Exhibit No.:

Paguest for Approval of

Issue(s): Request for Approval of Transfers, CCN and

Affiliate Rule Waivers

Witness/Type of Exhibit: Kind/Rebuttal Sponsoring Party: Public Counsel Case No.: EA-2013-0098

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

RYAN KIND

Submitted on Behalf of the Office of the Public Counsel

KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY KCP&L GREATER MISSOURI OPERATIONS COMPANY TRANSOURCE MISSOURI LLC

Case No. EA-2013-0098

**

Denotes Highly Confidential Information that has been Redacted

January 30, 2013



BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of the Application of Transource Missouri, LLC for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity Authorizing it to Construct, Finance, Own, Operate, and Maintain the Iatan-Nashua and Sibley- Nebraska City Electric Transmission Projects)	File No. EA-2013-0098
In the Matter of the Application of Kansas City Power & Light Company and KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company Regarding Arrangements for Approval to Transfer Certain Transmission Property to Transource Missouri, L.L.C. and for Other Related Determinations	File No. EO-2012-0367
AFFIDAVIT OF R	YAN KIND
STATE OF MISSOURI)) ss COUNTY OF COLE)	
Ryan Kind, of lawful age and being first duly sworn, deposes and states:	
 My name is Ryan Kind. I am a Chief U Counsel. 	Jtility Economist for the Office of the Public
2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for	or all purposes is my rebuttal testimony.
true and correct to the best of my knowled	ments contained in the attached affidavit are alge and belief. Kind

Subscribed and sworn to me this 30^{th} day of January 2013.



JERENE A. BUCKMAN My Commission Expires August 23, 2013 Cole County Commission #09754037

Jerene A. Buckman Notary Public

My commission expires August 23, 2013.

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

RYAN KIND

KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, KCPL GREATER MISSOURI OPERATIONS COMPANY AND TRANSOURCE MISSOURI, LLC CASE NOS. EO-2012-0367 & EA-2013-0098

Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, TITLE, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

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- A. Ryan Kind, Chief Energy Economist, Office of the Public Counsel, P.O. Box 2230,
 Jefferson City, Missouri 65102.
- Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND.
- A. I have a B.S.B.A. in Economics and a M.A. in Economics from the University of Missouri-Columbia (UMC). While I was a graduate student at UMC, I was employed as a Teaching Assistant with the Department of Economics, and taught classes in Introductory Economics, and Money and Banking, in which I served as a Lab Instructor for Discussion Sections.

My previous work experience includes several years of employment with the Missouri Division of Transportation as a Financial Analyst. My responsibilities at the Division of Transportation included preparing transportation rate proposals and testimony for rate cases involving various segments of the trucking industry. I have been employed as an economist at the Office of the Public Counsel (Public Counsel or OPC) since 1991.

Q. HAVE YOU TESTIFIED PREVIOUSLY BEFORE THIS COMMISSION?

A. Yes, prior to this case I submitted written testimony in numerous gas rate cases, several electric rate design cases and rate cases, as well as other miscellaneous gas, water, electric, and telephone cases.

- Q. HAVE YOU PROVIDED COMMENTS OR TESTIMONY TO OTHER REGULATORY OR

 LEGISLATIVE BODIES ON THE SUBJECT OF UTILITY REGULATION AND

 RESTRUCTURING?
- A. Yes, I have provided comments and testimony to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Missouri House of Representatives Utility Regulation Committee, the Missouri Senate's Commerce & Environment Committee and the Missouri Legislature's Joint Interim Committee on Telecommunications and Energy.
- Q. HAVE YOU BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR PARTICIPANT IN, ANY WORK GROUPS,

 COMMITTEES, OR OTHER GROUPS THAT HAVE ADDRESSED ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITY

 REGULATION AND POLICY ISSUES?
- A. Yes. I am currently a member of the National Association of State Consumer Advocates (NASUCA) Electric Committee and serve as one of the alternate public consumer group representatives to the Midwest ISO's (MISO's) Advisory Committee. I have served on the Stakeholder Steering Committee (SSC) of the Eastern Interconnection Planning Collaborative (EIPC), the Missouri Department of Natural Resources Weatherization Policy Advisory Committee, as the public consumer group representative to the Midwest ISO's (MISO's) Advisory Committee and as the small customer representative on both the NERC Operating Committee and the NERC Standards Authorization Committee. During the early 1990s, I served as a Staff Liaison to the Energy and Transportation Task Force of the President's Council on Sustainable Development.

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Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to address the applications filed by the applicants in Case Nos. EO-2012-0367 and EA-2013-0098. The applicants in Case No. EO-2012-0367 are Kansas City Power & Light Company (KCPL) and KCPL Greater Missouri Operations Company (GMO). The Applicant in Case No. EA-2013-0098 is Transource Missouri LLC (TransourceMO). In addition to addressing the relief requested in these two applications, I will also respond to some of the direct testimony filed in Case Nos. EO-2012-0367 and EA-2013-0098.

Q. WHY ARE YOU ADDRESSING BOTH OF THESE PENDING CASES IN THIS TESTIMONY?

The Commission issued an order on November 7, 2012 that consolidated the matters in these cases and set a single procedural schedule for testimony filing dates and the evidentiary hearing. The cases were consolidated by the Commission because they are both linked to the execution of the initial stages of a Transco¹ business plan by KCPL, GMO, and Great Plains Energy (GPE). GPE is the holding company that owns and controls KCPL and GMO. The Transco business plan that led to these cases was approved by GPE and it has apparently directed its wholly-owned subsidiary operating companies, KCPL and GMO to either make the filings or facilitate making the filings needed to execute this business plan. In the initial stages of this new Transco business plan, GPE is seeking Commission approval of the transfer of certain physical assets and

¹ Transco is a term used to refer to transmission companies that operate as separate affiliates of regulated utility operating companies or as totally independent companies not affiliated with a regulated utility. Transcos usually have a single focus of building, owning and operating transmission facilities and charge FERC regulated rates to wholesale customers. New transmission investment incentives resulting from FERC Order 679 and new opportunities to compete for major new transmission projects as a result of largely removing the right of first refusal in FERC Order 1000 have created greater interest in the Transco business model.

construction rights associated with two major transmission projects (the Iatan-Nashua 345 kV transmission project and the Sibley-Nebraska City 345 kV project) and approval of a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity (CCN) for TransourceMO to construct, own and operate these projects under a new Transco named Transource Energy, LLC which is a joint venture of GPE and American Electric Power (AEP). TransourceMO is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Transource Energy, LLC. These cases are also linked together by the request in both applications that the requested relief be conditioned upon obtaining the relief in the other application in addition to other approvals that the applicant is seeking from the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE TRANSCO BUSINESS PLAN THAT THE APPLICANTS IN THESE CASES SEEK TO EXECUTE, IN PART, THROUGH THE APPLICATIONS THAT WERE FILED IN CASE NOS. EO-2012-0367 AND EA-2013-

0098.

A. GPE and American Electric Power (AEP) have created a new entity to build large transmission projects which are subject to regional cost allocation. These projects will likely be built in the Eastern Interconnection power grid (EI) with the initial primary focus being on projects located in three Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), (SPP, MISO, and PJM) within the EI. This new entity was created as a result of GPE finding a business partner who would be interested in having access to the rights of KCPL and GMO to construct two major transmission projects (the Iatan-Nashua 345 kV transmission project and the Sibley-Nebraska City 345 kV project) for the SPP that would be subject to regional cost allocation. GPE sought a business arrangement where it could leverage the rights to these transmission projects to attract a joint venture partner

that would likely be a major player in the competitive US electric transmission market

that FERC is seeking to develop through FERC Order 1000. A desirable joint venture arrangement would be one that GPE expected to create a stream of future earnings that had more value than the earnings that would be expected from GPE and its subsidiaries being the sole entity constructing these two SPP transmission projects.

- Q. WHY DID THE IATAN-NASHUA 345 PROJECT (IATAN LINE) AND THE SIBLEYNEBRASKA CITY PROJECT (SIBLEY LINE) HAVE A VALUE LARGE ENOUGH TO
 PERMIT GPE TO UTILIZE THESE TWO PROJECTS TO LEVERAGE ITS ENTRY INTO A
 JOINT VENTURE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WITH AEP THAT WILL LIKELY PROVIDE
 A SUBSTANTIAL STREAM OF FUTURE EARNINGS TO GPE?
- A. These two projects are part of the final round of major transmission expansion projects that are subject to regional allocation but that can still be assigned to the incumbent transmission company by an RTO despite the fact that FERC has issued new regulations in Order 1000 that eliminate the right of first refusal (ROFR) for transmission projects.

 GMO and KCPL have received the Notification to Construct these projects from SPP that gives them the exclusive right to build these projects.

FERC has eliminated the right of first refusal in order to create competition between transmission companies for the construction, ownership and operation of major new transmission projects that are subject to regional cost allocation. There are expected to be a large number of large regional transmission projects built over the next 10 to 20 years in RTOs like SPP, MISO, and PJM that have: (1) a robust regional transmission expansion planning process and (2) tariffs in place that provide for region-wide allocation of the costs of these projects to transmission customers. It is likely that there will initially be five or ten independent transmission companies (some of the larger ones will be affiliates of large utilities like AEP) competing for these projects and since this is a relatively new business, those who are successful in being awarded the first few large

 projects and can demonstrate their capabilities to construct such projects are expected to achieve a competitive advantage in competing for the large number of major new projects expected to be awarded to the winning bidders over the next few years. New FERC Transmission Investment Incentives (including enhanced ROE, CWIP, project abandonment risk mitigation, etc.) that became available pursuant to FERC Order 679 have heightened the interest in participating in this competitive market to build new transmission.

- Q. HAVE YOU SEEN ANY STATEMENTS MADE BY SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF AEP THAT SHOW AEP WAS ATTRACTED, AT LEAST IN PART, TO FORM A JOINT VENTURE TRANSMISSION COMPANY WITH GPE BECAUSE OF THE RIGHTS THAT GPE'S SUBSIDIARIES, KCPL AND GMO, HAD TO CONSTRUCT THE IATAN AND SIBLEY LINES?
- A. Yes. Shortly after the Transource joint venture was announced to the public, AEP President and CEO Nicholas K. Akins made the following statements regarding the Transource joint venture with GPE in an April 20, 2012 first quarter 2012 earnings conference call with investment analysts:

So that's important for us to start that critical mass and see that transmission investment continue to grow. The reason why we did the Transource deal was to pursue competitive transmission development projects in the advent of Order 1,000 for – certainly wanted to set the tone for a comparative transmission going forward, and it was important for us to really put together an engine for that future growth.

And we saw, certainly, from the Great Plains perspective, a near-term project that could provide ability for us to put that critical mass in place and really give us an advantage going forward in the marketplace in the competitive access area. And it also is on the interface of MISO and SPP, so that provides some future prospects for us. And as well, it focuses on other state footprints like Missouri and Kansas. [Emphasis added]

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Q. PLEASE PROVIDE A DESCRIPTION OF THE APPLICATION IN CASE NO. EO-2012-0367 AND THE RELIEF THAT THE APPLICANTS ARE REQUESTING FROM THE COMMISSION IN THAT CASE.

- A. KCPL and GMO are requesting that the Commission:
 - 1) Approve the transfer of transmission property associated with the Iatan and Sibley lines conditioned upon the occurrence of several other events including TransourceMO receiving approvals from the Commission to construct these projects in Case No. EA-2013-0098.
 - 2) Find that no approval under state law is required to novate (transfer) the Notifications to Construct for the Iatan and Sibley lines or approve the novation of these lines to TransourceMO.
 - 3) Grant a waiver or variance from the Commission's Affiliate Transaction Rules for transactions between two regulated electric corporations, KCPL and GMO on one hand and Transource Energy LLC (Transource) and its subsidiaries (affiliates of KCPL and GMO), on the other.
- Q. WHAT IS PUBLIC COUNSEL'S POSITION REGARDING THE THREE REQUESTS THAT THE APPLICANTS MAKE FOR COMMISSION ACTION IN CASE No. EO-2012-0367?
- Public Counsel recommends that the Commission deny all three of the applicants' A. requests described above.
- Q. WHY DOES OPC OPPOSE COMMISSION APPROVAL OF THE TRANSFER OF TRANSMISSION PROPERTY ASSOCIATED WITH THE IATAN AND SIBLEY LINES?

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Q. YOU STATED THAT MR. IVES DOES NOT EVEN ATTEMPT TO PERFORM AND PROVIDE A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PROPOSED TRANSFER IS NOT DETRIMENTAL TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST. DID ANY OF THE APPLICANTS' OTHER WITNESSES ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE ANY QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS TO DEMONSTRATE

Public Counsel believes the evidence in this case will demonstrate that the proposed

transfer is detrimental to the public interest and should be denied. The applicants, KCPL

and GMO, have the burden of showing that the proposed transfer is not detrimental to the

public interest and they have failed to satisfy that burden in their application and direct

testimony. KCPL/GMO witness Darrin Ives attempts to show in his direct testimony that

the proposed transfer would not be detrimental to the public interest but fails to provide

facts and analysis to show this. His attempt to demonstrate that the proposed transfer

satisfies the not detrimental to the public interest standard is based solely on a qualitative

analysis that ignores the detrimental aspects of the transfer. Furthermore, he does not

even attempt to perform and provide a quantitative analysis to demonstrate that the

proposed transfer is not detrimental to the public interest. Public Counsel believes there

will clearly be substantial adverse rate impacts from having these projects constructed,

owned and operated by an entity other than GMO and KCPL, the utilities that are subject

THAT THE PROPOSED TRANSFER IS NOT DETRIMENTAL TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST?

- A. No.
- Q. IN YOUR REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE APPLICANTS IN RESPONSE TO DRS, HAVE YOU FOUND ANY QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT THAT THE APPROVAL OF THESE APPLICATIONS IS LIKELY TO HAVE ON THE CUSTOMERS OF KCPL AND GMO?

A. **

** comparing the rate

regulation framework that would be applicable for transmission projects built, owned, and operated by KCPL and GMO to the rate regulation framework that would be applicable if the same projects are built, owned, and operated by either a transmission company that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of GPE or a transmission company like Transource that is a joint venture between a wholly-owned transmission subsidiary of GPE and a wholly-owned transmission subsidiary of GPE and a wholly-owned transmission subsidiary of AEP. The rate regulation framework that would be applicable to these projects if built, owned, and operated by KCPL and GMO is the current Missouri Commission rate regulation framework where the revenue requirement takes into account return on rate base, depreciation expense, and operating expenses associated with the transmission assets and includes SPP transmission revenues as an offset to these costs.²

The rate regulation framework that would be applicable to these projects if built, owned, and operated by a Transco (either wholly-owned by GPE or a joint venture such as Transource) is only subject to Missouri Commission rate regulation in that the Commission will include SPP transmission charges related to the FERC regulated cost recovery for these transmission projects in the revenue requirements of GMO and KCPL. SPP transmission revenues as an offset to the transmission costs incurred by Transource would not be included in the Missouri revenue requirements for these transmission projects. It is also important to note that the FERC regulated SPP transmission charges

² This is similar to the common practice in Missouri of giving Missouri retail customers credit for the revenues from margins on off-system sales of energy and capacity associated with the generation assets that Missouri customers are funding when they pay rates that reflect the costs of having those generation assets in rate base.

related to the Sibley and Iatan lines that are passed thru to Missouri customers in the retail rates of GMO and KCPL would reflect the full range of FERC approved transmission investment incentives (including enhanced ROE, CWIP, project abandonment risk mitigation, etc.). Transource has already received FERC approval for many of these incentives in FERC Docket No. ER12-2554.

Q. **

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Q. WHY DOES OPC OPPOSE COMMISSION APPROVAL OF NOVATING (TRANSFERRING)

THE NOTIFICATIONS TO CONSTRUCT (NTC) FOR THE IATAN AND SIBLEY LINES TO

TRANSOURCEMO?

- A. Transferring these NTCs from KCPL and GMO to TransourceMO would be detrimental to the public interest for the same reasons that the proposed asset transfer from KCPL and GMO to TransourceMO would be detrimental to the public interest. The NTCs are essentially rights to construct two transmission projects that have significant financial and strategic value to whatever entity constructs these projects. The Commission has exercised its jurisdiction over emission allowances (rights to emit harmful power plant emissions) such as SO2 and NOX allowances and the transfer or sale of those allowances. Like emission allowances, the NTCs were issued to KCPL and GMO due to their operation as regulated electrical corporations and they have a value the utility should not be able to divert to providing benefits solely to utility shareholders at the expense of adverse impacts on ratepayers.
- Q. WHY DOES OPC OPPOSE THE REQUESTED WAIVER OR VARIANCE FROM THE COMMISSION'S AFFILIATE TRANSACTION RULES FOR TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN KCPL AND GMO ON ONE HAND AND TRANSOURCE AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES (AFFILIATES OF KCPL AND GMO), ON THE OTHER?
- A. The applicants are seeking this waiver from all provisions in 4 CSR 240-20.015 (the Commission's Affiliate Transactions Rule) for any and all transactions between KCPL and GMO on one hand and Transource and its subsidiaries (affiliates of KCPL and GMO), on the other. Public Counsel is not aware of any other broad extraordinary requests for waivers or variances from all provisions of the Affiliate Transactions Rule for such a broad range of transactions between regulated utilities and an unspecified list

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of affiliates (none of which would be subject to rate regulation by this Commission) that has ever been granted by this Commission.

The Applicants cite a couple reasons to support their request. First, they attempt to argue that the rule was not intended to apply to transactions between affiliated entities when both are subject to some form of regulation, even if one of them is not subject to rate regulation by this Commission. However, the rule was clearly intended to apply to all transactions between a regulated electrical corporation and their affiliates. Subsection (1)(A) of 4 CSR 240-20.015 defines an "affiliate transaction" to mean "any transaction for the provision, purchase or sale of any information, asset, product or service, or portion of any product or service, between a regulated electrical corporation and an affiliated entity, and shall include all transactions carried out between any unregulated business operation of a regulated electrical corporation and the regulated business operations of a electrical corporation. GPE will own more than 10% of Transource and TransourceMO, so Transource and TransourceMO clearly meet the definition of an "affiliated entity."

The second reason cited by TransourceMO in support of the Affiliate rule waiver or variance request is that GMO and KCPL have agreed to provide transmission property and services to TransourceMO at cost. This requires a waiver because the Affiliate Transactions Rule has provisions pertaining to the pricing of transfers of goods and services, including the asymmetrical pricing standard (see Subsection (2)(A)2 of 4 CSR 240-20.015) which requires that goods and services provided from the regulated electrical corporation to its affiliates to be priced at the greater of either cost or the market value (market price) of such goods and services.

On pages 24 and 25 of his testimony, KCPL/GMO witness Darrin Ives asserts that it would be to the advantage of Missouri end-use customers for KCPL and GMO to be able to transfer transmission property and provide services to TransourceMO at cost. He states

that applying the Affiliate Transactions Rule to exchanges of goods and services with TransourceMO "would be a detriment to utility customers who pay for the transmission services through Transource Missouri's FERC-approved formula rate because services that are provided "at cost" are generally lower than services provided at market rates, which typically include a profit component." This may sound like an attractive arrangement due to the incomplete explanation provided by Mr. Ives of the consequences of such an arrangement. He describes one of the consequences of such an arrangement but fails to explain the full impact of this arrangement which will inevitably lead to large negative net impacts on the Missouri end-use customers that are served by KCPL and GMO. While this arrangement may put downward pressure on the FERC formula rates referenced by Mr. Ives, the largest impact will come from the increase in offsetting revenue from the provision of goods and services to TransourceMO at market prices which will often be greater than the cost-based prices. GMO and KCPL customers would benefit from 100% of these increased revenues (form the payments to KCPL and GMO for goods and services provided to TransourceMO) whereas only about 8% of the benefit from lower cost-based services reflected in the Transource FERC revenue requirement would benefit GMO and KCPL customers since these transmission costs are allocated to GMO and KCPL based on their 8% share of the entire load served by SPP. The remaining 92% of these lower costs resulting from cost-based transfer pricing (if increased by market-based instead of cost-based pricing) would help reduce the transmission rates paid by other SPP transmission customers and their end-use customers. The main beneficiary of the reduced costs due to cost-based transfer pricing would be the shareholders of GPE and AEP who would benefit from the advantage that the GPE/AEPowned Transource obtains by using low cost goods and services from regulated companies like KCPL and GMO to help it compete against other transmission companies for major RTO transmission projects.

are not solely for the purpose of preventing regulated utilities (and their customers) from subsidizing the operations of their affiliates. These rules are also intended to prevent regulated utilities from providing a financial advantage or any preferential treatment to their affiliates. Customers could be harmed by either one of these things because they are likely to impact the outcomes of competitive markets by allowing the affiliates to have an unfair and unearned advantage as a competitor in these markets. If some affiliate competitors have an unfair and unearned competitive advantage in a market then the outcomes from that market are likely to be less beneficial for customers in the long run. For example, if an affiliate transmission company competitor has an unfair advantage because its lower cost structure (due to being subsidized by its regulated utility affiliate) enables it to consistently under-bid its competitors and drive some of them out of the market, then the market will become less competitive and this will likely lead to higher prices (increased transmission rates passed on to end-use customers) in the long run.

Subsections (2)(A) and (2)(B) of 4 CSR 240-20.015 make it clear that the affiliate rules

- Q. PLEASE PROVIDE A DESCRIPTION OF THE APPLICATION IN CASE NO. EA-2013-0098

 AND THE RELIEF THAT THE APPLICANTS ARE REQUESTING FROM THE COMMISSION IN THAT CASE.
- A. TransourceMO is requesting that the Commission:
 - 4) Grant the Applicant a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to construct, finance, own, operate, and maintain the Iatan-Nashua and Sibley-Nebraska City Projects conditioned upon the occurrence of several other events including KCPL and GMO receiving approvals from the Commission to transfer transmission plant and Notifications to Construct associated with these projects in Case No. EO-2012-0367.

 Grant waivers from the reporting requirements of 4 CSR 240-3.175 and 4 CSR 240-3.190.

- Q. WHAT IS PUBLIC COUNSEL'S POSITION REGARDING THE TWO REQUESTS THAT THE APPLICANTS MAKE FOR COMMISSION ACTION IN CASE No. EO-2012-0367?
- A. Public Counsel recommends that the Commission deny the applicant's request that it be granted a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity (CCN) for the Iatan-Nashua and Sibley-Nebraska City Projects. OPC takes no position at this time on the second request regarding waivers from certain reporting requirements.
- Q. WHY DOES OPC OPPOSE THE APPLICANT'S REQUEST FOR THE COMMISSION TO GRANT A CCN TO TRANSOURCEMO FOR THE IATAN-NASHUA AND SIBLEY-NEBRASKA CITY PROJECTS?
- A. Public Counsel believes the evidence in this case will demonstrate that the requested CCN does not meet the standard of being necessary and convenient for the public service and should be denied. The applicant, TransourceMO has the burden of showing that the proposed transfer is necessary and convenient for the public service. The requested CCN is part of a group of regulatory approvals that Transource, KCPL, GMO, GPE and AEP are pursuing in order to execute a Transco business plan that would not promote the interest of the public and of the customers served by KCPL and GMO because it will: (1) place upward pressure on the bundled rates paid by KCPL and GMO customers for electric service, (2) reduce the ability of this Commission to effectively regulate and oversee the rates charged to KCPL and GMO customers, and (3) reduce the ability of this Commission to effectively regulate and oversee the operations and maintenance of the transmission facilities that are vital to the provision of safe and adequate service to the customers of KCPL and GMO and the rest of the public.

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The Iatan-Nashua and Sibley-Nebraska City Projects for which TransourceMO seeks a CCN will be built by some other entity if the Commission denies this application. That other entity is likely to be GPE's subsidiaries, KCPL and GMO, since they will still have an excellent opportunity to create a new long-term stream of earnings for their shareholders even if KCPL, GMO, GPE and TransourceMO are unable to get the regulatory approvals needed to execute the Transco business plan that includes construction of these two SPP transmission projects. GPE, the holding company for KCPL and GMO, would prefer to have these projects transferred to, and built by, TransourceMO because doing so would permit it to execute the Transco business plan which it expects will provide a greater steam of earnings to shareholders in the long-run than if GPE and its utility operating companies build the two SPP projects as a standalone project. If TransourceMO is unable to build, own and operate the Iatan and Sibley lines, GPE will still find a way to obtain the enhanced shareholder earnings that the NTC from SPP gives it an opportunity to achieve because GPE's Board of Directors has a fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders to make this happen. Of course, in pursuing their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders, GPE and its operating company subsidiaries must comply with legal requirements such as the need to get Commission approval for the sale/transfer of the NTCs associated with the latan and Sibley lines.

Q. IN YOUR MOST RECENT ANSWER ABOVE, YOU NOTED THAT IF THE COMMISSION GRANTED THE REQUESTED CCN TO TRANSOURCEMO, THIS WOULD NOT PROMOTE THE PUBLIC INTEREST BECAUSE IT WOULD DIMINISH THE ABILITY OF THIS COMMISSION TO EFFECTIVELY REGULATE AND OVERSEE THE RATES CHARGED TO KCPL AND GMO CUSTOMERS. WHY WOULD GRANTING THE CCN DIMINISH THE COMMISSION'S ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY REGULATE AND OVERSEE THE RATES PAID BY KCPL AND GMO CUSTOMERS?

A.	This Commission currently has jurisdiction over all elements (transmission, distribution
	and generation) of the bundled rates paid by KCPL and GMO customers. The granting of
	the requested CCN for TransourceMO by the Commission would greatly hinder the
	Commission's ability to regulate the rates of KCPL and GMO because TransourceMO
	will argue that the transmission assets related to this CCN are solely within the
	ratemaking jurisdiction of FERC where Transource has filed an application for formula
	rates and transmission rate incentives that would apply to these assets. The transmission
	assets related to the CCN would go into the rate base of TransourceMO instead of the rate
	bases of KCPL and GMO. Similarly, the transmission revenues that TransourceMO
	receives would accrue to TransourceMO to offset the capital and operating costs of
	TransourceMO instead of being an offset to the revenue requirements of KCPL and
	GMO. The return on equity level and prudency determinations, if any, would be made by
	another regulatory agency, the FERC, which is located in Washington DC and does not
	have auditors located in Missouri. Even if the Commission and Public Counsel had the
	resources necessary to actively participate in FERC cases to try to protect the interests of
	Missouri customers, it is not completely clear that they have the legal standing to do so.

- Q. ARE THERE ADDITIONAL REASONS WHY OPC OPPOSES THE APPLICANT'S REQUEST FOR THE COMMISSION TO GRANT A CCN TO TRANSOURCEMO FOR THE IATAN-NASHUA AND SIBLEY-NEBRASKA CITY PROJECTS?
- A. Yes. In the case of the Sibley-Nebraska City Project, it is premature for the Commission to make a determination about the merits of granting a CCN at this time because KCPL and GMO are still in the process of determining the ultimate siting for the project and a definitive map of the transmission line route has not been provided in this case. This siting work is not expected to be completed until **
 - ** TransourceMO witness Brent Davis acknowledges on page 12 of his direct

testimony that the project cost estimates developed and provided thus far "are not control budget estimates; control budget estimates will be developed once the route has been selected." Again, it is premature for the Commission to make a determination about the merits of granting a CCN at this time because no reliable cost estimate has yet been provided for the Sibley-Nebraska City Project. The urgency of addressing whether a CCN should be granted at this early stage of project development for the Sibley-Nebraska City Project appears to be driven by the need to aggressively advance execution of the Transource business plan and the Commission should not rush to judgment on the merits of this CCN request until it has sufficient competent and substantial evidence (including a map containing a specific route for the transmission line and related facilities and a refined cost estimate based upon the specific configuration of transmission facilities in that map) upon which it can decision. How could the Commission make a determination at this time that a CCN for the Sibley-Nebraska City Project would promote the public interest when landowners in the vicinity of the proposed project don't yet have information about the impact that the project will have on their properties?

Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

A. Yes.