FILED March 8, 2012 Data Center Missouri Public Service Commission

Exhibit No.:

Issues:

Comprehensive Planning and Business

Transformation ("BT"), Pension Tracker,

AIP Compensation Recovery,

Acquisition Premiums and Discounts, Empire Contract and Interruptible Tariff,

Rate Design

Witness: Dennis R. Williams

Exhibit Type: Surrebuttal

Sponsoring Party: Missouri-American Water Company

Case No.:

WR-2011-0337 SR-2011-0338

Date:

February 2, 2012

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CASE NO. WR-2011-0337 CASE NO. SR-2011-0338

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

DENNIS R. WILLIAMS

ON BEHALF OF

MISSOURI-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

Staff Exhibit No.35

Date 2-21-12 Reporter JL

File No.1NR-2011-0337

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

IN THE MATTER OF MISSOURI-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY FOR AUTHORITY TO FILE TARIFFS REFLECTING INCREASED RATES FOR WATER AND SEWER SERVICE

CASE NO. WR-2011-0337 CASE NO. SR-2011-0338

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS R. WILLIAMS

Dennis R. Williams, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the witness who sponsors the accompanying testimony entitled "Surrebuttal Testimony of Dennis R. Williams"; that said testimony and schedules were prepared by him and/or under his direction and supervision; that if inquires were made as to the facts in said testimony and schedules, he would respond as therein set forth; and that the aforesaid testimony and schedules are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

Dennis R Williams

State of Missouri County of St. Louis

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to

Before me this and day of

Notary Public

My commission expires: $\frac{1}{2}$

JULIE M. POLZIN
Notary Public - Notary Seal
STATE OF MISSOURI
St. LOUIS COUNTY
WY COMMISSION FROM SEAL TO SEAL

My Commission Expires 6/11/2012 Commission # 08575308

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY DENNIS R. WILLIAMS MISSOURI-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY CASE NO. WR-2011-0337 SR-2011-0338

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1		SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY
2		
3		DENNIS R. WILLIAMS
4		WITHEST INTEGRALISTICAL AND DUDDOOF
5		WITNESS INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
6	^	DI BASE STATE VOLID NAME TITI E AND DI ISINESS ADDESS
7 8	Q. A.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, TITLE AND BUSINESS ADDRESS. My name is Dennis R. Williams, and my title is Senior Manager - Rates and
9	Α.	Regulation for the Central Division of American Water Works ("AWW"). My
10		
11		business address is 727 Craig Road, St. Louis, Missouri 63141.
12	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
13	A.	Yes, I have submitted direct and rebuttal testimony in this proceeding on behalf
14		of Missouri-American Water Company ("Missouri-American"," MAWC", or
15		"Company").
16		
17	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?
18	A.	The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to rebuttal testimony of other
19		parties. Specifically I will address the following issues:
20		1) Business Transformation Costs discussed in the rebuttal testimony of the
21		Missouri Public Service Commission Staff ("Staff") witness Kimberly Bolin and
22		Office of the Public Counsel ("OPC") witness Shawn Lafferty;
23		Pension Tracker as discussed in the rebuttal testimony of Staff witness
24		Paul Harrison;
25		3) Annual Incentive Plan ("AIP") costs as discussed in the rebuttal testimony
26		of OPC witness Shawn Lafferty;
27		4) Acquisition Premiums and Discounts as discussed in the testimony of
28		OPC witness Ted Robertson;
29		5) Empire Contract and Interruptible Tariff as discussed in the testimony of
30		The Empire District Electric Company ("Empire") witness Blake Mertens; and
31		6) Rate Design issues specific to comments made in the rebuttal testimony
32		of Ag Processing witness Donald Johnstone and OPC witness Barbara
33		Meisenheimer regarding acquisitions and phase-in plans

1. BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION

1 2

3 Q. WHAT IS BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION?

- A. The term "Business Transformation" or "BT" refers to the procurement, development, and deployment of new, integrated information technology systems, and the process of implementing the new systems in a manner that properly aligns the Company's business processes with the increased capabilities of the new systems. Over the life of the BT program, there will be four primary areas of focus:
 - Replace legacy systems near the end of their useful lives;
 - Promote operating excellence, efficiency, and economies of scale;
 - Enhance the customer experience; and
 - Increase employee effectiveness and satisfaction.

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14 Q. WHAT ARE THE PROJECTS THAT COMPRISE THE BT PROGRAM?

There are three projects that comprise the core of the BT program: Enterprise 15 A. Resource Planning ("ERP"); Enterprise Asset Management ("EAM"), and Customer 16 Information System ("CIS"). ERP includes human resource, finance and accounting, 17 18 supply chain, and procurement management functions and operations. EAM 19 includes the management of asset lifecycles including: the design, construction, 20 commissioning, operations, maintenance and decommissioning/ replacement of plant, equipment and facilities; as well as work management for both customer 21 22 service field work (service turn-ons, leak inspections, etc.) and Transmission & 23 Distribution system work. CIS includes all billing and personal data about our 24 customers, including billing rates, water consumption, associated charges, meter information, and the strategy for managing and nurturing our interactions with our 25

1	customers. ERP will go into service by August of 2012. CIS and EAM will be placed
2	into service in for MAWC the first quarter of 2013.

4 Q. WHAT IS THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION

5 PROGRAM?

6 A. The costs associated with the BT program are significant because the BT initiative is 7 significant. Missouri-American's allocated share of these costs is almost \$45 million.

Q. WHAT ARE COST AREAS FOR THE BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION

PROGRAM?

A. There are four distinct areas of cost related to the Business Transformation program:

(i) the initial comprehensive planning studies, (ii) hardware (e.g., personal computers, servers, storage, and networking equipment), (iii) software licenses, and (iv) capitalized labor costs required to design and modify the base software package as required, cleanse historical data and develop transition routines to transfer historical data from existing systems, modify business processes to optimize implementation of new information technology systems, train and prepare our employees for the new business processes and information technology systems, and implement the go-live use of the new information technology systems.

Q. WHAT RATE TREATMENT IS MISSOURI-AMERICAN REQUESTING FOR

BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION PROGRAM COSTS?

A. The Company requests that the Commission approve an Accounting Authority Order ("AAO") allowing the Company to synchronize the in-service dates and rate relief of its Business Transformation program assets. The Company also requests that the

Commission approve a 12 year depreciation period for the Company's depreciable BT assets.

- Q. STAFF AND OPC OPPOSE THE COMPANY'S REQUEST TO APPROVE AN AAO
 AND A 12 YEAR DEPRECIATION PERIOD FOR THE COMPANY'S
 DEPRECIABLE BT ASSETS. DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS ON
 THE STAFF AND OPC RECOMMENDATIONS?
- Yes, and, as I will explain further below, Staff's and OPC's analysis and recommendations reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the Company's BT program, are inconsistent with Commission practice, and are not in the best interests of customers or the Company.

Q. WHAT IS AN ACCOUNTING AUTHORITY ORDER?

A. An AAO is a Commission order authorizing a specified accounting treatment other than what would otherwise be prescribed by the Uniform System of Accounts ("USOA"). The usual and primary benefit of an AAO to a utility is that utility earnings are improved during the deferral period. The regulatory asset is amortized over a prescribed period. Further, the Commission may permit future recovery in rates of some portion of the amount deferred. Granting of an AAO does not guarantee recovery of the deferral. An AAO in this case would defer a final decision on current extraordinary BT costs until the next rate case, when the utility would be allowed to make a case that the deferred costs were prudently incurred and should be included in rates. AAO's may also have benefit to customers. By deferring costs from one period to another, rates may be more levelized, and the number of rates cases and their associated costs may be lessened. Finally, AAOs can be used by the

1		Commission to better match the timing of expenses and receipts, providing a balance
2		between the interests of the Company and its customers.
3		
4	Q.	WHEN IS IT APPROPRIATE FOR THE COMMISSION TO APPROVE AN AAO?
5	A.	The Commission has found AAOs to be appropriate in a wide variety of
6		circumstances. For example, AAOs have been sought to defer expenses where a
7		utility has undertaken a large construction project. This is often referred to as
8		construction accounting. An AAO permits a utility to capture those extraordinary
9		expenses for potential recovery in the forward-looking rates to be established at a
10		future rate case (even though the extraordinary expenses may occur outside the "test
11		year" utilized in that future rate case).
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13	Q.	MS. BOLIN INDICATED THE BENEFIT OF THE COMPANY'S REQUEST IS
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14	· σ.	SIMPLY TO REDUCE REGULATORY LAG. IS THE MITIGATION OF
	Q.	
14	A.	SIMPLY TO REDUCE REGULATORY LAG. IS THE MITIGATION OF
14 15		SIMPLY TO REDUCE REGULATORY LAG. IS THE MITIGATION OF REGULATORY LAG AN APPROPRIATE USE OF AAOs?
114 115 116 117 118 119 220 221 222 223 224 225 226		SIMPLY TO REDUCE REGULATORY LAG. IS THE MITIGATION OF REGULATORY LAG AN APPROPRIATE USE OF AAOs? Yes. In an Order issued in Case No. WO-2002-273, a case concerning Missouri-
114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 122 123 124 125		SIMPLY TO REDUCE REGULATORY LAG. IS THE MITIGATION OF REGULATORY LAG AN APPROPRIATE USE OF AAOs? Yes. In an Order issued in Case No. WO-2002-273, a case concerning Missouri-American, the Commission stated: In such cases, a primary purpose of the deferral may be to mitigate regulatory lag. The new asset can be added to rate base only through a traditional rate case (an eleven-month-long process in Missouri) and only after the asset has become used and useful in the public service. However, the USOA requires that expenses associated with the asset depreciation and the carrying costs of construction financing be booked from the moment it is placed in service. In such a case, an AAO is often sought in order to defer those expenses until the asset has been added to rate base and revenues associated with the
114 115 116 117 118 119 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227		SIMPLY TO REDUCE REGULATORY LAG. IS THE MITIGATION OF REGULATORY LAG AN APPROPRIATE USE OF AAOs? Yes. In an Order issued in Case No. WO-2002-273, a case concerning Missouri-American, the Commission stated: In such cases, a primary purpose of the deferral may be to mitigate regulatory lag. The new asset can be added to rate base only through a traditional rate case (an eleven-month-long process in Missouri) and only after the asset has become used and useful in the public service. However, the USOA requires that expenses associated with the asset depreciation and the carrying costs of construction financing be booked from the moment it is placed in service. In such a case, an AAO is often sought in order to defer those expenses until the asset has been added to rate base and revenues associated with the asset become available.

1		The Commission further stated:
2 3 4 5		AAOs are not used merely for the mitigation of regulatory lag, although that is a proper purpose for an AAO, as the Missouri Court of Appeals has made clear:
6 7 8 9 10 11 12		"The Commission has the regulatory authority to grant a form of relief to the utility in the form of an accounting technique, an Accounting Authority Order, (hereinafter called an "AAO") which allows the utility to defer and capitalize certain expenses until the time it files its next rate case. The AAO technique protects the utility from earnings shortfalls and softens the blow which results from extraordinary construction programs."
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21		The AAO is one of the Commission's chief regulatory tools for implementing another aspect of the Matching Principle. As discussed above, one aspect of the Matching Principle is to match revenues and expenses with the period in which they were incurred. However, under another aspect of the Matching Principle, "ratepayers are charged with the costs of producing the service they receive." The purpose is to match costs with benefits so that the ratepayers that enjoy the benefits of utility property also bear the costs thereof.
22 23		ld.
24		Moreover, as I demonstrate later in my testimony mitigation of regulatory lag is only
25		one of a number of benefits of the Company's request.
26		
27	Q.	ARE THERE OTHER INSTANCES WHERE AAOs HAVE BEEN GRANTED?
28	A.	Yes. As the Commission acknowledges: "AAOs have also been granted where
29		utilities have incurred expenses due to "Acts of God," such as ice storms; to facilitate
30		compliance with changing statutes or regulations, such as the Commission's Cold
31		Weather Rule, the Commission's Gas Safety Rules, or a new state statute requiring
32		an accounting change with respect to employee benefits; and where expenses were

incurred in preparing company computer equipment for the year 2000 ("Y2K"). Id.

Ms. Bolin's testimony specifically refers to AAO's associated with "Acts of God", but

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1		does not focus on the construction accounting type AAO that the Company has
2		requested in this case.
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4	Q.	WHAT TEST DOES THE COMMISSION USE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO
5		GRANT AN AAO?
6	A.	The Commission set out criteria in the above- referenced case:
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17		The USOA permits the deferral of "unusual and extraordinary" expenses. It is important to bear in mind that these words are used in an accounting sense and not in the common sense of 'remarkable.' The USOA defines "extraordinary items" as "those items related to the effects of events and transactions which have occurred during the current period and which are not typical or customary business activities of the company." This definition, adopted by the Commission as part of its regulation, is controlling here. An 'unusual and extraordinary' transaction is one that is not typical or customary.
18	Q.	DOES MS. BOLIN REFER TO A COMMISSION ORDER ADDRESSING
19		PURCHASED POWER CONTRACTS FOR WHICH THE COMMISSION DID NOT
20		GRANT AN AAO.
21	A.	Yes. Ms. Bolin is referring to a Commission decision on AAO's concerning the Sibley
22		Generating Plant life extension project that involved both a request for construction
23		accounting and the two purchased power contracts to which she refers. Ms. Bolin
24		does not mention that the Commission granted the request for construction
25		accounting. The Missouri-American case quoted above refers to "The Sibley Test"
26		as "the leading decision on AAO's." It sets out the Commission standard as follows:
27 28 29 30 31 32		In the Sibley decision, the Commission emphasized that it is the extraordinary event that is the "primary focus" in any request for an AAO, considered on a case-by-case basis: 'The decision to defer costs associated with an event turns on whether the event is in fact extraordinary and nonrecurring." The Commission emphasized that "[e]xtraordinary means unusual and

nonrecurring." Also relevant, but not dispositive, the Commission explained is "whether the event has a material or substantial effect on a utility's earnings." Another relevant factor is the certainty of the event's occurrence.

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7 Q. IS BT AN UNUSUAL AND EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSE?

Yes, it is. The Company's BT program is an extraordinary and unusual capital project in scope, complexity, and cost. The Company undertook the BT program in a reasonable manner. The business process analysis and improvement efforts were extensive and comprehensive. The Company's information technology systems are reaching or have reached the end of their useful life. The need for undertaking the BT program is well documented, and the Company has provided Staff and OPC with ample evidence to confirm the need and inefficiencies caused by the Company's aging IT systems. The selections of the new ITS platform and system integrator for the program were performed in an appropriate fashion using exhaustive competitive bidding and evaluation processes. This enterprise-wide project has been termed "Business Transformation" because it is more than a technology implementation project. The scope of the BT program includes all of the Company's core functional areas, including: human resources, finance and accounting, purchasing and inventory management, capital planning, cash management, and customer and field services to design and modify the base software package as required, procure hardware to support the new software applications, cleanse historical data and develop transition routines to transfer historical data from existing systems, modify our core business processes to optimize implementation of new information technology systems, train and prepare our employees for the new business

1	processes and information technology systems, and implement the use of the new
2	business processes and information technology systems.

BT is not a typical or customary upgrade of an information technology system.

BT is an "unusual and extraordinary" capital program that will have taken five

years to develop and implement at a cost of over \$300 million dollars enterprise

wide - \$45 million for MAWC. The BT solutions will be implemented for MAWC

over a seven month period. It is no exaggeration to state that the Company

expects, over time, that the Business Transformation program will enable the

Company to transform the way it does business.

A.

Q. WHY DO STAFF AND OPC OPPOSE THE COMPANY'S REQUEST FOR AN AAO?

Staff and OPC note that the Company has undertaken the BT program voluntarily and not to comply with a government mandate or in response to an "Act of God" over which the Company has no control. As discussed above, however, the Commission does not limit the use of AAOs to government mandate or in response to an "Act of God." In fact, the Commission finds AAOs to be appropriate in a wide variety of circumstances, for example, when a utility incurs extraordinary expenses associated with the construction of a new, productive asset.

Q. DOES MAWC HAVE CONTROL OVER THE TIMING OF THE BT

IMPLEMENTATION?

23 A. No. AWW is coordinating the development and implementation of integrated
24 technology systems that will serve its utility subsidiaries in fifteen states. In order to

gain the economies of scale and performance benefits available through a combined project, MAWC is dependent upon the overall AWWS implementation schedule. The only timing issue that MAWC can control is the timing of the rate case it files in order to recover the costs of the BT assets.

6 Q. IF THE COMPANY CAN ONLY CONTROL THE TIMING OF RATE CASES, WHAT 7 WOULD THE LIKELY RESULT BE IF THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL IS NOT

8 APPROVED?

The only other obvious solution for the Company, outside of the requested accounting treatment, would be to file another rate increase request as soon as possible. Because of the impact on our customers, the Company desires to avoid this solution.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN.

A. I have attended numerous local public hearings over the past two months and a consistent theme from many of our customers has been one of rate case fatigue. Many understand the need to replace infrastructure and to recover costs, but they point to recurring rate increases that have strained their financial resources. Absent approval of the Company's special accounting request, it will be difficult to avoid an almost immediate new rate increase application. Application of construction accounting would allow the Company to delay recording depreciation expense until such time as the costs of the BT program are included in rates – a matching between cost recognition and revenue recovery. At the same time, the construction accounting concept would allow the Company time to develop savings that may be

available from the BT program and utilize those saving to mitigate future increases. It simply serves no useful purpose to force the Company into an early rate case filing.

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Q. STAFF AND OPC ARGUE THAT THE COMPANY'S BT ASSETS ARE NOT EXTRAORDINARY, UNIQUE, OR NON-RECURRING. DO YOU AGREE WITH THIS CHARACTERIZATION?

No, I do not. In support of this position, OPC witness Lafferty argues that "Missouri-American experiences significant fluctuations in capital expenditures each year," and the Company's estimated total cost for BT is within "the normal range of annual fluctuations." I do not believe that the Commission should consider whether an event is "extraordinary" by comparing the expenditure to the "range of annual fluctuations" in a company's capital program. The Commission, however, may consider the relative amount of BT expenditures to the Company's other capital expenditures. For example, if we look at the make-up of rate base additions in the current case, we find that the largest single project in this case was for the installation of new intake valves in the Missouri River at Jefferson City. The cost of the intake valves, at slightly over \$11 million, was over five times more than any other single project. MAWC's portion of the cost of the Business Transformation program is almost \$45 million dollars more than four times the cost of the Jefferson City intakes and twenty times greater than the second largest single project. Moreover, the average depreciation life for most construction projects is about 50 years or 2% per year, whereas the depreciation rate on BT is 20%, 10 times as high. A typical large construction project might be \$1 million. The annual dollar impact in depreciation expense for BT is over \$8 million or more than 400 times the depreciation expense of a typical large rate base addition. Clearly, the BT program is not a typical, normal or usual capital

1	project.
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Α.

Q. OPC WITNESS LAFFERTY ARGUES IN HIS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY THAT THE
HISTORICAL INTERVALS BETWEEN RATE CASES AND THE PHASED

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BT PROGRAM SHOULD MINIMIZE THE
COMPANY'S CONCERN ABOUT REGULATORY LAG. DO YOU AGREE WITH
OPC'S ASSESSMENT?

I do not agree with Mr. Lafferty's assessment. The phased implementation of BT for MAWC will occur over only a seven month period - from August of 2012 (ERP in service) to March 2013 (EAM and CIS in service). Further Mr. Lafferty's argument assumes that the Company would continue to file rate cases in the future with the same frequency as it has in the recent past. As noted earlier, the annual depreciation expense associated with the BT program is \$8 million. If one were to assume for argument sake that the Company will file its next rate case in two years, it would not recover \$16 million of the cost of its BT investment and would be denied the opportunity to earn a return on that \$16 million of investment.

Α.

Q.

STAFF CONTENDS THAT THE COMPANY SHOULD SUPPORT ITS REQUEST

FOR AN AAO BY PERFORMING AN ANALYSIS OF THE NET FINANCIAL

IMPACT OF DEFERRING THE BT PROGRAM COSTS VERSUS NOT DEFERRING

THESE COSTS, AND SHOULD OFFSET SOME OF THE BT COSTS WITH

PROJECTED SAVINGS. DO YOU AGREE?

No. I do not agree with Staff's argument that the Company should be required to

No, I do not agree with Staff's argument that the Company should be required to perform "analysis of the net financial impact of deferring these [BT program] costs versus not deferring these costs, taking into account savings related to the Business

Transformation Program" as a precondition to the grant of an AAO. Staff argues that:

... the Company should incur some savings due to the implementation of the Business Transformation assets which should offset some of the costs of placing the assets into service. However, MAWC has not supported its request by performing any analysis of the net financial impact of deferring these costs versus not deferring these costs, taking into account savings related to the Business Transformation Program.

First, the Company cannot begin to achieve cost savings from the new BT systems that will be deployed until the systems are fully functional and employees have become fully acclimated to them. As Mr. Lafferty points out in his rebuttal testimony, the majority of any savings will occur in or subsequent to 2014, after full BT implementation. To the extent that BT produces productivity savings, they will manifest themselves as the new solutions are fully implemented. All other things being equal, potential BT savings should produce lower operating costs that will be realized in future rate cases. Through rejection of the Company's AAO proposal, Staff and OPC would make it necessary to consider an early and additional rate case filing. There are significant costs associated with conducting rate cases. It seems to be a better idea, especially in these economic times, to delay a new rate increase as long as possible and match the recovery of costs with the recognition of savings. Further, AAOs are not the same as ratemaking decisions. An AAO in this case would defer a final decision on current extraordinary BT costs until the next rate case. At the next rate case, the Company would be allowed to make a case that the deferred costs were prudently incurred and should be included in rates and, all other things being equal, potential BT savings should produce lower operating costs that are being realized at that time.

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Q. OPC WITNESS LAFFERTY CONTENDS THAT THE COMPANY'S REQUEST FOR

AN AAO VIOLATES AN EXISTING STIPULATION IN CASE NO. WR-2010-0131.

CAN YOU PROVIDE THE CONTEXT OF THAT STIPULATION?

A. Yes. The Stipulation approved by the Commission in Case No. WR-2010-0131 states, in part, that:

Costs associated with the CPS and the Business Transformation Project shall be accounted for on the books of the Company as construction work in progress (CWIP)...the Company shall accrue allowance for funds used during construction (AFUDC) on the related CWIP balances at the Company's monthly calculated AFUDC rate. The Company shall transfer the CWIP balances to Utility Plant in Service when in-service in accordance with the NARUC Uniform System of Accounts and, beginning in the month immediately following transfer, shall record depreciation thereon at the appropriate Commission approved depreciation rate.

Prior to instituting BT, a Comprehensive Planning Study ("CPS") was conducted to assess American-Water's IT needs and the best manner in which to address those needs. The BT program was a result of the CPS. The key question under discussion in the prior rate case was whether, given the fact that the CPS was complete, the cost associated with that Study should be declared in-service and if so, how costs should be treated for recovery in the pending case. Ultimately, an agreement was reached that, in essence, concluded that the BT program was a continuation of the CPS, and therefore, the latter should not be declared to be in-service. It was assumed at that time that normal ratemaking treatment for the BT Program as a whole would be appropriate and in the customers' best interest. The Company's current request for an AAO in this case is in no way inconsistent with the Stipulation and Agreement in Case No. WR-2010-0131 as Mr. Lafferty contends. If, and to the extent an AAO is granted by the Commission, the AAO would modify the Stipulation and Agreement in Case No. WR-2010-0131. But as noted above, the granting of an AAO does not guarantee recovery of the deferral. AAOs are not the same as

ratemaking decisions. An AAO in this case would only defer a final decision on current extraordinary BT costs until the next rate case. At the next rate case, the utility is allowed to make a case that the deferred costs were prudently incurred and should be included in rates.

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Q. WHY IS IT APPROPRIATE FOR THE COMPANY TO CAPITALIZE BT COSTS AND DEPRECIATE THEM OVER THEIR ANTICIPATED USEFUL LIVES?

By approving the Stipulation discussed earlier, the Commission has already deviated from generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). Without the accounting authority embodied in that agreement, GAAP would likely have required the expensing of about 40% of the BT project - primarily those costs associated with project labor. As the parties are aware, the costs associated with the BT program are significant because the BT initiative is significant. Given the sheer magnitude of the costs, it would be problematic to expense them or depreciate them over five years. For one reason, expensing the costs would require a much greater increase to the revenue requirement in the years the expenditures were made. By using the rate base treatment we proposed, those costs can be spread over the useful life of the project and be recovered on a levelized basis. Because the BT expenditures will provide service to ratepayers over their useful life, recovery of these significant costs on a levelized basis over time is a more responsible ratemaking method than seeking to recover the costs over a short four or five year period. Although it is certainly the case that American Water Service Company fees are usually recorded as expenses, the sheer magnitude of the BT effort justifies their being capitalized for the reasons expressed previously. Quite simply, these are not routine Service Company expenses but, rather, are labor charges devoted to an extensive, unique project. The

Company's capitalization proposal is consistent with prior precedent and results in proper intergenerational equity and mitigates the up-front rate increases that would be necessary if we attempted to collect as expenses over four years.

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Q. WHY IS MISSOURI-AMERICAN REQUESTING A 12 YEAR DEPRECIATION PERIOD FOR THE BT ASSETS?

The depreciation rates authorized by the Commission and applicable to the investment category that BT falls under are currently based on a five year life. The anticipated life cycle of the BT assets is estimated to be approximately twelve years. Given the sheer magnitude of the BT costs it would be problematic to depreciate or expense them over a five year period. Depreciating or expensing the BT costs over a five year period would require a quite significant increase to the MAWC revenue requirement. By using the depreciation rate MAWC proposes, those BT costs can be spread over the useful life of the assets and be recovered on a levelized basis. Because the BT expenditures will provide service to ratepayers over their useful life, it appears to the Company that recovery of these significant costs on a levelized basis over time is a more responsible ratemaking method than seeking to recover the costs over the shorter, five year period during which they are incurred or to capitalize them over a five year period. When compared to collecting certain BT costs as expenses in rates, or depreciating all of BT costs over a five year life, the Company's request to depreciate the BT assets over a 12 year life will mitigate the up-front rate increase for MAWC's customers. In other words, capitalizing and depreciating BT costs over 12 years will result in significantly lower annual revenue requirements. Capitalizing BT costs over twelve years will result in proper intergenerational equity by more closely aligning BT cost recovery with the anticipated service life of the

assets and their use by customers. Finally, if the Company discontinues Allowance for Funds Used During Construction ("AFUDC") and begins depreciation on the anticipated in-service dates, the BT assets could be well over fifty percent depreciated before even being considered for rate recovery in the Company's next rate case, thereby denying the Company the opportunity to recover a significant portion its BT investment. Therein lies the need for the Company to file an early rate case if the requested AAO treatment is not granted.

Q. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE DEPRECIATION RATE FOR THE DEPRECIABLE ASSETS THAT COMPRISE THE BT PROGRAM?

11 A. Given an estimated service life of twelve years, the appropriate annual depreciation 12 or amortization rate for the BT assets is 8.33 percent.

Q. WHAT IS STAFF'S RESPONSE TO THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL TO APPROVE A 12 YEAR AMORTIZATION PERIOD FOR MAWC'S BT ASSETS?

A. Staff witness Rice opposes MAWC's request to approve a 12 year amortization period for MAWC's BT program assets and claims that he "will not have sufficient information to recommend a specific amortization in this case because Staff will not be able to identify what current software and hardware that will be retired until the Business Transformation System is installed and operating."

Α.

Q. DID THE STAFF ADDRESS THE BT PROGRAM IN ITS DIRECT TESTIMONY?

Yes. Ms. Bolin stated: "In order for Staff to agree to or accept such special ratemaking treatment for these costs, MAWC should be required to help establish and follow parameters and conditions to allow Staff, and other parties in this case,

· •	HACTHE COMPANY ALLOWED STAFF TO DEVIEW THE MANACEMENT OF
4	
3	Company and other parties to see if a resolution can be reached."
2	the budget expended for such costs. Staff is willing to discuss this issue with the
1	adequate review of the management of the project, the costs associated with it, and

5 Q. HAS THE COMPANY ALLOWED STAFF TO REVIEW THE MANAGEMENT OF

THE PROJECT, ITS COSTS AND BUDGET?

Yes. Both Staff and OPC have been given complete access to budgets and cost information, as well as to a dedicated website that includes all supporting invoices for every cost item comprising the BT program. I have made specific inquiry on several occasions as to whether additional information is necessary for Staff to make what it considers an adequate review so that agreement can be reached that would, I believe, have a beneficial result to our customers. Personnel directly associated with the management of the project at its highest level have met with both Staff and OPC, explained the project and its management in detail, and are available for further discussion on an ongoing basis.

A.

2. PENSION TRACKER

Q. HAVE YOU READ THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF STAFF WITNESS PAUL HARRISON REGARDING STAFF'S PROPOSAL TO INSTITUTE A REVISED PENSION TRACKING MECHANISM?

Yes. Most of Mr. Harrison's testimony is a reiteration of the Staff proposal contained in the Staff Report – Cost of Service issued on November 17, 2011. I have previously responded to that proposal in my rebuttal testimony.

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE MOST SALIENT ISSUES YOU HAVE WITH THE STAFF PROPOSAL.

Staff continues to argue that they have suddenly discovered a "flaw" in the existing pension tracker mechanism. Mr. Harrison summarizes this "flaw" in the following words: "inclusion of both a FAS 87 rate base difference and a pension/asset liability in rate base will most likely result in either an overstatement or an understatement of MAWC's actual pension tracker for rate base." This "flaw" simply does not exist. The pension tracker is fair, was designed appropriately and is operating as designed. As I explained in my rebuttal testimony, the existing tracker was designed with two components. The first compares the estimated FAS 87 expense included in rates to the actual FAS 87 expensed on the Company's books. The difference, positive or negative, is included in rate base and amortized over five years. The second component compares the difference in the actual contributions recorded on the books and the actual cash expended by the Company. The difference, positive or negative, is recognized in rate base so that the Company earns a return only on its actual cash investment.

Α.

Α.

Q. PLEASE CONTINUE.

FAS 87 contribution levels are calculated on formulas that differ from ERISA minimum contribution levels. This leads to differences between costs recorded on the Company's books and actual cash payments – not unlike any number of other items under accrual accounting and the Commission's prescribed system of accounts. Since the establishment of the MAWC pension tracker, pension cost recorded on the Company's books was always greater than the actual contribution. Therefore, a pension liability was recorded and rate base reduced to reflect the fact

that customers, through rates that were based on FAS 87 levels, had contributed more than the Company had actually expended. The credit (or reduction) to rate base compensated customers for the carrying cost of this difference. That has recently changed, however. As of the true-up period, the level of actual cash contributions made by the Company exceeded the level of FAS 87 levels reimbursed by customers. Therefore, a pension asset has been recorded and rate base increased to recover the Company's carrying cost for this excess contribution. There is no sudden "flaw" in the mechanism design. It is simply that the relationship between actual cash contributions and pension expense has changed.

Q. HOW HAS THE STAFF PROPOSED CHANGING THE TRACKING MECHANISM?

12 A. Mr. Harrison explains the proposal as follows:

Staff recommends that on a going forward basis the Commission modify MAWC's pension's tracker mechanism so that it is a direct measurement of the Company's ongoing pension cash investment in its trust fund compared to its rate recovery of pension expense. This would require a direct comparison between the amount of MAWC's rate allowance for pension expense (currently calculated on a FAS 87 basis) and the amount of its allocated cash contributions to the pension trust fund (currently calculated on a minimum ERISA basis). This can be accomplished in one of two ways, either MAWC can agree to make cash contribution based upon a FAS 87 calculation and continue to include in rates the FAS 87 pension cost, or the Company's pension costs included in rates can be calculated on a minimum ERISA basis to match the Company's present minimum ERISA funding.

Α.

Q. WOULD THE STAFF'S PROPOSAL WORK?

Yes, but only as to the second way proposed. The Company cannot agree to make cash contributions based upon a FAS 87 calculation. MAWC participates in a national pension plan administered by AWWS. AWWS determines the level of contributions to be made based on the plan as a whole. The only way that MAWC could dictate the funding level of its pension plan would be to withdraw from the

national plan and establish a much smaller independent plan. Such an action would eliminate the existing economies of scale, increasing risk and greatly adding to the administrative costs of the plan, all to the detriment of our customers. However, if I understand the Staff proposal, that tracking mechanism would also provide fair and equitable recovery of costs if implemented appropriately.

Α.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN.

My understanding of the Staff proposal is simply that it intends to combine the two components of the existing tracking mechanism into one component, moving from an accrual basis to a cash basis. Over time, the cash basis and the accrual basis should equal (i.e. when the last pensioner receives the last paycheck from the fund, the amount of total cost over the life of the fund will equal the total cash expended from the fund). Therefore, if properly instituted the Staff's new proposal should have the same result as the existing tracking mechanism, as long as the new tracking mechanism is properly instituted and transitioned.

Α.

Q. WHAT CONCERNS WOULD YOU HAVE IN REGARD TO CHANGING TO STAFF'S PROPOSAL?

There are two of which I am currently aware. First, Mr. Harrison states that the tracking mechanism should be established comparing pension expense to actual cash contributions to the pension trust fund. If the existing tracking mechanism is to be replaced, I would agree with this approach. However, Mr. Harrison parenthetically states that actual contributions are currently calculated on a current minimum ERISA basis. This is not always the case. At times, plan trustees have determined that, in order to maintain the integrity of plan assets and alleviate significant underfunding

situations, contributions in excess of minimum ERISA calculations should be made. Any tracking mechanism based on the cash basis, as recommended by Staff, should clearly be tied to actual cash contributions, not to ERISA minimum calculations. Secondly, in order for the transition to a new method to be equitable, the existing tracker balances that have arisen as a result of the tracking mechanism on which rates are based should be included in rate base and continued to be amortized until the balances are zero. Likewise, the recorded pension asset balance at the true-up date should be allowed in rate base and amortized over some reasonable period of time to reflect the Company cost of capital for contribution to the pension plan in excess of funds received from customers through the current mechanism.

3. <u>AIP COMPENSATION RECOVERY</u>

Q. WHAT IS THE OPC ISSUE YOU ARE ADDRESSING IN REGARD TO AIP COMPENSATION?

I will address the ratemaking aspects of AIP compensation. Company witness

Maxine Mitch filed rebuttal testimony explaining the Company's AIP program.

Unfortunately, OPC witness Lafferty did not have the benefit of that explanation prior to filing his own rebuttal testimony and, as a result, has interpreted the AIP to be based entirely upon financial goals.

A.

Q. WHAT IS MR. LAFFERTY'S REBUTTAL POSITION?

Mr. Lafferty agrees with the Staff position that AIP compensation related to financial goals should be eliminated from recovery in setting rates. However, based upon a reading of the Company's Annual Incentive Plan Highlights, he has drawn an

1		incorrect conclusion that 100% of AIP compensation is dependent upon financial
2		goals.
3		
4	Q.	DOES THE COMPANY AGREE THAT AIP ASSOCIATED WITH FINANCIAL
5		GOALS SHOULD BE ELIMINATED FROM RECOVERY?
6	A.	No. That issue is addressed in the rebuttal testimony of Company witness William
7		Rogers.
8		
9	Q.	DOES THE COMPANY AGREE WITH MR. LAFFERTY'S ASSERTION THAT ALL
10		AIP COMPENSATION IS ASSOCIATED WITH FINANCIAL GOALS?
11	A.	No. Company witness Maxine Mitch, in her rebuttal testimony, indicates that about
12		7% of the Company's individual goals are what should be considered financial in
13		nature.
14		
15	Q.	DO YOU BELIEVE YOU UNDERSTAND THE SOURCE OF CONFUSION?
16	A.	Yes. As described by Ms. Mitch, there is a level of earnings that must be achieved
17		before any AIP compensation is "unlocked" and available for distribution to
18		employees who have achieved their individual goals, most of which are not financial
19		in nature. Ms. Mitch explains how this mechanism serves to protect both the
20		Company and its customers. Once achieved, 70% of the total AIP is unlocked. The
21		remaining 30% is unlocked based upon customer service, safety and other factors.
22		
23	Q.	IS MR. LAFFERTY CORRECT THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT INDIVIDUAL
24		EMPLOYEES COULD HAVE OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCES YET RECEIVE
25		NO AIP AWARD?

1	A.	Yes. As a protection to the overall financial health of the Company and for the
2		benefit of its customers, a minimum earnings level is an appropriate and common
3		hurdle that must be achieved before the opportunity for AIP compensation is
4		unlocked. However, once this hurdle is met, an individual employee's AIP payout is
5		still made based on individual goals. Mr. Lafferty's attempt to broadly characterize all
6		those goals as financial in nature and recommend elimination of the entire plan is, in
7		essence, simply a veiled restatement of his biased opposition to the concept of
8		incentive compensation in general.

9

11

HAS THE COMMISSION PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED THE RECOVERABILITY OF 10 Q. **INCENTIVE COMPENSATION?**

12 Yes. The Order issued in The Empire District Electric Company Case No. ER-2001-13 299 states the following: "Nonetheless, the Commission finds that the incentive payments at issue were made to employees who did in fact achieve goals that were 14 15 beyond their normal job duties and responsibilities. The Commission also 16 determines that Empire's plan directly benefits the Company's customers given that a 17 portion of employee pay is at risk, causing employees to recognize that superior performance will generate greater compensation." 18

19

20

21

22

IS THE AMERICAN WATER AIP PLAN DESCRIBED BY COMPANY WITNESS Q. MITCH BASED UPON ACHIEVING GOALS BEYOND AN EMPLOYEES NORMAL JOB DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES?

23 A. Yes, it is.

24

25 DOES THE AMERICAN WATER AIP PLAN DESCRIBED BY COMPANY WITNESS Q.

1		WITCH PLACE A PORTION OF EMPLOYEE PAY AT-RISK, CAUSING
2		EMPLOYEES TO RECOGNIZE THAT SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE WILL
3		GENERATE GREATER COMPENSATION?
4	A.	Yes, it does.
5		
6	Q.	IS MR. LAFFERTY'S STATEMENT CORRECT THAT COMPANY EMPLOYEES
7		COULD BE PROVIDING POOR SERVICE, YET STILL RECEIVE AN AIP AWARD?
8	A.	No. This is a mischaracterization of the plan. While achieving Company customer
9		service metrics "unlock" 7.5% of the plan for distribution, payout is still based solely
10		on an individual employee's performance. As I stated previously, if an employee has
11		individual goals that are customer service related, and if that employee has not
12		achieved those goals, there will be no AIP payout awarded for the goals that were
13		not achieved.
14		
15	Q.	DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. LAFFERTY'S STATEMENT THAT STAFF IS
16		INCONSISTENT IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF AWARD THAT IS
17		RELATED TO FINANCIAL GOALS?
18	A.	Yes. Staff utilized the same method of review of MAWC individual goals that it has
19		used in at least the past four rate cases – that is, the Staff looked at specific
20		individual goals and eliminated the payout associated with those goals that it
21		considered to be financial in nature or had no other benefit. Company witness Mitch
22		in rebuttal testimony noted her agreement with this review process but her
23		disagreement with specific goals that should be excluded. In its review of Service
24		Company AIP, however, Staff applied a standard not utilized in prior cases. Even

though both MAWC and Service Company employees are part of the same AIP plan,

25

Staff simply eliminated 70% of all Service Company AIP compensation, ostensibly because of the fact that 70% of the payout was "unlocked" by achieving a threshold of minimum earnings. Ultimately, an AIP payout is made only if an employee has achieved his/her individual goals.

6 Q. MR. LAFFERTY ALSO STATES THAT CERTAIN OTHER AIP RELATED

EXPENSES SHOULD BE DISALLOWED. DO YOU AGREE?

A. No. Mr. Lafferty indicates that the Company paid its portion of FICA, FUTA, and SUTA taxes on the incentive compensation payments and that these tax payments should also be disallowed. All these taxes are limited to certain maximum earnings levels (e.g. FUTA is paid only on the first \$7,000 of an individual's base compensation). It should be noted that AIP payments are made in March, prior to the time that most individuals have achieved the maximum earnings levels for withholdings. Much of these taxes would have been incurred during the year, whether or not any AIP payment was made in March.

4. ACQUISITION PREMIUMS AND DISCOUNTS

Q. WHAT ISSUES DO YOU WISH TO ADDRESS IN REGARD TO ACQUISITION PREMIUMS AND DISCOUNTS?

21 A. I will address issues contained in the rebuttal testimony of OPC witness Ted
22 Robertson, both as they relate to the calculation of acquisition premiums and
23 discounts, and the appropriate ratemaking treatment after they are properly
24 calculated.

Q. HAS MR. ROBERTSON CALCULATED ACQUISTION PREMIUMS OR

DISCOUNTS FOR THREE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY MAWC SUBSEQUENT

TO ITS LAST RATE CASE?

4 A. Yes. Mr. Robertson has correctly identified a discount for the acquisition of Roark
5 and a very small premium for the acquisition of Loma Linda. However, he made an
6 error in calculating whether there was a premium or discount on the acquisition of the
7 Agua properties.

A.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN.

In calculating net book value, Mr. Robertson subtracted from the purchase price certain non-rate base items such as construction work in progress. What he fails to recognize is that the Company, in developing its rate case filing, did not include the full purchase price in rate base. It only included those items that are typically included in rates. Construction work in progress, for example, was not included in the Company's request for recovery.

Α,

Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE A SIMPLE EXAMPLE?

Yes. Assume that for a purchase price of \$1,050 the Company acquired plant in service with a net book value of \$1,000 and construction work in progress with a book value of \$100. Thus, the Company would acquire assets with a total book value of \$1,100 for \$1,050 and would recognize that it paid a \$50 discount. In its rate case, the Company would then reflect \$1,000 in rate base, seeking to earn a return on only plant that is in service and used and useful (and therefore excluding the \$100 of construction work in progress). The \$100 of construction work in progress would be included in future rate cases after the associated plant has been placed into

service.

A.

3 Q. WHAT DID MR. ROBERTSON DO DIFFERENTLY?

As indicated in his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Robertson made his calculations of premium or discount by subtracting construction work in progress from the purchase price. In the above example, he would calculate a net book value of \$950 by subtracting the \$100 of construction work in progress from the \$1,050 purchase price. Subtracting his derived net book value from the purchase price results in a \$100 premium. This is clearly in error. If Mr. Robertson chooses to eliminate the value of construction work in progress from the net book value of assets acquired, he must also subtract that same value from the purchase price. The Company did not acquire the plant items that were in the process of construction for free. It acquired \$1,100 of assets for \$1,050, a price that is an obvious discount from recorded book value.

A.

Q. WHY IS THE CALCULATION OF WHETHER AN ITEM IS A DISCOUNT OR PREMIUM IMPORTANT FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES?

Normally, it would not be. Under traditional ratemaking treatment, assets acquired in a purchase transaction are recorded at their depreciated net original cost. Cash is credited for the amount paid for those assets and the difference is recorded as a discount or premium. OPC, however, is introducing a new ratemaking concept. Instead of simply recording assets at original cost, OPC suggests that ratemaking should vary depending upon whether a premium or discount is calculated.

Q. WHAT IS OPC'S PROPOSED TREATMENT FOR ACQUISITION PREMIUMS?

1	A.	OPC believes that recovery of an acquisition premium is inappropriate. Mr.
2		Robertson explains the OPC position stating:
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15		The rate base of these acquisitions should be derived from the original cost of the property when it was first dedicated to public use. The purchase of the assets at a price higher than book value does not affect the property's original cost. That is, a substitution of owners does not establish a new utility company, nor does the acquisition premium represent the addition of new investment within the operation. The transfer between the sellers and buyers is simply a financial transaction wherein ownership changed. Most, if not all, of the assets will continue to be used to provide the same services to the same ratepayers and those assets will remain subject to the same ratemaking jurisdiction of the same regulators. This continuity makes a recalculation of rate base unnecessary and inappropriate.
16	Q.	ARE THERE SITUATIONS WHERE THE PSC SHOULD APPROVE RECOVERY
17		OF ACQUISITION PREMIUMS?
18	A.	Yes, in instances where there is a showing that to do so would be in the public
19		interest.
20		
21	Q.	HAS THE COMPANY REQUESTED RECOVERY OF AN ACQUISITION PREMIUM
22		IN THIS CASE?
23	A.	No.
24		
25	Q.	THEN WHAT IS THE ISSUE IN REGARD TO ACQUISITION PREMIUM
26		RECOVERY IN THIS CASE?
27	A.	Aside from Mr. Robertson's calculation error as discussed above, I do not believe
28		there is one.
29		
30	Q.	DOES OPC PRESCRIBE THE SAME RATEMAKING TREATMENT FOR
31		ACQUISITION DISCOUNTS AS IT DOES FOR ACQUISITION PREMIUMS?

i	Α.	No. OPC abandons its position that the rate base of acquisitions should be derived
2		from the original cost of the property when it was first dedicated to public use.
3		Instead, OPC believes that the benefit of any acquisition discount, which occurs with
4		the purchase of assets at a price lower than book value, should be flowed through to
5		the customer.
6		
7	Q.	REFERRING BACK TO MR. ROBERTSON'S TESTIMONY, DOES THE
8		PURCHASE OF ASSETS AT A PRICE LOWER THAN BOOK VALUE AFFECT
9		THE PROPERTY'S ORIGINAL COST?
10	A.	No.
11		
12	Q.	DOES THE SUBSTITUTION OF OWNERS, ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW UTILITY
13		COMPANY OR ACQUISITION DISCOUNT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN THE
14		INVESTMENT WITHIN THE OPERATION?
15	A.	No. In the same context that an acquisition premium does not, neither does an
16		acquisition discount represent a change in the investment in the assets serving the
17		customers within the operation.
18		
19	Q.	IS THE TRANSFER OF ASSETS BETWEEN THE SELLERS AND BUYERS THAT
20		INCLUDES AN ACQUISITION DISCOUNT SIMPLY A FINANCIAL TRANSACTION
21		WHEREIN OWNERSHIP CHANGED?
22	A.	Yes.
23		
24	Q.	IN A TRANSACTION INVOLVING THE SALE OF UTILITY ASSETS AT A
25		DISCOUNT, WILL MOST, IF NOT ALL, OF THOSE ASSETS CONTINUE TO BE

1		USED TO PROVIDE THE SAME SERVICES TO THE SAME RATEPAYERS?
2	A.	Yes.
3		
4	Q.	WOULD THOSE SAME ASSETS REMAIN SUBJECT TO THE SAME
5		RATEMAKING JURISDICTION OF THE SAME REGULATORS?
6	A.	Yes.
7		
8	Q.	DOES THEN THE CONTINUITY THAT EXISTS IN A TRANSACTION INVOLVING
9		AN ACQUISITION PREMIUM SIMILARLY EXIST IN A TRANSACTION INVOLVING
10		AN ACQUISITION DISCOUNT?
11	A.	Yes, it does.
12		
13	Q.	HAS THE MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN A
14		POSITION ON THE APPROPRIATE RATEMAKING TREATMENT OF
15		ACQUISITION DISCOUNTS?
16	A.	Yes. I addressed this matter in my rebuttal testimony. A clear and concise statement
17		of the Commission's past position is found in the Second Report and Order in
18		Commission Case No. EM-2000-292, which reflected the following:
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30		Missouri has traditionally applied the net original cost standard when considering the ratemaking treatment of acquisition adjustments. That means that the purchasing utility has not been allowed to recover an acquisition premium from its ratepayers. But it also means that ratepayers do not receive lower rates through a decreased rate base when the utility receives a negative acquisition adjustment. Even if a company acquires an asset at a bargain price, it is allowed to put the asset into its rate base at its net original cost. Similarly, ratepayers do not share in the gains a utility may realize from selling assets at prices above their net original cost. Those gains flow only to the utility's shareholders.

1	Q.	DID MR. ROBERTSON ADDRESS THE SUBJECT OF GAINS ON PURCHASES
2		BELOW NET BOOK VALUE?
3	A,	Yes. He described the appropriate accounting treatment for gains from bargain
4		purchases in his rebuttal testimony, beginning at page 20, and correctly indicates that
5		the discount from the acquisition of utility assets at a price below net book value must
6		be reflected on the Company's books as a gain.
7		
8	Q.	DOES HE INDICATE THE COMMISSION'S NORMAL TREATMENT FOR GAINS
9		OR LOSSES ON THE SALE OF UTILITY PROPERTY?
10	A.	Yes. Mr. Robertson states that, "To my knowledge, the Commission has never
11		allowed ratepayers to share in any gains or losses resulting from the sale of a utility's
12		property."
13		
14	Q.	YET, OPC PROPOSES THAT THE GAIN THE COMPANY HAS RECORDED IN
15		ASSOCIATION WITH THE ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY BE GIVEN TO
16		RATEPAYERS?
17	A.	Yes. Not only does he propose that gain be given to ratepayers, he seems to further
18		suggest that any taxes on that gain should be absorbed by the Company despite the
19		fact that the ratepayers received the benefit of the gain.
20		
21	Q.	WHAT ACCOUNTING ENTRIES WOULD HAVE TO BE REFLECTED IF THE
22		COMMISSION FOLLOWED MR. ROBERTSON'S SUGGESTION?
23	A.	The Company would have to recognize a loss in the year the Commission issued its
24		Order approving Mr. Robertson's suggestion, thereby negatively impacting the
25		opportunity for MAWC to earn its authorized return.

2	Q.	MR. ROBERTSON REFERS TO THE WHITE RIVER VALLEY ELECTRIC
3		COOPERATIVE, INC. AND INDICATES IT IS PROBABLE THAT ENTITY WILL
4		BENEFIT FROM SELLING THEIR ASSETS AT A DISCOUNT. DO YOU AGREE?
5	A.	The owners of White River Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. (seller of what is
6		commonly referred to as the Roark assets) desired to exit the water and wastewater
7		utility business. Unless Mr. Robertson has special knowledge of the Cooperative's
8		corporate structure and tax situation, I do not believe that electric cooperatives are
9		subject to income taxation and therefore question whether the tax benefit Mr.
10		Robertson asserts could be achieved.
11		Further, I disagree with Mr. Robertson's statement that MAWC wants ratepayers to
12		pay for assets that have been fully recovered by White River. It is MAWC's position
13		that it should include in its rate base only the net book value of the utility assets at the
14		time of the close of the acquisition recorded in accordance with the Commission
15		approved NARUC system of accounts. The fact that those assets were reflected on
16		the books of White River is indicative of the fact that they had not been fully
17		recovered through rates charged to customers. In fact, the recorded net book value
18		of utility assets reflected in the Company's current rate case would have been higher
19		had White River chosen to file its own rate case instead of having sold its utility

21

22

23

20

assets.

- Q. MR. ROBERTSON SAYS THAT ACQUISITIONS ARE DRIVEN BY A DESIRE TO INCREASE SHAREHOLDER VALUE. DO YOU AGREE?
- 24 A. That is certainly one reason that utilities pursue acquisition opportunities.
- Acquisitions also occur to make operations more efficient. That is another way to

derive economic value from an acquisition, although admittedly that value is returned to customers through rates. There are other factors that sometimes motivate acquisitions, including fill-in of existing service areas, reputation, economies of scale opportunities, anticipated growth and social responsibility. Still, MAWC is a corporation responsible to its shareholders and accordingly must always be cognizant of a potential acquisition's impact on earnings.

Q.

FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT, LETS ACCEPT MR. ROBERTSON'S CLAIM
THAT ACQUISITIONS OCCUR PRIMARILY TO INCREASE SHAREHOLDER
VALUE. IN LIGHT OF THIS, IS MR. ROBERTSON CORRECT THAT
DISALLOWANCE OF ACQUISITION DISCOUNTS WOULD NOT IMPACT UTILITY
ACQUISITION DECISIONS?

No. Mr. Robertson's claims are based on faulty logic. To the contrary, the disallowance of acquisition discounts would clearly serve as a disincentive to utility acquisitions. As an example, one can simply look to Mr. Robertson's discussion of the acquisition of the North Jefferson City assets. Those assets were part of an extremely troubled system that the prior owners had unsuccessfully attempted to divest for a long period of time. OPC's proposed treatment for acquisition discounts would have essentially guaranteed that MAWC could achieve no (zero) earnings through its operation of the North Jefferson City assets. From a practical standpoint, why would any company take on the risks of ownership of troubled assets for which it had no opportunity to earn any return? Although part of MAWC's decision to acquire those assets was based on social responsibility and the recognition that the assets were close to existing operations, the inability to earn any return on the operation of those assets certainly would have been a very strong disincentive for the Company to

1		finalize the transaction.
2		
3		5. EMPIRE CONTRACT AND INTERRUPTIBLE TARIFF
4		
5	Q.	HAVE YOU READ THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF EMPIRE WITNESS BLAKE
6		MERTENS?
7	Α.	Yes, I have.
8		
9	Q.	DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. MERTENS' COMMENTS REGARDING A NEW
10		WATER SERVICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EMPIRE AND MAWC?
11	A.	Yes. Mr. Mertens has correctly described the new water service agreement. The
12		new 25 year agreement replaces the existing water supply agreement that would
13		otherwise expire in 2016. Except for the new contract expiration date, the major
14		terms of the agreement have changed little, if at all, from the original.
15		
16	Q.	UNDER WHAT TARIFF IS EMPIRE CURRENTLY SERVED?
17	A.	Empire is served under Original Tariff Rate Sheet Number 53, which is an
18		interruptible rate tariff.
19		
20	Q.	DID THE COMPANY PROPOSE AN INTERRUPTIBLE TARIFF IN THE CURRENT
21		PROCEEDING?
22	A.	No. MAWC has proposed consolidated tariff pricing in the current proceeding. At the
23		time of filing, the Company believed that Empire would be served under the same
24		tariff that it proposed for other manufacturers and large quantity users of water. Due
25		to the numerous rate design alternatives presented in the current rate proceeding

1		and the Company's original proposal to eliminate the interruptible tariff, it is unclear at
2		this time, however, under what tariff Empire might be served.
3		
4	Q.	DO YOU AGREE WITH EMPIRE'S POSITION THAT IF THE NEW AGREEMENT IS
5		NOT APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION, THE INTERRUPTIBLE RATE SHOULD
6		BE RETAINED?
7	A.	Yes. The new service agreement clarifies that Empire would be served under the
8		same tariff for manufacturers and large quantity users, retains an interruptible feature
9		and clarifies the terms under which Empire will take service at its State Line facility.
10		However, if the new service agreement is not approved, an interruptible rate should
11		be reinstated.
12		
13	Q.	DO THE COMPANY AND ITS CUSTOMERS GAIN BENEFIT FROM THE
14		INTERRUPTIBLE NATURE OF THE SERVICE TO EMPIRE?
15	A.	Yes. The existing tariff under which Empire is served allows the Company to
16		interrupt service to Empire when water availability is in relatively short supply. The
17		new service agreement maintains this interruptible feature.
18		
19	Q.	HAS THE COMPANY EVER INTERRUPTED SERVICE TO EMPIRE'S STATE LINE
20		FACILITY?
21	A.	Yes, on a number of occasions.
22		
23	Q.	DOES MAWC AGREE THAT THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH EMPIRE IS
24		IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
25	A.	Yes. The Settlement Agreement in this case serves to present to the Commission a

new water service agreement for approval. The new water service agreement insures that Empire will continue to take service from MAWC and that water service will be available to the State Line plant for the current expected life of the facility; increases the existing base rate by about 35 percent; and retains the interruptible feature of the existing agreement. The provisions of the new service agreement provide a reasonable balance between the Company and customers and results in just and reasonable rates.

6. RATE DESIGN

Α.

Q. WHAT ISSUES WILL YOU DISCUSS IN REGARD TO RATE DESIGN?

My testimony will be limited to addressing the rate design concepts Ag Processing Inc. ("AGP") witness Johnstone has proposed in regard to rate changes for customers in his recommended hybrid district, particularly his phase-in proposal.

A.

Q. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE MR. JOHNSTONE'S HYBRID RATE PROPOSAL.

Mr. Johnstone has proposed a hybrid district that would eventually equalize rates for all water customers in the subdivisions of Maplewood, Lake Carmel, Riverside Estates, Lake Taneycomo, Spring Valley, Ozark Mountain, Lakewood Manor, White Branch and Rankin Acres; the villages of Loma Linda and Incline Village; the township of Roark; and the City of Brunswick. Because of existing rate levels and sizable increases he has proposed to recover district specific costs of service, Mr. Johnstone has proposed that this equalization take place over a four year period and has divided these entities into four (4) different zones, proposing to phase-in rates through rates designed specific to each of these four (4) zones.

1

2

Q. HOW DOES MR. JOHNSTONE'S PHASE-IN PLAN WORK?

A. For three (3) of his zones, Mr. Johnstone suggests that the required rate increase be limited in the first year of implementation and that a second rate increase be implemented in year 2 sufficient to recover the year 1 shortfall over the ensuing three years. This approach would theoretically restore to the Company, over a four year period, the revenues that would have been received had there been no phase-in of

8 rates.

9

10

11

Q. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE PHASE-IN PLAN IF A NEW RATE CASE WERE

FILED DURING THE FOUR YEAR INTERIM?

12 A. Mr. Johnstone does not discuss that possibility.

13

14

Q. HOW OFTEN ARE RATE CASES FILED?

That depends on investment, customer growth or decline, cost increases and a A. 15 number of other factors, but generally MAWC rate cases have been filed about every 16 other year over the past decade. In fact, the Company has indicated that it is willing 17 18 to agree to file a request for a change in rates within three years to alleviate concerns 19 expressed by Staff and OPC. The Company has also indicated that it is likely that it 20 will have to file an earlier rate increase request if its request for accounting treatment 21 of its BT investment is not approved. A rate case during the pendency of Mr. 22 Johnstone's proposed phase-in would certainly create complications in setting future 23 rates.

24

25

Q. YOU INDICATED THAT THE PROPOSED PHASE-IN PLAN WOULD

1		THEORETICALLY RESTORE THE LEVEL OF REVENUES THAT WOULD
2		OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN RECEIVED OVER THE FOUR YEAR PERIOD. DOES
3		THAT MEAN THAT THE COMPANY WOULD BE MADE WHOLE FROM AN
4		EARNINGS PERSPECTIVE?
5	A.	No. Mr. Johnstone ignores the time value of money. He proposes no mechanism to
6		fully reimburse the Company for the shortfall in earnings that will occur in the first
7		year of his plan. In essence, he is asking the Company to provide ratepayers with an
8		interest free loan during the term of the phase-in and thereby denies the Company
9		the opportunity to earn its authorized return.
10		
11	Q.	HAVE ANY OTHER PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING DISCUSSED A PHASE-IN
12		PLAN?
13	A.	Yes. OPC witness Barbara Meisenheimer suggests that, for districts facing large
14		increases, she would recommend phase-ins of up to three years. She did not,
15		however, describe in detail a concept of how a phase-in approach would operate.
16		Therefore, I have limited my comments to Mr. Johnstone's phase-in proposal.
17		
18	Q.	DID MS. MEISENHEIMER ADDRESS THE TIME VALUE OF MONEY ISSUE IN
19		PHASE-IN PLANS?
20	A.	Yes, it appears she does. She stated that carrying costs should be paid to the
21		Company at a rate equal to the Company's AFUDC rate.
22		
23	Q.	DO YOU AGREE THAT IF A PHASE-IN PLAN WERE TO BE INSTITUTED THAT
24		THE PHASE-IN PLAN SHOULD REFLECT THE COST OF MONEY USING AN
25		AFUDC RATE?

Yes, but let me make it clear that the Company does not agree to a phase-in plan as proposed by Ms. Meisenheimer or Mr. Johnstone, even if carrying costs on deferred revenues are included in their plans. First, their phase-in plans cite no authority for the Commission to mandate a phase-in of rates without the concurrence of the Company. Second, and more importantly, their plans lack specificity and adequate assurances that the Company will receive a return on and of money it has expended in providing service to the public. The Company would be willing to discuss the specifics of a phase-in plan, but only if such phase-in plan: 1) resulted in just and reasonable rates to its customers; and, 2) fully compensates the Company for the money it has invested in providing service to the public. Neither Ms.

Meisenheimer's nor Mr. Johnstone's plans currently meet these criteria.

Α.

1 A.

Q. DOES MR. JOHNSTONE HAVE A DIFFERENT RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS FOURTH ZONE?

Yes. His phase-in plan for the zone containing Brunswick would operate generally the same as for his first three zones, except that Mr. Johnstone did not design rates so that the level of revenue over the four years of the phase-in plan would be equivalent to the same level of revenues that would be generated under traditional ratemaking. Instead, Mr. Johnstone places a cap on the Brunswick increase and expects the Company to absorb a reduction of over \$1.2 million dollars during this four year period. It should be noted that Mr. Johnstone has estimated this permanent taking of income based on Staff's filing in this case and that under the Company's revenue requirement proposal, the amount would be much larger.

Q. DOES MR. JOHNSTONE EXPLAIN WHY HE BELIEVES IT IS NECESSARY TO

	CAP THE BRUNSWICK RATE INCREASE?
A.	Yes. Mr. Johnstone stated that he limited the increase "in consideration of impact
	and the relatively high rates in Brunswick."
Q.	ARE THERE OTHER MEANS FOR THE COMMISSION TO ADDRESS THE
	IMPACT AND RELATIVELY HIGH RATES IN BRUNSWICK?
A.	Yes. Consolidated pricing as proposed by the Company and supported by Company
	witness McDermott would address this issue.
Q.	DOES MR. JOHNSTONE PROPOSE ANY ALTERNATIVES TO HIS PHASE-IN
	PLAN?
A.	Yes. He suggests that instead of implementing a phase-in plan that Missouri-
	American could simply absorb the amount that he has suggested be held for phase-
	in. Over the course of four years, this would amount to over \$3 million based on the
	Staff filing and substantially more based on the Company's request.
Q.	HOW DOES MR. JOHNSTONE SUPPORT THIS PROPOSAL?
A.	He indicates that based on a Company response to a data request that the Company
	never considered whether it would be able to increase rates or recover costs to newly
	acquired customers in a manner that would provide cost recovery. Although Mr.
	Johnstone did not identify these data requests by number, I have attached copies of
	the two data requests and responses to which I believe Mr. Johnstone was referring
	as Schedule DRW - 1 and Schedule DRW - 2.
	Q. A. Q. Q.

WHAT DOES MR. JOHNSTONE SAY ABOUT THE COMPANY'S RESPONSE?

25

Q.

He states that the Company made a dubious assumption that it should expect to recover costs incurred in consideration of the district-specific pricing that has been the norm. He goes on to state that MAWC should bear the consequences, if it incorrectly assumed that existing customers could be called upon to subsidize its system expansion.

A.

Q. DO THE DATA RESPONSES YOU PROVIDED REFER TO BRUNSWICK

OPERATIONS?

9 A. No. The data requests were restricted to certain specified wastewater operations.

A.

Q. ARE THE COSTS OF SYSTEM EXPANSION A MAJOR DRIVER IN THE COMPANY'S CURRENT REQUEST TO INCREASE RATES?

No. The Company has included in its current rate filing three acquisitions, Aqua, Loma Linda and Roark. Combined, these three acquisitions are very small in comparison to Missouri-American's existing investment and operations. The rate base for these acquisitions has been reflected in this filing at original cost and is equivalent to or lower than what the previous owners would have reflected in a rate case, in lieu of selling their assets. Economies of scale have been included in the cost of service. For example, the Joplin district manager is now also responsible for the village of Loma Linda and the township of Roark. His costs will be spread over a larger customer base. Likewise, the costs of the call center and other administrative costs will be spread over a larger customer base. While it is true that under a consolidated pricing concept some of the Company's existing districts may experience a very small increase as a result of these acquisitions, overall the total revenue requirement will be less than had these acquisitions not been made and all

1		these properties had filed separate rate requests.
2		
3	Q.	DID THE COMMISSION APPROVE THESE ACQUISTIONS?
4	A.	Yes, it did.
5		
6	Q.	AND IN APPROVING THESE ACQUISITIONS, DID THE COMMISSION FIND
7		THEM TO BE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
8	A.	Yes, it did.
9		
10	Q.	WHAT IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF CONSIDERATIONS USED TO
11		DETERMINE WHETHER AN ACQUISITION IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
12	A.	My understanding is that the public interest is broadly defined. In determining
13		whether an acquisition is in the public interest, regulators take into account
14		economies of scale, technical expertise, protection of the environment, long-term
15		commitment, financial capacity and other factors. The public interest is certainly
16		broader than the parochial interests of Ag Processing or the City of St. Joseph or any
17		other individual entity. Self-serving arguments against system expansion that are in
18		the public interest seem to be the regulatory equivalent of a water customer saying
19		"not in my back yard".
20		
21	Q.	WOULD YOUR ANSWER TO THIS DATA REQUEST HAVE BEEN ANY
22		DIFFERENT HAD IT ALSO REFERRED TO UTILITY OPERATIONS IN
23		BRUNSWICK?
24	A.	No. The Company believes that in a rate case it is reasonable and lawful that the
25		Commission establish rates at a sufficient level to allow a utility to recover its

1		prudently incurred costs and an opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable return.
2		
3	Q.	MR. JOHNSTONE SUGGESTS THAT THE COMPANY'S RESPONSE WAS
4		DUBIOUS GIVEN THAT DISTRICT SPECIFIC PRICING IS CURRENTLY
5		UTILIZED. DO YOU AGREE?
6	A.	No. The Commission-ordered revenue requirement determination in a rate case
7		determines the level of operating and capital cost recovery. Rate design, whether
8		district specific, consolidated, hybrid or any other method, has nothing to do with the
9		total cost recovery a company receives. Different rate design approaches may
10		increase or decrease the revenue from a particular district, but the overall revenue
11		determination remains the same.
12		
13	Q.	IS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT MR. JOHNSTONE BELIEVES THAT THE
14		DISTRICT SPECIFIC RATE DESIGN HE ENDORSES WOULD RESULT IN RATES
15		SO HIGH FOR BRUNSWICK CUSTOMERS THAT HE BELIEVES THEM TO BE
16		UNTENABLE?
17	A.	Yes, that is my understanding.
18		
19	Q.	AND IS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT MR. JOHNSTONE SUGGESTS THAT
20		THE COMPANY ABSORB ANY SHORTFALL FROM BRUNSWICK BECAUSE IT
21		WAS PART OF A SYSTEM EXPANSION, AND THE COMPANY SHOULD HAVE
22		BEEN AWARE THAT UNDER DISTRICT SPECIFIC PRICING IT MIGHT NOT BE
23		ABLE TO RECOVER ITS FULL COST OF SERVICE?
24	A.	Yes, that is also my understanding.

1	Q.	WHEN DID THE CITY OF BRUNSWICK BECOME A PART OF THE MISSOURI-
2		AMERICAN SYSTEM?
3	A.	The City of Brunswick has been a part of the MAWC system for 19 years. It was
4		acquired as part of the Missouri Cities transaction in 1993.
5		
6	Q.	AT THE TIME OF THE BRUNSWICK ACQUISITION, WAS DISTRICT SPECIFIC
7		PRICING IN PLACE?
8	A.	No. The Missouri Public Service Commission at the time of the acquisition and for
9		some time thereafter approved consolidated pricing for some or all of the MAWC
10		properties. While the Commission announced a move toward district specific pricing
11		in the 2000 rate case, rates have never been set based on full district specific pricing
12		in that the Commission has approved inter-district subsidies in all rate cases
13		subsequent to the 2000 rate case.
14		
15	Q.	IF DISTRICT SPECIFIC PRICING WERE STRICTLY ENFORCED, WOULD IT BE
16		APPROPRIATE FOR THE COMMISSION TO ESTABLISH RATES AT A LEVEL
17		THAT WAS NOT DESIGNED TO FULLY COMPENSATE THE COMPANY FOR ITS
18		COSTS?
19	A.	No. A utility company should have the opportunity to recover fully its prudently
20		incurred costs and a fair and reasonable rate of return on its invested capital.
21		
22	Q.	WHAT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE COMMISSION ADOPTING AN
23		APPROACH SUCH AS THAT SUGGESTED BY MR. JOHNSTONE?
24	A.	Public utilities would have no motivation to serve a community where they could not
25		earn a reasonable return or recover their costs. Communities, such as Brunswick,

1	would either have no water supply, go out of existence or be forced to turn to other
2	sources of supply, such as self-provision, which would likely lead to rates even higher
3	than what Mr. Johnstone already finds to be untenable.

4

- 5 Q. YOU EARLIER MADE MENTION OF THE LOMA LINDA ACQUISITION. IN ITS
- 6 ORDER APPROVING THAT ACQUISITION, DID THE COMMISSION APPROVE
- 7 THE INTEGRATION OF LOMA LINDA INTO THE JOPLIN DISTRICT FOR RATE
- 8 DETERMINATION?
- 9 A. Yes. Existing rates for Loma Linda were to be maintained until the Company's next rate proceeding and then rates for Loma Linda were to be consolidated with Joplin.

11

- 12 Q. DID MR. JOHNSTONE INCLUDE LOMA LINDA IN THE JOPLIN DISTRICT IN HIS
- 13 RATE DESIGN?
- 14 A. No. He included Loma Linda as a part of his hybrid district.

15

- 16 Q. WHY?
- 17 Α. I do not know. However, it does demonstrate the arbitrariness of his 18 recommendation. If a new subdivision had been built within the city limits of Joplin, 19 there would be no question that the subdivision would be considered a part of the 20 Joplin district for ratemaking purposes. However, Mr. Johnstone does not include 21 Loma Linda, a small village just outside the city limits and interconnected with the 22 existing Joplin district. Mr. Johnstone apparently assumes that if a new group of 23 customers is added, the possibility that the new cost structure could impact existing 24 customer rates dictates establishment of a separate and distinct district. Simply put, 25 the concept of district specific pricing is all about where one draws an imaginary line.

1 Certainly, there are different cost structures from district to district. There are also
2 different cost structures from customer to customer. Where the Commission draws
3 that line should be based upon all the factors discussed by MAWC witness Dr.
4 McDermott, not on cost alone.

A.

Q. WHAT IS THE ULTIMATE RESULT OF MR. JOHNSTONE'S PHASE IN PLAN?

As reflected on his Rebuttal Schedule 1, there would be an extremely wide range of rate increases among the various customers served by Missouri-American. Again, utilizing the Staff recommended overall revenue requirement increase, Mr. Johnstone would increase the rates for residential customers in St. Louis County, the district with the lowest current rates, only 19 cents per 1000 gallons over the next two years. During the same two years, he would increase residential rates for the Brunswick district, the district with the highest current rates, by \$6.73 per 1000 gallons over 35 times greater than St. Louis County, and still far lower than what Mr. Johnstone suggests should be implemented to reflect appropriate rates

Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

18 A. Yes, it does.

Ag Proc 098

DATA INFORMATION REQUEST Missouri-American Water Company WR-2011-0337 & SR-201-0338

Requested From:

John Reichart

Date Requested:

9/20/11

Date Response Provided:

9/29/11

Information Requested:

Please identify each acquisition of a wastewater system in the state of Missouri in the last decade. Please explain why MAWC has made each such acquisition in consideration of its alleged persistent inability to earn allowed returns.

Requested By: Stuart Conrad - stucon@fcplaw.com, - 816-753-1122

Finnegan, Conrad & Peterson, L.C. - Attorney for Ag Processing, Inc.

Information Provided:

2004 - Warren County

2004 - Cedar Hills

2010 - Lake Tamarack

2011 - Roark

2011 - Aqua American

There are a number of reasons why MAWC may pursue ownership of utility properties or systems including, but not limited to, projected incremental increases in earnings, spreading overhead costs over a larger base, system growth, infilling of existing systems and as a response to requests from regulatory authorities.

Ag Proc 158

DATA INFORMATION REQUEST Missouri-American Water Company WR-2011-0337 & SR-201-0338

Requested From:

John Reichart

Date Requested:

10/5/11

Date Response Provided:

10/25/11

Information Requested:

Please refer to the response to data request AG Proc 098. For each acquisition, please provide each projection of earnings and increased earnings and any documents created or modified in connection with this projection. Did MAWC assume that MAWC's capital costs for the acquired system would be recovered from the customers of the acquired system. Please explain fully why or why not.

Requested By: Stuart Conrad - stucon@fcplaw.com, - 816-753-1122

Finnegan, Conrad & Peterson, L.C. - Attorney for Ag Processing, Inc.

Information Provided:

For earnings information please see the response to Ag Proc 157.

MAWC assumed that its capital costs, including those capital costs associated with each acquired system, would be recovered from its customers in a rate proceeding subsequent to the acquisition to the extent those costs were determined to be prudently incurred.