37%	0%	63%
36	Westar Energy	1,563	21	2,324	3,908	40%	1%	59%
37	Xcel Energy Inc.	6,450	105	8,876	15,431	42%	1%	58%
38	Average					34%	1%	65%

Source of data: Value Line Investment Analyzer August 2007.

## AVERAGE CAPITAL STRUCTURE WEIGHTS ELECTRIC COMPANIES 2002 – 2007

Line No.	Long-term Debt	Preferred Equity	Market Cap \$ (Mil)	Total Capital	% Debt	% Preferred	% Equity
1	162,110	11,890	240,966	414,966	39%	3%	58%
2	194,805	10,803	193,264	398,872	49%	3%	48%
3	200,877	10,777	263,049	474,702	42%	2%	55%
4	216,264	6,644	322,119	545,027	40%	1%	59%
5	208,010	4,077	359,065	571,151	36%	1%	63%
6	199,456	3,661	408,602	611,719	33%	1%	67%
7	Average				40%	2%	58%

Data from The Value Line Investment Analyzer February each year for a group of 37 publicly-traded electric companies followed by Value Line.

**APPENDIX 1**  
**QUALIFICATIONS OF JAMES H. VANDER WEIDE**

**JAMES H. VANDER WEIDE, Ph.D.**

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James H. Vander Weide is Research Professor of Finance and Economics at Duke University, the Fuqua School of Business. Dr. Vander Weide is also founder and President of Financial Strategy Associates, a consulting firm that provides strategic, financial, and economic consulting services to corporate clients, including cost of capital and valuation studies.

Educational Background and Prior Academic Experience

Dr. Vander Weide holds a Ph.D. in Finance from Northwestern University and a Bachelor of Arts from Cornell University. He joined the faculty at Duke University and was named Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, Professor, and then Research Professor of Finance and Economics.

Since joining the faculty at Duke, Dr. Vander Weide has taught courses in corporate finance, investment management, and management of financial institutions. He has also taught courses in statistics, economics, and operations research, and a Ph.D. seminar on the theory of public utility pricing. In addition, Dr. Vander Weide has been active in executive education at Duke and Duke Corporate Education, leading executive development seminars on topics including financial analysis, cost of capital, creating shareholder value, mergers and acquisitions, real options, capital budgeting, cash management, measuring corporate performance, valuation, short-run financial planning, depreciation policies, financial strategy, and competitive strategy.

Dr. Vander Weide has designed and served as Program Director for several executive education programs, including the Advanced Management Program, Competitive Strategies in Telecommunications, and the Duke Program for Manager Development for managers from the former Soviet Union.

#### Publications

Dr. Vander Weide has written a book entitled *Managing Corporate Liquidity: An Introduction to Working Capital Management* published by John Wiley and Sons, Inc. He has also written a chapter titled, "Financial Management in the Short Run" for *The Handbook of Modern Finance*, and written research papers on such topics as portfolio management, capital budgeting, investments, the effect of regulation on the performance of public utilities, and cash management. His articles have been published in *American Economic Review*, *Financial Management*, *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, *Journal of Finance*, *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis*, *Journal of Bank Research*, *Journal of Portfolio Management*, *Journal of Accounting Research*, *Journal of Cash Management*, *Management Science*, *Atlantic Economic Journal*, *Journal of Economics and Business*, and *Computers and Operations Research*.

#### Professional Consulting Experience

Dr. Vander Weide has provided financial and economic consulting services to firms in the electric, gas, insurance, telecommunications, and water industries for more than 25 years. He has testified on the cost of capital, competition, risk, incentive regulation, forward-looking economic cost, economic pricing guidelines, depreciation, accounting, valuation, and other financial and economic issues in more than 375 cases before the United States Congress, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the National Energy Board of Canada, the public service

commissions of 40 states and the District of Columbia, the insurance commissions of five states, the Iowa State Board of Tax Review, North Carolina Property Tax Commission, and the National Association of Securities Dealers. In addition, he has testified as an expert witness in proceedings before the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire; United States District Court for the Northern District of California; United States District Court for the District of Nebraska; United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina; Superior Court of North Carolina, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of West Virginia; and United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. With respect to implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Dr. Vander Weide has testified in 30 states on issues relating to the pricing of unbundled network elements and universal service cost studies and has consulted with Bell Canada, Deutsche Telekom, and Telefónica on similar issues. He has also provided expert testimony on issues related to electric and natural gas restructuring. He has worked for Bell Canada/Nortel on a special task force to study the effects of vertical integration in the Canadian telephone industry and has worked for Bell Canada as an expert witness on the cost of capital. Dr. Vander Weide has provided consulting and expert witness testimony to the following companies:

#### Telecommunications Companies

ALLTEL and its subsidiaries	Ameritech (now AT&T new)
AT&T (old)	Verizon (Bell Atlantic) and subsidiaries
Bell Canada/Nortel	BellSouth and its subsidiaries
Centel and its subsidiaries	Cincinnati Bell (Broadwing)
Cisco Systems	Citizens Telephone Company
Concord Telephone Company	Contel and its subsidiaries
Deutsche Telekom	GTE and subsidiaries (now Verizon)
Heins Telephone Company	Lucent Technologies
Minnesota Independent Equal Access Corp.	NYNEX and its subsidiaries (Verizon)
Pacific Telesis and its subsidiaries	Phillips County Cooperative Tel. Co.
Pine Drive Cooperative Telephone Co.	Roseville Telephone Company (SureWest)
Siemens	SBC Communications (now AT&T new)
Sherburne Telephone Company	Southern New England Telephone
The Stentor Companies	Sprint/United and its subsidiaries
Telefónica	Union Telephone Company
Woodbury Telephone Company	United States Telephone Association
U S West (Qwest)	Valor Telecommunications (Windstream)

## Electric, Gas, and Water Companies

Alcoa Power Generating, Inc.  
 Alliant Energy  
 Ameren  
 American Water Works  
 Central Illinois Public Service  
 Citizens Utilities  
 Consolidated Natural Gas and its subsidiaries  
 Dominion Resources  
 Duke Energy  
 Empire District Electric Company  
 Interstate Power Company  
 Iowa-American Water Company  
 Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric  
 Iowa Southern  
 Kentucky-American Water Company  
 Kentucky Power Company  
 MidAmerican Energy and its subsidiaries  
 Nevada Power Company  
 NICOR  
 North Carolina Natural Gas  
 Northern Natural Gas Company

North Shore Gas  
 PacifiCorp  
 PG&E  
 Peoples Energy and its subsidiaries  
 The Peoples Gas, Light and Coke Co.  
 Progress Energy  
 Public Service Company of North Carolina  
 PSE&G  
 Sempra Energy  
 South Carolina Electric and Gas  
 Southern Company  
 Tennessee-American Water Company  
 TransCanada PipeLines Limited  
 United Cities Gas Company

## Insurance Companies

Allstate  
 North Carolina Rate Bureau  
 United Services Automobile Association (USAA)  
 The Travelers Indemnity Company  
 Gulf Insurance Company

Other Professional Experience

Dr. Vander Weide conducts in-house seminars and training sessions on topics such as creating shareholder value, financial analysis, competitive strategy, cost of capital, real options, financial strategy, managing growth, mergers and acquisitions, valuation, measuring corporate performance, capital budgeting, cash management, and financial planning. Among the firms for whom he has designed and taught tailored programs and training sessions are ABB Asea Brown Boveri, Accenture, Allstate, Ameritech, AT&T, Bell Atlantic/Verizon, BellSouth, Progress Energy/Carolina Power & Light, Contel, Fisons, GlaxoSmithKline, GTE, Lafarge, MidAmerican Energy, New Century Energies, Norfolk Southern, Pacific Bell Telephone, The Rank Group, Siemens, Southern New England Telephone, TRW, and Wolseley Plc. Dr. Vander Weide has also hosted a nationally prominent conference/workshop on estimating the cost of capital. In 1989, at the request of Mr. Fuqua, Dr. Vander Weide designed the Duke Program for Manager Development for managers from the former Soviet Union, the first in the United States designed exclusively for managers from Russia and the former Soviet republics.

In the 1970's, Dr. Vander Weide helped found University Analytics, Inc., which at that time was one of the fastest growing small firms in the country. As an officer at University Analytics, he designed cash management models, databases, and software packages that are still used by most major U.S. banks in consulting with their corporate clients. Having sold his interest in University Analytics, Dr. Vander Weide now concentrates on strategic and financial consulting, academic research, and executive education.

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## APPENDIX 2 DERIVATION OF THE QUARTERLY DCF MODEL

The simple DCF Model assumes that a firm pays dividends only at the end of each year. Since firms in fact pay dividends quarterly and investors appreciate the time value of money, the annual version of the DCF Model generally underestimates the value investors are willing to place on the firm's expected future dividend stream. In these workpapers, we review two alternative formulations of the DCF Model that allow for the quarterly payment of dividends.

When dividends are assumed to be paid annually, the DCF Model suggests that the current price of the firm's stock is given by the expression:

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{(1+k)} + \frac{D_2}{(1+k)^2} + \dots + \frac{D_n + P_n}{(1+k)^n} \quad (1)$$

where

$P_0$	=	current price per share of the firm's stock,
$D_1, D_2, \dots, D_n$	=	expected annual dividends per share on the firm's stock,
$P_n$	=	price per share of stock at the time investors expect to sell the stock, and
$k$	=	return investors expect to earn on alternative investments of the same risk, i.e., the investors' required rate of return.

Unfortunately, expression (1) is rather difficult to analyze, especially for the purpose of estimating  $k$ . Thus, most analysts make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, they assume that dividends are expected to grow at the constant rate  $g$  into the indefinite future. Second, they assume that the stock price at time  $n$  is simply the present value of all dividends expected in periods subsequent to  $n$ . Third, they assume that the investors' required rate of return,  $k$ ,

exceeds the expected dividend growth rate  $g$ . Under the above simplifying assumptions, a firm's stock price may be written as the following sum:

$$P_0 = \frac{D_0(1+g)}{(1+k)} + \frac{D_0(1+g)^2}{(1+k)^2} + \frac{D_0(1+g)^3}{(1+k)^3} + \dots, \quad (2)$$

where the three dots indicate that the sum continues indefinitely.

As we shall demonstrate shortly, this sum may be simplified to:

$$P_0 = \frac{D_0(1+g)}{(k-g)}$$

First, however, we need to review the very useful concept of a geometric progression.

### Geometric Progression

Consider the sequence of numbers 3, 6, 12, 24,..., where each number after the first is obtained by multiplying the preceding number by the factor 2. Obviously, this sequence of numbers may also be expressed as the sequence  $3, 3 \times 2, 3 \times 2^2, 3 \times 2^3$ , etc. This sequence is an example of a geometric progression.

Definition: A geometric progression is a sequence in which each term after the first is obtained by multiplying some fixed number, called the common ratio, by the preceding term.

A general notation for geometric progressions is:  $a$ , the first term,  $r$ , the common ratio, and  $n$ , the number of terms. Using this notation, any geometric progression may be represented by the sequence:

$$a, ar, ar^2, ar^3, \dots, ar^{n-1}.$$

In studying the DCF Model, we will find it useful to have an expression for the sum of  $n$  terms of a geometric progression. Call this sum  $S_n$ . Then

$$S_n = a + ar + \dots + ar^{n-1} . \quad (3)$$

However, this expression can be simplified by multiplying both sides of equation (3) by  $r$  and then subtracting the new equation from the old. Thus,

$$rS_n = ar + ar^2 + ar^3 + \dots + ar^n$$

and

$$S_n - rS_n = a - ar^n ,$$

or

$$(1 - r) S_n = a (1 - r^n) .$$

Solving for  $S_n$ , we obtain:

$$S_n = \frac{a(1 - r^n)}{(1 - r)} \quad (4)$$

as a simple expression for the sum of  $n$  terms of a geometric progression. Furthermore, if  $|r| < 1$ , then  $S_n$  is finite, and as  $n$  approaches infinity,  $S_n$  approaches  $a \div (1-r)$ . Thus, for a geometric progression with an infinite number of terms and  $|r| < 1$ , equation (4) becomes:

$$S = \frac{a}{1 - r} \quad (5)$$

#### Application to DCF Model

Comparing equation (2) with equation (3), we see that the firm's stock price (under the DCF assumption) is the sum of an infinite geometric progression with the first term

$$a = \frac{D_0(1+g)}{(1+k)}$$

and common factor

$$r = \frac{(1+g)}{(1+k)}$$



Applying equation (5) for the sum of such a geometric progression, we obtain

$$S = a \cdot \frac{1}{(1-r)} = \frac{D_0(1+g)}{(1+k)} \cdot \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1+g}{1+k}} = \frac{D_0(1+g)}{(1+k)} \cdot \frac{1+k}{k-g} = \frac{D_0(1+g)}{k-g}$$

as we suggested earlier.

**Quarterly DCF Model**

The Annual DCF Model assumes that dividends grow at an annual rate of  $g\%$  per year (see Figure 1).

Figure 1Annual DCF ModelFigure 2Quarterly DCF Model (Constant Growth Version)

In the Quarterly DCF Model, it is natural to assume that quarterly dividend payments differ from the preceding quarterly dividend by the factor  $(1 + g)^{.25}$ , where

$g$  is expressed in terms of percent per year and the decimal .25 indicates that the growth has only occurred for one quarter of the year. (See Figure 2.) Using this assumption, along with the assumption of constant growth and  $k > g$ , we obtain a new expression for the firm's stock price, which takes account of the quarterly payment of dividends. This expression is:

$$P_0 = \frac{d_0(1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}}}{(1+k)^{\frac{1}{4}}} + \frac{d_0(1+g)^{\frac{2}{4}}}{(1+k)^{\frac{2}{4}}} + \frac{d_0(1+g)^{\frac{3}{4}}}{(1+k)^{\frac{3}{4}}} + \dots \quad (6)$$

where  $d_0$  is the last quarterly dividend payment, rather than the last annual dividend payment. (We use a lower case  $d$  to remind the reader that this is not the annual dividend.)

Although equation (6) looks formidable at first glance, it too can be greatly simplified using the formula [equation (4)] for the sum of an infinite geometric progression. As the reader can easily verify, equation (6) can be simplified to:

$$P_0 = \frac{d_0(1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}}}{(1+k)^{\frac{1}{4}} - (1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}}} \quad (7)$$


Solving equation (7) for  $k$ , we obtain a DCF formula for estimating the cost of equity under the quarterly dividend assumption:

$$k = \left[ \frac{d_0(1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}}}{P_0} + (1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}} \right]^4 - 1 \quad (8)$$


### An Alternative Quarterly DCF Model

Although the constant growth Quarterly DCF Model [equation (8)] allows for the quarterly timing of dividend payments, it does require the assumption that the firm increases its dividend payments each quarter. Since this assumption is difficult for some analysts to accept, we now discuss a second Quarterly DCF Model that allows for constant quarterly dividend payments within each dividend year.

Assume then that the firm pays dividends quarterly and that each dividend payment is constant for four consecutive quarters. There are four cases to consider, with each case distinguished by varying assumptions about where we are evaluating the firm in relation to the time of its next dividend increase. (See Figure 3.)


**Figure 3****Quarterly DCF Model (Constant Dividend Version)****Case 1**

$$d_1 = d_2 = d_3 = d_4 = d_0(1+g)$$

**Case 2**


$$d_1 = d_0$$

$$d_2 = d_3 = d_4 = d_0(1+g)$$

**Figure 3 (continued)****Case 3**

$$d_1 = d_2 = d_0$$

$$d_3 = d_4 = d_0(1+g)$$

**Case 4**

$$d_1 = d_2 = d_3 = d_0$$

$$d_4 = d_0(1+g)$$

If we assume that the investor invests the quarterly dividend in an alternative investment of the same risk, then the amount accumulated by the end of the year will in all cases be given by

$$D_1^* = d_1 (1+k)^{3/4} + d_2 (1+k)^{1/2} + d_3 (1+k)^{1/4} + d_4$$

where  $d_1$ ,  $d_2$ ,  $d_3$  and  $d_4$  are the four quarterly dividends. Under these new assumptions, the firm's stock price may be expressed by an Annual DCF Model of the form (2), with the exception that

$$D_1^* = d_1 (1+k)^{3/4} + d_2 (1+k)^{1/2} + d_3 (1+k)^{1/4} + d_4 \quad (9)$$

is used in place of  $D_0(1+g)$ . But, we already know that the Annual DCF Model may be reduced to

$$P_0 = \frac{D_0(1+g)}{k-g}$$

Thus, under the assumptions of the second Quarterly DCF Model, the firm's cost of equity is given by

$$k = \frac{D_1^*}{P_0} + g \quad (10)$$

with  $D_1^*$  given by (9).

Although equation (10) looks like the Annual DCF Model, there are at least two very important practical differences. First, since  $D_1^*$  is always greater than  $D_0(1+g)$ , the estimates of the cost of equity are always larger (and more accurate) in the Quarterly Model (10) than in the Annual Model. Second, since  $D_1^*$  depends on  $k$  through equation (9), the unknown " $k$ " appears on both sides of (10), and an iterative procedure is required to solve for  $k$ .

### APPENDIX 3 EX ANTE RISK PREMIUM APPROACH

My ex ante risk premium method is based on studies of the DCF expected return on proxy companies compared to the interest rate on Moody's A-rated utility bonds. Specifically, for each month in my study period, I calculate the risk premium using the equation,

$$RP_{\text{PROXY}} = DCF_{\text{PROXY}} - I_A$$

where:

$RP_{\text{PROXY}}$	=	the required risk premium on an equity investment in the proxy group of companies,
$DCF_{\text{PROXY}}$	=	average DCF estimated cost of equity on a portfolio of proxy companies; and
$I_A$	=	the yield to maturity on an investment in A-rated utility bonds.

For my ex ante risk premium analysis, I began with the Moody's group of 24 electric companies shown in Table 1. I used the Moody's group of electric companies because they are a widely followed group of electric utilities, and use of this constant group greatly simplified the data collection task required to estimate the ex ante risk premium over the months of my study. Simplifying the data collection task was desirable because the ex ante risk premium approach requires that the DCF model be estimated for every company in every month of the study period. The Ex Ante Risk Premium Schedule in my direct testimony displays the average DCF estimated cost of equity on an investment in the portfolio of electric companies and the yield to maturity on A-rated utility bonds in each month of the study.

Previous studies have shown that the ex ante risk premium tends to vary inversely with the level of interest rates, that is, the risk premium tends to increase when interest rates decline, and decrease when interest rates go up. To test whether my studies also indicate that the ex ante risk premium varies inversely with the level of

interest rates, I performed a regression analysis of the relationship between the ex ante risk premium and the yield to maturity on A-rated utility bonds, using the equation,

$$RP_{\text{PROXY}} = a + (b \times I_A) + e$$

where:

$RP_{\text{PROXY}}$  = risk premium on proxy company group;

$I_A$  = yield to maturity on A-rated utility bonds;

$e$  = a random residual; and

$a, b$  = coefficients estimated by the regression procedure.

Regression analysis assumes that the statistical residuals from the regression equation are random. My examination of the residuals revealed that there is a significant probability that the residuals are serially correlated (non-zero serial correlation indicates that the residual in one time period tends to be correlated with the residual in the previous time period). Therefore, I made adjustments to my data to correct for the possibility of serial correlation in the residuals.

The common procedure for dealing with serial correlation in the residuals is to estimate the regression coefficients in two steps. First, a multiple regression analysis is used to estimate the serial correlation coefficient,  $r$ . Second, the estimated serial correlation coefficient is used to transform the original variables into new variables whose serial correlation is approximately zero. The regression coefficients are then re-estimated using the transformed variables as inputs in the regression equation. Based on my knowledge of the statistical relationship between the yield to maturity on A-rated utility bonds and the required risk premium, my estimate of the ex ante risk premium on an investment in my proxy electric company group as compared to an investment in A-rated utility bonds is given by the equation:

$$RP_{\text{PROXY}} = 8.20 - .5573 \times I_A.$$

Using the 6.25 percent average yield to maturity on A-rated utility bonds as of July 2007, the regression equation produces an ex ante risk premium based on the electric proxy group equal to 4.72 percent ( $8.20 - .5573 \times 6.25 = 4.72$ ).

To estimate the cost of equity using the ex ante risk premium method, one may add the estimated risk premium over the yield on A-rated utility bonds to the yield to maturity on A-rated utility bonds. As described above, my analyses produce an estimated risk premium over the yield on A-rated utility bonds equal to 4.72 percent. Adding an estimated risk premium of 4.72 percent to the 6.25 percent average yield to maturity on A-rated utility bonds produces a cost of equity estimate of 11.0 percent for the electric company proxy group using the ex ante risk premium method.

TABLE 1

**MOODY'S ELECTRIC COMPANIES**

American Electric Power  
 Constellation Energy  
 Progress Energy  
 CH Energy Group  
 Cinergy Corp.  
 Consolidated Edison Inc.  
 DPL Inc.  
 DTE Energy Co.  
 Dominion Resources Inc.  
 Duke Energy Corp.  
 Energy East Corp.  
 FirstEnergy Corp.  
 Reliant Energy Inc.  
 IDACORP. Inc.  
 IPALCO Enterprises Inc.  
 NiSource Inc.  
 OGE Energy Corp.  
 Exelon Corp.  
 PPL Corp.  
 Potomac Electric Power Co.  
 Public Service Enterprise Group  
 Southern Company  
 Teco Energy Inc.  
 Xcel Energy Inc.

Source of data: Mergent Public Utility Manual, August 2002. Of these 24 companies, I did not include three companies in my ex ante risk premium DCF analysis because there was insufficient data to perform a DCF analysis for most of my study period. Specifically, IPALCO merged with a company that is not in the electric utility industry; Reliant divested its electric utility operations; and CH Energy does not have any I/B/E/S analysts' estimates of long-term growth.

**APPENDIX 4**  
**EX POST RISK PREMIUM APPROACH**

**Source of Data**

Stock price and yield information is obtained from Standard & Poor's Security Price publication. Standard & Poor's derives the stock dividend yield by dividing the aggregate cash dividends (based on the latest known annual rate) by the aggregate market value of the stocks in the group. The bond price information is obtained by calculating the present value of a bond due in 30 years with a \$4.00 coupon and a yield to maturity of a particular year's indicated Moody's A-rated Utility bond yield. The values shown on Schedules JVW 3 and 4 are the January values of the respective indices.

**Calculation of Stock and Bond Returns**

Sample calculation of "Stock Return" column:

$$\text{Stock Return (2005)} = \left[ \frac{\text{Stock Price (2006)} - \text{Stock Price (2005)} + \text{Dividend (2005)}}{\text{Stock Price (2005)}} \right]$$

where  $\text{Dividend (2005)} = \text{Stock Price (2005)} \times \text{Stock Div. Yield (2005)}$

Sample calculation of "Bond Return" column:

$$\text{Bond Return (2005)} = \left[ \frac{\text{Bond Price (2006)} - \text{Bond Price (2005)} + \text{Interest (2005)}}{\text{Bond Price (2005)}} \right]$$

where Interest = \$4.00.

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES H. VANDER WEIDE

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA )  
 ) ss  
COUNTY OF DURHAM )

On the 20<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2007, before me appeared James H. Vander Weide, to me personally known, who, being by me first duly sworn, states that he is Research Professor of Finance and Economics at the Fuqua School of Business of Duke University and also President of Financial Strategy Associates and acknowledges that he has read the above and foregoing document and believes that the statements therein are true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief.

James H. Vander Weide  
James H. Vander Weide

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28 day of September, 2007.

Amy C Knudsen  
Notary Public

My commission expires: 2/29/2012

