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MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CASE NO.: EM-2017-0226, et al.

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

KEVIN E. BRYANT

ON BEHALF OF

GREAT PLAINS ENERGY INCORPORATED KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY KCP&L GREATER MISSOURI OPERATIONS COMPANY

Kansas City, Missouri March 2017

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Case No. EM-2017-0226, et al.

I. Introduction and Purpose

1	Q:	Please state your name and business address.
2	A:	My name is Kevin E. Bryant. My business address is 1200 Main Street, Kansas City,
3		Missouri 64105.
4	Q:	Are you the same Kevin E. Bryant that provided direct testimony on behalf of Great
5		Plains Energy ("GPE"), Kansas City Power & Light Company ("KCP&L") and
6		KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations ("GMO") ¹ in this case?
7	A:	Yes, I am.
8	Q:	What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?
9	A:	The purpose of my Surrebuttal testimony is to respond to the rebuttal testimony of
10		Midwest Energy Consumers Group ("MECG") witness Gorman and City of
11		Independence ("Independence") witness Herz regarding financial aspects of the proposed
12		acquisition of Westar by GPE (the "Transaction"). I will also provide updates with
13		respect to the financing of the Transaction and the financial and ring-fencing conditions
14		agreed to by GPE, KCP&L and GMO.
15	Q:	How is the remainder of your Surrebuttal testimony organized?
16	A:	My surrebuttal testimony is structured as follows:

¹ GPE, KCP&L, and GMO filed the Application for Limited Variance from Affiliate Transactions Rule (Case No. EE-2017-0113) and GPE filed the Application for Transaction Approval (Case No. EM-2017-0226). These cases have been consolidated. KCP&L and GMO are the "operating utilities."

1		• Section II provides an update on progress made in the Transaction to-date and the
2		financial conditions agreed to by GPE;
3		• Section III provides an overview of my surrebuttal testimony and summarizes the
4		key conclusions I reach;
5		• Section IV responds to Mr. Gorman's and Mr. Herz's testimony regarding the
6		reasonableness of the purchase price;
7		• Section V responds to Mr. Gorman's testimony regarding the capital market
8		reaction to the Transaction;
9		• Section VI responds to Mr. Gorman and Mr. Herz regarding the effect of the
10		Transaction on the going-forward financial condition and cost of capital of
11		KCP&L and GMO; and
12		• Section VII summarizes my conclusions and recommendations.
13		II. Transaction Updates
14	Q:	Mr. Gorman discusses the capital market reaction to the Transaction ² , leaving the
15		impression that it has been generally unfavorable. Do you agree, and what steps has
16		GPE taken since the merger announcement to advance the financing of the
17		Transaction?
18	A:	No, I don't agree. Within a week of the merger announcement, on June 6, 2016, GPE
19		entered into \$4.4 billion of interest rate swaps to hedge against potentially higher interest
20		rates on long-term debt that will be issued to fund the Transaction. These swaps protect

² Gorman Rebuttal, pp. 9-17. Note: All cites are to the March 23, 2017 Michael P. Gorman Rebuttal testimony filed in EM-2017-0226 *et al.*, based upon representations of MECG counsel that this is the only Gorman Rebuttal that will be offered into evidence.

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us against the possibility of having to fund the debt portion of the acquisition at higher rates.

On September 26, 2016 at special shareholder meetings held by both Westar and GPE, shareholders overwhelmingly supported the Transaction with over 92% of votes cast by GPE existing shareholders and over 95% of votes cast by Westar existing shareholders in favor the Transaction. GPE has a strong, sophisticated and informed institutional shareholder base. In fact, institutional shareholders own approximately 85% of GPE's common equity, and the vast majority voted in favor of the transaction.

9 The day after the shareholder vote, support for the Transaction was further 10 validated when GPE successfully issued \$1.6 billion of common stock and \$863 million 11 of mandatory convertible preferred stock to the public markets. Both of these offerings 12 were approximately two times oversubscribed (in other words demand for both securities 13 exceeded the offerings by approximately 100%) with approximately 60 institutional 14 investors with sizable and diverse investment portfolios participating in each offering. 15 The successful completion of these equity issuances demonstrates the favorable view of 16 the Transaction by some of the most sophisticated investors in the world.

17 Q: Has GPE issued long-term debt financing for the Transaction?

18 A: Yes. On March 6, 2017, Great Plains Energy ("GPE") priced \$4.3 billion of senior
19 notes. These notes comprised the following amounts, rates and maturity:

- \$750 million at a coupon of 2.50% maturing in 2020;
- \$1.15 billion at a coupon of 3.15% maturing in 2022;
- \$1.4 billion at a coupon of 3.90% maturing in 2027; and
- \$1 billion a coupon of at 4.85% maturing in 2047.

1 This completes GPE's remaining Transaction financing and results in Transaction debt 2 with a weighted average interest rate of 3.68% and a weighted average maturity of 12.1 3 years. GPE's actual Transaction debt compares favorably to the assumptions in GPE's 4 financial modeling because: (1) the total amount of GPE's Transaction debt of \$4.3 5 billion is lower than the \$4.325 billion assumed in the financial modeling; (2) the actual 6 weighted average interest rate of GPE's Transaction debt of 3.68% is lower than the 7 3.95% assumed in the financial modeling; and (3) the weighted average maturity of 8 GPE's Transaction debt of 12.1 years is longer than the 6.7 year weighted average 9 maturity assumed in the financial modeling. The order book finished approximately 5.8x 10 times oversubscribed with nearly \$25 billion of orders from numerous recognizable, high 11 quality participants. Proceeds from the financing will be used to finance a portion of the 12 cash consideration for GPE's proposed acquisition of Westar.

13 Q: What is the importance of these financing activities?

14 A: They remove financing execution risk and position GPE to unlock the billions of dollars 15 of efficiencies and customer savings that will result from the Transaction. With the debt 16 issuances completed on more favorable terms than those assumed in GPE's financial 17 modeling, Transaction value is protected. And with equity market risk the largest 18 variable to complete this Transaction, we made it a priority to prudently execute equity 19 financing and eliminate this risk at the earliest point possible. Given this priority, the 20 successful common stock and mandatory convertible preferred stock offerings reduce 21 financial execution risk and highlight the overwhelming support GPE received from both 22 sophisticated existing shareholders and new equity investors. These investors are

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supportive of GPE's financing structure and are enthusiastic about the benefits of the proposed merger.

3 Q: Have GPE, KCP&L and GMO expanded their Transaction-related commitments 4 since filing the Joint Application?

5 Yes. As discussed by Mr. Ives in his surrebuttal testimony, on October 26, 2016 GPE, A: 6 KCP&L and GMO together with the Office of Public Counsel ("OPC") entered into a 7 Stipulation and Agreement ("OPC S&A") pursuant to which they recommend that the 8 Commission approve the Transaction. In concert with the Stipulation and Agreement 9 between GPE, KCP&L, GMO and the Commission Staff ("Staff") ("Staff S&A"), the 10 OPC S&A expands the financial and ring-fencing commitments as originally set forth in 11 Exhibit B to the Agreement and Plan of Merger ("Agreement"). Further, as discussed by 12 Mr. Ives in his surrebuttal testimony, we also propose to adopt commitments made in the 13 KCC proceeding which are relevant to our Missouri operations and customers and 14 include a number of supplemental ring-fencing measures ("Supplemental Commitments") 15 (see Schedule DRI-4). These commitments provide customers with a greater degree of 16 protection than exists today. The Commission can be confident that customers are not 17 affected by the financing activity of GPE.

Q: What is the importance of the progress made by GPE in financing the Transaction and expanding its financial commitments to KCP&L, GMO and their Missouri customers?

A: With respect to financing the Transaction, the progress we have made is consistent with
the financing plan we outlined when the Transaction was announced on May 31, 2016
and reinforces our commitment and ability to execute this plan in a prudent manner that

manages and eliminates risk as early as possible along the way. With respect to the
expansion of the financial and ring-fencing commitments, the Stipulations and
Agreements ensure that KCP&L, GMO and their Missouri customers will benefit from
the Transaction and be protected from potential future risk. Collectively, this progress
will benefit customers in that it advances GPE towards a merged company where
customers will directly benefit through the billions of dollars of savings the Transaction
offers with appropriate protections for customers.

8

III. Overview and Key Conclusions

9 Q: Please summarize the positions of Mr. Gorman and Mr. Herz that you will be 10 responding to.

11 Mr. Gorman is "generally supportive" of the Stipulations and Agreements and proposes A: 12 three "additional" merger conditions that are intended to address Mr. Gorman's concern 13 with respect to potential credit rating downgrades for the utility operating subsidiaries as 14 a result of the leverage at the parent company to finance the Transaction. Mr. Gorman 15 alleges that the increased leverage will result in increased risk to customers from (1) an 16 increase in the cost of capital, and (2) uncertainty as to whether needed infrastructure 17 investments will be made and not deferred to preserve the ability to pay cash to the parent company to service debt.³ The three proposed conditions relate to ring-fencing, utility-18 19 specific capital structures and tax elections, and the treatment of integration costs. I will 20 address Mr. Gorman's testimony regarding financial risks of the Transaction and his 21 capital structure proposal that the utilities' use a stand-alone capitalization of 50% 22 debt/50% equity unless a different ratio is necessary to preserve a utility credit standing.

³ Gorman Rebuttal, p. 18.

1 The other conditions will be addressed by Mr. Ives (ring-fencing) and Ms. Hardesty (tax 2 elections). Further Ms. Lisa Quilici will address Mr. Gorman's proposed ring-fencing 3 conditions from an industry expert perspective.

4 Mr. Herz also cites the concern that the Transaction may result in an increased 5 cost of capital if savings don't materialize as projected and are not adequate to cover the 6 acquisition premium, thus having a direct impact on GPE or an indirect impact on the cost of capital of the utility operating subsidiaries.⁴ To address these concerns, Mr. Herz 7 proposes that GPE's network transmission customers be provided a "self-help" 8 9 opportunity to participate and fund future GPE transmission investments as protection 10 against higher capital costs being passed through formula transmission rates. He also 11 proposes that GPE monitor and report realized savings to safeguard against an inequitable 12 allocation of such savings.⁵

13 **Q**: Please summarize your response to specific concerns of Mr. Gorman and Mr. Herz 14 regarding the potential for credit ratings downgrades and impact on the cost of 15 capital for GPE's utility operating subsidiaries.

16 As discussed in the testimony of Mr. Ives, the Stipulations and Agreements and A. 17 Supplemental Commitments include a comprehensive set of merger commitments, 18 including ring-fencing conditions that are intended to address concerns that increased 19 debt incurred by GPE at the corporate level in order to finance the acquisition may 20 contribute at some future date to a downgrade of the credit ratings of one or more of 21 GPE's utility operating subsidiaries. GPE has pledged to insulate customers from any 22 increase in the cost of capital that is attributable to a downgrade caused by the increase in

⁴ Herz Rebuttal, pp. 6, 23. ⁵ Herz Rebuttal, p. 24.

1 GPE's leverage. As discussed further in the surrebuttal testimony of Mr. Ives and Ms. 2 Quilici, these conditions are constructive and workable, have been utilized in other 3 similar proceedings across the country, and may be adopted by the Commission to 4 address such concerns, yet still allow the Transaction to be completed to create the 5 benefits for customers that would otherwise be foregone. These assurances provide 6 customers with a greater degree of protection than exists today. The Commission can be 7 confident that customers are not adversely affected by the financing activity of GPE.

8 Q: Are there other points you would like to make in response to Mr. Gorman and Mr.

- 9 Herz?
- 10 A. Yes. It is important to recognize that:
- Both Standard & Poor's ("S&P") and Moody's have reviewed the Transaction
 and, in response, affirmed the existing investment grade credit ratings of Westar⁶,
 KCP&L and GMO. The credit metrics of the operating utilities, a fundamental
 measure of their financial risk, are unchanged by the Transaction.
- 15 2) GPE will also continue to maintain an investment grade credit rating following
 16 the Transaction. The Transaction is expected to have a near-term negative effect
 17 on GPE's financial risk due to the increased debt at the GPE parent holding
 18 company level to finance the Transaction. However, this is not uncommon in
 19 these types of transactions and, most importantly, any associated risk is borne by
 20 shareholders, not utility customers. Further, it is important to recognize that as
 21 the Transaction-related debt at GPE decreases, GPE's credit metrics will improve.

⁶ Including Kansas Gas & Electric Company ("KG&E") which, unless specifically identified, is included when discussing Westar in this surrebuttal testimony.

1 3) The Transaction will be financed using a low-cost financing mix, which 2 necessitates the additional debt. Using a low-cost financing mix is necessary for 3 the Transaction to be viable and create benefits for customers while also 4 benefitting shareholders. The Transaction debt is being issued and held by GPE, 5 the parent holding company, and, as noted above, any risk associated with such 6 debt will be borne by shareholders, not customers. We have also made the 7 significant concession not to seek rate recovery of the acquisition premium or 8 transaction costs as part of our application.

- 9 4) Regulatory risk is a critical factor in the rating agencies' assessments. S&P and
 10 Moody's each discuss regulatory considerations in their respective assessments of
 11 the Transaction. The actions taken by the Commission in this proceeding, future
 12 rate cases and other proceedings will impact the credit rating agencies'
 13 assessment of the operating utilities as significantly as changes in credit metrics.
- 14 5) As detailed in the testimony of GPE, KCP&L and GMO witnesses Steven Busser
 15 and William Kemp, the Transaction will create substantial benefits for customers
 16 without requesting customers to pay rates which include the acquisition premium
 17 or Transaction costs.

18 Q: In summary, will the Transaction financing undertaken by GPE negatively affect 19 the financial condition of the operating utilities?

A: No. As I mentioned above and will discuss in detail in Section IV of my surrebuttal
 testimony, the financial condition of the operating utilities will not change due to the
 Transaction debt incurred by GPE. Equally important, in part as a result of the initially
 agreed upon and expanded set of ring-fencing conditions offered in the Staff S&A, OPC

S&A and by Mr. Ives in his surrebuttal testimony, the Transaction financing will not
 affect customers.

3 Q: Will the financing of the Transaction negatively impact the financial condition of 4 GPE?

5 Initially, GPE will have elevated debt levels but will still continue to maintain investment A: 6 grade credit ratings following the Transaction. S&P has reaffirmed GPE's current rating. 7 The other major rating agency, Moody's, has indicated that GPE will likely see a one-8 notch degradation of its credit rating in response to the increase in parent holding 9 company debt. But as I said, both have affirmed that GPE will remain investment grade. 10 This near-term effect will be mitigated over time as Transaction debt is paid down. It is 11 important to recognize that the existing shareholders of GPE recognized and accepted this 12 near-term effect on GPE's financial risk when they overwhelmingly approved the 13 Transaction; and many shareholders again affirmed such acceptance by purchasing new 14 equity to finance the Transaction.

15

IV. Reasonableness of the Purchase Price

16 a. Introduction

17 Q: What testimony do you address in this section of your rebuttal testimony?

18 A: I respond to MECG witness Gorman and Independence witness Herz who suggest that
 19 the purchase price GPE has agreed to pay is excessive.⁷

- 20 Q: Please briefly highlight your response.
- A: The purchase price GPE agreed to pay Westar shareholders is reasonable and reflects thefair market value of Westar and the unique value that will be created for customers and

⁷ Gorman Rebuttal, starting on p. 3; Herz Rebuttal, starting on pp. 5, 6.

1 shareholders by the Transaction. We have already conceded that we will not seek to 2 recover in rates any acquisition premium or transaction costs. Regardless, GPE was able 3 to offer the highest purchase price due to the value of the numerous unique benefits that 4 the combination of GPE and Westar will create for customers and shareholders and that 5 were not available to other bidders. I will address these points in detail in the sections 6 which follow starting first with the reasonableness of the purchase price GPE agreed to 7 pay Westar shareholders, then the acquisition premium implicit in the purchase price, and 8 finally the unique value created by the Transaction.

9

b. Reasonableness of Purchase Price

10 Q: How do you respond to the suggestions of Messrs. Gorman and Herz that the 11 purchase price GPE agreed to pay for Westar is excessive.

A: The Transaction was the result of a competitive auction process in which many bidders
participated and the purchase price resulting from that process is, by definition, the fair
market value and as such is reasonable. While GPE was ultimately selected as the
winning bidder, four other bidders submitted bids that were in the range of GPE's final,
winning bid. Further, as discussed in my direct testimony, the valuation of the
Transaction is within a reasonable range of other recent transactions.

18 Q: How does a competitive auction process demonstrate that the purchase price is19 reasonable?

A: By soliciting specific proposals to acquire a company, a professionally run, competitive
 auction process identifies the value of the company available in the marketplace at that
 time. The value resulting from a well-run, competitive auction process is by definition
 the reasonable, market value of the company.

11

Q: How did the competitive market value Westar?

2 A: There were four separate parties in addition to GPE that made binding or non-binding 3 indications of interest for Westar at a purchase prices that ranged from \$50.50 to \$60.00 4 per share. As a result, the market firmly valued Westar with an equity value between 5 \$7.1 billion and \$8.6 billion. These facts are not in dispute. As the winning bidder, 6 GPE's bid was the highest of all submitted, yet well within the financial advisor's 7 valuation range. As I discuss later in my testimony, it is reasonable for GPE to be at the 8 high end of this range of values given the numerous efficiency opportunities resulting 9 from the geographic proximity of the two companies and their shared ownership of 10 assets. The bottom line is that a fair, competitive and efficient process was conducted 11 during the sale process for Westar and the market of suitors determined the price in this 12 Transaction to be reasonable.

13 Q: Is the purchase price within the reasonable range of other recent transactions?

A: Yes. Our financial advisor's analysis also adjusts for the fact that certain transactions,
including our Transaction, leaked and therefore the stock price of the targets traded up
prior to announcement of the deals. The forward price to earnings multiples and the
forward Enterprise Value to EBITDA multiples implied by the purchase price is also
consistent with the multiples paid in precedent transactions of regulated utilities.

It is important to note that we compared the premium and multiple being paid for
Westar against the most recent and therefore most relevant precedent regulated utility
transactions at the time of deal announcement.

I would point out that Goldman is a well-known international investment bank and a preeminent advisor on mergers and acquisition transactions and has worked on thousands of transactions. Goldman has a leading utility practice and has served as
advisor to either the acquirer or the acquiree on 12 corporate merger transactions since
2010. For all transactions in which Goldman delivers a fairness opinion, including this
one, they have a rigorous process in which their firm-wide fairness opinion committee
reviews the work of the transaction advisory team. Goldman's analysis was based on a
broad range of assumptions.

7 In summary, our financial advisor and we looked to a number of financial
8 analyses to determine the appropriate purchase price for Westar. We did not rely on any
9 single analysis as the definitive measure but rather looked at the totality of these various
10 methodologies before concluding that the purchase price is reasonable.

11 c. Acquisition Premium

12 Q: Can you provide an update to the calculation of the acquisition premium and13 related goodwill?

14 A: Yes. Specific accounting rules prevent an exact determination of the acquisition
15 premium, and related goodwill, until the day the Transaction closes, as it is subject to a
16 number of factors, including the GPE stock price at the time of closing and the fair value
17 of Westar's assets at that time. Various estimates of goodwill (a term used
18 interchangeably with "acquisition premium" in this case) have been provided.

The Direct Testimony of Steven P. Busser included goodwill as \$4.8⁸ billion.
The Joint Applicants' Proxy Statement included goodwill as \$4.8 billion based on the
estimated fair value of assets as of June 30, 2016.

⁸ Busser Direct, p. 12.

From June 30, 2016 through December 31, 2016, Westar's common shareholder's
 equity has increased by approximately \$111 million as common earnings, in excess of
 dividends paid, have accrued. All else equal, this would be expected to reduce the
 estimated goodwill to \$4.7 billion as of December 31, 2016.

5 6

O:

Is it common for goodwill to be incurred in connection with a merger or acquisition?

7 A: It is not only common; it is almost universal. The vast majority of utility deals have 8 created goodwill as publicly traded utilities in recent years have typically been trading at 9 market values which are above their book value of equity, so that even a theoretical 10 merger with no market premium can generate goodwill. This is the case with Westar, as 11 prior to the announcement of the Transaction and even prior to March 9, 2016 when the 12 sale process leaked to the market, Westar was already trading at 1.7 times its book value 13 (a closing stock price on March 9 of \$44.08 per share versus book value of \$25.87 per 14 share). In the context of an acquisition for a healthy company, acquirers typically pay a 15 premium to the market value of equity, as without doing so, it would be far less likely to 16 find a willing seller.

17

Q: Why do acquirers of financially sound companies pay acquisition premiums?

A: Acquirers are willing to pay acquisition premiums because they believe the acquisition
 will create incremental value for their shareholders relative to the standalone value of the
 acquiring company. These benefits can be generated through economies of scale,
 increased opportunities for investment and growth, improved operations and cost
 efficiencies and enhanced access to financing which lowers the cost of capital and
 increases strategic flexibility.

1 The target company will typically run a sale process that will involve more than 2 one potential acquirer, as was the case with Westar. As a result of the competitive 3 dynamic, the successful acquirer will always need to offer a premium that fully reflects 4 the value of the underlying business, compensating selling shareholders who are 5 relinquishing both control and future upside potential.

6 To determine the appropriate premium, acquirers will evaluate the business 7 prospects of the combined company relative to that of their standalone business on a per 8 share basis, just as GPE has done when determining the purchase price for Westar. The 9 price that an acquirer is willing to pay must result in a transaction that is value enhancing 10 for its shareholders when accounting for all the strategic and operational benefits of the 11 merger and the value of potential merger efficiencies as well as the transaction expenses, 12 the cost of financing and the premium.

13

d. Unique Value of the Transaction

14 Q: You commented earlier that GPE was able to offer the highest purchase price due to
15 the value of the numerous unique benefits that the combination of GPE and Westar
16 will create for customers and shareholders and that were not available to other
17 bidders. Please expand.

A: It is important to consider the fundamental drivers of value in this Transaction and the
 broader industry context in which the Transaction occurred, namely the consolidation that
 is occurring throughout the electric utility industry as noted by Ms. Quilici. The
 Transaction value is driven by many factors including:

- 22 1) Compelling logic of the combination
- 2) Enhanced strength of the combined company

2

- 3) Advantageous financing plan
- 4) Continued investment grade credit ratings for operating utilities and GPE

3 All of this results in lower rates for customers than is possible absent the Transaction.

4 Q: Please expand upon the compelling logic of the combination.

5 A: The combination of GPE and Westar creates a larger, more diversified utility company 6 with greater opportunities for growth, greater economies of scale, and enhanced financial 7 capabilities—an overall stronger, more stable platform better positioned to provide safe, 8 reliable and reasonably-priced energy to the region. Given adjacent service territories 9 and already shared power plants, the combination of GPE and Westar creates significant 10 benefits for all stakeholders that are not available to either company on a standalone 11 basis. The combination of Westar and GPE will create far greater value for the respective 12 stakeholders than any other potential combination available to either Westar or GPE. 13 These benefits will accrue to our customers as well as to our shareholders and were 14 thoroughly evaluated when we determined the purchase price.

15 Q: Please describe the enhanced financial strength that will be created by the 16 Transaction.

A: As I discussed earlier, prior to negotiating the purchase price, we, together with our
financial advisor, performed rigorous financial analysis of the combined company's
business prospects in comparison to GPE's standalone plan. Over the longer term, the
combined company will be stronger financially than either GPE or Westar stand-alone.
In this regard, it cannot be forgotten that GPE and Westar, as they exist on a stand-alone
basis today, are on the smaller size of electric utility companies across the country, and
they are becoming smaller relative to their industry peers as industry consolidation

1 continues across the rest of the country. Issues accompany this relatively small size, and 2 the risks of GPE and Westar remaining stand-alone should not be ignored. As a result of 3 the merger benefits outlined above, the Transaction will allow GPE's operating utilities 4 to earn closer to their allowed returns. This greater ability for the operating utilities to 5 earn their allowed returns makes the combined company more attractive to investors, 6 which over the long-term will lower our cost of capital for customers and improve our 7 ability to finance investment in our region's critical energy infrastructure while keeping 8 customer rates lower than they would otherwise be moving forward.

9

Q: Please describe the impact of the Transaction's advantageous financial plan.

10 As I discussed earlier, the current unprecedented low-cost interest rate environment A: 11 allows GPE to finance the Transaction and create benefits for customers and 12 shareholders. We thoroughly vetted our financing plan with our financial advisors. The 13 most challenging aspect of the financing plan - the equity issuances - was executed by14 GPE in the Fall of 2016, and Transaction debt was issued by GPE in March of 2017, 15 eliminating financing risk from the Transaction. The risk of the remaining part of our 16 financing plan have already been addressed, with pre-established equity commitments 17 from Westar's shareholders.

18 Q: Please

Please expand upon the value of investment grade credit ratings.

A: As described in more detail in Section V of this rebuttal testimony, we have a firm
understanding of the combined company's expected credit profile. GPE's projected
parent company key credit metrics will initially decline as a result of the debt issued to
finance the transaction but will remain supportive of investment grade credit ratings.
There will be no decreases on the utilities' key credit metrics or credit ratings. In fact,

17

the utilities' credit metrics only stand to improve as merger savings are realized. The
bottom line is that our purchase price for a high quality business is reasonable, our
financing plan is sound and the pro forma combined company will have a strong balance
sheet that supports solid investment grade ratings.

5

Q: Please describe the impact of these value attributes on customer rates.

6 A: As much time as GPE and Westar spend working to control cost, nothing that either 7 company could implement on its own can come close to the operational efficiencies that 8 will be created by this Transaction, all of which will go to the benefit of customers 9 through normal rate cases. Annual savings after a short ramp-up period are expected to 10 reach \$200 million per year. With GPE's commitment not to seek to recover the 11 acquisition premium or transaction costs from customers and the fact that we are only 12 seeking to recover from customers transition costs that yield identifiable savings in 13 excess of such costs, customers will benefit from the savings created by the Transaction 14 without paying for the acquisition premium or transaction costs necessary to create them.

15

V. Capital Market Reaction to the Transaction

16 Q: What testimony do you address in this section of your surrebuttal testimony?

17 A: I respond to MECG witness Gorman's testimony regarding the capital market reaction to
18 the Transaction. In particular, I respond to Mr. Gorman's and Independence witness
19 Herz's assertions that the Transaction, and GPE's plans for financing it, may increase the
20 financial risk of GPE and the operating utilities.⁹

⁹ Gorman Rebuttal, starting at 3; Herz Rebuttal starting at 6.

Q: Mr. Gorman discusses GPE's, KCP&L's and GMO's credit ratings in his rebuttal
 testimony. In order to provide context for your surrebuttal testimony, what are
 credit ratings?

4 A: Credit ratings are evaluations by credit rating agencies of the creditworthiness of debt-5 issuing entities and a measure of the probability of default, or the failure to pay interest or 6 principal on a debt security when due. These forward-looking opinions are represented 7 by a letter rating, with further sub-ratings, which is an ordinal or positional ranking of the 8 entity and/or a specific debt issuance. The rating is representative of the credit quality of 9 a given entity or issuance and is ranked relative to others across a spectrum of risk 10 including both financial risk and business risk. GPE, Westar and KCP&L are rated by 11 the two most prominent credit rating agencies, S&P and Moody's. The table below 12 provides the letter rating scales used by these rating agencies.

13

Table	1: Credit Rating Scal	les
	S&P	Moody's
Investment Grade	AAA	Aaa
	AA	Aa
	А	А
	BBB	Baa
Sub Investment Grade	BB	Ba
	В	В
	CCC	Caa
	CC	Ca
	С	
In Default	D	С

The rating agencies also use sub-ratings, or "notches" within each rating category, and
outlooks (e.g., positive, stable, negative). S&P denotes ratings notches with a "+" or "-"

(*i.e.*, BBB+, BBB, and BBB-), and Moody's denotes notches with a 1, 2, or 3 (*i.e.*, Baa1,
 Baa2, and Baa3, with 1 being the highest).

3 Q: How much do credit metrics impact credit ratings?

4 A: In S&P's credit rating methodology, credit metrics, such as the ratio Cash Flow from 5 Operations before changes in working capital and interest to interest and the ratio of Debt 6 to total Capitalization, impact a company's financial risk profile which, when combined 7 with a company's business risk profile, establishes the company's anchor credit rating 8 before other credit modifiers are applied. This means that credit metrics have a 50% or 9 less impact on a company's S&P credit rating. In Moody's credit rating methodology, 10 credit metrics have a 40% weighting in determining a company's Moody's credit rating. 11 While credit metrics are an important part of determining credit ratings, they contribute 12 no more than half to the ultimate credit ratings developed by S&P and Moody's and 13 cannot be relied on as the sole determination of financial condition.

14 Q: Does the regulatory environment affect credit ratings?

15 A: Yes. For S&P, the other half of a utility's credit rating is determined by their assessment 16 of a company's business risk profile. Half of this assessment of business risk profile is 17 driven by S&P's view of the regulatory environment. As described by S&P, "The 18 regulatory framework/regime's influence is of critical importance when assessing 19 regulated utilities' credit risk because it defines the environment in which a utility operates and has a significant bearing on a utility's financial performance."¹⁰ 20 In other 21 words, a quarter of S&P's determination of a utility's credit rating is driven by their view 22 of the regulatory environment.

¹⁰ S&P Criteria Corporates Utilities: Key Credit Factors For The Regulated Utilities Industry, November 19, 2013, page 3.

1		Moody's has two rating factors that are impacted by the regulatory environment
2		with each having a 25% weighting in their credit rating methodology. One factor is the
3		Regulatory Framework: "For a regulated utility, the predictability and supportiveness of
4		the regulatory framework in which it operates is a key credit consideration." ¹¹ The other
5		factor is the Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns: "The ability to recover prudently
6		incurred cost in a timely manner is perhaps the single most important credit consideration
7		for regulated utilities." ¹² In combination, these two factors contribute half to Moody's
8		determination of a utility's credit rating.
9		The bottom line is that the rating agencies view of the regulatory environment is
10		as important, if not more important, than credit metrics when determining a utility's
11		credit rating.
11 12	Q:	credit rating. Did S&P and Moody's review the Transaction and offer their respective
	Q:	
12	Q: A:	Did S&P and Moody's review the Transaction and offer their respective
12 13		Did S&P and Moody's review the Transaction and offer their respective assessments of its implications for the credit ratings of GPE, KCP&L and Westar?
12 13 14		Did S&P and Moody's review the Transaction and offer their respective assessments of its implications for the credit ratings of GPE, KCP&L and Westar? Yes. GPE reviewed the Transaction with both S&P and Moody's. The rating agencies
12 13 14 15		Did S&P and Moody's review the Transaction and offer their respective assessments of its implications for the credit ratings of GPE, KCP&L and Westar? Yes. GPE reviewed the Transaction with both S&P and Moody's. The rating agencies also conducted their own analyses of the Transaction and published reports on the credit
12 13 14 15 16		Did S&P and Moody's review the Transaction and offer their respective assessments of its implications for the credit ratings of GPE, KCP&L and Westar? Yes. GPE reviewed the Transaction with both S&P and Moody's. The rating agencies also conducted their own analyses of the Transaction and published reports on the credit implications of the Transaction. S&P affirmed its corporate credit rating for GPE,
12 13 14 15 16 17		Did S&P and Moody's review the Transaction and offer their respective assessments of its implications for the credit ratings of GPE, KCP&L and Westar? Yes. GPE reviewed the Transaction with both S&P and Moody's. The rating agencies also conducted their own analyses of the Transaction and published reports on the credit implications of the Transaction. S&P affirmed its corporate credit rating for GPE, KCP&L and Westar as BBB+ with a negative outlook. Moody's affirmed its long-term
12 13 14 15 16 17 18		Did S&P and Moody's review the Transaction and offer their respective assessments of its implications for the credit ratings of GPE, KCP&L and Westar? Yes. GPE reviewed the Transaction with both S&P and Moody's. The rating agencies also conducted their own analyses of the Transaction and published reports on the credit implications of the Transaction. S&P affirmed its corporate credit rating for GPE, KCP&L and Westar as BBB+ with a negative outlook. Moody's affirmed its long-term debt rating for KCP&L and Westar of Baa1 with a stable outlook. Moody's placed

¹¹ Rating Methodology, Moody's Global Infrastructure Finance-Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities, August 2009, page 6. Rating Methodology, Moody's Global Infrastructure Finance-Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities, August 12

^{2009,} page 7.

O:

What is the importance of a credit rating agency's "outlook"?

2 A: An "outlook" reflects the agency's view of the future only if certain future events happen. 3 It is important to recognize that an outlook is not the same as a credit rating action – the 4 affirmation of the utilities' credit ratings is a definitive action by the agency stating that 5 credit ratings are not changing, and Moody's negative watch for GPE is a specific action 6 with regard to GPE's credit rating. While a "stable" or "positive" outlook is preferred, a 7 "negative" outlook, or even a negative action, is not uncommon in utility transactions. 8 For example, Moody's placed Wisconsin Energy Corporation ("WEC") on negative 9 watch after the announcement of WEC's proposed acquisition of Integrys, a transaction 10 which received the approvals of multiple regulatory jurisdictions and closed in 2015. 11 S&P's "negative" outlook and Moody's negative watch for GPE do not negate the 12 benefits of the Transaction and the value it will create for customers and shareholders, 13 which, as I discuss a bit later in my testimony, is recognized very favorably by these 14 credit rating agencies. Further, and most importantly, while we do not expect the 15 Transaction to impact the utilities' risk, customers are nonetheless protected by the 16 merger conditions we have proposed.

17 Q:

Please expand on S&P's outlook.

18 A: S&P attributes its "negative" outlook specifically to potential future changes in GPE's

- 19 financial condition if the Transaction does not proceed as planned.
- The ratings affirmation on GPE and its subsidiaries reflects our
 view that the Westar acquisition will enhance GPE's business risk
 profile given that Westar's operations also consist of regulated
 electric utilities that benefit from operations under a generally

2		constructive regulatory framework and service territories with average customer growth. 13
3 4 5 6 7		The negative outlook on GPE and its subsidiaries reflects the potential for lower ratings if GPE's financial risk profile, which will deteriorate due to the financing used in the acquisition, does not improve after the transaction closes such that FFO to total debt is well over 13% after 2018. ¹⁴
8		As I discuss later in my surrebuttal testimony, and as recognized by S&P, GPE's
9		financial profile is actually expected to strengthen over time so while S&P identifies
10		potential future risk, this risk is not likely to materialize and customers will not bear this
11		risk in the unlikely event it did materialize.
12 13 14 15		We expect that after the acquisition closes, the combined entity's financial profile will strengthen mainly due to ongoing regulatory recovery of costs such that funds from operations (FFO) to total debt is consistently above 13%. ¹⁵
16	Q:	Please expand on Moody's outlook.
16 17	Q: A:	Please expand on Moody's outlook. Moody's, on the other hand, attributed its "stable" outlook to improving credit profiles
	-	

¹³ S&P Global Ratings, Research Update: Great Plains Energy Inc. Ratings Affirmed, Outlook Revised To Negative On Proposed Acquisition Of Westar Energy, May 31 2016, page 2

¹⁴ Ibid, page 4.

 ¹⁵ S&P Global Ratings, Research Update: Great Plains Energy Inc. Ratings Affirmed, Outlook Revised To Negative On Proposed Acquisition Of Westar Energy, May 31 2016, page 2

¹⁶ Moody's Investors Service, Issuer In-Depth, Great Plains Energy Incorporated FAQ: Great Plains' Acquisition of Westar (July 7, 2016), page 4.

- 1 Moody's outlook highlights the importance of regulatory actions on the utilities' risk and
- 2 credit profiles. In fact, Moody's went on to state:
- 3 What is the main risk to Great Plains' investment-grade credit 4 profile? Regulatory contentiousness that results in stagnant 5 financial performance is the biggest risk for the investment-grade 6 credit profile. Great Plains will need to secure regulatory 7 approvals and maintain sufficient regulatory support for its three 8 utility subsidiaries...Great Plains needs healthy relationships with 9 its regulators in order to achieve the cash flow improvements necessary to keep its investment-grade rating.¹⁷ 10
- 11 As I discuss later in my testimony, the actions of the Commission have a significant
- 12 impact on GPE's and the operating utilities' credit profiles.

13 Q: Is it customary in a transaction like the proposed merger to impact near-term credit

14 metrics of the holding company?

15 A: Yes. As is customary when financing an investment made today that will deliver 16 benefits over a longer-term, the Transaction-related debt will decrease GPE's credit 17 metrics as compared to a standalone plan that does not include such an investment. 18 Although the parent holding company credit metrics are projected to be lower than they 19 would have been on a standalone basis, on average, they remain within the ranges 20 acceptable for investment grade companies. As noted, S&P has maintained its current 21 investment grade credit rating for GPE. And while Moody's has indicated that a one-22 notch downgrade is likely for GPE, GPE's credit rating by Moody's will also remain 23 investment grade. Moreover, it is expected that this near-term impact related to Moody's 24 will reverse as Transaction debt is paid down over time. That GPE's credit ratings will

¹⁷ Moody's Investors Service, Issuer In-Depth, Great Plains Energy Incorporated FAQ: Great Plains' Acquisition of Westar (July 7, 2016), pages 1-2.

remain investment grade is driven by both maintaining investment grade credit metrics and maintaining a constructive regulatory environment.

2 3

Q: Will the Transaction affect the credit metrics of the operating utilities?

A: No. It is very important to recognize that although the debt GPE issues in connection
with the Transaction will impact GPE, it will not affect the credit metrics of its utility
subsidiaries or their customers. Since the additional debt is only at the parent holding
company level, the debt does not impact the GMO or KCP&L credit metrics. S&P and
Moody's took this into consideration before affirming the existing investment grade
credit ratings for each of the operating utility companies.

10 Q: Please describe the risks to GPE and how they might be mitigated.

A: There is always the risk to GPE that the earnings and cash flow of its operating utilities
could be lower than expected. GPE also has the risk of servicing its debt obligations, that
it incurred to finance the acquisition premium, and producing adequate returns for GPE
shareholders. These are risks for GPE shareholders and not for customers of either GMO
or KCP&L.

16 Meaningful opportunities are available to mitigate these risks and meet the needs 17 of financing the acquisition and related costs, should the unexpected need to employ them 18 arise. These options include issuance of additional equity, a reduction in the level of 19 GPE dividends and/or withstanding a lower earned rate of return on Westar's, KCP&L's 20 and/or GMO's common equity than assumed. Although these opportunities would have a 21 negative impact on shareholders, they are options available, if necessary, to provide 22 further assurance that we can meet GPE's debt obligations related to the Transaction 23 without asking customers to bear any of that risk.

1	Q:	Will GPE have the ability to reduce its debt and improve its credit metrics after the
2		Transaction closes?
3	A:	Yes, as shown in the table and chart which follows, the Transaction-related net free cash
4		flows are projected to be nearly \$500 million in the first full five years following closing
5		of the Transaction and will enable GPE to reduce its debt by just over 11%. This is
6		accomplished while maintaining balanced capital structures at Westar, GMO and
7		KCP&L.
8		The Transaction-related net free cash flows are the result of four fundamental
9		drivers as follows:
10		1) Dividends received from Westar Utility Operating Company ("OpCo") Earnings
11		- Based on the standalone operating and financial plans of Westar, earnings not
12		paid to existing shareholders in the form of common dividends will instead be
13		paid to the parent holding company.
14		2) Net after-tax operating cash flows from Transaction efficiencies – Reductions in
15		operating expenses at Westar, GMO and KCP&L, after consideration for savings
16		which will flow to customers through normal rate proceedings, will improve these
17		utilities' ability to earn their allowed returns and create additional earnings that
18		can be paid to the parent holding company
19		3) Dividends on Transaction related equity – The parent holding company will pay
20		dividends on the common stock and mandatory convertible preferred stock issued
21		to fund the Transaction.
22		4) Interest cost on Transaction related debt – The parent holding company will pay
23		interest cost on the debt issued to fund the Transaction.

1 The following table, which is based only on the Westar cash flows and excludes cash 2 flows from KCP&L and GMO, summarizes Transaction-related net free cash flows for 3 each of the first full five years following closing of the Transaction and the cumulative 4 effect of these Transaction-related net free cash flows. It should be noted that while not 5 depicted for purposes of the table below, cash flows from KCP&L and GMO will also 6 continue to be available to GPE.


7

Table 2: Transaction-Related Net Free Cash Flows

In millions	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Dividends received from Westar	\$352	\$389	\$402	\$402	\$402
OpCo Earnings					
Net after-tax operating cash flows	32	46	68	83	92
from Transaction efficiencies					
Dividends on Transaction related	(228)	(221)	(181)	(175)	(175)
equity					
Interest cost on Transaction	(159)	(159)	(162)	(159)	(155)
related debt					
Transaction-related net free	(\$3)	\$55	\$127	\$151	\$164
cash flows					
Cumulative	(\$3)	\$52	\$179	\$330	\$494

8 The following chart highlights GPE's ability to deleverage its balance sheet (i.e., pay 9 down debt) by utilizing the Transaction-related net free cash flows (highlighted in the 10 prior table) to pay down the debt originally issued to finance the Transaction.

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Q: Did the rating agencies recognize GPE's ability to deleverage its balance sheet?

4 A: Yes. This was recognized in the S&P report dated May 18, 2016 that states "....
5 operating cash flow, after capital spending and dividends, would be positive over the
6 2018-2020 period, and would provide incremental operating cash flow that could be used
7 to help support balance sheet deleveraging."

8 Q: Messrs. Gorman and Herz claim that the Transaction results in a financially weaker 9 utility.¹⁸ Do you agree?

10 A: No. While Mr. Gorman's testimony references select excerpts from credit rating agency 11 reports that focus on the potential for negative credit impacts after the Transaction 12 closes¹⁹, both S&P and Moody's have indicated that GPE will remain investment grade 13 and the current credit ratings for all of GPE's utility subsidiaries will be <u>maintained</u> and 14 <u>unchanged</u> from their current levels after the Transaction closes. Further, while credit 15 quality of the combined entity has been affirmed by the rating agencies, there are other

¹⁸ Gorman Rebuttal, pp. 17-19; Herz Rebuttal, pp. 6 and 23.

¹⁹ Gorman Rebuttal, pp. 9-17.

1 aspects of "financial condition" that are relevant. The improved access to capital, greater 2 buying power, and overall larger size of the combined company will allow it to perform 3 and withstand various market conditions better than otherwise. In addition to GPE's 4 credit metrics improving over time as Transaction debt is paid down, I also expect the 5 utilities' credit metrics to improve over time as efficiencies and savings are generated at 6 the utilities. A careful reading of the rating agencies' actual assessments demonstrates 7 they balance their evaluations with both positive and negative credit sentiments, but 8 express no sense of alarm and generally view the Transaction as favorable.

9 Q: Did S&P and Moody's offer viewpoints on the Transaction overall that the

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Commission should be aware of?

- 11 A: Yes. In its May 31, 2016 research update regarding its credit rating rationale, S&P states:
- Prospectively, the combined entity would have more diverse
 electric utility cash flow sources, strengthening the excellent
 business risk profile.²⁰
- 15 Moody's offered its assessment in several reports.
- 16The acquisition of Westar will enhance the business profile of17Great Plains in many ways, including: increased size, scale and18scope; operating cost synergies due to a contiguous service19territory; core competency in managing Missouri and Kansas20regulatory and political environments; and the addition of \$1.221billion of FERC regulated transmission rate base.²¹
- 22 ***
- From a strategic perspective Moody's sees Westar as a natural fit
 for Great Plains, given overlapping service territories and a shared
 ownership of the 1,170 mega-watt Wolf Creek nuclear generation

²⁰ S&P Global Ratings, Research Update: Great Plains Energy Inc. Ratings Affirmed, Outlook Revised To Negative On Proposed Acquisition Of Westar Energy, May 31 2016, page 3.

²¹ Moody's Investors Service, Credit Opinion Great Plains Energy Incorporated: A Midwest Utility Holding Company, June 1 2016, page 4.

1 2		facility. Utilities with contiguous service territories tend to produce higher operating cost synergies. ²²
3		Moody's also explains its expectations regarding the outcome of the Commission's
4		review of the Transaction which are reflected in Moody's business risk assessment which
5		inform its ratings.
6 7 9 10 11 12		We believe regulators will approve the combination because the reasoning behind spreading fixed costs across a larger asset base makes sense for all stakeholders. We also believe that regulators will approve the transaction based on prior approvals, such as when Kansas allowed Great Plains and Black Hills Corp. (Baa1 negative) to divide the assets of Aquila Inc. within the state. ²³
13	Q:	Will the Transaction increase the financial risk to customers as compared to the
14		status quo?
15	A:	No. The financial risks to customers are largely the same as the current risks that may
15 16	A:	No. The financial risks to customers are largely the same as the current risks that may impact customers on a standalone basis with two potential exceptions. To the extent the
	A:	
16	A:	impact customers on a standalone basis with two potential exceptions. To the extent the
16 17	A:	impact customers on a standalone basis with two potential exceptions. To the extent the parent holding company cannot fulfill its obligations to its debt holders and/or
16 17 18	A:	impact customers on a standalone basis with two potential exceptions. To the extent the parent holding company cannot fulfill its obligations to its debt holders and/or shareholders, the parent holding company may experience higher debt or equity financing
16 17 18 19	A:	impact customers on a standalone basis with two potential exceptions. To the extent the parent holding company cannot fulfill its obligations to its debt holders and/or shareholders, the parent holding company may experience higher debt or equity financing costs and/or have limitations in accessing such financing. In such extreme circumstances,
16 17 18 19 20	A:	impact customers on a standalone basis with two potential exceptions. To the extent the parent holding company cannot fulfill its obligations to its debt holders and/or shareholders, the parent holding company may experience higher debt or equity financing costs and/or have limitations in accessing such financing. In such extreme circumstances, this could indirectly impact the utilities' credit ratings. As I previously indicated, and
16 17 18 19 20 21	A:	impact customers on a standalone basis with two potential exceptions. To the extent the parent holding company cannot fulfill its obligations to its debt holders and/or shareholders, the parent holding company may experience higher debt or equity financing costs and/or have limitations in accessing such financing. In such extreme circumstances, this could indirectly impact the utilities' credit ratings. As I previously indicated, and will explain in more detail below, GPE, KCP&L and GMO have agreed upon certain

²² Moody's Investors Service, Rating Action: Moody's Places Great Plains Energy on Review for Downgrade; Westar Energy, Kansas City Power & Light and KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Affirmed; Outlooks Stable (May 31, 2016), page 3.

 ²³ Moody's Investors Service, Issuer In-Depth, Great Plains Energy Incorporated FAQ: Great Plains' Acquisition of Westar (July 7, 2016), page 1.

GMO and KCP&L and their customers from the parent holding company than exist today
 and will exist absent the Transaction.

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VI. Financial Risks and Financial and Ring-Fencing Conditions

Q: What testimony do you address in this section of your surrebuttal testimony?

5 A: I respond to Mr. Gorman's assertion that KCP&L and GMO may be under pressure to 6 increase their dividend payments to GPE to help service Transaction debt, increase their 7 retail rates, and impact their ability to make necessary capital investments. I respond to 8 MECG witness Gorman and Independence witness Herz who question whether the 9 Transaction, and GPE's plans for financing it, may adversely impact customers through a higher cost of capital at the operating utilities.²⁴ Finally, I discuss how the financial and 10 11 ring-fencing conditions agreed to by GPE, KCP&L, GMO, Staff and OPC address the 12 concerns raised by Mr. Gorman and Mr. Herz and why no additional conditions are 13 warranted.

14 Q: Will KCP&L be under extraordinary pressure to increase dividends to GPE in 15 order to pay debt service on the Transaction debt, as alleged by Mr. Gorman?

A: No. GPE's financial analysis affirms that dividends from the utility operating
subsidiaries will be sufficient for GPE to meet its debt service obligations. Moreover,
should any financial stress create issues for GPE, the parent company has actions that it
can take to address these issues without changing the dividend policies of the operating
utilities. These include issuing more equity and reducing dividends at the parent
company like GPE did in 2009 during the economic downturn while Iatan was being

²⁴ Gorman Rebuttal, starting on p. 3; Herz Rebuttal, starting on p. 8.

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constructed when it cut the dividend in half and issued both common equity and equity units that received equity credit from the rating agencies.

Q: Mr. Gorman also raises a concern that, "The parent company may have an
incentive to increase cost of service at the utilities in order to permit the utilities to
pay larger dividends and income tax payments to the parent company, which will
enhance GPE's cash flow available for serving acquisition debt."²⁵ Please respond.

7 A: As discussed by Mr. Ives and Ms. Quilici, the cost of service of the utility operating 8 companies is subject to the jurisdiction of the Missouri and Kansas Commissions. Even 9 making such a proposal would be short-sighted and foolhardy as it would undoubtedly 10 inflict serious harm on our relationships with customers and regulators. In contrast, 11 KCP&L, GMO and Westar are focused on reducing the cost of service, not increasing it. 12 Our long-term success and ability to grow earnings depends on serving our customers 13 efficiently and reliably. The interests of our shareholders and customers are aligned and 14 will continue to be aligned based on the structure of the Transaction.

15 Q: Will the Transaction increase KCP&L's and GMO's cost of capital and their 16 Missouri customers rates?

A: No. As I noted earlier, the credit ratings of KCP&L and GMO are unchanged by the
Transaction. Further, GPE, KCP&L and GMO have agreed to specific financial and ringfencing conditions in the Stipulations and Agreements reached with Staff and OPC which
we have added to in the Supplemental Commitments discussed by Mr. Ives to insulate the
operating utilities and their customers from potential effects or costs related to the
Transaction. In particular, neither KCP&L nor GMO shall seek an increase to the cost of

²⁵ Gorman Rebuttal, p. 19.

capital as a result of the Transaction or KCP&L and GMO's ongoing affiliation with GPE
and its affiliates other than KCP&L and GMO after the Transaction (see Staff S&A,
Financing Condition 7 and Supplemental Commitment 24) and GPE commits that retail
rates for Missouri KCP&L and GMO customers shall not increase as a result of the
Transaction (Staff S&A, Ratemaking/Accounting Condition 4).

6 Q: What is the import of the financial and ring-fencing commitments provided for in 7 the Stipulations and Agreements with Staff and OPC and in the Supplemental 8 Commitments?

9 A: As discussed by Mr. Ives and Ms. Quilici, GPE, KCP&L and GMO have agreed upon a
10 number of specific financial integrity and ring-fencing commitments to provide
11 protections for the operating utilities and their customers. See Schedule DRI-4 to Mr.
12 Ives' surrebuttal testimony and Schedule LMQ-2 to Ms. Quilici's surrebuttal testimony.

13 These conditions demonstrate GPE, KCP&L and GMO's commitment to 14 customers and to ensuring that customers will benefit from the Transaction without being 15 exposed to financing and affiliate risk. As discussed further in the surrebuttal testimony 16 of Mr. Ives and Ms. Quilici, these conditions are constructive and workable, have been 17 utilized in other similar proceedings across the country, and may be adopted by the 18 Commission to address such concerns and still allow the Transaction to be completed and 19 create the benefits for customers that would otherwise be foregone. Further, should any 20 unforeseen risks or financial challenges arise, this Commission will retain its full and 21 broad authority to regulate the utilities, ensuring that customers' rates will remain just 22 and reasonable. Finally, as I noted earlier, these conditions provide greater protections

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from the parent holding company than exist today for GMO and KCP&L and their customers and will not exist if the Transaction is not approved and does not close.

3 Q: Mr. Gorman also proposes a condition that would require that a 50% debt/50% 4 equity capital structure be used by KCP&L and GMO. What is your response?

5 In making his recommendation, Mr. Gorman cites to my testimony describing our A: 6 intention to maintain a capital structure for the operating utilities that is approximately 50% debt and 50% equity and asserts that this intent should be a requirement.²⁶ In 7 8 response to Mr. Gorman's recommendation, as Mr. Ives discusses in his Surrebuttal 9 Testimony, GPE, KCP&L and GMO are willing to commit that KCP&L and GMO will 10 use an actual utility-specific capital structure with an equity share of no less than 45% 11 and no more than 53%. It is appropriate for the operating utilities to have some 12 flexibility around a target range to allow us to manage changes in each utility's capital 13 structure which may occur from time to time in the normal course of business. Further, 14 as discussed by Mr. Ives, it will continue to be within the Commission's rate-setting 15 authority to review KCP&L's and GMO's capital structure in the normal course of 16 ratemaking.

17 Q: Should GPE's consolidated capital structure, which includes the Transaction18 related debt, be used for utility ratemaking purposes?

A: No. I would note that KCP&L and GMO intend to use a utility-specific capital structure
 for ratemaking purposes and this intent is recognized in the Staff S&A. However, others
 may propose the use of GPE's consolidated capital structure with substantial Transaction

²⁶ Gorman Rebuttal, p. 17.

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debt post-closing as this fundamentally flawed position has been advocated in Kansas so it is worth explaining our objection here, if only briefly.

3 The rates of both KCP&L and GMO have historically been set using actual 4 capital structures with debt/equity ratios that have been very consistent with their peer 5 utilities across the country. Prior to the acquisition of GMO the difference between 6 KCP&L's and GPE's capital structures was relatively minor with only \$100 million of 7 debt and \$39 million of preferred stock at the holding company level. The preferred 8 stock had originally been issued by KCP&L prior to the formation of GPE and the \$100 9 million of debt issued in 2007 was contributed as equity to KCP&L. These facts and the 10 small dollar amounts involved made it easy for KCP&L to agree to use the GPE 11 consolidated capital structure to set rates. When GMO was acquired in 2008, GPE 12 guaranteed all of GMO's debt and GMO's equity ratio was higher than what was 13 typically approved by the Commission so initially using the GPE consolidated capital 14 structure to set rates for GMO was appropriate. GMO now issues its own debt without 15 guarantees and has lowered its equity ratio to be within a range approved by the 16 Commission so the circumstances have changed sufficiently to allow for use of the 17 utility-specific capital structures to set rates today. It is both reasonable, and necessary 18 for the Transaction to go forward, to continue this practice after the Transaction closes. It 19 is standard in the industry overall to use a utility capital structure to establish utility rates 20 when (1) the utility issues its own debt without guarantees; (2) the utility has its own 21 bond rating; and (3) the utility has a capital structure within the range of capital structures 22 approved by the Commission. Using a parent company consolidated capital structure, 23 with a debt ratio considerably higher than typical for utilities on account of Transactionrelated debt, the proceeds of which cannot be used to support utility operations, to
establish utility rates for GMO and KCP&L post-closing would be far outside industry
norms. Rates today reflect the actual capital raised and retained that fund the utility
assets (rate base) out of which we serve customers. That should remain the case after the
Transaction closes.

6 Further, GPE is undertaking financing activities at the parent holding company 7 level in connection with this Transaction that it would not do but for the Transaction and, 8 as a result, GPE's consolidated capital structure will contain more debt than what would 9 be typical for the utility peers of KCP&L and GMO. Because these financing activities 10 are solely related to the Transaction and because the proceeds of such financing activities 11 can only be devoted to one purpose at a time, it is clear that these proceeds will be 12 dedicated solely to supporting the Transaction and will not support any of the operations 13 of GMO and KCP&L.

14 Due to both the expected negative cash flow impact and the implications of a likely material degradation in the rating agencies' view of constructiveness of the 15 16 Missouri regulatory environment, I would expect the use of the company's consolidated 17 capital structure for utility ratemaking to contribute to the downgrading of the credit 18 ratings of GPE and all of its utility subsidiaries, including GMO and KCP&L. Given 19 these implications, if the consolidated capital structure of the parent holding company is 20 used for utility ratemaking purposes, GPE would no longer be able to commit not to seek 21 rate recovery of the acquisition premium and Transaction costs and this customer benefit 22 would be lost.

As a result of these facts, the continued use of capital structures with debt/equity
 ratios consistent with their industry peers for purposes of setting GMO and KCP&L's
 rates is reasonable.

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VII. Conclusions and Recommendations

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Q: Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations.

6 A: This Transaction has the ability to take advantage of a rare confluence of events and 7 create a combined company better positioned to drive value to customers and 8 shareholders for both the near and long-term. While transformative, the Transaction will 9 preserve GPE's current character as almost exclusively a utility holding company. The 10 operating utilities comprise 100% of GPE's 2016 revenues and if the Transaction is 11 approved and closes, 100% of GPE's revenues will come from utility operations. As 12 detailed in the rebuttal testimony of GPE, KCP&L and GMO's surrebuttal witnesses 13 Steven Busser and William Kemp, the Transaction will create substantial benefits for 14 customers. This is a big transaction for GPE and requires effective capital market and 15 operational execution and constructive regulatory treatment. In particular, the 16 Transaction must be financed using as low cost financing mix as possible and the utilities 17 rates must continue to be set based upon a capital structure reflecting an evenly mixed 18 balance of debt and equity and not the consolidated capital structure of the parent holding 19 company which includes substantial Transaction debt. Absent the ability to finance the 20 Transaction with low-cost debt, the Transaction will not go forward and the significant 21 customer benefits will be lost.

To effect this Transaction is not without risk but we have a proven track recordand are effectively managing these risks along the way in a responsible manner that will

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1 create billions of dollars of value for customers. The Transaction has not impacted the 2 credit ratings or credit metrics of the operating utilities. Both S&P and Moody's have 3 reaffirmed the existing already strong investment grade credit ratings of KCP&L and 4 GMO. And while Moody's has indicated that it will downgrade the parent holding 5 company's credit rating one-notch, GPE will also continue to maintain an investment 6 grade credit rating following the Transaction. The modest near-term negative impact on 7 GPE's financial risk due to the increased parent holding company debt to finance the 8 Transaction, which is typical in these types of transactions, is temporary and debt at GPE 9 will decrease over time, but until such time, any of this financing plan risk is borne by 10 shareholders, not customers. The financial and ring-fencing commitments made by the 11 GPE, KCP&L and GMO through the Stipulations and Agreements with Staff and OPC, 12 and the Supplemental Commitments ensure that customers will be protected from 13 potential future risks of the Transaction. These conditions include the commitment that 14 the cost of capital reflected in the operating utilities rates for Missouri customers will not 15 increase as a result of the Transaction. In fact, these financial and ring-fencing conditions 16 provide customers with a greater degree of protection than they have today.

We live and work in this community and care passionately about ensuring GMO
and KCP&L can better serve our region now and for the future. We believe this
Transaction does that.

20 Q: Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?

A: Yes, at this time.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION STATE OF MISSOURI

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF GREAT PLAINS ENERGY INCORPORATED FOR APPROVAL OF ITS ACQUISITION OF WESTAR ENERGY, INC.

Docket No. EM-2017-0226

AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN E. BRYANT

STATE OF MISSOURI)) ss COUNTY OF JACKSON)

Kevin E. Bryant, being first duly sworn on his oath, states:

1. My name is Kevin E. Bryant. I work in Kansas City, Missouri, and I am employed by Kansas City Power & Light Company as Senior Vice President – Finance and Strategy and Chief Financial Officer of Great Plains Energy, KCP&L and KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations.

2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my Surrebuttal Testimony on behalf of Great Plains Energy Incorporated, Kansas City Power & Light Company, and KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company consisting of <u>thirty-eight</u> (38) pages, having been prepared in written form for introduction into evidence in the above-captioned docket.

3. I have knowledge of the matters set forth therein. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded, including any attachments thereto, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Subscribed and sworn before me this $2 \overrightarrow{}^{\dagger}$ day of March, 2017.

MicoG A. (Notary Public

My commission expires: Feb. 4, 2019

ļ	NICOLE A. WEHRY
	Notary Public - Notary Seal
1	State of MISSOUII
1	Commissioned for Jackson County
	My Commission Expires: February 04, 2019
ļ	Commission Number: 14391200