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Witness: H. Edwin Overcast
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Case No.
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**Before the Public Service Commission
of the State of Missouri**

Direct Testimony

of

H. Edwin Overcast

June 2009

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H. EDWIN OVERCAST
ON BEHALF OF
THE EMPIRE DISTRICT GAS COMPANY
BEFORE THE MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
CASE NO.

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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
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Section 1- Introduction

Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

A. H. Edwin Overcast
P. O. Box 2946
McDonough, GA 30253

Q. WHAT IS YOUR POSITION AND BY WHO ARE YOU EMPLOYED?

A. I am a Director with Enterprise Management Solutions, a Black & Veatch Corporation.

Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU APPEARING?

A. I am appearing on behalf of The Empire District Gas Company ("EDG" or "the Company").

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND.

A. A detailed description of my educational and business background is provided in Appendix A. Briefly, I have a Ph. D. in Economics from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. I have been employed in various analytical, management and executive positions in the gas and electric industry for over 30 years. During that time, I have testified extensively on a variety of regulatory matters including cost of service and rate design for natural gas Local Distribution Companies ("LDCs") in both a bundled and unbundled service model. I have participated as an instructor in the American Gas Association Rate Fundamentals course discussing issues such as Straight Fixed Variable ("SFV") rates, decoupling and other appropriate rate design alternatives as well as cost of

1 service. I have designed and implemented SFV rates for Atlanta Gas Light
2 Company as part of their filing to unbundle natural gas service in Georgia.

3 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS**
4 **PROCEEDING?**

5 A. My testimony addresses the development of the cost of service study and the
6 appropriate rate design for gas delivery service. As part of my testimony, I
7 describe the problems inherent in recovery of fixed costs in volumetric rates. The
8 testimony demonstrates that SFV rate design strikes the best balance between the
9 competing objectives that are in play when a regulatory authority is making
10 determinations regarding the establishment of rates and charges for public utility
11 service. I demonstrate that SFV rate design matches rates and cost of service
12 more closely than is possible with traditional volumetric rates. Further, I discuss
13 the benefits of SFV incorporating more economically efficient price signals for
14 consumers. In addition, I discuss the more practical benefits of the SFV rate
15 design in minimizing adverse bill impacts on customers. I discuss the
16 combination of the current North, South and Northwest areas of the EDG system
17 in terms of distribution rates. Finally, I will discuss some proposed changes to the
18 provisions of the transportation portion of the tariff.

19 **Q. HOW IS THE TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?**

20 A. The testimony is organized in the following sections:

21 Section 1- Introduction

22 Section 2- Cost of Service Principles

23 Section 3- Results of the Cost Study

24 Section 4- Principles of Rate Design

25 Section 5- Issues with Current Volumetric Rates

26 Section 6- Alternatives to Volumetric Rates

27 Section 7- The SFV Rate Design Proposal

28 Section 8- Combining Service Areas

29 Section 9- Transportation Tariff Issues

30 Section 10- Summary

31 In addition, I am sponsoring a number of schedules attached to the testimony.

1 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR CONCLUSIONS AND**
2 **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

3 A. My testimony supports EDG's proposed SFV rate design and recommends that
4 the Missouri Public Service Commission ("Commission") adopt this approach for
5 purposes of establishing just and reasonable rates and charges that will produce
6 the revenue authorized by the Commission. I make this recommendation based
7 on the analysis of the current volumetric rate design and an application of rate
8 design and other regulatory principles. Importantly, SFV rates track costs more
9 accurately than volumetric rates and eliminate intra-class discriminatory pricing.
10 The gas distribution business is a capital intensive, fixed cost business. Under
11 volumetric rates, revenue recovery is based on sales volumes which are driven by
12 variable factors that are out of the LDC's control including, among other things,
13 weather and natural gas prices. As things presently stand, I believe the current
14 volumetric rate design is unreasonable and must be modified to: (1) help to
15 stabilize and make more predictable the month-to-month bills customers pay for
16 natural gas service provided by EDG; (2) more clearly delineate the relationship
17 between the distribution service provided by EDG and the costs related to the
18 supply of natural gas;(3) improve the quality of the price signals that occur by
19 adopting a rate design that clarifies the match between the customer's and the
20 Company's cost savings resulting from usage reductions; (4) reflect proper rate
21 design principles; (5) facilitate budgeting and funding of the capital improvements
22 that are necessary to maintain or improve the integrity of the systems of pipes and
23 mains that must stand ready to meet the service needs of natural gas customers;
24 and, (6) provide the Company with a reasonable opportunity to collect the
25 revenues authorized by the Commission. . I also believe that an SFV rate design
26 can have a useful influence on efforts to reduce the frequency of applications to
27 increase base rates.

28
29 For residential customers and the smaller general service customers, I recommend
30 a SFV rate structure that consists of an annual charge that is recovered through
31 monthly customer charges that may be either uniform or variable. For the larger

1 general service customers, I ultimately recommend an SFV rate structure that
2 consists of a customer charge and a demand charge with the demand based either
3 on an imputed demand or the contract demand of the customer. As I explain in
4 the testimony, the larger general service classes are less homogeneous than the
5 residential and small general service classes and the combination of a customer
6 and demand charge tracks cost better than the single annual charge. Based on
7 discussions with EDG, we have not proposed to go completely to the
8 recommended SFV rates but rather to make an interim step in order to have the
9 time to refine the basis for customer groups and the SFV rate design.

10
11 **Section 2- Cost of Service Principles**

12
13 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE AND USE OF THE COST OF SERVICE**
14 **STUDY?**

15 A. There are many purposes for utility cost analysis ranging from designing
16 appropriate price signals to determining the share of costs or revenue
17 requirements borne by various rate classes. In this case, the cost study is a useful
18 guide for the allocation of the revenue requirements.

19 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE VARIOUS TYPES OF COST OF SERVICE**
20 **STUDIES THAT MAY BE USEFUL FOR RATE DESIGN AND THE**
21 **ALLOCATION OF REVENUE REQUIREMENTS.**

22 A. In general, cost studies may be based on embedded costs or marginal cost.
23 Embedded cost studies analyze the costs for a test period based on either the book
24 value of accounting costs (a historical period) or the estimated book value of costs
25 for a forecast test year. Typically, embedded cost studies are used to allocate the
26 revenue requirement between classes and between customers within a class.
27 Marginal cost studies do not reflect actual costs but rely on estimates of the
28 expected changes in cost associated with changes in service. Marginal cost
29 studies are forward looking to the extent permitted by available data. Marginal

1 cost studies are useful for rate design where it is important to send appropriate
2 price signals associated with additional consumption by customers.

3 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE REASON THAT COST OF SERVICE STUDIES**
4 **ARE USED.**

5 A. Cost studies represent an attempt to analyze which customer or group of
6 customers cause the utility to incur the costs to provide service. The requirement
7 to develop cost studies results from the nature of utility costs. Utility costs are
8 characterized by the existence of common and joint costs¹. In addition, utility
9 costs may be fixed or variable costs². Finally, utility costs exhibit significant
10 economies of scale³. These characteristics have implications for both cost
11 analysis and rate design from a theoretical and practical perspective. The
12 development of cost studies, either marginal or embedded, requires an
13 understanding of the operating characteristics of the utility system. Further, as
14 discussed below, different cost studies provide different contributions to the
15 development of economically efficient rates and the cost responsibility by
16 customer class.

17 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE ECONOMIC THEORY UNDER-PINNING COST**
18 **ANALYSIS.**

19 A. Economic theory holds that efficient prices equal short-run marginal cost. For a
20 gas utility characterized by economies of scale, setting prices based on marginal
21 costs will not produce adequate revenues because marginal cost is below average
22 cost. Utilities must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to earn a return of and on
23 the assets used to serve customers. Since the utility could not satisfy the revenue
24 adequacy constraint with prices based on marginal cost, economists developed a
25 theoretical approach to reconciling marginal cost based prices with the revenue

¹ Common costs occur when the fixed costs of providing service to one or more classes or the cost of proving multiple products to the same class use the same facilities and the use by one class precludes the use by another class. Joint costs occur when two or more products are produced simultaneously by the same facilities in fixed proportions. In either case, the allocation of such costs is arbitrary in a theoretical economic sense.

² Fixed costs do not change with the level of output while variable costs change directly with the utility output. Most non-fuel related utility costs are fixed and do not vary with changes in load.

³ Scale economies result in declining average cost as output increases and marginal costs below average costs.

1 constraint. The theory of Ramsey pricing resolves the revenue adequacy issue by
2 suggesting that raising prices above marginal cost in relation to the inverse of the
3 price elasticity of the product or service provided results in the least societal
4 welfare loss from prices that differ from marginal cost.

5

6 Under Ramsey pricing (a form of differential pricing), customers' rates are
7 increased above marginal cost until the rates produce adequate revenues.
8 Increases are largest for those customers or classes of service whose demand is
9 most inelastic. To implement Ramsey pricing requires, among other things,
10 estimates of customer or class price elasticity. Since estimating price elasticity
11 for gas service is complex, utilities developed other practical methods for
12 resolving the revenue adequacy issue. Alternatively, the theory of multi-part
13 pricing suggests that it is possible to recover average costs from infra-marginal
14 prices while setting the marginal price equal to marginal cost. Thus, the use of
15 block rates permits efficient prices while recovering total revenue requirements.
16 Other examples of efficiency based rates includes the concept of fixed variable
17 rate design where fixed cost recovery occurs through fixed charges (since fixed
18 costs do not contribute to marginal cost) and variable charges recover variable
19 costs.

20

21 The theory of pricing also requires a theory of class or service cost allocation.
22 However, the existence of joint and common costs makes any allocation of costs
23 arbitrary. This is theoretically true for any of the various marginal or embedded
24 cost methods that may be used to allocate costs. Theoretical economists have
25 developed the theory of subsidy free prices to evaluate traditional regulatory cost
26 allocations. Prices are said to be subsidy free so long as the price exceeds
27 marginal cost but is less than stand alone costs ("SAC"). Indeed all of this theory
28 provides useful insight to the regulatory process where, as a practical matter, costs
29 must be allocated between classes of service and within classes of service. For
30 example, if the process of cost allocation results in rates that exceed stand alone
31 costs for some customers, prices must be set below the stand alone cost but above

1 marginal cost to assure that those customers make the maximum practical
2 contribution to common costs. SAC plays a role in addressing issues such as gas
3 bypass where customers may potentially exit the grid. SAC represents an element
4 of the allocation process for cost studies and is an alternative to the concept of
5 fully allocated costs. Unlike other more conventional allocation methods SAC
6 relies on estimated replacement costs rather than actual costs.

7 **Q. IF ANY ALLOCATION OF COMMON COST IS ARBITRARY, HOW IS**
8 **IT POSSIBLE TO MEET THE PRACTICAL REQUIREMENTS OF COST**
9 **ALLOCATION?**

10 A. As noted above, the practical reality of regulation often requires that common
11 costs be allocated among jurisdictions, classes of service, rate schedules and
12 customers within rate schedules. The key to a reasonable cost allocation is an
13 understanding of cost causation. Under the traditional embedded cost allocation,
14 the process follows three steps: functionalization, classification and allocation.
15 This three step process underlies the determination of cost causation. By
16 identifying the functions of utility service- supply, storage, transmission,
17 distribution and customer for gas service- and the costs of these functions, the
18 foundation is laid for classifying costs based on the factors that cause the utility to
19 incur these costs- commodity, demand and customers. The development of
20 allocation factors by rate schedule or class uses principles of both economics and
21 engineering to develop allocation factors appropriate for different elements of
22 costs. Embedded cost allocation may provide the class costs associated with
23 actual test year revenue requirements or simply the relationship between costs and
24 revenues for an historic period by customer class.

25 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE ELEMENTS OF MARGINAL COST ANALYSIS.**

26 A. Marginal cost studies, in contrast to embedded cost studies, focus on the change
27 in costs associated with a small change in output. Marginal costs are forward
28 looking and require making estimates of future costs with an understanding of the
29 elements that drive those future costs. As a practical matter, marginal costs bear
30 no relationship to the mix of actual historical costs that constitute the utility

1 revenue requirement. The reasons that marginal costs do not reflect actual costs
2 include the following:

- 3 1. The relationship between historic and prospective costs reflects changes in
4 technology.
- 5 2. Sunk costs (the fixed cost of the existing system) do not impact marginal cost
6 but may account for a large portion of the test year revenue requirement,
7 particularly where economies of scale are significant.
- 8 3. The underlying impacts of inflation on prospective costs differ from past
9 costs.
- 10 4. Additions to capacity are lumpy and as a result utilities optimal additions
11 often include more capacity than the marginal change in load.

12
13 To estimate marginal cost, the first step requires determining the change in cost
14 associated with the consumption of one more therm of natural gas. Essentially,
15 marginal costs require an understanding of the system planning process. Often,
16 however, the planning process does not provide all of the information necessary
17 to develop marginal cost estimates. For the commodity component of marginal
18 cost, the existence of competitive wholesale markets provides a direct basis for
19 estimating marginal commodity costs. The rationale for this statement relies on
20 the economics of competition where prices equal marginal cost in competitive
21 markets. Having markets for gas commodity allows the direct estimation of
22 marginal costs from the market.

23
24 To the extent that marginal costs differ by hour or by season, wholesale markets
25 provide the basis for this determination. Where the utility purchases default
26 service from the market at a fixed rate, the fixed rate provides the appropriate
27 marginal commodity cost determination. Thus the existence of commodity
28 markets and active futures markets makes the estimation of commodity marginal
29 costs both less complex and more accurate.

1 The second step in the determination of marginal cost relates to the change in
2 capacity requirements as measured by the daily therm demand of gas. Unlike the
3 commodity determination, there is no competitive market for either transmission
4 or distribution. Thus it is necessary to estimate how capacity demand influences
5 the costs for distribution and transmission. The analysis begins by recognizing
6 that the capacity demand is different for transmission and distribution because the
7 load diversity increases as the analysis becomes remote from individual
8 customers. Initially, the capacity requirements for transmission reflect the
9 coincident demand for the transmission system as measured by loads on
10 transmission. The capacity requirements for the distribution system must reflect
11 the non-coincident demands on the system since delivery must satisfy the local
12 demands that may not be coincident with the system peaks for a number of
13 reasons. Although, for customers who use the gas system for heating, as opposed
14 to process or interruptible services, demands tend to be coincident. For process
15 and interruptible customers, marginal cost is zero for existing customers unless
16 the customer expands operations. If expansion occurs marginal cost is the cost
17 incurred to expand capacity to meet contract demand.

18
19 Gas customers in the residential and commercial service classes exhibit declining
20 use per customer due to the improved efficiency of capital stock replacement and
21 improvements to the thermal envelope. This declining use per customer creates
22 additional design day capacity within the existing system to serve new loads. As
23 a result, the growth in transmission plant and distribution plant for gas customers
24 reflects the growth in number of customers using gas service. For existing
25 customers the marginal distribution and transmission capacity related cost is
26 actually zero. Marginal cost for new customers is the driver for the new
27 investment in the gas system along with the replacement of aging infrastructure.
28 Further, for gas service there are substantial economies of scale associated with
29 gas distribution infrastructure such that the unit cost of capacity for gas delivery
30 declines with size at a relatively rapid rate. The resulting marginal cost becomes
31 the customer related expansion of main and service for gas delivery.

1 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE SCALE ECONOMIES ASSOCIATED WITH GAS**
2 **DISTRIBUTION SERVICE.**

3 A. Gas system scale economies reflect the relationship between the installed cost of
4 pipe by size and type coupled with the increased capacity from pressure and pipe
5 diameter. Simply doubling the size of the gas main more than doubles the
6 available capacity of the main at a cost approximately equal to or less than double
7 the smaller size all else equal. For a low pressure system, increasing pipe size
8 from two inch to four inch allows over five times the amount of gas to flow and
9 under higher pressure, the flow rate increases by more than six times that of two
10 inch pipe all else equal. The resulting cost causation implies that larger customers
11 impose lower per unit costs on the distribution system than do smaller customers.
12 Table 1 below provides the data for EDG on the installed cost per foot of main
13 and the available capacity to serve load based on standard operating pressure for
14 the system.

Table 1
Main Cost Comparisons

| Size of Main | Materials Costs per foot | Installation Costs per foot | Total cost per foot | Design Day Capacity* | Cost per foot of Design Capacity |
|--------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|
| 2 inch | \$1.10 | \$3.78 | \$4.88 | 195 Mcf/day | \$0.025 |
| 4 inch | \$3.57 | \$6.35 | \$9.92 | 1,102 Mcf/day | \$0.009 |

*Based on 5280 feet of main

15 Further, given the customer density for the EDG system of 46 customers per mile
16 of line, the minimum size of pipe installed will serve the design day load
17 characteristics of the smallest customers and even for larger customers up to 387
18 Mcf per year assuming a 25 percent annual load factor. This means that
19 residential customers using under 387 Mcf annually have the same cost as all
20 other residential customers. EDG has almost no residential customers this large.
21 Thus, all residential customers are fully served by the minimum system and thus
22 have the same delivery service costs.

1 **Q. WHAT IMPLICATIONS RESULT FROM SCALE ECONOMIES AND**
2 **THE EDG DATA RELATED TO COST OF SERVICE AND RATE**
3 **DESIGN?**

4 A. The implication of these conclusions for both cost allocation (either marginal or
5 embedded) and rate design on the gas system are quite important. Namely, the
6 recovery of distribution costs through volumetric charges creates intraclass
7 subsidies from larger customers to smaller customers and those subsidies may be
8 quite large. Further, the failure to recover fixed costs in fixed charges results in
9 inefficient price signals and causes customers to bear the consequences of the
10 inefficiency. Finally, the cost to serve residential customers (excluding gas costs)
11 is the same regardless of the size of customer since the minimum system installed
12 by the Company will serve nearly every residential customer.

13 **Q. WHAT FACTORS CAUSE THE LDC TO INCUR DISTRIBUTION**
14 **COSTS?**

15 A. Both marginal and embedded costs for the distribution system are determined by
16 two major factors: (1) the number and location of customers and (2) their
17 demands (albeit for gas distribution the impact of demand becomes less important
18 when pipe scale economies for residential and small commercial customers cause
19 the minimum installation to also serve design day demand.) Utility cost studies,
20 both marginal and embedded, have traditionally attempted to identify a portion of
21 distribution costs as customer-related and the remaining portion as demand-
22 related. While it is true that marginal demand costs play a role in the installed
23 facilities, the customer considerations play a much larger role since local facilities
24 and policies reflect the underlying customer mix and density. The critical issue
25 for a gas system is that the system provides sufficient capacity to meet the design
26 day load requirements of customers. For residential and the smallest general
27 service customers, the smallest distribution pipe installed on the system will serve
28 the design day capacity of these customers. As a result, the cost to serve the
29 individual customers in these classes is the same regardless of the design day
30 demand.

1 **Section 3- Results of the Cost Study**

2
3 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE APPLICATION OF THE THREE STEPS IN THE**
4 **COST OF SERVICE STUDY.**

5 A. Cost are functionalized and classified in the study based on data from the Uniform
6 System of Accounts (USOA). The cost study uses two types of allocation factors:
7 external factors and internal factors. *External* allocation factors are based on
8 direct knowledge from data in the utility's accounting and other records. For
9 example, transmission costs are functionalized to transmission FERC accounts
10 and are assigned by an external transmission allocation factor. Another example
11 of an external allocation factor is allocation of distribution mains. The cost of
12 distribution mains are known and assigned directly to the distribution function.
13 Once assigned to distribution, mains are allocated using the minimum system as
14 the external allocation factor. *Internal* allocation factors are based on some
15 combination of external allocation factors, previously directly assigned costs and
16 other internal allocation factors. For example, the allocation factors for property
17 insurance costs are based on plant investment amounts assigned to each function;
18 it is necessary to compute the amount of plant by function before property
19 insurance costs can be assigned. Both external and internal allocation factors are
20 used in each of the functional, and classification steps outlined below.

21 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RESULTS OF THE ALLOCATION PROCESS**
22 **AS APPLIED TO THE USOA.**

23 A. The follow section outlines by FERC account the allocation of costs to each
24 function and classification.

25
26 A. Intangible Plant (FERC Accounts 301-303)

27 Intangible plant is functionalized and classified based on plant or labor.

28
29 B. Production Plant - None

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C. Natural Gas Storage Plant and Expenses -None

D. Transmission Plant and Expenses

1. Plant

Transmission Plant (FERC Accounts 365-371) represents measuring and regulating equipment and other associated equipment used to track volumes and heat content of gas entering the distribution system. The cost of this equipment is functionalized to Transmission, and classified to Demand.

2. Expense

Transmission Operation & Maintenance (FERC Accounts 850-865) are functionalized, and classified based on FERC Accounts 365-371.

E. Distribution Plant and Expenses

1. Distribution Plant (FERC Accounts 374-385)

a. Mains (FERC Account 376)

Mains are functionalized to Distribution, and then classified as either Distribution Customer or Distribution Demand. The customer component percentage was determined by taking the ratio of the cost of replacing the present distribution system verse replacing the total system with only the minimum size main. The minimum size main was determined to be 2” main.

As a result of employing the minimum-size concept, 77% of the distribution mains were classified as customer related and 23% distribution demand related.

b. Services (FERC Account 380)

Services are functionalized to Distribution, and then classified to Distribution Customer.

c. Meters (FERC Account 381)

Meter-Plant is functionalized to Distribution, and then classified to Distribution Customer.

d. Measuring and Regulating Station Equipment (FERC Account 378)

1 Measuring and regulating equipment is functionalized to Distribution, and
2 classified to Demand.

3 e. Structures and Improvements (FERC Account 375)

4 Structures and Improvements are functionalized to Distribution, and classified to
5 Demand.

6 f. Land and Land Rights (FERC Accounts 374)

7 Land and Land rights are functionalized to Distribution, and classified to Demand

8 2. Distribution Expenses (FERC Accounts 870-895)

9 a. Operation of Mains/Services (FERC Account 874)

10 Operating Expense for mains and services are functionalized and classified
11 proportionally based on Accounts 376 and 380.

12 b. Measuring and Regulating Operation Expenses (FERC Account 875)

13 Measuring and Regulating operating expenses are functionalized to Distribution,
14 and classified to Demand.

15 c. Meter and House Regulator Operation Expenses (FERC Account 878)

16 Meter and House Regulator Expenses are functionalized and classified based on
17 FERC Account 381.

18 d. Customer Installation Expenses (FERC Account 879)

19 Customer Installation Expenses are functionalized to Distribution, classified to
20 Customer.

21 e. Distribution Rents (FERC Account 881)

22 Rents are functionalized and classified based on other distribution accounts.

23 f. Maintenance of Mains (FERC Account 887)

24 Maintenance of mains is functionalized and classified based on FERC Account
25 376.

26 g. Maintenance of Services (FERC Account 892)

27 Maintenance of Services is functionalized and classified based on FERC Account
28 380.

29 h. Meters and House Regulators – Maintenance (FERC Account 893)

30 Maintenance of Meters and House Regulators is functionalized and classified
31 based on FERC Account 381.

1 i. Measuring and Regulating Maintenance Expenses (FERC Accounts 889 to 890)

2 Measuring and Regulating maintenance expense is functionalized to Distribution,
3 and classified to Demand.

4 j. Maintenance of Structures (FERC Account 886)

5 Maintenance of Structures is functionalized and classified based on FERC
6 Account 375.

7

8 F. General Plant (FERC Accounts 390-398)

9 General Plant accounts are functionalized and classified based on labor.

10

11 G. Depreciation Reserve (FERC Account 108-111)

12 Depreciation Reserve accounts are functionalized and classified based on their
13 corresponding gross plant values.

14

15 H. Other Rate Base Items

16 These various accounts are functionalized and classified based on labor or plant.

17

18 I. Customer Accounts Expenses

19 1. Meter Reading Expense (FERC Accounts 902)

20 Meter Reading Expense is functionalized and classified to Customer.

21 2. Customer Records & Collection Expense (FERC Accounts 903)

22 Customer Records & Collection Expense are functionalized and classified to
23 customer.

24 3. Uncollectible Account Expenses (FERC Account 904)

25 Uncollectible Accounts Expense is functionalized and classified based on
26 Customers

27 J. Customer Service & Information Expenses

28 1. Call Center (FERC Account 908)

29 Call Center Expenses are functionalized and classified to Customer.

30

31 2. Inform. & Instruct Advertising (FERC Account 909)

1 Information & Instructional Advertising Expenses are functionalized and
2 classified to Customer.

3 K. Administrative and General Expenses (Accounts 920-939)

4 Administrative and General Expenses are identified in two groups: labor related,
5 and plant related. Labor related expenses are functionalized and classified
6 according to labor in each function. Plant related expenses are functionalized and
7 classified according to plant in each function.

8
9 L. Depreciation and Amortization (FERC Accounts 403-407)

10 Depreciation and Amortization Expenses are functionalized and classified the
11 same as the allocation of Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization.

12

13 M. General Tax, Payroll and Real Estate Tax

14 Payroll taxes were functionalized and classified based on labor. Real Estate Taxes
15 were functionalized and classified based on Plant.

16

17 N. Revenue Taxes

18 Revenue Taxes were functionalized, and classified based on revenue.

19

20 O. Income Taxes

21 Income Taxes were functionalized and classified based on revenue.

22

23 P. Revenue and Other Revenue

24 Revenues were functionalized and classified based on revenue requirements and
25 allocated based on actual revenues collected from each class in the Test Period.

26 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF THE COST OF SERVICE**
27 **STUDY.**

28 A. The cost study results are summarized in the following table:

Table 2

THE EDG DISTRICT GAS COMPANY
Class Cost of Service Study
Test Year Ended Dec. 31, 2008

| Rate Class | Actual Return |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| N&S- Res-RS | -0.4% |
| NW- Res-RS | -1.2% |
| N&S- Sm Comm-SCF | 23.5% |
| NW- Sm Comm-SCF | 18.8% |
| N&S- Sm Vol Firm-SVF | 37.1% |
| NW- Sm Vol Firm-SVF | 35.4% |
| N&S- Lg Vol Firm-LVF | 12.0% |
| NW- Lg Vol Firm-LVF | 11.3% |
| N&S- Lg Vol Int-LVI | 92.2% |
| NW- Lg Vol Int-LVI | 0.0% |
| N&S- Tran Sm Vol-SVTS | 44.4% |
| NW- Tran Sm Vol-SVTS | 41.1% |
| N&S- Tran Lg Vol-LVTS | 8.9% |
| NW- Tran Lg Vol-LVTS | 17.4% |

1 As the table illustrates, residential returns are currently below the system average
2 return. Most of the other classes of service have higher returns. Returns on the
3 NW system are below the returns for the N&S systems with the exception of rates
4 for large volume customers. As a result, it is appropriate to allocate a larger
5 portion of the rate increase to residential customers and minimize the increases to
6 other classes.

7 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE COST OF SERVICE SCHEDULES**
8 **ATTACHED TO THE TESTIMONY.**

9 A. There are five schedules attached to the testimony that provide the results of the
10 cost of service study. Schedule HEO-1 consists of 18 pages and represents the
11 results of the class cost of service study for the test year ended December 31,
12 2008. Each page contains an account description or label for those items not part
13 of the uniform system of accounts. Where the item is part of the uniform system
14 of accounts, the account number is provided. The total dollars for each account is

also provided. The remainder of the page shows the proportion of each account allocated to each rate schedule. Pages 13 and 14 provide the net income and earned return for each rate schedule. Pages 17 and 18 provide the revenue requirement for each rate schedule. Schedule HEO-2 consists of seven pages and provides the summary of account functionalization. Schedule HEO-3 consists of six pages and summarizes the classification of the distribution function accounts. Schedule HEO-4 consists of 126 pages and provides the allocation of each account by classification and by rate schedule. Finally, Schedule HEO-5 consists of 10 pages and provides a summary of the allocation factors by account and function.

Section 4- Principles of Rate Design

Q. PLEASE IDENTIFY THE PRINCIPLES OF RATE DESIGN YOU HAVE RELIED ON TO RECOMMEND THE RATE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSED BELOW TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF FIXED COST RECOVERY.

A. A number of rate design principles or objectives find broad acceptance in regulatory and policy literature. These include:

1. Efficiency;
2. Cost of Service;
3. Value of Service;
4. Stability;
5. Non-Discrimination;
6. Administrative Simplicity; and
7. Balanced Budget.

These rate design principles draw heavily on the “Attributes of a Sound Rate Structure” developed by James Bonbright in Principles of Public Utility Rates. Each of these principles plays an important role in analyzing the proposals

1 developed in my testimony. To understand the role these principles play, the
2 following discusses each of the principles.

3 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE PRINCIPLE OF EFFICIENCY.**

4 A. The principle of efficiency broadly incorporates both economic and technical
5 efficiency. As such, this principle has both a pricing dimension and an
6 engineering dimension. Economically efficient pricing promotes good decision-
7 making by gas producers and consumers, fosters efficient expansion of delivery
8 capacity, results in efficient capital investment in customer facilities and
9 facilitates the efficient use of existing pipeline, storage and distribution resources.
10 The efficiency principle benefits stakeholders by creating outcomes for regulation
11 consistent with the long-run benefits of competition while permitting the
12 economies of scale consistent with the best cost of service. Technical efficiency
13 means that the development of the system is designed and constructed to meet the
14 design day requirements of customers using the most economic equipment and
15 technology consistent with design standards.

16 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE COST OF SERVICE AND VALUE OF SERVICE**
17 **PRINCIPLES.**

18 A. These principles each relate to designing rates that recover the total revenue
19 requirement without causing inefficient choices by consumers. The cost of
20 service principle contrasts with the value of service principle when certain
21 transactions do not occur at price levels determined by embedded cost of service.
22 In essence, the value of service acts as a ceiling on prices. Where prices are set at
23 levels higher than the value of service, consumers will not purchase the service.

24

25 The calculation of a “true” cost of service is complicated by the fact that for
26 network industries like the natural gas distribution industry, the provision of
27 public utility service often involves joint and common costs which must be
28 allocated (rather than directly assigned) to specific customer classes or rate
29 schedules to develop a full cost of service study. While a good fully distributed
30 cost of service analysis can be performed using principles of cost causation,
31 informed judgment is nonetheless required to perform such a study. A fully

1 distributed cost of service study, properly reflecting cost causation principles and
2 employing sound methods, provides a reasonable tool for the allocation of the
3 total revenue requirement to customer classes (interclass distribution) and within
4 the customer classes (intraclass distribution).

5 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE PRINCIPLE OF STABILITY.**

6 A. The principle of stability typically applies to customer rates. This principle
7 suggests that reasonably stable and predictable prices are important objectives of
8 a proper rate design.

9 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE CONCEPT OF NON-DISCRIMINATION.**

10 A. The concept of non-discrimination requires prices designed to promote fairness
11 and avoid undue discrimination. Fairness requires no undue subsidization either
12 between customers in the same class or across different classes of customers.

13

14 This principle recognizes that the ratemaking process requires discrimination
15 where there are factors at work that cause the discrimination to be useful in
16 accomplishing other objectives. For example, things like the location, type of
17 meter and service, demand characteristics, size, and a variety of other
18 considerations are often recognized in the design of utility rates to properly
19 distribute the total cost of service to and within customer classes.

20 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE**
21 **SIMPLICITY.**

22 A. The principle of administrative simplicity as it relates to rate design requires
23 prices reasonably simple to administer and understand. This concept includes
24 price transparency within the constraints of the ratemaking process. Prices are
25 transparent when customers are able to reasonably calculate and predict bill levels
26 and interpret details about the charges resulting from the application of the tariff.

27 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE BALANCED BUDGET.**

28 A. Finally, there is the critical principle that rate design permits the utility a
29 reasonable opportunity to recover the allowed revenue requirement based on the
30 cost of service. Proper design of utility rates is a necessary condition to enable an
31 effective opportunity to recover the cost of providing service included in the

1 revenue authorized by the regulatory authority. This principle is very similar to
2 the stability objective that I previously discussed from the perspective of customer
3 rates.

4 **Q. AT TIMES, CAN THE OBJECTIVES EMBEDDED IN THESE**
5 **PRINCIPLES COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER?**

6 A. Yes, like most principles that have broad application, these principles can
7 compete with each other. This competition or tension requires further judgment
8 to strike the right balance between the principles. Detailed evaluation of rate
9 design alternatives and rate design recommendations must recognize the potential
10 and actual competition between these principles. Indeed, Bonbright discusses this
11 tension in detail. Rate design recommendations must deal effectively with such
12 tension. For example, as noted above, there are tensions between cost and value
13 of service principles.

14 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MARGINAL COST**
15 **PRICE SIGNALS AND THE RECOVERY OF THE REVENUE**
16 **REQUIREMENT.**

17 A. The conflict between good price signals based on marginal cost and a balanced
18 budget or revenue recovery principle arises because marginal cost is below
19 average cost due to economies of scale. Where fixed delivery service costs do not
20 vary with volume of gas sales, marginal costs for delivery equal zero. Marginal
21 customer costs equal the additional cost of providing the entire delivery service to
22 the customer. Marginal cost tends to be either above or below average cost in
23 both the short run and the long run. This means that marginal cost-based pricing
24 will produce either too much or too little revenue to support the revenue
25 requirement. This suggests that efficient price signals may require a multi-part
26 tariff designed to meet the revenue requirements while sending marginal cost
27 price signals related to consumption decisions. Properly designed, a multi-part
28 tariff may include elements such as access charges, facilities charges, demand
29 charges, consumption charges and the potential for revenue credits. In the case of
30 a gas LDC, for residential and small commercial customers the combination of
31 scale economies and class homogeneity permits the use of a single fixed annual

1 charge that meets all of the requirements for an efficient rate and recovers the
2 embedded cost revenue requirement. For larger customers, a combination of
3 these elements permit good price signals and revenue recovery; however, the
4 tariff design becomes more difficult to structure and likely will no longer meet the
5 requirements of simplicity. Therefore, sacrificing some economic efficiency for a
6 customer class in order to maintain simplicity represents a reasonable
7 compromise. For larger customers the added complexity of a demand charge is
8 not a concern. Further, for the largest customers, the cost of metering is customer
9 specific and each customer creates its own unique requirements for distribution
10 service based on factors such as distance from the city gate, pressure requirements
11 and contract demand.

12 **Q. ARE THERE OTHER POTENTIAL CONFLICTS?**

13 **A.** Yes. There are potential conflicts between simplicity and non-discrimination and
14 between value of service and non-discrimination. Other potential conflicts arise
15 where companies face unique circumstances that must be considered as part of the
16 rate design process.

17 **Q. HOW ARE THESE PRINCIPLES TRANSLATED INTO THE DESIGN OF**
18 **RETAIL GAS RATES?**

19 **A.** The process of developing rates within the context of these principles and
20 conflicts requires a detailed understanding of all the factors that impact rate
21 design. These factors include:

- 22 1. System cost characteristics such as the embedded customer,
23 demand and commodity related costs by type of service;
- 24 2. Customer load characteristics such as peak demand, load factor,
25 seasonality of loads, and quality of service;
- 26 3. Market considerations such as elasticity of demand, competitive
27 fuel prices, end-use load characteristics and bypass alternatives;
28 and
- 29 4. Other considerations such as the value of service ceiling/marginal
30 cost floor, unique customer requirements, areas of under-utilized

1 facilities, opportunities to offer new services and the status of
2 competitive market development.

3
4 In addition, the development of rates must consider existing rates and the
5 customer impact of modifications to the rates.

6 In each case, a rate design seeks to recover the authorized level of revenue based
7 on the actual billing determinants occurring during the test period used to develop
8 the rates.

9
10 **Section 5- Issues with Current Volumetric Rates**

11
12 **Q. PLEASE GENERALLY DESCRIBE THE CURRENT EDG GAS RATES.**

13 A. EDG's current residential service base rates consist of a customer charge and a
14 flat volumetric charge for distribution. Both the customer charge and the
15 volumetric charge differ for the North and South portions of the system when
16 compared to the NW portion of the system. The volumetric charge is a per Ccf
17 charge. The small general service base rates consist of a customer charge and a
18 volumetric charge. For both residential and small general service customers the
19 rate also includes a volumetric Purchased Gas Adjustment (PGA) charge and a
20 Tax and License Rider charge in addition to the applicable base rate charges. The
21 PGA charge differs by each system- North, South and NW based on the costs
22 associated with the interstate pipelines that serve each segment of the system.

23
24 The customer charge and volumetric charge, referred to as base rate charges,
25 recover the delivery service costs, including the costs that are incurred as a
26 function of the number of customers and the design day demand that is placed on
27 EDG's distribution system. Base rate costs represent the costs incurred to provide
28 distribution service since the PGA is designed to recover the delivered cost of
29 natural gas supply plus applicable storage service costs.

1

2 The PGA charge recovers the delivered cost of obtaining a natural gas supply
3 required to meet the needs of customers. Various other specific purpose
4 adjustment charges or riders apply in accordance with their respective
5 applicability language.

6 From a total annual bill perspective, the revenue that EDG collects volumetrically
7 through the PGA is substantially greater than the revenue that is collected to cover
8 the costs incurred to provide base rate service. For example and based on the test
9 year data presented by EDG, the annual PGA revenue is about 70 percent of the
10 total annual bill for a typical residential customer. My recommended SFV rate
11 design better informs the customer about efficient conservation choices by letting
12 the customer know that the cost of base rate service is not avoided by a reduction
13 in annual usage volumes.

14 **Q. ARE RATE DESIGN CHANGES REQUIRED TO PROMOTE**
15 **ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY?**

16 A. Yes. The current volumetric rate design is unreasonable in my opinion because it
17 does a poor job of aligning the revenue recovered by EDG for providing service
18 with the costs incurred to provide base rate service. As a result of this poor
19 alignment, the current rate design works against the goal of ensuring that EDG is
20 provided a reasonable opportunity to recover its costs including a return of and on
21 the capital that has been invested in the property, plant and equipment that is used
22 and useful in providing natural gas distribution service.

23

24 Once revenues are authorized as part of the ratemaking process and recovery is
25 attempted through a volumetric rate design, the volumetric rate design will almost
26 certainly produce too much or too little revenue to match the fixed costs of
27 providing natural gas distribution service. In current circumstances, I believe that
28 preserving volumetric rate design for distribution service simply because it has
29 been used historically will work against fundamental regulatory principles and,

1 when compared to SFV, does a poor job of balancing the interests of customers
2 and EDG's shareholders.

3
4 Failure to provide a rate design by which a reasonable opportunity for cost
5 recovery is realized also causes inefficiencies relative to the removal of
6 disincentives for conservation, long-term capital investment and efficient access
7 to capital markets.

8
9 As explained in more detail below, changing EDG's rate design is critical to the
10 long-term provision of efficient, reliable and cost-effective delivery service. To
11 understand more fully the problems created by a volumetric rate design for base
12 rate service, it is important to understand certain basic utility cost concepts.

13 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF DELIVERY SERVICE COSTS**
14 **RECOVERED IN DISTRIBUTION RATES.**

15 A. LDC delivery service costs are fixed costs and do not vary with throughput. An
16 LDC designs and installs a distribution system capable of meeting its customers'
17 design day requirements at the time of initial installation. These facilities include
18 the city gate, mains and pressure regulating facilities, services, meters and
19 regulators all designed to meet the design day requirements of customers at the
20 time of the installation. Placing these facilities in service permits the LDC to
21 serve the changes in load due to extreme weather (the design day peak load) or
22 economic conditions. Once facilities serve customers, the costs associated with
23 these facilities are by their nature fixed and do not vary as a function of the
24 volume of gas consumed by customers.

25 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE**
26 **REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO RECOVER THESE FIXED**
27 **DELIVERY SERVICE COSTS THROUGH CURRENT RATES WITH A**
28 **VOLUMETRIC RATE COMPONENT.**

29 A. Essentially, the problems fall into two broad categories and a third related
30 category. First, problems relate to economically efficient price signals. Second,
31 problems relate to the failure to provide a reasonable opportunity to collect the

1 authorized level of revenue. Third, the problems that fall in the first two
2 categories of problems are made worse in the context of other policy objectives
3 that promote cost-effective energy conservation to address resource constraints,
4 obtain more efficient use of capital and to help manage price level and volatility
5 risks.

6 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE ECONOMICALLY**
7 **EFFICIENT PRICE SIGNALS.**

8 A. When fixed costs are recovered volumetrically, customers who conserve save
9 costs that the Company does not save. As noted above, this causes more frequent
10 rate cases and from an economic perspective wastes resources. An economically
11 efficient price signal matches the reduction in cost for the company with the
12 reduction in cost for the consumer. In the case of EDG, the cost reduction from
13 conservation is lower PGA related costs. Any customer savings in excess of the
14 cost of gas overstates the value of conservation and results in both excess
15 investments by the customer and cross subsidies among customers.

16 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE A REASONABLE**
17 **OPPORTUNITY TO COLLECT THE AUTHORIZED LEVEL OF**
18 **REVENUE.**

19 A. A fundamental tenet of rate regulation provides that rates create an opportunity
20 for the utility to earn the allowed return. This regulatory principle has its
21 foundations in a Missouri case before the U. S. Supreme Court where Justice
22 Brandeis concluded that a utility is permitted an *opportunity to earn the cost of*
23 *service* including a return of and on the assets devoted to public service.⁴
24 (Emphasis added). This regulatory principle is well accepted and has a long
25 history of application.

26

27 The allowed return along with operating and maintenance expenses (excluding the
28 gas costs), depreciation expenses and taxes for a test year constitutes the revenue
29 requirements for delivery service. For gas delivery service, none of these costs

⁴ Missouri *ex rel.* Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U. S. 276, 290-291 (1923).

1 varies with the volume of gas consumed by customers. This fact is recognized by
2 regulatory bodies because they do not weather normalize any of these costs as
3 would be appropriate if the costs varied with the volume of gas consumed.

4
5 The recovery of revenues occurs in a prospective period, the first year referred to
6 as the Rate Effective Period. The dollars that are actually available for the earned
7 return in the Rate Effective Period equal revenue minus all of the costs incurred in
8 that same year, not the level of costs included in the test year and used for
9 ratemaking purposes to establish the revenue requirement. Thus, if rates do not
10 provide a reasonable opportunity of producing the allowed revenue because of
11 changing use patterns, even though costs equal test year costs, the opportunity to
12 earn the allowed return disappears.

13
14 Even if the annual revenue obtained in the Rate Effective Period coincidentally
15 matches the authorized revenue, a volumetric rate design still poorly aligns the
16 flow of revenue a natural gas distribution company receives with the way that
17 costs are incurred to provide its public utility service. Looking at this from a
18 customer's perspective, the volumetric rate design tends to also swing monthly
19 base rate bills up or down without regard to the fixed nature of the costs that are
20 being incurred to provide base rate service. Thus, a volumetric base rate falsely
21 suggests that a customer that reduces consumption will somehow produce a
22 corresponding effect on the costs of providing base rate delivery service.

23
24 The fundamental point is that sales volume variation from the level assumed for
25 the test year and ratemaking purposes results in revenue and an actual earned
26 return variation, either higher or lower than the amount specified for ratemaking
27 purposes. Actual earned return over time does not equal the allowed return even
28 though earnings vary from year to year under a variety of circumstances including
29 declining use per customer, conservation, price elasticity responses, asymmetric
30 costs and other relevant factors. Nevertheless, volumetric recovery of fixed costs

1 fails to provide a reasonable basis for cost recovery as well as a reasonable
2 opportunity to earn the allowed return.
3

4 **Section 6- Alternatives to Volumetric Rates**

5

6 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS**
7 **ASSOCIATED WITH THE CURRENT VOLUMETRIC RATE DESIGN.**

8

9 A. Potential solutions cover a range of possible alternatives. For example, rate
10 decoupling represents a commonly discussed alternative to resolving the issue of
11 rate design and revenue recovery. The term “rate decoupling” describes a family
12 of tools that include partial decoupling mechanisms such as weather
13 normalization clauses to more complex full decoupling clauses that permit
14 revenue true-up. Yet another alternative permits the utility to adjust rates for over
15 or under-recovery of authorized return.
16

17 In fact, the alternative selected for addressing revenue recovery issues may
18 include several different tools. For example, Northwest Natural (NWN) Gas uses
19 a combination of adjustments to provide for various elements of decoupling,
20 including a weather normalization adjustment mechanism and a distribution
21 margin adjustment.
22

23 But, as I describe below, SFV rate design represents the best alternative to solve
24 the problems of volumetric rate design.

25 **Q. DO ALL ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES PROVIDE THE SAME**
26 **SOLUTION TO THE ISSUES OF FIXED COST RECOVERY?**

27 A. No. For example, a normal weather adjustment clause as a mechanism for
28 improving fixed cost recovery protects against abnormal weather but does not
29 address declining use per customer. As such, this alternative represents only a
30 partial decoupling method in that the adjustment does not resolve the problem of
31 fixed cost recovery in the face of declining average use per customer (or the risk

1 resulting from higher costs associated with colder than normal weather). Thus,
2 the solution requires more than weather normalization.

3 **Q. HAVE OTHER GAS COMPANIES AND REGULATORY AUTHORITIES**
4 **INTRODUCED ALTERNATIVES THAT PROVIDE A REASONABLE**
5 **OPPORTUNITY TO RECOVER FIXED COSTS?**

6 A. Yes. Gas distribution companies and regulatory authorities use various methods
7 to provide a reasonable opportunity to recover fixed costs. Examples range from
8 the combination of a real-time normal weather adjustment plus a Rate
9 Stabilization and Equalization (RSE) for Alabama Gas Company to the SFV rate
10 design of Atlanta Gas Light Company and combinations in between.

11
12 Other gas utility proposals designed to better align fixed cost recovery with the
13 revenue produced by rate levels and rate design cover a variety of options such as
14 weather normalization plus decoupling. Some methods use deferral accounts and
15 recover shortfalls in revenues or earnings in a future period. For example, the
16 Northwest Natural distribution margin adjustment includes a deferred component
17 for recovery in the next year and the Baltimore Gas and Electric mechanism
18 adjusts with a one-month lag time. In each case, the provision improves the
19 probability of achieving the expected test year revenue.

20 **Q. SHOULD ONE ASSUME THAT ALL THE AVAILABLE**
21 **ALTERNATIVES TO VOLUMETRIC RATES PRODUCE THE SAME**
22 **RESULTS?**

23 A. No. Many of the alternatives continue to send volumetric price signals even
24 though they solve the revenue recovery issue. Since the volumetric price signal
25 causes rates to exceed marginal cost, the solution to issues with volumetric rates
26 remains inefficient. As will be discussed below, SFV rates offer a superior option
27 to volumetric rates when compared to other alternatives.

28

29 **Section 7- The SFV Rate Design Proposal**

30

1 **Q. HOW DOES EDG PROPOSE TO IMPLEMENT SFV RATES FOR**
2 **DISTRIBUTION SERVICE?**

3 A. EDG proposes to have a single Delivery Service Charge for all residential
4 customers. The delivery service charge recovers the base revenue requirements
5 for residential service. In addition, residential customers will continue to be
6 subject to the PGA that recovers the variable cost of gas commodity including
7 delivery to the city gate. For the smaller general service customers, EDG
8 proposes to use graduated Delivery Service Charges to recognize the cost
9 difference based on the local facilities used to serve commercial customers. The
10 use of graduated delivery service charges reflects the more expensive cost of
11 meters and service lines for customers as their size increases. In addition, the
12 small general service rate also includes customers much larger than the residential
13 customers. For these customers, and as an interim step, EDG proposes to
14 maintain a commodity related charge that is about half of the existing commodity
15 charge. For firm, large general service customers, the rate will consist of a
16 customer charge, a demand charge and as an interim step a commodity charge that
17 is less than half the existing charge as designed to recover base revenue
18 requirements. Transportation customers will have the same delivery service rates
19 but will not be subject to the PGA charge.

20 **Q. DOES THE PROPOSED RATE DESIGN BALANCE THE PRINCIPLES**
21 **DICSUSSED ABOVE?**

22 A. Yes, EDG will recover nearly all fixed costs through fixed monthly charges. That
23 is, the Delivery Service Charge for residential and the smallest general service
24 customers will recover the allocated revenue requirement associated with: (a) gas
25 delivery (transmission and distribution); (b) the costs associated with customer
26 service; and (c) the common costs for administration and general services. All of
27 these costs are fixed. For larger customers, the proposed customer and demand
28 charges will recover a larger share of fixed costs than under current rates.

29
30 For residential customers, the relative homogeneity of the residential class permits
31 the residential rate design to consist of an annual Delivery Service Charge,

1 payable in twelve equal monthly installments or in summer and winter
2 installments that differ with summer charges being lower. The Company
3 mentions both of these options because it may be better to vary the charge
4 seasonally so that customers will continue to receive lower summer bills. In any
5 event, the annual charge will be applicable for all customers.

6
7 Small general service customers also demonstrate relative homogeneity and the
8 use of a graduated annual Delivery Service Charge payable in twelve monthly
9 installments represents a reasonable rate design. During the transition, only the
10 smallest customers will have a pure SFV rate design while larger customers in the
11 class will be subject to the graduated customer charge and the reduced commodity
12 charge. For larger general service customers, a continuation of a customer charge
13 and a demand charge will track costs better since these classes are less
14 homogeneous. Differences for larger customers include meter costs, service lines,
15 mains, pressure regulation and other facilities. During the transition, the reduced
16 commodity charge will continue to be used to recover revenue requirements.

17 **Q. DOES THE SFV RATE PROVIDE BENEFITS TO BOTH THE**
18 **CUSTOMERS AND THE COMPANY?**

19 A. Yes. Customers benefit from the fixed rate simplicity. Customers understand that
20 a single charge for delivery represents a common pricing method. Since this
21 component of the bill does not change regardless of the weather, customers know
22 the impact of additional gas use in cold weather represents the cost of the gas
23 used. Customers benefit by knowing that a portion of their bill remains the same
24 each month and that overall bills during the high cost winter months are lower as
25 compared to bills under volumetric rates.

26
27 From an economic perspective, customers benefit from more efficient price
28 signals and make more economically rational decisions related to conservation.
29 Importantly, the elimination of volumetric rates for delivery service provides the
30 most benefit to the customers least able to afford heat. The reason these
31 customers benefit is that unlike volumetric rates, under SFV rates, customers'

1 distribution bills will not increase as usage increases. And those customers have
2 higher usage than average customers because the relative inefficiency of their
3 capital stock (i.e. heating equipment, wall and attic insulation, windows, etc) and
4 the resulting higher marginal use associated with colder weather.

5

6 SFV represents a more direct and customer friendly option with added efficiency
7 benefits. Benefits for EDG are largely related to the principles of stability and
8 administrative simplicity. EDG benefits from the movement to SFV because it
9 permits customers to better appreciate the relationship between base rate bills and
10 annual consumption and this should, over time, reduce the potential customer
11 confusion relative to their bills. It will also permit regulators and other
12 stakeholders that interact with customers to educate customers about the structure
13 of the industry, the nature and scope of state and federal regulatory authorities and
14 the effect of decisions and rules issued by state and federal regulatory authorities.
15 The Company benefits from more stable and predictable revenues. The Company
16 also benefits from the improved price signals and the ability to develop economic
17 line extension policies based on the SFV rate.

18 **Q. DOES THE SFV RATE GUARANTEE EDG WILL EARN THE**
19 **ALLOWED RATE OF RETURN?**

20 A. No. SFV rates may stabilize revenue assuming that the customer counts used to
21 develop the billing determinants accurately reflect the customers during the Rate
22 Effective Period.⁵ Revenues only reflect part of the equation determining the
23 rate of return. The other part of the equation is the costs used to establish the
24 revenue requirement. If costs during the Rate Effective Period differ materially
25 from the costs actually incurred during the rate effective period then the earned
26 return will differ materially from the allowed return. The value of SFV is to
27 improve the opportunity to earn the allowed return as compared to volumetric rate
28 designs.

29

⁵ The Rate Effective Period is the first twelve months after the effective date of new rates. The test period is designed to be a forecast of the costs and revenues during the Rate Effective Period.

Section 8- Combining Service Areas

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RESIDENTIAL BASE RATES FOR THE SERVICE AREAS.

A. Currently, the EDG gas rates differ between the South and North system and the Northwest system. The following Table 3 illustrates the differences between the service areas for residential customers.

Table 3
Summary of Residential Rate Differences

| Charges | North and South | NW | Differences |
|-------------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------|
| Customer Charge | \$9.50 | \$7.00 | \$2.50 |
| Energy Charge | \$0.2737/Ccf | \$0.2654/Ccf | \$0.0083 |
| 500 Ccf Base Bill | \$250.80 | \$216.70 | \$34.10 |
| 750 Ccf Base Bill | \$319.28 | \$283.05 | \$36.23 |

Nearly all of the difference in the two residential rates results from the different customer charges (\$30.00 per year). These rate differences are not justified on the basis of cost since the cost to serve residential customers is the same as discussed above. Thus it is appropriate to combine all customers in a single residential rate class.

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DIFFERENCES IN THE RESIDENTIAL PGA FACTORS FOR THE SERVICE AREAS.

A. The PGA factors vary between service areas as the following table illustrates.

| Service Area | North System | South System | NW System |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|
| PGA | \$0.76489 | \$0.79004 | \$0.73323 |

1 These differences result from different interstate pipeline transportation and
2 storage costs for the gas as delivered to the various city gates. In addition the
3 Actual Cost Adjustment (ACA) differs for each system. The Company proposes
4 no change in the PGA applicable to each system.

5 **Q. HOW SHOULD THESE CUSTOMERS BE COMBINED?**

6 A. The process to combine customers is to determine the residential revenue
7 requirement for the system, determine the number of annual customers and divide
8 the customers into the revenue requirement to produce the annual fixed charge
9 rate for residential schedules. For the other rate schedules the graduated Delivery
10 Service charges and the combination of customer and demand charges are
11 designed to produce the class revenue requirement.

12 **Q. HOW SHOULD THE NUMBER OF ANNUAL CUSTOMERS BE**
13 **DETERMINED?**

14 A. The adoption of SFV rates creates certain price responses from customers who
15 use little or no gas. These customers are likely to discontinue service as a result
16 of the SFV rate. This would include vacant dwellings and customers who use gas
17 for purposes other than heating and water heating. The proforma adjustment to
18 billing data would exclude all accounts with zero annual use as well as customers
19 who have winter use under ten Ccf per month. Usage under ten Ccf would
20 indicate the absence of both space and water heating. By making this adjustment,
21 the customer count will be more reflective of the customer accounts expected
22 during the Rate Effective Period.

23 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF COMBINING THE TWO RATES ON**
24 **CUSTOMERS?**

25 A. As the following table illustrates, customers served under the North-South system
26 rates will have lower increases than under the separate systems and customers in
27 the NW system will have greater increases.

Table 4
Customer Impacts of Rate Consolidation

| System | 500 Ccf Current Rates | 500 Ccf New Rates | % Change | 750 Ccf Current Rates | 750 Ccf New Rates | % Change |
|--------|-----------------------------|----------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
| North | \$800.45 | | | \$1143.76 | | |
| South | \$797.47 | | | \$1139.28 | | |
| NW | \$708.74 | | | \$1021.10 | | |

1 Table 4 shows that for annual use of 500 and 750 Ccf the total bill difference is
2 negligible for the North and South systems. As a result, the combination of those
3 two systems has little overall impact on customers. For the NW system, the
4 differences are larger. However, since the proposed combination applies only to
5 the delivery service charge, the overall bill impact is relatively small.

6

7 **Section 9- Transportation Issues**

8

9 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE**
10 **TRANSPORTATION PORTION OF THE TARIFF.**

11 A. The changes to the transportation tariff include certain changes to definitions,
12 terms of service and various requirements of the tariff. The changes are designed
13 to protect system reliability, clarify provisions, to provide charges associated with
14 certain ancillary services provided by the Company and to reflect best practices
15 for such services.

16 **Q, PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PROPOSED CHANGE TO CAPACITY**
17 **ASSIGNMENT.**

18 A. Currently, capacity assignment is non-recallable. Under the proposed change,
19 capacity assignment is changed to be recallable under certain conditions that
20 potentially have adverse impacts on system reliability. For example, if a customer
21 or aggregator were to declare bankruptcy, there is the potential that gas would not
22 flow to the system using this capacity. This would adversely impact the ability of

1 the system to meet design day requirements. As a result, the Company has the
2 right to recall released capacity if there is a bankruptcy filing or other potentially
3 adverse event.

4 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE COST OF SERVICE ASSOCIATED WITH**
5 **IMBALANCES.**

6 A. When the gas delivered to the system by a customer, aggregator or marketer is
7 less than the gas used by the customer the Company meets this shortfall by
8 withdrawing gas from storage. This occurs because the Company purchases and
9 delivers gas for sales customers and expects transporters to match daily load with
10 daily deliveries. Failure to match loads with deliveries requires the Company to
11 use storage capacity to match not only sales demand but transportation demand as
12 well. Since both injection and withdrawal have a direct cost (storage injection
13 and withdrawal costs) customers, marketers and aggregators impose those costs
14 on the Company and those costs should be paid by the party imposing costs. In
15 addition to the direct costs, there is an indirect cost of holding space in storage.
16 That indirect cost is a portion of the fixed costs associated with storage service.
17 All storage costs currently pass through the Purchased Gas Adjustment (PGA)
18 clause and are paid by sales customers. By adding ancillary service charges to the
19 transportation service provisions, the customers imposing these costs will pay for
20 both the direct cost and make a contribution to fixed costs based on the level of
21 the charge. Revenues from the ancillary services charges will be a credit to gas
22 costs for the benefit of sales customers who otherwise pay these costs.

23 **Q. DOES THE TARIFF PROVIDE THE OPTION FOR TRANSPORTATION**
24 **CUSTOMERS TO RETURN TO SALES SERVICE?**

25 A. Yes. The Company currently permits transportation customers to return to sales
26 service.

27 **Q. DOES THIS PROVISION CREATE POTENTIAL ADVERSE IMPACTS**
28 **ON OTHER SALES CUSTOMERS?**

29 A. Yes, depending upon the timing of the return to sales service. Unlike the current
30 small volume transportation tariff, the current large volume transportation tariff
31 does not restrict the timing of a large customer's return to sales service or election

1 of transportation service. If this return to sales service were to take place at the
2 very beginning of the winter heating season, it could adversely impact the
3 Company's gas supply planning for the upcoming winter. To avoid this situation,
4 the Company is proposing that a large customer's return to sales service can only
5 take place on June 1st each year, and that a large transportation customer must
6 elect to change to transportation service by May 1st each year.

7 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY PROPOSE TO CHANGE THE DELIVERY**
8 **TOLERANCES DURING OPERATIONAL FLOW ORDERS?**

9 A. Yes. Operational flow orders ("OFO") represent a time when the system is
10 stressed. During such times, having transportation customers match supply and
11 demand as closely as possible is critical to the reliable operation of the system.
12 As a result, the Company proposes a much tighter tolerance on matching receipts
13 and deliveries before incurring penalties. Failure to match receipts and deliveries
14 has potential for loss of pressure on the system resulting in outages. Thus the
15 tighter standards and penalties for failure provide signals that OFO requires more
16 effort on the part of transportation customers, aggregators and marketers.

17 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY HAVE A PROPOSAL REGARDING**
18 **TELEMETRY FOR SMALL VOLUME CUSTOMERS?**

19 A. Yes. The Company proposes to allow customers, aggregators and marketers to
20 have telemetry installed at the customer's expense where such installation will
21 reduce cash out impacts or provide other benefits for customers by providing
22 better use data during the month. Under the proposed telemetry option for
23 schools the school will pay a monthly rental fee for the metering installation
24 based on actual costs of installation. The Company will own, operate and
25 maintain the equipment.

26

27 **Section 10- Summary**

28

29 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY.**

H. EDWIN OVERCAST
DIRECT TESTIMONY

1 A. My testimony provides a detailed cost of service study reflecting cost causation,
2 economies of scale and appropriate capacity cost allocation based on design day
3 demand requirements. Since the system is planned and designed to meet these
4 design day requirements the cost study reflects the factors causing system costs.
5 My testimony supports the use of SFV rate design to reflect cost causation for
6 delivery service to customers. The inclusion of a volumetric component in
7 delivery rates does not represent sound rate design and should be eliminated as
8 my testimony demonstrates. I also include recommended changes to the
9 transportation tariff provisions designed to protect system reliability and to result
10 in a more efficient set of price signals.

11 **Q. DOES THIS COMPLETE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

12 A. Yes.

AFFIDAVIT OF H. EDWIN OVERCAST

STATE OF GEORGIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF HENRY)

On the 3 day of June, 2009, before me appeared H. Edwin Overcast, to me personally known, who, being by me first duly sworn, states that he is Director of Black & Veatch and acknowledged that he has read the above and foregoing document and believes that the statements therein are true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief.


H. Edwin Overcast

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3 day of June, 2009


Notary Public

My commission expires: January 7, 2013

