Exhibit No.: Issue: Sponsoring Party: MoPSC Staff Date Testimony Prepared: March 27, 2020

Rate of Return Witness: Peter Chari *Type of Exhibit:* Surrebuttal Testimony *Case No.:* ER-2019-0374

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS ANALYSIS DIVISION

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

PETER CHARI

THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY

CASE NO. ER-2019-0374

Jefferson City, Missouri March 2020

1	TABLE OF CONTENTS OF
2	SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF
3	PETER CHARI
4	THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY
5	CASE NO. ER-2019-0374
6	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1
7	RESPONSE TO MR. HEVERT'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
8	RESPONSE TO MR. DAVID MURRAY'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY12
9	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS14

1	SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF						
2	PETER CHARI						
3	THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY						
4	CASE NO. ER-2019-0374						
5	Q. Please state your name.						
6	A. My name is Peter Chari.						
7	Q. Are you the same Peter Chari who previously prepared the Rate of Return						
8	("ROR") Section of Staff's Cost of Service Report ("Staff Report") and rebuttal testimony in						
9	this case?						
10	A. Yes.						
11	Q. What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?						
12	A. The purpose of my surrebuttal testimony is to respond to the rebuttal testimonies						
13	of Robert B. Hevert (Mr. Hevert) and David Murray (Mr. Murray). Mr. Hevert sponsored						
14	testimony on behalf of The Empire District Electric Company ("Empire" or "Company") and						
15	Mr. Murray sponsored testimony on behalf of Office of the Public Counsel ("OPC").						
16	Mr. Hevert responded to the authorized return on equity ("ROE") recommendation that Staff						
17	sponsored in the Staff Direct Report - Cost of Service. Mr. Murray responded to the authorized						
18	ROE and the capital structure that Staff sponsored in the Staff Direct Report - Cost of Service.						
19	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY						
20	Q. What are Mr. Hevert's primary disagreements with Staff's ROE						
21	recommendation?						

1	A. Mr. Hevert states that Staff's "9.25 percent recommendation falls						
2	considerably below a reasonable estimate of the Company's Cost of Equity." ¹ Mr. Hevert						
3	does not agree that it is appropriate to compare the current COE results of an electric proxy						
4	group to the prior COE results of a natural gas proxy group to determine how the authorized						
5	ROE has changed over time. Mr. Hevert also does not agree with Staff's analysis estimating						
6	the cost of equity to have fallen during the time period referenced by Staff: June 30, 2017, to						
7	November 30, 2019. ² Mr. Hevert believes that Staff's costs of equity ("COE") are unreliable,						
8	because Staff's COE estimates are below Staff's recommended authorized ROE. The following						
9	are the specific areas of Staff's analysis that Mr. Hevert disagrees with:						
10 11 12 13 14 15	 The basis of Staff's ROE recommendation; Staff's interpretation of capital market conditions; Staff's constant growth DCF analyses; Staff's application of the CAPM, the reasonableness of those results, and their relevance in determining the Company's ROE; and The relevance of authorized returns. 						
16	Q. What is Mr. Murray's disagreement with Staff's Capital Structure						
17	Recommendation?						
18	A. Mr. Murray pointed out Staff's unintentional use of Empire's deconsolidated						
19	capital structure. Staff relied on Empire's capital structure provided in response to Staff's data						
20	request ("DR") No. 0186. The capital structure excludes Empire's other operating affiliate –						
21	Empire District Gas. Staff assumed that the capital structure included all of Empire's affiliates.						
22	Before Empire merged with Algonquin Power and Utility Corp., Empire financed and operated						
23	itself and all its affiliates as one entity. Empire has, in the past, used a consolidated capital						

¹ Hevert's Rebuttal, page 3. ² Ibid, page 3.

structure to set its ROR. Mr. Murray believes that Empire should continue to use a consolidated 1 2 capital structure to set its ROR. **RESPONSE TO MR. HEVERT'S REB**UTTAL TESTIMONY 3 4 Where does Mr. Hevert go wrong in his interpretation of Staff's calculation Q. 5 of the COE change between the period of Spire Missouri's rate case and Empire's current 6 rate case? 7 Mr. Hevert's interpretation of Staff's calculation is summed up in the following A. 8 formulae and explanation: 9 y = a - b + b - c [1] 10 Where: 11 y = the adjustment to the authorized ROE in the Spire Missouri Rate Case. 12 a = the average current results based on the electric proxy group. b = the average current results based on the natural gas proxy group. 13 14 c = the average results based on the natural gas proxy group from the 15 Spire Missouri Rate Case. 16 Because it adds then subtracts *b*, Equation [1] can be simplified to: y = a - c [2] 17 18 The current results of the natural gas proxy group therefore have no effect on Mr. Chari's adjustment to the 9.80 percent authorized in the Spire 19 20 Missouri rate case. Whether the current natural gas proxy group results 21 average 6.21 percent as Mr. Chari estimates, zero percent, 100.00 percent, 22 or any other value, the adjustment remains negative 57 basis points (see 23 Schedule RBH-R8). That is, Mr. Chari's approach assumes it is 24 appropriate to compare the current results of an *electric proxy group* to the 25 prior results of a *natural gas proxy group* to determine how the ROE has changed over time."³ 26 27 Staff estimated the relative change in COE (-57 basis points) between the periods of June 30, 2017, and November 30, 2019, and used the -57 basis points to adjust the Spire Missouri 28

³ Ibid pages 7 and 8.

authorized ROE (9.80%) to 9.23%, rounded up to 9.25%. While Mr. Hevert's formulas are
correct, his overall interpretation is premised on the wrong belief that COE and authorized ROE
are the same. Mr. Hevert's concern, expressed in the statement, "Here, the results presented in
Schedule PC-12 all are significantly below the lowest authorized return for a vertically
integrated utility in at least 40 years"⁴ is misplaced. The results presented in Schedule PC-12
are significantly lower than authorized ROEs because as Staff explained in Direct Testimony,
there is evidence that COEs have been lower than authorized ROEs.

8 Mr. Hevert only expressed concern about the comparability of proxy groups,
9 reasonableness of model inputs, and the meaningfulness of results.⁵

10

Q.

Are the proxy groups (electric and gas proxy groups) comparable?

11 A. Yes, after Staff's risk differential adjustment. An important step in Staff's 12 calculation of relative change in the authorized ROE is the estimation of risk differential 13 between the gas proxy group and the electric proxy group. Through analyzing the difference 14 in current COEs of the gas proxy group (6.21%) and electric proxy group (6.39%). Staff was 15 able to determine that there is an 18-basis point risk differential between the gas proxy group 16 and the electric proxy. As shown in the table below, the COE changed between the gas proxy groups over the period of June 30, 2017, and November 30, 2019, decreasing by 75-basis points. 17 18 Consideration of Staff's calculated risk differential between the current gas and electric proxy 19 groups led Staff to make an upward adjustment of 18 basis points to Staff's initial 75-basis 20 point decreased COE adjustment. The sum of these adjustments to the COE led Staff to utilize 21 a relative adjustment to apply to the Spire Missouri rate case's authorized ROE and arrive at

*2*1

⁴ Ibid., page 8, lines 12 to 13.

⁵ Ibid., page 8, lines 10 to 12.

1 the recommended ROE for Empire. With the adjustments Staff made for risk differential, the

2 proxy groups are comparable:

3

S	Summary of Staff's C	Cost of Equ	ity Estimates				
Current C	Cost of Equity Estima	ates for the	Electric Proxy	Group			
OCF Range of Growth %		<u>4.20%</u>		<u>5.00%</u>	Average		
DCF		7.34%		8.14%		7.74%	_
	Geometric		Arithmetic		_		
CAPM		4.63%		5.43%		5.03%	
			Average			6.39%	(1)
Current	t Cost of Equity Estin	mates for t	he Gas Proxy G	roup			
OCF Range of Growth %		<u>4.20%</u>		<u>5.00%</u>	Average		
DCF		6.65%		7.45%		7.05%	-
	Geometric		Arithmetic		_		
CAPM		4.91%		5.81%		5.36%	
	Equity Estimates for		Average roxy Group in tl	ne Spire N	Aissouri Ca	6.21% ase	(2)
	Equity Estimates for	the Gas Pr <u>4.20%</u>	-	<u>5.00%</u>	Aissouri Ca		(2)
Past Cost of I		the Gas P	roxy Group in tl	-			(2)
Past Cost of I DCF Range of Growth % DCF	Equity Estimates for Geometric	the Gas Pr <u>4.20%</u> 6.91%	-	<u>5.00%</u> 7.71%		nse 7.31%	(2)
Past Cost of I DCF Range of Growth %		the Gas Pr <u>4.20%</u>	roxy Group in the Arithmetic	<u>5.00%</u>		nse 7.31% 6.61%	-
Past Cost of I DCF Range of Growth % DCF		the Gas Pr <u>4.20%</u> 6.91%	roxy Group in tl	<u>5.00%</u> 7.71%		nse 7.31%	(2)
Past Cost of I DCF Range of Growth % DCF	Geometric	• the Gas P a <u>4.20%</u> 6.91% 6.08%	roxy Group in th Arithmetic Average	<u>5.00%</u> 7.71%		nse 7.31% 6.61%	(3)
Past Cost of I DCF Range of Growth % DCF CAPM	Geometric	the Gas Pr <u>4.20%</u> 6.91% 6.08%	roxy Group in th Arithmetic Average	<u>5.00%</u> 7.71%	Average	nse 7.31% 6.61%	(3) - <u>0.75</u>
Past Cost of I OCF Range of Growth % DCF CAPM Average COE Difference Betwee COE Differential Between Electr	<u>Geometric</u> on Updated Spire Case ic Proxy Group and G	the Gas Pr <u>4.20%</u> 6.91% 6.08% e and Last S Gas Proxy	roxy Group in th Arithmetic Average	5.00% 7.71% 7.14%	Average (2)-(3) (1)-(2)	nse 7.31% 6.61%	(3) -0.75 0.18
Past Cost of I OCF Range of Growth % DCF CAPM Average COE Difference Betwee	<u>Geometric</u> on Updated Spire Case ic Proxy Group and G	the Gas Pr <u>4.20%</u> 6.91% 6.08% e and Last S Gas Proxy	roxy Group in th Arithmetic Average	5.00% 7.71% 7.14%	<u>Average</u> (2)-(3) (1)-(2) (1)-(3)	nse 7.31% 6.61% 6.96%	(3) -0.75 0.18
Past Cost of I OCF Range of Growth % DCF CAPM Average COE Difference Betwee COE Differential Between Electr	<u>Geometric</u> en Updated Spire Case ic Proxy Group and G en Electric Proxy Gro	the Gas Pr <u>4.20%</u> 6.91% 6.08% e and Last S Gas Proxy	roxy Group in th Arithmetic Average	5.00% 7.71% 7.14%	Average (2)-(3) (1)-(2)	nse 7.31% 6.61% 6.96%	(3) -0.75 0.18 -0.57
Past Cost of I OCF Range of Growth % DCF CAPM Average COE Difference Betwee COE Differential Between Electr	<u>Geometric</u> en Updated Spire Case ic Proxy Group and G en Electric Proxy Gro	the Gas Pr <u>4.20%</u> 6.91% 6.08% e and Last S Gas Proxy	roxy Group in th Arithmetic Average	5.00% 7.71% 7.14%	<u>Average</u> (2)-(3) (1)-(2) (1)-(3)	nse 7.31% 6.61% 6.96%	(3) -0.75 0.18 -0.57 9.80
Past Cost of I OCF Range of Growth % DCF CAPM Average COE Difference Betwee COE Differential Between Electr	<u>Geometric</u> en Updated Spire Case ic Proxy Group and G en Electric Proxy Gro	the Gas Pr <u>4.20%</u> 6.91% 6.08% e and Last S Gas Proxy	roxy Group in th Arithmetic Average	5.00% 7.71% 7.14%	<u>Average</u> (2)-(3) (1)-(2) (1)-(3)	nse 7.31% 6.61% 6.96%	-

4 5

Q. Do you agree with Mr. Hevert's assessments of Staff's conclusion related to

6 capital market environment?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A. No, Mr. Hevert's assessments that the large decrease in 30-year Treasury rates in 2019, "relates to something other than long-term fundamental market factors" and that "we should question the extent to which changes in bond yields reflect changes in investor return requirements" are unfounded.⁶ Similarly, Mr. Hevert's concern that "greater variability in P/E ratios increases the risk of capital loss" is unfounded.⁷ Mr. Hevert's concerns equate to a belief that lower long-term interest rates and higher P/E ratios are not normal or sustainable, that they are somehow anomalous.

8 Reviewing percentage changes in 30-year Treasury yields shows that volatility in 9 30-year Treasury rates has increased since the Financial Crisis; reviewing P/E ratios for Staff's 10 electric proxy group shows that P/E ratios have been trending higher for an equally considerable 11 period. The combination of cyclical and secular forces driving down interest rates has led to reduced opportunity costs, forcing investors to search for yields.⁸ Mr. Hevert suggests that 12 13 "the fall in yields does not reflect a reduction in required returns, it reflects an increase in risk 14 aversion and, therefore, an increase in investor-required returns."⁹ Utility stocks have long 15 been referred to as bond substitutes – when yields are low, investors shift their funds into utility 16 stocks in search for higher yields. Edward Jones, in its "Utilities Sector Report" on January 27, 17 2020, noted, "Utilities' perceived safe and steadily growing dividends continue to make utility 18 stocks an attractive source of current income for investors." In reference to the role of low 19 interest rates, Edward Jones noted, "[T]he marked decline in interest rates has led to the group [Utilities] achieving all-time high levels."¹⁰ As indicated by the high valuations in utilities, the 20

⁶ Ibid., page 12.

⁷ Ibid., page 15.

⁸ Cyclical factors are factors that occur over the course of a business cycle; meanwhile, secular factors are factors occurring over multiple business cycles.

⁹ Ibid., page 13, line 10.

¹⁰ <u>https://www.edwardjones.com/images/utilities-sector-outlook.pdf</u>, page 3.

net effect of falling yields has been high stock prices for utilities and, with the generally 1 2 accepted knowledge that stock prices are inversely related to investor-required returns (COE), 3 it is indisputable that falling yields and high stock prices have led to lower investor-required 4 returns (COE), not higher investor-required returns (COE) as Mr. Hevert argues.

5 Below are graphs of the percentage changes in 30-year Treasury yields, 30-year Treasury vields, and P/E ratios for Staff's proxy group.¹¹ Notice that the frequency of higher 6 7 percentage rate changes in 30-year Treasury rates has increased since the Financial Crisis. 8 Coincidentally, this corresponds to the time period Mr. Hevert references as when utility 9 dividend yields generally began to exceed Treasury yields.¹² Notice that lower interest rates 10 and higher P/E ratios are not singular events that the Commission should be wary of, as 11 Mr. Hevert suggests. Instead, they are longstanding events that are likely to continue. The 12 coincidence of the inflection point Mr. Hevert references combined with lower interest rates 13 and utility stocks low risk profile, increases the attractiveness of utility stocks as substitutes for 14 bonds because utilities are providing a safe haven at higher yields than bonds. Although, at 15 times, increased volatility facilitates utility stock appreciation, the primary factor that continues 16 to lead to increased utility stock prices is the consistent low interest rate environment forcing 17 investors to search for yields in safe haven assets. As interest rates decline further, utility stocks 18 will become even more attractive.

¹¹ The percentage Changes in 30 year Rates graph encompasses a longer time period to allow for comparison of volatility after the Financial Crisis.

¹² Hevert Rebuttal, page 14.



1

2

Q. Do you agree with Mr. Hevert's primary concern with Staff's inputs for the Constant Growth DCF model?

3 No. Mr. Hevert's primary concern relates to the growth rates Staff used in the A. 4 constant growth DCF model. Mr. Hevert is concerned that Staff's current DCF growth rates 5 did not change from those presented in the Spire Missouri rate cases. Mr. Hevert argues that 6 because the Ten- and Five-year average growth rates, as well as the analyst projected long-term 7 growth rates, Staff presented in the Spire Missouri rate cases increased in the current case, the 8 growth rates in the current case should have increased too. Staff understands Mr. Hevert's 9 concern and excludes historical growth rates when focusing on the relative change in growth 10 rates between rate cases. However, excluding historical growth rates, as Mr. Hevert suggests 11 does not change Staff's rate of return recommendation in any way because Mr.Hevert's 12 observation of increased growth rate is not sufficient to conclude that Staff's growth rates 13 should be higher. Staff maintains, as described in the Discount Dividend Valuation, "an earnings growth rate far above the nominal GDP growth rate is not sustainable in perpetuity."¹³ 14 15 Similarly, acknowledging an increase in projected growth rates between rate cases in not 16 sufficient to conclude that the COE has increased because price earnings ratios ("P/E") have 17 increased at a greater rate than projected growth rates. For example, projected growth rates for 18 Staff's natural gas proxy group as presented by Mr. Hevert on page 17 of his rebuttal testimony 19 shows that growth rates increased by about 11% between June 30, 2017, and November 30, 20 2019.¹⁴ Contrast that with about 27% increase in P/E ratios for the same gas proxy group in

 ¹³ Henry, E., Pinto, J., Robinson, T., & Stowe, J., Discount Dividend Valuation, Reading 29, Level II Chartered Financial Analyst Curriculum, 2019.
 ¹⁴ 5 77% - 5 10% - 0 58% (0.58% (5.10% - 11%))

 $^{^{14}}$ 5.77% - 5.19% = 0.58%, 0.58%/5.19% = 11%.

the same period.¹⁵ The higher growth in P/E ratios than growth in projected growth rates lends further support to Staff's position that COE declined during the period because the rate of increase in investors' willingness to pay more for each unit of earnings outpaced the rate of increase in growth for each unit of earnings.

5 Mr. Hevert also expressed concern with Staff's inclusion of negative earnings per share 6 ("EPS") growth rates in the calculation of historical average growth rates for the electric proxy 7 group. Staff understands Mr. Hevert's concern, however, Staff notes that Mr. Hevert's corrected growth rate range of 4.44% to 5.16%¹⁶ is above the estimated long-term nominal GDP 8 9 growth rate of about 4.00%.¹⁷ Staff still maintains its view that "an earnings growth rate far 10 above the nominal GDP growth rate is not sustainable in perpetuity." Therefore, Mr. Hevert's 11 concern about inclusion of negative EPS changes neither Staff's choice of growth rate for the 12 constant growth DCF model nor the overall rate of return recommendation.

Q. Do you agree with Mr. Hevert's concern about Staff's application of the capital
asset pricing model ("CAPM"), the reasonableness of those results, and their relevance in
determining the Company's ROE?

A. No. Mr. Hevert's concerns about Staffs' CAPM analysis revolve around Staff's
market risk premium ("MRP") estimates and their effects on Staff's CAPM results. With regard
to the relevance and reasonableness of Staff's CAPM results, Mr. Hevert states:

19 20 21

22

Mr. Chari's CAPM results are so far removed from observable benchmarks that they provide little, if any, value in determining the company's ROE. For example, Mr. Chari's CAPM analysis suggests investors would be willing to receive an ROE ranging from 13 basis

¹⁵ Gas P/E ratios from Staff's Direct Testimony, page 10, line 25. 32.10x - 25.26x = 6.84x, 6.84x/25.26x = 27%.

¹⁶ Ibid., page 19, line 7.

¹⁷ <u>https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/11/fed-decision-interest-rates.html</u>. The Fed's estimated long-term real GDP growth of 1.80% to 2.00% plus projected inflation rate of 2.00% = about 4.00% nominal GDP growth rate.

1 2 points below the Company's embedded Cost of Debt (as recommended by Staff, 4.76 percent) to only 67 basis points above.

The basis of Mr. Hevert's contention is that Staff's MRP results in such a low COE estimate 3 4 that it is unreasonable because it is only slightly above Staff's recommended embedded cost of 5 debt. Mr. Hevert states that because "[d]ebt and equity are fundamentally different securities with different risk/return characteristics, different lives, and different investors... no rational 6 7 equity investor would have a required ROE equal to the Cost of Debt, as Mr. Chari's CAPM analysis suggests."¹⁸ Mr. Hevert's contention ignores the fact that the embedded cost of debt 8 9 recommendation presented by Staff contains the costs of debt for 30-year debt instruments that 10 were issued as far back as November 2003, when interest rates and risk premiums were high. 11 Empire's coupon rate for the November 2003 debt instrument was 6.70%. From 2005 to 2010, 12 Empire issued debt instruments with coupon rates ranging from 5.20% to 5.88%. Those coupon 13 rates inevitably led to the higher embedded cost of debt Mr. Hevert references.

Currently, debt instrument rated Baa, corresponding to Empires credit rating, have a yield of 3.60%, approximately 103 basis points below the low-end of Staff's CAPM estimate of 4.63%. Empire also has debts with coupon rates ranging from 3.58% to 3.73%, all at least 90 basis points below the low-end of Staff's CAPM estimate. Given current utility debt costs and the increasing attractiveness of utility stocks as bond substitutes, the low-end of Staff's estimated COE appears reasonable, especially when considering that valuation experts estimate utilities' cost of equity to be as low as 3.40%.¹⁹

21

22

Q. Mr. Hevert expressed concern that Staff relied exclusively on historical data in estimating the MRP. Is Mr. Hevert's concern valid?

¹⁸ Ibid., pages 27 to 28.

¹⁹ <u>http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/</u>.

1	A. No, it is not. Exclusive use of historical data is common among many rate of					
2	return analysts, taxing authorities and other regulatory bodies. ²⁰ Exclusive use of historical					
3	data is supported by the theory "that the past provides a reasonable indicator of how the market					
4	will behave in the future and investors' expectations are influenced by the historical					
5	performance of the market." ²¹					
6	Mr. Hevert uses forecasted MRPs, which, as I previously showed in my rebuttal					
7	testimony, are highly flawed. ²² Studies have indicated that forecasted MRPs are biased high. ²³					
8	RESPONSE TO MR. DAVID MURRAY'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY					
9	Q. Do you agree with Mr. Murray that Empire should use a consolidated					
10	capital structure?					
11	A. Yes. As Staff already explained in the executive summary, Staff unintentionally					
12	used a deconsolidated capital structure submitted by Empire in response to Staff's DR No. 0186					
13	in its direct filing. Therefore, in light of this new discovery, Staff will change its recommended					
14	capital structure, as of September 30, 2019, from 52.93% common equity ratio and 47.07%					
15	long-term debt ratio, to 52.49% common equity ratio and 47.51% long-term debt ratio. ²⁴ Staff's					
16	position is that a consolidated capital structure is the appropriate capital structure for setting					
17	Empire's ROR.					
18	However, these changes do not change Staff's recommendation to use Empire's book					
19	capital structure in lieu of Liberty Utilities Company's ("LUCo") book capital structure					
	²⁰ <i>Cost of Capital</i> , 4 th edition, Shannon P. Pratt and Roger J. Grabowski, page 121. ²¹ <i>Cost of Capital</i> , 4 th edition, Shannon P. Pratt and Roger J. Grabowski, page 121.					

 ²² Mr. Hevert's MRPs, calculated using the constant growth DCF method, included non-dividend paying companies of the S&P 500 which led to unreasonably high MRPs. Mr. Hevert's MRPs ranged from 12.15% to 12.25%, as compared to financial industry consensus of 4.50% to 8.00%.
 ²³ Ibid., page 134.

²⁴ Staff's capital structure excludes obligations under capital leases.

Q.

because, per condition 5^{25} of the Stipulation and Agreement of merger case EM-2016-0213. 1 2 Empire's book capital structure remains more economical than LUCo's book capital structure. 3 Therefore, although Staff accepts that a consolidated capital structure is the appropriate capital 4 structure for setting Empire's ROR, Staff still maintains that Empire's capital structure is more 5 economical than LUCo's capital structure.

6

Is there any other concern that Mr. Murray raised?

7 Yes. Mr. Murray also raised concern about the embedded cost of debt Staff used A. 8 to set Empire's rate of return. Of particular concern to Mr. Murray is the coupon rate, 4.53%, 9 assigned to a debt, "Related Party Note (\$90 million note)", listed in the Cost of Debt Summary provided to Staff by Empire in response to DR No. 0186. This debt is an affiliate note.²⁶ 10 Affiliate notes are regulated under the "Commission's Affiliate Transaction Rules."27 11 which prohibit Algonquin Power and Utility Company ("APUC") from charging "more than 12 13 the fully distributed cost or fair market value, whichever is less." Mr. Murray pointed out that 14 because LUCo funded this loan through short-term debt, which had an average cost of 2.43% 15 through the 12-months ended September 30, 2019, 2.43% is the correct debt cost for the note, not 4.53%.²⁸ After a closer analysis of the issue, Staff agrees the \$90 million note should be 16 17 assigned a lower debt cost, not 4.53%. Please refer to the surrebuttal testimony of Staff witness Kimberly K. Bolin for more discussion of this issue, and for support for Staff's assumed 2.15%

18

²⁵ Condition 5 of the Stipulation and Agreement of the Merger Case No. EM-2016-0213 states: If Empire's per books capital structure is different from that of the entity or entities in which Empire relies for its financing needs, Empire shall be required to provide evidence in subsequent rate cases as to why Empire's per book capital structure is the most economical for purposes of determining a fair and reasonable allowed rate of return for purposes of determining Empire's revenue requirement.

²⁶ An Affiliate Note is a loan lend between two or more entities that are in a business relationship. For example, APUC raises funds through its subsidiary, Liberty Utilities Financing, GP ("LUF"), and in turn, lends to other subsidiaries of APUC, which include Empire.

²⁷ 20 CSR 4240-20.015.

²⁸ Murray Rebuttal Testimony, page 9, lines 16 to 19.

debt cost for this transaction. Based upon this adjustment, Staff changes its embedded cost of
 debt recommendation from 4.84% to 4.57%.

3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

4

Q. Please summarize the conclusions of your surrebuttal testimony.

A. Mr. Hevert and Staff disagree over the appropriate ROE for Empire. Mr. Hevert
recommends an authorized ROE of 9.95%. Staff recommends an authorized ROE of 9.25%.
Mr. Hevert's belief that the COE and the authorized ROE are equivalent defies basic financial
logic and, more importantly, market evidence. Mr. Hevert's claim that Staff's ROE
recommendation approach is inappropriate is baseless.

Mr. Murray raised concern about Staff's use of a deconsolidated capital structure for
Empire. While Staff accepts Mr. Murray's concern, the changes that Mr. Murray suggest do
not change Staff's overall capital structure recommendation. Staff still maintains that Empire's
capital structure is more economical than LUCo's and consequently, the appropriate capital
structure for setting Empire's ROR.

Does this complete your surrebuttal testimony?

15

16

A. Yes.

Q.

Page 14

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of The Empire District Electric)	
Company's Request for Authority to File)	Case No. ER-2019-0374
Tariffs Increasing Rates for Electric Service)	
Provided to Customers in its Missouri)	
Service Area)	

AFFIDAVIT OF PETER CHARI

STATE OF MISSOURI)	
)	SS.
COUNTY OF COLE)	

COMES NOW PETER CHARI and on their oath declares that they are of sound mind and lawful age; that they contributed to the foregoing Surrebuttal Testimony; and that the same is true and correct according to their best knowledge and belief, under penalty of perjury.

Further the Affiant sayeth not.

/s/ Peter Chari PETER CHARI