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Issues: Rate Design Witness: James A. Busch

Sponsoring Party: MO PSC Staff
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Case No.: WR-2015-0301

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MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

COMMISSION STAFF

RATE DESIGN REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

JAMES A. BUSCH

MISSOURI-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CASE NO. WR-2015-0301

Jefferson City, Missouri February 2016

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of Missouri-American Water Company's Request for Authority to Implement a General Rate Increase for Water and Sewer Service Provided in Missouri Service Areas)) File No. WR-2015-0301))					
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES A. BUSCH						
STATE OF MISSOURI)) ss) county of cole)						
	th and on his oath declares that he is of sound mind he attached Rebuttal Testimony; and that the same t knowledge and belief.					
Further the Affiant sayeth not.	James A. Busch					
Subscribed and sworn to before me this	s 18th day of February, 2016.					
SUSAN L. SUNDERMEYER Notary Public - Notary Seal State of Missouri Commissioned for Callaway County My Commission Expires: October 28, 2013 Commission Number: 14942086	Notary Public					

1	Table of Contents
2 3	
3 4	RATE DESIGN
5	REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
6	
7	\mathbf{OF}
8	
9	JAMES A. BUSCH
10	
11	MISSOURI-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY
12 13	CASE NO. WR-2015-0301
13	CASE NO. W K-2015-0301
15	
16	District Consolidation - Water 1
17	District Consolidation – Wastewater 15
18	Revenue Stabilization Mechanism and Customer Charges 16
19	MAWC's supplemental testimony23
20	Special Contracts
20	Special Contracts
21	Updates26
22	Summary27

1 2	2 REBUTTAL TESTIMONY							
3	OF							
5 6	JAMES A. BUSCH							
7 8		ANY						
9 10 11	10 CASE NO. WR-2015-0301							
12 13 14	Q. Please state your name and business address.							
15		dress is P. O. Box 360,						
16	Jefferson City, Missouri 65102.							
17	Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?							
18	A. I am the Regulatory Manager of the Water a	and Sewer Department,						
19	Commission Staff Division of the Missouri Public Service Commission (Commission).							
20	Q. Are you the same James A. Busch that has alread	y filed testimony in this						
21	proceeding?							
22	A. Yes, I am.							
23	Q. What is the purpose of your rate design rebuttal tes	stimony?						
24	A. The purpose of my rate design rebuttal testimon	ny is to respond to the						
25	testimony of Missouri-American Water Company (MAWC) with	nesses Paul Herbert and						
26	Jeanne Tinsley, Office of the Public Counsel (Public Counsel) witnesses Geoff Marke							
27	and Ralph Smith, and MIEC witness Brian Collins. Furthermore, I will be responding to							
28	the supplemental testimony filed by MAWC witnesses Herbert and Roach.							
29	District Consolidation - Water							
30	Q. What is the major difference among the parties wit	h regard to rate design?						

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- A. The major difference between the parties is whether or not the Commission should order further consolidation of rate districts or should keep the current structure in place.
 - Q. What parties have filed testimony regarding this issue?
- Staff, MAWC, Public Counsel, and MIEC have filed testimony on this A. issue.
 - Q. What are the different proposals concerning water district consolidation?
- Staff and MAWC have proposed to further consolidate MAWC's various A. water districts. Both Staff and MAWC have proposed to consolidate the water districts into three distinct districts or zones. However, Staff and MAWC differ on the makeup of the districts. Public Counsel proposed to keep the current structure in place at this time. MIEC seems to recommend district-specific pricing.
 - Q. What is the current structure?
- A. The current structure, as agreed to by the parties in MAWC's last general rate case and approved by the Commission (WR-2011-0337), left the seven largest districts (St. Louis Metro -- which consists of St. Louis County, St. Charles County, and Warren County -- Mexico, Jefferson City, Warrensburg, St. Joseph, Platte County, and Joplin) as stand-alone entities and combined the remaining districts into one district, called District 8.
 - Q. How is District 8 constructed?
- District 8 consists of ten separate districts. A. Those ten districts were grouped into four distinct sub-districts. One group, consisting of the Warsaw and Rankin Acres territories are charged a flat, monthly rate only. The other three groups have both a

customer charge and a commodity rate. The customer charge is the same among these three groups. However, the commodity rate is different among the three groups. The districts are grouped as follows: Brunswick, Spring Valley, and Lakewood Manor; Ozark Mountain and Lake Taneycomo Acres; and, Maplewood/Lake Carmel, Riverside Estates, and Stonebridge (Roark).

- Q. Has MAWC added new water districts since its last rate case?
- A. Yes. MAWC has added Saddlebrooke, Emerald Pointe, and Tri-States, all in and around the Branson area; Anna Meadows in Lincoln County near its St. Louis Metro district; and Redfield near Jefferson City.
- Q. Please describe the difference between MAWC's position and Staff's position.
- A. According to the testimony of MAWC witness Herbert (Herbert Direct, page 13, lines 17 24), MAWC divides the water districts into three zones. The zones were designed to combine districts that had similar current rates. Thus, Zone 1 contains: St. Louis Metro, St. Joseph, Joplin, Warrensburg, Maplewood, Stonebridge, Saddlebrooke, Emerald Pointe, Anna Meadows, and Tri-States. Zone 2 contains: Mexico, Jefferson City, and Platte County. Zone 3 contains: Brunswick, Ozark Mountain, Lake Taneycomo, Rankin Acres, White Branch, Spring Valley, and Lakewood Manor.

Staff's proposal combines districts based more on geographical location and operating characteristics. Staff's District 1 contains the water districts in the east-central portion of the state (St. Louis Metro, Anna Meadows, Jefferson City, Redfield, and Mexico). District 2 contains the districts located in the northwest portion of the state (St.

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Joseph, Brunswick, and Platte County). District 3 contains those districts in the southwest part of the state (Joplin and Branson area), including Sedalia area systems and Warrensburg.

- Q. Does Staff agree with MAWC's proposed consolidated districts?
- A. No.
- Q. Why not?
- By combining St. Louis Metro with St. Joseph, Joplin, and others, MAWC A. has created a district with over 95% of the company's customers. One of the major benefits of district consolidation is to spread out the rate impact of future capital costs to a larger customer base. By putting the vast majority of customers in one district or zone, but excluding others, MAWC defeats this goal. In fact, a review of MAWC's proposed Zone 3 shows that this district is made up entirely of very small water districts, with a combined customer base of approximately 1,200. Any benefits associated with consolidation or zonal pricing are negated by the lack of size of all the districts in this zone.
- Q. Since the St. Louis Metro district contains a majority of MAWC's water customers, isn't any zone or district containing that district going to have the vast majority of MAWC's water customers?
 - Yes. A.
 - Q. So why is Staff's proposed rate design more reasonable than MAWC's?
- Although Staff's District 1 also has a larger percentage of MAWC's water A. customers, it is not as disproportionate as MAWC's proposal. Further, each of Staff's proposed districts has at least one larger district as an anchor (St. Louis Metro – ~350,000

customers, St. Joseph - ~30,000 customers, and Joplin - ~21,000 customers). This creates a more balanced grouping of districts which leads to a greater benefit of spreading costs to a larger customer base. Also, Staff's proposal makes geographic sense.

- Q. Why is it important that the consolidated districts make geographic sense?
- A. In MAWC's case, many of the districts are managed by an area manager. For example, Matt Barnhart is the operations manager for Joplin and southwest operations, the Branson area districts, and Warrensburg. Staff's proposal combines all of those districts into District 3. Therefore, there is some cost justification to Staff's proposal that does not exist in MAWC's proposal.
 - Q. Have you read the direct testimony of MIEC witness Collins?
 - A. Yes, I have.
 - Q. What is Mr. Collins' recommendation?
- A. Mr. Collins, on page 8, lines 6 10, recommends that district-specific pricing be continued.
 - Q. Is there a problem with this recommendation?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. What is that problem?
- A. As noted above, the current structure contains seven independent districts and all other districts are combined into a different, separate district. Since the last rate case, MAWC has purchased additional systems. It is not clear what Mr. Collins intends to do with these additional systems. Mr. Collins' schedule BCC-1, attached to his direct testimony, includes the seven larger districts, but also separates Brunswick into its own district, separate from District 8. The schedule also seems to combine the other districts

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into one district. Thus, it is unclear if Mr. Collins is recommending complete districtspecific rates, recommending the current rate design, or proposing some other combination.

- Q. Why is this lack of clarity an issue?
- Brunswick is a relatively small district. Some of the districts that MAWC A. has purchased are actually bigger than Brunswick (~350 customers), i.e. Tri-States (~3,000). In fact, Tri-States by itself is more similar to established districts like Platte County, Warrensburg, and Mexico than to the any district in District 8. Thus, it does not make sense to separate Brunswick, but combine a bigger service district with the other small districts. Another issue is that, as described above, the systems in District 8 are further grouped together by commodity rate. Mr. Collins does not seem to address if those groupings should remain together or if they should be separated or if they should be just consolidated into one rate. If Mr. Collins suggests keeping the groupings the same, he does not have a recommendation for the newly acquired systems. Thus, Mr. Collins' recommendation is incomplete at this time.
- Q. Have you read the testimony of Public Counsel witnesses Marke and Smith?
 - Yes. A.
 - What is Public Counsel's recommendation? Q.
- A. According to Dr. Marke's testimony on page 4, lines 3 - 6, he states that further consolidation is not warranted at this time.
- Does Public Counsel's proposal have the same deficiency as MIEC's Q. proposal?

- A. Yes. Public Counsel does not specifically indicate what should happen with MAWC's newly acquired districts. Public Counsel does not indicate if those new districts should remain independent like the seven largest districts or if they should be combined within District 8. Thus, Public Counsel's recommendation is incomplete at this time as well.
- Q. Do MIEC and Public Counsel make similar arguments for their collective disagreement with consolidation of rate districts?
- A. Yes. Both parties discuss the concepts of cost causation and the potential for over-investment as significant factors in opposing further consolidation of rate districts.
 - Q. Does Staff agree with those arguments?
 - A. Fundamentally, yes.
- Q. If Staff fundamentally agrees with those arguments, why is it proposing further consolidation at this time?
- A. It is a very complex issue. In a perfect, simplistic world, district-specific pricing is the most reasonable approach to determining rates. The economic concept of cost causation, that those who cause the cost should pay, is efficient and equitable. However, we do not live in a perfect, simplistic world. Water is the one utility product that customers actually ingest. Water is the basic building block of life and the ability to access safe supplies of water is essential to the health and safety of all of Missouri's citizens as well as being a necessary infrastructure for economic growth. As water and sewer systems continue to fail and/or require significant investment to avoid further degradation and failure, different strategies must be considered to address this situation.

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Unfortunately, there are not many entities that are willing and able to purchase failing systems and make the appropriate investment in them in Missouri, or throughout the nation.

Q. Please continue.

MAWC is one of only a small handful of companies willing and able to A. take the risk associated with these types of systems in Missouri. Unfortunately, when a company like MAWC purchases a distressed system, investment is generally needed immediately or in the very near future. Once that investment is made, the cost of providing service to the system, especially if it has a small customer base, becomes prohibitive. Consolidating rates helps to spread out those costs to a much larger customer base, which means that all MAWC customers and more Missouri citizens will have access to safe and adequate water at just and reasonable rates. This extremely important public policy determination has to take precedence over the very valid concerns of cost causation.

- Q. Both MIEC and Public Counsel state that over-investment is a concern of further consolidation. What is Staff's position regarding the potential of overinvestment?
- A. Staff agrees that when service territories are consolidated, the company has an opportunity to over-invest in any particular district.
 - Q. Please explain.
- Under a more district-specific structure, any investment is going to have to A. be paid for by those customers living within that district. Thus if a large capital investment is required, it can cause a substantial amount of rate shock that will impact the

ratepayers within that district. Once districts are combined, those costs are spread over a larger customer base. Thus, the rates will not rise as dramatically. This means that the utility could, in theory, overbuild facilities and rates would not be as objectionable to customers or regulators.

- Q. Is there any incident that supports this theory?
- A. Yes. During the Flood of 1993, MAWC's water treatment facility in its St. Joseph service territory, which was already in need of major rehabilitation, was out of service for a week because it was severely damaged due to flooding. After a study of various alternatives for rehabilitation and for new reliability concerns, MAWC decided the best course of action was to replace the facility with a new plant at a different location. Part of MAWC's selling points to the customers in the St. Joseph service area was that the costs of the new facility would be spread to all MAWC customers through single-tariff pricing (STP), another name for consolidation. In the rate case that was filed to include the St. Joseph plant into rates and further the move toward single-tariff pricing (WR-2000-281), Staff, Public Counsel, and others not only argued against STP, but also argued for a prudence disallowance to certain aspects of the new facility.
 - Q. What was the Commission's decision in that proceeding?
- A. The Commission ruled against moving towards STP and went back to district-specific pricing. Further, the Commission ruled that some of the costs of the treatment facility were not prudently incurred and disallowed a portion of those costs.
 - Q. Is MAWC the same company today as it was then?
 - A. No.
 - Q. Please explain.

- A. At the time of WR-2000-281, MAWC had seven districts. Those districts were St. Charles, Mexico, Brunswick, St. Joseph, Platte County, Warrensburg, and Joplin. Today, MAWC has included St. Louis County, Jefferson City, as well as many other small water systems, not to mention its sewer operations.
 - Q. Why is the change in composition of MAWC important?
- A. The change in composition of MAWC is important because it no longer only operates in a limited number of districts of relatively similar size. It is a water utility that provides service to a single, large area with over 350,000 customers, as well as to a single, small area with only 15 customers. It has expanded to take systems that were failing and it has grown its operations. Therefore, the manner in which it is regulated through its rate design needs to evolve to address this new reality.
- Q. What are some potential consequences of maintaining the status quo regarding district consolidation?
- A. The major consequence that could occur from maintaining the status quo, in Staff's opinion, is that MAWC may decide that further acquisition of failing systems is no longer justifiable. If that occurs, the State of Missouri will lose an important player in addressing the continued provision of safe and adequate service to its citizens. Both Staff of the Commission as well as the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) reach out to MAWC, as well as other entities, when there is a failing system that needs immediate repair. MAWC's potential refusal to continue to participate in "bailing out" failing systems could be detrimental to the State of Missouri.
- Q. Has anyone at MAWC indicated to you that it plans on ceasing its current strategy of purchasing troubled water and sewer systems?

- A. Absolutely not. However, it is Staff's fear of what may happen in the future.
- Q. Due to the issues of potential over-investment if further district consolidation is approved, does Staff have a proposal to combat that threat?
- A. Yes. Staff would suggest that MAWC be required to file a five-year capital expenditure plan with the Commission for review by January 31 of each year after the effective date of rates in this case. Every party to this case would then have the ability to review MAWC's plans and make recommendations regarding investment and the need to make investments in any service area. All expenditures will still be subject to full review in MAWC's future rate cases.
- Q. On page 6, lines 15 21, of his direct testimony, Mr. Collins posits that consolidated pricing reduces MAWC's incentive to perform due diligence when acquiring new systems and this may impact the price MAWC is willing to pay. Do you have a comment on his statement?
- A. Yes. Staff has been involved with MAWC, and others, in the potential acquisition of various water and sewer utilities. Due diligence is something that all potential purchasers take very seriously. Secondly, MAWC and other potential purchasers understand that Staff does not recognize acquisition premiums for purchased systems and that the Commission has generally not granted any acquisition premium. Thus, systems are usually purchased based on the selling utility's rate base valuation, which is a generally accepted regulatory philosophy. This philosophy has worked extremely well in Missouri, keeps purchase prices in line, and avoids undue costs being borne by ratepayers.

- Q. On page 20, lines 8 and 9, Dr. Marke states that consolidated pricing would clearly give MAWC a competitive advantage in the market place for future municipal acquisitions. Does Staff agree with Dr. Marke's assertion?
- A. No. As noted earlier, MAWC is one of only a small number of utilities that is willing and able to purchase struggling water and/or sewer utilities. Thus there is not a lot of competition for water/sewer systems. Further, if another entity was more active in purchasing distressed utilities and was as diverse as MAWC, the Commission could also provide a consolidated rate structure for that entity. Moving to a consolidated rate design for MAWC does not preclude other entities from requesting similar treatment.
- Q. Please explain Staff's assertion that MAWC is one of a very small number of entities willing and able to purchase water and/or sewer utilities in Missouri.
- A. First, Staff keeps a list of entities that it has personal knowledge of that have expressed an interest in expanding its operations. The list is small and Staff is always looking to add companies to this list. Second, a water/sewer utility in receivership recently was ordered by a Circuit Court Judge to solicit bids for the transfer of its assets. This was a decent-sized system with decent revenues as far as small systems are concerned. MAWC was one of four entities to place a bid.
- Q. Starting on page 4 of his direct testimony, Mr. Collins argues against consolidated pricing stating that there is no common or economic cost structure across MAWC's districts. How does Staff's proposal address this argument?
- A. Staff's proposal addresses this argument by consolidating districts by geographic location and operating characteristics. Staff agrees that water treated in St. Louis does not go to customers in Joplin as argued by Mr. Collins and Public Counsel

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witnesses Marke and Smith. However, certain operational functions are spread over certain geographic areas within MAWC. Staff's proposal matches those operational functions with its consolidated districts. Thus, Staff's proposal takes into account those micro-cost structures.

- Q. Did you participate in any of the local public hearings (LPHs) held by the Commission for this rate case?
- A. Yes. I presented Staff's position on rate design at 10 of the 12 ordered LPHs. I did not attend the LPH held in Warsaw, mainly a sewer area, or the LPH held in Joplin.
- Q. At the ten LPHs that you did attend, was the consolidated district proposal discussed?
- A. Yes. The consolidated pricing issue was discussed in both the question and answer sessions held prior to the LPH and during the on-the-record portion of the LPH as well.
 - Q. What was the customer reaction to the proposed consolidation?
- The reaction, not surprisingly, was mixed. In areas where rates were A. proposed to be lower, customers were okay with consolidation. In areas where rates were proposed to be higher, customers did not like consolidation. The main argument against consolidation was the concept of cost causation. The main argument for consolidation was why do customers in one area pay more for the same commodity than customers in different area.

- Q. In Mr. Collins' testimony, he argues that under consolidated pricing, some districts would be providing subsidies to other districts (page 7, lines 1 -13). Do you agree with his argument?
 - A. No.
 - Q. Why not?
- A. Subsidization means that someone is paying above costs so that someone else can pay below costs. In the case of MAWC, many of the costs of providing service are not directly allocated. Costs for MAWC's ratepayers come from corporate allocations from its parent company, American Water, in New Jersey. These costs are allocated to each state that American Water operates. Further, MAWC's own Missourispecific corporate overhead costs are also allocated to each district. There are various methods of allocating costs to any given district and all parties, including Staff, do a reasonable job of allocating them. However, since many of those costs are allocated, it makes it difficult to fully determine what it actually costs to provide service to say St. Louis County compared to what it actually costs to provide service to Spring Valley. Thus, the idea of subsidization is difficult to fully accept. And due to this, consolidation of rates does not really mean that one district is "subsidizing" another district since any given allocation method could allocate more or less costs to any given district.
- Q. Does Staff agree that when districts are combined, some districts will have rates that increase and others will have rates that decrease absent any increase in revenue requirement?
- A. Yes. Staff acknowledges that some customers will see a reduction in rates while others will see an increase in rates. However, Staff's proposal will lead to just and

reasonable rates throughout MAWC's service territory and will provide long-lasting benefits to consumers and the public interest going forward.

- Q. With Staff's movement to three districts or zones, does Staff foresee further consolidation in the future?
- A. Not at this time. Staff's proposal is one that could settle the issue of consolidation for the foreseeable future. It is a fair and balanced approach to the issue of district pricing and addresses many of the concerns of all parties.

District Consolidation – Wastewater

- Q. Is there a similar argument for and against district consolidation of MAWC's wastewater districts as there is on the water side?
 - A. No.
 - Q. Please explain.
- A. MAWC proposes to combine all sewer districts into a consolidated rate district, except for the newly acquired Arnold system. Staff proposed to combine the sewer districts into five districts. However, based on Staff's cost of service recommendation, Staff has proposed maintaining the sewer rates at current levels. Public Counsel, in Mr. Smith's testimony starting on page 60, indicates that it prefers to keep the wastewater districts as is, but it believes Staff's proposal has some merit, with slight modifications.
 - Q. What is Staff's main concern with sewer rates and district consolidation?
- A. Staff's main concern is that many of MAWC's wastewater customers already pay \$65.22 per month for sewer service. Staff is concerned with magnitude of this rate and will support a rate design that does not impact this rate too much. At this time, Staff's revenue requirement allows for all wastewater rates in all districts to remain

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unchanged. However, if revenue requirement increases, Staff will move toward its proposed district consolidation and may ultimately support further consolidation as proposed by MAWC if necessary.

Revenue Stabilization Mechanism and Customer Charges

- Q. Is MAWC proposing a revenue stabilization mechanism (RSM) in this proceeding?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. What is a RSM?
- A RSM can be designed in many ways, but in this case, the RSM is a A. mechanism that will provide MAWC with a much greater probability that MAWC will receive the revenue requirement granted by the Commission in this rate case.
 - Q. Does MAWC agree that its revenues will be more certain under a RSM?
- Yes. MAWC witness Tinsley states on page 27, line 13 15, that a RSM A. "... will help **ensure** that the Company would receive the authorized revenue, no more and no less, and customers would pay the appropriate price for water service in their monthly bills..." (emphasis added).
- Q. Is it the Commission's role or responsibility to provide any guarantee that a utility has the right to earn its "authorized revenue?"
- A. No. The Commission does not guarantee that the utility will actually earn its authorized revenue. The Commission does give the utility an opportunity to earn its authorized revenue.
- What is the Commission's role then if not to guarantee authorized Q. revenues?

- A. The Commission's role is to approve a revenue requirement during the course of the rate case that is equivalent to the utility's cost of providing service. Rates are then developed that will allow the utility to charge its customers in order to collect revenues. In a perfect world, the utility would collect those revenues and the utility's actual cost will not change, so that revenues will equal cost and a fair return will be earned by shareholders. However, in the real world, usage will be greater or lesser than the level used in the rate case to create rates; costs will be lower or higher than the normalized costs used to develop the revenue requirement; or any combination of those and many other factors will occur causing revenues to be higher or lower. This is why the shareholders are allowed to earn a return on their investment to compensate them for the risk that costs and revenues will be higher or lower after rates are established. There is no guarantee that the revenues will be consistent nor any guarantee that costs will be consistent.
- Q. In Ms. Tinsley's statement, she also states that the RSM would allow the customers to pay the "appropriate price" for water service. Does Staff agree with this statement?
- A. No. The appropriate price for water service is established at the time rates are set in the rate case. Under the RSM, rates will be adjusted between rate cases. Thus, the rate that the customer will pay will either be greater or lesser than the appropriate rate that the Commission established as a just and reasonable rate in the rate case.
 - Q. How would MAWC's proposed RSM work?
 - A. At this time, it is very unclear as to how MAWC's proposal will work.
 - Q. Please explain.

- A. In Ms. Tinsley's testimony, beginning on page 28, Ms. Tinsley goes into a little detail about the mechanism. But, she starts her discussion off with, "Please **generally** describe the components...." (emphasis added). She then provides some characteristics that would be included in the RSM. However, on page 27, lines 16 17, she states, "Depending on how the RSM is designed...." So, it seems that MAWC has not provided a concrete example or methodology of how the RSM would actually work.
- Q. Did MAWC provide a sample tariff sheet for review to provide the parties and the Commission an opportunity to see how the RSM would operate?
- A. No, it did not. The Commission, Staff, and the other parties are left to the vague description within Ms. Tinsley's testimony to determine how the RSM would work.
- Q. Ms. Tinsley's testimony does go through some description of MAWC's proposed mechanism. Why does Staff think it is vague?
- A. In Staff's opinion, a request to consider establishing any sort of change to the regulatory process as consequential as what MAWC is proposing requires a full description with examples and tariff sheets for review, critique, and proposed changes. What MAWC has proposed is a shell for the mechanism, without the details needed for proper consideration.
- Q. On page 18, lines 14 22, Ms. Tinsley states that revenue is decreasing. Does Staff agree with this statement?
- A. No. Revenues have not been decreasing. Public Counsel witness Hyneman in his revenue requirement rebuttal testimony provided revenues for MAWC

since 2011 as reported in MAWC's Annual Report. Starting in 2011, revenues were \$241 million, \$276 million, \$261 million, and \$266 million, respectively.

- Q. On page 18, lines 14 22, Ms. Tinsley states that the reduction in water sales has been a source of fiscal stress for MAWC. Does Staff agree with this statement?
- A. No. Staff disagrees with the statement that MAWC has been under fiscal stress. If a utility is under fiscal stress, it should file for rate relief. MAWC waited almost as long as it was statutorily allowed to wait before it filed this rate increase case. Further, MAWC made approximately \$436 million in capital investments, plus purchased a handful of new systems, including the City of Arnold's wastewater treatment assets. Such activity does not indicate that a company is in financial stress.
- Q. Please explain the statement that MAWC waited for almost as long as it was statutorily allowed before it filed for this rate increase.
- A. MAWC utilizes the Infrastructure System Replacement Surcharge (ISRS). By statute, when MAWC establishes an ISRS, it must file a general rate case to reset the ISRS rate to zero within three years of that establishment. Thus, MAWC was required to file a rate case no later than September of this year. MAWC filed this rate case on July 31.
- Q. On page 20, lines 6 and 7, Ms. Tinsley states that MAWC's proposed RSM will advance the Commission's goals. Does Staff agree with this statement?
 - A. No. Staff is not aware of what Commission goals are being referenced.
- Q. On page 27, lines 1-7, Ms. Tinsley argues that the traditional ratemaking model clearly fails to achieve its goal if sales volumes do not **exactly** match the projected

pro forma volumes used to establish rates (emphasis added). Does Staff agree with this statement?

A. No. The traditional, cost-of-service ratemaking model has been successfully used for decades. Within that model, sales volumes will not **exactly** match those used in a given rate case. They can be higher or lower. Just like explained above, any cost or any component used in the traditional ratemaking process can be higher or lower. It is because of this variability that investors require a certain level of compensation so that they can have the opportunity to earn a fair return on their investment.

- Q. Do consumers benefit from the traditional ratemaking model?
- A. Yes. Consumers benefit from the traditional ratemaking model by having stable rates once those rates become effective in a rate proceeding. These rates are set appropriately after a thorough review of all the utilities books and records are reviewed. The RSM proposed by MAWC will allow for that rate to change without an appropriate review of all of the utility's costs and revenues. The proposed RSM as described by Ms. Tinsley shifts the risk of variability from the utility to the consumer, without any proposed reduction in risk payment to the utility or benefits accrued to the customer.
- Q. On page 31, lines 8 10, Ms. Tinsley states that MAWC's proposed RSM encourages and rewards customers for using water more efficiently, because reduced consumption translates into a reduced bill and increased consumption results in a higher bill. Does Staff agree with this statement in the context of MAWC's proposed RSM?
- A. No. Throughout her discussion regarding the RSM, Ms. Tinsley cites the Company's belief that declining usage is causing revenues to be less and thus an

alternative mechanism, such as the RSM, is needed to offset that proposition. On page 24, line 17, she states, "The current ratemaking structure is simply not well adapted to a declining usage...." Then on the other hand (page 31), MAWC is arguing that a RSM is needed to encourage customers to use less water. If the rate a customer pays for water increases in the future because the customer used less today, then the customer is not encouraged or rewarded for conserving its usage.

- Q. Does any other party agree with Staff's assessment?
- A. Yes. Public Counsel witness Gorman in his direct testimony, on page 5, lines 5 17, discusses how MAWC's proposed RSM will discourage conservation efforts.
- Q. On page 31, line 15, Ms. Tinsley states that a RSM will reduce the frequency of rate cases. Does Staff agree with that statement?
- A. No. As was mentioned earlier, MAWC is required to file a rate case within a defined period due to its use of the ISRS statute. If MAWC continues its use of the ISRS statute, there is no basis for assuming the frequency of rate cases will change.
- Q. The ISRS mechanism was mentioned earlier in this testimony. How does the ISRS mechanism impact MAWC's concerns about the alleged declining revenues?
- A. The ISRS is a mechanism that allows MAWC to recover the costs of certain types of capital expenditures it makes for the replacement of aging infrastructure. The ISRS allows MAWC to collect additional revenues of up to 10% of the revenue requirement approved by the Commission in MAWC's last rate case. So even if MAWC is experiencing declining revenues, the ISRS allows additional revenue to be collected by the Company outside the need for a rate request. If MAWC is granted a RSM, with an

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ISRS in place, MAWC will likely be guaranteed to collect more revenues between rate cases than what the Commission approved.

- Q. On pages 25 and 26 of her direct testimony, Ms. Tinsley discusses how the RSM could produce both refunds and surcharges. On page 26, she includes a graph from Ms. Pamela Morgan's paper, A Decade of Decoupling for U.S. Energy Industries, that shows rate impacts of other decoupling measures in the U.S. What does this graph show?
- A. What this graph shows is that the impacts of providing a surcharge or a refund to customers are virtually identical and that the frequency and impact are similar for either a surcharge or refund. This graph, to Staff, indicates that the current ratemaking model works. Some years, the utility may see revenues increase and some years, the utility may see revenues decrease. This graph shows that a RSM is not necessary.
 - Q. Does any other party agree with Staff's interpretation of this graph?
- Yes. On page 6, lines 1 15, Mr. Gorman also discusses the relative A. balance of the traditional ratemaking without an RSM.
 - Q. What is Staff's recommendation for MAWC's proposed RSM?
- Staff recommends that the Commission not approve MAWC's RSM as A. proposed.
 - Is Staff against all revenues stabilizations mechanisms? Q.
- A. Not necessarily. Staff might be able to support a properly designed mechanism that would provide benefits to both customers and shareholders. However, at this time, Staff does not have a recommendation on how to design such a mechanism.

1	Q. Are	there alternative methods to address some of the concerns raised by						
2	MAWC?							
3	A. Yes.							
4	Q. Pleas	se explain.						
5	A. As p	pointed out in Mr. Herbert's direct testimony, moving toward a rate						
6	structure more closely aligned with the concepts of straight fixed variable pricing (SFV)							
7	is an alternative t	o the RSM proposed by MAWC. According to Mr. Herbert's						
8	testimony, in questi	ion 39 (some of the page numbers are missing in Mr. Herbert's filed						
9	testimony), MAWO	C could have a customer charge of about \$56 if it was designed to						
10	collect 90% of MA	WC's fixed costs.						
11	Q. Did	Staff propose an increase to MAWC's customer charge?						
12	A. No,	Staff's proposed customer charge varies by district, and is generally						
13	lower than the Com	pany's proposed \$17.40 system-wide customer charge.						
14	Q. Is S	taff taking an inconsistent position by arguing against MAWC's						
15	proposed RSM, pro	oposing an alternative mechanism similar to SFV, and supporting a						
16	lower customer cha	rge?						
17	A. No.	Staff proposed customer charge is a just and reasonable rate for						
18	MAWC's customer	rs. Staff does not recommend the Commission approve MAWC's						
19	RSM proposal. He	owever, Staff recognizes that an alternative may be considered and						
20	would support a hig	ther customer charge rather than the RSM as proposed by MAWC.						
21	MAWC's s	upplemental testimony						
22	Q. Has	Staff reviewed the supplemental testimony filed by MAWC?						
23	A. Yes.							

- Q. Is there any other Staff witness filing testimony in response to MAWC's supplemental testimony?
- A. Yes. Staff expert David Murray will address MAWC witness Rungren's supplemental testimony.
- Q. On page 4, lines 5 and 6 of his supplemental testimony, Mr. Herbert states that he believes Staff, by its statements in its Analysis, has accepted that water companies have fixed costs of up to 75-80%. Does Staff agree with this assertion?
- A. No. In its Analysis, Staff stated, "it has been claimed by some utilities that approximately 75-80% of all costs of providing water service is fixed." This is by no means Staff's acceptance of the claim.
- Q. On page 5, lines 17 24 of his supplemental testimony, Mr. Herbert, in his discussion regarding inclining block rates argues for a three-block structure instead of the two-block structure suggested by Staff. Does Staff agree with this suggestion?
- A. Mr. Herbert, later in his testimony on page 6, lines 6 10, indicates that he does not believe an inclining block rate structure is necessary. Staff agrees with this statement, that an inclining block rate structure is not necessary. Thus, the difference between a two-block vs. three-block structure is most at this point.
 - Q. What is Staff's position if an inclining block rate structure is requested?
- A. In that case, Staff agrees with Public Counsel witness Marke's direct testimony that a rate design/class cost of service docket be open for MAWC to fully vet all of these potential changes. To further this point, if the Commission is interested in a revenue stabilization mechanism, Staff would recommend including that discussion in the docket as well. This way, all factors that go into the creation of rates and rate structures

can be addressed and the potential impacts can be explored prior to any actual change in regulatory practice takes place.

- Q. Did you read the supplemental testimony of Mr. Roach?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Does Staff have any comments to his supplemental testimony?
- A. No. Most of Mr. Roach's supplemental testimony is similar to the debate being held between MAWC and Staff/Public Counsel regarding declining customer usage.

Special Contracts

- Q. Does Staff propose any change to the Triumph Food contract rates?
- A. Not at this time.
- Q. Does Staff have any recommendation at this time regarding the contract rates that Triumph Foods is currently operating under?
 - A. Yes, it does.
- Q. What is Staff's recommendation concerning Triumph Foods special contract and rates?
- A. Staff recommends that a review of the contract between MAWC and Triumph Foods be conducted for consideration during MAWC's next general rate increase. In MAWC's rate case, WR-2010-0131, the contract was amended and a new commodity charge was established based upon a variable cost component and a margin component. Further, in the Stipulation and Agreement that was filed in the case and approved by the Commission, Highly Confidential Appendix D stated, among other provisions, that the Signatories agree not to request a review of the Triumph Foods contract until after December 31, 2015. As this current case was filed in July of 2015,

1	1 Staff did not request a review at the	nat time. However, since it is now past December 31,					
2	2 2015, Staff is requesting a review	2015, Staff is requesting a review of the contract be conducted and any changes deemed					
3	appropriate will be addressed in M	AWC's next general rate proceeding.					
4	Q. Does MAWC have	any other special contracts?					
5	5 A. Yes.						
6	6 Q. Does Staff have an	y recommended changes or requests regarding those					
7	7 contracts?						
8	8 A. No. Those contract	s are slightly different than the Triumph contract and					
9	9 thus are not subject to the same trea	atment.					
10	Q. Please explain.						
11	A. The other two contra	racts have been approved under a different section of					
12	the Economic Development Rider	tariff provision and also have a different term than the					
13	Triumph contract. Due to those sp	pecific differences, the rate and review that is allowed					
14	of the Triumph contract does not a	oply to the other contracts.					
15	Updates						
16	Q. Was there an error i	n Staff's water District 2 information?					
17	A. Yes. There was an	error in calculating total usage in the industrial class.					
18	Q. Did Staff update its	District 2 CCOS?					
19	A. Yes. The summary	y of Staff's new District 2 CCOS is attached to this					
20	testimony.						
21	Q. Please summarize S	taff's revised District 2 CCOS.					
22	A. Based on correcting	g the error and other minor updates, the results show					
23	the following: instead of substantia	al percentage decreases to the residential, commercial,					

and other public authority (OPA) classes and a large increase to the industrial class, the

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17 18 residential and OPA classes will receive increases, the commercial class will receive a slight decrease, and the industrial class will receive a substantial decrease. Sale for resale and the fire classes were not impacted to the same degree as the other classes.

Summary

- Q. Please summarize your testimony.
- A. Staff's proposal for rate consolidation is the most reasonable approach to designing rates. It takes some of the best arguments for district-specific pricing and single-tariff pricing and combines them into a fair and equitable rate design. Staff is opposed to MAWC's proposed revenue stabilization mechanism as proposed in its direct case. With that said, Staff would not be opposed to increasing the customer charge if a RSM is not approved by the Commission in this case, but the Commission is interested in providing more stability to MAWC.

Staff is not proposing to change any of the rates approved through the special contracts MAWC has with various industrial customers in the St. Joseph service area. However, Staff is requesting a review of the rates and the contract between MAWC and Triumph to be conducted in MAWC's next general rate request.

- Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?
- A. Yes.

Missouri American Water Company Water District 2 PSC Staff Study

Comparison of Cost of Service with Revenues under Present and Proposed Rates For Test Year Ending December 31, 2014

nange	Percent	4.93%	-2.51%	-45.30%	12.71%	-19.80%	-61.71%			-7.47%
Proposed Change	Amount	794,695	(137,664)	(2,238,309)	117,200	(505,302)	(336,435)			(2,305,815)
		\$	↔	↔	↔	\$	↔			↔
osed Rates	Percent	59.85%	18.92%	9.56%	3.68%	7.24%	0.74%	100%		
Revenues Proposed Rates	Amount	16,916,493	5,348,237	2,703,125	1,039,300	2,046,999	208,739	28,262,893	286,237	28,549,130
1		\$	\$	↔	\$	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔
ent Rates	Percent	52.74%	17.95%	16.17%	3.02%	8.27%	1.78%	100%		
Revenues Present Rates	Amount	16,121,798	5,485,901	4,941,434	922,100	2,552,301	545,174	30,568,708	286,237	30,854,945
		8	S	S	S	S	S	↔	↔	↔
	Customer Classification	Residential	Commercial	Industrial	Other Public Authority	Sale for Resale	Public and Private Fire	Total	Other Revenues	Total \$