Exhibit No: Issues: Regulatory Policy Witness: Craig A. Unruh Type of Exhibit: Rebuttal Testimony Sponsoring Party: Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P., d/b/a AT&T Missouri Case No: TT-2006-0474

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE, L.P.,

d/b/a AT&T MISSOURI

CASE NO. TT-2006-0474

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

CRAIG A UNRUH

St. Louis, Missouri September 26, 2006

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of McLeodUSA Telecommunications Services, Inc.'s Tariff Filing to Increase its Missouri Intrastate Access Rates.) Case No. TT-2006-0474) Tariff No. JC-2006-0789

<u>AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG A. UNRUH</u>

STATE OF MISSOURI)	
)	SS
CITY OF ST. LOUIS)	

I, Craig A. Unruh, of lawful age, being duly sworn, depose and state:

- 1. My name is Craig A. Unruh. I am presently Executive Director Regulatory for Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P., d/b/a/ AT&T Missouri.
- 2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my rebuttal testimony.
- 3. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

nay 17

Subscribed and sworn to before this $\underline{\mathcal{A}}_{\underline{\mathcal{A}}}^{\underline{\mathcal{A}}}$ day of September, 2006

Maryan Jurcel

My Commission Expires: 1/5/2008

MARYANN PURCELL Notary Public - Notary Seal STATE OF MISSOURI City of St. Louis My Commission Expires: Jan. 5, 2008

Table of Contents

1	INTRODUCTION
2	
3	PURPOSE AND MAIN POINTS OF TESTIMONY
4	
5	THE COMMISSION SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS EXISTING POLICY OF
6	CAPPING CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES AT THE LEVEL OF THE ILEC
7	AGAINST WHICH THEY ARE COMPETING
8	
9	THE FCC HAS ALSO CAPPED CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES 6
10	
11	MCLEOD'S PROPOSED PRICES ARE SUBSTANTIALLY ABOVE THE
12	COMMISSION'S ARBITRATED UNE RATES AND AT&T MISSOURI'S
13	SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES
14	
15	PERMITTING MCLEOD TO INCREASE SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES
16	ABOVE THE CAP WOULD CREATE IMPROPER INCENTIVES 11
17	
18	SB 237 MAINTAINS A CAP ON PRICE CAP CARRIERS' SWITCHED ACCESS
19	PRICES EVEN IN COMPETITIVE EXCHANGES
20	
21	ACTION TO STOP MCLEOD'S PRICE INCREASES IS LIKELY IN OTHER
22	STATES
23	
24	SUMMARY

1 2 3 4 5		CASE NO. TT-2006-0474 SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE, L.P. D/B/A/ AT&T MISSOURI REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF CRAIG A. UNRUH
6 7	INT	RODUCTION
8	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
9	A.	My name is Craig A. Unruh and my business address is One AT&T Center, Room
10		3528, St. Louis, Missouri, 63101.
11		
12	Q.	BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT POSITION?
13	A.	I am employed by Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P., d/b/a AT&T Missouri,
14		(AT&T Missouri) and serve as its Executive Director – Regulatory. I am
15		responsible for advocating regulatory policy and managing AT&T Missouri's
16		regulatory organization.
17		
18	Q.	HAVE YOU PREPARED AN EXHIBIT THAT SUMMARIZES YOUR
19		PROFESSIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND
20		EXPERIENCE BEFORE THE MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE
21		COMMISSION (COMMISSION)?
22	A.	Yes. This information is contained in Unruh - Schedule 1.
23		
24	PUR	POSE AND MAIN POINTS OF TESTIMONY
25	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

1	A.	My testimony rebuts the testimony of Tami J. Spocogee ¹ and explains that
2		McLeod's proposed tariff would drastically increase its switched access prices to
3		levels significantly higher than AT&T Missouri's switched access prices and
4		should be rejected. The Commission's long-standing policy to cap Competitive
5		Local Exchange Carrier (CLEC) switched access prices at the level of the
6		Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILEC) in which it competes remains the
7		correct public policy. AT&T Missouri also sponsors the testimony of Mr. Craig
8		Conwell who points out numerous flaws with McLeod's cost study and shows
9		that the proposed prices are not justified by costs and that the proposed tariff
10		should be rejected.
11		
11		
11	Q.	WHAT ARE THE MAIN POINTS THE COMMISSION SHOULD
	Q.	WHAT ARE THE MAIN POINTS THE COMMISSION SHOULD UNDERSTAND ABOUT YOUR TESTIMONY?
12	Q. A.	
12 13	_	UNDERSTAND ABOUT YOUR TESTIMONY?
12 13 14	_	UNDERSTAND ABOUT YOUR TESTIMONY? The Commission should understand the following points about my testimony:
12 13 14 15	_	UNDERSTAND ABOUT YOUR TESTIMONY? The Commission should understand the following points about my testimony: • The Commission has already determined that CLEC switched access prices
12 13 14 15 16	_	 UNDERSTAND ABOUT YOUR TESTIMONY? The Commission should understand the following points about my testimony: The Commission has already determined that CLEC switched access prices should be capped and this decision remains the correct public policy.
12 13 14 15 16 17	_	 UNDERSTAND ABOUT YOUR TESTIMONY? The Commission should understand the following points about my testimony: The Commission has already determined that CLEC switched access prices should be capped and this decision remains the correct public policy. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has likewise determined
12 13 14 15 16 17 18	_	 UNDERSTAND ABOUT YOUR TESTIMONY? The Commission should understand the following points about my testimony: The Commission has already determined that CLEC switched access prices should be capped and this decision remains the correct public policy. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has likewise determined that CLEC switched access prices should be capped.

¹ Direct Testimony of Tami J. Spocogee on behalf of McLeodUSA Telecommunications Services, Inc. (McLeod) dated August 25, 2006.

1		• McLeod proposed switched access prices are significantly above AT&T
2		Missouri's switched access prices.
3		• Permitting McLeod to increase switched access prices above the cap would
4		open the door for other CLECs to do likewise.
5		• SB 237, which enhanced pricing flexibility for carriers, recognizes that
6		switched access prices should remain capped because switched access prices
7		remain subject to price caps even when all other services in the exchange are
8		declared competitive.
9		• Higher switched access prices provide disincentives for carriers to offer
10		attractive calling plans and can even discourage carriers from serving in
11		markets with high switched access prices.
12		
12 13	THE	COMMISSION SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS EXISTING POLICY OF
		COMMISSION SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS EXISTING POLICY OF PING CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES AT THE LEVEL OF THE ILEC
13	CAPI	
13 14	CAPI	PING CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES AT THE LEVEL OF THE ILEC
13 14 15	CAPI AGA	PING CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES AT THE LEVEL OF THE ILEC INST WHICH THEY ARE COMPETING
13 14 15 16	CAPI AGA	PING CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES AT THE LEVEL OF THE ILEC INST WHICH THEY ARE COMPETING MS. SPOCOGEE CLAIMS THAT MCLEOD'S PROPOSED TARIFF
13 14 15 16 17	CAPI AGA	PING CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES AT THE LEVEL OF THE ILEC INST WHICH THEY ARE COMPETING MS. SPOCOGEE CLAIMS THAT MCLEOD'S PROPOSED TARIFF PROMOTES THE PUBLIC INTEREST (SPOCOGEE DIRECT, PAGE 2,
 13 14 15 16 17 18 	CAPI AGA Q.	PING CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES AT THE LEVEL OF THE ILEC INST WHICH THEY ARE COMPETING MS. SPOCOGEE CLAIMS THAT MCLEOD'S PROPOSED TARIFF PROMOTES THE PUBLIC INTEREST (SPOCOGEE DIRECT, PAGE 2, LINES 43-44). DO YOU AGREE?
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 	CAPI AGA Q.	PING CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES AT THE LEVEL OF THE ILEC INST WHICH THEY ARE COMPETING MS. SPOCOGEE CLAIMS THAT MCLEOD'S PROPOSED TARIFF PROMOTES THE PUBLIC INTEREST (SPOCOGEE DIRECT, PAGE 2, LINES 43-44). DO YOU AGREE? No. I believe that McLeod's tariff is, to the contrary, detrimental to the public
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 	CAPI AGA Q.	PING CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES AT THE LEVEL OF THE ILEC INST WHICH THEY ARE COMPETING MS. SPOCOGEE CLAIMS THAT MCLEOD'S PROPOSED TARIFF PROMOTES THE PUBLIC INTEREST (SPOCOGEE DIRECT, PAGE 2, LINES 43-44). DO YOU AGREE? No. I believe that McLeod's tariff is, to the contrary, detrimental to the public interest. As my testimony explains in more detail below, the FCC and this

2 Q. HAS THE COMMISSION PREVIOUSLY DECIDED THAT SWITCHED 3 **ACCESS PRICES SHOULD BE CAPPED?** 4 A. Yes. The Commission has a long-standing policy to cap CLEC switched access 5 prices. From early on, the Commission, through the certification process, placed 6 the condition on CLECs that their switched access prices would be capped. 7 Subsequently, the Commission determined in Case No. TO-99-596 to cap CLEC 8 switched access prices at the switched access pricing levels of the ILEC against 9 which the CLEC was competing.² 10 11 Q. WHY DID THE COMMISSION REACH THIS DECISION? 12 A. Consistent with the FCC's determinations related to CLEC access, the 13 Commission's Order in Case No. TO-99-596 indicates that CLEC intrastate 14 switched access "is a 'bottleneck' service that confers a locational monopoly upon the company providing it."³ The Commission's order explains that there 15 16 exists only a single route for an interexchange call to be directed to a particular 17 end user customer and that route is the local loop, which in this case is controlled 18 is by McLeod. The Order goes on to state that switched access prices are not 19 subject to competitive pressure because interexchange carriers have no choice but 20 to pay them in order to complete calls. Testimony in that case demonstrated that 21 in jurisdictions where CLEC switched access prices had not been capped, CLECs

1		tended to set access prices at high levels, sometimes as high as 20 times the level
2		of the directly competing ILEC. ⁴
3		
4	Q.	HAS THE COMMISSION CONFIRMED THE APPROPRIATENESS OF
5		THIS POLICY IN OTHER CASES?
6	A.	Yes. In Case No. TR-2001-65 the Commission again confirmed that CLEC
7		switched access prices should remain capped. This case was established to
8		investigate all of the issues affecting switched access service and to establish a
9		long-term solution with the goal to result in just and reasonable prices for
10		switched access service. ⁵
11		
12	Q.	WHAT DID THE COMMISSION FIND IN CASE NO. TR-2001-65?
13	A.	While the Commission investigated several issues in this case, it elected to only
14		decide two issues – both dealing with capping CLEC switched access prices. The
15		Commission found that a cap on CLEC switched access prices continued to be
16		necessary and thus in the public interest. Accordingly, the Commission made the
17		interim cap established in Case No. TO-99-596 a permanent cap. In doing so, the
18		Commission noted that the cost studies reviewed in the case showed that the

² In the Matter of the Access Rates to be Charged by Competitive Local Exchange Telecommunications Companies in the State of Missouri; Case No. TO-99-596, Report and Order, issued June 1, 2000, at p. 22 (CLEC Access Rate Cap Case).

³ *Id.*, p. 27.

⁴ *Id.*, pp. 17-18.

⁵ In the Matter of an Investigation of the Actual Costs Incurred in Providing Exchange Access Service and the Access Rates to be Charged by Competitive Local Exchange Telecommunications Companies in the State of Missouri; Case No. TR-2001-65, Report and Order, issued August 26, 2003 at p. 20 (Cost of Access Case).

1		interim cap was high in comparison to costs and that the evidence was persuasive
2		that existing switched access prices are high in comparison to costs for all of the
3		companies. ⁶
4		
5	THE	FCC HAS ALSO CAPPED CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES
6	Q.	HAS THE FCC ALSO CAPPED CLEC SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES?
7	A.	Yes. The FCC in its CLEC Access Reform Order ⁷ promulgated rules ⁸ that
8		generally cap a CLEC's interstate switched access prices at the prices
9		charged by the competing ILEC. ⁹
10		
11	Q.	WHAT RATIONALE DID THE FCC USE TO PLACE A CAP ON CLEC
12		SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES?
13	A.	The FCC's rationale for capping CLEC switched access prices include
14		ensuring the development of efficient local competition, ensuring network
15		interconnection remains ubiquitous and ensuring that CLECs do not shift
16		an unreasonable level of their costs to interexchange carriers. Specifically
17		the FCC stated:
18 19		Our order today is designed to spur more efficient local competition and to avoid disrupting the development of

⁶ Id.

⁷ See In the Matter of Access Charge Reform, Reform of Access Charges Imposed by Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket No. 96-262, Seventh Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd 9923 (2001) (*CLEC Access Reform Order*).

⁸ 47 C.F.R 61.26.

⁹ The rules provide certain exceptions such as for rural CLECs and for a transition period ending June 21, 2004. These exceptions do not apply to McLeod.

1 2 3	competition in the local telecommunications market currently taking root ¹⁰
4	The Order goes on to state:
5 6 7 8 9 10 11	In addition, these rules should continue to ensure the ubiquity of a fully interconnected telecommunications network that consumers have come to expect. Finally, by ensuring that CLECs do not shift an unjust portion of their costs to interexchange carriers, our actions should help continue the downward trend in long-distance rates for end users. ¹¹
12	With respect to the rational of the CLEC Access Reform Order seeking to ensure
13	the ubiquitous interconnection of networks, the FCC stated:
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32	Additionally, IXCs have threatened to stop delivering traffic to, or accepting it from, certain CLECs that they view as over-priced. Thus, AT&T has notified a number of CLECs that it refused to exchange originating or terminating traffic. In some instances, AT&T has terminated its relationship with CLECs and is blocking traffic, thus raising various consumer and service quality issues. These practices threaten to compromise the ubiquity and seamlessness of the nation's telecommunications network and could result in consumer confusion. Once one or more IXCs refuse to do business with a CLEC, it will become impossible for that CLEC's end users to reach, or receive calls from, some parties outside of the local calling area. If such refusals to exchange traffic were to become a routine bargaining tool, callers might never be assured that their calls would go through. We are particularly concerned with preventing such a degradation of the country's telecommunications network. It is not difficult to foresee instances in which the failure of a call to go through would represent a serious problem, and, in certain circumstances, it could be life-
32 33 34 35	threatening. Accordingly, the public interest demands a resolution to this set of problems. ¹²

¹⁰ CLEC Access Reform Order, para. 6.
¹¹ Id.
¹² Id., para. 24 (internal footnotes omitted).

1		With respect to the improper shifting of costs to the interexchange carriers
2		and to promote the trend in declining long distance prices, the FCC stated
3		in its Order:
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15		We are concerned that, in this environment, permitting CLECs to tariff any rate that they choose may allow some CLECs inappropriately to shift onto the long distance market in general a substantial portion of the CLECs' start-up and network build-out costs. Such cost shifting is inconsistent with the competitive market that we seek to encourage for access service. Rather, it may promote economically inefficient entry into the local markets and may distort the long distance market. While we seek to promote competition among local-service providers, we also seek to eliminate from our rules opportunities for arbitrage and incentives for inefficient market entry. ¹³
16	Q.	IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THE FCC STATED IN ITS ORDER THAT
17		THE COMMISSION SHOULD CONSIDER WITH RESPECT TO CLEC
18		SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES?
19	A.	Yes. The FCC's Order also states:
20 21 22 23		We find persuasive IXC arguments that it is highly unusual for a competitor to enter a market at a price dramatically above the price charged by the incumbent, absent a differentiated service offering. ¹⁴

¹³ *Id.*, para. 33. ¹⁴ *Id.*, para. 37.

1	MCL	EOD'S PROPOSED PRICES ARE SUBSTANTIALLY ABOVE THE
2	COM	IMISSION'S ARBITRATED UNE RATES AND AT&T MISSOURI'S
3	SWI	TCHED ACCESS PRICES
4	Q.	HAS THE COMMISSION ARBITRATED UNE RATE ELEMENTS THAT
5		ARE SIMILAR TO THE SWITCHED ACCESS RATE ELEMENTS
6		PROPOSED BY MCLEOD?
7	A.	Yes. The Commission initially arbitrated prices for AT&T Missouri's UNEs
8		dealing with switching and transport functions (the same types of functions
9		performed in the provision of switched access services) in Case No. TO-97-40.
10		There, the Commission examined UNE costs in detail, and, while AT&T
11		Missouri did not agree with the Commission's arbitrated TELRIC-based rates in
12		that case, the Commission nonetheless established UNE rates for functions like
13		switching and transport that are common between switched access rate elements
14		and UNE rate elements.
15		
16	Q.	ARE THE COMMISSION ORDERED TELRIC-BASED UNE RATES FOR
17		SWITCHING AND TRANSPORT FUNCTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY
18		LOWER THAN MCLEOD'S PROPOSED SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES
19		FOR SWITCHING AND TRANSPORT FUNCTIONS?
20	A.	Yes. McLeod's proposed prices across the board are substantially higher than the
21		Commission arbitrated UNE rates and, in fact, some elements are hundreds of

1		times higher. ¹⁵ Unruh - Schedule 2 compares the Commission's arbitrated rates
2		with the ones proposed by McLeod.
3		
4	Q.	ARE MCLEOD'S PROPOSED PRICES HIGHER THAN AT&T
5		MISSOURI'S PRICES FOR SWITCHED ACCESS SERVICE?
6	A.	Yes. McLeod's proposed prices are substantially higher than AT&T Missouri's
7		prices for switched access service. For example, McLeod's switching price is
8		153% higher than AT&T Missouri's switching. Unruh - Schedule 3 compares
9		McLeod's proposed switched access prices with AT&T Missouri's current prices.
10		
11	Q.	ARE MCLEOD'S CURRENT SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES HIGHER
12		THAN THE SWITCHED ACCESS CAP?
13	A.	Yes. In spite of the requirement to cap McLeod's switched access prices at
14		AT&T Missouri's prices in areas where McLeod competes against AT&T
15		Missouri (i.e., the cap), McLeod's existing switched access prices are higher than
16		AT&T Missouri's prices. It appears McLeod has failed to lower its switched
17		access prices as required when AT&T Missouri has lowered its switched access
18		prices in recent years. It appears McLeod's switched access prices have exceeded
19		the existing cap for almost 6 years.
20		

¹⁵ For example, McLeod's proposed Tandem Transport Switched Facility is 759 times higher than the Commission arbitrated UNE rate for Tandem Transport Facilities - Zone 4.

1	PERN	MITTING MCLEOD TO INCREASE SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES
2	ABO	VE THE CAP WOULD CREATE IMPROPER INCENTIVES
3	Q.	WOULD OTHER CLECS BE INCENTED TO INCREASE SWITCHED
4		ACCESS PRICES ABOVE THE CAP IF MCLEOD IS PERMITTED TO
5		INCREASE ITS SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES ABOVE THE CAP?
6	A.	Yes. Other CLECs will see this as an opportunity to essentially get "free money"
7		and could likely seek similar price increases.
8		
9	Q.	ARE HIGHER SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES APPROPRIATE IN
10		TODAY'S MARKETPLACE?
11	A.	No. Historically, the Commission's policy was to set prices for services like
12		switched access well above cost in order to keep residential basic local prices as
13		low as possible. The Commission's Order in TR-2001-65 noted that "state
14		commissions and the federal government have acted to keep residential telephone
15		service rates low in order to encourage a high level of participation in the local
16		telephone network by residential customers. As a result, business rates, toll rates
17		and access rates have historically been set high, in order to produce sufficient
18		revenue to support the low residential rates." While this was a reasonable goal in
19		a marketplace where prices could be structured to achieve this policy goal, the
20		downside is that it created a highly subsidized market structure that created
21		difficulties as additional competition was introduced in the marketplace.

1	Additionally, high switched access prices have created disincentives for carriers
2	to create attractive calling plans and have even discouraged carriers from serving
3	in markets with high switched access costs. ¹⁶ The Commission's Order in TR-
4	2001-65 points out that high switched access rates impact carriers that provide toll
5	service and result in higher toll prices. The Order also states that high access
6	rates discourage small ILECs from cooperating to provide expanded local calling
7	scopes and that higher switched access prices distort the interexchange market,
8	create disincentives for carriers to serve certain markets and provide opportunities
9	for discriminatory pricing. ¹⁷
10	
10	
10	The prevailing view appears to be that switched access prices are generally too
	The prevailing view appears to be that switched access prices are generally too high and should be lowered. The FCC, state commissions and companies have
11	
11 12	high and should be lowered. The FCC, state commissions and companies have
11 12 13	high and should be lowered. The FCC, state commissions and companies have taken steps over time to lower switched access prices through pricing changes,
11 12 13 14	high and should be lowered. The FCC, state commissions and companies have taken steps over time to lower switched access prices through pricing changes, funding mechanisms and other means. For example, AT&T Missouri's prices for
11 12 13 14 15	high and should be lowered. The FCC, state commissions and companies have taken steps over time to lower switched access prices through pricing changes, funding mechanisms and other means. For example, AT&T Missouri's prices for switched access have declined significantly. In 1984, AT&T Missouri's total
11 12 13 14 15 16	high and should be lowered. The FCC, state commissions and companies have taken steps over time to lower switched access prices through pricing changes, funding mechanisms and other means. For example, AT&T Missouri's prices for switched access have declined significantly. In 1984, AT&T Missouri's total switched access price for originating a call was \$0.0752 while today that price has

¹⁶ The Commission's Order in Case No. TO-99-596 indicates that some exchanges were served by as few as nine interexchange carriers even though there were over 500 interexchange carriers certificated in Missouri. The Order goes on to explain that this situation is explained by density issues and by the high ¹⁷ Cost of Access Case, p. 13.
 ¹⁸ Represents the total price per minute using one mile of transport.

1		would, among other things, significantly lower switched access prices across the
2		country.
3		
4	SB 23	7 MAINTAINS A CAP ON PRICE CAP CARRIERS' SWITCHED ACCESS
5	PRIC	ES EVEN IN COMPETITIVE EXCHANGES
6	Q.	WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF SB 237?
7	A.	SB 237, passed in 2005, provides additional pricing flexibility for companies and
8		it significantly altered the manner in which price cap companies obtain
9		competitive classifications.
10		
11	Q.	DOES A PRICE CAP CARRIER'S SWITCHED ACCESS PRICES
12		REMAIN SUBJECT TO A PRICE CAP EVEN WHEN ALL OTHER
13		SERVICES OFFERED BY THE COMPANY IN AN EXCHANGE
14		BECOME COMPETITIVELY CLASSIFIED?
15	A.	Yes. Switched access prices for price cap carriers remain subject to a price cap
16		under the price cap mechanism set out in Section 392.245 RSMo. even when all
17		other services in the exchange become competitively classified.
18		
19	ACTI	ON TO STOP MCLEOD'S PRICE INCREASES IS LIKELY IN OTHER
20	STAT	ES
21	Q.	MS. SPOCOGEE IMPLIES THAT MISSOURI IS THE ONLY STATE
22		QUESTIONING MCLEOD'S PROPOSED PRICE INCREASES
23		(SPOCOGEE DIRECT, PAGE 7, LINES 149-150). DO YOU BELIEVE

1		THERE WILL BE ACTIVITY IN ADDITIONAL STATES BEYOND
2		MISSOURI TO CHALLENGE MCLEOD'S PROPOSED SWITCHED
3		ACCESS PRICE INCREASES?
4	A.	Yes. I believe it is likely there will be actions in other states to challenge
5		McLeod's proposed switched access price increases. The tariff filing intervals
6		and the procedures to challenge tariff filings vary across the states. In some
7		cases, for example, tariffs simply go into effect the day after they are filed and
8		then parties may file motions to investigate the tariffs that have already gone into
9		effect. Given this, I believe it is likely that challenges will be made in additional
10		states.
11		
10		
12	SUM	MARY
12	Q.	MARY PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY.
13	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY.
13 14	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY. My testimony has demonstrated that it is not in the public interest to approve
13 14 15	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY. My testimony has demonstrated that it is not in the public interest to approve McLeod's proposal to increase their switched access prices above the cap. This
13 14 15 16	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY. My testimony has demonstrated that it is not in the public interest to approve McLeod's proposal to increase their switched access prices above the cap. This Commission and the FCC have already decided it is in the public interest to cap
13 14 15 16 17	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY. My testimony has demonstrated that it is not in the public interest to approve McLeod's proposal to increase their switched access prices above the cap. This Commission and the FCC have already decided it is in the public interest to cap switched access prices. McLeod's proposed prices significantly exceed the
 13 14 15 16 17 18 	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY. My testimony has demonstrated that it is not in the public interest to approve McLeod's proposal to increase their switched access prices above the cap. This Commission and the FCC have already decided it is in the public interest to cap switched access prices. McLeod's proposed prices significantly exceed the Commission's arbitrated UNE rates for comparable switching and transport
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY. My testimony has demonstrated that it is not in the public interest to approve McLeod's proposal to increase their switched access prices above the cap. This Commission and the FCC have already decided it is in the public interest to cap switched access prices. McLeod's proposed prices significantly exceed the Commission's arbitrated UNE rates for comparable switching and transport functions. McLeod's proposed prices are significantly higher than AT&T
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY. My testimony has demonstrated that it is not in the public interest to approve McLeod's proposal to increase their switched access prices above the cap. This Commission and the FCC have already decided it is in the public interest to cap switched access prices. McLeod's proposed prices significantly exceed the Commission's arbitrated UNE rates for comparable switching and transport functions. McLeod's proposed prices are significantly higher than AT&T Missouri's prices for the same service. Permitting McLeod to increase its prices

9	Q.	DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?
8		
7		competitively classified. McLeod's proposed tariff should be rejected.
6		remain capped even after a price cap carrier's other services become
5		unique nature of switched access service by ensuring that switched access prices
4		recent major legislative overhaul of pricing flexibility regulation, recognizes the
3		testimony, McLeod's purported costs are not appropriate. Even SB 237, the most
2		or lower cost calling plans. As Mr. Conwell demonstrates in his rebuttal
1		subsidy driven switched access pricing discourages the development of expanded

10 A. Yes.

1	<u>SUN</u>	IMARY OF EDUCATION, WORK EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS
2 3		
4	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR PROFESSIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL
5		BACKGROUND?
6	A.	I received a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science from Kansas State
7		University in 1986. I received a Master of Business Administration from
8		Washington University in St. Louis in 1995. I have been employed by AT&T
9		Missouri since 1986 and have held several positions in the company mostly
10		working in the regulatory area. I have worked on regulatory issues at both the
11		federal and state level.
12		
13	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THIS COMMISSION?
14	A.	Yes, I have previously testified in the following Missouri cases:
15		• Missouri Case No. TO-98-212, In the Matter of the Investigation into the
16		Exhaustion of Central Office Codes in the 314 Numbering Plan Area
17		• Missouri Case No. TO-97-217, In the Matter of an Investigation Concerning
18		the Continuation or Modification of the Primary Toll Carrier Plan (PTC)
19		When IntraLATA Presubscription is Implemented in Missouri
20		• Missouri Case No. TO-99-14, In the Matter of the Implementation of Number
21		Conservation Methods in the St. Louis, Missouri Area
22		• Missouri Case No. TO-99-254, et al., In the Matter of an Investigation
23		Concerning the Primary Toll Carrier Plan and IntraLATA Dialing Parity
24		• Missouri Case No. TO-99-483, In the Matter of an Investigation for the
25		Purpose of Clarifying and Determining Certain Aspects Surrounding the

1		Provisioning of Metropolitan Calling Area Service after the Passage and
2		Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
3	•	Missouri Case No. TR-2001-344, In the Matter of Northeast Missouri Rural
4		Telephone Company's Rate Case in Compliance with the Commission's
5		Orders in TO-99-530 and TO-99-254
6	•	Missouri Case No. TO-98-329, Investigation into Various Issues Relating to
7		the Missouri Universal Service Fund
8	•	Missouri Case No. TT-2002-227, et al., In the Matter of Southwestern Bell
9		Telephone Company's Proposed Revisions to PSC MO No. 26, Long
10		Distance Message Telecommunications Service Tariff
11	•	Missouri Case No. TR-2001-65, Investigation of actual costs incurred in
12		providing exchange access service and the access rates to be charged by
13		competitive local exchange telecommunications companies
14	•	Missouri Case No. IT-2004-0015, In the Matter of Southwestern Bell
15		Telephone Company, d/b/a SBC Missouri's Proposed Revised Tariff Sheet
16		Intended to Increase by Eight Percent the Rates for Line Status Verification
17		and Busy Line Interrupt as Authorized by Section 392.245, RSMo, the Price
18		Cap Statute
19	•	Missouri Case No. TO-2005-0035, In the Matter of The Second Investigation
20		into the State of Competition in the Exchanges of Southwestern Bell
21		Telephone, L. P., d/b/a SBC Missouri

1	•	Missouri Case No. TO-2006-0093, In the Matter of the Request of
2		Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P., d/b/a SBC Missouri, for Competitive
3		Classification Pursuant to Section 392.245.6, RSMo (2005) – 30 day Petition.
4	•	Missouri Case No. TO-2006-0102, In the Matter of the Request of
5		Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P., d/b/a SBC Missouri, for Competitive
6		Classification Pursuant to Section 392.245.6, RSMo (2005) – 60 day Petition

				% McLeod above
UNE/Service	ATA	&T Missouri	McLeod	AT&T Missouri
		A	B	(B/A) -1
Switching				
Zone I Urban (STL, KC), per MOU	\$	0.001988	\$ 0.02033	923%
Zone 2 Suburban, per MOU	\$	0.002391	\$ 0.02033	750%
Zone 3 Rural, per MOU	\$	0.003444	\$ 0.02033	490%
Zone 4 Urban (Springfield), per MOU	\$	0.002934	\$ 0.02033	593%
Tandem Switching				
Duration charge, per MOU	\$	0.001510	\$ 0.01081	616%
Transport Termination				
Termination, per MOU Zone 1	S	0.000190	\$ 0.00169	789%
Termination, per MOU Zone 2	S	0.000285	\$ 0.00169	493%
Termination, per MOU Zone 3	\$	0.000302	\$ 0.00169	460%
Termination, per MOU Zone 4	S	0.000162	\$ 0.00169	943%
Termination, per MOU Interzone	\$	0.000332	\$ 0.00169	409%
Transport Facility Mileage				
Facility, per Mile, per MOU Zone 1	\$	0.000002	\$ 0.00076	37900%
Facility, per Mile, per MOU Zone 2	\$	0.000007	\$ 0.00076	10757%
Facility, per Mile, per MOU Zone 3	\$	0.000015	\$ 0.00076	4967%
Facility, per Mile, per MOU Zone 4	\$	0.000001	\$ 0.00076	75900%
Facility, per Mile, per MOU Interzone	\$	0.000003	\$ 0.00076	25233%

McLeod Proposed Switched Access Prices Compared to Commission Arbitrated TELRIC-Based Rates for AT&T Missouri UNEs

Service	Line	АТ	&T Missouri	McLeod		% McLeod above AT&T Missouri	
		-	Α	В		(B/A) -1	
Switching, per MOU		S	0.008024	\$ 0.020330		153%	
Carrier Common Line, per MOU							
Terminating	2	\$	0.0171586	\$ 0.018130		6%	
Originating	3	\$	0.0094626	\$ 0.018130		92%	
Transport, per MOU, 1 mile	4	S	0.0048	\$ 0.002450	(1)	-49%	
Transport, per MOU, 10 miles	5	<u>Ş</u>	0.0073	\$ 0.014610	(1)	100%	
Total Access Minute Price (2)							
Terminating, per MOU, 1 mile	L1+2+4	\$	0.02998	\$ 0.04091		36%	
Originating, per MOU, 1 mile	L1+3+4	\$	0.02229	\$ 0.04091		84%	
Terminating, per MOU, 10 mile	L1+2+5	\$	0.03248	\$ 0.0531		63%	
Originating, per MOU, 10 mile	L1+3+5	\$	0.02479	\$ 0.0531		114%	

McLeod's Proposed Switched Access Prices Compared to AT&T Missouri's Current Prices

Footnotes

(1) McLeod Transport calculation includes \$0.00169 fixed termination and \$0.00076 per mile;

i.e. Transport, 10 miles = \$0.00169 + (10 x \$0.00076)

(2) Total Access Minute Price refers to the "total" price an IXC pays to originate or terminate a call with a LEC. The "total" price includes switching, carrier common line and transport.