STATE OF MISSOURI
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of the Establishment of a Working Case Regarding FERC Order 2222 Regarding Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregators in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent Systems Operators	File No. EW-2021-0267

Voltus Comments on Order Offering an Opportunity to Comment Regarding Modification of Temporary Ban on Aggregators for Commercial and Industrial Customers

Voltus, Inc. (Voltus) greatly appreciates the continued willingness of the Missouri Public Service Commission (Commission) to revisit its 2010 ban on demand response aggregators, or "ARCs." ARCs allow retail customers to earn revenues through direct participation in the wholesale markets. The question for the Commission is therefore whether it wants Missouri businesses to be able to earn money through energy management. As Voltus stated at the June 29, 2021 Commission workshop, if the Commission were to remove its 2010 prohibition on demand response aggregators, Voltus could register Missouri resources in the wholesale markets in a matter of weeks. Those resources would provide megawatts of reliability to the grid while earning meaningful revenue for Missouri businesses still recovering from the economic impacts of the pandemic. For the reasons stated below, Voltus believes it is time to modify the ban to allow commercial and industrial customers to work with ARCs, and to allow Missouri businesses to receive the benefits.

I. Background on Demand Response and Aggregators

Demand response, or load flexibility, is managing energy use to avoid consuming energy when the grid is stressed or energy is expensive. Federal regulations define "demand response"

as "a reduction in the consumption of electric energy by customers from their expected consumption in response to an increase in the price of electric energy or to incentive payments designed to induce lower consumption of electric energy."[1] Essentially, a load will be curtailed during an event, meaning load is reduced by a prescribed amount for a set period of time. That consumption might be shifted to occur before or after an event, or it might never occur at all. HVAC load is a helpful example: a building might pre-cool to avoid consuming energy during an evening peak (*i.e.*, load shift) or it might increase its thermostat set point (*i.e.*, avoided consumption).

A. Types of Demand Response

Demand response may be done at the retail or wholesale level. Utility demand response programs can manage customer load to benefit the distribution system or to manage the utility's power supply costs. Alternatively, the utility might offer the load of customers enrolled in retail programs into the wholesale market as demand response resources.

Traditionally, wholesale market demand response has been a **capacity resource**: customers are paid a standby payment to be available for curtailments, which might occur once a year for several hours. The capacity payment is determined in MISO via the Planning Resource Auction. Capacity products are emergency only resources dispatched by the grid operator (i.e., MISO). These products can be provided in capacity markets or through bilateral contracts with utilities, where they count towards their resource adequacy obligation. Capacity resources demonstrate the nexus of retail and wholesale demand response: the utility enrolls the load of a retail interruptible rate customer in the wholesale market as a capacity resource.

[1] 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(4), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/18/35.28.

Wholesale demand response now increasingly operates in non-emergency **economic** programs. These energy resources are bid in the market by the aggregator and deployed when they clear. These resources are paid the energy price (the locational marginal price, "LMP").

Resources can also participate in **ancillary services** programs like operating reserves/spinning reserves, supplemental/non-spinning reserves, or frequency regulation. Operating reserves events are short deployments (10-15 minutes), potentially multiple times a month. In MISO and SPP, there is an hourly auction for operating reserves. Resources that clear are paid a standby price that is set by the auction. If the resource is actually called on to perform —meaning the resource is "deployed" because there is a contingency event—the resource is then also paid the locational marginal price. These programs allow demand response to provide critical grid balancing that helps integrate renewable resources by providing ramping and balancing capabilities. Automated demand response can respond more quickly than a "fast start" gas turbine generator, aiding the grid in the event of sudden drops in intermittent resources.[2]

Additionally, private companies work with large energy consumers to manage their energy charges by helping them to minimize either peak or non-coincident peak charges. As this does not involve wholesale market participation, an aggregator ban is irrelevant to where these companies operate.

B. Types of Demand Response Providers

There are a variety of demand response providers. Utilities are demand response providers. Their programs are primarily at the retail level but also might enable wholesale market participation. For example, many of the utilities in MISO offer their interruptible rate customers'

[2] *See* Voltus Reply Comments, Exhibit B at 6, Expert Report of Paul Centolella, *Participation of Aggregators of Retail Demand Response Customers in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, FERC Docket RM21-14 (filed Aug. 23, 2021).

load into the MISO load modifying resource program. Evergy's Business Demand Response tariff enables energy market participation.[3]

Demand response aggregators (a.k.a. aggregators of retail customers, or "ARCs"), like Voltus, generally work directly with retail customers to offer those customers' loads directly into the wholesale market. Voltus operates in all nine North American wholesale markets, including the Midcontinent Independent Systems Operator (MISO) and Southwest Power Pool (SPP). Voltus is the only ARC operating in both MISO and SPP, where we aggregate customers of both restructured and vertically integrated utilities. Voltus has secured over 2,000 MW of distributed energy resources (DERs) to date.

An aggregator like Voltus works with customers to develop an individualized plan for them to curtail. This involves sales staff looking at the customer's energy use, understanding the customer's needs, and developing a curtailment plan that works for the customer. Voltus then offers those megawatts directly into the wholesale markets. Voltus pays the customer a share of the revenues the market pays to Voltus; this "split" is negotiated by the customer, with the customer receiving the majority of the revenues. Voltus, like all ARCs, pays any underperformance penalties—penalties are not passed through to the customer. Critically, the customer is not charged anything, but simply receives its share of revenues. Yet since Voltus and the customer are paid only when the resource performs, the two have a synergistic relationship to ensure the resource performs, and the grid receives the reliability that it needs.

Generally, Voltus would expect that by Voltus managing the customer's energy use, the customer could earn revenues equivalent to 10% of its energy costs by 10%. In SPP's operating

[3] *See* Evergy, Demand-Side Management Plan, Section 10.07, Business Demand Response, at 14, "Market Based Demand Response" (eff. Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.evergy.com/-/media/documents/billing/missouri/rules_and_regulations_mo/missouri-west/meeia-programs-010120.pdf?la=en.

reserve program, a $1,000-$2,000/MW a month.[4] Yet in tail events, the customer could also earn significantly more: as Voltus stated in its March 2021 comments, a resource curtailing 6 MW in the SPP's operating reserves program could have earned its split of $700,000 in the February 2021 polar vortex.[5] Meanwhile there are negligible impacts on utility load: generally demand shifts from a high demand period to a low demand period.

Alternatively, a utility might hire an aggregator to work as the program administrator to manage the utility's retail and/or wholesale demand response program. This however, deprives customers of the benefits of competition, e.g., multiple providers competing to give the customer a more generous revenue split. It also limits the customer to the technologies the utility-selected program administrator is capable of providing. For example, many demand response aggregators have not developed the technology to offer demand response resources into operating reserves.

C. Demand Response in MISO and SPP

Demand response resources already participate in MISO and SPP. As stated at the June 29th workshop, MISO and SPP have the following programs, and those in bold are ones in which Voltus enrolls demand response resources:

[4] Voltus Comments, at 7, *In the Matter of the Establishment of a Working Case Regarding FERC Order 2222,* Mo. P.S.C. File No. EW-2021-0267 (filed Mar. 31, 2021).
[5] *Id*. at 6-7.

	MISO	SPP
Energy	**Real-Time**	Real-Time
	Day Ahead	Day Ahead
Ancillary Services	**Spinning Reserve**	**Spinning Reserve**
	Supplemental	Supplemental
	Regulation	Regulation
Capacity	**Load Modifying Resources**	N/A

The fact that demand response resources already participate in MISO and SPP is critical: there are already wholesale market participation models and rules for demand response resources. There are processes to prevent double counting to ensure utility capacity resources are not enrolled by an aggregator. When a resource is enrolled, the utility and the state regulator receive notice of the registration and have a right to object. In MISO and SPP, the utility sees performance data following a deployment and in some cases has access to real-time data. The utility therefore has full visibility into a retail customer's wholesale market participation.

D. Benefits of Demand Response

Demand response provides undisputed benefits, both to the system and to the individual customer. ARCs maximize these benefits.

In terms of system benefits, wholesale demand response cost-effectively enhances reliability, provides grid stability that helps integrate renewables while enabling aging plants to retire, and reduces wholesale power supply costs. As to reliability, demand response has avoided or mitigated grid emergencies. In January 2014 in PJM , demand response resources were critical to reliability during a cold weather event.[6] Even though these resources were not required to

[6] PJM, *Analysis of Operational Events and Market Impacts During the January 2014 Cold Weather Events* (May 2014), at 37-38 https://www.hydro.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/PJM-January-2014-report.pdf.

respond given the time of year, the demand response provided resources equal to 96%, 98%, 76%, and 84% of projections over four events.[7] In 2019, PJM deployed over 700 MW of flexible demand response resources to maintain reliability during a heat event that occurred during a period when many traditional generation technologies are typically shut down for maintenance.[8] In ERCOT, its Emergency Response Service (ERS) enabled the system to avoid going beyond Energy Emergency Alert Level 1 (EEA1), which could have resulted in involuntary load shed.[9] In the 2021 Winter Event, ERS loads "generally over-provided," with an on average fleet-level load reduction of "30%-35% above the combined fleet-level obligation during the first 12 hours after the first deployment…"[10] The Texas Commission is now looking to expand this program.[11] Demand response provided critical emergency reliability in MISO on June 10, 2021: MISO asked for 2.5 GW of load reduction through its load modifying resource program, and ultimately received 5 GW more than requested.[12]

This additional reliability also has the effect of reducing overall system costs. Over a decade ago the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission recognized that demand response

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[7] *Id*.

[8] See Opening Comments of Advanced Energy Economy, at 16, *Participation of Aggregators of Retail Demand Response Customers in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, FERC Docket RM21-14 (filed July 23, 2021) (citing PJM, "Estimated Demand Response Activity October 2, 2019", available at https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/oc/20191015/20191015-item-06-load-management-reduction-action.ashx).

[9] *Id*. (citing Watson, M., S&P Global Platts, "Demand Response Helped Ensure Grid Reliability in ERCOT this Summer" (October 8, 2019), available at https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electricpower/100819-demand-response-helped-ensure-grid-reliability-in-ercot-this-summer.)

[10] *See* ERCOT, *ERCOT Winter Storm Review of Demand-Side Resources and Other Related Topics*, at 6 (Apr. 16, 2021), http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/key_documents_lists/226624/April_2021_DSWG_Meeting_ERCOT_FINAL.PPTX. Slide 2 illustrates this over-performance.

[11] *See* Questions for Comment, *Review of Wholesale Electric Market Design,* Project No. 52373 (Tex. PUC Aug. 2021) (Question 5, p. 2: "How can ERCOT's emergency response service program be modified to provide additional reliability benefits? What changes would need to be made to Commission rules and ERCOT market rules and systems to implement these program changes?").

[12] RTO Insider, *MISO Defends June Emergency Declaration* (July 11, 2021), https://www.rtoinsider.com/articles/28181-miso-market-subcommittee-briefs-july-8-2021.

providers competitive pressure that reduces wholesale power prices.[13] The price for wholesale demand response is set through market forces, such that a demand response is paid a market rate that minimizes system costs. Numerous studies show incorporating demand response fosters the integration of low costs renewables that further reduce system costs.[14] Due to these foregoing system benefits, public interest organizations like the Environmental Law and Policy Center, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club, and the Sustainable FERC Project support allowing demand response aggregators to operate in the wholesale markets.[15]

Wholesale demand response also benefits customers. Customers earn revenues that can meaningfully improve their bottom lines (see Question 4, *infra*).

ARCs maximize these system and customer benefits while providing unique additive benefits. ARCs enlist more demand response: in just two years, Voltus was able to bring 800 MWs of demand response in southern Illinois into the MISO market, representing nearly 10% of that area's 9,000 MW system peak.[16] Through advanced technologies provided only by aggregators, customers gain a better understanding of their energy usage which causes them to be more interested in other energy products, like efficiency or distributed generation. Aggregators are also able to offer new products as quickly as the market and technology allow, such as frequency regulation or operating reserves. This contrasts utility programs which might have an extended timeline due to regulation or difficulty devoting resources to enlisting

[13] Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Elec. Mkts., 125 FERC ¶ 61,071 at PP 16, 18 (2008) ("Order 719").

[14] *See* Voltus Opening Comments, Exhibit B, Expert Report ¶¶ 64-77.

[15] *See* Opening Comments of Public Interest Organizations, *Participation of Aggregators of Retail Demand Response Customers in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, FERC Docket RM21-14 (filed July 23, 2021). Voltus acknowledges and respects Missouri's opposing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission eliminating a state's ability to "opt-out" of permitting demand response aggregations, and believes that is a distinct from whether the Missouri Public Service Commission concludes it is in the public interest to allow aggregators.

[16] Compl. of Voltus, Inc. Requesting Fast Track Processing, Exhibit B, ¶ 39, Affidavit of Gregg Dixon, Docket No. EL21-12-000 (Oct. 20, 2020), Accession No. 20201020-5136 ("Voltus Complaint")

customers in new programs. ARCs have a strong business incentive to develop and offer new products in order to remain competitive and to grow. Utilities, quite reasonably, prioritize maintaining operations and system reliability. Finally, ARCs can remove barriers to participation. For example, ARCs absorb customers' non-performance penalties, which under other circumstances might be paid by the customer or the utility. Yet with ARCs, penalties are borne by the private sector.

E. Common Preconceptions about Aggregator Demand Response

There are common preconceptions about ARC demand response. One is that they are incompatible with vertical integration. Yet ARC demand response does operate in vertically integrated service territories. West Virginia never opted out and has had robust demand response for over a decade. Customers in Oklahoma and Kansas participate in ARC demand response, as well as customers of numerous, self-regulating municipal utilities and cooperatives. Demand response is not subject to the economics that justify vertical integration: power supply involves exorbitant fixed costs and minimal marginal costs. Demand response has high marginal costs to recruit customers and manage dispatches, which occur 24/7/365. Behind-the-meter services like demand response are not a core monopoly utility function. This is why utilities like Baltimore Gas & Electric and Ameren appreciate the complementary services that demand response can provide.

Another preconception is that regulators and utilities will not know about an ARC's activities. In reality, both entities review registrations so they are aware of a resource being enrolled. Utilities also see deployment data.

A utility might have concerns about distribution system reliability, but such issues have not appeared in decades of demand response experience. In an emergency event, demand

response will alleviate congestion on an overloaded system. In a non-emergency event, a short-duration deployment is no different than a customer changing its use pattern due to typical fluctuations or for routine maintenance. Utilities generally do not have insight into these events.

II. Responses to Commission Questions

1. Whether the Commission should modify the current prohibition on the operation of ARCs in Missouri?

Voltus supports the Commission modifying the current prohibition on the operation of ARCs in Missouri to allow all commercial and industrial customers to work with an aggregator. ARCs have operated in the wholesale markets for almost two decades. The role of ARCs in wholesale markets is far less speculative than it was when the Commission instituted its ban in 2010. Similarly, the Missouri Energy Efficiency Investment Act ("MEEIA") is firmly established whereas it was new legislation in 2010. Aggregators have experience in vertically integrated states, like Kansas, Oklahoma, Vermont, and West Virgina. At the June 29th workshop, two utilities spoke positively about the role of aggregators in their markets. Peter Milberg of Ameren Illinois spoke favorably of its experience with Voltus in particular. David Bloom of Baltimore Gas and Electric described the utility's residential demand response program, and disclosed that the utility no longer does C&I aggregations, having decided that is best left to the competitive DR providers.

Now is an opportune time to unlock the additional benefits of ARC demand response. Through participating in MISO and SPP programs, Missouri customers could unlock benefits not available through the current demand response programs. Resources could curtail in winter peaks to manage costs and ensure reliability. Resources could participate in operating reserves programs to provide regular grid reliability and incorporate additional renewables.

2. What modifications should be made to the current prohibition?

Since the Commision's order only sought comments regarding modifying the ban as it relates to aggregations of commercial or industrial customers, Voltus proposes modifying the ban to allow any commercial or industrial customer to work with an aggregator. One of the benefits aggregators provide is that they can work with customers who are too small to qualify for utility demand response programs like interruptible rates. So if the Commission were to only allow resources above a certain size threshold to work with aggregators, it would unfairly exclude smaller loads from earning revenues through wholesale market participation.

Furthermore, national businesses with locations in Missouri would be unable to unify their resources under a single aggregator if Missouri were to institute a size minimum. To illustrate, the load for a drug store like CVS or Walgreens is only around 10 kW. If a size minimum were adopted, these types of businesses could work with an aggregator in Illinois or Kansas, but not Missouri. As discussed in response to Question 4, demand response participation has a meaningful impact on the bottom lines of commercial and industrial businesses. A strong justification should be provided to exclude resources based on their load size.

3. What impact would a modification to permit operation of ARCs for commercial and industrial customers have on existing MEEIA programs?

Voltus is not certain that there would be any impacts on demand response MEEIA programs. Utility and aggregator demand response programs can peacefully co-exist as complementary services. Utilities have competitive advantages, including name recognition and

insight into customer load profiles. States like California,[17] Illinois, and Maryland have healthy utility demand response programs,[18] which are complemented by aggregator demand response programs.

In states with developed demand response programs, aggregators can serve customers differently than do utilities. Perhaps they serve customers who do not qualify for utility programs. Or, aggregators can enable customers to participate in different programs without risking double-counting: for example, in PJM, a resource might participate in its utility's interruptible program as a capacity resource but participate in ancillary services through an aggregator. Or, a national business might appreciate working with one aggregator in various markets, rather than a different utility in each. These are complementary services that can be provided by different market participants.

Notably, demand response is a helpful onramp to other energy services. Voltus's software platform[19] gives customers real-time energy data. We find this enhanced knowledge of their energy usage causes customers to become interested in other energy services, like efficiency, storage, or distributed generation. In this respect, aggregator's advanced technology can actually build a bridge, by piquing customers' interest in other MEEIA programs.

[17] California is actually a helpful model for Missouri on this issue. California is vertically integrated in most respects. The three major investor-owned utilities own generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure, and customers only have limited consumer choice to instead receive service from the one community choice aggregator in their territory (if there is one). ARCs are allowed, where they compete with utilities in the same demand response programs.

[18] *See* Smart Electric Power Alliance, 2019 Utility Demand Response Market Snapshot, Appendix B (Sept. 2019), https://sepapower.org/resource/2019-utility-demand-response-market-snapshot/.

[19] Screenshots of this software platform were provided in Voltus's slides at the June 29th workshop. *See* pp. 122-124, https://psc.mo.gov/CMSInternetData/ConsumerInformation/FERC%20Workshop%20Sessions%201-9.pdf.

Or, utilities might make the decision that aggregators provide adequate benefits such that utility resources are better spent supporting other energy efficiency endeavors. Letting all market actors operate to their comparative advantages is a positive outcome for Missouri ratepayers.

4. What impact would a modification to permit operation of ARCs for commercial and industrial customers have on the commercial and industrial customers?

Allowing ARCs to work with commercial and industrials would have impacts on those customers' profits. The revenues local businesses earn through wholesale market revenues are pure profit that add significant value to a business's bottom line. Electricity costs for larger industrials might constitute 30% of their operating costs. Saving 10% of those costs enables that business to increase its profits, increase wages, hire additional workers, or re-invest. As the Illinois Commerce Commission recently noted, Voltus estimated that for 2018/2019 planning year, "'commercial, institutional, and industrial demand response totaled nearly 600 MWs in the MISO portion of Illinois and has helped the average commercial and industrial customer's energy costs decrease by nearly $50,000 annually.'"[20]

For narrow margin businesses, meanwhile, demand response revenues greatly increases their profit margins. For a business with a 5% profit margin, $1 of demand response revenue is equivalent to $20 of top line revenue. A local grocery store might only have a profit margin of .5-1%, meaning the impacts would be even greater. Businesses can operate the same way, just

[20] Opening Comments of the Illinois Commerce Commission, at 5, *Participation of Aggregators of Retail Demand Response Customers in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, FERC Docket RM21-14 (filed July 23, 2021) (citing Dixon, "Use of Demand Response Reduces Energy Costs, Creates Jobs in Illinois," posted Sept. 15, 2017 https://www.voltus.co/tag/illinois/; See, ICC, Public Notice of Successful Bidders and Average Prices, Illinois Power Agency, MISO Zonal Resource Credits (Aug. 30, 2017) https://www.ipa-energyrfp.com/?wpfb_dl=1382.

more profitably. An ARC is only paid a minority of what the local business receives, which aligns an ARC's incentives to make sure the business is satisfied with its demand response participation, both financially and operationally.

5. What impact would a modification to permit operation of ARCs for commercial and industrial customers have on non-commercial and non-industrial customers?

Voltus asserts that permitting ARC demand response will have a net benefit for non-C&I customers. ARCs increase demand response in the region. Increased demand response helps bring down wholesale power supply costs by reducing peaks that are a significant driver of costs for all customer classes. Demand response also helps further integrate low-cost renewables that in turn further reduce system costs.

Yet when talking about impacts on non-C&I customers, it is important to differentiate between capacity, energy, and ancillary services demand response programs. Capacity programs and operating reserves programs essentially operate as an insurance policy, ensuring reliability. Demand response is lower-cost insurance policy than a peaking power plant,[21] in addition to being cleaner. With increasingly volatile weather patterns, all customers benefit from the reliability demand response resources provide. The Value of Lost Load is significant: a review of 10 jurisdictional studies found load-weighted averages for the value of lost load ("VOLL") to be in the $30,000-$40,000/MWh range.[22] For energy, demand response resources would only be

[21] Voltus Comments, at 6, *In the Matter of the Establishment of a Working Case Regarding FERC Order 2222,* Mo. P.S.C. File No. EW-2021-0267 (filed Mar. 31, 2021) (detailing how a GW of demand response can be procured for an estimated $1,825,000, compared to $100,000,000 for a peaking power plant).
[22] London Economics, *Estimating the Value of Lost Load*, at 51 (June 17, 2013), http://www.ercot.com/content/gridinfo/resource/2014/mktanalysis/ERCOT_ValueofLostLoad_LiteratureReviewandMacroeconomic.pdf#page=21&zoom=100,0,77.

dispatched when they are cheaper than the next available resource. This market design ensures that lowest-cost resources are leveraged.

Since wholesale demand response costs are allocated across the entire wholesale market, Voltus would expect that the costs of wholesale demand response are lower for non-participating customers than are the costs for retail demand response programs that are only socialized across the utility's service territory.

6. Are any changes to the Commission's existing rules necessary?

Voltus is not aware of any changes that are necessary to the Commission's existing rules, though the Commission is of course free to exercise its jurisdiction in any manner necessary to protect the Missouri public interest. Voltus has begun working in the vertically integrated states of Kansas and Oklahoma, and with self-regulating municipal utilities and cooperatives, without any rule changes. Only five states regulate ARCs in even a limited fashion.[23] ARCs are subject to Missouri's consumer protection laws, the same as any business in the state. Competition between aggregators is also great consumer protection for local businesses.

The Commission could institute a registry for demand response providers, but only five states have felt the need to do this.[24] It's important to recall that State regulators and the utility receive notification of registrations in MISO and SPP, and have the right to object to any registrations, such as on the grounds that the resource is already enrolled in a program. The Commission is therefore aware of the aggregators operating within the State. The Commission is

[23] *See* CPower Presentation at 107, https://psc.mo.gov/CMSInternetData/ConsumerInformation/FERC%20Workshop%20Sessions%201-9.pdf (noting New York, Pennsylvania, California, Virginia, and Maryland have some sort of registry and at least limited regulation over aggregators).
[24] *Id*.

also always free to institute a registry later if necessary, including as part of the Order No. 2222 implementation process. Given the visibility that the Commission has, Voltus would propose that the Commission modify the ban now and then in the Order 2222 process develop any rules or regulations that experience proves it needs, rather than predict these needs now.

III. Conclusion

Voltus believes there is a compelling case that permitting ARCs now is in the public interest. Both the MEEIA and wholesale demand response are well established. The regional energy mix is rapidly changing which, combined with volatile weather patterns, creates a need not just for demand response but for all available technologies. Missouri businesses would enjoy the marginal profit during these times. We know that ARC demand response can beneficially operate in vertically integrated states and peacefully co-exist with utility demand response programs. While the "wait-and-see" approach might have been justified in 2010's developing landscape, experience now proves that removing the aggregator ban is entirely safe. Furthermore, it could provide useful experience for developing Order 2222 processes. In the end, Voltus hopes that the Commission will have the same reaction as prospective customers, and be excited for the opportunities that demand response provides.

Respectfully submitted,

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