

*Exhibit No.:*

*Issue(s):* *Exceptional Performance Bonus,  
Short and Long-term  
Incentive Compensation*

*Witness:* *Matthew R. Young*

*Sponsoring Party:* *MoPSC Staff*

*Type of Exhibit:* *Surrebuttal and  
True-up Testimony*

*Case No.:* *ER-2021-0240*

*Date Testimony Prepared:* *November 5, 2021*

**MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS ANALYSIS DIVISION**

**AUDITING DEPARTMENT**

**SURREBUTTAL / TRUE-UP DIRECT TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**MATTHEW R. YOUNG**

**UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY,  
d/b/a AMEREN MISSOURI**

**CASE NO. ER-2021-0240**

*Jefferson City, Missouri*

*November 2021*

**\*\* Denotes Confidential Information \*\***

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OF  
MATTHEW R. YOUNG  
UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY,  
d/b/a AMEREN MISSOURI  
CASE NO. ER-2021-0240**

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1           A.     Yes. I have filed testimony in a variety of cases processed by the Commission.  
2 Attached to this testimony is Schedule MRYS-1, which details the major audits and other case  
3 work in which I participated, as well as the scope of the audits I have performed.

4           Q     Did you contribute to Staff's *Revenue Requirement Cost of Service Report* filed  
5 September 3, 2021 in this case?

6           A.     No I did not. However, I am adopting Staff's testimony related to incentive  
7 compensation that was sponsored by Jason Kunst.

8           Q.     What is the purpose of your surrebuttal / true-up direct testimony in this  
9 proceeding?

10          A.     My surrebuttal testimony will identify the differences between Staff and Union  
11 Electric Company, d/b/a Ameren Missouri ("Ameren Missouri") regarding the proper  
12 ratemaking methodology for Ameren Corporation's ("Ameren") Exceptional Performance  
13 Bonus program, short term incentive compensation, and long term incentive compensation.  
14 My true-up testimony will also address the true-up of short-term incentive compensation.

15 **EXCEPTIONAL PERFORMANCE BONUS PROGRAM**

16          Q.     Please summarize the issue with Ameren's Exceptional Performance Bonus  
17 Program ("EPB" or "Program").

18          A.     In its direct case, Staff included a three-year average cost of Ameren  
19 Missouri's EPB. As described by witness Mitchell Lansford, Ameren Missouri believes that  
20 normalizing historical cost doesn't appropriately reflect the ongoing expenses because  
21 historical costs have been trending upward.

1 Q. What is a normalization?

2 A. A normalization often uses averages to find an amount that is “normal”, as  
3 opposed to amounts that are higher or lower than normal for various reasons. Normalizations  
4 are typically used during ratemaking for costs that are fluctuating and do not show a clear  
5 trend. When a cost is trending upward or downward, the last-known annual amount is often  
6 used to “annualize” the cost.

7 Q. Does Staff agree with Ameren Missouri that the historical cost of the EPB is  
8 trending upward?

9 A. Yes. The historical cost of the EPB has sharply increased in the three most  
10 recent years. Mr. Lansford’s testimony shows that the cost of the Program has increased by  
11 59% from 2018 to 2020.

12 Q. Is it required to annualize a cost that shows an increasing trend?

13 A. No. The cost can be normalized if the circumstances make it appropriate.

14 Q. Why is a normalization appropriate in this instance?

15 A. The sharp increase in EPB costs since 2018, coupled with the EPB awards  
16 being 100% under the discretion of Ameren’s management, makes a normalization  
17 appropriate. If all expenses recorded by Ameren Missouri showed the similar increase as the  
18 EPB has, Ameren Missouri’s cost of service would quickly become unaffordable.  
19 Additionally, the EPB differs from the majority of Ameren Missouri’s expenses as most costs  
20 are out of management’s direct control to some degree. However, Ameren is completely in  
21 control of the size and quantity of awards approved under its EPB program. Staff’s  
22 normalization includes the cost of the EPB in rates while somewhat insulating ratepayers from  
23 the ballooning costs of awards given by management.

1 Q. Did Ameren Missouri address the increasing costs in its rebuttal testimony?

2 A. No. Mr. Lansford’s rebuttal testimony merely classifies the EPB as a  
3 “legitimate expense” that is a “result of increased employment levels and inflation.”<sup>1</sup>

4 Q. Does Staff agree that a 59% increase in Ameren Missouri’s EPB is explained  
5 by increased headcount and inflation?

6 A. No. While Ameren Missouri’s response to Staff Data Request No. 0875 shows  
7 increases in employee headcount and total salaries, EPB is also driven by the number of  
8 awards management is approving. The data supplied in response to this data request shows  
9 that the number of eligible employees receiving an EPB was 25% in 2016 but has increased  
10 to 41% in 2020 test year. It is more accurate to assert that the cost of Ameren’s EPB is  
11 increasing due to the discretion exercised by management.

12 Q. What is Ameren Missouri’s policy or standard for awarding an employee with  
13 an Exceptional Performance Bonus, or EPB?

14 A. Ameren Missouri designed its EPB to be awarded as-needed. The policy’s  
15 stated purpose is, \*\* [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]<sup>2</sup> \*\*

18 Q. If 41% of eligible employees receive an EPB, in your opinion is the EPB still  
19 rewarding performance that is “exceptional” or “truly outstanding?”

20 A. It is less likely that the EPB awards are for truly outstanding performance. As  
21 Samuel Johnson observed, “Praise, like gold and diamonds, owes its value only to its

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<sup>1</sup> Lansford Rebuttal, page 25.

<sup>2</sup> Staff Data Request No. 0874.

1 scarcity.” As Ameren Missouri becomes more liberal in awarding EPBs, the value of the EPB  
2 decreases and the incentive for exceptional or truly outstanding performance is eroded.

3 Q. Has the Commission had an opportunity to provide guidance on including the  
4 EPB in rates during prior proceedings?

5 A. Yes. In Case No. ER-2008-0318, pages 91 and 92 of the Commission’s Report  
6 and Order described the merits and dangers of the EPB as:

7 The program could certainly encourage outstanding customer service  
8 and exceptional performance that would benefit ratepayers and the  
9 company as a whole. However, if not run properly, the program could  
10 degenerate into a means by which extra money is funneled to  
11 management favorites, without any benefit to the company or to  
12 ratepayers. The Commission will allow the program to be included  
13 in rates, but will direct AmerenUE to maintain proper records of  
14 payments made under the program so that Staff can review it in  
15 AmerenUE’s next rate case.

16 Q. What was the cost of the EPB in Case No. ER-2008-0318?

17 A. While records are not clear, Ameren Missouri’s witness Krista G. Bauer  
18 explained in her ER-2008-0318 rebuttal testimony that 60 employees had received awards  
19 during the first three quarters of that year with payments ranging from \$500 to \$3,000.  
20 Assuming each employee only received one award over the nine months, this represents an  
21 annual cost range of \$40,000 to \$240,000. Given that the cost of the EPB has moved from  
22 approximately \$240,000 in 2008 to just short of \$2,000,000 in 2020, Staff believes that a  
23 normalization is a fair balance of competing information for ratemaking purposes.

24 **SHORT TERM INCENTIVE COMPENSATION**

25 Q. Please summarize the issue with Ameren’s Short Term Incentive  
26 Compensation Plan (“STIP”).

1           A.     In its direct case, Staff included the cost of STIP based on the 2019 plan year  
2 (paid in the first quarter of 2020) with adjustments to remove earnings-based compensation.  
3 Ameren Missouri witness Lansford's rebuttal testimony states that Staff should have true-up  
4 STIP payments made subsequent to the test year but prior to the true-up date. As such, Staff  
5 should have included STIP based on the payout for Ameren Missouri's 2020 STIP that was  
6 paid in the first quarter of 2021. Ameren Missouri's witness Hasenfratz's rebuttal goes further  
7 and recommends that rates be set on the 2021 STIP, which is to be paid in the first quarter of  
8 2022. Witness Hasenfratz's testimony states that using the 2021 plan is appropriate since it  
9 is the plan that will be effective at the operation of law date in the current case.

10           Q.     Does Staff agree with Ameren Missouri?

11           A.     Staff is not opposed to the true-up of STIP that is based on the 2020 plan year  
12 and the payout that occurred in the first quarter of 2021. Staff intends to reflect the revised  
13 STIP adjustment in its true-up revenue requirement. However, Staff cannot agree to use the  
14 2021 STIP to set rates in this case.

15           Q.     Will Staff still exclude costs associated with earnings-based compensation in  
16 its true-up recommendation?

17           A.     Yes. Staff will evaluate the 2020 plan metrics with the same criteria it used on  
18 the 2019 plan.

19           Q.     Why is Staff opposed to including the cost of the 2021 STIP?

20           A.     The actual cost of the 2021 plan is not known and measurable and also violates  
21 the matching principle. Not only does the expected payout date of the 2021 STIP fall beyond  
22 the September 30, 2021 true-up date, the cash payout is dependent on variables such as



1 headcount, employee turnover, and the level of achievement of dozens of metrics.

2 Recognizing such a speculative cost for ratemaking purposes would be inappropriate.

3 **LONG TERM INCENTIVE COMPENSATION**

4 Q. Please summarize the issue of Ameren's Long Term Incentive Compensation  
5 Plan ("LTIP").

6 A. In its direct case, Staff excluded the cost of both components of Ameren's  
7 LTIP; Performance Stock Units ("PSUs") and Restricted Stock Units ("RSUs"). While  
8 Ameren Missouri is not seeking recovery of PSUs that are tied to shareholder return, the  
9 rebuttal testimony of Ameren witness Kelly S. Hasenfratz argues that the cost of RSUs should  
10 be included in the revenue requirement because RSUs encourage employment longevity and  
11 workforce stability. Ameren Missouri argues that employment longevity and workforce  
12 stability create value for ratepayers thereby creating a ratepayer benefit.

13 Q. What makes the RSUs different from the PSUs?

14 A. An employee's grant of Ameren stock through PSUs vest if the goals for actual  
15 shareholder returns are met at the end of the vesting period. On the other hand, the only  
16 condition for vesting an employee's RSUs is active employment at the vesting date.

17 Q. Does the continuity of employment create value for ratepayers?

18 A. Under the assumption that the continuity of employment avoids the cost of  
19 recruitment and training replacements, the avoided costs can be flowed to ratepayers in a rate  
20 case.

21 Q. Did Ameren quantify the avoided cost of employee turnover?

1 A. In response to Staff Data Request No. 0882, Ameren Missouri states

2 \*\*

3  
4 \*\* However, the estimated avoided costs are not based on an  
5 analysis of Ameren Missouri's actual employee turnover and recruitment, and training costs  
6 for ALT employees in the test year have not been quantified.

7 Q. Is it Staff's opinion that passing the avoided employee turnover costs to  
8 ratepayers is the intended consequence of Ameren's RSU's?

9 A. No. Any benefit to ratepayers from Ameren's RSUs are incidental at most.  
10 The direct results intended by Ameren Missouri's RSU awards are achieved by aligning the  
11 interests of employees with the interests of shareholders.

12 Q. How do RSU awards align the interest of employees with the interests of  
13 Ameren's shareholders?

14 A. Generally, a company's value is reflected in the price of its publically traded  
15 stock. Shareholders desire an increase of the company's value because that leads to an  
16 increase in stock price, thereby increasing the value of the shareholder's investment in the  
17 Company. Stock awards incent employees to increase their own compensation by maximizing  
18 the value of the Company stock. Since both shareholders and employees are interested in  
19 maximized stock price, awarding stock compensation aligns the interests of the employee with  
20 the shareholders.

21 Q. Do employees have the ability to maximize their compensation by increasing  
22 the value of the RSUs during the vesting period?

1           A.     Yes. The following excerpt of Ameren’s LTIP shows that \*\* [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]  
7 [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]  
9 [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]<sup>3</sup> \*\*

11           Q.     Has the Commission had the opportunity to provide guidance on equity-based  
12 incentive compensation?

13           A.     Yes. The Commission’s Report and Order in Kansas City Power & Light  
14 Company’s (“KCPL”) rate case in File No. ER-2007-0291 is consistent with the  
15 Commission’s historic treatment of equity based compensation. In the Order, the Commission  
16 stated:

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<sup>3</sup> 2021 Ameren Long-Term Incentive Program, Staff Data Request No. 0022.

1 KCPL has the right to tie compensation to [earnings per share].  
2 However, because maximizing [earnings per share] could  
3 compromise service to ratepayers, such as by reducing maintenance,  
4 the ratepayers should not have to bear that expense. What is more,  
5 because KCPL is owned by Great Plains Energy, Inc., and because  
6 GPE has an unregulated asset, Strategic Energy L.L.C., KCPL could  
7 achieve a high [earnings per share] by ignoring its Missouri ratepayers  
8 in favor of devoting its resources to Strategic Energy. Even KCPL  
9 admits it is hard to prove a relationship between earnings per share  
10 and customer benefits. Nevertheless, if the method KCPL chooses to  
11 compensate employees shows no tangible benefit to ratepayers, then  
12 those costs should be borne by shareholders, and not included in the  
13 cost of service.<sup>4</sup>

14 Similarly, by compensating employees with company stock, Ameren is incenting  
15 employees to increase the price of stock, which indirectly creates an environment where  
16 service to ratepayers could be compromised.

17 Q. Has the Commission issued a decision regarding stock compensation more  
18 recently than the KCPL decision above?

19 A. Yes. In Case Nos. GR-2017-0215 and GR-2017-0216, the Commission  
20 explained:

21 The Commission has traditionally not allowed earnings based or  
22 **equity based compensation** to be recovered in rates because such  
23 incentives are primarily for the benefit of shareholders and not for the  
24 benefit of the ratepayers. As the Commission has said in the past,  
25 incentivizing employees to improve the company's bottom line aligns  
26 the interests with the shareholders and not with the ratepayers.  
27 Aligning interest in this way can negatively affect ratepayers.<sup>5</sup>  
28 [Emphasis added.]

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<sup>4</sup> Report and Order, Case No. ER-2007-0291, dated Dec. 6, 2007, page 49-50 (internal footnotes omitted). See also Report and Order, Case No. ER-2006-0314, dated Dec. 21, 2006, page 58.

<sup>5</sup> Amended Report and Order, Case Nos. GR-2017-0215 & GR-2017-0216, dated Mar. 7, 2018, page 122 (emphasis added), aff'd on other grounds in *Spire Missouri, Inc. v. Public Service Com'n*, 2019 WL 1246323, Mar. 15, 2019.

1 Q. Does the rebuttal testimony of Ameren Missouri state why RSUs were  
2 incorporated into the LTIP?

3 A. Yes. \*\* [REDACTED]  
4 [REDACTED]  
5 [REDACTED] \*\*

6 Q. Does this explanation create a foundation for rate recovery?

7 A. No. This explanation attempts to justify the existence of RSUs but does not  
8 explain why the cost of RSUs should be charged to ratepayers. As the Commission has  
9 explained in its decisions to exclude stock compensation, the Commission does not attempt to  
10 design incentive compensation programs for utilities. Rather, the Commission assigns the  
11 cost of such compensation to the appropriate beneficiaries of the incentive plans. In this  
12 instance, RSUs are designed to establish a direct incentive for employees to create value for  
13 themselves and for shareholders. As such, it is appropriate for shareholders to carry the cost  
14 burden.

15 Q. If the ratepayers are charged for RSUs, are there further revenue requirement  
16 impacts the Commission should consider?

17 A. Yes. Awarding RSUs generates a tax timing difference on Ameren's tax  
18 returns. If the Commission includes RSUs in the cost of service, the Commission should also  
19 reduce income tax expense by flowing through RSU-related income tax benefits.

20 Q. By what amount should income tax expense be reduced to account for the  
21 RSU-related income tax benefits?

22 A. In response to Data Request No. 0881, Ameren Missouri quantified the  
23 reduction to income tax expense as \$214,341.

**TRUE-UP TESTIMONY**

**TRUE-UP OF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION**

Q. Please describe Staff's adjustment for short-term incentive compensation in its Direct revenue requirement.

A. In its Direct case, Staff included the cost of Ameren's 2019 STIP after making adjustments to remove earnings-based compensation from the annualized amount. To remove earnings-based compensation, Staff adjusted Ameren Missouri's test year expense and rate base to the adjusted cash payout made in the first quarter of 2020.

Q. How did Staff true-up short-term incentive compensation?

A. Using the same methodology as utilized in its direct case, Staff revised its annualized incentive compensation so it is based on Ameren's 2020 STIP. Staff's adjustment for earnings-based incentive compensation included removing 75% of the cost of Ameren's 2020 plans that included an earnings metric.

Q. Did basing Staff's recommended revenue requirement on the 2020 plan year instead of the 2019 plan year create or eliminate accounting adjustments?

A. Yes, Staff has one additional adjustment due to different payouts of the 2019 and 2020 plan years.

Q. Please describe the additional adjustment.

A. In its Direct case, Staff did not make an adjustment for \*\* [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] \*\* As such, Staff removed the related costs from its recommendation.

Surrebuttal / True-up Direct Testimony of  
Matthew R. Young

1 Q. Does this conclude your surrebuttal / true-up direct testimony?

2 A. Yes, it does.





## Matthew R. Young

### **Educational and Employment Background and Credentials**

I am employed as a Senior Utility Regulatory Auditor for the Missouri Public Service Commission (“Commission”). I earned a Bachelor of Liberal Arts Degree from The University of Missouri – Kansas City in May 2009 and a Master of Science in Accounting, also from The University of Missouri – Kansas City, in December 2011. I have been employed by the Commission as a Regulatory Auditor since July 2013.

As a Utility Regulatory Auditor, I perform rate audits and prepare miscellaneous filings for consideration by the Commission. In addition, I review exhibits and testimony on assigned issues, develop accounting adjustments and issue positions which are supported by workpapers and written testimony. For cases that do not require prepared testimony, I prepare Staff Recommendation Memorandums.

Cases in which I have participated and the scope of my contributions are listed below:

<b>Case/Tracking Number</b>	<b>Company Name</b>	<b>Scope of Issues</b>	<b>Testified at Hearing</b>
EO-2022-0105	Evergy Metro	Revenue Requirement Issues	
ER-2021-0240 GR-2021-0241	Ameren Missouri	Incentive Compensation	
GR-2021-0108	Spire Missouri	Capitalized Overheads, Income Taxes, Rate Base Amortizations	Yes
SA-2021-0017	Missouri American Water Company	Feasibility Studies, Construction Cost Estimates	Yes
GO-2021-0030 GO-2021-0031	Spire – East and Spire – West	ISRS Rate Base	
SA-2021-0017	Missouri American Water Company	Sale of Assets	
GA-2021-0010	Spire – West	Costs to Expand Distribution System	
WR-2020-0264	Raytown Water Company	Tank Painting and Tower Maintenance, Taxes, Leases, Capitalized Depreciation	

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Case/Tracking Number	Company Name	Scope of Issues	Testified at Hearing
GO-2020-0229 GO-2020-0230	Spire – East and Spire – West	ISRS Rate Base	
GA-2020-0105	Spire – West	Costs to Expand Distribution System	
WA-2019-0366 SA-2019-0367	Missouri American Water Company	Sale of Assets, Rate Base	
WA-2019-0364 SA-2019-0365	Missouri American Water Company	Sale of Assets, Rate Base	
GO-2019-0356 GO-2019-0357	Spire – East and Spire – West	Overhead Costs in Rate Base, Reconciliation	Yes
ER-2019-0335	Ameren Missouri	Incentive Compensation, Fuel Inventory	
WO-2019-0184	Missouri American Water Company	ISRS Rate Base	
SA-2019-0161	United Services Inc.	Application for Certificate, Rate Base	
ER-2018-0145 ER-2018-0146	Kansas City Power & Light & KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations	Fuel Prices & Inventories, Purchased Power Expense, Pensions, OPEBs, SERP, Outside Services	
WM-2018-0104	Missouri American Water Company	Rate Base	
WM-2018-0023	Liberty Utilities	Sale of Assets, Rate Base	
WR-2017-0343	Gascony Water Company	Rate Base	Yes
GR-2017-0215 GR-2017-0216	Laclede Gas Company & Missouri Gas Energy	Pensions, OPEBs, SERP, Incentive Compensation, Equity Compensation, Severance Costs	Yes

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Case/Tracking Number	Company Name	Scope of Issues	Testified at Hearing
WR-2017-0139	Stockton Hills Water Company	Revenue, Expenses, Rate Base	
ER-2016-0285	Kansas City Power & Light	Forfeited Discounts, Bad Debt Expense, Customer Growth, Cash Working Capital, Payroll and Payroll Related Costs, Incentive Compensation, Rate Case Expense, Renewable Energy Standards Cost Recovery, Property Taxes	Yes
SR-2016-0202	Raccoon Creek Utility Operating Company	Rate Base	
ER-2016-0156	KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations	Payroll, Payroll Benefits, Payroll Taxes, Incentive Compensation, Injuries and Damages, Insurance Expense, Property Tax Expense, Rate Case Expense	
SR-2016-0112	Cannon Home Association	Revenues and Expenses, Rate Base	
WR-2016-0109 SR-2016-0110	Roy-L Utilities	Revenues and Expenses, Rate Base	
WO-2016-0098	Missouri American Water Company	ISRS Revenues	
WR-2015-0246	Raytown Water Company	Revenues and Expenses, Rate Base	
SC-2015-0152	Central Rivers Wastewater Utility	Verification of amounts identified in Complaint	
WR-2015-0104	Spokane Highlands Water Company	Revenues and Expenses, Rate Base	
GR-2015-0026	Laclede Gas Company	Plant Additions and Retirements, Contributions in Aid of Construction	

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<b>Case/Tracking Number</b>	<b>Company Name</b>	<b>Scope of Issues</b>	<b>Testified at Hearing</b>
GR-2015-0025	Missouri Gas Energy	Plant Additions and Retirements, Contributions in Aid of Construction	
WR-2015-0020	Gascony Water Company	Revenues and Expenses, Rate Base	
SM-2015-0014	Raccoon Creek Utility Operating Company	Sale of Assets, Rate Base, Acquisition Premium	
ER-2014-0370	Kansas City Power & Light	Injuries & Damages, Insurance, Payroll, Payroll Benefits, Payroll Taxes, Property Taxes, Rate Case Expense	Yes
SR-2014-0247	Central Rivers Wastewater Utility	Revenues and Expenses, Rate Base, Affiliated Transactions	
HR-2014-0066	Veolia Energy Kansas City	Payroll, Payroll Benefits, Payroll Taxes, Bonus Compensation, Property Taxes, Insurance Expense, Injuries & Damages Expense, Outside Services, Rate Case Expense	
GO-2014-0179	Missouri Gas Energy	Plant Additions, Contributions in Aid of Construction	
GR-2014-0007	Missouri Gas Energy	Advertising & Promotional Items, Dues and Donations, Lobbying Expense, Miscellaneous Expenses, PSC Assessment, Plant in Service, Depreciation Expense, Depreciation Reserve, Prepayments, Materials & Supplies, Customer Advances, Customer Deposits, Interest on Customer Deposits	
SA-2014-0005	Central Rivers Wastewater Utility	Application for Certificate, Revenue and Expenses, Plant in Service, Depreciation Reserve. Other Rate Base Items	