IN THE CIRCUIT COURT MISSOURI 1 19TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DIVISION II HONORABLE PAUL C. WILSON, JUDGE 2 3 MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE 4 COMMISSION, 5 Plaintiff, 10AC-CC00170 6 vs. 7 LACLEDE GAS, GROUP & ENERGY, 8 Defendants, 9 10 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 11 On May 11, 2010, the above-entitled cause came 12 on regularly before the Honorable Paul C. Wilson, Judge of 13 Division II of the 19th Judicial Circuit, Cole County, at 14 Jefferson City, Missouri. 15 16 17 18 19 Mindy S. Hunt, Certified Court Reporter Official Court Reporter, 19th Judicial Circuit 20 Cole County, Missouri 21 22 23 24 25

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1 THE COURT: 10AC-CC0010 -- excuse me -- 170, Missouri Public Service Commission versus Laclede Gas Group 2 and Energy, et al. Correct? And I think this is the first 3 hearing that we've had in this case, yes? 5 MR. PENDERGAST: It is, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Let's have everyone enter their 7 appearance for the record, please, and start with the 8 relator. 9 MS. HEINTZ: Jennifer Heintz, H-e-i-n-t-z, for 10 the Missouri Public Service Commission. 11 MR. PENDERGAST: Michael C. Pendergast, 12 appearing on behalf of Laclede Gas Company. That's P, as in Paul, e-n-d-e-r-g-a-s-t. And my business address is 13 14 720 Olive Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63101. 15 MR. NIEHOFF: William Niehoff, N-i-e-h-o-f-f, 16 and I'm here on behalf of Laclede Energy Resources. 17 MR. DARRELL: I'm Mark C. Darrell, appearing on behalf of the Laclede Group. Business address is also 18 19 720 Olive Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63101. 20 THE COURT: I think what we have before us is 21 the motion to dismiss of Laclede Group and Energy 22 Resources. Correct? 23 MR. PENDERGAST: And Gas. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MS. HEINTZ: This is also the hearing on my

petition, and that's the statutory hearing.

THE COURT: That's what I was trying to figure out, is whether we had the ultimate merits here as well.

MS. HEINTZ: I don't know. Have those been formally noticed? I don't remember getting notice of them being heard today. I'm prepared to argue, but I don't know if there was a notice filed.

MR. NIEHOFF: I think it's part of the Court's scheduling order, certainly, and the pleadings that were filed up to this date.

THE COURT: Probably it's all going to have to get discussed even in the context of your petition. So I think it would be more helpful for me to have the Commission go first anyway, and then we'll hear your defenses, both to the nature of the motion to dismiss and otherwise.

So, Ms. Heintz, let's hear from the Commission for this action.

MS. HEINTZ: Thank you. Just briefly, your Honor. The underlying case here is a case where the Commission is sitting as the fact finder in what is known as a purchased gas adjustment or actual cost adjustment dispute. And that is a case where the gas costs of the regulated utility get adjusted up or down, based on what the actual costs were, which, of course, can only be

reviewed after the fact.

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So in this case, what happened is that Staff, as a party, requested certain documents from Laclede as part of this prudent determination that the Commission has to make. And Staff contended that the Commission -- or I'm sorry --or that Laclede didn't fully comply with that order. They filed a motion to compel. And that motion to compel went through several iterations. It was first granted unanimously. There has been extensive litigation at the Commission level on this motion. It resulted in a November 4th order wherein the motion was granted. It was granted by a 3-2 margin and Laclede was ordered to produce the remainder of the documents.

Staff has subsequently informed the Commission that there still has not been compliance, so that is what led to the filing of this action in the Circuit Court. Of course, the Commission doesn't have enforcement powers, but we do have a statutory authority under 386.360 to come in and have our orders enforced through the Circuit Court through a mandamus, which is why the petition was filed in this Court.

THE COURT: Did the Commission make -- was there any other action at the Commission level that said that they were not in compliance or that further compulsion was needed or are we all -- is the last thing that the

Commission did was granted the motion to compel that the Staff had filed?

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MS. HEINTZ: After the motion to compel was granted and the Staff informed the Commission that there was no compliance, the Commission then issued a show-cause order to Laclede. Laclede responded to that show-cause order, and the Commission said, Okay, we have heard your response. We still need to have the order enforced. And that's what authorized me as the general counsel to come in and file the enforcement action. So that's the last thing that happened at the Commission.

THE COURT: And when was that, just so I'm caught up?

MS. HEINTZ: That was -- this petition was filed, I believe, in late March.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I interrupted you. I'm sorry.

MS. HEINTZ: That was what I wanted to tell you, so...

THE COURT: At what point was it clear -- or was it clear to the Commission that you were seeking documents not all of which may have been in the possession or control of the gas company?

MS. HEINTZ: Well, the documents are -- that's a little bit of a loaded question, because I think that they

are in the possession of, the gas company, in that they have the right authority and ability to obtain them. The fact that they pertain to transactions that are between an affiliate of Laclede and a third party, I think was clear from the first time Staff filed its first motion to compel in September of '08.

THE COURT: I should have asked the basic question. What makes Group and Energy necessary to this action as necessary to enforce the Commission's order?

MS. HEINTZ: Right. Well, the Commission -- all of the Commission-level orders have been directed to Laclede, the regulated company. The statute that authorizes mandamus has a section in it that says that, at the Circuit Court's discretion, any parties can be added to make the Court's orders effective. So at that point I included Laclede Group and LER in my petition because these are records that do involve LER's transactions with a third party, although the Commission in this case does have the right to order those documents to be produced for the purposes of this prudence review.

THE COURT: And it's your position that even if you hadn't done that, then the regulated entity could comply with the subpoena or could comply with the writ in this case through LER, even though the -- regardless of where the documents actually are? They could still comply

and produce them. Correct?

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MS. HEINTZ: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's hear first from the Gas Company, and then we'll work our way up to the Group and to LER.

MR. PENDERGAST: Thank you, your Honor. I'll be speaking for the gas company. And I want to make it very clear from the very beginning that we don't dispute that, in a proper case, the Commission has the ability to get documents from LER directly. In fact, the Commission, I believe, has issued subpoenas in the past seeking documents from Laclede's affiliates. And those have been, I think, complied with. At least I've heard no arguments about them being complied with.

Nor do we disagree that under a proper case the Commission could go ahead and get documents from LER through Laclede Gas Company. The problem is this isn't that proper case, and I think it's most instructive to look at what the Commission hasn't done as opposed to what it has done here.

As I said, the Commission says it's proceeding under general rules of civil discovery. The Commission has determined, in fact, in a very recent case that when it comes to a non-party like LER -- and LER was never a party nor was Laclede Group in these underlying Commission

proceedings — that the proper way to go ahead and get information and records from them is to go ahead and issue a subpoena under the statutory power the Comission has to issue subpoenas. For whatever reason — and to this day I don't know — the Commission has not pursued that particular administrative remedy. And I think it's grossly premature to come before this Court and have you get involved in this process at this stage when they haven't even exhausted that remedy. In fact, they are seeking to have you compel LER and Laclede Group to provide information that they haven't even sought through the sole administrative remedy the Commission itself has said is available to seek such information.

So they could have gone ahead and tried to get it directly from LER, and that would have had the benefit of giving LER the opportunity, you know, if it has legitimate reasons for not providing that information, like confidentiality agreements, it doesn't believe such information is relevant, go ahead and defend itself, go ahead and object, go ahead and file a motion to quash, then the Commission would have to go ahead and decide whether to seek enforcement and we could be back here in front of you with an evidentiary hearing under which LER would be able to ahead and pursue its rights. That's all been short-circuited by the process the Commission has followed

here.

The Commission could have also tried to get these documents from Laclede through LER by virtue of the affiliate transaction rule. Now, the affiliate transaction rules are rules that the Commission proposed and adopted almost ten years ago, and its purpose was to go ahead and protect utility rate payers from detrimental impacts and subsidies by making sure that if a utility like Laclede did business with an affiliate like LER, that those transactions would be priced a certain way to go ahead and prevent subsidies, primarily because they have to be priced at a market price so a utility is not overpaid or not undercollecting for what the true value of the good or service is.

And it also has very specific provisions that provide access to affiliate records and say, if you need those, to go ahead and ensure compliance with these standards and other requirements in the rules, you shall get them. Now, for the life of me, your Honor, I don't understand since this involved an affiliate transaction, it's a purchase of gas or a sale of gas between Laclede and LER, you have an affiliate transaction rule that purports to govern these specific transactions. It's an affiliate transaction rule. It's been upheld by the Supreme Court. We weren't crazy about it, didn't particularly like it, but

those are the rules and we complied with it. Why on earth wouldn't the Commission say, Okay, I've got my affiliate transaction rule, it's been upheld. Here's why this is relevant under the affiliate transaction rules, and we're going to go ahead and pursue it from you under those rules.

Instead, instead, astoundingly, they called the affiliate transaction rule a red herring, a red herring in the context of transactions that involve two affiliates. And you know, my theory on why they did that is because you can't square these information requests. And why they wanted them under the affiliate transaction rule is because they are based on a pricing standard that's not in those rules. And I just direct your attention to Tab No. 2, which includes those rules, and they go into great detail on what information has to be provided and why it has to be provided. And it just beggars the imagination that the Commission would go ahead and conclude that these rules are a red herring, it doesn't have — even have to articulate a basis as to why they're not applicable under these circumstances.

There's an alternative way that the Commission could have gotten access to LER records through Laclede that would have been through the stipulation and agreement in a holding company case that the Commission approved, once again, about ten years ago in 2001. And Laclede and

its various affiliates were reorganizing their corporate structure. And as part of that process, the Commission approved stipulation and agreement, which Ms. Heintz has referenced in her pleadings, in which they did several things.

First of all, the stipulation and agreement adopted a cost allocation manual. Just like the affiliate transaction rule, the cost allocation manual was designed to protect utility rate payers by developing specific pricing standards for governing transactions between an affiliate and a utility. It also had provisions that provided access to affiliate information to the extent necessary to demonstrate compliance with those particular pricing standards and the other requirements in the rule.

Now, once again, if the Commission wanted to get information from LER, it could have said, Well, you know, guys, you signed a stipulation and agreement here about ten years ago. We've got a valid Commission order that says that you have an obligation to provide information to the extent it's necessary to comply with the CAM. Now, why on earth, given that, would they say in their order, Well, that CAM and enforcement thereof is just a red herring.

I mean, you know, these are the very kind of transactions that this CAM and that stipulation and agreement were designed to address. Once again, I think

the Commission said that was a red herring because it knows that the various information that Staff has requested and the various adjustments it's made can't be squared with the pricing standard in that CAM. In fact, a majority of Commissioners at one time, on April 22nd, determined that all of this information was indeed irrelevant for that very reason.

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But in any event, the Commission decided I'm not going to ahead and apply the affiliate transaction rule. I'm not going to go ahead and apply the CAM or the stipulation and agreement. Those are all red herrings. I'm going to go ahead and proceed through the general rules of civil discovery. The Commission had said that, as Ms. Heintz indicated earlier, when it first granted the motion to compel for it first itself, but what she didn't mention is that in granting that initial motion to compel, the Commission, because it was proceeding under the general rules of civil discovery, clarified its order on January 21st. And that January 21st order is in Document No. 5 here, Tab 5, in which it said, of course, we mean only to the extent that they are in your possession. To this day the Commission has not altered that clarification.

It went back to the general rules of civil discovery, the November 4th order, said, let's ignore the CAM, let's ignore the affiliate transaction rule. It never

altered and it shouldn't, because that's consistent with the rules of -- general rules of civil discovery that they have to be in your possession. We have, we being Laclede Gas Company, have provided everything that's in our possession. We have indicated to the Commission that we have provided everything in our possession. And we think they have complied fully with that rule or that order as it would be reasonably construed.

The documents aren't something that Laclede Gas Company has possession, custody or control over. They belong to LER. Unlike the case that's been cited by the Commission in support of the proposition that's never been proven up in any kind of evidentiary hearing, but is based solely on a Staff recommendation. They are a separate company. They have their own fiduciary duties. We do not get to dictate to LER what documents they have to provide to us. They are not under pendage (phonetic spelling) of Laclede Gas Company and they have their own fiduciary duties to go ahead and provide information and to respond to these things in a way that they believe is appropriate and in conformance with their own corporate interest.

The fact that they have that fiduciary duty, and the regulated gas company can't be forced to go ahead and make them comply with something was recognized in a recent case involving AmerenUE. In that case, the allegation was

made that an AmerenUE affiliate should have sold gas to the utility at cost rather than a fair market price. Of course, the Commission did apply the affiliate transaction rules in that case and they determined that AmerenUE's affiliate had no obligation to go ahead and sell electricity to the utility at cost. That market price was the right price, that the directors and officers of that affiliate had a fiduciary duty to the affiliate's company and that it would have been inappropriate to go ahead and require the regulated utility to try and force the affiliate to act against its own interest and its own fiduciary duty.

And so, if you just look at that, if you look at the fact that we don't have these documents, that we don't have the legal right to get them, that we can't force LER to provide them, and that the Commission has provided absolutely nothing for your Honor to go ahead and suggest otherwise, other than to go ahead and say, Well, they have some overlapping officers and they are in the same building. You know, I can just easily say that about a case — it was, I believe, State of Missouri — excuse me. It was a Department of Revenue case and I'll find it for you, but in that particular case, the issue was could the Department of Revenue be required to go ahead and produce records in a DUI case. And the Department of Revenue said,

I don't have them. The Department of Health Services has those records.

Now, you know, those are all under the same executive, whoever the Governor was at that time. They may all be in the same building, for all I know. They all have overlapping service territories and they all serve the State of Missouri. Now, the Court recognized, you're a separate governmental entity and, therefore, I can't require that you provide records that aren't in your control and possession.

The same thing is true of us. So I think the sensible thing to do at this point from our perspective is to go ahead and tell the Commission, look, you haven't issued a subpoena. I'm not going to go ahead and get involved when you haven't even exhausted that simple administrative remedy that you said is appropriate under here. You haven't explained to me why the affiliate transaction rule which governs information in this very kind of transaction as inapplicable. Go back and look at that, if you want to go ahead and proceed under that. Look at the CAM if you want to proceed under that. But don't come to me in the first instance and say, I've got to rule upon these matters without giving the utility an opportunity to go ahead and do an evidentiary hearing.

I think the Commission said that -- the

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Commission said it was a red herring because some parties had said this was in the nature of a complaint and it really wasn't in the nature of a complaint. Well, your Honor, it had to be a complaint. They would have to have given us an evidentiary hearing. We would have been able to go ahead demonstrate, No. 1, that we had complied and, No. 2, that this wasn't within our control or possession and, therefore, we couldn't be required to go ahead and get it. And we'd also be able to go ahead and demonstrate that far from us violating the CAM, far from us violating the affiliate transaction rule, it's the Staff and its proposal in its effort to get this information that has been in violation of those.

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The Commission decided to short-circuit all of that, which basically says, we can't have a hearing, LER can't have a hearing, nobody can have any evidentiary hearing and we're going to go to you first and have you take all of that out of, you know, the Commission's hands and our hands and rule in the first instance. And I think that is backwards and there is no basis for enforcing this particular order.

THE COURT: If they had not named the Group and LER, where would we be?

MR. PENDERGAST: In this enforcement action or before?

THE COURT: In this writ application.

MR. PENDERGAST: In this writ application, I think it would be just as untenable and unlawful as I've said it is, because they still haven't explained why they should get it from Laclede Gas Company when they say the affiliate transaction rule isn't applicable, and so we have no obligation under there. When they say that the CAM and the stipulation and agreement in 2001 isn't applicable, and we have no obligation there. Then the only thing that's applicable, I guess, is the general rules of discovery.

The Commission has already said we only have to provide those to the extent they are in our possession.

And under those general rules of civil discovery, if they are not within our possession, which they are not, we have no obligation to provide them. So we have already complied and there's nothing more that I think we can be required to do.

THE COURT: Okay. I want to ask both the Group and LER to respond, but let me go back to the Commission for a second. Where would we be if you had not named the Group and LER? What -- would there be a factual issue as to whether or not they are within the custody and control of the regulated entity? Because he thinks that he's provided -- he has fully complied with the Commission's order.

MS. HEINTZ: No. Because I think that the issue of whether or not the documents are in possession of a party are -- first of all, I think it's a legal question.

And the case that I cited in my written response does a good job, I think, of laying out the standard and when those documents can be produced.

The other piece of this is that Mr. Pendergast mentioned the stipulation. And the stipulation and agreement that was entered into about ten years ago contains a provision that I cited in my petition that said, When the Commission is exercising its normal regulatory function, which is what an actual cost adjustment is, then Laclede Group, among others, and Group and the gas company and LER, can have any legal objection except objections based on relevance or that the documents are not in possession of Laclede Gas Company.

And the Commission's order of November 4th, while it said, This is not a complaint, there has been no violation or there has been no alleged violation of that stipulation, does not say, Oh, and by the way, the stipulation is out the window here and Laclede is not bound by it. That is not what the November 4, 2009 order says.

MR. PENDERGAST: And, once again, your Honor, that's just a way of circumventing the Commission's obligation to grant us a hearing if it's going to make any

kind of determination that we haven't complied with that stipulation and agreement. If you read the terms of the stipulation and agreement, before you even get to what we agreed to object on or not object on and what basis, it says — and this is in paragraph 2 on page 8 and tab 3, upon request, Laclede Gas Company and our affiliates upon written notice during its normal working hours and subject to appropriate confidentiality and discovery procedures, agree to provide all books, records and employees and its affiliates as may be reasonably required to verify compliance with the CAM and the conditions set forth in this stipulation and agreement.

You know, we talked until we were blue in the face how those information requests were inconsistent with the CAM, with the stipulation and agreement's provisions for enforcing that CAM. And during the oral argument, the first oral argument, I think what turned the Commission around on on this, and made the first majority decide that, you know, it was irrelevant was Staff counsel telling the Commission, well, you know, it doesn't really matter to us what's in the CAM, we're not paying any attention to the CAM. We think we can go ahead and proceed on whatever basis we have.

And it's just absolutely ridiculous to sit here and say I'm going to hold you to one part of this agreement

while I completely violate and ignore the other part. And while I have the Commission say that other part is a red hearing, and then, having done that, I'm going to come to Court and I'm going to ask the Court to rely on that red herring and to go ahead and enforce the order that said it was a red herring. I don't know. That just doesn't make any sense to me.

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And as far as the case that she mentioned, that's the Hancock case, that was a situation where you had an individual, an expert witness who wanted to go ahead and testify or wanted to have him testify for the plaintiff about some tests that were in the expert witness's possession. The expert witness had failed to go ahead and turn over those tests. And therefore, the court said, well, you didn't turn over the tests. You know, the plaintiff could have gotten the tests because the tests were done for the plaintiff. And, therefore, I'm going to go ahead and not allow you to move forward and use that evidence affirmatively.

Well, your Honor, we're not trying to use any of this LER evidence. We think this LER evidence is completely irrelevant. You'll never find us going before the Commission and saying, We want to go ahead and introduce that evidence because we don't think it's relevant under the Commission's affiliate transaction rule

or the CAM.

Secondly, LER and Laclede Group, they are not expert witnesses of Laclede. This information doesn't involve Laclede information, it doesn't involve tests on Laclede. Most of the information relates to sales and purchases that LER made involving third parties. They have nothing to do with Laclede. So I don't think there's one bit of applicability of that Hancock decision on this particular case.

THE COURT: Let me hear from whichever of the other two entities thinks that logically ought to go first.

MR. NIEFHOFF: Probably me, your Honor. I'm Bill Niehoff. I represent LER in this matter. And I agree, first off, with what Mike has said on behalf of Laclede Gas Company. We adopt his arguments. We did receive -- I received this morning in my home a 16-page brief from Staff on this issue that the Court has given us leave to address and we will do that.

From our perspective, it's very, very important to note these are documents that are being sought that are LER's transactions with unrelated third parties, including its suppliers, customers and pipelines. These are not documents that represent or cover transactions LER had with Laclede. To my understanding, those documents have been made available.

We believe that the order or the mandamus should not be issued because the order they are attempting to enforce as it concerns LER, there's no legal authority for that, that it would be highly burdensome and that the information sought has no relevance. And we have gone through those issues in detail in our pleadings.

I would point out that the Court, I think, has come to something I noticed in the pleadings that were filed this morning in my quick read through them, in that the Commission has on one hand said we have all the authority we need to order Laclede Gas Company to produce LER documents, and yet they joined us in this mandamus action so that this Court can make its order effective. So either they did that as an admission that they don't have the authority to order Laclede to produce LER records, or as a hedge at best. But we think that LER should not be in the case, should be dismissed from the mandamus, from this mandamus action.

We believe there's not a valid underlying order as concerns LER and that there's not -- the procedure that, as Mike has -- as Mr. Pendergast has laid out very, very well, shows that there's not a legal basis to get LER documents that are exclusively -- relate to transactions exclusively with unrelated third parties. There's no statutory authority. They haven't followed their own

rules. They haven't followed prior decisions of the Commission, as we've pointed out. And we think that this is all compelling evidence of arbitrary and capricious behavior certainly with respect to LER.

THE COURT: You wanted to in turn adopt his position that these documents could be compelled by the Commission using some other mechanism. Correct?

MR. NIEFHOFF: I would not concede that they could be compelled. I would say that that's appropriate procedure. We're not there yet. Had the Staff or the Commission issued or sought to issue a subpoena, then we have another process to go through. We have the ability on behalf of LER to make our objections, to state our positions, to brief it, maybe even have documents looked at in camera by the Court or some other fact finder and then a decision made.

This has, again, short-circuited all of that, attempting to bring us in really at the tail end of the process in a mandamus action we believe is inappropriate.

MR. DARRELL: Yes, your Honor. Mark Darrell on behalf of the Laclede Group. The Laclede Group is a publicly traded company. It owns 100 percent of the stock of Laclede Gas Company, which is — the company is regulated by the Commission, and Laclede Energy Resources, which is an unregulated marketing company that's not

regulated by the general authority of the Commission.

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Your Honor, we do not know why the Laclede Group was named as a Respondent in this proceeding. Commission has provided the Laclede Group with no notice of any legal obligations that it has in the ACA proceedings. Laclede Group is not a party to the ACA proceedings. orders as issued by the Commission in the ACA proceedings were not directed to the Laclede Group. The Laclede Group has never been ordered by the Commission to do anything in this proceedings, but yet they have come to this Court and asked the Commission to -- or asked this Court to order or to enforce an order against Laclede Gas Company, against Laclede Group, frankly, makes no sense to me. We do not believe there's any basis for us to be named as a Respondent, and we believe that this petition should be dismissed as Laclede Group.

THE COURT: If they were proceeding under the -either the other two vehicles, that would allow at least to
more directly approach LER, would those vehicles allow the
Commission to subpoena records from Group as well?

MR. DARRELL: Well, as far as I know, they are not asking for or seeking any records that we have in this matter. The records, again, as Mr. Niehoff pointed out, are records that are owned by and in the possession of LER, so I'm not sure I'm following your question exactly.

THE COURT: Well, I'm trying to figure out, I guess maybe inartfully, what documents we're talking about, where they are and whether the Commission has any relief other than the form that they are seeking.

MR. DARRELL: It would be our position, your Honor, that the Commission has ample authority to subpoena the documents from LER. Now, in prior cases and prior matters is not a factor, whereas this year the Commission issued a subpoena against Laclede Group for specific documents in another matter and we responded to that subpoena. So I'm not sure why the Commission could not do that in this instance.

THE COURT: Ms. Heintz, why is the Group necessary to make the writ effective in this case?

MS. HEINTZ: I added the Laclede Group. I don't think that they are necessary. It's in the statute that they can be — that they can be added if the Court thinks that they are necessary or proper. The statutes also say that you get to craft the relief the way you see fit. Laclede Group was added to the petition because they are the parents, first of all, of the regulated entity, and because they are parties to that stipulation and agreement. They have made that agreement again to cooperate with the Commission, to produce records, to allow access to any records. I don't think any of the records belong to the

Laclede Group in the sense that you're asking the question.

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THE COURT: Okay. So let's go back then to LER.

And if there are other mechanisms by which the Commission could have sought these documents directly rather than through the gas company, why didn't you?

MS. HEINTZ: This is a -- this is a complicated question and I hope that I will be able to explain it by using an example. First of all, in this case it's important to remember that the Commission is acting in its judicial function until we come here, and then we're a party. So the way the case proceeds when the Commission is sitting as the fact finder is largely dictated by counsel for Staff, who is not the same as counsel for the Commission, and Laclede, who are the parties of the case. And the docket sheet shows that there has been a lot of back and forth here.

But the Commission was just asked to decide whether or not the Staff's motion to compel was well grounded and that's what they did. When the argument is made, well, you didn't show a violation of the affiliate transactions rule or a violation of the CAM, well, that's not why the Commission is sitting in its fact finding role in this case. This case is to determine whether Laclede prudently incurred its gas costs for the period that's under review. That can be done without any reference to

either the CAM or the affiliate transactions rules. And here is an example of why the Commission determined that this information was relevant.

Laclede Gas Company during the relevant period purchased gas from LER. If, for example, LER sold that gas to Laclede Gas Company -- and I'm just making this number up -- for \$5 per decatherm, but they sold the same amount of gas at the same amount of time for -- you know, for another customer at \$3 a decatherm, well, then the Commission might well determine that Laclede's \$5 purchase was not prudent and that it harmed their rate payers so that Laclede Gas Company would have to adjust their rates to make up for their imprudence for that gas purchase.

So it's important for the Commission to be able to -- or the Staff in this case, I'm sorry, to be able to see not only what Laclede and LER were doing with each other, which is always, of course, a little bit of self dealings because they are affiliates, but what they were doing in the market. And it's particularly important in this case because there is no other way to see, because the St. Louis market doesn't have, unlike other markets, like the Henry hub in Louisiana or the NYMEX in New York, they don't have published indices where you can see what the price of gas is on a given day. We have to look at the actual transactions that occurred.

THE COURT: And let me just follow up here.

Before the Commission, who has the burden of proving that it was prudent?

MS. HEINTZ: Staff. In fact, Laclede has a presumption in their favor, and I've cited this case law in my memoranda, that they -- it is presumed that their purchases were prudent. So Staff, in the event that they recommend a disallowance, which we haven't even reached that point yet, but if they recommend a disallowance, they have to overcome -- they have to produce evidence to overcome the presumption of prudence. That's where the burden of proof will be.

THE COURT: And so the discovery that Staff sought originally was to see whether or not there was evidence between LER and third parties that you could use then to overcome that?

MS. HEINTZ: That they could use for this case, yes.

THE COURT: Well, that either they would use or if it was --

MS. HEINTZ: And the Commission could rely on it, correct.

THE COURT: And in the most recent Commission order that was talking about -- that was limited to the documents that the gas company had, was it not clear at

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transactions that didn't involve the gas company and, therefore, were not at all going to be in their records? MS. HEINTZ: I'm not -- I'm sorry. At what point?

that point that the documents that we're now talking about

were not -- were in the possession of LER and dealt with

THE COURT: Whichever order it is that would underlie the request for the writ, which I am assuming that's the way this normally happens, is they issue an order. And then to the extent that it's not complied with, then you seek a writ based on the particular order. that's why I tried to identify the most recent in time order.

MS. HEINTZ: Right. That would be the November 4th order, except -- well, that's not most recent in time order, because we have had the motion to reconsider and to show cause and all that since then. But when the Commission issued its November 4th, 2009 order, it knew that the documents were LER documents rather than Laclede Gas Company documents.

THE COURT: And what about when they dealt with the show cause issue?

> MS. HEINTZ: Yes.

THE COURT: And so am I -- what can I conclude then from their unwillingness to overtly require anybody

but the gas company to produce them? I mean, it doesn't seem when they took up the -- either the show cause or the clarification -- in other words, none of this is new. So what is it that the Commission -- what can I infer that the Commission concluded about the propriety of having these other companies directly compelled to produce these?

MS. HEINTZ: It's not new, but what is new -the facts are not new and the Commission knew when it
issued its order. But what's new is when we come into
court, we have this statute and the statute is, you know,
it's a statute that allows us to obtain enforcement of our
order in the circuit court and it contains a provision
where you, as the fact finder in this case, can decide that
certain parties are necessary or proper.

THE COURT: But only to enforce -- only to make effective my writ compelling compliance with the Commission's order.

MS. HEINTZ: Right.

THE COURT: So if the Commission's order is only this big, then I can only bring in new parties and craft my relief to do that much or less. It would seem to me that you're asking for me to issue a writ requiring more than the Commission did, which I'm not sure I'm entitled to do, I'm not sure I'm authorized to do.

MS. HEINTZ: I don't think that that's true.

And I don't think that's what the Commission's writ petition was intended to do. Again, as I said, we have gone through this ad nauseam at the Commission level.

THE COURT: I certainly get that sense.

MS. HEINTZ: And so we need — something has to give at this point. And if what the Commission needs in order to make Laclede Gas Company produce these documents is an order compelling Laclede Gas to produce these documents and they are going to need the cooperation of their affiliated companies to do that, then I think it is within the Court's authority to issue that order.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Pendergast?

MR. PENDERGAST: Just very briefly, I don't think anything Ms. Heintz has said in any way disturbs the basic point that you have subpoena powers. You can go ahead and pursue this directly. You know, she complains about the fact that this has gone on ad nauseam. I agree. It's been, like, over a year and a half, I think, since they first asked for this information. Why in that year and a half they have never taken the simple step of issuing a subpoena to LER and say, I want this information, I do not know. Particularly since the Commission said that's the vehicle that we ought to be pursuing.

THE COURT: Can they do that, though, without bringing -- without -- and, again, I don't do PSC practice

so I may not use the right words -- but without opening up a matter under the affiliate transaction rule or -- and can they do it without opening up -- you know, can they do it in context of the purchased gas adjustment?

MR. PENDERGAST: Sure, they can. They can issue a subpoena to any corporation. The issue, as Mr. Niehoff indicated, is whether or not that subpoena is appropriate and whether or not whoever it's being issued to has lawful objections and offenses to it is a different matter, but they can do that and they have done it in other proceedings involving us. I think one of them has been an ACA.

And, once again, I don't know why they haven't done it, because that's the way to go ahead and comply with what the Commission said is the appropriate route. And regardless of whether the Staff brought this up, the Commission is the custodian of its own rules. And, you know, the KCPL case, Staff was pursuing something different there, and the Commission said, wait a minute, there's a way you have to do this when you have a non-party or it's a non-contested case and that you have to issue a subpoena. And, you know, quite frankly, they should have done the same thing here. Why they haven't and why the Staff hasn't pursued that approach, I don't know.

As far as why they need this information, look, if the affiliate transaction rule was insufficient, if it

wasn't, you know, up to the task of covering this particular transaction, at the very least I would expect to see something in the Commission's order along the lines of what Ms. Heintz has just argued. Instead, you just have this summary dismissal. It's a red hearing. We're not going to talk about it. We're not going to say why it's inapplicable, we're not going to say why it doesn't do the job, why we need additional information. Forget about it. We're not even going to go ahead and talk about it.

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And I think when you're an administrative agency and you have passed very detailed rules that set out how these transactions are going to be priced and you're supposed to go ahead and get affiliate records, to simply dismiss it in that kind of summary fashion, you know, it's just completely arbitrary. It's completely capricious. And it's not the kind of order that you should have to rely on to go ahead and say, I'm going to intervene now and order you to provide this information. I mean, if they think that's the case, then they ought to articulate that in an order. In fact, they ought to go ahead and have some kind of hearing so we can go ahead and challenge it, but at least they ought to articulate an order and then we'd have something to talk about.

As far as the St. Louis market, we provided information on the St. Louis market. We worked with LER

to go ahead and make some of the information available on the St. Louis market that we thought was relevant. During oral arguments, the Staff just basically said, Oh, well, you know, that doesn't do the job for us. That's nothing we really want to take a look at.

And so I'm not sure what it takes to go ahead and satisfy these folks. What they are asking for is every sales transaction that LER had with every third party whether it was in the St. Louis market or whether it was someplace else in Illinois, you know, wherever. And every purchase they made regardless of what state it was made in and regardless of who it was for.

THE COURT: But it sounds to me like the Commission said and they can have it, to the extent you have it.

MR. PENDERGAST: And the Commission said to the extent it's in your possession, they can have it. So we said, Okay, to the extent it's in our possession, we'll turn it over. We have turned it over. We have complied with it. And I just don't think there's anything more to require of Laclede Gas Company under these circumstances.

THE COURT: Mr. Pendergast, in his first iteration here referenced that there had been -- that at one point, a majority of the Commission had determined the documents not to be relevant. Did I recall that? What was

he referring to, do you think, and is that an accurate assessment of what happened?

MS. HEINTZ: When the Commission -- gosh. There was -- the first order granting the motion to compel, which was unanimous. There was then reconsideration. There was oral arguments. The Commission issued its January 21st, 2009 order. I think there might have been -- no, the first oral argument happened in March. And in April, the Commission split, I think it was 3/2, and said the original motion to compel is withdrawn. We withdraw our grant of that motion.

Staff at that point, and I believe maybe public counsel, asked to reconsider that. There was another oral argument in September. And the Commission then changed its mind again by a 3/2 majority and said, you're right, it was relevant and you should produce the documents. That was the November -- that was the November 9th order.

THE COURT: Was the scope of the subpoena changing in this or simply the threat of what the Commission was willing to compel?

In other words, is the underlying request the same?

MS. HEINTZ: The underlying requests are the same.

THE COURT: So the Commission unanimously

ordered --

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MS. HEINTZ: Granted the first motion. Granted the motion to compel in the first instance.

THE COURT: Three to two denied the motion to compel?

MS. HEINTZ: Right.

THE COURT: Upon reconsideration and three to two granting the motion to compel upon further reconsideration?

MS. HEINTZ: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PENDERGAST: And, your Honor, the only clarification I would offer to that is that the Commission's order of clarification on January 21st has never been changed. Never was challenged. That was unanimous as well. And in that particular order, they indicated that we only had to provide the documents to the extent they were in our possession. And once again, we have complied with that. And then it was after --

THE COURT: Now, Ms. Heintz, will you agree with that, that the clarification from January of '09 still attaches, even though we've gone in and out of motion to compel world, but the most recent order compelling production is clarified by this statement in January of '09?

MS. HEINTZ: No. I disagree with that because the order that that -- that the January 29th order was clarifying is no longer a valid order.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HEINTZ: And so we have now is the November 4th, 2009 order, which is a different order than the one that was -- I'm sorry -- that was clarified.

MR. PENDERGAST: And, your Honor, I think that hits the nub of it, the whole custody, control and possession issue. In this whole series of Commission orders, the only thing that ever addresses that particular issue is the January 21st order. When the Commission came back after reversing itself from having determined that these documents were irrelevant under the affiliate transaction rule and the CAM, it went ahead and decided three to two that that information should be provided.

It did not alter the possession language of the earlier one. It did not go ahead and make a finding that Laclede was in possession, custody and control of it.

We've never had a hearing to determine whether we were in custody and control of it. In fact, Ms. Heintz is here today wanting your Honor to make that determination without any evidentiary basis whatsoever. And nothing other than the Staff assertion based on some conclusory comments about the fact that we share a common office and we have some

overlapping directors that we are.

And so, you know, what we have is an unchallenged Commission order saying that we only have to provide what's in our possession and absolutely nothing to go ahead and suggest that it isn't or it is.

MS. HEINTZ: Your Honor, I don't believe that Laclede has actually raised lack of possession as an issue. I don't think they argued that in front of the Commission. And, again, the stipulation and agreement bars them from doing so. There are three separate provisions in that agreement. One relates to the CAM and access to information under the CAM, which incidentally Laclede — we're not here to argue this — but they never actually submitted that to the Commission for approval. They have one. It's a procedural manual for Laclede's employees, but we have not approved it. The Commission has not approved that CAM.

The second relates to information about employees, and the third relates to the Commission's regulatory function, and that is where the waiver of the defense of lack of possession comes in with regard to the Commission's regular regulatory functions.

MR. PENDERGAST: And, your Honor, I just have to say, the Commission approved the CAM. You know, it was in draft form at the time. But my recollection is when we had

the holding company docket, it approved it. It was the Staff that went ahead and proposed the CAM. In proposing the CAM, the Staff of the Commission said, this is what we really need to go ahead and protect rate payers when we have transactions between the utility and its affiliates.

Okay. We had transactions between the utility and affiliate. And now for the Commission to go ahead and say, I'm going to summarily dismiss that, I don't care what's in it. I don't care what the pricing standards are. I'm not going to pay any attention to it, as counsel for the Staff said during the first oral argument, well, you know, I think the Commission just looked at that and said, wait a minute, this is a document that we approved, that we authorized the company to develop, that you guys have basically proposed, you being the Staff, and now you're telling us you're not going to pay any attention to it.

And, you know, this whole thing in the order about I'm just going to go ahead and say it's a red hearing, the affiliate transaction rule is a red herring.

I'm trying to go ahead and get this information through the general rules of discovery. You know, leave aside all my substantive rules for dealing with affiliate transactions, which is what's at issue here. Okay, fine. If that's what you're going to do, then kind of cue to the rules of discovery and if we're not in possession and control and

custody of it, which we're not, and which you never found that we are. In fact, the only thing you said is, you know, to the extent that you're in possession, it's in your possession, provide it. To the extent you're not, you don't have to. You know, I think the matter is closed.

I don't think having said enforcement of that agreement is a red hearing and we're not going talk about it, we're not going to talk about whether you've complied with it. And then have counsel for the Commission to come in and say, I want you, your Honor, to rely on that agreement that we said was a red herring, to go ahead and enforce the order that said it was a red herring, I just don't see how that adds up. I really don't.

THE COURT: Let's talk about schedules. If I were to dismiss -- if I were to deny the motion to dismiss on one or both parties, is there anything that the party that would be left -- and assume I deny it for both of you. Is there anything that would need to be decided from your perspective before the Court rules on the underlying petition for the writ?

In other words, is there anything in the way of an answer or factual issues that you think need to be resolved, or when I leave here today is -- even if I deny your motion, can I take your responses to be your response to the writ as well, to the petition for a writ?

MR. NIEHOFF: And I don't want to speak for both entities. There are differences. I would say, from LER's perspective, I think were some new issues particularly with respect to control, whether having the same registered agent, the same corporate address in a 20-something-story building and a common officer is enough control, that would be an issue that, you know, may need to be explored factually before the Court could rule that Laclede was in possession of LER documents.

Without the benefit of having been able to go through the pleading that I received this morning in detail, there may be more. And we certainly would like to file a response to that in any event to point some of the other deficiencies out.

THE COURT: All right. At a minimum do I have an answer to the petition from the gas company?

MR. PENDERGAST: You do.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DARRELL: Your Honor, with respect to

Laclede Group, I don't -- again, as Mr. Niehoff pointed

out, I too received the Staff's or the Commission's

pleadings this morning, and I've only had a cursory

opportunity to review it. I'm not aware of any other

issues that I've got with respect to this matter that I

would need to present additional authority to represent it.

I think our position is pretty straightforward. If you deny the motion to dismiss, I'm not sure exactly where that leaves us, but since we don't have a Commission order pending against us, I don't know if I understand that, so . . .

THE COURT: Well, if there is any light to be shed in the cases, I assume you would have already done so, about expanding the -- adding to the list of parties and at this stage you were not before the Commission when it entered the order that is the underlying order, so -- Ms. Heintz?

MS. HEINTZ: When I looked at the case law under 360, there were no cases that addressed that issue.

THE COURT: How long have we been doing purchase gas adjustments?

MS. HEINTZ: I think Laclede has had their PGA since 1962. A good long while.

THE COURT: I'm trying to figure out why this little brush fire started now and why we are dealing in such an unchartered territory. Anybody?

MS. HEINTZ: In transactions, the kinds of transactions that the Staff is interested in here, I think only took place during this limited review period, is what I believe the answer to that question is.

MR. PENDERGAST: From our perspective, your

Honor, the reason this proceeding has developed as it has and why we're here today is because we sincerely believe that the Staff and Commission has proposed disallowances and sought information based on pricing standards that are nowhere to be found in the affiliate transaction rule.

Nowhere to be found in the CAM. The majority of the Commissioners agreed with that at one point before proceedings were delayed and another Commissioner came on board. It is a standard that would preclude those transactions even taking place.

The Commission has an obligation to implement and enforce its own rules. I think it's had an abject failure doing that. It's tried to avoid it by saying these rules that are so seemingly applicable are just a red herring and the CAM that's so seemingly applicable is a red herring. And I guess my only question as far as what further needs to be done, you know, and the process for hearing these are rather vague.

But we haven't been given our evidentiary
hearing in front of the Commission. They scripted things
so that we don't get an evidentiary hearing showing that we
violated anything, that we've rendered an obligation that
we haven't met. And obviously we haven't had an
evidentiary hearing here either. And I guess my only
question would be, if the Commission's not going to be

compelled to follow its own procedures and provide those kind of hearings, do we get a hearing here on these particular issues?

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Because I think, you know, there is a real dispute. We don't believe that these are in our possession, custody and control. We don't believe a factual foundation has been laid for that. And, you know, if the thing's not going to be sent down to the Commission and say, you know, do your job and, you know, provide me with an evidentiary foundation or at least findings of fact that address these issues, do we need to address them here in court?

THE COURT: If I denied it, because I didn't feel that the first subsection of 360 had been met, there was an order sufficient to grant a writ to compel performance, that was my next question. That then puts this where it was before you filed it, which is they have — the Commission has its own motion to compel out there and they have either exhausted their remedies or they have got additional remedies, which would include, I imagine, adding one or the other of you to its subpoena or finding that, as a matter of fact, that you do have and that you haven't complied.

Ordinarily, in a motion to compel in normal civil practice, although it's usually assumed, there is a

finding that you haven't complied, which I don't think has been made here.

MS. HEINTZ: The Commission did issue -- when it issued its show-cause order, and Laclede responded to that, the Commission, when it denied Laclede's response, did find that there had -- there was still a lack of compliance.

MR. PENDERGAST: We went ahead and said we have complied on the information, and the Staff made an assertion that Laclede has not or refuses to comply. We asked for a hearing to go ahead and demonstrate to the Commission that we had complied. That wasn't afforded us. And based on nothing the but unsworn allegations made by Staff counsel, the Commission made a finding for which it has no evidentiary foundation at all.

THE COURT: Well, suppose -- no. Let's not go there.

Ms. Heintz, am I -- have I followed this accurately that the reason you're not -- the reason that the affiliate transaction rule and the CAM are red herrings is that whether they have been complied with or not, the Staff's position is that you may still be able to show that the price they paid was imprudent, even if it complied with these other regulatory mechanisms?

MS. HEINTZ: There doesn't need to be a violation of the affiliate transactions rule for there to

be imprudence, yes.

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THE COURT: And is the Staff entitled to seek documents under the affiliate transaction rule without there being an allegation at least that it hadn't been complied with?

MS. HEINTZ: Under the affiliate transactions rules, could they seek the documents? They didn't. That would be a different case. I mean, yes, I think if Staff brought a complaint that said that Laclede has violated the affiliate transaction rules, they could then obtain the information. They haven't made such an allegation here. They haven't filed such a complaint, so they didn't seek the information under the affiliate transaction rules because they don't have to.

THE COURT: That's what I'm asking. Can they seek it under the affiliate transactions rule --

MS. HEINTZ: And it's a different case.

THE COURT: -- without bringing a case that alleges a violation?

MS. HEINTZ: I don't believe so.

MR. PENDERGAST: Your Honor, I think they could. I think as long as they followed what the rule says and the information they are seeking from the affiliate is necessary to show compliance with the pricing standards and the rule and the other requirements, they are free to do

that. In fact, we have to go ahead and file an annual report and make information available to the Commission that shows, you know, how we complied with it, what our transactions have been, and why those transaction are appropriate.

We also provided a significant amount of other information. And, once again, if the rule was insufficient to go ahead and protect the customers, if there was something missing, you know, something could have still been improved even if you were in complete compliance with the rule, I think the Commission had an obligation to articulate how that could be so. I think it had an obligation to say, well, you know, proceeding through the affiliate transaction rule, even though it seemingly covers this, just won't do the job and here's why. And instead, all you get in the order is, well, it's a red herring and we're just going to say we're going to go under the general rules of discovery.

And I think, once again, if you promulgated rules like that, that detail is purported to cover those kind of things, you have some kind of obligation if you're going to jettison them and say they are a red herring to explain why. And I don't think you will find anything in the Commission's order that even approaches doing that.

Same thing with the CAM that we were operating

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under that the Commission Staff proposed and the Commission approved, at least in form, draft form as part of that holding company docket. I just think an administrative agency has to go ahead and first deal with its own rules and explain to the world and to the judges that have to review it why, you know, these seemingly applicable rules aren't.

THE COURT: Yes. I'm not unsympathetic to that logic. The problem is I'd much rather deal with that in a case where they have determined, notwithstanding the compliance, that your purchased gas adjustment would be X instead of Y. I don't want to do it in a discovery battle, which is not my discovery. So the -- if the Commission at least has not foreclosed the possibility that the Staff can prove imprudence without needing to prove a violation, then I'm not inclined to trump them on that in the broad world of discovery.

It may be that this comes back and the argument then you will make is, they are not allowed to assert the imprudence without a violation, then I think your whole argument about the proper conduct of a regulatory body should have a lot more weight. At least that's the normal time in which you would -- you would review this, if the court of appeals doesn't review the decisions I make about what's a proper cause of action and the context of

discovery writs. They just get to say denied, so you don't know what they think.

But I assume this. But I would much rather have this case come up where I've awarded, you know, judgment for somebody on the ground and then they will decide whether it's a proper ground.

MR. PENDERGAST: And quite frankly, I don't think you have to reach those issues. I don't think you have to get to them.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PENDERGAST: But what I -- you know, that's just by way of background, and where we are and why it's developed the way it has. But I do think that if they're going to proceed under some other basis than just the general rules of civil discovery, that they have to comply with those rules.

And, once again, you know, they have made no showing that these are in the possession of Laclede Gas Company and their custody and control. The only thing they have ever said is, if it's not in our possession, we don't have to go ahead and provide it. And I think having you try and enforce something where they haven't made any kind of finding like that and where we say we have complied, without any evidence to the contrary and where they haven't sought administrative remedies like issuing a subpoena and

there's still been no explanation provided as to why they haven't done that, I think it's premature to go ahead and enforce that order.

THE COURT: What happens if the -- what's the mechanism for enforcing a writ in this case of mandamus that's not complied with or that you don't think is complied with?

Suppose I issued a writ of mandamus to the gas company only that says exactly no more and no less than the Commission said in its last order, where would we be?

MR. PENDERGAST: Well, we'd probably be asking for a stay so we could go ahead and seek judicial review.

THE COURT: But surely 360 would allow me to issue that writ against you only.

MR. PENDERGAST: Well, I think arguably it would allow it. I might not agree with the propriety of the writ, but -- and then, you know, I guess we would have to go ahead and look at whether to pursue judicial review of that. And --

THE COURT: Not that I would mind that but, I mean, ordinarily that's what 360 would allow me to do, is if I got an order from the Commission, I can mail it out to you if there were a writ of mandamus at the tip of it. So now it's a court order instead of just the Commission.

MR. PENDERGAST: And assuming it went back to

the Commission, that would put us in the unenviable position of trying to go ahead and somehow get documents that aren't in our possession, put us in the unenviable position of trying to go ahead and somehow require a separate company to go ahead and furnish us with documents.

THE COURT: Suppose you refuse to do that?

Suppose you say, Look, I've given you everything I have custody and control of. Is the remedy contempt?

MR. PENDERGAST: Well, then I think the Commission can come back to court and seek penalties.

THE COURT: Move for contempt for your failure to comply with the writ, your defense would be, I've complied with the writ, and we would be in the factual hearing that you say today you haven't gotten?

MR. PENDERGAST: Yeah. We would be in that, only there might be some penalties at issue under those circumstances.

THE COURT: I don't know, but that's certainly only in the common law context of -- well, before I get too far ahead of myself, does 360 provide penalties in the case of non-compliance or no?

MS. HEINTZ: No. We have a different statute, 386.600 that provides for penalties.

THE COURT: Of a writ?

MS. HEINTZ: No. Well, of --

THE COURT: I mean, ordinarily if you violate --

MS. HEINTZ: Right.

THE COURT: The Court's remedy for the Court's writ would be whatever I decide it would be. And in this case certainly -- I'm trying to figure out when that issue of custody and control is going to get litigated.

MR. PENDERGAST: Right. Yeah. And I suppose that if you were to issue a writ like that and we were to respond that it's not within our, you know, possession, custody and control, we would be back here talking about it and maybe having an evidentiary hearing.

MR. NIEHOFF: The one point I might make is I think that counsel said she thought it was legal issue. I think there's factual — I think there's a substantial factual underlying of that and there may be time to build in an actual hearing to determine what the scope of custody and control is, rather than, you know, a sentence and a brief.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, we're way outside of the normal procedure here for this particular type of action. So I'm thrashing around a little bit to try and find a way to respond. And this is assuming that I'm not going to go 100 percent your way or 100 percent your way.

So the other thing that normally we would do with other types of writs is issue a show-cause order

before I issue the writ, which allows you to establish compliance without the writ ever having been issued. And that's not the normal process. It's not even a good process, frankly, in this situation or in this normal procedure, but it might — doesn't seem to be completely out of line here because there was a show-cause proceeding below, but I don't have much of a record of what was or wasn't determined in it, other than that you, you know — usually if you do a show-cause order and the party fails to show cause, then you do something.

And so that's the piece of this puzzle that I don't think I have. They didn't do anything after the failure to show cause. They didn't issue any other orders.

MS. HEINTZ: They did. That was the order then telling us to go get the writ. I think that's part of the record.

THE COURT: Yeah, but that -- it didn't have factual findings of the sort that we're talking about here, correct? And that's the order I need to read again, obviously, because that's the --

MS. HEINTZ: So do I obviously. I'm not having recall of it now. I think it was very short and I don't believe that it had findings of fact and conclusions of law like a normal Commission order does. But, of course, from the Commission's point of view, this is an interlocutory

order, and I cited that case law in my memoranda about how in discovery orders, you don't get the same sort of review that you do -- that Laclede will, in fact, be entitled to whenever the Commission can decide this issue on the ACA case that we've still got kicking around down there.

MR. PENDERGAST: The order still has to be, I think, valid and not require us to do something that's beyond our power to do, your Honor.

MR. NIEFHOFF: And the last thing I'll say on behalf of LER, that this is all ending up on us with the cost expense, the invasion of the confidentiality of records that they maintain all for transactions that do not relate to anything it did with Laclede. And we have outlined some of that expense. There will be significant expense, disruptions for information that is not going to be relevant or useful in any regulatory proceeding.

THE COURT: All right. I'll give you the last word if you want it.

MS. HEINTZ: You've already heard quite a lot.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. HEINTZ: The relevance determination has been made by the Commission. I gave you that example. And I think the relief that Laclede is intimating as a part of all of this, the idea that we've alleged that the violation of the affiliate transactions rule or we've alleged a

violation of stipulation and agreement, those are things that are not at issue here. The sole issue is this 2 underlying ACA case. And I guess, the Commission's 3 position is that it is permitted to require this type of 4 discovery in that case. 5 6 THE COURT: How long would the Respondents like to respond to the memorandum this morning? No. It was 7 8 yesterday. In any event --Well, it was --9 MR. NIEFHOFF: 10 THE COURT: -- the Commission's --MR. NIEHOFF: -- after business hours. 11 MS. HEINTZ: I faxed it late yesterday 12 13 afternoon. That's all right. I think I would 14 THE COURT: 15 benefit from your having an opportunity to respond to this, but without belaboring the issue, how long will it take? 16 17 MR. NIEHOFF: Fourteen days, is that too much? I don't know if we need that much. 18 MR. DARRELL: 19 Ten days? 20 MR. NIEFHOFF: Ten days. 21 THE COURT: There's one for you, and one for the 22 two of you. 23 MR. NIEFHOFF: I think we can do this in ten We'll try to focus on the -- we'll try to keep it 24

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short.

THE COURT: I would like to have those then by the 25th.

And then would the PSC like time to reply? And you pretty well briefed it. I did have an opportunity to read these. But if you would like time to reply.

MS. HEINTZ: I would like -- not knowing what they are going to say, I would like the opportunity to respond since I am the relator here.

THE COURT: Yes. Let's do this then. The Respondents have to the 25th --

MS. HEINTZ: I am out of town until June 2nd.

I'll be back in the office on the 3rd. So if I could have until the Friday of the week of Memorial Day.

THE COURT: What is the date of that?

MS. HEINTZ: June 4th.

THE COURT: So the Respondents have until the 25th to file replies to the Petitioner's opposition of their motions to dismiss. Then the last briefing will be on or before June 4th. Petitioner will have an opportunity to file a reply in support of its petition.

MR. PENDERGAST: Your Honor, would it be at all helpful to file proposed orders?

THE COURT: I hate to assign those because it's -- a lot of times unless we're in complete agreement in our thoughts, it's not worth a lot of your time. On the

other hand, I don't ever refuse them. So if you would like to, I tell you I'm inclined to take the very narrowest route I can find here, because the world is not going to be well served by having the Cole County Circuit Court delving into the minutia of PSC practice. The statutes don't ordinarily require it and we don't ordinarily do it.

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If we let the reviewing court get involved in the process business, I think that's a bad -- you know, I am inclined to delve into that as the court of appeals is in my discovery. So it's not to say never, but it's going to be the narrowest extent that I can find a way to do.

orders, that's the narrow order I'll be looking for. And so I'll do a docket entry that reads that Respondents have until the 25th to file replies, and by June 4th, the petitioner will file a reply in support of its petition.

And at that point, the Court will take both the motions and the petition itself under submission.

MS. HEINTZ: Your Honor, I did bring -- they are in the record. I filed them with my petition. I did bring copies of my exhibits. Would you like to have a copy for yourself?

THE COURT: I would, yes. It's very difficult to break them out of these things and get them back in. Thank you all.

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

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I, Mindy S. Hunt, Certified Court Reporter,
hereby certify that I was the official court reporter for
Division II of the Circuit Court of the County of Cole,
State of Missouri; that on the 11th day of May, 2010, I was
present and reported all the proceedings had in the case of
Missouri Public Service Commission, Plaintiff, versus
Laclede Gas, Group and Energy, Defendants, Cause No.
10AC-CC00170; and I further certify that the foregoing
pages contain a true and accurate reproduction of the
proceedings had on that date.

Mindy S. Hunt, CCR #840

Official Court Reporter

Nineteenth Judicial Circuit

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