

*Exhibit No.:*  
*Issue: Rate of Return*  
*Witness: Shana Atkinson*  
*Sponsoring Party: MoPSC Staff*  
*Type of Exhibit: Surrebuttal Testimony*  
*Case No.: ER-2010-0130*  
*Date Testimony Prepared: April 23, 2010*

**MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**UTILITY SERVICES DIVISION**

**SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**SHANA ATKINSON**

**THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CASE NO. ER-2010-0130**

**Jefferson City, Missouri**  
*April 2010*

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**SHANA ATKINSON**  
**THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CASE NO. ER-2010-0130**

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1 order to obtain consents needed to amend their mortgage bond indenture. I will address each  
2 of these points.

3 **CORRECTIONS**

4 Q. After reviewing Dr. Vander Weide's Rebuttal Testimony regarding certain  
5 mistakes he believes Staff made in its testimony, does Staff need to make any corrections to  
6 its testimony in this case?

7 A. Yes. On page 4, lines 1 through 6 of Dr. Vander Weide's  
8 surrebuttal testimony, he says that Staff mistakenly eliminated NSTAR and DTE from its  
9 proxy group. "Staff eliminates NSTAR because it apparently believes that NSTAR reduced  
10 its dividend since 2006, and Staff eliminates DTE because it apparently believes that DTE is  
11 not classified as a "regulated" utility by the Edison Electric Institute ("EEI"). Contrary to  
12 Staff's belief NSTAR has not reduced its dividend since 2006; and DTE is classified as a  
13 "regulated" utility by EEI." Dr. Vander Weide is correct that DTE is classified as a  
14 "regulated" utility by EEI.

15 Q. Did Staff make a mistake regarding NSTAR's dividend reduction since 2006,  
16 as alleged by Dr. Vander Weide?

17 A. No. According to the February 26, 2010, Value Line Investment Survey:  
18 Ratings & Reports for NSTAR, dividends declared per share in 2006 were \$1.54 and  
19 decreased to \$1.33 in 2007.

20 Q. Would Staff have selected DTE after it made the correction of the mistake  
21 identified by Dr. Vander Weide?

1           A.     No. DTE would have still been eliminated because it does not meet the criteria  
2 of having at least 70 percent of revenues from electric utility operations.

3           **RESPONSE TO DR. VANDER WEIDE’S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

4           Q.     On page 6, in his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Vander Weide discusses his concern  
5 with Staff’s proxy group selection criteria. What is Staff’s response?

6           A.     Staff’s criteria for proxy group selection are as follows:

- 7                   1. Classified as an electric utility company by Value Line;
- 8                   2. Stock publicly traded;
- 9                   3. Classified as a regulated utility by Edison Electric Institute (“EEI”);
- 10                  4. At least 70 percent of revenues from electric operations as classified  
11                   by AUS;
- 12                  5. Ten-year Value Line historical growth data available;
- 13                  6. No reduced dividend since 2006;
- 14                  7. Projected growth available from Value Line and Reuters;
- 15                  8. At least investment grade credit rating; and
- 16                  9. Company-owned generating assets

17           Staff used these criteria to improve the risk comparability of its proxy group.  
18 Companies incur two types of risk, business risk and financial risk. The financial risk of an  
19 entity is driven by the amount of fixed obligations created by issuing debt. Some analysts will  
20 attempt to screen their comparable companies for financial risk by selecting companies with a  
21 certain common equity percentage in their capital structure. I controlled for this type of risk  
22 by selecting companies that have at least an investment grade credit rating. The business risk  
23 of an entity is primarily driven by the dominant operations of the company. The best way to  
24 select companies that face similar business risk is to select companies that are in the same  
25 business as the operations being evaluated. In common finance textbooks, this approach is  
26 commonly referred to as the “pure play method.” According to the January 2010 AUS  
27 monthly report, Empire has 86 percent of revenues from electric utility operations. Empire is

1 also listed as a regulated electric utility by EEI. Therefore, Staff considers these selection  
2 criteria to be appropriate for selecting a proxy group that is comparable to Empire's regulated  
3 electric utility operations.

4 Q. On page 7 of his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Vander Weide criticizes Staff's  
5 comparable company criteria of companies being classified as "Regulated" by EEI. Does  
6 Staff have evidence that companies in EEI's "Regulated" asset group have less risk than  
7 companies in EEI's "Mostly Regulated" and "Diversified" groups?

8 A. According to Value Line, the average beta for the companies in EEI's  
9 "Regulated" asset group is .71 (Eight of the forty-four companies listed by EEI in the  
10 Regulated group were not listed on Value Line). The average beta for the "Mostly  
11 Regulated" asset group is .79 (One of these nineteen companies was not listed on Value Line).  
12 The average beta for the "Diversified" group is .83 (One of these six companies was not listed  
13 on Value Line.). Beta is a measure of the volatility, or systematic risk, of a security or a  
14 portfolio in comparison to the market as a whole. A beta of 1 indicates that the security's  
15 price will move with the market. A beta of less than 1 means that the security will be less  
16 volatile than the market. A beta of greater than 1 indicates that the security's price will be  
17 more volatile than the market. Therefore, the Value Line betas are evidence that companies in  
18 EEI's "Regulated" asset group have less risk than companies in EEI's "Mostly Regulated"  
19 and "Diversified" groups.

20 Q. On page 10 of his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Vander Weide states that Staff  
21 estimates Empire's cost of equity using both a single-stage annual DCF method and a  
22 multi-stage annual DCF method. Which methodology was the primary driver of Staff's  
23 estimated cost of common equity in this case?

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1           A.     Staff relied primarily on its multi-stage annual DCF model in estimating  
2 Empire’s cost of equity. Staff attempted to estimate the cost of common equity for Empire by  
3 initially performing its traditional constant-growth DCF analysis. However, due to Staff’s  
4 concerns about being able to reliably estimate a sustainable constant-growth rate for the  
5 electric utility industry, Staff decided a multi-stage DCF analysis better reflects the current  
6 characteristics of the electric utility industry.

7           Q.     On pages 12 through 15 in his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Vander Weide discusses  
8 a variety of matters regarding the growth rates Staff analyzed when performing Staff’s  
9 constant-growth DCF analysis. What is Staff’s response?

10          A.     Staff clearly stated in the Rate of Return (“ROR”) Section of the Cost of  
11 Service Report in this case that Staff determined the historical and projected data that Staff  
12 reviewed made it difficult to estimate a reliable constant-growth rate for a single-stage DCF  
13 cost of equity estimate. Staff believes it is rather pointless to analyze this data to determine a  
14 growth rate that Staff would hesitate to give much weight in context of a constant-growth  
15 DCF estimate. This is why Staff decided that a multi-stage DCF analysis would provide a  
16 more reliable cost of common equity estimate.

17          Q.     At page 18, lines 1 through 15 of Dr. Vander Weide’s rebuttal testimony, he  
18 criticizes Staff’s opinion that analysts’ projected growth rates for electric utilities are not  
19 sustainable in the long run. What is Staff’s response?

20          A.     Dr. Vander Weide believes that Staff should use equity analysts’ five-year  
21 earnings per share (“EPS”) growth forecasts whether or not investors consider these growth  
22 forecasts as “sustainable”. He also believes that Staff fails to recognize that investor growth  
23 forecasts affect stock prices so Staff should adjust the stock prices for the companies in Staff’s

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1 DCF analyses as well as the growth forecasts if Staff believes that five-year EPS growth  
2 forecasts are irrational. In contrast, Staff believes that if a growth rate estimate does not  
3 reflect rational expectations, then an analyst is justified in rejecting that growth rate estimate.  
4 According to *The Cost of Capital - A Practitioners Guide* by David Parcell, pg. 8-5, “The  
5 DCF method assumes that investors evaluate stocks in a classical economic framework and  
6 buy and sell securities rationally at prices which reflect that value assessment. Classical  
7 economic, or valuation, theory maintains that the value of a financial asset is determined by  
8 its earning power, or its ability to generate future cash flows. As a result, DCF theory  
9 assumes that the stock price of a firm fully considers and reflects the return expected by  
10 stockholders.” This assumption underlying the DCF approach shows that there is no need to  
11 adjust the stock price, in attempting to estimate what a rational investment market would use  
12 in evaluating a utility stock. Dr. Vander Weide is incorrect in assuming that rational investors  
13 would rely on equity analysts’ five-year EPS forecasts for a sustainable long-term growth rate  
14 in valuing a stock.

15         Near term projected growth rates for the electric industry are higher than the projected  
16 long-term economic growth rates provided in the Congressional Budget Office’s *2010 The  
17 Budget and Economic Outlook*. As Staff already stated in its Cost of Service Report,  
18 according to an article in the October 2004 issue of *Public Utilities Fortnightly* entitled “The  
19 Dividend Yield Trap,” regulated electric utilities’ long-term growth expectations should not  
20 be much more than one to three percent.

21         These lower expected long-term growth rates are also consistent with many of the  
22 perpetual growth rates used by equity analysts when performing DCF analysis for purposes of  
23 determining a fair price to pay for electric utility stocks, and more specifically for Empire. In



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1 response to Staff Data Request No. 204.2, Empire provided a February 9, 2009,  
2 Jesup & Lamont equity research report (Attachment A) covering Empire that used a perpetual  
3 growth rate of 3 percent for purposes of discounting Empire's expected dividends in the  
4 context of the dividend discount model, which is commonly referred to as the DCF model in  
5 utility regulatory ratemaking proceedings.

6 Q. On page 11, line 8 through 16, in his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Vander Weide  
7 criticizes Staff for not using the quarterly compounding version of the DCF model as he did.  
8 How do you respond?

9 A. Value Line does not publish quarterly projected dividends. It provides  
10 projected dividends on an annual basis. The dividend yield provided by Value Line in its  
11 Ratings and Reports tear sheets is based on the expected dividend for the next year without  
12 quarterly compounding. The following definition of "dividend yield" is contained in the  
13 *Value Line Investment Survey for Windows: User's Manual*, © 1995 through 2002:

14 The common dividends declared per share expressed as a percentage  
15 of the average annual price of the stock. Dividend yield = common  
16 dividends declared per share divided by the average annual price of a  
17 stock. The year-ahead estimated dividend yield (shown in the top  
18 right-hand corner of the Value Line page) is the estimated total of cash  
19 dividends to be declared over the next 12 months, divided by the  
20 recent price of the stock.

21  
22 Staff believes that investors make their investment decisions primarily based upon the annual  
23 dividend assumption, and for that reason it is appropriate to recommend ROE estimations to  
24 the Missouri Public Service Commission ("Commission") based on that assumption.

25 Additionally, it is interesting to note that Dr. Vander Weide determined that there  
26 currently is no need to make an upward adjustment to his annual DCF cost of equity estimate  
27 for purposes of quarterly compounding. Dr. Vander Weide stated on page 22, line 21 through

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1 page 23, line 2 of his direct testimony that he employs the quarterly DCF model throughout  
2 his calculations, even though the results of the quarterly DCF model for his companies are  
3 approximately equal to the results of a “properly” applied annual DCF model.

4 Q. On page 12, lines 1 through 11, in his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Vander Weide  
5 criticized Staff’s use of Value Line to estimate the dividends expected amount over the next  
6 year in order to calculate the dividend yield in Staff’s DCF analysis. What is  
7 Staff’s response?

8 A. Dr. Vander Weide claims that Staff’s approach is not consistent with the  
9 assumption that dividends will grow at the same constant rate forever. Empire is a good  
10 example of why Dr. Vander Weide’s argument in this case is not consistent with the reality of  
11 investor expectations. In Staff’s opinion it is unreasonable to believe that investors expect to  
12 receive an annual dividend next year that is higher than Empire’s current annual dividend of  
13 \$1.28. Empire has paid this same dividend amount since 1993 and has been unable to earn  
14 this dividend in eleven of the years since 1993. The inability of Empire to earn higher than its  
15 dividend is evidence that investors are not likely to expect Empire to have the earnings  
16 capacity to allow it to increase its dividend per share (“DPS”). Value Line does not anticipate  
17 that Empire will increase its dividend next year and this is most likely the investors’  
18 expectation as well, which is what rate of return witnesses should be trying to evaluate.<sup>1</sup>

19 Q. On page 17, lines 9 through 13 of Dr. Vander Weide’s rebuttal testimony, he  
20 criticized Staff’s multi-stage growth assumptions for Staff’s multi-stage DCF Model. What is  
21 Staff’s response?

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that Staff made the simplifying assumption in its multi-stage DCF analysis that Empire would be able to grow its DPS by 6 percent per year for the next five years, hence the higher cost of equity indication when making simplifying assumptions that aren’t consistent with actual investor expectations.

1           A.     Dr. Vander Weide states that he believes Staff's multi-stage growth  
2 assumptions seem to reflect its own view of investors' growth expectations rather than being  
3 based on any studies or analysis. Staff explained its multi-stage growth rate assumptions on  
4 page 26 of the ROR section of Staff's Cost of Service Report. It is advisable to use a  
5 multi-stage DCF analysis because the electric industry is in a non-constant growth situation  
6 due to increased capital expenditure programs.

7           Also, as previously discussed, Staff is aware of a February 9, 2009, Jesup & Lamont  
8 equity research report that used a perpetual growth rate of 3 percent for Empire. This  
9 followed a five-year period of 0 percent growth for Empire's DPS, as referenced in the  
10 Jesup & Lamont report, which calls into question the appropriateness of assuming the  
11 EPS growth rate is always an accurate predictor of DPS growth, which is what the  
12 DCF method is supposed to discount. This verifies the reasonableness of Staff's 3.35 percent  
13 perpetual growth rate used in Staff's multi-stage DCF analysis.

14           Q.     On page 21, lines 3 through 18 of his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Vander Weide  
15 supports his belief that risk premium estimates should be based on using arithmetic means  
16 rather than use of geometric means in its CAPM analysis. Do you have a simple example to  
17 illustrate why Staff does not believe investors use arithmetic means when determining the  
18 amount of risk premium they will require on a given stock or a portfolio of stocks?

19           A.     Yes. Suppose that an investor makes a \$1 stock investment over a three-year  
20 period. If an investor pays \$1 for a stock in year 1 and in year 2 the stock increases to \$1.50,  
21 then the investor would have a 50 percent growth rate. In year three the price of the stock  
22 decreases by 50 percent to \$.75. If an investor performed a simple arithmetic average of these  
23 two returns, then they would think that they received 0 percent  $[(50 \text{ percent} + -50 \text{ percent})/2]$

1 growth in the investment over the three-year period. However, in reality the investor actually  
2 had a 25 percent decline in the investment over this three-year period. This is why using the  
3 arithmetic mean as advocated by Dr. Vander Weide produces questionable results.

4 Q. On page 23, lines 5 through 12, in his rebuttal testimony, Dr. Vander Weide  
5 claims an adjustment should be made to Staff's CAPM result because of Empire's small size.  
6 What is Staff's response?

7 A. Dr. Vander Weide uses an Ibbotson Associates study that was based on all of  
8 the stocks in the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange and the  
9 NASDAQ National Market, which is not a utility specific study. If Dr. Vander Weide were  
10 concerned about small size in estimating the cost of equity for Empire, then  
11 Dr. Vander Weide shouldn't have followed his standard methodology of estimating the cost  
12 of equity by using market-weighted cost of equity averages, which gives large company cost  
13 of equity estimates more weight in his recommendation.

14 Q. Has Staff been able to perform any additional research that supports the  
15 reasonableness of its cost of equity estimate?

16 A. Yes. The February 9, 2009, Jesup & Lamont report covering Empire provided  
17 in response to Staff Data Request 0204.2, stated the following in the Valuation section of the  
18 report:

19 Our dividend discount analysis [same thing as the DCF in utility  
20 regulatory terminology] results in a valuation of \$19 per share. Our  
21 projections assume that EDE will be able to pay its dividend in the  
22 short-term and will not raise its dividend over the next five years.  
23 Beyond the next five years, we estimate a dividend growth rate of 3%  
24 annually, based in large part on our assumptions for future Missouri  
25 rate decisions.  
26

1 Staff calculated the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), i.e. the cost of common equity, based on  
2 the assumptions of Jesup & Lamont's dividend discount analysis and Staff found the IRR to  
3 be 9.08 percent. The IRR is the discount rate that makes the present value of all future cash  
4 flows equal to the cost of the initial investment. The 9.08 percent verifies the reasonableness  
5 of Staff's recommendation.

6 **RESPONSE TO MR. GIPSON'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

7 Q. Mr. Gipson's rebuttal testimony addresses Staff's disallowance of \$1.6 million  
8 of Empire's debt costs. What is Staff's position regarding this debt disallowance?

9 A. Staff disallowed \$1.6 million of debt expenses associated with Empire's choice  
10 to amend its mortgage bond indenture because Empire amended the indenture in order to  
11 allow it to maintain its current dividend per share of \$1.28.

12 Q. Mr. Gipson states that the amendment was executed in support of the  
13 Company's overall financing plan, not just to benefit shareholders and that the amendment  
14 was done in order to provide investors some comfort that Empire understood the importance  
15 of the dividend to shareholders. What is Staff's response?

16 A. Empire stated that they had to amend the Indenture because its retained  
17 earnings balance dropped to \$17.2 million and the Indenture, before the amendment, did not  
18 allow Empire to pay dividends with essentially a negative retained earnings balance. As  
19 previously discussed, Empire has not earned their dividend in eleven of the past seventeen  
20 years. Ratepayers should not be burdened with explicit costs associated with Empire's desire  
21 to continue to pay the current dividend level to its shareholders.

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1           Q.     Mr. Gipson implies in his rebuttal testimony that if Empire were unable to pay  
2 its dividend that Empire's cost of equity would be higher. Have any other Missouri utilities,  
3 such as Ameren and Great Plains Energy, requested a higher cost of equity after reducing  
4 their dividends?

5           A.     No.

6           **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

7           Q.     Please summarize the conclusion of your surrebuttal testimony.

8           A.     Staff's criteria for its proxy group improves the comparability of its proxy  
9 group. Staff's multi-stage growth assumptions are reasonable for its multi-stage DCF model  
10 and the Jesup & Lamont equity research report supports the reasonableness of Staff's  
11 3.35 percent perpetual growth rate, as well as the overall reasonableness of Staff's estimated  
12 cost of common equity. Also, Staff believes that its debt disallowance is necessary and  
13 appropriate at this time. In conclusion, Staff continues to believe its testimony provides a  
14 reliable estimate of the cost of common equity.

15          Q.     Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?

16          A.     Yes, it does.

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**  
**OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

In the Matter of The Empire District Electric )  
Company for Authority to File Tariffs Increasing ) Case No. ER-2010-0130  
Rates for Electric Service Provided to Customers in )  
the Missouri Service Area of the Company )


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
STATE OF MISSOURI     )  
                                  )     ss.  
COUNTY OF COLE     )

Shana Atkinson, of lawful age, on her oath states: that she has participated in the preparation of the foregoing Surrebuttal Testimony in question and answer form, consisting of 12 pages to be presented in the above case; that the answers in the foregoing Surrebuttal Testimony were given by her; that she has knowledge of the matters set forth in such answers; and that such matters are true and correct to the best of her knowledge and belief.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Shana Atkinson

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22<sup>nd</sup> day of April, 2010.



  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public

Member FINRA, SIPC

 February 9, 2009  
 Timothy M. Winter, CFA  
 Senior Analyst  
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## Empire District Electric (EDE)

**Current Price: \$17.65**

### Solid Fourth Quarter Results

# Hold

### Highlights

- Empire District Electric (EDE-Hold) reported 2008 EPS results of \$1.17 vs. \$1.09 in 2007. Our 2008 EPS estimate was \$1.15.
- The electric utility business contributed \$1.11 in 2008 vs. \$1.04 in 2007 and the gas utility business contributed \$0.05 vs. \$0.03. Full year-2008 results benefited from a Missouri rate increase of \$22 million, or 7%, on August 23, 2008 based on a 10.8% ROE. The company was finally allowed to implement a fuel adjustment clause (FAC) on September 1, 2008. Higher fuel and purchased power costs hurt results by (\$0.29) in 2008, but were actually a neutral in the fourth quarter as a result of the fuel clause.
- Importantly, fourth quarter results were \$0.23 vs. a loss of (\$0.01) last year. The new rate plan helped boost results in the fourth quarter and is encouraging for 2009.
- Our 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 EPS estimates are \$1.15, \$1.45, \$1.45 and \$1.80, respectively. We forecast flat EPS growth in 2010 as financing costs and regulatory lag hamper growth. Continued constructive Missouri regulatory treatment is paramount to achievement of “full EPS power” of \$1.80 in 2011.
- EDE plans to invest roughly \$325 million in regulated utility infrastructure in 2009 and 2010, including its share of 100 megawatts (MW) of one coal-fired power plant (Iatan 2) and 50 MW of another coal-fired power plant (Plum Point Energy Station). Both plants remain on schedule for mid-2010 commercial operation.
- We expect these investments to receive rate treatment in mid-to-late 2010 and assuming constructive treatment result in 2011 EPS power of roughly \$1.80. Our 2011 EPS estimate results in an earned ROE of 10.7%, “ZERO” external financing needs and a dividend payout ratio of 71%.

Revenues and Earnings	F2007A	F2008E	F2009E	F2010E
<b>Sales (\$ mil.)</b>	<b>\$490.1</b>	<b>\$518.2</b>	<b>\$557.9</b>	<b>\$593.1</b>
1Q	\$125.0	\$136.0		
2Q	\$106.4	\$110.1		
3Q	\$141.6	\$137.5		
4Q	\$113.9	\$134.6		
<b>EPS</b>	<b>\$1.09</b>	<b>\$1.17</b>	<b>\$1.45</b>	<b>\$1.45</b>
1Q	0.15	0.21		
2Q	0.19	0.14		
3Q	0.76	0.59		
4Q	-0.01	0.23		
<b>Current Annual Dividend:</b>	<b>\$1.28</b>	<b>Current Yield:</b>	<b>7.2%</b>	
P/E (x)	16.3	15.2	12.3	12.3
Book Value	\$16.04	\$15.96	\$16.16	\$16.57
ROE	6.9%	7.3%	9.0%	8.9%

Stock Data	
52-Week Range	\$14.9 – \$23.5
Shares Outstanding (mil.)	33.95
Market Capitalization (mil.)	\$560.1
Enterprise Value (mil.)	\$1,237.7
Debt to Capital	40.0%
Insider Ownership	0.5%
Institutional Ownership	46.5%
Short Interest (mil. shares)	1.16
Average Daily Volume	96,708

**Company Description.** Headquartered in Joplin, Missouri, EDE is a small, regulated utility that provides electric service to customers in southwest Missouri (89% of electric revenue), southeastern Kansas (6%), northeastern Oklahoma (3%), and northwestern Arkansas (3%).

**\*\*\*See Last Page for Disclosure\*\*\***



**2008 EPS Results Were  
\$1.17 vs. \$1.09**

**Fourth Quarter Results  
Were \$0.23 vs. (\$0.01)**

**On August 23, 2008,  
EDE Implemented a  
\$22.0 million, or 6.7%,  
Annual Revenue  
Increase**

**Fuel Adjustment Clause  
Effective September 1,  
2008**

### EDE Reports Solid Fourth Quarter Results

On February 6, Empire District Electric (EDE-Hold) reported 2008 EPS results of \$1.17 vs. \$1.09 in 2007. Our 2008 EPS estimate was \$1.15. Importantly, fourth quarter results were \$0.23 vs. a loss of (\$0.01) last year. Last year's fourth quarter was negatively impacted by a major outage at the Asbury generating station.

The electric utility business contributed \$1.11 in 2008 vs. \$1.04 in 2007 and the gas utility business contributed \$0.05 vs. \$0.03. Full year-2008 results benefited from a Missouri rate increase of \$22 million, or 7%, on August 23, 2008 based on a 10.8% ROE. The company was finally allowed to implement a fuel adjustment clause (FAC) on September 1, 2008. Higher fuel and purchased power costs hurt results by (\$0.29) in 2008, but were actually a neutral in the fourth quarter as a result of the fuel clause. The new rate plan helped boost results in the fourth quarter and is encouraging for 2009.

	EPS Results	
	Quarter	Full year
<b>Period ended 12/31/2007</b>	<b>(\$0.01)</b>	<b>\$1.09</b>
<b>Revenues</b>		
Electric	0.25	0.48
Gas	0.10	0.12
Other		(0.03)
<b>Expenses</b>		
Fuel & purchased power	0.06	(0.29)
Electric operating expenses		(0.02)
Maintenance & repairs	(0.02)	0.08
Depreciation	0.02	(0.02)
Tax rate	(0.03)	(0.04)
Interest expense	(0.03)	(0.09)
AFUDC	0.03	0.11
Share dilution	(0.02)	(0.11)
<b>Other</b>	<b>(0.12)</b>	<b>(0.11)</b>
<b>Year-to-year Change</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>0.08</b>
<b>Period ended 12/31/2008</b>	<b>\$0.23</b>	<b>\$1.17</b>

Higher electric revenues were driven by the August 2008 rate increase, higher wholesale sales (which flow back through the fuel adjustment clause) and modest customer growth. The \$21 million, or 5%, increase in revenues was partially offset by a (\$2.8) million negative weather impact. Higher AFUDC associated with higher capital expenditures positively impacted results by \$0.11 per share. However, the lack of fuel clause through eight months of the year negatively impacted results by roughly (\$0.29). Lower maintenance expenses aided bottom line results by \$0.08 for the year primarily due to the absence of severe 2007 ice storms as well cost control efforts. Share dilution and higher interest expense associated with the capital investment program negatively impacted results by (\$0.11) and (\$0.09) per share.

### EPS Outlook

**Our 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 EPS Estimates are \$1.15, \$1.45, \$1.45 and \$1.80**

**Our 2009 EPS Estimate Results in a Below-Average Earned ROE of 9.2%**

**EDE to File a General Rate Case in early January 2010 With New Rates Effective in November 2010 and Result in 2011 EPS Power of Roughly \$1.80**

**EDE Adding Roughly 200-Megawatts of Coal-Fired Generation to be in Operation By Mid-to-Late 2010**

**The 2009-2011 Capital Budget Totals \$375 Million including \$175 Million in 2009, \$118 Million in 2010 and \$80 Million in 2011**

**We Forecast Roughly \$200 Million of External Financing Needs in**

Our 2009, 2010 and 2011 EPS estimates are \$1.45, \$1.45 and \$1.80, respectively. We were encouraged by the strong fourth quarter EPS report as it reflected the recent rate increase and fuel adjustment clause.

We expect the rate increase and FAC to boost EPS to \$1.45 in 2009. We note that our 2009 forecast assumes roughly \$12 million in non-cash allowance for funds used during construction (AFUDC). In addition, we forecast roughly 2.5% retail sales growth as a return to normal weather more than offsets the relatively weak economy. However, our 2009 estimate results in a below-average earned ROE of 9.2% due to financing costs associated with a heavy capital expenditure budget not recognized in the recent rate case.

Continued constructive Missouri regulatory treatment is paramount to achievement of “full EPS power” of \$1.80 in 2011.

EDE is in the midst of a multiyear infrastructure investment plan driven by ownership interests in two coal-fired plants currently under construction and scheduled for mid-2010 in-service dates. EDE plans to invest roughly \$325 million in regulated utility infrastructure in 2009 and 2010, including its ownership share of 100 megawatts (MW) of one coal-fired power plant (Iatan 2) and 50 MW of another coal-fired power plant (Plum Point Energy Station). Both plants remain on schedule for mid-2010 commercial operation. We forecast roughly \$200 million of external financing needs in 2009-2010 (we modeled \$150 million of long-term debt in 2009 and \$60 million of common stock in 2010).

We forecast flat EPS growth in 2010 as financing costs and regulatory lag will hamper growth. We expect EDE to file a general rate case in early January 2010 with new rates effective in November 2010. Following the rate request true-up date, new rates cannot be implemented for three months. The accrual of noncash AFUDC earnings (roughly \$12 million in 2010) associated with Plum Creek and Iatan 2 end when the plants go into service and the expensing of depreciation, operating and maintenance costs and property taxes begin upon commercial operation. We assume 1.5% retail sales growth in 2010.

We expect these investments to receive final rate treatment in November of 2010 and, assuming constructive treatment, result in 2011 EPS power of roughly \$1.80. Based on the current forecasted capital expenditure budget (which falls dramatically in late 2010), and improved regulatory environment, which includes a fuel adjustment clause, we optimistically believe EDE’s 2011 financial situation can be described as relatively “clear sailing”. Our 2011 EPS estimate results in an earned ROE of 10.6%, “ZERO” external financing needs and a dividend payout ratio of 71%.

#### **Capital Expenditures Budget Heavy Through Mid-2010**

EDE’s 2008 capital budget totaled \$211 million and reflect Plum Point Unit 1 and Iatan 2, as well as the payments for the capitalized portion of the December 2007 ice storm.

The 2009-2011 capital expenditure (excluding AFUDC and expenditures to retire assets) budget totals roughly \$375 million, including \$174.8 million in 2009, \$117.5 million in 2010 and \$79.5 million in 2011. EDE’s share of Plum Point and Iatan 2 are

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**2009-2010**

**Common Equity Ratio  
is 44%**

**Our 2011 EPS Estimate  
of \$1.80 Results in an  
Earned ROE of 10.6%,  
“ZERO” External  
Financing Needs &  
Payout Ratio of 71%**

**Shares Offer a High  
7.7% Yield on \$1.28  
Dividend**

**We Believe Shares are  
Fairly Valued**

estimated at \$103 million and \$225 million, respectively.

We estimate operating cash flow after common dividends will represent 30%, 60% and 100% of capital expenditures in 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. A combination of short-term debt, proceeds of sales of long-term debt and/or common stock (including various internal plans) to finance the remainder. Effective August 15, 2008, EDE maintained a \$400 million shelf registration covering common stock, unsecured debt securities, preference stock, first mortgage bonds and trust preferred

**Balance Sheet**

Common equity represented 44% of total capitalization as of September 30, 2008. S&P and Moody's corporate credit ratings are BBB-/Baa2 (S&P has a Stable outlook and Moody's has a Negative outlook). We forecast roughly \$200 million of external financing needs in 2009-2010 (we modeled \$150 million of long-term debt in 2009 and \$60 million of common stock in 2010).

**Valuation**

Our comparative P/E multiple analysis results in a twelve-to-eighteen month fair value estimate of \$19 per share. We apply a regulated power company median P/E multiple of 10.7 X our estimated 2011 EPS of \$1.80. Based upon the timing of rate increases, large capital projects coming online in late 2010, we believe our 2011 EPS estimate is most representative of the future earnings power of EDE. The P/E multiple is equal to the median 2009E P/E for the regulated utility peer group, but note that the current peer group average is at the bottom end of the historical group range of 10-17X. We consider Missouri regulation to be average, customer growth to be in-line with other utilities and long-term EPS growth to be “about average”, we believe an industry-average multiple is warranted.

Our dividend discount analysis results in a valuation of \$19 per share. Our projections assume that EDE will be able to pay its dividend in the short-term and will not raise its dividend over the next five years. Beyond the next five years, we estimate a dividend growth rate of 3% annually, based in large part on our assumptions for future Missouri rate decisions.

<b>Empire District Electric</b>							
2005-2011 Financial Summary							

<b>Operating Revenues</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008E</b>	<b>2009E</b>	<b>2010E</b>	<b>2011E</b>
Electric	359.1	382.6	425.1	448.2	485.3	518.4	565.5
Gas	0.0	25.1	59.9	65.4	67.4	69.4	71.5
Water	1.4	1.8	1.9	5.0	5.2	5.3	5.5
Non-regulated	2.3	2.5	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>Total Revenues</b>	<b>362.8</b>	<b>412.2</b>	<b>490.1</b>	<b>518.2</b>	<b>557.9</b>	<b>593.1</b>	<b>642.5</b>
<b>Operating Expenses</b>							
Fuel-Electric	112.8	94.0	113.6	cf	cf	cf	cf
Purchased power	52.7	66.3	77.7	246.7	227.6	237.9	248.7
Fuel cost/KWH	0.0308	0.0294	0.0336	0.0429	0.0386	0.0398	0.0409
Cost of natural gas	0.0	15.3	37.6	37.6	37.6	37.6	37.6
Regulated-other	54.2	60.1	71.4	65.0	67.0	69.6	72.4
Maintenance	20.9	23.2	32.1	27.0	26.0	27.3	28.7
Loss on plant disallowance	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Gain on sale of assets	0.0	0.0	-1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Depreciation	34.7	38.4	52.6	54.0	55.0	59.3	63.9
Income taxes	12.6	21.9	14.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other taxes	19.4	21.0	24.9	25.8	26.7	27.6	28.6
<b>Total operating expenses</b>	<b>308.8</b>	<b>342.4</b>	<b>424.6</b>	<b>447.2</b>	<b>441.6</b>	<b>461.1</b>	<b>481.7</b>
<b>Operating income</b>	<b>54.0</b>	<b>69.8</b>	<b>65.5</b>	<b>71.0</b>	<b>116.3</b>	<b>132.0</b>	<b>160.8</b>
<b>Other income</b>							
AFUDC	0.3	1.4	2.9	6.1	6.2	4.0	1.5
Interest income	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>Total other income</b>	<b>-0.3</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>1.5</b>
<b>Interest charges</b>							
Long-term debt	23.9	25.9	31.1	31.1	31.1	31.1	31.1
New long-term debt	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	12.0	17.4	17.4
Note payable	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
AFUDC	-0.3	-2.9	-4.7	-6.1	-6.2	-4.0	-1.5
Short-term debt	0.2	2.3	2.9	3.7	5.1	5.9	5.8
Other	0.5	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0
<b>Interest charges</b>	<b>28.7</b>	<b>30.6</b>	<b>34.6</b>	<b>37.2</b>	<b>46.2</b>	<b>55.7</b>	<b>58.1</b>
<b>Pre-tax income</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>62.0</b>	<b>47.6</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>76.3</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>104.2</b>
<b>Income taxes</b>	<b>12.6</b>	<b>21.9</b>	<b>14.4</b>	<b>14.0</b>	<b>26.7</b>	<b>28.1</b>	<b>36.5</b>
	<b>33.5%</b>	<b>35.4%</b>	<b>30.3%</b>	<b>35.0%</b>	<b>35.0%</b>	<b>35.0%</b>	<b>35.0%</b>
Income from continuing operator	25.0	40.0	33.2	25.9	49.6	52.2	67.7
Discontinued operations	-1.2	-0.7	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>Net income</b>	<b>23.9</b>	<b>39.3</b>	<b>33.2</b>	<b>39.7</b>	<b>49.6</b>	<b>52.2</b>	<b>67.7</b>
Wtd average shs out.	25.9	28.3	30.6	33.8	34.2	35.9	37.6
Actual shs. out.	26.1	30.3	33.6	34.1	34.3	37.5	37.7
<b>EPS</b>	<b>\$0.92</b>	<b>\$1.39</b>	<b>\$1.09</b>	<b>\$1.17</b>	<b>\$1.45</b>	<b>\$1.45</b>	<b>\$1.80</b>
Dividends	\$1.28	\$1.28	\$1.28	\$1.28	\$1.28	\$1.28	\$1.28

Book value year-end	\$15.08	\$15.49	\$16.04	\$15.96	\$16.16	\$16.57	\$17.11
Book value-average		\$15.29	\$15.77	\$16.00	\$16.06	\$16.36	\$16.84
ROE	#DIV/0!	9.1%	6.9%	7.3%	9.0%	8.9%	10.7%
	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008E</b>	<b>2009E</b>	<b>2010E</b>	<b>2011E</b>
<b>Operating Cash Flow</b>							
Net income	23.8	39.3	33.2	39.7	49.6	52.2	67.7
Depreciation	39.2	43.0	57.3	54.0	55.0	59.3	63.9
Pension	6.4	5.7	9.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Deferred income taxes	7.1	0.8	18.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
AFUDC	(0.3)	(1.4)	(2.9)	(6.1)	(6.2)	(4.0)	(1.5)
<b>Operating Cash Flow</b>	<b>76.1</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>103.7</b>	<b>87.6</b>	<b>98.4</b>	<b>107.5</b>	<b>130.1</b>
<b>Investing Activities</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>
Capital expenditures	(68.6)	(112.6)	(178.5)	(189.3)	(174.8)	(117.5)	(79.5)
Acquisition of gas properties	0.0	(103.2)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-regulated	(1.9)	(2.6)	(4.9)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sale of ppty plant & equipment	0.0	1.1	4.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	<b>(71.2)</b>	<b>(217.7)</b>	<b>(178.9)</b>	<b>(189.3)</b>	<b>(174.8)</b>	<b>(117.5)</b>	<b>(79.5)</b>
<b>Financing activities</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>
Long-term debt	(3.1)	54.2	78.8	90.0	150.0	0.0	0.0
Pmt of interest rate derivatives	(1.4)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Common stock	6.6	79.3	71.7	8.0	5.0	60.0	5.0
Short-term debt	31.0	46.1	(44.0)	25.0	0.0	(22.0)	(10.0)
Dividends	(33.2)	(36.1)	(39.0)	(43.3)	(43.8)	(45.9)	(48.1)
Other	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>Financing activities</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>142.7</b>	<b>67.0</b>	<b>79.7</b>	<b>111.2</b>	<b>(7.9)</b>	<b>(53.1)</b>
Stock price issuance	0	0	0	18.0	18.5	19.1	19.7
Long-term debt	0	0	0	45.0	165.0	240.0	240.0
Short-term debt	0	0	0	12.5	25.0	14.0	(2.0)
Net change in cash	5.4	-3.6	-8.3	-22.0	34.8	-18.0	(2.5)
Cash at beginning of year	12.5	17.9	14.3	6.0	-16.0	18.9	0.9
<b>Cash at end of year</b>	<b>17.9</b>	<b>14.3</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>-16.0</b>	<b>18.9</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>(1.6)</b>
	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008E</b>	<b>2009E</b>	<b>2010E</b>	<b>2011E</b>
Common equity	393.4	468.6	539.2	543.6	554.4	620.7	645.3
Preferred equity	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Short-term debt	31.6	77.2	33.2	58.2	58.2	36.2	26.2
Long-term debt	409.9	462.4	541.9	631.9	781.9	781.9	781.9
<b>Total capitalization</b>	<b>834.9</b>	<b>1,008.2</b>	<b>1,114.2</b>	<b>1,233.7</b>	<b>1,394.5</b>	<b>1,438.8</b>	<b>1,453.4</b>
<b>Common equity</b>	<b>47.1%</b>	<b>46.5%</b>	<b>48.4%</b>	<b>44.1%</b>	<b>39.8%</b>	<b>43.1%</b>	<b>44.4%</b>
Short-term debt	3.8%	7.7%	3.0%	4.7%	4.2%	2.5%	1.8%
Long-term debt	49.1%	45.9%	48.6%	51.2%	56.1%	54.3%	53.8%

## Empire District Electric (EDE) – 3 Year Price Chart



### Price Target and Ratings Changes over the Past 3 Years:

Date	Stock Price	Rating	Target Price	Initiation
12/10/2008	\$16.22	Hold	NM	X

### Companies Mentioned in Report:

- None

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## Analyst Disclosure

I, **Tim Winter**, the author of this research report, certify that the views expressed in this report accurately reflect my personal views about the subject securities and issuers, and no part of my compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly tied to the specific recommendations or views contained in this research report.

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