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# LACLEDE GAS COMPANY MISSOURI GAS ENERGY 

GR-2017-0215
GR-2017-0216

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

PAULINE M. AHERN, CRRA
APRIL 2017

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## DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAULINE M. AHERN

## Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

A. My name is Pauline M. Ahern. I am an Executive Director of ScottMadden, Inc. My business address is 1900 West Park Road, Suite 250, Westborough, MA 01581. My mailing address is 3000 Atrium Way, Suite 241, Mount Laurel, NJ 08054.

## Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE EDUCATION BACKGROUND.

A. I have offered expert testimony on behalf of investor-owned utilities before thirty-one state regulatory commissions in the United States and Canada on rate of return issues including, but not limited to, common equity cost rate, fair rate of return, capital structure issues, relative investment risk and credit quality issues. I am a graduate of Clark University, Worcester, MA, where I received a Bachelor of Arts degree with honors in Economics. I have also received a Master of Business Administration with high honors and a concentration in finance from Rutgers University.

On behalf of the American Gas Association ("A.G.A."), I calculate the A.G.A. Gas Index, which serves as the benchmark against which the performance of the American Gas Index Fund ("AGIF") is measured monthly. The A.G.A. Gas Index and AGIF are a market capitalization weighted index and mutual fund, respectively, comprised of the common stocks of the publicly traded corporate members of the A.G.A.

I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts ("SURFA") and currently serve on its Board of Directors, having previously served two terms as President, from 2006 - 2008 and 2008 - 2010, and as its Secretary/Treasurer from 2004 - 2006. In 1992, I was awarded the professional designation "Certified Rate
of Return Analyst" ("CRRA") by SURFA, which is based upon education, experience and the successful completion of a comprehensive written examination.

I am also an associate member of the National Association of Water Companies, serving on its Finance/Accounting/Taxation and Rates and Regulation Committees; a member of A.G.A.'s State Affairs Committee; a member of the Advisory Council of the Financial Research Institute - University of Missouri - Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. College of Business; a member of the American Finance and Financial Management Associations; and, a member of Edison Electric Institute's Cost of Capital Working Group.

The details of my educational background, expert witness appearances, presentations I have given and articles I have co-authored are contained in Appendix A.
Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY BEFORE THIS COMMISSION?
A. Yes. I have previously filed testimony before the MOPSC in the following rate cases: Union Electric Company, d/b/a Ameren Missouri: ER-2016-0179, Missouri Gas Energy: GR-2014-0007, Missouri American Water Company: WR -2011-0337 / SR-2001-0338, WR-2010-0131, WR-2008-0311 / SR-2008-0312, WR-2007-0216, WR-2003-0500 / WC-2004-0168, and Arkansas Western - ANG Division (Missouri): GR-97-272.

## PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY

## Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

A. The purpose is to provide testimony on behalf of Laclede Gas Company ("Laclede") and its two operating units, Laclede Gas (LAC) and Missouri Gas Energy ("MGE") (collectively "the Companies") relative to the appropriate overall fair rate of return, including the appropriate capital structure ratios, long-term debt cost rate and investor-
required return on common equity, which they should be afforded the opportunity to earn on their respective jurisdictional rate bases.

## Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE?

A. I recommend that the Missouri Public Service Commission ("MOPSC" or "the Commission") authorize the Companies the opportunity to earn an overall rate of return of $7.700 \%$, including a common equity cost rate of $10.35 \%$, on their jurisdictional rate bases. This recommendation is summarized on Schedule PMA-D1 and in Table 1 below:

## Table 1

LAC / MGE

| $\underline{\text { Type of Capital }}$ | $\underline{\text { Ratios }}$ |  | Cost Rate |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Weighted Cost Rate |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | $42.80 \%$ |  | $4.159 \%$ |  |
| Common Equity | $\underline{57.20 \%}$ |  | $10.350 \%$ |  |
| Total | $\underline{\underline{100.00 \%}}$ |  | $\underline{5.920 \%}$ |  |
|  |  |  | $\underline{\underline{7.700 \%}}$ |  |

## Q. HAVE YOU PREPARED SCHEDULES THAT SUPPORT YOUR RECOMMENDED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE?

A. Yes. They have been designated as Schedules PMA-D1 through PMA-D9.

## Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR COMMON EQUITY COST RATE ANALYSIS.

A. Because the Companies' common stock is not publicly traded, their market-based common equity cost rate cannot be directly observed. Consequently, I have assessed the market-based common equity cost rates of companies of relatively similar, but not necessarily identical risk, i.e., a proxy group, for insight into a recommended common equity cost rate applicable to Laclede, and its operating units.. Using companies of relatively similar risk as proxies is consistent with the principle of a fair rate of return established in the Hope ${ }^{1}$ and Bluefield ${ }^{2}$ cases, adding reliability to the informed expert judgment necessary to arrive at a recommended common equity cost rate.

However, no proxy is identical in risk to any single entity. Accordingly, an assessment of relative risk between the Companies and a proxy group of publicly traded natural gas utilities ("Natural Gas Proxy Group"), whose selection is discussed in further detail later in this testimony, must be made to determine whether any adjustments to the Natural Gas Proxy Group's indicated common equity cost rate are necessary.

In determining my recommended common equity cost rate, I first applied several well-recognized cost of common equity models (i.e., the Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF"), the Risk Premium Model ("RPM") and the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM")) to the market data of the Natural Gas Proxy Group as well as a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group whose selection will also be discussed below.

The results derived from each are as follows:

1 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
2 Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1922).

Table 2
Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate

| Natural Gas Proxy Group |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Discounted Cash Flow Model ("DCF") | $8.68 \%^{3}$ |
| Risk Premium Model ("RPM") | $10.57 \%$ |
| Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") | $9.11 \%$ |
| Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group |  |
| Cost of Equity Models Applied to <br> Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Cos. | $\underline{10.45 \%}$ |
| Common Equity Cost Rate Before Adjustment | $10.00 \%$ |
| Flotation Risk Adjustment | $0.16 \%$ |
| Business Risk Adjustment | $0.20 \%$ |
| Common Equity Cost Rate After Adjustment | $10.36 \%$ |
| Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate | $10.35 \%$ |

## Q. WHAT GENERAL PRINCIPLES HAVE YOU CONSIDERED IN YOUR COMMON EQUITY COST RATE ANALYSES?

A. The cost of capital is defined as that return which investors require to be willing to make an investment in a given firm. From the firm's perspective, that required return, whether it is provided to debt or equity investors, has a cost. Individually, these are known as the "cost of debt" and the "cost of equity" and are collectively referred to as the "cost of capital."

The cost of capital (including the costs of both debt and equity) is based upon the economic principle of "opportunity cost," meaning that investing in any asset / security

[^0]implies a forgone opportunity to invest in alternative assets / securities. Because investments with similar risks should offer similar returns, the opportunity cost of an investment should equal the return available on investments of comparable risk.

Although both debt and equity have required costs, they differ fundamentally. The cost of debt is contractually defined and can be directly observed in the market as the interest rate or yield on debt securities. ${ }^{4}$ In contrast, the cost of common equity does not have a contractual obligation, nor can it be directly observed in the market. Rather, because common equity investors have a claim on a firm's cash flows only after debt holders ${ }^{5}$ are paid, it is the uncertainty (or risk) associated with those residual cash flows that determines the cost of common equity. Because common equity investors bear this "residual risk," they require higher returns than debt holders. In that sense, common equity and debt investors are distinct: they invest in different securities; face different risks; and, require different returns. That is not to say that the risks facing debt and equity investors are separate and distinct as discussed above, with the two having much in common, but only to a point. Nonetheless, commentary from both debt and equity analysts is instructive and helps inform the determination of the required return within a range of analytical results.

The cost of capital, specifically the cost of common equity or the investor required return on common equity, is also an economic and financial concept which refers to the ex-ante, or the expected return on an investment at the market value of the publicly traded common shares of a corporation. According to the basic financial principle of risk and return, the investor required return on investment is a function of the

[^1]level of investor perceived risk as reflected in the market prices paid by investors. The higher / lower the investor perceived risk, the higher / lower the investor required return. The investor required return is also forward-looking, or expectational, as it is the return which the investor expects to receive in the future for investing capital today and is based upon expected economic and capital market conditions.

In unregulated industries, the competition of the marketplace is the principal determinant of the price of products or services. For regulated public utilities, regulation must act as a substitute for marketplace competition. A sufficient level of earnings is required to assure that the utility can: 1) fulfill its obligation to provide safe and reliable service at all times; 2) maintain the integrity of presently invested capital through future reinvestment; and, 3) attract needed new capital at a reasonable cost and on reasonable terms in competition with other firms of comparable risk. This is consistent with the previously noted fair rate of return standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Hope and Bluefield cases.

In rate base / rate of return regulation, the authorized (allowed) return on common equity is defined as the investor required market return. In turn, the investor required return is defined as the return required by the investor on the funds invested in the publicly traded common stocks of firms. As stated previously, the cost of common equity is not directly observable in the capital markets since there is no contractual basis or obligation on the part of a firm to provide a return to its common shareholders, unlike the contractual coupon or interest rate on its debt obligations. Therefore, the cost of common equity must be estimated from market (economic and financial) data, using financial models developed for that purpose, such as the CAPM, DCF and RPM.

Therefore, my recommended common equity cost rate is based upon the marketplace data of a proxy group of utilities that are as similar in risk as possible to the Companies based upon selection criteria discussed below.

Because quantitative financial models produce a range of results from which the market, or investor, required return must be estimated, that estimation must be based upon a comprehensive review of relevant data and information, both qualitative and quantitative, and not necessarily left to a strict mathematical estimation. The key consideration in estimating the common equity cost rate is to ensure that the overall analysis reasonably reflects investors' expectations in light of capital markets in general, and the relative investment risk of the subject company (in the context of the proxy companies), in particular.

Because empirical financial models for determining the cost of common equity are subject to limiting assumptions or other constraints, most finance texts recommend using multiple approaches to estimate the cost of common equity. As a practical matter, no individual model is more reliable than all others under all market conditions. The use of multiple common equity cost rate models adds reliability to the estimation of the investor-required return. This fact is well supported in the academic literature with respect to regulatory finance and utility regulation.

For example, Roger A. Morin ${ }^{6}$ ("Morin") states:
Each methodology requires the exercise of considerable judgment on the reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the methodology and on the reasonableness of the proxies used to validate a theory. The inability of the DCF model to account for changes in relative market valuation, discussed below, is a vivid example of the potential shortcomings of the DCF model when applied to a given company. Similarly, the inability of

[^2]the CAPM to account for variables that affect security returns other than beta tarnishes its use.


#### Abstract

No one individual method provides the necessary level of precision for determining a fair return, but each method provides useful evidence to facilitate the exercise of an informed judgment. Reliance on any single method or preset formula is inappropriate when dealing with investor expectations because of possible measurement difficulties and vagaries in individual companies' market data. (emphasis added)


*     *         * 

The financial literature supports the use of multiple methods. Professor Eugene Brigham, a widely respected scholar and finance academician, asserts ${ }^{\text {(footnote omitted) }}$

> Three methods typically are used: (1) the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), (2) the discounted cash flow (DCF) method, and (3) the bond-yield-plus-risk-premium approach. These methods are not mutually exclusive - no method dominates the others, and all are subject to error when used in practice. Therefore, when faced with the task of estimating a company's cost of equity, we generally use all three methods and then choose among them on the basis of our confidence in the data used for each in the specific case at hand.

Both the use of the market data of a proxy group of similar risk, as well as the use of multiple common equity cost rate models, adds reliability to the informed expert judgment used in estimating the common equity cost rate. Therefore, it is both prudent and appropriate to use multiple methodologies to mitigate the effects of limiting assumptions and inputs associated with any single approach. As such, I have considered the results of three well-tested market models: the DCF, RPM and CAPM in arriving at my recommended common equity cost rate for the Companies.

## INVESTMENT RISK

## Business Risk

## Q. PLEASE DEFINE BUSINESS RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE DETERMINATION OF A FAIR RATE OF RETURN.

A. The investor-required return on common equity reflects investors' assessment of the total investment risk of the subject firm. Total investment risk is often discussed in the context of business and financial risk.

Business risk reflects the uncertainty associated with owning a company's common stock without the company's use of debt and / or preferred stock financing. One way of considering the distinction between business and financial risk is to view the former as the uncertainty in the expected earned return on common equity assuming the firm is financed with no debt.

Examples of business risks generally faced by utilities include, but are not limited to, the regulatory environment, mandatory environmental compliance requirements, customer mix and concentration of customers, service territory economic growth, market demand, risks and uncertainties of supply, operations, capital intensity, size, the degree of operating leverage, and the like, all of which have a direct bearing on earnings. Although analysts, including rating agencies, may categorize business risks according to individual categories, as a practical matter they are inter-related and are not wholly distinct from one another. Therefore, it is difficult to specifically and numerically quantify the effect of any individual factor on investors' required return, i.e., the cost of capital. For determining an appropriate return on common equity, the relevant issue is where investors see the subject company as falling within a spectrum of risk. To the
extent investors view a company as being exposed to additional risk, the required return will increase, and vice versa.

For regulated utilities, business risks are both long- and near-term in nature. Whereas near-term business risks are reflected in year-to-year variability in earnings and cash flow brought about by economic or regulatory factors, long-term business risks reflect the prospect of an impaired ability of investors to earn a return on and of their capital. Moreover, because utilities accept the obligation to provide safe, adequate and reliable service at all times (in exchange for the opportunity to earn a fair return on their investment), they generally do not have the option to delay, defer, or reject capital investments. Because those investments are capital-intensive, utilities generally do not have the option to avoid raising external funds during periods of capital market distress, if necessary.

Because utilities invest in long-lived assets, long-term business risks are of considerable concern to equity investors. That is, the risk of not recovering the return on and of their investment extends far into the future. But, the timing and nature of events that may lead to losses also are uncertain and consequently, those risks and their implications for the required return on equity tend to be difficult to quantify. That does not mean, however, that the risk is of no consequence to investors. Analysts may apply, for example, simulation-based methods to assess the potential risk, but in the final analysis (like the investors that commit their capital) regulatory commissions must review a variety of quantitative and qualitative data and apply their reasoned judgment to determine how long-term risks weigh in their assessment of the market-required return on common equity.

## Q. DOES THE SMALLER SIZE OF THE COMPANIES RELATIVE TO THE NATURAL GAS PROXY GROUP INCREASE THEIR BUSINESS RISK RELATIVE TO THE NATURAL GAS PROXY GROUP?

A. Yes. The Companies' smaller collective size relative to the Natural Gas Proxy Group indicates greater relative business risk for each Company because, all else being equal, size has a material bearing on risk.

Size affects business risk because smaller companies generally are simply less able to cope with significant events that affect sales, revenues and earnings. For example, smaller companies face more risk exposure to business cycles and economic conditions, both nationally and locally. Additionally, the loss of revenues from a few larger customers would have a greater effect on a small company than on a much bigger company with a larger, more diverse, customer base.

Further evidence that smaller firms are riskier is the fact that investors demand greater returns to compensate for the lack of marketability and liquidity of the securities of smaller firms. Duff \& Phelps 2016 Valuation Handbook Guide to Cost of Capital Market Results through 2015 ("D\&P - 2016") discusses the nature of the small size phenomenon, providing an indication of the magnitude of the size premium based upon several measures of size. In discussing "Size as a Predictor of Equity Premiums," D\&P $\underline{2016}$ states $^{7}$ :

The size effect is based on the empirical observation that companies of smaller size are associated with greater risk and, therefore, have greater cost of capital [sic]. The "size" of a company is one of the most important risk elements to consider when developing cost of equity capital estimates for use in valuing a business simply because size has been shown to be a predictor of equity returns. In other words, there is a significant (negative)

[^3]relationship between size and historical equity returns - as size decreases, returns tend to increase, and vice versa. ${ }^{\text {(footnote omitted) }}$ (emphasis in original)

Furthermore, in "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence, ${ }^{8}$ Fama and French note that size is indeed a risk factor which must be reflected when estimating the cost of common equity. On page 14, they note:
. . . the higher average returns on small stocks and high book-to-market stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable risks (covariance's) in returns not captured in the market return and are priced separately from market betas.

Based upon this evidence, Fama and French proposed their three-factor model which includes a size variable in recognition of the effect of size on the cost of common equity.

Also, the fact that it is the use of funds invested, and not the source of those funds, which gives rise to the risk of any investment, is a basic financial principle. ${ }^{9}$ Brigham ${ }^{10}$, a well-known authority, states:

A number of researchers have observed that portfolios of small-firms have earned consistently higher average returns than those of large-firms stocks; this is called "small-firm effect." On the surface, it would seem to be advantageous to the small firms to provide average returns in a stock market that are higher than those of larger firms. In reality, it is bad news for the small firm; what the small-firm effect means is that the capital market demands higher returns on stocks of small firms than on otherwise similar stocks of the large firms. (emphasis added)

Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return discussed above, such increased relative risk due to small size must be considered in the allowed rate of return

[^4]on common equity. Therefore, the MOPSC's authorization of a cost rate of common equity in this proceeding must appropriately reflect the Companies' respective and relevant unique risks, including the impact of their small size, and is justified and supported by evidence in the financial literature as well as in financial markets as will be discussed subsequently.

## Q. PLEASE DEFINE FINANCIAL RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE DETERMINATION OF A FAIR RATE OF RETURN.

A. Financial risk is created by the introduction of senior capital, i.e., debt and preferred stock, into the capital structure. It is the additional risk that a company may not have sufficient cash flows to meet its financial obligations. The higher the proportion of senior capital in the capital structure, the higher the financial risk which must be factored into the common equity cost rate, consistent with the previously mentioned basic financial principle of risk and return, i.e., investors demand a higher common equity return as compensation for bearing higher investment risk.
Q. CAN THE COMBINED BUSINESS RISKS (I.E., INVESTMENT RISK) OF AN ENTERPRISE BE PROXIED BY BOND AND CREDIT RATINGS?
A. Yes, similar bond / issuer credit ratings reflect and are representative of similar combined business and financial risks, i.e., total risk faced by bond investors. Although specific business or financial risks may differ between companies, the same bond / credit rating indicates that the combined risks are similar, albeit not necessarily equal (as the purpose of the bond / credit rating process is to assess credit quality or credit risk and not common equity risk).

However, one must keep in mind that a long-term issuer credit or bond issue rating is an opinion regarding the particular company's overall financial capacity to pay its financial obligations as they become due and payable. It is not an assessment of the risk faced by equity investors. The claims of equity holders are subordinate to the claims of debt holders and are perpetual in life. As noted above, whereas bondholders can be assured of the probability that a particular company will be able to meet its financial obligations (and thus have higher credit/bond ratings), common equity holders bear the residual risk of insufficient or volatile cash flows in perpetuity. For that fundamental reason, the risks of owning common equity do not directly correspond to the risks of owning bonds. The two have similar considerations, but only up to a point.

## NATURAL GAS PROXY GROUP

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU CHOSE THE NATURAL GAS PROXY GROUP.

A. I chose the Natural Gas Proxy Group by selecting those companies which met the following criteria:

1) They are included in the Natural Gas Utility Group of Value Line's Standard Edition (December 2, 2016);
2) They have $50 \%$ or greater of 2015 total operating income derived from, and $50 \%$ or greater of 2015 total assets devoted to, regulated natural gas operations;
3) They had not publicly announced involvement in any major merger or acquisition activity (i.e., one publicly-traded utility merging with or acquiring another) at the time of the preparation of this testimony;
4) They have not cut or omitted their common dividends during the past five years or through the time of the preparation of this testimony;
5) They have Value Line and Bloomberg adjusted betas;
6) They have a positive Value Line five-year dividends per share ("DPS") growth rate projection; and,
7) They have Value Line, Reuters, Zacks or Yahoo! Finance, consensus five-year earnings per share ("EPS") growth rate projections.

The following seven companies meet these criteria:

- Atmos Energy Corp. (ATO);
- Chesapeake Utilities Corp. (CPK);
- New Jersey Resources Corp. (NJR);
- Northwest Natural Gas Co. (NWN);
- South Jersey Industries, Inc. (SJI);
- Southwest Gas Corp. (SWX);
- Spire, Inc. (SR).
Q. HAVE YOU REVIEWED FINANCIAL DATA FOR THE NATURAL GAS PROXY GROUP?
A. Yes. Page 1 of Schedule PMA-D2 contains comparative capitalization and financial statistics for the Natural Gas Proxy Group for the years 2011 - 2015. As shown on page 1, during the five-year period ending 2015, the historically achieved average earnings rate on book common equity for the group was $10.70 \%$. The average five-year common equity ratio based upon permanent capital (excluding short-term debt) was $55.81 \%$, and the average dividend payout ratio was $57.83 \%$.

In addition, total debt outstanding as a percentage of EBITDA for the years 2011 2015 ranged between 3.23 and 4.62 times, averaging 3.98 times, for the five-year period, while funds from operations relative to total debt ranged between $19.53 \%$ and $29.74 \%$, average $26.17 \%$.

## CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS AND LONG-TERM DEBT COST RATE

Q. WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR USE IN DETERMINING THE OVERALL COST OF CAPITAL FOR THE COMPANIES AND WHY?
A. I recommend that the pro forma consolidated capital structure ratios and embedded longterm debt cost rate of Laclede at December 31, 2016 be used to establish an allowed overall rate of return for the Companies. These ratios, as well as corresponding cost rates, are shown on Schedule PMA-D1. They consist of $42.80 \%$, long-term debt at an embedded cost rate of $4.159 \%$ and $57.20 \%$ common equity, at my recommended common equity cost rate of $10.35 \%$.
Q. ARE THE PRO FORMA CONSOLIDATED LACLEDE ACTUAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS AT DECEMBER 31, 2016 APPROPRIATE FOR USE IN

## A COST OF CAPITAL DETERMINATION?

A. Yes. The pro forma consolidated Laclede capital structure ratios at December 31, 2016 are reasonable to use for both the Companies because: 1) they are the "actual" pro forma capital structure ratios of Laclede, in other words, the long-term debt is issued by Laclede based upon the utilities' mortgage of assets and the common equity represents Laclede's common stock and retained earnings; 2) MGE is a division of Laclede; and, 3) the ratios are consistent with the capital structure ratios maintained on average by the Natural Gas Proxy Group upon whose market data I relied in deriving my recommended common equity cost rate.
Q. HOW DOES LACLEDE'S LONG-TERM DEBT RATIO OF 42.80\% PRO FORMA AT DECEMBER 31, 2016, COMPARE WITH THE LONG-TERM DEBT

## RATIOS MAINTAINED ON AVERAGE BY THE COMPANIES IN THE NATURAL GAS PROXY GROUP?

A. Laclede's long-term debt ratio of $42.80 \%$ pro forma at December 31, 2016 is similar, but slightly less than the long-term debt ratio based upon permanent capital (excluding shortterm debt) of $44.98 \%$, maintained on average in 2015 by the companies in the Natural Gas Proxy Group. In addition, the long-term debt ratios based upon permanent capital of the Natural Gas Proxy Group companies ranged from $30.68 \%$ to $54.06 \%$ in 2016, with a midpoint of $42.37 \%$, as shown on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D2.

## COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS

## Q. ARE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS YOU USE MARKETBASED MODELS?

A. Yes. The DCF model is market-based in that market prices are utilized in developing the dividend yield component of the model. The RPM and CAPM are also market-based in that the bond / issuer ratings and expected bond yields / risk-free rate used in the application of the RPM and CAPM reflect the market's assessment of bond / credit risk. In addition, the use of beta to determine the equity risk premium also reflects the market's assessment of market / systematic risk, as betas are derived from regression analyses of market prices. In addition, market prices are used in the development of the monthly returns and equity risk premiums used in the Predictive Risk Premium Model ("PRPM"). Selection of the companies included in the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group is market-based in that the selection criteria are based upon statistical regression analyses of market prices.

## Discounted Cash Flow Model ("DCF")

## Q. WHAT IS THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE DCF MODEL?

A. The theory underlying the DCF model is that the present value of an expected future stream of net cash flows during the investment holding period can be determined by discounting those cash flows at the cost of capital, or the investors' capitalization rate. DCF theory assumes that an investor buys a stock for an expected total return rate which is derived from cash flows received in the form of dividends plus appreciation in market price (the expected growth rate). Mathematically, the dividend yield on market price plus a growth rate equals the capitalization rate (i.e., the total common equity return rate expected by investors).

## Q. WHICH VERSION OF THE DCF MODEL DO YOU USE?

A. I utilize the single-stage constant growth DCF model. The single-stage DCF model is expressed as:

$$
K=\left(D_{1} / P_{0}\right)+g
$$

Where: $\quad \mathrm{K}=$ Cost of Equity Capital
$\mathrm{D}_{1}=$ Expected Dividend Per Share in one year
$\mathrm{P}_{0}=$ Current Market Price
G = Expected Dividend Per Share Growth
Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DIVIDEND YIELD YOU USED IN YOUR APPLICATION OF THE DCF MODEL.
A. The unadjusted dividend yields are based upon a recent (January 30, 2017) indicated dividend, divided by the average of closing market prices for the 60 days ending January 31, 2017, as shown in Column [1] on page 1 of Schedule PMA-D3.
Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ADJUSTED DIVIDEND YIELD SHOWN ON PAGE 1 OF SCHEDULE PMA-D3 COLUMN [7].
A. Because dividends are paid quarterly, or periodically, as opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model.

DCF theory calls for the use of the full expectational growth rate, referred to as $D_{1}$, in calculating the dividend yield component of the model. However, since the various companies in the Natural Gas Proxy Group increase their quarterly dividend at various times during the year, a reasonable assumption is to reflect one-half the annual dividend growth rate in the dividend yield component, referred to as $D_{1 / 2}$. This is a conservative approach because it does not overstate the dividend yield, which should be representative of the next twelve-month period. Therefore, the actual average dividend yields in Column [1], page 1 of Schedule PMA-D3, have been adjusted upward to reflect one-half the average projected growth rate shown in Column [6].

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF THE GROWTH RATES OF THE NATURAL gas proxy group which you dse in your application of the DCF MODEL.

A. Investors with more limited resources than institutional investors are likely to rely upon widely available financial information services, such as Value Line, Reuters, Zacks and Yahoo! Finance. Investors recognize that such analysts have significant insight into the dynamics of the industries and individual companies they analyze, as well as an entity's historical and future ability to effectively manage the effects of changing laws and regulations and ever changing economic and market conditions.

Security analysts' earnings expectations have a significant, but not sole, influence on market prices and are therefore reasonable indicators of investor expectations. ${ }^{11}$ As noted by Morin ${ }^{12}$ :

> Because of the dominance of institutional investors and their influence on individual investors, analysts' forecasts of long-run growth rates provide a sound basis for estimating required returns. Financial analysts exert a strong influence on the expectations of many investors who do not possess the resources to make their own forecasts, that is, they are a cause of $g$. [g = growth]

Over the long run, there can be no growth in DPS without growth in EPS. Thus, the use of earnings growth rate forecasts in a DCF analysis provides a better matching between investors' market price appreciation expectations and the growth rate component of the DCF. Therefore, I have relied upon security analysts' five-year forecasts of EPS growth in my application of the DCF model.

## Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE DCF MODEL RESULTS.

A. As shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-D3, the average result of the single-stage DCF model is $8.65 \%$, while the median result is $8.70 \%$. I have averaged these two results in arriving at a conclusion of a DCF-indicated common equity cost rate of $8.68 \%$ for the Natural Gas Proxy Group. By doing so, I have not only considered the DCF results for each company, but have not given undue weight to outliers on either the high or the low side.

## Q. PLEASE COMMENT UPON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DCF MODEL IN ESTABLISHING A COST OF COMMON EQUITY.

[^5]A. The DCF model has a tendency to mis-specify the investor required common equity return rate when the market value of common stock differs significantly from its book value. Mathematically, because the "simplified" DCF model traditionally used in rate regulation assumes a market-to-book ratio of one, it understates / overstates investors' required return rate when market value exceeds or is less than book value. It does so because, in many instances, market prices reflect investors' assessments of long-range market price growth potentials (consistent with the infinite investment horizon implicit in the standard regulatory version of the DCF model) not fully reflected in analysts' shorter range forecasts of future growth in earnings per share (EPS), an accounting proxy. Thus, the market-based DCF model will result in a total annual dollar return on book common equity equal to the total annual dollar return expected by investors only when market and book values are equal, a rare and unlikely situation. In recent years, the market values of natural gas utilities' common stocks have been well in excess of their book values as shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-D2 ranging between $149.16 \%$ and $190.88 \%$ for the five years ending 2015.

Under DCF theory, the rate of return investors require is related to the market price paid for a security. Thus, market prices form the basis of investment decisions and investors' expected rates of return. In contrast, a regulated utility is generally limited to earning on a net book value (depreciated original cost) rate base. Although market prices are significantly influenced by analysts' EPS growth forecasts, market values can diverge from book values for a myriad of macroeconomic reasons including, but not limited to, EPS and DPS expectations, merger or acquisition expectations, interest rates, investor sentiment, unemployment levels, monetary policy, fiscal policy, etc.

Traditional rate base / rate of return regulation, where a market-based common equity cost rate is applied to a book value rate base, presumes that market-to-book ratios are at unity or 1.00 . However, there is ample empirical evidence over sustained periods which demonstrate that this is an incorrect presumption. Since market-to-book ratios of unity or 1.00 are rarely the case as discussed above, regulatory allowed returns on common equity, i.e., earnings, have a limited effect on utilities' market/book ratios as the market prices of utility common stocks are also influenced by factors beyond the direct influence of the regulatory process.

As noted by Phillips: ${ }^{13}$
Many question the assumption that market price should equal book value, believing that 'the earnings of utilities should be sufficiently high to achieve market-to-book ratios which are consistent with those prevailing for stocks of unregulated companies.'

In addition, Bonbright ${ }^{14}$ states:
In the first place, commissions cannot forecast, except within wide limits, the effect their rate orders will have on the market prices of the stocks of the companies they regulate. In the second place, whatever the initial market prices may be, they are sure to change not only with the changing prospects for earnings, but with the changing outlook of an inherently volatile stock market. In short, market prices are beyond the control, though not beyond the influence of rate regulation. Moreover, even if a commission did possess the power of control, any attempt to exercise it ... would result in harmful, uneconomic shifts in public utility rate levels. (emphasis added)

## Q. IS IT REASONABLE TO EXPECT THE MARKET VALUES OF UTILITIES' COMMON STOCKS TO CONTINUE TO SELL WELL ABOVE THEIR BOOK VALUES?

[^6]A. Yes. Market-to-book ratios of regulated utilities vary from year to year, due to such influences as the effects on the "Great Recession", subsequent economic and capital market turmoil and the ongoing economic recovery and the like. In my opinion, the common stocks of utilities will continue to sell substantially above their book values, on average, because many investors will likely continue to commit a greater percentage of their available capital to common stocks in view of lower interest rate alternative investment opportunities. The recent past and current capital market environment is in stark and historical contrast to the late 1970's and early 1980's when very high (by historical standards) yields on secured debt instruments in public utilities were available. Despite the fact that the market declined significantly during late 2001 through 2003, following the September 11, 2001 tragedy and dipped to a low in March 2009 as the "Great Recession" unfolded and the U.S. is now recovering from the "Great Recession" at a moderate pace, the majority of utility stocks, on average, have continued to sell at market prices well above their book value. In addition, as previously discussed, such sustained high market-to-book ratios have been influenced by factors other than fundamentals such as actual and reported growth in EPS and DPS.

## Q. CAN THE UNDER- OR OVERSTATEMENT OF THE INVESTORS' REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN ON THE MARKET BY THE DCF MODEL BE DEMONSTRATED MATHEMATICALLY?

A. Yes. Page 2 of Schedule PMA-D3 demonstrates how a market-based DCF cost rate of $8.65 \%{ }^{15}$ applied to a book value which is below market value will understate the investor required return on market value. As shown, there is no realistic opportunity to earn the expected market-based rate of return on book value. In Column [1], investors expect an

[^7]$8.65 \%$, the average DCF result for the proxy group, return on a market price of $\$ 59.536 .{ }^{16}$ Column [2] shows that when the $8.65 \%$ return rate on market value is applied to a book value of $\$ 25.848^{17}$ which is approximately $43 \%$ of market value, the total annual return opportunity is just $\$ 2.236$ on book value. With an annual dividend of $\$ 1.703$, there is an opportunity for growth of $\$ 0.533$ which is just $0.90 \%$ in contrast to the $5.79 \%$ growth in market price expected by investors.

The converse is also true. When the market-to-book value is below 1 , the DCF cost rate will overstate the investor required return on market value.

Hence, the DCF model mis-specifies, that is, it either understates / overstates investors' required cost of common equity capital when market values exceed / are less than their underlying book values. Therefore, as stated above, to add reliability to the estimation of the cost of common equity, multiple cost of common equity models should be relied upon, rather than exclusive reliance upon the DCF model, when estimating investors' expectations.

In view of all the foregoing, at this time the traditional application of the DCF mis-specifies investor required return. Specifically, it understates investor required return because of the confluence of recently rising market prices, the use of accounting measures as proxies for capital appreciation in the DCF, the recent dramatic rise in interest rates in response to recent Federal Reserve comments and the expected continued rise in interest rates and capital costs discussed below. The magnitude of this understatement can be found in the difference between the $5.79 \%$ growth in market

[^8]values, i.e., growth in EPS, shown in Column [1] on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D3 and the growth in market value of $0.90 \%$, shown in Column [2], when the $8.65 \%$ DCF cost rate is applied to book value, or nearly 490 basis points. Coupled with the added reliability and accuracy that the use of multiple cost of common equity models provides in the estimation of the cost of common equity, it is more imperative than ever to not give exclusive or even primary reliance to the DCF analysis currently. In fact, in my opinion, it would be inappropriate to give any greater weight to the DCF analysis than I already have in deriving my multi-model return on equity recommendation.

## The Risk Premium Model ("RPM")

## Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE RPM.

A. The RPM is based upon the basic financial principle of risk and return, namely, that investors require greater returns for bearing greater risk. The RPM recognizes that common equity capital has greater investment risk than debt capital, as common equity shareholders are last in line in any claim on an entity's assets and earnings, as previously discussed. Therefore, investors require higher returns from investment in common stocks than from investment in bonds to compensate them for bearing the additional risk.

While, as also discussed previously, it is possible to directly observe bond returns and yields, the investor required common equity return cannot be directly determined or observed. According to RPM theory, one can estimate a common equity risk premium over bonds, either historically or prospectively, and then use that premium to derive a cost rate of common equity. In summary, according to the RPM, the cost of common equity equals the expected cost rate for long-term debt capital plus a risk premium over
that cost rate to compensate common shareholders for the added risk of being unsecured and last-in-line for any claim on a corporation's assets and earnings.

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU DERIVED YOUR INDICATED COST OF COMMON EQUITY BASED UPON THE RPM.

A. I relied upon the results of the application of two risk premium methods, as shown in Schedule PMA-D4. The first method is the Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM). The second method is a risk premium model using an adjusted total market approach.

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PRPM.

A. The PRPM, published in the Journal of Regulatory Economics (JRE) ${ }^{18}$ and The Electricity Journal (TEJ) ${ }^{19}$, was developed from the work of Robert F. Engle, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2003, "for methods of analyzing economic time series with time-varying volatility ("ARCH")" ${ }^{20}$ (with "ARCH" standing for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity). Engle found that the volatility in market prices, returns, and equity risk premiums clusters over time, making them highly predictable and available to predict future levels of risk and risk premiums.

The PRPM estimates the risk / return relationship directly as the predicted equity risk premium is generated by the predictability of volatility, or risk. Thus, the PRPM is not based upon an estimate of investor behavior, but rather upon the evaluation of the actual results of that behavior, i.e., the variance of historical equity risk premiums.

[^9]The inputs to the model are the historical returns on the common shares of each publicly traded utility in the Natural Gas Proxy Group, minus the historical monthly yield on long-term U.S. Treasury securities, through January 2017. Using a generalized form of ARCH, known as GARCH, each natural gas utility's projected equity risk premium was determined using Eviews ${ }^{\ominus}$ statistical software. When the GARCH model is applied to the historical return data, it produces a predicted GARCH variance series ${ }^{21}$ and a GARCH coefficient. ${ }^{22}$ The forecasted 30 -year U.S. Treasury Bond yield of $3.65 \%$ is based upon consensus forecasts for the six quarters ending with the second quarter 2018, derived from the February 1, 2017 Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (Blue Chip), averaged with the long-range forecasts for 2018 - 2022 and 2023 - 2027, from the December 1, 2016 Blue Chip. The average PRPM indicated common equity cost rate is $11.43 \%$, while the median is $11.81 \%$ for the Natural Gas Proxy Group, as shown in Column [7]. Consistent with my use of the average of the average and median DCF results, I rely upon the average of the average and median PRPM results of $11.62 \%^{23}$ as my conclusion of the PRPM equity cost rate, also shown in Column [7] of Schedule PMA-D4.

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ADJUSTED TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM.

A. The adjusted total market approach RPM adds a prospective public utility bond yield to the average of: 1) an equity risk premium derived from a beta-adjusted total market equity risk premium; 2) an equity risk premium based upon the $S \& P$ Utilities Index; and, 3) an equity risk premium based upon the authorized returns for natural gas companies over Moody's A rated public utility bonds.

[^10]Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF THE ADJUSTED PROSPECTIVE BOND YIELD OF 4.89\% APPLICABLE TO THE NATURAL GAS PROXY GROUP, SHOWN ON LINE NO. 5 ON PAGE 3 OF SCHEDULE PMA-D4.
A. The first step in the adjusted total market approach RPM analysis is to determine the expected bond yield. Because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including the common equity cost rate, are prospective in nature, a prospective yield on long-term debt, similarly rated to the Natural Gas Proxy Group, is essential. Since Blue Chip does not publish consensus yield forecasts for the Moody's A rated public utility bonds, I began with the February 1, 2017 Blue Chip consensus forecast of about 50 economists of the expected yield on Aaa rated corporate bonds for the six calendar quarters ending with the second calendar quarter of 2018, averaged with the long-range forecasts for $2018-2022$, and 2023 - 2026, from the December 1, 2016 Blue Chip ${ }^{24}$. As shown on Line No. 1 of page 3, the average expected yield on Moody's Aaa rated corporate bonds is $4.68 \%$. In order to derive a prospective Moody's A rated public utility bond yield, an adjustment of $0.21 \%$, or the average spread between Moody's Aaa rated corporate bond yields and Moody's A rated public utility bond yields for the three months ending January $2017^{25}$ must be made to the average Aaa corporate bond yield, which results in a bond yield of 4.89\% applicable to a Moody's A rated public utility bond. ${ }^{26}$

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE METHOD OF ESTIMATING THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM IN THE ADJUSTED TOTAL MARKET APPROACH.

A. The total beta-derived equity risk premium shown on page 8 of Schedule PMA-D5 is based upon an average of:

[^11]1) The arithmetic mean monthly historical equity market equity risk premium of large company common stocks, relative to Moody's Aaa / Aa corporate bonds from 1928-2015;
2) The PRPM predicted monthly equity risk premium of large company common stocks relative to Moody's Aaa / Aa corporate bonds from January 1928 January 2017;
3) The results of a regression analysis of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to Moody's Aaa / Aa corporate bonds from 1928-2015;
4) The 3-5 year median total market price appreciation projections and expected market dividend yield for the thirteen weeks ending February 10, 2016 reported by Value Line; and,
5) A forecasted equity risk premium based upon the $\mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{P} 500$ market-value weighted projected market appreciation and dividend yield.

## Q. HOW DID YOU DERIVE THE LONG-TERM HISTORICAL MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM?

A. To derive a historical market equity risk premium, I used the most recent Morningstar data on holding period returns for the large company common stocks from the Morningstar ${ }^{\circledR}$ SBBI $^{\circledR}$ Appendix A Tables ("Morningstar - 2016"), ${ }^{27}$ and the average historical yield on Moody's Aaa and Aa rated corporate bonds for the period 1928-2015. The use of holding period returns over a very long period of time is useful because it is

[^12]consistent with the long-term investment horizon by investing in a going concern, i.e., a company expected to operate in perpetuity.

Morningstar's long-term arithmetic mean monthly total return rate on large company common stocks is $11.68 \%$ and the long-term arithmetic mean monthly yield on Moody's Aaa and Aa rated corporate bonds is $6.16 \%$. The resultant long-term historical equity risk premium on the market as a whole is $5.52 \%$, shown on Line No. 1 on page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4.

I used arithmetic mean monthly total return rates for the large company stocks and yields (income returns) for Moody's Aaa / Aa corporate bonds because they are appropriate for cost of capital purposes. The use of arithmetic mean return rates and yields are appropriate because ex-post (historical) total returns and equity risk premiums differ in size and direction over time, providing insight into the variance and standard deviation of returns needed by investors in estimating future risk when making a current investment. Absent such valuable insight into the potential variance of returns, investors cannot meaningfully evaluate prospective risk. If investors alternatively relied upon the geometric mean of ex-post equity risk premiums, they would have no insight into the potential variance of future returns because the geometric mean relates the change over many periods of time to a constant rate of change, thereby obviating the period-to-period fluctuations, or variance, critical to risk analysis.

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF A PRPM MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.

A. I used the same PRPM approach described previously to develop a second market equity risk premium estimate. The inputs to the model are the historical monthly returns on
large company common stocks from Morningstar - 2016, minus the monthly yields on Aaa and Aa rated corporate bonds during the period January 1928 through January 2017. Using the previously discussed GARCH model, the market's projected equity risk premium was determined using Eviews ${ }^{\ominus}$ statistical software. The resulting predicted market equity risk premium based upon the PRPM is $6.38 \%$, shown on Line No. 2 on page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4.

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF THE REGRESSION BASED MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.

A. To derive the regression analysis-derived market equity risk premium of $7.40 \%$, shown on Line No. 3 on page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4, I used monthly annualized total returns on large company common stocks relative to the monthly annualized yields on Moody's Aaa / Aa corporate bonds from 1928-2015. The relationship between interest rates and the market equity risk premium was modeled using the observed monthly market equity risk premium as the dependent variable, and the monthly yield on Moody's Aaa / Aa corporate bonds as the independent variable. I used a linear Ordinary Least Squares ("OLS") regression, in which the market equity risk premium is expressed as a function of the Moody's Aaa / Aa corporate bonds yield:

$$
\mathrm{RP}=\alpha+\beta\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{Aa} / \mathrm{Aa}}\right)
$$

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF A PROJECTED MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED UPON VALUE LINE DATA.

A. As noted previously, because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including the cost rate of common equity, are prospective, a prospective market equity risk premium is essential. Consistent with the development of the dividend yield component of my DCF
analysis, the fourth prospective market equity risk premium of $4.60 \%$, shown on Line No. 4 on page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4, is derived from an average of the $3-5$ year estimated median market price appreciation potential provided by Value Line, plus an average of the median estimated dividend yield for the common stocks of the approximately 1,700 firms covered in Value Line's Standard Edition, both for the thirteen weeks ending February 10, 2017.

The average median expected price appreciation is $32 \%$, which translates to an $7.19 \%$ annual appreciation and, when added to the average (similarly calculated) median dividend yield of $2.09 \%$, equates to a forecasted annual total return rate on the market as a whole of $9.28 \%$. The forecasted Aaa bond yield of $4.68 \%^{28}$ is deducted from the total market return of $9.28 \%$, resulting in an equity risk premium of $4.60 \%$.

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF A MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED UPON THE S\&P 500 COMPOSITE INDEX COMPANIES.

A. Using data from Bloomberg Professional Services, a market-value weighted expected total return for the S\&P 500 companies can be derived using the expected dividend yields and projected long-term growth in earnings per share as a proxy for capital appreciation. The expected market-value weighted total return for the $\mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{P} 500$ is $13.08 \%$. Subtracting the prospective yield on Moody's Aaa rated corporate bonds of $4.68 \%$ results in an $8.40 \%$ projected market equity risk premium, shown on Line No. 5 on page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4.

## Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF THE MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM FOR YOUR TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM?

A. It is $6.46 \%$ as shown on Line No. 6 on page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4. In arriving at this conclusion, I averaged: 1) the historical market equity risk premium of $5.52 \% ; 2$ ) the PRPM based market equity risk premium of $6.38 \%$; 3) the regression based market equity risk premium of $7.40 \%$; 4) the Value Line-based forecasted market equity risk premium of $4.60 \%$; and, 5) the $\mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{P} 500$ market-value weighted projected market equity risk premium of $8.40 \%$ shown on Line Nos. 1 through 5 on page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4. ${ }^{29}$

## Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF A BETA DERIVED EQUITY RISK PREMIUM FOR USE IN YOUR TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM ANALYSIS?

A. The conclusion of the market equity risk premium of $6.46 \%$ is then adjusted by beta to account for the market risk of the Natural Gas Proxy Group. Beta is a measure of relative risk to the market as a whole and a logical means by which to allocate an entity's/proxy group's share of the total market's equity risk premium relative to corporate bond yields. As shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-D5, Column [3], the average of the mean and median Value Line and Bloomberg betas for the Natural Gas Proxy Group average is 0.69. Multiplying a beta of 0.69 by the market equity risk premium of $6.46 \%$, on Line No. 6 of page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4, results in a beta adjusted equity risk premium of $4.46 \%$ for the Natural Gas Proxy Group, as shown on Line No. 8 on page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4.

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM

 BASED UPON THE S\&P UTILITY INDEX.A. I calculated four estimated equity risk premiums based upon the S\&P Utility Index. First, I derived the long-term monthly arithmetic mean equity risk premium between the $\mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{P}$

[^13]Utility Index total returns of $10.49 \%$ and monthly Moody's A rated public utility bond yields of $6.64 \%$ from $1928-2015$, to arrive at an equity risk premium of $3.85 \% .^{30}$ Second, I applied the PRPM using historical monthly equity risk premiums from January 1928 through January 2017, to arrive at the PRPM derived equity risk premium of 4.34\% for the S\&P Utility Index. ${ }^{31}$ Third, I derived a regression based analysis of the monthly equity risk premiums of the S\&P Utility Index relative to Moody's A rated public utility bonds from $1928-2015$, of $5.50 \% .^{32}$ Fourth, I derived an expected market-value weighted total return on the S\&P Utility Index of $8.25 \%$ using data from Bloomberg Professional Services, and subtracting the prospective Moody's A rated public utility bond yield of $4.89 \%$, resulting in an equity risk premium of $3.36 \%$, as shown on Line No 6 on page 11 of Schedule PMA-D4.

I rely upon the average of the historical (3.85\%); the PRPM (4.34\%); the regression based (5.50\%); and, S\&P Utility Index (3.36\%) derived equity risk premiums, which is $4.26 \%$, shown on Line No. 7 on page 11 of Schedule PMA-D4. ${ }^{33}$

## Q. HOW DID YOU DERIVE AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM OF 5.15\% BASED ON AUTHORIZED RETURNS ON COMMON EQUITY FOR NATURAL GAS COMPANIES?

A. The equity risk premium of $5.15 \%$ shown on Line No. 3, page 7 of Schedule PMA-D4 is the result of a regression analysis based on regulatory awarded returns on common equity related to the yields on A-rated public utility bonds. That analysis is summarized on page 12 of Schedule PMA-D4, which presents the graphical results of a regression analysis of

[^14]752 rate cases for natural gas utility companies which were fully litigated during the period from January 1, 1980 through December 31, 2016. The data used were the implicit equity risk premium relative to the yields on A-rated public utility bonds immediately prior to the issuance of each regulatory decision. ${ }^{34}$ An inverse relationship between the yield on A-rated public utility bonds and equity risk premium is clearly visible in the chart on page 12. In other words, as interest rates decline, the equity risk premium rises and vice versa, a result consistent with regulatory financial literature on the subject. ${ }^{35}$ Given the expected A-rated utility bond yield of $4.89 \%$, it can be interpolated that the indicated equity risk premium applicable to that bond yield is $5.15 \%$, which is shown on Line No. 3, page 5 of Schedule PMA-D4.

## Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM FOR USE IN YOUR ADJUSTED TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM ANALYSIS?

A. The equity risk premium applicable to the Natural Gas Proxy Group is $4.62 \%,{ }^{36}$ derived by averaging the beta-derived premium of $4.46 \%$ (Line No. 8 on page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4), the equity risk premium of $4.26 \%$ based upon the holding period returns of public utilities with Moody's A rated bonds (Line No. 7 on page 11 of Schedule PMAD4) and the $5.15 \%$ equity risk premium based upon the regression analysis of authorized returns on common equity for natural gas companies (page 12 of Schedule PMA-D4).

[^15]
## Q. WHAT IS THE RPM-BASED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BASED UPON THE ADJUSTED TOTAL MARKET APPROACH?

A. It is $9.51 \%$ for the Natural Gas Proxy Group as shown on Line No. 7 on page 3 of Schedule PMA-D4.
Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR APPLICATION OF THE PRPM AND THE ADJUSTED TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM?
A. As shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-D4, the indicated RPM-derived common equity cost rate is $10.57 \%^{37}$, derived by averaging the PRPM results with those based upon the adjusted total market approach.

Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM")

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE CAPM.

A. CAPM theory defines risk as the covariance of a security's returns with the market's returns as measured by beta ( $\beta$ ). A beta less than 1.0 indicates lower variability while a beta greater than 1.0 indicates greater variability than the market.

The CAPM assumes that all other risk, i.e., all non-market or unsystematic risk, can be eliminated through diversification. The risk that cannot be eliminated through diversification is called market or systematic risk. In addition, the CAPM presumes that investors require compensation only for these systematic risks that are the result of macroeconomic and other events that affect the returns on all assets. The model is applied by adding a risk-free rate of return to a market risk premium, which is adjusted proportionately to reflect the systematic risk of the individual security relative to the total market, as measured by beta. The traditional CAPM model is expressed as:

[^16]$$
\text { Rs } \quad=\quad \mathrm{Rf}+\beta(\mathrm{Rm}-\mathrm{Rf})
$$

Where: Rs $=$ Return rate on the common stock
$\operatorname{Rf}=\quad$ Risk-free rate of return
$\mathrm{Rm}=\quad$ Return rate on the market as a whole
$\beta=$ Adjusted beta (volatility of the security relative to the market as a whole)

Numerous tests of the CAPM have measured the extent to which security returns and betas are related, as predicted by the CAPM, confirming the CAPM's validity. The empirical CAPM ("ECAPM") reflects the reality that, while the results of these tests support the notion that beta is related to security returns, the empirical Security Market Line ("SML") described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin ${ }^{38}$ states:

With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that ... low-beta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted.

Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:

$$
K=R_{F}+x \beta\left(R_{M}-R_{F}\right)+(1-x) \beta\left(R_{M}-R_{F}\right)
$$

where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of x that best explains the observed relationship Return $=0.0829+0.0520 \beta$ is between 0.25 and 0.30 . If $x=0.25$, the equation becomes:

$$
\mathrm{K}=\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}+0.25\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{M}}-\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}\right)+0.75 \beta\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{M}}-\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}\right)
$$

[^17]In view of theory and practical research, I have applied both the traditional CAPM and the ECAPM to the companies in the Natural Gas Proxy Group, and averaged the results.

## Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF BETA FOR YOUR CAPM

 ANALYSIS?A. I relied upon an average of the adjusted betas published by the Value Line and provided by Bloomberg Professional Services. While both of those services adjust their calculated (or "raw") beta to reflect the tendency of beta to regress toward the market mean of 1.00, Value Line calculates its beta over a five-year period, while Bloomberg's calculation is based upon two years of data.

## Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF A RISK-FREE RATE OF RETURN FOR YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS.

A. As shown in Column [5], of Schedule PMA-D5, the risk-free rate adopted for both applications of the CAPM is $3.65 \%$. The risk-free rate of $3.65 \%$ is based upon the average of the consensus forecast for the six quarters ending with the second quarter 2018, from the January 1, 2017 Blue Chip, averaged with the long-range forecasts for 2018 - 2022, and 2023 - 2027, from the December 1, 2016, Blue Chip, ${ }^{39}$ as detailed in Note 2 on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D5.

## Q. WHY IS THE YIELD ON LONG-TERM U.S. TREASURY BONDS APPROPRIATE FOR USE AS THE RISK-FREE RATE?

A. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury Bonds is almost risk-free and its term is consistent with: 1) the long-term cost of capital to public utilities measured by the yields on A rated public utility bonds; 2) the long-term investment horizon inherent in utilities' common

[^18]stock; and 3) the long-term life of the jurisdictional rate base to which the allowed fair rate of return (i.e., cost of capital) will be applied. In contrast, short-term U.S. Treasury yields are more volatile, and reflect a short-term investment horizon that is not consistent with the long-term investment horizon and life of the rate base to which the allowed rate of return is applied.

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ESTIMATION OF THE EXPECTED EQUITY RISK PREMIUM FOR THE MARKET.

A. The basis of the market equity risk premium is explained in detail in Note 1 of Schedule PMA-D5. It is derived from an average of:

1) The 3-5 year median total market price appreciation projections and expected market dividend yield for the thirteen weeks ending February 10, 2016 reported by Value Line;
2) The arithmetic mean monthly equity risk premium of large company common stocks relative to long-term U.S. Treasury bond income yields from Morningstar - 2016 from 1926-2015;
3) The PRPM predicted market equity risk premium, using monthly equity risk premiums for large company common stocks relative to long-term U.S. Treasury securities from January 1926 through January 2017;
4) The results of a regression analysis of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to long-term U.S. Treasury bond income yields from Morningstar - 2016 from 1926-2015; and,
5) The market-value weighted projected total return on the S\&P 500 minus the projected risk-free rate.

The Value Line-derived forecasted total market equity risk premium is derived by deducting the projected $3.65 \%$ risk-free rate, discussed above, from the Value Line projected total annual market return of $9.28 \%$, also discussed above, resulting in a forecasted total market equity risk premium of $5.63 \%$, derived in Note 1 on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D5. ${ }^{40}$

The long-term income return on U.S. Government Securities of $5.20 \%$ was deducted from the Morningstar - $2016^{41}$ monthly historical total market return of $11.95 \%$, resulting in an historical market equity risk premium of $6.75 \%{ }^{42}$, derived in Note 1 on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D5.

The PRPM market equity risk premium is $7.20 \%$, derived using the PRPM, discussed above, relative to the yields on long-term U.S. Treasury securities from January 1926 through January 2017, as shown in Note 1 on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D5.

To derive the regression analysis-derived market equity risk premium of $8.66 \%$, shown in Note 1 on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D5, I used monthly annualized historical returns on the S\&P 500 relative to historical yields on long-term U.S. Government Securities from Morningstar - 2016. The relationship between interest rates and the market equity risk premium was modeled using the observed monthly market equity risk premium as the dependent variable, and the monthly yield on long-term U.S. Government Securities yield as the independent variable. I used a linear OLS regression, in which the market equity risk premium is expressed as a function of the U.S. Government Securities yield:

[^19]$$
\mathrm{RP}=\alpha+\beta\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{f}}\right)
$$

The S\&P 500 market-value weighted projected market equity risk premium of $9.43 \%$ is derived by subtracting the $3.65 \%$ projected risk-free rate, discussed above, from the projected total return of $13.08 \%$, also discussed above, as shown on Schedule PMAD5. ${ }^{43}$

These five market equity risk premiums result in an average total market equity risk premium of $7.53 \%$, as shown on Schedule PMA-D5. ${ }^{44}$
Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR APPLICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL AND EMPIRICAL CAPM TO THE NATURAL GAS PROXY GROUP?
A. As shown in Column [8] on page 1 of Schedule PMA-D5, the average CAPM / ECAPM equity cost rate is $9.14 \%$, while the median CAPM / ECAPM result is $9.07 \%$, averaging $9.11 \%$. Consistent with my reliance upon the average of the average and median results of the DCF discussed above, the Natural Gas Proxy Group's common equity cost rate based upon my CAPM analyses is $9.11 \% .^{45}$

## DCF, RPM and CAPM Analyses for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group

Q. YOU HAVE ALSO INCLUDED AN ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR A NON-PRICE REGULATED PROXY GROUP. PLEASE EXPLAIN.
A. Neither the Hope nor Bluefield cases specify that comparable risk companies have to be regulated utilities. Since rate regulation is a substitute for the competition of the marketplace, non-price regulated firms operating in the competitive marketplace are an excellent proxy if a group can be selected to be comparable in total risk to the Natural

[^20]Gas Proxy Group upon whose market data is used to estimate the cost of common equity for the Companies. As explained below, the selection criteria I utilized are theoretically and empirically sound and produced results for a non-regulated proxy group which is comparable in total risk to the Natural Gas Proxy Group.

## Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU SELECTED THE NON-PRICE REGULATED PROXY GROUP.

A. The selection criteria I utilized to select the non-price regulated firms were based upon statistics derived from Value Line regression analyses of weekly market prices over the most recent 260 weeks, i.e., five years, from the market prices paid by investors. Value Line unadjusted betas were used as a measure of systematic risk, while the standard errors of the regressions giving rise to those beta coefficients are a measure of unsystematic or firm-specific risk reflecting the extent to which events specific to a firm's operations affect its stock price. In essence, companies with similar betas and standard errors of the regression have similar total investment risk. The criteria used to select the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group were:

1) The unadjusted beta coefficients from the Value Line regressions must lie within plus or minus two standard deviations of the average unadjusted beta coefficients of the Natural Gas Proxy Group;
2) The residual standard errors of the Value Line regressions which gave rise to the unadjusted beta coefficients must lie within plus or minus two standard deviations of the average residual standard error of the Natural Gas Proxy Group;
3) The non-price regulated firms must be covered by Value Line (Standard Edition); and,
4) The firms must be domestic, non-price regulated companies, i.e., non-utilities.

The basis of selection and the comparison group's regression statistics are shown in Schedule PMA-D6. The following sixteen companies met these criteria:

- AmerisourceBergen (ABC);
- AutoZone Inc. (AZO);
- Bard (C.R.) (BCR);
- Campbell Soup (CPB);
- Dr. Pepper Snapple (DPS);
- Erie Indemnity (ERIE);
- Lancaster Colony Corp. (LANC);
-Lilly (Eli) and Co. (LLY);
- Merck \& Co. (MRK);
- Reynolds American (RAI);
- Smucker (J.M.) (SJM);
- Stericycle Inc. (SCRL);
- Target Corp. (TGT);
- TJX Companies (TJX);
- Verisk Analytics (VRSK); and
- Waste Connections (WCN).


## Q. DID YOU CALCULATE COMMON EQUITY COST RATES USING THE DCF, RPM AND CAPM FOR THE NON-PRICE REGULATED PROXY GROUP?

A. Yes. Because the DCF, RPM and CAPM have been applied in an identical manner as described above relative to the market data of the Natural Gas Proxy Group, I will not repeat the details of the rationale and application of each model shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-D7. I should note, however, that in the application of the RPM, I did not use public utility-specific equity risk premiums nor apply the PRPM to the individual companies.

Page 2 of Schedule PMA-D7 contains the derivation of the DCF cost rates. As shown, the average of the mean and median DCF-based cost rates for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group is $11.86 \%$.

Pages 3 through 5 of Schedule PMA-D7 contain the data and calculations relating to the $10.11 \%$ RPM cost rate for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group. As shown on Line No. 1 of page 3, the consensus prospective yield on Moody's Baa-rated corporate bonds of $5.51 \%$ is based upon the forecasted yields for the six quarters ending with the first quarter of 2018, from the February 1, 2017 Blue Chip, averaged with the long-range forecasted yields for 2018 - 2022, and 2023 - 2027, from the December 1, 2016 Blue Chip. ${ }^{46}$ Because the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group members have an average Moody's long-term issuer rating of Baa1, as shown on page 4 of Schedule PMA-D7, a downward adjustment of $0.18 \%$ to the prospective bond yield is necessary to reflect the difference in ratings ${ }^{47}$, which results in a projected Baa1 corporate bond yield of $5.33 \%$, shown in Line No. 4 of page 3 of Schedule PMA-D7. When the beta-adjusted risk premium of $4.97 \%^{48}$, relative to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, is added to the prospective Baa1 rated corporate bond yield of $5.33 \%$, the RPM-based cost rate is $10.30 \%$, as shown in Line No. 5 on page 3 of Schedule PMA-D7.

Page 6 of Schedule PMA-D8 contains the details of the application of the traditional CAPM and ECAPM to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group. As shown, the mean and median traditional CAPM and ECAPM results are 9.67\% / 9.57\% for the NonPrice Regulated Proxy Group which, when averaged, result in a CAPM-based cost rate of $9.62 \%{ }^{49}$

## Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF THE COST RATE OF COMMON EQUITY BASED UPON THE NON-PRICE REGULATED PROXY GROUP?

[^21]A. It is $10.45 \%$, as shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-D7. The results of the DCF, RPM and CAPM applied to the Non-Price Regulated Group are $11.86 \%, 10.30 \%$ and $9.62 \%$, respectively. Based upon these results, I will rely upon the average of the mean and median results of the three models, which is $10.45 \%$ for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group.

## INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE

## Q. WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE?

A. It is $10.00 \%$, based upon the common equity cost rates resulting from the application of cost of common equity models to the Natural Gas Proxy Group and to a Non-Price Regulated proxy group comparable in total risk to the Natural Gas Proxy Group before any adjustments for flotation costs or the Companies' greater business risk due to their smaller size relative to the Gas Proxy Group.

As discussed above, I employ multiple cost of common equity models as primary tools in arriving at my recommended common equity cost rate because:

1) No single model is so inherently precise that it can be relied upon solely to the exclusion of other theoretically sound models;
2) All of the models are market-based;
3) The use of multiple models adds reliability to the estimation of the common equity cost rate; and,
4) The prudence of using multiple cost of common equity models is supported in both the financial literature and regulatory precedent.

Therefore, multiple models should be relied upon when estimating the investor required rate of return on common equity.

The results of my cost of common equity models applied to the Natural Gas Proxy Group are shown on Schedule PMA-D1 and are summarized in Table 3 below:

Table 3
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate

## Natural Gas Proxy Group

Discounted Cash Flow Model ("DCF")
$8.68 \%{ }^{50}$
Risk Premium Model ("RPM") 10.57\%

Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM")
9.11\%

## Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group

Cost of Common Equity Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Cos. 10.45\%

Indicated $\begin{gathered}\text { Common } \\ \text { Adjustments }\end{gathered}$
Equity Cost Rate Before
$\underline{\underline{10.00 \%}}$

Based upon these common equity cost rate results, I conclude that a common equity cost rate of $10.00 \%$ is indicated for the Natural Gas Proxy Group before applying a flotation cost adjustment and the necessary business risk adjustment to determine the Companies' common equity cost rate of $10.35 \%$, which will be discussed in detail below

## ADJUSTMENTS TO THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE TO

 REFLECT FLOTATION COSTS, AND THE BUSINESS RISK OF THE COMPANIES
## Flotation Cost Adjustment

## Q. WHAT ARE FLOTATION COSTS?

A. Flotation costs are those costs associated with the sale of new issuances of common stock. They include market pressure and the essential costs of issuance (e.g., underwriting fees and out-of-pocket costs for printing, legal, registration, etc.).

[^22]
## Q. WHY MUST FLOTATION COSTS BE RECOGNIZED IN THE ALLOWED RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY?

A. Flotation cost must be recognized in the allowed return on common equity because there is no other mechanism in the ratemaking paradigm with which such costs can be recovered. Because these costs are real and legitimate, recovery of these costs should be permitted. As noted by Morin ${ }^{51}$ :

The costs of issuing these securities are just as real as operating and maintenance expenses or costs incurred to build utility plants, and fair regulatory treatment must permit recovery of these costs....

The simple fact of the matter is that common equity capital is not free....[Flotation costs] must be recovered through a rate of return adjustment.
Q. SHOULD FLOTATION COSTS BE RECOGNIZED ONLY WHEN THERE WAS AN ISSUANCE DURING THE TEST YEAR OR THERE IS AN IMMINENT POST-TEST YEAR ISSUANCE OF ADDITIONAL COMMON STOCK?
A. No. As noted above, there is no mechanism through which such costs can be captured in the ratemaking paradigm other than an adjustment to the allowed common equity cost rate. Flotation costs are charged to capital accounts and are not expensed on a utility's income statement. As such, flotation costs are analogous to capital investments, albeit negative, reflected on the balance sheet. Recovery of capital investments relates to the expected useful lives of the investment. Since common equity has a very long and indefinite life (assumed to be infinity in the standard regulatory DCF model), flotation costs should be recovered through an adjustment to common equity cost rate even when

[^23]there has not been an issuance during the test year nor in the absence of an expected imminent issuance of additional shares of common stock.

Historical flotation costs are a permanent loss of investment to the utility and should be accounted for when setting the allowed return on common equity. When any company, including a utility, issues common stock, flotation costs are incurred for legal, accounting, printing fees and the like. For each dollar of issuing market price, a small percentage is expensed and is permanently unavailable for investment in utility rate base. For example, since these expenses are charged to capital accounts and not expensed on the income statement, the only way to restore the full value of the issuance price is to earn more than the investor required market return on the issuance price, so that the investor receives a full fair return on his / her investment. In other words, if a company issues stock at $\$ 1.00$ with $5 \%$ in flotation costs, it will net $\$ 0.95$ in investment. Assuming the investor in that stock requires a $10 \%$ return on his or her invested $\$ 1.00$ (i.e., a return of $\$ 0.10$ ), the company needs to earn approximately $10.5 \%$ on its invested $\$ 0.95$ to receive a $\$ 0.10$ return.

## Q. DO THE DCF, RPM, AND CAPM ALREADY REFLECT INVESTORS' ANTICIPATION OF FLOTATION COSTS?

A. No. These models assume no transaction costs and therefore flotation costs are not reflected in the results of the application of these models. The literature is quite clear on this point. For example, Brigham and Daves ${ }^{52}$ confirm this, providing the methodology utilized to calculate the flotation adjustment. Morin ${ }^{53}$ also confirms the need for such an adjustment even when no new equity issuance is imminent. Consequently, it is proper to

[^24]include a flotation cost adjustment when using market-based cost of common equity models to estimate the common equity cost rate.

## Q. HOW DID YOU CALCULATE THE FLOTATION COST ALLOWANCE?

A. I modified the DCF calculation to provide a dividend yield that would reimburse investors for issuance costs in accordance with the method cited in literature by Brigham and Daves as well as Morin. The flotation cost adjustment recognizes the costs of issuing equity that were incurred by Spire Inc. ${ }^{54}$ since January 2001. Based upon the issuance costs shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-D8, an adjustment of $0.16 \%$ is required to reflect the flotation costs applicable to the Natural Gas Proxy Group.

## Business Risk Adjustment

## Q. IS THERE A WAY TO QUANTIFY AN ADJUSTMENT DUE TO THE

 COMPANIES' GREATER BUSINESS RISK DUE TO SIZE RELATIVE TO THE NATURAL GAS PROXY GROUP?A. Yes, the previously discussed empirical evidence on the effect of small size provides insight into the magnitude of such adjustments to reflect the greater business risk of the Companies' based upon their collective small size relative to the Natural Gas Proxy Group.

As discussed above, increased risk due to small size must be taken into account in the cost of common equity, consistent with the financial principle of risk and return. Because the Companies are collectively smaller in size relative to the Natural Gas Proxy Group, as previously discussed and measured by their estimated market capitalization,

[^25]they have greater business risk than the average company in the Natural Gas Proxy Group. The previously cited Duff \& Phelps 2016 which discusses the nature of the small size phenomenon, provides one indication of the magnitude of the size premium based upon estimated market capitalization.

The Companies are collectively smaller than the average company in the Natural Gas Proxy Group, upon whose market data my recommended common equity cost rate is based. Since the Natural Gas Proxy Group's market data reflects its collective risk, including the lower risk of its greater size based upon market capitalization relative to the Companies, an adjustment to the Natural Gas Proxy Group's indicated common equity cost rate of $10.000 \%$ must be made to reflect the greater relative risk of the Companies due to their smaller size based on estimated market capitalization as shown in Table 4 below:

Table 4
Estimated Market Capitalization for the Natural Gas Proxy Group and
LAC / MGE

$$
\frac{\text { Market Capitalization (1) }}{\frac{(\$ \text { Millions) }}{}} \quad \frac{\text { Times Greater than the }}{\underline{\text { Company }}}
$$

Natural Gas Proxy Group
$\$ 3,220.742$

LAC / MGE
\$2,466.000
1.3X
(1) From page 1 of Schedule PMA-D9.

As shown above, the Companies' estimated market capitalization of $\$ 2,466.000$ million is lower than the average market capitalization of the Natural Gas Proxy Group, $\$ 3,220.742$ million, or 1.3 times greater than the Companies, as of January 31, 2017.

Consequently, the Companies have greater relative business risk because, all else equal, size has a bearing on risk. Because investors demand a higher return as compensation for assuming greater risk, this greater relative business risk of the Companies must be reflected in the recommended cost of common equity derived from the market data of the less business risky Natural Gas Proxy Group.

The magnitude of such an adjustment to reflect the Companies' greater relative business risk due to the Companies' smaller relative size is based upon the size premiums for decile portfolios of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and NASDAQ listed companies for the 1926-2015 period and related data from Duff \& Phelps -2016. The average size premium for the $4^{\text {th }}$ and $5^{\text {th }}$ deciles (1.24\%) between which the market capitalization of the Natural Gas Proxy Group falls has been compared with the average size premium for the $5^{\text {th }}$ and $6^{\text {th }}$ deciles ( $1.56 \%$ ) between which the estimated market capitalization of the Companies' falls. As shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-D10, the size premium spread between the $5^{\text {th }}$ and $6^{\text {th }}$ and the $4^{\text {th }}$ and $5^{\text {th }}$ deciles is $0.32 \% .{ }^{55}$ In view of the foregoing, I am recommending a business risk adjustment of $0.20 \%$ to reflect the greater business risk of the Companies due to their smaller size relative to the Natural Gas Proxy Group.

## CONCLUSION OF COMMON EQUITY COST RATE FOR LAC/MGE

## Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF COMMON EQUITY COST RATE FOR

 LAC AND MGE?A. In view of the foregoing, it is necessary to add a flotation cost adjustment, as well as a business risk adjustment to the $10.00 \%$ indicated common equity cost rate based upon the

[^26]market data of the Natural Gas Proxy Group. Table 5 below summarizes these adjustments and the resulting cost of common equity for the Companies.

Table 5
Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate for LAC / MGE
Indicated Proxy Group
Common Equity Cost
$10.00 \%$ Rate Before Adjustments

Flotation Cost Adjustment 0.16\%
Business Risk Adjustment $\underline{0.20 \%}$
Common Equity Cost Rate
After Adjustments $\quad 10.36 \%$
Recommended Common
Equity Cost Rate

Adding a flotation cost adjustment of $0.16 \%$ and a business risk adjustment of $0.20 \%$ to the $10.00 \%$ indicated common equity cost rate applicable to the Natural Gas Proxy Group results in a flotation cost and risk-adjusted common equity cost rate of $10.36 \%$, which when rounded to $10.35 \%$ is my recommended common equity cost rate applicable to the Companies.

In my opinion, a common equity cost rate of $10.35 \%$, which results in an overall rate of return of $7.700 \%$, is both reasonable and conservative given the Companies' greater business risks relative to the Natural Gas Proxy Group.

In addition, a common equity cost rate of $10.35 \%$ is consistent with the Hope and Bluefield standards of a fair and reasonable return which ensures the integrity of presently invested capital and enables the attraction of needed new capital on reasonable terms. It also ensures that the Companies will be able to continue providing safe, adequate and reliable natural gas service to the benefit of their customers. Thus, it balances the interests of both customers and the Companies.

1 Q. DOES THIS COMPLETE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?
2 A. Yes.

## Pauline M. Ahern, CRRA <br> Executive Director ScottMadden Inc.

Ms. Ahern has served as a consultant for investor-owned and municipal utilities and authorities for nearly 30 years. As a Certified Rate of Return Analyst (CRRA), she has extensive experience in rate of return analyses, including the development of ratemaking capital structure ratios, senior capital cost rates, and the cost rate of common equity for regulated public utilities. She has testified as an expert witness before 31 regulatory commissions in the U.S. and Canada.

She also maintains the benchmark index against which the American Gas Association's (AGA) Mutual Fund performance is measured. Ms. Ahern has also served as President of the Society of Utility Regulatory and Financial Analysts (SURFA) from 2006-2010 and now sits on its Board of Directors. SURFA is a nonprofit organization founded to promote the education and understanding of rate of return analysis which represents utility financial analysts in government, the financial community, industry and academia. She also serves on the Finance/Accounting/Taxation Committees of the National Association of Water Companies. Ms. Ahern is also a member of the Advisory Council, Financial Research Institute, University of Missouri - Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. School of Business. She is also a member of Edison Electric Institute's Cost of Capital Working Group.

## PROFESSIONAL HISTORY

## ScottMadden Inc. (2016 - Present)

## Sussex Economic Advisors, LLC (2015-2016)

Partner

## AUS Consultants (1988-2015)

Principal

- Offered testimony as an expert witness on the subjects of fair rate of return, cost of capital and related issues before state public utility commissions.
- Provided assistance and support to clients throughout the entire ratemaking litigation process; supervision of the financial analyst and administrative staff in the preparation of fair rate of return and cost of capital testimonies and exhibits which are filed along with expert testimony before various state and federal public utility regulatory bodies as well as the preparation of interrogatory responses, as well as rebuttal exhibits.
- Responsible for the production, publishing, and distribution of the AUS Utility Reports (formerly C. A. Turner Utility Reports), which has provided financial data and related ratios for about 80 public utilities (i.e., electric, combination gas and electric, natural gas distribution, natural gas transmission, telephone, and water utilities, on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis) since 1930. Subscribers include utilities, many state regulatory commissions, federal agencies, individuals, brokerage firms, attorneys, as well as public and academic libraries.
- Responsible for maintaining and calculating the performance of the AGA Index, a market capitalization weighted index of the common stocks of the approximately 70 corporate members of the AGA, which serves as the benchmark for the AGA Gas Utility Index Fund.


## Assistant Vice President

- Prepared fair rate of return and cost of capital exhibits which were filed along with expert testimony before various state and federal public utility regulatory bodies; supporting exhibits include the determination of an appropriate ratemaking capital structure and the development of embedded cost rates of senior capital and also support the determination of a recommended


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return on common equity through the use of various market models, such as, but not limited to, Discounted Cash Flow analysis, Capital Asset Pricing Model and Risk Premium Methodology, as well as an assessment of the risk characteristics of the client utility.

- Assisted in the preparation of responses to any interrogatories received regarding such testimonies filed on behalf of client utilities. Following the filing of fair rate of return testimonies, assisted in the evaluation of opposition testimony in order to prepare interrogatory questions, areas of cross-examination, and rebuttal testimony and evaluated and assisted in the preparation of briefs and exceptions following the hearing process.
- Submitted testimony before state public utility commissions regarding appropriate capital structure ratios and fixed capital cost rates.


## Senior Financial Analyst

- Supervised two analysts and assisted in the preparation of fair rate of return and cost of capital exhibits which are filed along with expert testimony before various state and federal public utility regulatory bodies; the team also assisted in the preparation of interrogatory responses.
- Evaluated the final orders and decisions of various commissions to determine whether further actions were warranted and to gain insight which assisted in the preparation of future rate of return studies.
- Assisted in the preparation of an article authored by Frank J. Hanley and A. Gerald Harris entitled "Does Diversification Increase the Cost of Equity Capital?" published in the July 15, 1991 issue of Public Utilities Fortnightly.
Administrator of Financial Analysis for AUS Utility Reports
- Oversaw the preparation of this monthly publication, as well as the accompanying annual publication, Financial Statistics - Public Utilities.
Financial Analyst
- Assisted in the preparation of fair rate of return studies including capital structure determination, development of senior capital cost rates, determination of an appropriate rate of return on equity, preparation of interrogatory responses, interrogatory questions of the opposition, areas of cross-examination and rebuttal testimony, as well as preparation of the annual publication $\underline{\text { C. }}$ A. Turner Utility Reports - Financial Statistics - Public Utilities.


## Research Dept. of the Regional Economics Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (1973 - 1975)

Research Assistant

- Involved in the development and maintenance of econometric models to simulate regional economic conditions in New England in order to study the effects of, among other things, the energy crisis of the early 1970's and property tax revaluations on the economy of New England. I was also involved in the statistical analysis and preparation of articles for the New England Economic Review. Also, I was Assistant Editor of New England Business Indicators.


## Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Treasury Department, Washington,

 D.C. (1972)Research Assistant

- Developed and maintained econometric models which simulated the economy of the United States in order to study the results of various alternate foreign trade policies so that national trade policy could be formulated and recommended.


## Page A-2

## EDUCATION

M.B.A., Rutgers University, High Honors, 1991
B.A., Clark University, Honors, 1973

## DESIGNATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

## Advisory Council

Financial Research Institute
University of Missouri's Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. School of Business
Edison Electric Institute
Cost of Capital Working Group
National Association of Water Companies
Member of the Finance/Accounting/Taxation and Rates and Regulation Committees Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts

Member, Board of Directors - 2010-2014 President - 2006-2008 and 2008-2010
Secretary/Treasurer - 2004-2006

## American Finance Association

Financial Management Association

## SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS

"Leadership in the Financial Services Sector", Guest Professor - Cost of Capital, Business Leader Development Program, Rutgers University School of Business, February 24, 2015, Camden, NJ.

Sponsor / Moderator: Hot Topic Hotline (webinar) of the Financial Research Institute - University of Missouri's Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. School of Business: "The Cost of Capital: Slower and Lower for Longer" presenter: John Lonski, Managing Director \& Chief Capital Market Economist, Capital Markets Research Group, Moody's Analytics, November 2, 2016.
"Leadership in the Financial Services Sector", Guest Professor - Cost of Capital, Business Leader Development Program, Rutgers University School of Business, February 20, 2015, Camden, NJ.
"ROE: Trends \& Analysis", American Gas Association, AGA Mini-Forum for the Financial Analysts Community \& Finance Committee Meeting, September 11, 2014, The Princeton Club, New York, NY.

Guest Professor, "Measuring Risk", Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council of the Peoples' Republic of China, Rutgers School of Business, July 21, 2014, New Brunswick, NJ.

Instructor, "Cost of Capital 101", EPCOR Water America, Inc., Regulatory Management Team, June 9, 2014, Phoenix, AZ.

Moderator: Society of Utility Financial Analysts: 46th Financial Forum - "The Rating Agencies'
Perspectives: Regulatory Mechanisms and the Regulatory Compact", April 22-25, 2014, Indianapolis, IN.
"The Return on Equity Debate: Its Impact on Budgeting and Investment and Wall Street's View of Risk", National Association of Water Companies - 2014 Indiana Chapter Water Summit, March 13, 2014, Indianapolis, IN.
"Regulatory Training in Financing, Planning, Strategies and Accounting Issues for Publicly- and PrivatelyOwned Water and Wastewater Utilities", New Mexico State University Center for Public Utilities, October 13-18, 2013, Instructor (Cost of Capital).
"Regulated Utilities - Access to Capital", (panelist) - Innovation: Changing the Future of Energy, 2013 Deloitte Energy Conference, Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions, May 22, 2013, Washington, DC.
"Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model for Estimating the Cost of Common Equity", (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) - Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, $32^{\text {nd }}$ Annual Eastern Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRI), May 17, 2013, Rutgers University, Shawnee on the Delaware, PA.
"Decoupling: Impact on the Risk and Cost of Common Equity of Public Utility Stocks", before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 45th Financial Forum, April 17-18, 2013, Indianapolis, IN.
"Issues Surrounding the Determination of the Allowed Rate of Return", before the Staff Subcommittee on Electricity of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Winter 2013 Committee Meetings, February 3, 2013, Washington, DC.
"Leadership in the Financial Services Sector", Guest Professor - Cost of Capital, Business Leader Development Program, Rutgers University School of Business, February 1, 2013, Camden, NJ.
"Analyst Training in the Power and Gas Sectors", SNL Center for Financial Education, Downtown Conference Center at Pace University, New York City, December 12, 2012, Instructor (Financial Statement Analysis).
"Regulatory Training in Financing Planning, Strategies and Accounting Issues for Publicly and Privately Owned Water and Wastewater Utilities", New Mexico State University Center for Public Utilities, October 1419, 2012, Instructor (Cost of Financial Capital).
"Application of a New Risk Premium Model for Estimating the Cost of Common Equity", Co-Presenter with Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, AUS Consultants, Edison Electric Institute Cost of Capital Working Group, October 3, 2012, Webinar.
"Application of a New Risk Premium Model for Estimating the Cost of Common Equity", Co-Presenter with Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, AUS Consultants, Staff Subcommittee on Accounting and Finance of the National Association of Regulatory Commissioners, September 10, 2012, St. Paul, MN.
"Analyst Training in the Power and Gas Sectors", SNL Center for Financial Education, Downtown Conference Center at Pace University, New York City, August 7, 2012, Instructor (Financial Statement Analysis).
"Advanced Regulatory Training in Financing Planning, Strategies and Accounting Issues for Publicly and Privately Owned Water and Wastewater Utilities", New Mexico State University Center for Public Utilities, May 13-17, 2012, Instructor (Cost of Financial Capital).
"A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium Applied to Public Utilities", before the Finance and Regulatory Committees of the National Association of Water Companies, March 29, 2012, Telephonic Conference.
"A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium Applied to Public Utilities", (co-presenter with Frank J. Hanley, Principal and Director, AUS Consultants) before the Water Committee of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners' Winter Committee Meetings, February 7, 2012, Washington, DC.
"A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium Applied to Public Utilities", (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Frank J. Hanley, Principal and Director, AUS Consultants) before the Wall Street Utility Group, December 19, 2011, New York City, NY.
"Advanced Cost and Finance Issues for Water", (co-presenter with Gary D. Shambaugh, Principal \& Director, AUS Consultants), 2011 Advanced Regulatory Studies Program - Ratemaking, Accounting and Economics, September 29, 2011, Kellogg Center at Michigan State University - Institute for Public Utilities, East Lansing, MI.
"Public Utility Betas and the Cost of Capital", (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) - Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, 30th Annual Eastern Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRI), May 20, 2011, Rutgers University, Skytop, PA.

Moderator: Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 43rd Financial Forum - "Impact of Cost Recovery Mechanisms on the Perception of Public Utility Risk", April 14-15, 2011, Washington, DC.
"A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities", (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) - Hot Topic Hotline Webinar, December 3, 2010, Financial Research Institute of the University of Missouri.
"A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities", (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) before the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission Cost of Capital Task Force, September 28, 2010, Indianapolis, IN.

Tomorrow's Cost of Capital: Cost of Capital Issues 2010, Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions, 2010 Deloitte Energy Conference, "Changing the Great Game: Climate, Customers and Capital", June 7-8, 2010, Washington, DC.
"A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities", (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) - Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, 29th Annual Eastern Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRI), May 20, 2010, Rutgers University, Skytop, PA.

Moderator: Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 42nd Financial Forum - "The Changing Economic and Capital Market Environment and the Utility Industry", April 29-30, 2010, Washington, DC.
"A New Model for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities" (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) - Spring 2010 Meeting of the Staff Subcommittee on Accounting and Finance of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, March 17, 2010, Charleston, SC.
"New Approach to Estimating the Cost of Common Equity Capital for Public Utilities" (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) - Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, 28th Annual Eastern Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRI), May 14, 2009, Rutgers University, Skytop, PA.

Moderator: Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 41st Financial Forum - "Estimating the Cost of Capital in Today's Economic and Capital Market Environment", April 16-17, 2009, Washington, DC.
"Water Utility Financing: Where Does All That Cash Come From?", AWWA Pre-Conference Workshop: Water Utility Ratemaking, March 25, 2008, Atlantic City, NJ.

## PAPERS

"Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model ${ }^{\text {TM }}$, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, Dylan W. D'Ascendis, and Frank J. Hanley, The Electricity Journal, May, 2013.

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"A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities", co-authored with Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, The Journal of Regulatory Economics (December 2011), 40:261-278.
"Comparable Earnings: New Life for Old Precept" co-authored with Frank J. Hanley, Financial Quarterly Review, (American Gas Association), Summer 1994.

| SPONSOR | Date | CASE/APPLICANT | Docket No. | SuBJECT |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| City Council of the City of Edmonton, CA |  |  |  |  |
| EPCOR Water Services, Inc. | 5/16 | EPCOR Water Services, Inc. |  | Rate of Return |
| Arizona Corporation Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Arizona Water Company | 12/16 | Arizona Water Company | W-01445A-16-0443 | Return on Equity |
| Arizona Water Company | 08/15 | Arizona Water Company | W-01445A-15-0277 | Return on Equity |
| EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc. | 04/16 | EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc. | WS-01303A-16-0145 | Return on Equity |
| EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc. | 03/14 | EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc. | WS-01303A-14-0010 | Return on Equity |
| Arizona Water Company | 04/12 | Arizona Water Company - Eastern Group | W-01445A-11-0310 | DSIC Mechanism - Credit Quality; Return on Equity |
| Chaparral City Water Company | 04/13 | Chaparral City Water Company | W-02113A-13-118 | Return on Equity |
| Arizona Water Company | 08/12 | Arizona Water Company - Northern Group | W-01445A-12-0348 | Return on Equity |
| Bermuda Water Co. | 09/11 | Bermuda Water Co. | W-01812A-10-0521 | Return on Equity |
| Arkansas Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| United Water Arkansas, Inc. | 03/10 | United Water Arkansas, Inc. | 09-130-U | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Arkansas, Inc. | 12/06 | United Water Arkansas, Inc. | 06-160-U | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Arkansas, Inc. | 09/03 | United Water Arkansas, Inc. | 03-161-U | Return on Equity |
| Arkansas Western Gas Company d/b/a Associated Natural Gas Company | 02/97 | Associated Natural Gas Company | 97-019-U | Capital Structure |
| Arkansas Western Gas Company | 02/97 | ANG Division - Arkansas | 97-019-1 | Capital Structure |
| Arkansas Western Gas Company | 02/96 | ANG Division - Arkansas | GR-97-272 | Return on Equity |
| Arkansas Eastern Gas Company | 02/96 | Arkansas Western Gas Company | 96-030-U | Capital Structure |
| British Columbia Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Corix Utilities, Inc. | 07/13 | Corix Utilities, Inc. | Generic Cost of Capital Proceeding- Phase II | Return on Equity |
| Corix Utilities, Inc. | 08/12 | Corix Utilities, Inc. | Generic Cost of Capital Proceeding - Phase I | Return on Equity |
| California Public Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| San Gabriel Valley Water Company | 05/12 | San Gabriel Valley Water Company | 12-05-002 | Return on Equity |
| San Jose Water Company | 05/09 | San Jose Water Company | U-168-W | Return on Equity |
| San Jose Water Company | 05/11 | San Jose Water Company | U-168-W | Return on Equity |
| Thames RWE re: CaliforniaAmerican Water Co. | 05/02 | Thames RWE re: CaliforniaAmerican Water Co. | 02-01-036 | Return on Equity |


| Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut | 03/13 | Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut | 13-02-30 | Return on Equity |
| Connecticut Water Company | 01/10 | Connecticut Water Company | 09-12-11 | Return on Equity |
| Aquarion Water Company | 03/10 | Aquarion Water Company | 10-02-13 | Return on Equity |
| United Water Connecticut | 09/10 | United Water Connecticut | 10-09-08 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Connecticut | 05/07 | United Water Connecticut | 07-05-44 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Delaware Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| SUEZ Water Delaware Inc. | 02/16 | SUEZ Water Delaware Inc. |  | Fair Rate of Return |
| Artesian Water Company | 04/14 | Artesian Water Company | 14-132 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 11/13 | Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 13-466 | Return on Equity |
| Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 09/11 | Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 11-397 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Artesian Water Company | 04/11 | Artesian Water Company | 11-207 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Delaware, Inc. | 12/10 | United Water Delaware, Inc. | 10-421 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Delaware, Inc. | 02/09 | United Water Delaware, Inc. | 09-60 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 01/09 | Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 09-29 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Artesian Water Company | 04/08 | Artesian Water Company | 14-132 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Sussex Shores Water Company | 10/07 | Sussex Shores Water Company | 07-278 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Delaware, Inc. | 05/06 | United Water Delaware, Inc. | 06-174 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 04/06 | Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 06-145 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 04/04 | Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 04-152 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 01/02 | Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 02-28 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Sussex Shores Water Company | 11/99 | Sussex Shores Water Company | 99-576 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 9/99 | Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 99-446 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Long Neck Water Company | 01/99 | Long Neck Water Company | 99-31 | Overall Rate of Return |
| United Water Delaware, Inc. | 03/98 | United Water Delaware | 98-98 | Return on Equity |
| United Water Delaware, Inc. | 08/96 | United Water Delaware, Inc. | 96-164 | Capital Structure and Fixed Capital Cost Rates |
| Florida Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Utilities Inc. | 08/08 | Utilities Inc. | 080006-WS | Fair Rate of Return |
| Utilities, Inc. of Florida | 06/03 | Utilities, Inc. of Florida | 020071-WS | Fair Rate of Return |
| Hawaiian Public Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Laie Water Company, Inc. | 9/16 | Laie Water Company, Inc. | 2016-0229 | Fair Rate of Return |
| GTE Hawaiian Telephone | 10/96 | GTE Hawaiian Telephone | 95-0054 | Common Equity Cost, Capital Structure and Storm Damage Cost Recovery |

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| GTE Hawaiian Telephone | 06/96 | GTE Hawaiian Telephone | 95-0051/94-0298 | Self-Insurance Property Damage Reserve- <br> Ratepayer Responsibility |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Idaho Public Utility Commission |  |  |  |  |
| United Water Idaho, Inc. | 05/15 | United Water Idaho, Inc. | UWI-W-15-01 | State Property Tax Study |
| United Water Idaho, Inc. | 08/11 | United Water Idaho, Inc. | UWI-W-11-02 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Idaho, Inc. | 11/04 | United Water Idaho, Inc. | UWI-W-04-04 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Illinois Commerce Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Illinois-American Water Company | 10/11 | Illinois-American Water Company | 11-0767 | Return on Equity |
| Apple Canyon Utility Co. / Lake Wildwood Utilities Corp. | 04/10 | Apple Canyon Utility Co. / Lake Wildwood Utilities Corp. | 09-0548/0549 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Illinois American Water Company | 05/09 | Illinois American Water Company | 09-0319 | Return on Equity |
| Illinois-American Water Company | 08/07 | Illinois-American Water Company | 07-0507 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua Illinois, Inc. | 02/06 | Aqua Illinois, Inc. - Kankakee Water Division | 06-0285 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua Illinois | 12/04 | Aqua Illinois - Woodhaven Water \& Sewer Divisions | 05-0071 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua Illinois | 12/04 | Aqua Illinois - Oak Run Water \& Sewer Divisions | 05-0072 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua Illinois | 05/04 | Aqua Illinois - Vermillion Water Division | 04-0442 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua Illinois (formerly Consumers III. Water Co.) | 05/03 | Aqua Illinois (formerly Consumers III. Water Co.) | 03-0403 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Aqua Illinois (formerly Consumers III. Water Co.) | 04/00 | Aqua Illinois (formerly Consumers III. Water Co.) | $\begin{aligned} & 00-0337,00-0338,00- \\ & 0339 \end{aligned}$ | Return on Equity |
| Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Indiana-American Water Company | 01/14 | Indiana-American Water Company | 44450 | Return on Equity |
| Pioneer Water LLC | 10/13 | Pioneer Water LLC | 4434 | Return on Equity |
| Utility Center, Inc. | 03/10 | Utility Center, Inc. | 43874 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Twin Lakes Utilities, Inc. | 11/06 | Twin Lakes Utilities, Inc. | 43128 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Utility Center, Inc. | 08/07 | Utility Center, Inc. | 43331 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Twin Lakes Utilities, Inc. | 09/03 | Twin Lakes Utilities, Inc. | 42488 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water West Lafayette, Inc. | 01/97 | United Water West Lafayette, Inc. | 41046 | Return on Equity |
| United Water Indiana, Inc. | 01/97 | United Water Indiana, Inc. | 41047 | Return on Equity |
| Iowa Utilities Board |  |  |  |  |
| Iowa-American Water Company | 04/11 | Iowa-American Water Company | RPU-2011-0001 | Return on Equity |
| Iowa-American Water Company | 04/09 | Iowa-American Water Company | RPU-2009-0004 | Return on Equity |


| Iowa-American Water Company | 08/07 | Iowa-American Water Company | RPU-2007-0003 | Return on Equity |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kentucky Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Water Service Corp. of Kentucky | 01/09 | Water Service Corp. of Kentucky | 2008-00563 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Water Service Corp. of Kentucky | 08/05 | Water Service Corp. of Kentucky | 2005-00325 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Louisiana Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Louisiana Water Service, Inc. | 03/08 | Louisiana Water Service, Inc. | U-30553 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Maine Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Maine Water Company | 12/13 | Maine Water Company - Camden \& Rockland Division | 2013-00362 | Return on Equity |
| Consumers Maine Water Company | 05/00 | Consumers Maine Water Company | 2000-96 \& 2000-175 | Return on Equity |
| Maryland Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Greenridge Utilities, Inc. | 05/03 | Greenridge Utilities, Inc. | 8962 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Michigan Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Alpena Power Company | 05/09 | Alpena Power Company | U-15935 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Alpena Power Company | 04/07 | Alpena Power Company | U-15250 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Alpena Power Company | 07/99 | Alpena Power Company | U-12000 | Return on Equity |
| Missouri Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Union Elec. Co., D/B/A Ameren Missouri | 01/17 | Union Elec. Co., D/B/A Ameren Missouri | ER-2016-0179 | Capital Structure |
| Missouri Gas Energy | 09/13 | Missouri Gas Energy | GR-2014-0007 | Return on Equity |
| Missouri-American Water Company | 06/11 | Missouri-American Water Company | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WR-2011-0337 / SR- } \\ & \text { 2011-0338 } \end{aligned}$ | Fair Rate of Return |
| Missouri-American Water Company | 10/09 | Missouri-American Water Company | WR-2010-0131 | Return on Equity |
| Missouri American Water Company | 03/08 | Missouri American Water Company | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WR-2008-0311 / SR- } \\ & \text { 2008-0312 } \end{aligned}$ | Return on Equity |
| Missouri American Water Company | 12/06 | Missouri American Water Company | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WR-2007-0216 / WR- } \\ & \text { 2007-0217 } \end{aligned}$ | Return on Equity |
| Missouri-American Water Company | 05/03 | Missouri-American Water Company | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WR-2003-0500 \& WC- } \\ & \text { 2004-0168 } \end{aligned}$ | Fair Rate of Return |
| Arkansas Western Gas Company | 02/97 | ANG Division - Missouri | GR-97-272 | Capital Structure |
| New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Aquarion Water Co. of New Hampshire, Inc. | 03/13 | Aquarion Water Co. of New Hampshire, Inc. | DW 12-085 | Return on Equity |
| New Jersey Board of Public Utilities |  |  |  |  |
| SUEZ Water Arlington Hills, Inc. | 2/17 | SUEZ Water Arlington Hills, Inc. | WR-16060510 | Return on Equity |
| Atlantic City Sewerage Company | 10/16 | Atlantic City Sewerage Company | WR-16100951 | Return on Equity |


| Jersey Central Power \& Light Co. | $4 / 16$ | Jersey Central Power \& Light Co. | ER-16040383 | Return on Equity |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | $01 / 16$ | Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | WR-16010089 | Return on Equity |
| United Water New Jersey, Inc. | $10 / 15$ | United Water New Jersey, Inc. | WR-15101177 | Return on Equity |
| United Water Toms River, Inc. | $02 / 15$ | United Water Toms River, Inc. | W-01303A-14-0010 | Return on Equity |
| Atlantic City Sewerage Company | $10 / 14$ | Atlantic City Sewerage Company | WR-14101263 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | $01 / 14$ | Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | WR-14010019 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Middlesex Water Company | $11 / 13$ | Middlesex Water Company | WR-13111059 | Return on Equity |
| United Water New Jersey, Inc. | $03 / 13$ | United Water New Jersey, Inc. | WR-13030210 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Jersey Central Power \& Light <br> Company | $11 / 12$ | Jersey Central Power \& Light <br> Company | ER-12111052 | Return on Equity |
| United Water Toms River, Inc. | $09 / 12$ | United Water Toms River, Inc. | WR-12090830 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Pinelands Water Company | $08 / 12$ | Pinelands Water Company | WR-12080735 | Return on Equity |
| Pinelands Wastewater Company | $08 / 12$ | Pinelands Wastewater Company | WR-12080734 | Return on Equity |
| Middlesex Water Company | $01 / 12$ | Middlesex Water Company | WR-12010027 / PUC | 1653-2012 |

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| Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | 12/07 | Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | WR-07120955 | Fair Rate of Return |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The Atlantic City Sewerage Company | 11/07 | The Atlantic City Sewerage Company | WR-0007110866 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Middlesex Water Company | 04/07 | Middlesex Water Company | PUCRL 05663-2007N | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water New Jersey, Inc. | 02/07 | United Water New Jersey, Inc. | WR-07020135 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | 12/05 | Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | WR-05121022 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Pinelands Water Company | 08/05 | Pinelands Water Company | WR-05080681 | Return on Equity |
| Pinelands Wastewater Company | 08/05 | Pinelands Wastewater Company | WR-05080680 | Return on Equity |
| Middlesex Water Company | 05/05 | Middlesex Water Company | WR-05050451 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Pinelands Wastewater Company | 12/03 | Pinelands Wastewater Company | WR-031201017 | Return on Equity |
| Pinelands Water Company | 12/03 | Pinelands Water Company | WR-031201016 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua New Jersey, Inc. (formerly Consumers New Jersey Water Co.) | 12/03 | Aqua New Jersey, Inc. (formerly Consumers New Jersey Water Co.) | WR-03120974 | Return on Equity |
| Middlesex Water Company | 11/03 | Middlesex Water Company | WR-03110900 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Mount Holly Water Company | 07/03 | Mount Holly Water Company | WR-03070509 \& OAL PUCRL 07280-2003N | Fair Rate of Return |
| Elizabethtown Water Company | 07/03 | Elizabethtown Water Company | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WR-03070510 \& OAL } \\ & \text { PUCRL 07281-2003N } \end{aligned}$ | Return on Equity |
| New Jersey-American Water Company | 04/03 | New Jersey-American Water Company | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WR-03070511 \& OAL } \\ & \text { PUCRL 07279-2003N } \end{aligned}$ | Fair Rate of Return |
| Thames RWE re: New JerseyAmerican Water Co. | 08/02 | Thames RWE re: New JerseyAmerican Water Co. | WM-01120833 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua New Jersey, Inc. (formerly Consumers New Jersey Water Co.) | 03/02 | Aqua New Jersey, Inc. (formerly Consumers New Jersey Water Co.) | WR-02030133 | Return on Equity |
| Elizabethtown Water Company | 04/01 | Elizabethtown Water Company | WR-01040205 | Overall Fair Rate of Return |
| Middlesex Water Company | 06/00 | Middlesex Water Company | WR-00060362 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Aqua New Jersey, Inc. (formerly Consumers New Jersey Water Co.) | 03/00 | Aqua New Jersey, Inc. (formerly Consumers New Jersey Water Co.) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { WR-00030174 \& OAL } \\ & \text { PUCRS04524-00S } \end{aligned}$ | Return on Equity |
| Middlesex Water Company | 09/98 | Middlesex Water Company | 98-090795 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Middlesex Water Company | 11/96 | Middlesex Water Company | 96-110818 | Return on Equity |
| New York State Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| SUEZ New York Inc. | 2/16 | SUEZ New York Inc. | 16-W-0130 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water New Rochelle, Inc. / United Water West Chester, Inc. | 11/13 | United Water New Rochelle, Inc. / United Water West Chester, Inc. | 13-W-0539/13-W-564 | Return on Equity |
| United Water New York, Inc. | 07/13 | United Water New York, Inc. | 13-W-0295 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Long Island American Water Company d/b/a Long Island | 05/11 | Long Island American Water Company | 11-W-0200 | Return on Equity |

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| American Water for Water Service |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| United Water Owego-Nichols, Inc. | 02/11 | United Water Owego-Nichols, Inc. | 11-W-0082 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Westchester, Inc. | 11/09 | United Water Westchester, Inc. | 09-W-0828 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water New Rochelle Inc. | 11/09 | United Water New Rochelle Inc. | 09-W-0824 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water New York, Inc. | 09/09 | United Water New York, Inc. | 09-W-0731 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Owego/Nichols, Inc. | 05/07 | United Water Owego/Nichols, Inc. | 07-W-0639 / 07-W0872 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water New York, Inc. / South County | 01/06 | United Water New York, Inc. | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Cases 06-W-0131 and } \\ & 06-W-0244 \end{aligned}$ | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water New Rochelle, Inc. | 09/04 | United Water New Rochelle, Inc. | 04-W-1221 | Fair Rate of Return |
| North Carolina Utility Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Carolina Water Service of North Carolina | 08/15 | Carolina Water Company of North Carolina | W-354, Sub 344 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | 12/13 | Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | W-218, Sub 363 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. of NC. | 10/13 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. of NC. | W-354 Sub 336 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Pluris, LLC | 08/12 | Pluris, LLC | W-1282, Sub 8 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | 05/11 | Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | W-218, Sub 319 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. of NC | 10/10 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. of NC | W-354. Sub 324 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. of NC | 10/10 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. of NC Ops. in Currituck Co. | W-354. Sub 327 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Transylvania Utilities, Inc. | 05/06 | Transylvania Utilities, Inc. | W-1012, Sub 7 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Carolina Pines Utilities, Inc. | 04/04 | Carolina Pines Utilities, Inc. | W-1151 | Return on Equity |
| Transylvania Utilities, Inc. | 04/04 | Transylvania Utilities, Inc. | W-1012, Sub 5 | Return on Equity |
| Nero Utilities, Inc. | 04/04 | Nero Utilities, Inc. | W-1152 | Return on Equity |
| Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Metropolitan Edison Co. | 04/16 | Metropolitan Edison Co. | R-2016-2537349 | Return on Equity |
| Pennsylvania Electric Co. | 04/16 | Pennsylvania Electric Co. | R-2016-2537352 | Return on Equity |
| Pennsylvania Power Co. | 04/16 | Pennsylvania Power Co. | R-2016-2537355 | Return on Equity |
| West Penn Power Co. | 04/16 | West Penn Power Co. | R-2016-2537359 | Return on Equity |
| United Water Pennsylvania Inc. | 01/15 | United Water Pennsylvania Inc. | R-2015-2462523 | Return on Equity |
| Penn Estates Utilities, Inc. | 12/11 | Penn Estates Utilities, Inc. | R-2011-2255159 | Return on Equity |
| United Water Pennsylvania, Inc. | 05/11 | United Water Pennsylvania, Inc. | R-2011-2232985 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Pennsylvania, Inc. | 09/09 | United Water Pennsylvania, Inc. | R-2009-2122887 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Penn Estates Utilities, Inc. (Water) / (Sewer) | 09/09 | Penn Estates Utilities, Inc. (Water) / (Sewer) | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { R-2009-2117532 / R- } \\ & 2009-2117400 \end{aligned}$ | Fair Rate of Return |
| Utilities, Inc. - Westgate | 09/09 | Utilities, Inc. - Westgate | R-2009-2117389 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Utilities, Inc. of Pennsylvania | 09/09 | Utilities, Inc. of Pennsylvania | R-2009-2117402 | Fair Rate of Return |

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| Trigen-Philadelphia Energy Corp. | 06/09 | Trigen-Philadelphia Energy Corp. | R-2009-2111011 | Fair Rate of Return |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| The Columbia Water Company | 12/08 | The Columbia Water Company | R-2008-2045157 | Return on Equity |
| The Newtown Artesian Water Company | 11/08 | The Newtown Artesian Water Company | R-2008-2042293 | Fair Rate of Return |
| NRG Energy Center Harrisburg | 03/08 | NRG Energy Center Harrisburg | R-2008-2028395 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Total Environmental Solutions, Inc. - Treasure Lake Water Division | 02/08 | Total Environmental Solutions, Inc. Treasure Lake Water Division | R-00072493 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Total Environmental Solutions, Inc. - Treasure Lake Sewer Division | 02/08 | Total Environmental Solutions, Inc. Treasure Lake Sewer Division | R-00072495 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Emporium Water Company | 06/06 | Emporium Water Company | R-00061297 | Fair Rate of Return |
| NRG Energy Center Pittsburgh | 06/06 | NRG Energy Center Pittsburgh | R-00061435 | Fair Rate of Return |
| City of DuBois, PA | 04/06 | City of DuBois, PA | R-00050671 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Pennsylvania, Inc. | 01/06 | United Water Pennsylvania, Inc. | R-00051186 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Valley Energy, Inc. | 10/04 | Valley Energy, Inc. | R-00049345 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Borough of Hanover | 08/02 | Borough of Hanover | R-00027522 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Audubon Water Company | 04/02 | Audubon Water Company | R-00027104 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Wellsboro Electric Company | 10/01 | Wellsboro Electric Company | R-00016356 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Emporium Water Company | 09/00 | Emporium Water Company | R-00005050 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Penn Estates Utilities, Inc. | 01/00 | Penn Estates Utilities, Inc. | $\begin{aligned} & \text { R-00005031 \& R- } \\ & 00005032 \end{aligned}$ | Fair Rate of Return |
| Pittsburgh Thermal, L.P. | 11/99 | Pittsburgh Thermal, L.P. | R-00994641 | Fair Rate of Return |
| PG Energy | 03/98 | PG Energy | R-009880 | Capital Structure and Embedded Fixed Capital Cost Rates |
| Western Utilities, Inc. | 08/97 | Western Utilities, Inc. | R-00963856 | Fair Rate of Return |
| PG Energy | 05/96 | PG Energy | R-0096312 | Capital Structure and Embedded Fixed Capital Cost Rates |
| Public Service Commission of Ne |  |  |  |  |
| Utilities Inc. of Central Nevada | 06/15 | Utilities Inc. of Central Nevada | 15-06063 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Utilities Inc. of Central Nevada | 12/09 | Utilities Inc. of Central Nevada | 09-12017 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Utilities Inc., of Nevada | 06/09 | Utilities Inc., of Nevada | 09-06037 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Spring Creek Utilities, Inc. | 06/08 | Spring Creek Utilities, Inc. | 08-06036 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Utilities, Inc. of Central Nevada | 12/06 | Utilities, Inc. of Central Nevada | 06-12023 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Spring Creek Utilities, Inc. | 04/06 | Spring Creek Utilities, Inc. | 06-01002 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Public Service Commission of South Carolina |  |  |  |  |


| United Utility Companies, Inc. | 09/13 | United Utility Companies, Inc. | 2013-199-WS | Capital Structure |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Utilities Services of South Carolina | 09/13 | Utilities Services of South Carolina | 2013-201-WS | Capital Structure |
| Tega Cay Water Services Inc. | 12/12 | Tega Cay Water Services Inc. | 2012-177-WS | Fair Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 08/11 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 2011-47-WS | Fair Rate of Return |
| Tega Cay Water Service, Inc. | 04/10 | Tega Cay Water Service, Inc. | 2009-473-WS | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Utility Companies, Inc. | 02/10 | United Utility Companies, Inc. | 2009-479-W/S | Fair Rate of Return |
| Utilities Services of South Carolina | 11/07 | Utilities Services of South Carolina | 2007-286-WS | Fair Rate of Return |
| Southland Utilities, Inc. | 09/07 | Southland Utilities, Inc. | 2007-244-W | Fair Rate of Return |
| Tega Cay Water Service, Inc. | 07/06 | Tega Cay Water Service, Inc. | 2006-97-WS | Return on Equity |
| United Utility Companies, Inc. | 07/06 | United Utility Companies, Inc. | 2006-107-W/S | Fair Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 06/06 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 2006-92-W/S | Fair Rate of Return |
| Utilities Services of South Carolina | 11/05 | Utilities Services of South Carolina | 2005-217-WS | Fair Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service of South Carolina | 04/05 | Carolina Water Service of South Carolina | 2004-357-W/S | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Utility Companies | 01/02 | United Utility Companies | 2000-0210-W/S | Fair Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service of South Carolina | 06/01 | Carolina Water Service of South Carolina | 2000-0207-W/S | Fair Rate of Return |
| Public Utility Commission of Ohio |  |  |  |  |
| Aqua Ohio, Inc. | 12/13 | Aqua Ohio, Inc. | 13-2124-WW-AIR | Return on Equity |
| Ohio American Water Company | 8/12 | Ohio American Water Company | 11-4161-WS-AIR | Fair Rate of Return |
| Ohio American Water Company | 6/09 | Ohio American Water Company | 09-391-WS-AIR | Fair Rate of Return |
| Ohio American Water Company | 10/06 | Ohio American Water Company | 06-433-WS-AIR | Fair Rate of Return |
| Ohio-American Water Company | 11/04 | Ohio-American Water Company | 03-2390-WS-AIR | Return on Equity |
| Regulatory Commission of Alaska |  |  |  |  |
| Fairbanks Natural Gas, LLC | 6/14 | Fairbanks Natural Gas, LLC | U-14-102 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| United Water Rhode Island, Inc. | 8/13 | United Water Rhode Island, Inc. | 4434 | Fair Rate of Return |
| United Water Rhode Island, Inc. | 6/11 | United Water Rhode Island, Inc. | 4255 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Virginia State Corporation Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Aqua Virginia, Inc. | 8/14 | Aqua Virginia, Inc. | PUE-2014-00045 | Return on Equity |
| Massanutten Public Service Corporation | 9/09 | Massanutten Public Service Corporation | PUE-2009-00041 | Return on Equity |
| Land'Or Utility Company | 12/06 | Land'Or Utility Company | PUE-2006-00128 | Return on Equity |
| Massanutten Public Service Corporation | 12/06 | Massanutten Public Service Corporation | PUE-2006-00126 | Return on Equity |
| Reston Lake Anne Air Conditioning | 5/12 | Reston Lake Anne Air Conditioning | PUE-2011-00130 | Return on Equity |

Page A-15

| Corp. |  | Corp. |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Aqua Virginia, Inc. | $10 / 11$ | Aqua Virginia, Inc. (Monticello) | PUE-2005-00080 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua Virginia, Inc. | $10 / 11$ | Aqua Virginia, Inc. - Sydnor <br> Hydrodynamics, Inc. | PUE-2011-00099 | Return on Equity |
| United Water Virginia, Inc. | $10 / 97$ | United Water Virginia, Inc. | PUE-2097-0544 | Fair Rate of Return |
| Washington Utilities \& Transportation Commission | UG-950278 | Capital Structure Ratios - <br> Fixed Capital Cost Rates |  |  |

LAC / MGE
Table of Contents to the Financial Supporting Schedules of Pauline M. Ahern, CRRA

| Summary of Cost of Capital and Fair Rate of Return | Schedule |
| :--- | :--- |
| Financial Profile of the Proxy Group of |  |
| Seven Natural Gas Companies |  |
| Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted |  |
| Cash Flow Model | PMA-D1 |
| Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Risk Premium Model | PMA-D2 |
| Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Capital Asset <br> Pricing Model | PMA-D3 |
| Basis of Selection for the Non-Price Regulated Companies <br> Comparable in Total Risk to the Natural Gas Proxy Group | PMA-D4 |
| Cost of Common Equity Models Applied to the <br> Comparable Risk Non-Price Regulated Companies | PMA-D5 |
| Estimation of the Flotation Cost Adjustment |  |
| Estimated Market Capitalization for LAC / MGE |  |
| and the Natural Gas Proxy Group |  |

## LAC / MGE

Summary of Cost of Capital and Fair Rate of Return Based Upon a Test Tear Ended December 31, 2016 (Pro Forma)

## LAC / MGE

| Type Of Capital | Ratios (1) | Cost Rate | Weighted Cost Rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Long-Term Debt | 42.80\% | 4.159\% (1) | 1.780\% |
| Common Equity | 57.20\% | 10.350\% (2) | 5.920\% |
| Total | 100.00\% |  | 7.700\% |

Notes:
(1) From Schedule GWB-1.
(2) From page 2 of this Schedule.

LAC / MGE<br>Brief Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate

Line No.
Principal Methods

## Natural Gas Proxy Group

1. Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1) 8.68 \%
2. Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2) 10.57
3. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)

Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price
4. Regulated Companies (4)
5. Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate before Adjustments
9.11
6. Flotation Cost Adjustment (5)
0.16
7. Business Risk Adjustment (6)
0.20
8. Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate
10.36 \%
9. Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate
10.35 \%

Notes: (1) From Schedule PMA-D3.
(2) From page 1 of Schedule PMA-D4.
(3) From page 1 of Schedule PMA-D5.
(4) From page 1 of Schedule PMA-D7.
(5) From page 1 of Schedule PMA-D8.
(6) Business risk adjustment to reflect LAC / MGE's greater business risk due to their respective unique risks as well as their respective collective small size relative to the proxy group as detailed in the accompanying direct testimony.

Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1) 2011-2015, Inclusive


```
Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the
                Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies
                2011-2015, Inclusive
```

|  | $\underline{2015}$ | $\underline{2014}$ | $\underline{2013}$ | $\underline{2012}$ | $\underline{2011}$ | 5 YEAR AVERAGE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Atmos Energy |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | 43.46 \% | 44.31 \% | 48.76 \% | 45.33 \% | 49.48 \% | 46.27 \% |
| Preferred Stock | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 56.54 | 55.69 | 51.24 | 54.67 | 50.52 | 53.73 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |


| Chesapeake Utilities |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Long-Term Debt | 30.68 \% | 35.82 \% | 31.63 \% | 30.03 \% | 32.98 \% | 32.23 \% |
| Preferred Stock | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 69.32 | 64.18 | 68.37 | 69.97 | 67.02 | 67.77 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |

New Jersey
Resources Corp.
Long-Term Debt Preferred Stock Common Equity

Total Capital

| 43.57 \% | 39.57 \% | 39.59 \% | 39.57 \% | 35.88 \% | 39.64 \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 56.43 | 60.43 | 60.41 | 60.43 | 64.12 | 60.36 |
| 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |

Northwest Nat. Gas

| Long-Term Debt | 43.52 \% | 46.30 \% | 49.66 \% | 48.55 \% | 45.29 \% | 46.66 \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Preferred Stock | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 56.48 | 53.70 | 50.34 | 51.45 | 54.71 | 53.34 |
| Total Capital | $\underline{100.00}$ \% | $\underline{100.00}$ \% | $\underline{100.00}$ \% | 100.00 \% | $\underline{100.00}$ \% | 100.00 \% |
| South Jersey |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Industries, Inc. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | 49.96 \% | 51.98 \% | 45.89 \% | 45.97 \% | 40.59 \% | 46.88 \% |
| Preferred Stock | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 50.04 | 48.02 | 54.10 | 54.03 | 59.41 | 53.13 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 99.99 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.01 \% |


| Southwest Gas |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Holdings Inc |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long-Term Debt | 49.59 \% | 52.64 \% | 49.57 \% | 50.13 \% | 53.53 \% | 51.09 \% |
| Preferred Stock | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| Common Equity | 50.34 | 47.29 | 50.36 | 49.81 | 46.43 | 48.85 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.01 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | $100.00 \%$ |

Spire Inc.


Source of Information
Annual Forms 10-K
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model for the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model for the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies
$\sqrt{\boxed{6}}$





$\mathrm{NA}=$ Not Available
(1) Indicated dividend at $01 / 31 / 2017$ divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending
$01 / 31 / 2017$ for each company.
(2) From pages 3 through 10 of this Schedule.
(3) Average of columns 2 through 5 excluding negative growth rates.
(4) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column
6) $x$ column 1 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the
continuous payment. Thus, for Atmos Energy, $2.46 \% \times(1+(1 / 2 \times 7.03 \%))=2.55 \%$.
$\ddot{0}$
$\stackrel{0}{\circ}$
z.

## (5) Column $6+$ column 7.

Value Line Investment Survey www.reuters.com Downloaded on 01/31/2017
www.yahoo.com Downloaded on $01 / 31 / 2017$
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| Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas |
| :--- |
| Companies |
| Atmos Energy |
| Chesapeake Utilities |
| New Jersey Resources Corp. |
| Northwest Nat. Gas |
| South Jersey Industries, Inc. |
| Southwest Gas Holdings Inc |
| Spire Inc. |

LAC / MGE<br>Demonstration of the Inadequacy of<br>Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies<br>When Market Value is Greater than Book Value

Line No.

1. Per Share
2. DCF Cost Rate (3)
3. Return in Dollars (4)
4. Dividends (5)
5. Growth in Dollars (6)
6. Return on Market Value (7)
7. Rate of Growth on Market

Value (8)

Based on the Proxy Group of Seven

Natural Gas Companies

| Column A |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Market Value | Column B |

\$ 59.536 (1)
\$ 25.848
(2)
8.65\%
\$ 5.150
\$ 2.236
\$ 1.703
\$ 1.703
\$ 3.447
\$ 0.533
8.65\%
3.76\%

Notes:
(1) Average price of the proxy group as shown on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D9.
(2) Average book value of the proxy group as shown on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D9.
(3) Average DCF cost rate derived from Column [7] on page 1 of this Schedule.
(4) Line $1 x$ Line 2.
(5) Dividends are based on a $2.86 \%$ adjusted dividend yield which is the
(6) Line 3 - Line 4.
(7) Line 3 / Line 1.
(8) Line 7 / Line 1.

| ATMOS ENERGV CORP. NYSE-ATO |  |  | $\begin{array}{\|l\|l\|} \text { RECENT } \\ \text { PRICE } \end{array}$ | $72.84$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { P/E } \\ & \text { RATIO } 20.8\binom{\text { Trailing: } 21.4}{\text { Median: } 15.0} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RELATIVE } 1,09 \\ & \text { PIE RATIO } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline \text { DIV'D } \\ \text { YLD } \end{array}$ | $2.5 \%$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { VALUE } \\ & \text { LINE } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{array}{r}33.1 \\ 25.5 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 33.5 \\ 23.9 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 29.3 \\ & 19.7 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 30.3 \\ & 20.1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 32.0 \\ & 25.9 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 35.6 \\ & 28.5 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 37.3 \\ & 30.4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 47.4 \\ & 34.9 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 58.2 \\ & 44.2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 64.8 \\ & 50.8 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 182.0 \\ & 60.0 \end{aligned}$ | - |  | Target Price  <br> 2019 2020 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Range } \\ & 2021 \end{aligned}$ |
| SAFETY 1 Raised $6 / 6 / 14$ <br>   LEGENDS <br> TECHNICAL 3 Lewered $9 / 30 / 16$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -120 |
| 2019-21 PROJECTIONS Shaded area indica |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -100 |
| Ann'l Total |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | - |  |  |  |  |
| Price Gain Return |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | [,1111 |  |  |  |  | 60 50 |
| $\begin{array}{cccc}\text { High } & 110 & (+50 \%) & 13 \% \\ \text { Low } & 90 & 85 \%\end{array}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 50 40 |
| Insider Decisions |  |  |  |  |  | , | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 30 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| lobuy |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | RETURN 10/16 |  |
| Institutional Decisions   <br>  402015 102016 <br>  202016 $\quad$ Perce |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { THIS } \\ & \text { VLARITH.* } \\ & \text { STOCK } \\ & \text { INDEX } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| to Buy 159 212 188 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 yr . | $\begin{array}{lr}20.9 & 6.4 \\ 887 \\ 157\end{array}$ |  |
| to Sell 133 142 148 traded <br> Hldd's(000) 70628 71888 73716  traded |  |  |  |  |  | \|11 | , |  | 11 | 1 | 1 |  |  | $\begin{array}{rr} 82.7 & 15.7 \\ 154.6 & 76.0 \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  |
| Atmos Energy's history dates back to | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | ${ }^{\text {© VAL }}$ | JE LINE PUB. LLC | 19-21 |
| 1906 in the Texas Panhandle. Over the | 75.27 | 66.03 | 79.52 | 53.69 | 53.12 | 48.15 | 38.10 | 42.88 | 49.22 | 40.82 | 32.20 | 33.65 | Reve | per sh ${ }^{\text {A }}$ | 45.85 |
| years, through various mergers, it became | 4.26 | 4.14 | 4.19 | 4.29 | 4.64 | 4.72 | 4.76 | 5.14 | 5.42 | 5.81 | 6.20 | 6.50 | "Cash | low" per sh | 7.25 |
| part of Pioneer Corporation, and, in 1981, | 2.00 | 1.94 | 2.00 | 1.97 | 2.16 | 2.26 | 2.10 | 2.50 | 2.96 | 3.09 | 3.38 | 3.55 | Earni | per sh AB | 4.20 |
| Pioneer named its gas distribution division | 1.26 | 1.28 | 1.30 | 1.32 | 1.34 | 1.36 | 1.38 | 1.40 | 1.48 | 1.56 | 1.68 | 1.80 | Div'ds | ecl'd per sh Cm | 2.15 |
| Energas. In 1983, Pioneer organized | 5.20 | 4.39 | 5.20 | 5.51 | 6.02 | 6.90 | 8.12 | 9.32 | 8.32 | 9.61 | 10.45 | 11.00 | Cap'IS | ending per sh | 10.60 |
| Energas as a separate subsidiary and dis- | 20.16 | 22.01 | 22.60 | 23.52 | 24.16 | 24.98 | 26.14 | 28.47 | 30.74 | 31.48 | 33.30 | 31.25 | Book V | lue per sh | 36.65 |
| tributed the outstanding shares of Energas | 81.74 | 89.33 | 90.81 | 92.55 | 90.16 | 90.30 | 90.24 | 90.64 | 100.39 | 101.48 | 104.00 | 107.00 | Comme | Shs Outst'g ${ }^{\text {D }}$ | 120.00 |
| to Pioneer shareholders. Energas changed | 13.5 | 15.9 | 13.6 | 12.5 | 13.2 | 14.4 | 15.9 | 15.9 | 16.1 | 17.5 | 20.8 |  | Avg A | 'I P/E Ratio | 24.0 |
| its name to Atmos in 1988. Atmos acquired | . 73 | . 84 | . 82 | . 83 | . 84 | . 90 | 1.01 | . 89 | . 85 | . 89 | 1.11 |  | Relativ | P/E Ratio | 1.50 |
| Trans Louisiana Gas in 1986, Western Ken- | 4.7\% | 4.2\% | 4.8\% | 5.3\% | 4.7\% | 4.2\% | 4.1\% | 3.5\% | 3.1\% | 2.9\% | 2.4\% |  | Avg An | 'I Div'd Yield | 2.1\% |
| tucky Gas Utility in 1987, Greeley Gas in | 6152.4 | 5898.4 | 7221.3 | 4969.1 | 4789.7 | 4347.6 | 3438.5 | 3886.3 | 4940.9 | 4142.1 | 3349.9 | 3600 | Reve | (\$mill) ${ }^{\text {A }}$ | 5500 |
| 1993, United Cities Gas in 1997, and others. | 162.3 | 170.5 | 180.3 | 179.7 | 201.2 | 199.3 | 192.2 | 230.7 | 289.8 | 315.1 | 350.1 | 380 | Net Pro | it (\$mill) | 500 |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 6/30/16 | 37.6\% | 35.8\% | 38.4\% | 34.4\% | 38.5\% | 36.4\% | 33.8\% | 38.2\% | 39.2\% | 38.3\% | 36.4\% | 37.0\% | Income | Tax Rate | 40.0\% |
| Total Debt $\$ 3126.1$ mill. Due in 5 Yrs $\$ 1157.9$ mill. | 2.6\% | 2.9\% | 2.5\% | 3.6\% | 4.2\% | 4.6\% | 5.6\% | 5.9\% | 5.9\% | 7.6\% | 10.5\% | 10.6\% | Net Pro | it Margin | 9.1\% |
| LT Debt $\$ 2205.6$ mill. LT Interest $\$ 135.0$ mill. | 57.0\% | 52.0\% | 50.8\% | 49.9\% | 45.4\% | 49.4\% | 45.3\% | 48.8\% | 44.3\% | 43.5\% | 39.0\% | 42.0\% | Long-T | m Debt Ratio | 45.0\% |
| coverage: 5.4x) | 43.0\% | 48.0\% | 49.2\% | 50.1\% | 54.6\% | 50.6\% | 54.7\% | 51.2\% | 55.7\% | 56.5\% | 61.0\% | 58.0\% | Commo | Equity Ratio | 55.0\% |
| Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals $\$ 16.5$ mill. | 3828.5 | 4092.1 | 4172.3 | 4346.2 | 3987.9 | 4461.5 | 4315.5 | 5036.1 | 5542.2 | 5650.2 | 5655 | 5765 | Total C | pital (\$mill) | 8000 |
| Pfd Stock None | 3629.2 | 3836.8 | 4136.9 | 4439.1 | 4793.1 | 5147.9 | 5475.6 | 6030.7 | 6725.9 | 7430.6 | 8280 | 9060 | Net Pla | (\$mill) | 11500 |
| Pension Assets-9/15 \$450.9 mill. | 6.1\% | 5.9\% | 5.9\% | 5.9\% | 6.9\% | 6.1\% | 6.1\% | 5.9\% | 6.4\% | 6.6\% | 7.5\% | 8.0\% | Return | n Total Cap'l | 7.5\% |
| Oblig. $\$ 508.6$ mill. | 9.8\% | 8.7\% | 8.8\% | 8.3\% | 9.2\% | 8.8\% | 8.1\% | 8.9\% | 9.4\% | 9.9\% | 10.0\% | 11.5\% | Return | n Shr. Equity | 11.5\% |
| $\text { as of } 7 / 29 / 16$ | 9.8\% | 8.7\% | 8.8\% | 8.3\% | 9.2\% | 8.8\% | 8.1\% | 8.9\% | 9.4\% | 9.9\% | 10.0\% | 11.5\% | Return | n Com Equity | 11.5\% |
| MARKET CAP: $\$ 7.6$ billion (Large Cap) | 3.6\% | 3.0\% | 3.1\% | 2.7\% | 3.5\% | 3.3\% | 2.8\% | 4.0\% | 4.7\% | 4.9\% | 5.0\% | 5.5\% |  | to Com Eq | 5.5\% |
| $\begin{array}{llll}\text { CURRENT POSITION } & 2014 & 2015 & 6 / 30 / 16\end{array}$ | 63\% | 65\% | 65\% | 68\% | 62\% | 62\% | 65\% | 56\% | 50\% | 51\% | 50\% | 51\% | All Div' | s to Net Prof | 52\% |



| Fiscal <br> Year <br> Ends | QUARTERLY REVENUES(\$ mill.) A <br> Dec.31 |  |  |  | Full <br> Mar.31 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | Jun.30 | Sep.30 |  |  |  |
| Fiscal |  |  |  |  |  |
| Year |  |  |  |  |  |$|$

BUSINESS: Atmos Energy Corporation is engaged primarily in the distribution and sale of natural gas to roughly three million customers through six regulated natural gas utility operations: Louisiana Division, West Texas Division, Mid-Tex Division, Mississippi Division, Colorado-Kansas Division, and Kentucky/Mid-States Division. Gas sales breakdown for fiscal 2015: 66\%, residential; 29\%, com-
Atmos Energy may well post respectable results in fiscal 2017 (started October 1st). The natural gas distribution division, accounting for the largest portion of revenues, stands to benefit from a rise in throughput, assuming that both the weather and economic environment are generally favorable (leading to a boost in consumption levels). Also, we look for reasonably decent performances from the other segments, including the regulated pipeline unit. At this juncture, full-year profits might advance around $5 \%$, to $\$ 3.55$ a share, versus the fiscal 2016 tally of $\$ 3.38$. Concerning fiscal 2018, we believe the bottom line can grow at a similar percentage rate, to $\$ 3.75$ a share, if operating margins expand.
There are plans to sell Atmos Energy Marketing (AEM) to a subsidiary of CenterPoint Energy. The transaction involves the transfer of 800 delivered gas customers and AEM's related asset optimization business at an all-cash price of $\$ 40$ million plus working capital at the closing date (anticipated during the first cal endar quarter of 2017). Proceeds are to be utilized for infrastructure investment in
mercial; 3\%, industrial; and 2\% other. The company has around 4,760 employees. Officers and directors own approximately $1.5 \%$ of common stock (12/15 Proxy). President and Chief Executive Officer: Kim R. Cocklin. Incorporated: Texas. Address: Three Lincoln Centre, Suite 1800, 5430 LBJ Freeway, Dallas, Texas 75240. Telephone: 972-934-9227. Internet: www.atmosenergy.com.
the core regulated units. Note that we estimate the pending divestiture's impact on earnings per share would be minimal.
The fiscal 2017 capital expenditures budget is expected to lie between $\mathbf{\$ 1 . 1}$ billion and $\$ 1.25$ billion. That would be some $8 \%$ higher than the previous year's figure, assuming the midpoint of that range is used. Similar to fiscal 2016, a meaningful portion of the resources will be deployed to enhance the safety and reliability of Atmos' natural gas distribution and transmission systems.
The quarterly common stock dividend was raised a few cents, to $\$ 0.45$ a share. Moreover, our 2019-2021 projections indicate that additional, steady increases in the distribution will take place. The payout ratio over that period ought to be roughly $50 \%$, which should not place a substantial financial burden on the energy company.
These top-quality shares hold decent, risk-adjusted long-term total return potential. That reflects the healthy dividend and worthwhile capital gains possibilities here.
Frederick L. Harris, III December 2, 2016

[^27] ued operations: '11, 10¢; '12, 27¢; '13, 14¢. Direct stock purchase plan avail.
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| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Cal- } \\ & \text { endar } \end{aligned}$ | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) |  |  |  | Full <br> Year |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | $\text { Dec. } 31$ |  |
| 2013 | 140.7 | 94.1 | 86.6 | 122.9 | 444.3 |
| 2014 | 186.3 | 100.5 | 91.6 | 120.4 | 498.8 |
| 2015 | 170.1 | 92.7 | 91.9 | 104.5 | 459.2 |
| 2016 | 146.3 | 102.3 | 108.3 | 118.1 | 475 |
| 2017 | 170 | 110 | 110 | 125 | 515 |
| Calendar | EARNINGS PER SHARE A |  |  |  | Full <br> Year |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 |  |
| 2013 | 1.02 | . 30 | 27 | 67 | 2.26 |
| 2014 | 1.21 | . 35 | 22 | 69 | 2.47 |
| 2015 | 1.44 | . 35 | . 33 | . 56 | 2.68 |
| 2016 | 1.33 | . 52 | . 29 | . 61 | 2.75 |
| 2017 | 1.41 | . 45 | . 42 | . 67 | 2.95 |
| Cal- | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID Ba |  |  |  | Full |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2012 | . 23 | . 23 | 243 | . 243 | 95 |
| 2013 | . 243 | . 243 | . 257 | . 257 | 1.00 |
| 2014 | . 257 | . 257 | . 27 | . 27 | 1.05 |
| 2015 | . 27 | . 27 | . 288 | . 288 | 1.12 |
| 2016 | . 288 | . 288 | . 305 | . 305 |  |

(A) Diluted shrs. Excludes nonrecurring items:

02, d23c; '08, d7c: '15, 6c. Excludes discontin ued operations: '03, d9c; '04, d1c. Next earnings report due early Feb.

BUSINESS: Chesapeake Utilities Corporation consists of two units: Regulated Energy and Unregulated Energy. The Regulated Energy segment ( $65 \%$ of 2015 revenues) distributes natural gas in Delaware, Maryland, and Florida; distributes electricity in Florida; and transmits natural gas on the Delmarva Peninsula and in Florida. The Unregulated Energy operation (35\% of 2015 revenues)
Chesapeake Utilities appears headed for an unspectacular 2016. That's partly because first-quarter share net (versus the year-ago period's) suffered from the unfavorable impact of substantially warmer temperatures on the natural gas and propane distribution operations. This event occurred during a time when customer consumption levels are normally high. To make matters worse, the company's September-interim performance was squeezed partly by fixed pipeline and storage costs associated with natural gas supply contracts where a significant portion of sales will occur during the winter months, plus lower retail propane margins per gallon on the Delmarva Peninsula. Even though results for the second quarter were extra strong and we believe 2016 will end on a positive note, full-year profits may advance only about $2.5 \%$, to $\$ 2.75$ a share.
Brighter things might be in store for 2017, nonetheless. That ought to reflect growing benefits from the April, 2015 purchase of Aspire Energy. New projects (see below) are another positive. Generally fa-
vorable weather patterns would obviously
(B) Dividends historically paid in early January, $\quad$ (C) In millions, adjusted for split.

April, July, and October. - Dividend reinvest ment plan. Direct stock purchase plan avail able.
wholesales and distributes propane; markets natural gas; and provides other unregulated energy services, including midstream services in Ohio. Officers and directors own $5.4 \%$ of common stock; $T$. Rowe Price, 8.3; BlackRock, 5.8\% (3/16 Proxy). CEO: Michael P. McMasters. Inc.: Delaware. Address: 909 Silver Lake Boulevard, Dover, DE 19904. Tel.: (302) 734-6799. Internet: www.chpk.com.
help, as well. Consequently, Chesapeake's bottom line stands to increase around 7\%,

## to $\$ 2.95$ a share.

The 2016 capital spending budget is expected to fall between $\$ 150$ million and $\$ 170$ million. (That would be $10.6 \%$ higher than last year's level, using the midpoint of that range.) Projects have included Eight Flags' CHP plant; new facilities to serve an electric power generator in Kent County, Delaware; Eastern Shore's system reliability project; continued natural gas infrastructure improve ment initiatives; and additional expansions of the company's natural gas distribution and transmission systems. Manage ment states that in order to fund these expenditures it might further increase the level of borrowings to supplement cash provided by operating activities.
The dividend yield now rests below the average of all equities in Value Line's Natural Gas Utility group. But the payout is well covered by corporate earnings, and future, steady hikes are a good possibility. Meanwhile, the stock is ranked 4 (Below Average) for Timeliness. Frederick L. Harris, III December 2, 2016

[^28]NEW JERSEY RES. NYSE-Nr


| 14.71 | 25.61 | 22.06 | 31.14 | 30.44 | 38.10 | 39.81 | 36.31 | 45.37 | 31.17 | 32.05 | 36.30 | 27.08 | 38.38 | 44.40 | 32.09 | 21.90 | 27.35 | Revenues per sh A | 29.85 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1.00 | 1.06 | 1.07 | 1.19 | 1.25 | 1.31 | 1.37 | 1.22 | 1.81 | 1.58 | 1.63 | 1.70 | 1.86 | 1.93 | 2.73 | 2.52 | 2.45 | 2.50 | "Cash Flow" per sh | 2.85 |
| . 60 | . 65 | . 70 | . 79 | . 85 | . 88 | . 93 | . 78 | 1.35 | 1.20 | 1.23 | 1.29 | 1.36 | 1.37 | 2.08 | 1.78 | 1.61 | 1.75 | Earnings per sh ${ }^{\text {B }}$ | 2.10 |
| . 38 | . 39 | . 40 | . 41 | . 43 | . 45 | . 48 | . 51 | . 56 | . 62 | . 68 | . 72 | . 77 | . 81 | . 86 | . 93 | . 98 | 1.02 | Div'ds Decl'd per sh | 1.05 |
| . 62 | . 55 | . 51 | . 5 | . 72 | . 64 | . 64 | . 73 | . 86 | . 90 | 1.05 | 1.13 | 1.26 | 1.33 | 1.52 | 3.76 | 1.70 | 1.75 | Cap'l Spending per sh | 1.80 |
| 4.14 | 4.40 | 4.35 | 5.13 | 5.62 | 5.30 | 7.50 | 7.75 | 8.64 | 8.29 | 8.81 | 9.36 | 9.80 | 10.65 | 11.48 | 12.99 | 13.80 | 14.55 | Book Value per sh ${ }^{\text {D }}$ | 17.40 |
| 79.17 | 79.99 | 83.00 | 81.70 | 83.22 | 82.64 | 82.88 | 83.22 | 84.12 | 83.17 | 82.35 | 82.89 | 83.05 | 83.32 | 84.20 | 85.19 | 85.88 | 86.00 | Common Shs Outst'g | 86.00 |
| 14.7 | 14.2 | 14.7 | 14.0 | 15.3 | 16.8 | 16.1 | 21.6 | 12.3 | 14.9 | 15.0 | 16.8 | 16.8 | 16.0 | 11.7 | 16.6 | 21.3 |  | Avg Ann'I P/E Ratio | 14.0 |
| . 96 | . 73 | . 80 | . 80 | . 81 | . 89 | . 87 | 1.15 | . 74 | . 99 | . 95 | 1.05 | 1.07 | . 90 | . 62 | . 84 | 1.17 |  | Relative P/E Ratio | . 90 |
| 4.4\% | 4.2\% | 3.9\% | 3.7\% | 3.3\% | 3.1\% | 3.2\% | 3.0\% | 3.3\% | 3.5\% | 3.7\% | 3.3\% | 3.4\% | 3.7\% | 3.5\% | 3.1\% | 2.9\% |  | Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield | 3.6\% |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of $6 / 30 / 16$ <br> Total Debt $\$ 1223.8$ mill. Due in 5 Yrs $\$ 321.9$ mill. LT Debt $\$ 967.8$ mill. LT Interest $\$ 25.4$ mill. Incl. \$53.2 mill. capitalized leases. <br> (LT interest earned: 7.5x; total interest coverage: 7.5x) |  |  |  |  |  | 3299.6 | 3021.8 | 3816.2 | 2592.5 | 2639.3 | 3009.2 | 2248.9 | 3198.1 | 3738.1 | 2734.0 | 1880.9 | 350 | Revenues (\$mill) A | 2565 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 78.5 | 65.3 | 113.9 | 101.0 | 101.8 | 106.5 | 112.4 | 113.7 | 176.9 | 153.7 | 138.1 | 150 | Net Profit (\$mill) | 180 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 38.9\% | 38.8\% | 37.8\% | 27.1\% | 41.4\% | 30.2\% | 7.1\% | 25.4\% | 30.2\% | 26.3\% | 32.0\% | 32.0\% | Income Tax Rate | 32.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 2.4\% | 2.2\% | 3.0\% | 3.9\% | 3.9\% | 3.5\% | 5.0\% | 3.6\% | 4.7\% | 5.6\% | 7.3\% | 6.4\% | Net Profit Margin | 7.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 34.8\% | 37.3\% | 38.5\% | 39.8\% | 37.2\% | 35.5\% | 39.2\% | 36.6\% | 38.2\% | 43.2\% | 43.0\% | 43.0\% | Long-Term Debt Ratio | 40.5\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 65.2\% | 62.7\% | 61.5\% | 60.2\% | 62.8\% | 64.5\% | 60.8\% | 63.4\% | 61.8\% | 56.8\% | 57.0\% | 57.0\% | Common Equity Ratio | 59.5\% |
| Oblig. \$394.4 mill. |  |  |  |  |  | 95 | 1028.0 | 1182.1 | 1144.8 | 1154.4 | 1203.1 | 1339.0 | 1400.3 | 1564.4 | 1950.6 | 2085 | 2200 | Total Capital (\$mill) | 2495 |
| Pfd Stock None |  |  |  |  |  | 934.9 | 970.9 | 1017.3 | 1064.4 | 1135.7 | 1295.9 | 1484.9 | 1643.1 | 1884.1 | 2128.3 | 2170 | 2215 | Net Plant (\$mill) | 2350 |
| Common Stock 86,150,280 shs. |  |  |  |  |  | 9.6\% | 7.7\% | 10.7\% | 9.7 | 9.7\% | 9.7\% | 9.2\% | 9.0\% | 12.1\% | 8.6\% | 7.5\% | 8.0\% | Return on Total Cap'l | 8.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 12.6\% | 10.1\% | 15.7\% | 14.6\% | 14.0\% | 13.7\% | 13.8\% | 12.8\% | 18.3\% | 13.9\% | 11.6\% | 12.0\% | Return on Shr. Equity | 12.0\% |
| MARKET CAP: \$2.9 billion (Mid Cap) |  |  |  |  |  | 12.6\% | 10.1\% | 15.7\% | 14.6\% | 14.0\% | 13.7\% | 13.8\% | 12.8\% | 18.3\% | 13.9\% | 11.6\% | 12.0\% | Return on Com Equity | 12.0\% |
| CURRENT POSITION 2014 2015 6/30/16 <br> (\$MILL.).) 2.2 4.9 94.8 <br> Cash Assets 2.5 53.6 50 |  |  |  |  |  | 6.3\% | 3.6\% | 9.5\% | 7.2\% | 6.7\% | 6.2\% | 6.2\% | 5.2\% | 11.0\% | 6.8\% | 4.6\% | 5.0\% | Retained to Com Eq | 6.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 50\% | 64\% | 40\% | 50\% | 52\% | 55\% | 55\% | 59\% | 40\% | 50\% | 61\% | 58\% | All Div'ds to Net Prof | 50\% |


| (\$MILL.) | , | - |  | 50\% | 64\% | 40\% | 50\% | 52\% | 55\% | 55\% | 59\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Other | 680.5 | 539.6 | 509.9 |  | N |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current Assets | 682.7 | 544.5 | 604.7 |  | ail/ |  |  |  |  |  |  |


| Current Assets | 682.7 | 544.5 | 604.7 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Accts Payable | 330.3 | 273.2 | 216.0 |
| Debt Due | 335.5 | 77.5 | 256.0 |
| Other | 125.3 | 85.4 | 129.5 |
| Current Liab. | 791.1 | 436.1 | 601.5 |
| Fix. Chg. Cov. | 1007\% | 750\% | 750\% |
| ANNUAL RATES | Past | Past Est' | d '13-'15 |
| of change (per sh) | 10 Yrs . | 5 Yrs. | '19-'21 |
| Revenues | 1.5\% | 1.0\% | 4.0\% |
| "Cash Flow" | 6.5\% | 7.5\% | 3.0\% |
| Earnings | 7.5\% | 6.5\% | 3.0\% |
| Dividends | 7.0\% | 7.0\% | 3.5\% |
| Book Value | 8.0\% | 6.5\% | 7.0\% | providing retail/wholesale energy svcs. to customers in New Jersey, and in states from the Gulf Coast to New England, and Canada. New Jersey Natural Gas had about 512,300 customers at 9/30/15 in Monmouth and Ocean counties, and other N.J. counties. Fiscal 2015 volume: 341 bill. cu. ft. (14\% interruptible, 21\% residential and

New Jersey Resources faced a difficult operating environment in fiscal 2016 (ended September 30th). Indeed, the company posted a downturn in both revenues and earnings this past year. What's more, since our September review, the stock has registered a modest 5\% pullback, likely as a reflection of the slowdown in the retail/wholesale energy business. Revenues declined more than $30 \%$ on a year-over-year basis, to $\$ 1.88$ billion. This largely stemmed from the warmer-than-normal weather patterns that existed across NJ R's service territory. This trend was further exacerbated by the falloff of natural gas and commodity prices when compared to 2015's levels. Despite these challenges, the New J ersey Natural Gas (NJ NG), regulated utility business added 8,170 new customer accounts in 2016. A bit more than $55 \%$ of those came from new construction. Still, on the profitability front, the sharp downturn in volumes weighed on both fixed- and variable-cost absorption. In fact, operating expenses ticked 20 basis points higher, when viewed as a percentage of the top line. Combined, these factors equated to an earnings re-
commercial and electric utility, $65 \%$ incentive programs). N.J. Natural Energy subsidiary provides unregulated retail/wholesale natural gas and related energy svcs. 2015 dep. rate: $2.5 \%$. Has 991 empls. Off./dir. own about $1.4 \%$ of common ( $12 / 15$ Proxy). Chrmn., CEO \& Pres.: Laurence M. Downes. Inc.: NJ Addr.: 1415 Wyckoff Road, Wall, NJ 07719. Tel.: 732-938-1480. Web: www.niresources.com.

## duction of almost $10 \%$, to $\$ 1.61$ per share.

 This was in line with our expectation.That said, we have adjusted our outlook for this year. The company appears poised to log a rebound in revenues of about $25 \%$, to $\$ 2.35$ billion, due primarily to new NJ NG customer accounts. Management estimates roughly $24,000-27,000$ accounts will be added between fiscal 2017 and 2019. Elsewhere, the regulated utility division received approval of a rate reduction as well as a bill credit, that will have a net impact on the typical residential heating customer lowering a bill about 2\% annually. This helps to put rates more in line with the current natural gas pricing environment. Finally, we have trimmed a nickel off our 2017 share-net estimate, to $\$ 1.75$, placing it near the top end of management's recently issued guidance range of $\$ 1.65-\$ 1.75$. This would represent an annual increase of almost $9 \%$.

## We think most investors' funds could

 be better utilized elsewhere. Neutrally ranked NJR is lacking upside potential based on our projections. And the dividend yield is a bit light for a utility.Bryan J. Fong
December 2, 2016

## A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30th <br> B) Diluted earnings. Qtly egs may not sum to otal due to change in shares outstanding. Nex

 earnings report due late Jan.(C) Dividends historically paid in early Jan.., $\quad \begin{aligned} & \text { million, \$4.82/share. } \\ & \text { (E) }\end{aligned}$

April, July, and October. 1Q '13 div'd paid in
million, \$4.82/share.
(E) In millions, adjusted for splits.
(D) Dividend reinvestment plan available.
(D) Includes regulatory assets in 2015: $\$ 410.2$

Company's Financial Strength Stock's Price Stability Price Growth Persistence Earnings Predictability
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| N.W. NATH GAS NYSE-NWN |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RECENT } \\ & \text { PRICE } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\left.\begin{array}{l} \text { PEE } \\ \text { RATIO 26,3 (Trailing: } 26.5 \\ \text { Median: } 18.0 \end{array}\right)$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RELATIVE } \\ & \text { PIE RATIO } 1.38 \\ & \hline 108 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $3.2 \%$ |  | VALUE LINE |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TIMELINESS $\mathbf{3}$ Lowered 8/12/16 <br> SAFETY $\mathbf{1}$ Raised 3/18805 <br> TECHNICAL 2 Raised 12/2/16 <br> BETA $.65 \quad(1.00=$ Market) |  |  |  | High: Low: | 39.6 32.4 | 43.7 32.8 | 52.8 39.8 | 55.2 37.7 | $\begin{aligned} & 46.5 \\ & 37.7 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{l\|} \hline 50.9 \\ 41.1 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 49.0 \\ & 39.6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 50.8 \\ & 41.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 46.6 \\ & 40.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 52.6 \\ & 40.1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 52.3 \\ & 42.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1 \\ & 66.2 \\ & 48.9 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \text { Target Pric } \\ 2019 \mid 202 \end{array}$ | Range $2021$ |
|  |  |  |  | LEGENDS <br> L $1.10 \times$ Dividends $p$ sh divided by Interest Rate $\ldots$ Relative Price Strength Options: Yes Shaded area $\qquad$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 120 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 100 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 80 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 64 |
|  | 9-21 PR | OJECTIO |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }_{\text {II }} \mathrm{IN}^{\circ}$ |  |  |  |  |
|  | - |  | n'l Total |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 的 |  | , |  |  |  |  |  | ,11" |  |  |  |  | 48 |
|  |  | - | Return |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | . |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { High } \\ & \text { Low } \end{aligned}$ |  | 5\%) |  |  |  | $\cdots$ | \%** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 24 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 16 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 12 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Institutional Decisions |  |  |  | Percen shares |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | , |  |
|  | 402015 | 102016 | 202016 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | STOCK |  |
| to Buy | 81 | 98 | 118 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{lr}27.3 & 6.4 \\ 51.8 & 15.7\end{array}$ |  |
| to Sell Hld H000) | 65 16813 | 65 15946 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | \||1/! |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{ll} 51.8 & 15.7 \\ 51.2 & 76.0 \end{array}$ |  |
| 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | $\bigcirc$ © VAL | JE LINE PUB. LLC | 19-21 |
| 21.09 | 25.78 | 25.07 | 23.57 | 25.69 | 33.01 | 37.20 | 39.13 | 39.16 | 38.17 | 30.56 | 31.72 | 27.14 | 28.02 | 27.64 | 26.39 | 23.45 | 25.15 | Reven | s per sh | 28.90 |
| 3.68 | 3.86 | 3.65 | 3.85 | 3.92 | 4.34 | 4.76 | 5.41 | 5.31 | 5.20 | 5.18 | 5.00 | 4.94 | 5.04 | 5.05 | 4.91 | 4.50 | 4.85 | "Cash | low" per sh | 6.05 |
| 1.79 | 1.88 | 1.62 | 1.76 | 1.86 | 2.11 | 2.35 | 2.76 | 2.57 | 2.83 | 2.73 | 2.39 | 2.22 | 2.24 | 2.16 | 1.96 | 2.15 | 2.35 | Earnin | per sh A | 3.15 |
| 1.24 | 1.25 | 1.26 | 1.27 | 1.30 | 1.32 | 1.39 | 1.44 | 1.52 | 1.60 | 1.68 | 1.75 | 1.79 | 1.83 | 1.85 | 1.86 | 1.87 | 1.88 | Div'ds | ecl'd per sh Bn | 2.05 |
| 3.46 | 3.23 | 3.11 | 4.90 | 5.52 | 3.48 | 3.56 | 4.48 | 3.92 | 5.09 | 9.35 | 3.76 | 4.91 | 5.13 | 4.40 | 4.37 | 4.50 | 6.20 | Cap'I | ending per sh | 6.35 |
| 17.93 | 18.56 | 18.88 | 19.52 | 20.64 | 21.28 | 22.01 | 22.52 | 23.71 | 24.88 | 26.08 | 26.70 | 27.23 | 27.77 | 28.12 | 28.47 | 27.40 | 28.40 | Book | lue per sh D | 30.55 |
| 25.23 | 25.23 | 25.59 | 25.94 | 27.55 | 27.58 | 27.24 | 26.41 | 26.50 | 26.53 | 26.58 | 26.76 | 26.92 | 27.08 | 27.28 | 27.43 | 29.00 | 29.00 | Comm | Shs Outst'g ${ }^{\text {C }}$ | 28.00 |
| 12.4 | 12.9 | 17.2 | 15.8 | 16.7 | 17.0 | 15.9 | 16.7 | 18.1 | 15.2 | 17.0 | 19.0 | 21.1 | 19.4 | 20.7 | 23.7 | Bold figur | res are | Avg | 'I P/E Ratio | 17.0 |
| . 81 | . 66 | . 94 | . 90 | . 88 | . 91 | . 86 | . 89 | 1.09 | 1.01 | 1.08 | 1.19 | 1.34 | 1.09 | 1.09 | 1.19 |  |  | Relativ | P/E Ratio | 1.05 |
| 5.6\% | 5.1\% | 4.5\% | 4.6\% | 4.2\% | 3.7\% | 3.7\% | 3.1\% | 3.3\% | 3.7\% | 3.6\% | 3.9\% | 3.8\% | 4.2\% | 4.1\% | 4.0\% | estima |  | Avg An | 'I Div'd Yield | 3.7\% |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 9/30/16 Total Debt $\$ 790.1$ mill. Due in 5 Yrs $\$ 360.0$ mill. LT Debt $\$ 530.2$ mill. LT Interest $\$ 45.0$ mill. |  |  |  |  |  | 1013.2 | 1033.2 | 1037.9 | 1012.7 | 812.1 | 848.8 | 730.6 | 758.5 | 754.0 | 723.8 | 680 | 730 | Rev | (\$mill) | 865 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 65.2 | 74.5 | 68.5 | 75.1 | 72.7 | 63.9 | 59.9 | 60.5 | 58.7 | 53.7 | 62.0 | 68.0 | Net Protis | it (\$mill) | 86.0 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 36.3\% | 37.2\% | 36.9\% | 38.3\% | 40.5\% | 40.4\% | 42.4\% | 40.8\% | 41.5\% | 40.0\% | 35.0\% | 35.0\% | Incom | Tax Rate | 35.0\% |
| (Total interest coverage: 3.5 x ) |  |  |  |  |  | 6.4\% | 7.2\% | 6.6\% | 7.4\% | 8.9\% | 7.5\% | 8.2\% | 8.0\% | 7.8\% | 7.4\% | 9.2\% | 9.3\% | Net Pro | it Margin | 10.9\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 46.3\% | 46.3\% | 44.9\% | 47.7\% | 46.1\% | 47.3\% | 48.5\% | 47.6\% | 44.8\% | 42.5\% | 43.0\% | 43.0\% | Long-T | m Debt Ratio | 43.0\% |
| Pension Assets-12/15 \$249.4 mill. <br> Oblig. $\$ 445.6$ mill. |  |  |  |  |  | 53.7\% | 53.7\% | 55.1\% | 52.3\% | 53.9\% | 52.7\% | 51.5\% | 52.4\% | 55.2\% | 57.5\% | 57.0\% | 57.0\% | Comm | Equity Ratio | 57.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 1116.5 | 1106.8 | 1140.4 | 1261.8 | 1284.8 | 1356.2 | 1424.7 | 1433.6 | 1389.0 | 1357.7 | 1390 | 1445 | Total C | pital (\$mill) | 1605 |
| Pfd Stock None |  |  |  |  |  | 1425.1 | 1495.9 | 1549.1 | 1670.1 | 1854.2 | 1893.9 | 1973.6 | 2062.9 | 2121.6 | 2182.7 | 2270 | 2360 | Net Pla | (\$mill) | 2655 |
| Common Stock 27,557,756 shares as of 10/21/16 |  |  |  |  |  | 7.1\% | 8.5\% | 7.7\% | 7.3\% | 7.0\% | 6.2\% | 5.7\% | 5.8\% | 5.8\% | 5.5\% | 5.5\% | 6.0\% | Return | on Total Cap'l | 7.5\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 10.9\% | 12.5\% | 10.9\% | 11.4\% | 10.5\% | 8.9\% | 8.2\% | 8.1\% | 7.6\% | 6.9\% | 8.0\% | 8.0\% | Return | Shr. Equity | 10.5\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 10.9\% | 12.5\% | 10.9\% | 11.4\% | 10.5\% | 8.9\% | 8.2\% | 8.1\% | 7.6\% | 6.9\% | 8.0\% | 8.0\% | Return | on Com Equity | 10.5\% |
| MARKET CAP $\$ 1.6$ billion (Mid Cap) |  |  |  |  |  | 4.5\% | 6.0\% | 4.5\% | 5.0\% | 4.0\% | 2.4\% | 1.6\% | 1.5\% | 1.1\% | 6\% | 1.0\% | 1.5\% | Retain | to Com Eq | 3.5\% |
| CURRENT POSITION |  |  | $2014$ | 2015 | 9/30/16 | 59\% | 52\% | 59\% | 56\% | 61\% | 73\% | 80\% | 81\% | 85\% | 92\% | 87\% | 80\% | All Div | s to Net Prof | 65\% |


| CURRENT POSITI (\$MILL.) | ION 2014 | 2015 | 9/30/16 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cash Assets | 9.5 | 4.2 | 6.2 |
| Other | 353.1 | 327.9 | 204.4 |
| Current Assets | 362.6 | 332.1 | 210.6 |
| Accts Payable | 91.4 | 73.2 | 55.9 |
| Debt Due | 274.7 | 295.0 | 259.9 |
| Other | 103.3 | 109.5 | 86.9 |
| Current Liab. | 469.4 | 477.7 | 402.7 |
| Fix. Chg. Cov. | 321\% | 300\% | 350\% |
| ANNUAL RATES | Past | Past E | '13-'15 |
| of change (per sh) | 10 Yrs. | 5 Yrs. | to '19.'21 |
| Revenues | -- | -5.5\% | 1.0\% |
| "Cash Flow" | 2.0\% | -1.0\% | 3.0\% |
| Earnings | 1.0\% | -5.0\% | 7.0\% |
| Dividends | 3.5\% | 3.0\% | 2.0\% |
| Book Value | 3.0\% | 2.5\% | 1.5\% |


| Calendar | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) <br> Mar. 31 Jun. 30 Sep. 30 Dec. 31 |  |  |  | Full Year |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2013 | 277.9 | 131.7 | 88.2 | 260.7 | 758.5 |
| 2014 | 293.4 | 133.1 | 87.2 | 240.3 | 754.0 |
| 2015 | 261.7 | 138.3 | 93.1 | 230.7 | 723.8 |
| 2016 | 255.5 | 99.2 | 87.7 | 237.6 | 680 |
| 2017 | 255 | 130 | 95.0 | 250 | 730 |
| Cal- endar | EARNINGS PER SHARE A |  |  |  | Full Year |
| 2013 | 1.40 | . 08 | d. 31 | 1.07 | 2.24 |
| 2014 | 1.40 | . 04 | d. 32 | 1.04 | 2.16 |
| 2015 | 1.04 | . 08 | d. 24 | 1.08 | 1.96 |
| 2016 | 1.33 | . 07 | d. 29 | 1.04 | 2.15 |
| 2017 | 1.35 | . 10 | d. 25 | 1.15 | 2.35 |
| Cal- | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID B - |  |  |  | Full |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2012 | . 445 | . 445 | . 445 | . 455 | 1.79 |
| 2013 | . 455 | . 455 | . 455 | . 460 | 1.83 |
| 2014 | . 460 | . 460 | . 460 | . 465 | 1.85 |
| 2015 | . 465 | . 465 | . 465 | . 4675 | 1.86 |
| 2016 | . 4675 | . 4675 | . 4675 | . 470 |  |

BUSINESS: Northwest Natural Gas Co. distributes natural gas to 90 communities, 704,000 customers, in Oregon ( $89 \%$ of customers) and in southwest Washington state. Principal cities served: Portland and Eugene, OR; Vancouver, WA. Service area population: 2.5 mill. ( $77 \%$ in OR). Company buys gas supply from Canadian and U.S. producers; has transportation rights on Northwest Pipeline system.
Northwest Natural Gas reported lackluster third-quarter results. Revenues fell 6\% year over year, hurt by lower commodity prices. Still, the company had better gross profits, aided by stronger gas storage results. Operating expenses increased during the quarter, while bottomline results were hurt by a $\$ 1.2$ million environmental remediation charge. This caused losses to expand to $\$ 0.29$ a share. Still, cooler weather is expected in the fourth quarter, which should help drive revenues higher. We have lowered our 2016 full-year estimate by a nickel to $\$ 2.15$ a share.
Near-term results should benefit from improvements in the Portland market. Unemployment there has continued to drop, and construction in the area continues to be strong, as building permits were up $20 \%$ year over year. Too, the company should continue to benefit from decent conversion efforts, which ought to drive usage growth. These efforts will likely allow for better earnings in 2017.
Meanwhile, the Mist expansion plant has received its notice to proceed
from Portland General Electric. This

Owns local underground storage. Rev. breakdown: residential, $35 \%$; commercial, $22 \%$; industrial, gas transportation, and other, $43 \%$. Employs 1,092 . BlackRock Inc. owns $10.0 \%$ of shares; officers and directors, $2.1 \%$ (4/16 proxy). CEO: Gregg S. Kantor. Inc. Oregon. Address: 220 NW 2nd Ave., Portland, OR 97209. Telephone: 503-226-4211. Internet: www.nwnatural.com
project will provide up to 120 million cubic feet of gas per day through a 13-mile pipeline, and will cost around $\$ 128$ million. The company has already started to raise the funds required through equity sales, as it will sell up to 1.01 million shares, largely paying for the early buildout of the system. The facility is on track to be in service by the winter of 2018-2019, and will allow for a sizable bump in earnings.
The company raised its quarterly dividend to $\$ 0.47$ a share (up 1\%). This marks the 61st annual increase for the dividend aristocrat. The yield remains average for a utility, and will likely grow at modest rates until the Mist facility comes on line. Too, higher market interest rates are expected, which should decrease the appeal of the slow-growing dividend.
Shares of Northwest Natural Gas do not hold much appeal at the recent quotation. They are trading within our long-term Target Price Range, and the yield does not stand out among utilities. Long-term accounts would be best served waiting for a dip in price. J ohn E. Seibert III

[^29]
## Company's Financial Strengt <br> Stock's Price Stability <br> Price Growth Persistence

Earnings Predictability

|  |
| :---: |
|  |  |


| TIMELINESS $\mathbf{2}$ Lowered $10 / 28 / 16$ <br> SAFETY $\mathbf{2}$ Lowered $11 / 9191$ <br> TECHNICAL 3 Lowered $11 / 181 / 16$ <br> BETA 80 (1.00 $=$ Market) |  |  |  | High: Low: | $\begin{aligned} & 16.2 \\ & 12.5 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 17.1 \\ & 12.8 \end{aligned}$ | 20.6 15.6 | $\begin{aligned} & 20.3 \\ & 12.6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 20.4 \\ & 16.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 17.1 \\ & 18.6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 29.0 \\ & 21.4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 29.0 \\ & 22.9 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 31.1 \\ & 25.3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 30.6 \\ & 25.9 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 30.4 \\ & 21.2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1 \\ & 32.9 \\ & 22.1 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | Target Price 2019 | Range |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | LEGENDS$0.80 \times$ Dividends $p$ shdivided by Interest Rate$\ldots .$. Relative Price Strength |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2021 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 80 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 60 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019-21 PROJECTIONS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 2 \text {-for- } 1 \text { split } 5 / 15 \\ & \text { Options: Yes } \\ & \text { Shaded area indicates recession } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 40 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 30 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 詸 |  |  |  | 25 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 20 |
| Insider Decisions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | I | $1{ }^{1+1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 15 |
|  | J F M | $\begin{array}{cccc}\text { A M J } \\ 0 & \text { J }\end{array}$ | J A A |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 10 |
| ${ }^{10}$ | 909 | 001 | 0 00 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -7.5 |
| to Sell | 001 | 100 | $0 \quad 0 \quad 0$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | \% TOT. RETURN 10/16 |  |  |
| Institutional Decisions |  |  |  | Percen shares traded | $\begin{array}{r} 15 \\ 0 \\ 10 \\ \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  |  | 11 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 402015 | 102016 | 202016 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| to Buy to Sell | $\begin{array}{r} 105 \\ 72 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 109 \\ 77 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 129 \\ 61 \end{array}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hld's(00) | 43333 | 46585 | 56193 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5 yr . | $25.4 \quad 76.0$ |  |
| 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |  | $2005$ |  | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | © VALUE LINE PUB. LLC 19-21 |  |  |
| 11.22 | 17.65 | 10.35 | 13.17 | 14.75 | 15.89 | 15.88 | 16.15 | 16.18 | 14.19 | 15.48 | 13.71 | 11.16 | 11.18 | 12.98 | 13.52 | 12.40 | 12.80 | Revenu | ser sh | 15.10 |
| . 97 | . 95 | 1.06 | 1.12 | 1.22 | 1.25 | 1.75 | 1.60 | 1.74 | 1.86 | 2.10 | 2.23 | 2.34 | 2.48 | 2.67 | 2.42 | 2.45 | 2.55 | "Cash | ow" per sh | 2.95 |
| . 54 | . 57 | . 61 | . 68 | . 79 | . 86 | 1.23 | 1.05 | 1.14 | 1.19 | 1.35 | 1.45 | 1.52 | 1.52 | 1.57 | 1.44 | 1.45 | 1.50 | Earning | per sh A | 1.80 |
| . 37 | . 37 | . 38 | . 39 | . 41 | . 43 | . 46 | . 51 | . 56 | . 61 | . 68 | . 75 | . 83 | . 90 | . 96 | 1.02 | 1.06 | 1.10 | Div'ds | Decl'd per sh ${ }^{\text {B }}$ - | 1.30 |
| 1.11 | 1.41 | 1.74 | 1.18 | 1.34 | 1.60 | 1.26 | . 94 | 1.04 | 1.83 | 2.79 | 3.20 | 4.01 | 4.84 | 5.01 | 4.87 | 3.25 | 3.90 | Cap'I Sp | ending per sh | 5.10 |
| 3.62 | 3.91 | 4.84 | 5.63 | 6.20 | 6.75 | 7.55 | 8.12 | 8.67 | 9.12 | 9.54 | 10.33 | 11.63 | 12.64 | 13.65 | 14.62 | 16.90 | 18.30 | Book Va | lue per sh ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 21.50 |
| 46.00 | 47.44 | 48.83 | 52.92 | 55.52 | 57.96 | 58.65 | 59.22 | 59.46 | 59.59 | 59.75 | 60.43 | 63.31 | 65.43 | 68.33 | 70.97 | 80.00 | 82.00 | Commo | Shs Outst'g ${ }^{\text {D }}$ | 86.00 |
| 13.0 | 13.6 | 13.5 | 13.3 | 14.1 | 16.6 | 11.9 | 17.2 | 15.9 | 15.0 | 16.8 | 18.4 | 16.9 | 18.9 | 18.0 | 17.9 | Bold fig | ures are | Avg A | 'I P/E Ratio | 16.0 |
| . 85 | . 70 | . 74 | . 76 | . 74 | . 88 | . 64 | . 91 | . 96 | 1.00 | 1.07 | 1.15 | 1.08 | 1.06 | . 95 | . 90 |  |  | Relative | P/E Ratio | 1.00 |
| 5.2\% | 4.7\% | 4.6\% | 4.3\% | 3.7\% | 3.0\% | 3.2\% | 2.8\% | 3.1\% | 3.4\% | 3.0\% | 2.8\% | 3.2\% | 3.1\% | 3.4\% | 3.9\% |  |  | Avg Ann | 'I Div'd Yield | 4.5\% |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 9/30/16 Total Debt $\$ 1270.8$ mill. Due in 5 Yrs $\$ 1140$ mill. LT Debt $\$ 808.7$ mill. LT Interest $\$ 25.0$ mill. (Total interest coverage: 6.1x) |  |  |  |  |  | 931.4 | 956.4 | 962.0 | 845.4 | 925.1 | 828.6 | 706.3 | 731.4 | 887.0 | 959.6 | 990 | 1050 | Rev | (\$mill) | 1300 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 72.0 | 61.8 | 67.7 | 71.3 | 81.0 | 87.0 | 93.3 | 97.1 | 104.0 | 99.0 | 110 | 120 | Net Pro | it (\$mill) | 150 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 41.3\% | 41.9\% | 47.7\% | 23.0\% | 15.2\% | 22.4\% | 10.8\% |  | 10.8\% | 5.9\% | 25.0\% | 25.0\% | Income | Tax Rate | 25.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 7.7\% | 6.5\% | 7.0\% | 8.4\% | 8.8\% | 10.5\% | 13.2\% | 13.3\% | 11.7\% | 10.3\% | 11.1\% | 11.4\% | Net Pro | t Margin | 11.5\% |
| Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals $\$ .8$ mill. |  |  |  |  |  | 44.7\% | 42.7\% | 39.2\% | 36.5\% | 37.4\% | 40.5\% | 45.0\% | 45.1\% | 48.0\% | 49.2\% | 41.5\% | 42.5\% | Long-Te | m Debt Ratio | 45.0\% |
| Pension Assets-12/15 \$184.8 mill. <br> Oblig. $\$ 254.2$ mill. |  |  |  |  |  | 55.3\% | 57.3\% | 60.8\% | 63.5\% | 62.6\% | 59.5\% | 55.0\% | 54.9\% | 52.0\% | 50.8\% | 58.5\% | 57.5\% | Commo | Equity Ratio | 55.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 801.1 | 839.0 | 848.0 | 856.4 | 910.1 | 1048.3 | 1337.6 | 1507.4 | 1791.9 | 2043.9 | 2300 | 2600 | Total Ca | pital (\$mill) | 3350 |
| Pfd Stock None |  |  |  |  |  | 920.0 | 948.9 | 982.6 | 1073.1 | 1193.3 | 1352.4 | 1578.0 | 1859.1 | 2134.1 | 2448.1 | 2580 | 2700 | Net Plan | (\$mill) | 3000 |
| Common Stock 79,477,822 shs. as of $11 / 1 / 16$ |  |  |  |  |  | 10.1\% | 8.6\% | 8.9\% | 9.0\% | 9.5\% | 8.9\% | 7.4\% | 6.8\% | 6.4\% | 5.4\% | 5.5\% | 5.0\% | Return | n Total Cap'l | 5.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 16.3\% | 12.8\% | 13.1\% | 13.1\% | 14.2\% | 13.9\% | 12.7\% | 11.7\% | 11.2\% | 9.5\% | 8.0\% | 8.0\% | Return | Shr. Equity | 8.0\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 16.3\% | 12.8\% | 13.1\% | 13.1\% | 14.2\% | 13.9\% | 12.7\% | 11.7\% | 11.2\% | 9.5\% | 8.0\% | 8.0\% | Return | Com Equity | 8.0\% |
| MARKET CAP: \$2.6 billion (Mid Cap) |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 10.2 \% \\ 37 \% \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 6.7\% | 6.7\% | 6.4\% | 7.1\% | 6.7\% | 5.8\% | 4.8\% | 4.3\% | 2.8\% | 2.0\% | 2.0\% | Retaine | to Com Eq | 2.0\% |
| CURRENT POSITION |  |  | 2014 | 2015 | 9/30/16 |  | 48\% | 49\% | 51\% | 50\% | 52\% | 55\% | 59\% | 61\% | 71\% | 77\% | 75\% | All Div'd | s to Net Prof | 75\% |


| CURRENT POSITION | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ | $\mathbf{9 / 3 0 / 1 6}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| (\$MILL.) |  |  |  |


| $\begin{gathered} \text { Cal- } \\ \text { endar } \end{gathered}$ | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) |  |  |  | Full Year |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 |  |
| 2013 | 255.6 | 122.6 | 128.8 | 224.4 | 731.4 |
| 2014 | 350.2 | 133.3 | 122.4 | 281.1 | 887.0 |
| 2015 | 383.0 | 177.7 | 141.1 | 257.8 | 959.6 |
| 2016 | 333.0 | 154.4 | 219.1 | 283.5 | 990 |
| 2017 | 350 | 175 | 200 | 325 | 1050 |
| Calendar | EARNINGS PER SHARE A |  |  |  | FullYear |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 |  |
| 2013 | . 76 | . 16 | d. 02 | . 62 | 1.52 |
| 2014 | 1.01 | . 15 | d. 05 | . 47 | 1.57 |
| 2015 | . 86 | . 03 | d. 07 | . 62 | 1.44 |
| 2016 | . 80 | . 12 | . 05 | . 48 | 1.45 |
| 2017 | . 82 | . 12 | Nil | . 56 | 1.50 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Cal- } \\ & \text { endar } \end{aligned}$ | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID Bı |  |  |  | Full |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2012 | -- | . 202 | . 202 | . 423 | . 83 |
| 2013 | -- | . 222 | . 222 | . 458 | . 90 |
| 2014 | -- | . 237 | . 237 | . 488 | . 96 |
| 2015 | -- | . 251 | . 251 | . 515 | 1.02 |
| 2016 | -- | . 264 | . 264 | . 536 |  |

BUSINESS: South Jersey Industries, Inc. is a holding company. Its subsidiary, South Jersey Gas Co., distributes natural gas to 373,100 customers in New Jersey's southern counties. Gas revenue mix '15: residential, $45 \%$; commercial, $22 \%$; cogeneration and electric generation, 12\%; industrial, $21 \%$. Non-utility operations include: South Jersey Energy, South Jersey Resources Group, South
Shares of South J ersey Industries are trading near an all-time high price. The company posted impressive results for the September interim. This was largely due to performance at SJ Energy Services. This line benefited from strong production from its solar fleet and improved SREC (Solar Renewable Energy Credit) prices. A recovery related to the writedown of an energy facility and investment tax credits associated with solar project development also boosted results here. Both SJ Energy Group and utility South Jersey Gas reported lower operating losses for the period. The third quarter is traditionally weak for the utility.
South Jersey Gas has received regulatory approval to continue its Accelerated Infrastructure Replacement Program and to adjust rates to reflect prior investments. This allows the utility to invest up to $\$ 302.5$ million over the next five years to continue the accelerated replacement of aging bare steel and cast iron mains with plastic pipe, which is more durable. It will recover these investments though annual rate adjustments, the first of which will occur next October.

Jersey Exploration, Marina Energy, South Jersey Energy Service Plus, and SJI Midstream. Has about 720 employees. Off./dir. own less than $1 \%$ of common shares; BlackRock, Inc., 10.5\%; The Vanguard Group, Inc., $7.7 \%$ ( $3 / 16$ proxy). Pres. \& CEO: Michael J. Renna. Inc.: NJ. Address: 1 South Jersey Plaza, Folsom, NJ 08037. Tel.: 609-561-9000. Internet: www.sjindustries.com

South Jersey Gas is also to recover $\$ 74.5$ million in safety and reliability investments not previously reflected in rates through a base rate adjustment. In addition, the utility will issue customers a $\$ 10$ million credit, mainly due to lower-thanexpected wholesale gas costs.
We expect healthy operating improvement to late decade. The utility should further benefit from infrastructure investment and customer additions. Natural gas remains the fuel of choice within its service territory, and this business should continue to gain from customer conversions. Meanwhile, growth in the number of fuel management contracts augurs well for volumes and margins at SJ Energy Group. Elsewhere, SJ Energy Services should benefit from the healthy performance of its energy production assets.
This timely stock offers a good dividend yield. Moreover, South J ersey earns favorable marks for Safety, Financial Strength, Price Stability, and Earnings Predictability. But capital gains potential is underwhelming at this juncture, following a run-up in the share price.
Michaed Napoli, CFA December 2, 2016

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| TIMELIN | NESS 3 | Lowered 9 | /30/16 | High: Low: | $\begin{array}{r} 28.1 \\ 23.5 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r\|} \hline 39.4 \\ 26.0 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 39.9 \\ 26.5 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 33.3 \\ & 21.1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 29.5 \\ & 17.1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 37.3 \\ & 26.3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 43.2 \\ & 32.1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 46.1 \\ & 39.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 56.0 \\ & 42.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 64.2 \\ & 47.2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 63.7 \\ & 50.5 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 79.6 \\ & 53.5 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | Target Price | Range |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| SAFETY | Y 3 | Lowered 1 | $14 / 91$ | LEGE | S |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TECHN | AL 4 | Lowered |  |  | $0 \times$ Div | Rat |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 128 |
| TECH |  | Lowered |  |  | ditive Pric | Strength |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 96 |
| BETA 75 | 75 (1.00 = | Market) |  | Op |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 80 |
|  | 9-21 PRO | OJECTIO | NS |  |  | rece |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{\text {1, }}$ |  |  |  | 64 |
|  | Price | Ain An | n'1 Total |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{11,111}$ | I',1, |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Gain | Return |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 川"! |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 40 |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 80 \\ & 55 \end{aligned}$ | $(+5 \%)$ | 5\% |  |  |  |  |  |  | It | ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 32 |
| Insider | Decisi | ons |  |  |  |  |  | , |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 24 |
| toruy | J F M | A M J | J A S |  |  |  |  | . | -0.*. | - | ... |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| to Buy | 00 | 000 | 000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 16 |
|  | 82010 | $\begin{array}{lll}0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{llll}0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1\end{array}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 12 |
| to Sell | 009 | 035 | 01 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | RETURN 10/16 |  |
| Institut | tional D | Decision |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | THIS VLARITM |  |
|  | 402015 | 102016 | 202016 | Perc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{rr} \text { STOCK } & \text { INDEX } \\ 21.1 & 6.4 \end{array}$ |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 99 \\ & 87 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 108 \\ 85 \end{array}$ |  | shares |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 yr. $3 \mathrm{yr}$. | $\begin{array}{lr} 21.1 & 6.4 \\ 44.8 & 15.7 \end{array}$ |  |
| roldel Hid's Hooo) | 37256 | 37942 | 37855 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5 yr . | $110.0 \quad 76.0$ |  |
| 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |  | JE LINE PUB. LLC | 19-21 |
| 32.61 | 42.98 | 39.68 | 35.96 | 40.14 | 43.59 | 48.47 | 50.28 | 48.53 | 42.00 | 40.18 | 41.07 | 41.77 | 42.08 | 45.61 | 52.00 | 52.60 | 53.55 | Reven | sper sh | 61.55 |
| 4.57 | 4.79 | 5.07 | 5.11 | 5.57 | 5.20 | 5.97 | 6.21 | 5.76 | 6.16 | 6.46 | 6.81 | 7.73 | 8.24 | 8.47 | 8.62 | 9.25 | 10.10 | "Cash | ow" per sh | 12.30 |
| 1.21 | 1.15 | 1.16 | 1.13 | 1.66 | 1.25 | 1.98 | 1.95 | 1.39 | 1.94 | 2.27 | 2.43 | 2.86 | 3.11 | 3.01 | 2.92 | 3.20 | 3.50 | Earnin | per sh ${ }^{\text {A }}$ | 4.50 |
| . 82 | . 82 | . 82 | . 82 | . 82 | . 82 | . 82 | . 86 | . 90 | . 95 | 1.00 | 1.06 | 1.18 | 1.32 | 1.46 | 1.62 | 1.76 | 1.90 | Div'ds | ecl'd per sh ${ }^{\text {Bat }}+$ | 2.40 |
| 7.04 | 8.17 | 8.50 | 7.03 | 8.23 | 7.49 | 8.27 | 7.96 | 6.79 | 4.81 | 4.73 | 8.29 | 8.57 | 7.86 | 8.53 | 10.30 | 11.25 | 11.75 | Cap'IS | ending per sh | 13.10 |
| 16.82 | 17.27 | 17.91 | 18.42 | 19.18 | 19.10 | 21.58 | 22.98 | 23.49 | 24.44 | 25.62 | 26.66 | 28.35 | 30.47 | 31.95 | 33.61 | 34.90 | 36.20 | Book V | lue per sh | 40.40 |
| 31.71 | 32.49 | 33.29 | 34.23 | 36.79 | 39.33 | 41.77 | 42.81 | 44.19 | 45.09 | 45.56 | 45.96 | 46.15 | 46.36 | 46.52 | 47.38 | 48.00 | 49.00 | Comm | Shs Outstg ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 52.00 |
| 16.0 | 19.0 | 19.9 | 19.2 | 14.3 | 20.6 | 15.9 | 17.3 | 20.3 | 12.2 | 14.0 | 15.7 | 15.0 | 15.8 | 17.9 | 19.4 | Bold fig | re | Avg | 'I P/E Ratio | 15.0 |
| 1.04 | . 97 | 1.09 | 1.09 | . 76 | 1.10 | . 86 | . 92 | 1.22 | . 81 | 89 | . 98 | . 95 | . 89 | . 94 | . 98 |  |  | Relat | P/E Ratio | . 95 |
| 4.2\% | 3.8\% | 3.6\% | 3.8\% | 3.5\% | 3.2\% | 2.6\% | 2.6\% | 3.2\% | 4.0\% | 3.2\% | 2.8\% | 2.8\% | 2.7\% | 2.7\% | 2.9\% |  | ates | Avg An | 'I Div'd Yield | 3.6\% |
| CAPITA | L STRUC | CTURE as | s of 9/30 |  |  | 2024.7 | 2152.1 | 2144.7 | 1893.8 | 1830.4 | 1887.2 | 1927.8 | 1950.8 | 2121.7 | 2463.6 | 2525 | 2625 | Reve | (\$mill) | 3200 |
| Total De | ebt \$1642 | 2.4 mill. D | ue in 5 Y | rs \$525.0 | mill. | 80.5 | 83.2 | 61.0 | 87.5 | 103.9 | 112.3 | 133.3 | 145.3 | 141.1 | 138.3 | 155 | 175 | Net P | it (\$mill) | 240 |
| LT Debt | \$1592.9 | mill. LT | T Interes | t $\$ 72.0 \mathrm{~m}$ | ill. | 37.3\% | 36.5\% | 40.1\% | 34.0\% | 34.7\% | 36.2\% | 36.2\% | 35.0\% | 35.7\% | 36.4\% | 35.0\% | 35.0\% | Income | Tax Rate | 35.0\% |
| (Total int Leases, | terest co Uncapit | verage: 4 <br> talized An | .3x) <br> nnual ren | (49\% of tals $\$ 7.0$ | mill. | 4.0\% | 3.9\% | 2.8\% | 4.6\% | 5.7\% | 6.0\% | 6.9\% | 7.4\% | 6.7\% | 5.6\% | 6.1\% | 6.7\% | Net Pro | t Margin | 7.5\% |
| Pension | Assets- | -12/15 \$78 | 80.5 mill. |  |  | 60.6\% | 58.1\% | 55.3\% | 53.5\% | 49.1\% | 43.2\% | 49.2\% | 49.4\% | 52.4\% | 49.3\% | 49.0\% | 49.0\% | Long-T | $m$ Debt Ratio | 49.0\% |
|  |  |  | Oblig. | \$1117.4 | mill. | 39.4\% | 41.9\% | 44.7\% | 46.5\% | 50.9\% | 56.8\% | 50.8\% | 50.6\% | 47.6\% | 50.7\% | 51.0\% | 51.0\% | Comm | Equity Ratio | 51.0\% |
| Pfd Stoc | ck None |  |  |  |  | 2287.8 | 2349.7 | 2323.3 | 2371.4 | 2291.7 | 2155.9 | 2576.9 | 2793.7 | 3123.9 | 3143.5 | 3275 | 3475 | Total | pital (\$mill) | 4100 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 2668.1 | 2845.3 | 2983.3 | 3034.5 | 3072.4 | 3218.9 | 3343.8 | 3486.1 | 3658.4 | 3891.1 | 4080 | 4275 | Net Pla | (\$mill) | 4850 |
| Commo | n Stock | 47,482,06 |  |  |  | 5.5\% | 5.5\% | 4.5\% | 5.4\% | 6.1\% | 6.4\% | 6.4\% | 6.3\% | 5.7\% | 5.5\% | 6.0\% | 6.0\% | Retur | n Total Cap'l | 7.0\% |
| as of 10 | /28/16 |  |  |  |  | 8.9\% | 8.5\% | 5.9\% | 7.9\% | 8.9\% | 9.2\% | 10.2\% | 10.3\% | 9.5\% | 8.7\% | 9.5\% | 10.0\% | Return | Shr. Equity | 11.5\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 8.9\% | 8.5\% | 5.9\% | 7.9\% | 8.9\% | 9.2\% | 10.2\% | 10.3\% | 9.5\% | 8.7\% | 9.5\% | 10.0\% | Return | n Com Equity | 11.5\% |
| MARKE | T CAP: \$ | \$3.5 billio | n (Mid | ap) |  | 5.2\% | 4.8\% | 2.1\% | 4.1\% | 5.1\% | 5.3\% | 6.1\% | 6.1\% | 5.0\% | 4.0\% | 4.0\% | 4.5\% | Retaine | to Com Eq | 5.5\% |
| CURRE | NT POSI | TION | 2014 | 2015 | 9/30/16 | 42\% | 44\% | 63\% | 48\% | 43\% | 43\% | 40\% | 41\% | 47\% | 54\% | 55\% | 53\% | All Div' | s to Net Prof | 52\% |


| CURRENT POSITI (\$MILL.) | ION 2014 | 2015 | 9/30/16 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cash Assets | 39.6 | 36.0 | 85.2 |
| Other | 567.2 | 522.2 | 459.1 |
| Current Assets | 606.8 | 558.2 | 544.3 |
| Accts Payable | 168.0 | 164.9 | 138.8 |
| Debt Due | 24.2 | 37.5 | 49.5 |
| Other | 277.9 | 332.6 | 424.7 |
| Current Liab. | 470.1 | 535.0 | 613.0 |
| Fix. Chg. Cov. | 395\% | 401\% | 411\% |
| ANNUAL RATES | Past | Past Est | d '13-'15 |
| of change (per sh) | 10 Yrs. | 5 Yrs. | '19-'21 |
| Revenues | 1.5\% | 1.5\% | 5.0\% |
| "Cash Flow" | 5.0\% | 6.5\% | 6.5\% |
| Earnings | 8.5\% | 10.0\% | 7.0\% |
| Dividends | 6.0\% | 9.0\% | 8.5\% |
| Book Value | 5.5\% | 5.5\% | 4.0\% |


| $\begin{gathered} \text { Cal- } \\ \text { endar } \end{gathered}$ | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) ${ }^{\text {d }}$ |  |  |  | Full Year |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 |  |
| 2013 | 613.5 | 411.6 | 387.3 | 538.4 | 1950.8 |
| 2014 | 608.4 | 453.2 | 432.5 | 627.7 | 2121.7 |
| 2015 | 734.2 | 538.6 | 505.4 | 685.4 | 2463.6 |
| 2016 | 731.2 | 547.7 | 540.0 | 706.1 | 2525 |
| 2017 | 765 | 575 | 560 | 725 | 2625 |
| Cal- | EARNINGS PER SHARE A D |  |  |  | Full Year |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 |  |
| 2013 | 1.73 | . 22 | d. 06 | 1.22 | 3.11 |
| 2014 | 1.51 | . 21 | . 04 | 1.25 | 3.01 |
| 2015 | 1.53 | . 10 | d. 10 | 1.38 | 2.92 |
| 2016 | 1.58 | . 19 | . 05 | 1.38 | 3.20 |
| 2017 | 1.68 | . 22 | . 10 | 1.50 | 3.50 |
| Cal- | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ${ }^{\text {Bat }} \dagger$ |  |  |  | Full |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2012 | . 265 | . 295 | . 295 | . 295 | 1.15 |
| 2013 | . 295 | . 330 | . 330 | . 330 | 1.29 |
| 2014 | . 330 | . 365 | . 365 | . 365 | 1.43 |
| 2015 | . 365 | . 405 | . 405 | . 405 | 1.58 |
| 2016 | . 405 | . 450 | . 450 | . 450 |  |

[^31] historically paid early March, June, September,

## and December. - $\dagger$ Div'd reinvestment and stock purchase plan avail. (C) In millions. <br> (D) Totals may not sum due to rounding.

BUSINESS: Southwest Gas Corporation is a regulated gas distributor serving approximately 2.0 million customers in sections of Arizona, Nevada, and California. Comprised of two business segments: natural gas operations and construction services. 2015 margin mix: residential and small commercial, 85\%; large commercial and industrial, 4\%; transportation, 11\%. Total throughput: 2.1 billion
Shares of Southwest Gas have come off a high-water mark in recent months. The company reported favorable comparisons for the September quarter. The construction services segment, Centuri, benefited from additional pipe replacement work with existing customers, incremental work from awarded bid contracts, and growth in the customer base. Earnings of $\$ 14.9$ million here more than offset a net loss of $\$ 12.4$ million at the natural gas operation due to seasonal factors. Nevertheless, the utility reported a lower deficit, thanks to positive returns on company-owned life insurance policies. Performance here was also supported by rate relief and customer additions. Looking forward, we expect that earnings per share will match the prior-year figure for the December quarter. For the full year, we look for healthy bottom-line improvement for Southwest Gas, on modest topline gains.
Prospects appear favorable for the long term. The company's natural gas business ought to further benefit from customer growth, infrastructure tracker mechanisms, and expansion projects. Else
therms. Has 5,876 employees. Officers \& directors own 1.3\% of common stock; BlackRock Inc., $9.6 \%$; The Vanguard Group, Inc., 7.4\%; GAMCO Investors, Inc., 6.4\% (3/16 Proxy). Chairman: Michael J. Melarkey. Pres. \& CEO: John Hester. Inc.: CA. Address: 5241 Spring Mountain Road, Las Vegas, Nevada 89193. Tel.: 702-876-7237. Internet: www.swgas.com
where, Centuri should continue to report solid performance. This business operates in 20 major markets in the United States and two major markets in Canada. Fundamentals appear solid here, considering the need to replace aging infrastructure. Centuri has a strong base of large utility clients to sustain and grow its operation. Many of these are multiyear pipe replacement programs.
The stock does not stand out at this time. The equity is ranked to perform in line with the broader market for the coming six to 12 months. Moreover, appreciation potential is subpar, as the shares are trading well within our Target Price Range. Though we anticipate healthy growth for the company in the coming years, the issue is currently trading at a premium valuation. The dividend yield is nothing special for a utility, either. However, it's worth mentioning that Southwest Gas earns favorable marks for Price Stability, Growth Persistence, and Earnings Predictability. A pullback in the share price may present conservative investors with a better entry point.
Michaed Napoli, CFA December 2, 2016


| Cash Assets | $\begin{array}{r} 16.1 \\ 5888 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}13.8 \\ 516.3 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 85.2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Other |  |  | . 364.4 |
| Current Assets | 604.9 | 9530.1 | .1 569.6 |
| Accts Payable | 176.7 | 7146.5 | . 210.9 |
| Debt Due | 287.1 | 148.0 | . 648.7 |
| Other | 319.0 | - 289.3 | . 301.7 |
| Current Liab. | 782.8 | 853.8 | 1161.3 |
| Fix. Chg. Cov. | 360\% | - 365\% | \% 366\% |
| ANNUAL RATES | Past | Past Es | Est'd '14-'16 |
| of change (per sh) | 10 Yrs. | 5 Yrs. | 10'19.21 |
| Revenues | -6.5\% | -13.0\% | 6.5\% |
| "Cash Flow" | 5.5\% | 4.0\% | 9.5\% |
| Earnings | 3.5\% | 1.5\% | 9.0\% |
| Dividends | 3.0\% | 3.5\% | 3.5\% |
| Book Value | 7.5\% | 8.5\% | 4.5\% |


| Fiscal | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill. ${ }^{\text {A }}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Full } \\ \text { Fiscal } \\ \text { Year } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year Ends | Dec. 31 | Mar. 31 | JUS | Sep. 30 |  |
| 2013 | 307.0 | 397.6 | 165.3 | 147.1 | 1017.0 |
| 2014 | 468.6 | 694.5 | 241.8 | 222.3 | 1627.2 |
| 2015 | 619.6 | 877.4 | 275.2 | 204.2 | 1976.4 |
| 2016 | 399.4 | 609.3 | 249.3 | 279.3 | 1537.3 |
| 2017 | 475 | 775 | 250 | 400 | 1900 |
| Fiscal | EARN | NINGS PE | SHARE | ABF | Full |
| Year Ends | Dec. 31 | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Fiscal } \\ & \text { Year } \end{aligned}$ |
| 2013 | 1.14 | 1.34 | . 25 | d. 30 | 2.02 |
| 2014 | 1.09 | 1.59 | . 33 | d. 35 | 2.35 |
| 2015 | 1.09 | 2.18 | . 32 | d. 43 | 3.16 |
| 2016 | 1.08 | 2.31 | . 24 | d. 31 | 3.24 |
| 2017 | 1.20 | 2.30 | . 30 | d. 30 | 3.50 |
|  | QUART | ERLY DIVI | DENDS PA | AID C. | Full |
| enda | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2013 | . 425 | . 425 | . 425 | . 425 | 1.70 |
| 2014 | . 44 | . 44 | . 44 | . 44 | 1.76 |
| 2015 | . 46 | . 46 | . 46 | . 46 | 1.84 |
| 2016 | . 49 | . 49 | . 49 | . 49 |  |
| 2017 | 525 |  |  |  |  |

BUSINESS: Spire Inc., formerly known as the Laclede Group, Inc., is a holding company for natural gas utilities, which distributes natural gas across Missouri, including the cities of St. Louis and Kansas City. Has roughly 1.6 million customers. Acquired Missouri Gas 9/13, Alabama Gas Co 9/14. Utility therms sold and transported in fiscal 2016: 2.6 bill. Revenue mix for regulated operations: residen-
Spire Inc. reported mixed fiscal fourth-quarter results (ended September 30th). Revenues were kept in check by lower commodity prices, and 20\% warmer-than-usual weather during the period. But the total was supported by better gas marketing revenues and additional contributions from the MobileGas and Willmut Gas acquisitions. Overall, the company had better operational performance across the board, including strong results in its gas marketing division, which allowed for losses of $\$ 0.31$ a share.
Near-term results will be driven by regulatory outcomes. Spire has filed for infrastructure replacement surcharges on its Laclede and Missouri Gas subsidiaries, which would boost results if approved. Too, changes in the utility regulatory environment in Missouri may change ratemaking mechanisms. The company will file its next general rates cases in April, which could allow for better profitability. Those outcomes are uncertain, but we think the company will earn $\$ 3.50$ a share in fiscal 2017.
The integrations of Willmut Gas and MobileGas are occurring. Completion of
fial, 67\%; commercial and industrial, 23\%; transportation, 2\%; other, $8 \%$. Has around 3,078 employees. Officers and directors own $3.2 \%$ of common shares (1/16 proxy). Chairman: Edward Glotzbach; CEO: Suzanne Sitherwood. Inc.: Missouri. Address: 700 Market Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63101. Telephone: 314-3420500. Internet: www.thelacledegroup.com
the purchases boosted utility incomes in Alabama and Mississippi. This deal could be earnings accretive sooner than fiscal 2018 thanks to the early accord comple tion, and cost synergies are expected to emerge shortly.
The build out of the STL pipeline remains on track. An environmental assessment and route refinements are being nailed down in anticipation of the J anuary filing with FERC. This project should cost between $\$ 190$ million and $\$ 210$ million, and be put into service during fiscal 2019. As pipelines generally have higher allowable returns, we expect this would provide an ample boost to long-term results.
The company has raised the dividend 7\% to $\$ 0.525$ quarterly. This represents a decent bump in the payout, and should appeal to investors. This marks the 14th year in a row of dividend increases.
Shares of Spire Inc. do not stand out for Timeliness. Though they offer a decent yield and steady dividend growth, the shares offer little total return potential. Most investors would be best served waiting for a price dip.
J ohn E. Seibert III

[^32]
## LAC / MGE

Summary of Risk Premium Models for Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies

Proxy Group of

Seven Natural Gas
Companies
Predictive Risk
Premium Model
(PRPM) (1)
11.62 \%

Risk Premium Using
an Adjusted Total
Market Approach (2)

Average | 9.51 $\%$ |
| :---: |
|  |

Notes:
(1) From page 2 of this Schedule.
(2) From page 3 of this Schedule.

LAC / MGE
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies Indicated ROE
Derived by the Predictive Risk Pr -

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { [4] } \\
& \cdots \\
& \text { き }
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \begin{array}{l}
\text { Proxy Group of Seven Natural } \\
\text { Gas Companies } \\
\hline \text { Atmos Energy } \\
\text { Chesapeake Utilities } \\
\text { New Jersey Resources Corp. } \\
\text { Northwest Nat. Gas } \\
\text { South Jersey Industries, Inc. } \\
\text { Southwest Gas Holdings Inc } \\
\text { Spire Inc. }
\end{array}
\end{aligned}
$$

| Proxy Group of Seven Natural |
| :--- |
| Gas Companies |
| Atmos Energy |
| Chesapeake Utilities |
| New Jersey Resources Corp. |
| Northwest Nat. Gas |
| South Jersey Industries, Inc. |
| Southwest Gas Holdings Inc |
| Spire Inc. |

[7] $\left.\begin{array}{rrrr}\begin{array}{c}\text { Predicted } \\ \text { Risk } \\ \text { Premium (2) }\end{array} & & \begin{array}{c}\text { Risk-Free } \\ \text { Rate (3) }\end{array} & \end{array} \begin{array}{c}\text { Indicated } \\ \text { ROE (4) }\end{array}\right]$




$\mathfrak{\square}$
$\pm$
Average of Mean and Median
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Notes: } \\ \text { (1) } & \text { The Predictive Risk Premium Model uses historical data to generate a predicted variance and a GARCH } \\ \text { coefficient. The historical data used are the equity risk premiums for the first available trading month as } \\ & \text { reported by Bloomberg Professional Service. } \\ \text { (2) } & \left(1+(\text { Column }[3] * \text { Column }[4])^{\wedge 12}\right)-1 . \\ \text { (3) } & \text { From note } 2 \text { on page } 2 \text { of Schedule PMA-D5. } \\ \text { (4) } & \text { Column [5] + Column [6]. }\end{array}$

LAC / MGE<br>Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate<br>Through Use of a Risk Premium Model<br>Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

## Line No.

Proxy Group of
Seven Natural Gas
Companies

1. Prospective Yield on Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)
4.68 \%
2. Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds and A Rated Public Utility Bonds
3. Adjusted Prospective Yield on A Rated Public Utility Bonds
4. Equity Risk Premium (3)
5. Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate
4.89 \%
0.21 (2)
$4.89 \%$
4.62
$\xlongequal{9.51} \%$

Notes: (1) Consensus forecast of Moody's Aaa Rated Corporate bonds from Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (see pages 9-10 of this Schedule).
(2) The average yield spread of A rated public utility bonds over Aaa rated corporate bonds of $0.21 \%$ from page 4 of this Schedule.
(3) From page 7 of this Schedule.

## LAC / MGE

Interest Rates and Bond Spreads for Moody's Corporate and Public Utility Bonds

Selected Bond Yields
[1]
[2]
[3]


Selected Bond Spreads
A Rated Public Utility Bonds Over Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds:

$$
0.21 \%(1)
$$

Baa Rated Public Utility Bonds Over A Rated Public Utility Bonds:

$$
0.52 \%(2)
$$

Notes:
(1) Column [2] - Column [1].
(2) Column [3] - Column [2].

Source of Information:
Bloomberg Professional Service

LAC / MGE
Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies

| Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies | $\begin{gathered} \text { Long-Term } \\ \text { Issuer } \\ \text { Rating } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Numerical } \\ \text { Weighting }(1) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Long-Term Issuer Rating | Numerical <br> Weighting(1) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Atmos Energy Corporation | A2 | 6.0 | A | 6.0 |
| Chesapeake Utilities Corporation | NR | -- | NA | -- |
| New Jersey Resources Corporation (2) | Aa2 | 3.0 | A | 6.0 |
| Northwest Natural Gas Company | A3 | 7.0 | A+ | 5.0 |
| South Jersey Industries, Inc. (3) | A2 | 6.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc. (4) | A3 | 7.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Spire Inc. (5) | A1/A2 | -- | A- | 7.0 |
| Average | A2 | 5.8 | A- | 6.7 |

Notes:
(1) From page 6 of this Schedule.
(2) Ratings those of New Jersey Natural Gas Co.
(3) Ratings those of South Jersey Gas Co.
(4) Ratings those of Southwest Gas Corp.
(5) Ratings those of Alabama Gas Corp. and Laclede Gas Co.

| Source Information: | Moody's Investors Service <br> Standard \& Poor's Global Utilities Rating Service |
| :--- | :--- |

Numerical Assignment for
Moody's and Standard \& Poor's Bond Ratings

| Moody's Bond Rating | Numerical Bond Weighting | Standard \& Poor's Bond Rating |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aaa | 1 | AAA |
| Aa1 | 2 | AA+ |
| Aa2 | 3 | AA |
| Aa3 | 4 | AA- |
| A1 | 5 | A+ |
| A2 | 6 | A |
| A3 | 7 | A- |
| Baa1 | 8 | BBB+ |
| Baa2 | 9 | BBB |
| Baa3 | 10 | BBB- |
| Ba1 | 11 | BB+ |
| Ba2 | 12 | BB |
| Ba3 | 13 | BB- |
| B1 | 14 | B+ |
| B2 | 15 | B |
| B3 | 16 | B- |

## LAC / MGE

Judgment of Equity Risk Premium for Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies

Line
No.

1. Calculated equity risk premium based on the total market using the beta approach (1) $4.46 \%$
2. Mean equity risk premium based on a study using the holding period returns of public utilities with A rated bonds (2)
3. Predicted Equity Risk Premium based on Regression Analysis of 752 Fully-Litigated Natural Gas Utility Rate Cases (3)
4. Average equity risk premium
4.62 \%

Notes: (1) From page 8 of this Schedule.
(2) From page 11 of this Schedule.
(3) From page 12 of this Schedule.

LAC / MGE
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies

| Line No. | Equity Risk Premium Measure | Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1) | 5.52 \% |
| 2. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (2) | 6.38 |
| 3. | Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (3) | 7.40 |
| 4. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4) | 4.60 |
| 5. | Equity Risk Premium Based on S\&P 500 Companies(5) | 8.40 |
| 6. | Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium (6) | 6.46 \% |
| 7. | Adjusted Beta (7) | 0.69 |
| 8. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium | 4.46 \% |

Notes: (1) Based on the arithmetic mean historical monthly returns on large company common stocks from Ibbotson® SBBI® 2016 Market Report minus the arithmetic mean monthly yield of Moody's Aaa and Aa corporate bonds from 1928-2015. (11.68\%-6.16\% = 5.52\%).
(2) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is discussed in the accompanying direct testimony. The Ibbotson equity risk premium based on the PRPM is derived by applying the PRPM to the monthly risk premiums between Ibbotson large company common stock monthly returns minus the average Aaa and Aa corporate monthly bond yields, from January 1928 through January 2017.
(3) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to Moody's Aaa/Aa rated corporate bond yields from 1928-2015 referenced in Note 1 above.
(4) The equity risk premium based on the Value Line Summary and Index is derived from taking the projected 3-5 year total annual market return of 9.28\% (described fully in note 1 of Schedule PMA-D5) and subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of $4.68 \%$ (Shown on page 3 of this Schedule). ( $9.28 \%-4.68 \%=4.60 \%$ ).
(5) Using data from the Bloomberg Professional Service for the S\&P 500, an expected total return of $13.08 \%$ was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of $4.68 \%$ results in an expected equity risk premium of $8.40 \%$. $(13.08 \%-4.68 \%=8.40 \%)$.
(6) Average of lines 1 through 5.
(7) Average of mean and median beta from Schedule PMA-D5.

Sources of Information:
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - Ibbotson® SBBI® 2016 Market Report, Morningstar, Inc., 2016 Chicago, IL.
Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, February 1, 2017 and December 1, 2016
Bloomberg Professional Services

Consensus Forecasts Of U.S. Interest Rates And Key Assumptions ${ }^{1}$

Interest Rates
Federal Funds Rate
Prime Rate
LIBOR, 3-mo.
Commercial Paper, 1-mo.
Treasury bill, 3-mo.
Treasury bill, 6-mo.
Treasury bill, 1 yr.
Treasury note, 2 yr.
Treasury note, 5 yr.
Treasury note, 10 yr .
Treasury note, 30 yr .
Corporate Aaa bond
Corporate Baa bond
State \& Local bonds
Home mortgage rate

Key Assumptions
Major Currency Index
Real GDP
GDP Price Index
Consumer Price Index

| -----------------------------------History------------------------------------------ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly Avg. |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -------Average For Week Ending------ |  |  |  | ----Average For Month--- Latest Qtr |  |  |  | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2 Q |
| Jan. 20 | Jan. 13 | Jan. 6 | Dec. 31 | Dec | Nov | Oct | 4Q 2016* | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2018}$ | $\underline{2018}$ |
| 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.60 | 0.66 | 0.54 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.45 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 |
| 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 3.73 | 3.63 | 3.50 | 3.50 | 3.54 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.6 |
| 1.03 | 1.02 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 0.97 | 0.90 | 0.88 | 0.92 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 |
| 0.66 | 0.63 | 0.62 | 0.65 | 0.56 | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.47 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 |
| 0.53 | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.45 | 0.33 | 0.43 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
| 0.62 | 0.60 | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.58 | 0.47 | 0.56 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 |
| 0.82 | 0.82 | 0.86 | 0.87 | 0.86 | 0.74 | 0.66 | 0.75 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 |
| 1.21 | 1.20 | 1.21 | 1.24 | 1.19 | 0.98 | 0.84 | 1.00 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| 1.92 | 1.89 | 1.92 | 2.00 | 1.94 | 1.60 | 1.27 | 1.60 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
| 2.43 | 2.38 | 2.43 | 2.51 | 2.47 | 2.14 | 1.76 | 2.12 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.1 |
| 3.01 | 2.98 | 3.01 | 3.09 | 3.10 | 2.86 | 2.50 | 2.82 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
| 4.04 | 4.02 | 4.05 | 4.14 | 4.18 | 4.00 | 3.69 | 3.96 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.8 |
| 4.64 | 4.63 | 4.67 | 4.75 | 4.81 | 4.66 | 4.34 | 4.60 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.6 |
| 3.67 | 3.67 | 3.73 | 3.75 | 3.78 | 3.51 | 3.35 | 3.55 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.3 |
| 4.09 | 4.12 | 4.20 | 4.32 | 4.20 | 3.77 | 3.47 | 3.81 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.8 |
|  |  |  | -Histor |  |  |  |  |  | nsens | For | casts-Q | uarter |  |
| 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2 Q |
| $\underline{2015}$ | $\underline{2015}$ | $\underline{2015}$ | $\underline{2015}$ | $\underline{2016}$ | $\underline{2016}$ | $\underline{2016}$ | 2016* | $\underline{2017}$ | 2017 | 2017 | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2018}$ | 2018 |
| 89.4 | 89.9 | 91.8 | 93.1 | 93.3 | 89.6 | 90.3 | 93.7 | 94.8 | 95.3 | 95.6 | 95.7 | 95.5 | 95.1 |
| 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 3.5 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
| -0.1 | 2.3 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 2.3 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| -2.9 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 0.8 | -0.3 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 3.4 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 |

Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve’s Major Currency Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index and Consumer Price Index are seasonally-adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9. Historical data: Treasury rates from the Federal Reserve Board's H.15; AAA-AA and A-BBB corporate bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and are 15+ years, yield to maturity; State and local bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, A-rated, yield to maturity; Mortgage rates from Freddie Mac, 30-year, fixed; LIBOR quotes from Intercontinental Exchange. All interest rate data is sourced from Haver Analytics. Historical data for Fed's Major Currency Index is from FRSR H.10. Historical data for Real GDP and GDP Chained Price Index are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumer Price Index (CPI) history is from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).


## Long-Range Survey:

The table below contains the results of our twice-annual long-range CONSENSUS survey. There are also Top 10 and Bottom 10 averages for each variable. Shown are consensus estimates for the years 2018 through 2022 and averages for the five-year periods 2018-2022 and 2023-2027. Apply these projections cautiously. Few if any economic, demographic and political forces can be evaluated accurately over such long time spans.

| Interest Rates |  | -----------Average For The Year------------ |  |  |  |  | Five-Year Averages |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2018-2022 | 2023-2027 |
| 1. Federal Funds Rate | CONSENSUS | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 3.0 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.4 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 3.6 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.3 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.2 |
| 2. Prime Rate | CONSENSUS | 4.8 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 5.6 | 5.9 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 5.4 | 6.2 | 6.6 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.3 | 6.6 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 4.9 | 5.1 |
| 3. LIBOR, 3-Mo. | CONSENSUS | 2.1 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 3.2 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.7 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.8 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.5 |
| 4. Commercial Paper, 1-Mo. | CONSENSUS | 2.0 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 3.2 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.5 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.7 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.6 |
| 5. Treasury Bill Yield, 3-Mo. | CONSENSUS | 1.7 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.9 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.4 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 3.6 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.3 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.1 |
| 6. Treasury Bill Yield, 6-Mo. | CONSENSUS | 1.9 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 3.0 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.6 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.7 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.2 |
| 7. Treasury Bill Yield, 1-Yr. | CONSENSUS | 2.1 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 3.2 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.8 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.5 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.3 |
| 8. Treasury Note Yield, 2-Yr. | CONSENSUS | 2.2 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.0 | 3.3 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.9 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 4.1 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
| 10. Treasury Note Yield, 5-Yr. | CONSENSUS | 2.7 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 3.6 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 3.3 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.4 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.8 |
| 11. Treasury Note Yield, 10-Yr. | CONSENSUS | 3.1 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.9 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 3.8 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.7 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.1 |
| 12. Treasury Bond Yield, 30-Yr. | CONSENSUS | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 4.5 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 4.5 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 5.3 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
| 13. Corporate Aaa Bond Yield | CONSENSUS | 4.8 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.5 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 5.4 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 6.2 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.9 |
| 13. Corporate Baa Bond Yield | CONSENSUS | 5.9 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.4 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 6.5 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 6.9 | 7.2 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 5.3 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.7 |
| 14. State \& Local Bonds Yield | CONSENSUS | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.8 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 4.9 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 5.6 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 4.0 |
| 15. Home Mortgage Rate | CONSENSUS | 4.9 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.6 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 5.5 | 6.0 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 6.0 | 6.3 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.7 | 4.9 |
| A. FRB - Major Currency Index | CONSENSUS | 94.6 | 93.8 | 93.6 | 93.5 | 93.2 | 93.8 | 92.1 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 97.6 | 97.9 | 98.3 | 98.4 | 98.4 | 98.1 | 97.4 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 91.5 | 89.6 | 88.7 | 88.4 | 87.9 | 89.2 | 86.6 |
|  |  |  | Year-O | -Year, | Chang | --- | Five-Ye | Averages |
|  |  | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2018-2022 | 2023-2027 |
| B. Real GDP | CONSENSUS | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| C. GDP Chained Price Index | CONSENSUS | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.2 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| D. Consumer Price Index | CONSENSUS | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Schedule PMA-D4 Page 10 of 12 |  |

## LAC / MGE

## Derivation of Mean Equity Risk Premium Based on a Study

 Using Holding Period Returns of Public UtilitiesOver A Rated Moody's
Public Utility Bonds

Arithmetic Mean Holding Period Returns on

1. the Standard \& Poor's Utility Index 19282015 (2): $10.49 \%$
2. Arithmetic Mean Yield on Moody's A Rated Public Utility Yields 1928-2015
(6.64)
3. Historical Equity Risk Premium
4. Forecasted Equity Risk Premium Based on PRPM (3)

Regression of Historical Equity Risk Premium
5.
(4)

Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on
6. Projected Total Return on the S\&P Utilities Index (5)
7. Average Equity Risk Premium

Notes: (1) Based on S\&P Public Utility Index monthly total returns and Moody's Public Utility Bond average monthly yields from 1928-2015.
(2) Holding period returns are calculated based upon income received (dividends and interest) plus the relative change in the market value of a security over a one-year holding period.
(3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is applied to the risk premium of the monthly total returns of the S\&P Utility Index and the monthly yields on Moody's A rated public utility bonds from January 1928 - January 2017.
(4) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of the S\&P Utility Index relative to Moody's A rated public utility bond yields from 1928-2015 referenced in note 1 above.
(5) Using data from Bloomberg Professional Service for the S\&P Utilities Index, an expected return of $8.25 \%$ was derived based on expected dividend yields and longterm growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A rated public utility bond yield of $4.89 \%$, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of 3.36\%. (8.25\% - 4.89\% = 3.36\%)

LAC / MGE
Prediction of Equity Risk Premiums Relative to
Moody's A Rated Utility Bond Yields


A Rated Moody's Bond Yield (\%)

|  |  | Prospective <br> A Rated <br> Utility Bond | Prospective <br> Equity Risk <br> Constant |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $7.497094 \%$ | $\frac{\text { Slope }}{-0.48037}$ | $\frac{(1)}{\text { Premium }}$ |  |

Notes:
(1) From line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule.

Source of Information: Regulatory Research Associates


Indicated Common $\frac{\text { LAC / MGE }}{\text { Equity Cost Rate Through Use }} 1$
of the Traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model (ECAPM)

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { [2] } \\
& \begin{array}{r}
\text { Bloomberg } \\
\text { Adjusted Bet }
\end{array}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \begin{array}{l}
\text { Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas } \\
\text { Companies } \\
\hline \text { Atmos Energy } \\
\text { Chesapeake Utilities } \\
\text { New Jersey Resources Corp. } \\
\text { Northwest Nat. Gas } \\
\text { South Jersey Industries, Inc. } \\
\begin{array}{l}
\text { Southwest Gas Holdings Inc } \\
\text { Spire Inc. } \\
\text { Average } \\
\text { Average of Mean and Median }
\end{array} \\
\text { Notes on page } 2 \text { of this Schedule. }
\end{array}
\end{aligned}
$$

LAC / MGE
Notes to Accompany the Application of the CAPM and ECAPM
Notes:
(1) The market risk premium (MRP) is an average of five different measures. The first measure of the MRP derives the total return on the market by adding the thirteen-week average forecasted 3-5 year capital appreciation to the thirteen-week average expected dividend yield from Value Line Summary and Index. The projected risk-free rate (developed in Note 2) is then subtracted from the total return to arrive at the projected MRP. The second measure of MRP is based on the arithmetic mean of historical monthly return data of large company stocks less the income return on long-term government bonds from 1926-2015 as published by Morningstar, Inc. The third measure applies the PRPM to the Ibbotson historical data to derive a projected MRP. The fourth measure applies a regression analysis to the Ibbotson historical data to derive a projected MRP. The fifth measure uses data from Bloomberg Professional Services to derive a total projected return on the S\&P 500 by using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. The projected risk-free rate is then subtracted from the projected total return to arrive at the projected MRP. The five measures of MRP are illustrated below:

Measure 1: Value Line Projected MRP (Thirteen weeks ending February 10, 2017

| Total projected return on the market $3-5$ years hence: | $9.28 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Projected Risk-Free Rate (described in Note 2): | 3.65 |
| MRP based on Value Line Summary \& Index: | $5.63 \%$ |

Measure 2: Ibbotson Arithmetic Mean MRP (1926-2015)

| Arithmetic Mean Monthly Returns for Large Stocks 1926-2015: | $11.95 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Arithmetic Mean Income Returns on Long-Term Government Bonds: | 5.20 | MRP based on Ibbotson Historical Data:

Measure 3: Application of the PRPM to Ibbotson Historical Data:
(January 1926- January 2017)
Measure 4: Application of a Regression Analysis to Ibbotson Historical Data
$(1926-2015)$

Measure 5: Bloomberg Projected MRP

| Total return on the Market based on the S\&P 500: | $13.08 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Projected Risk-Free Rate (described in Note 2): | 3.65 |
| MRP based on Bloomberg data | Average MRP: |
|  |  |

(2) For reasons explained in the direct testimony, the appropriate risk-free rate for cost of capital purposes is the average forecast of 30 year Treasury Bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts. (See pages 9-10 of Schedule PMA-D4.) The projection of the risk-free rate is illustrated below:

| First Quarter 2017 | $3.10 \%$ |
| ---: | :--- |
| Second Quarter 2017 | 3.20 |
| Third Quarter 2017 | 3.40 |
| Fourth Quarter 2017 | 3.50 |
| First Quarter 201 8 | 3.60 |
| Second Quarter 2018 | 3.70 |
| 2018-2022 | 4.20 |
| 2023-2027 | 4.50 |
|  |  |

(3) Average of Column 6 and Column 7.

Sources of Information:
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, February 1, 2017 and December 1, 2016
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - Ibbotson® SBBI® 2016 Market Report, Morningstar, Inc., 2016 Chicago, IL.
Bloomberg Professional Services

LAC / MGE<br>Basis of Selection of the Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies

The criteria for selection of the proxy group of sixteen non-price regulated companies was that the non-price regulated companies be domestic and reported in Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition).

The proxy group of sixteen non-price regulated companies were then selected based on the unadjusted beta range of $0.44-0.70$ and residual standard error of the regression range of $1.9593-2.3369$ of the water proxy group.

These ranges are based upon plus or minus two standard deviations of the unadjusted beta and standard error of the regression. Plus or minus two standard deviations captures $95.50 \%$ of the distribution of unadjusted betas and residual standard errors of the regression.

The standard deviation of the water industry's residual standard error of the regression is 0.1095. The standard deviation of the standard error of the regression is calculated as follows:

Standard Deviation of the Std. Err. of the Regr. $=\underline{\text { Standard Error of the Regression }}$ $\sqrt{2 N}$
where: $\mathrm{N}=$ number of observations. Since Value Line betas are derived from weekly price change observations over a period of five years, $\mathrm{N}=259$

$$
\text { Thus, } 0.0944=\frac{2.1481}{\sqrt{518}}=\frac{2.4926}{22.7596}
$$

Source of Information: Value Line, Inc., December 2016 Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition)

LAC / MGE
Basis of Selection of Comparable Risk
Domestic Non-Price Regulated Companies

|  | [1] |  | [2] |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| [3] |  |  |  |  |  |

LAC / MGE
Proxy Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies
Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies

|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Proxy Group of Sixteen Non-Price- <br> Regulated Companies | $\begin{gathered} \text { VL Adjusted } \\ \text { Beta } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Unadjusted $\qquad$ | Residual <br> Standard <br> Error of the Regression | Standard Deviation of Beta |
| AmerisourceBergen | 0.80 | 0.65 | 2.1089 | 0.0616 |
| AutoZone Inc. | 0.65 | 0.46 | 2.0988 | 0.0613 |
| Bard (C.R.) | 0.80 | 0.66 | 2.2216 | 0.0648 |
| Campbell Soup | 0.70 | 0.49 | 1.9728 | 0.0576 |
| Dr Pepper Snapple | 0.75 | 0.55 | 2.0574 | 0.0600 |
| Erie Indemnity | 0.75 | 0.62 | 2.1273 | 0.0621 |
| Lancaster Colony | 0.80 | 0.63 | 2.2055 | 0.0644 |
| Lilly (Eli) | 0.80 | 0.63 | 2.1902 | 0.0639 |
| Merck \& Co. | 0.80 | 0.66 | 2.2052 | 0.0644 |
| Reynolds American | 0.70 | 0.48 | 2.2439 | 0.0655 |
| Smucker (J.M.) | 0.75 | 0.54 | 2.1053 | 0.0614 |
| Stericycle Inc. | 0.80 | 0.69 | 2.2738 | 0.0664 |
| Target Corp. | 0.70 | 0.52 | 2.2600 | 0.0660 |
| TJX Companies | 0.80 | 0.65 | 2.2068 | 0.0644 |
| Verisk Analytics | 0.80 | 0.64 | 2.1656 | 0.0632 |
| Waste Connections | 0.75 | 0.58 | 2.0257 | 0.0591 |
| Average | 0.76 | 0.59 | 2.1543 | 0.0629 |
| Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas |  |  |  |  |
| Companies | 0.74 | 0.57 | 2.1481 | 0.0627 |

## LAC / MGE

Summary of Cost of Equity Models Applied to the Proxy Group of Sixteen Non-Price-Regulated Companies

Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies

| Principal Methods |  | Proxy Group of Sixteen Non-Price-Regulated Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1) |  | 11.86 \% |
| Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2) |  | 10.30 |
| Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)(3) |  | 9.62 |
|  | Mean | 10.59 \% |
|  | Median | 10.30 \% |
| Averag | Median | 10.45 \% |

Notes:
(1) From page 2 of this Schedule.
(2) From page 3 of this Schedule.
(3) From page 6 of this Schedule.
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## NA $=$ Not Available NMF $=$ Not Meaningful Figure

（1）The application of the DCF model to the domestic，non－price regluated comparable risk companies is identical to the application of the DCF to the utility proxy group．The dividend yield is derived by using the 60 day average price and the spot indicated dividend as of January 31,2017 ．The dividend yield is then adjusted by $1 / 2$ the average projected growth rate in EPS，which is calculated by averaging the 5 year projected growth in EPS provided by Value Line，www．reuters．com，www．zacks．com，and www．yahoo．com（excluding any negative growth rates）and then adding that growth rate to the adjusted dividend yield．

[^33]

## LAC / MGE

Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate
Through Use of a Risk Premium Model
Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

| Line No. |  | Proxy Group of Sixteen Non-PriceRegulated Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | Prospective Yield on Baa Rated Corporate Bonds (1) | 5.51 \% |
| 2. | Adjustment to Reflect Bond rating Difference of Non-Price Regulated Companies (2) | (0.18) |
| 3. | Adjusted Prospective Bond Yield | 5.33 |
| 4. | Equity Risk Premium (3) | 4.97 |
| 5. | Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate | 10.30 \% |

Notes: (1) Average forecast of Baa corporate bonds based upon the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts dated February 1, 2017 and December 1, 2016 (see pages 9 and 10 of Schedule PMA-D4). The estimates are detailed below.

| First Quarter 2017 | $4.90 \%$ |
| ---: | :--- |
| Second Quarter 2017 | 5.00 |
| Third Quarter 2017 | 5.20 |
| Fourth Quarter 2017 | 5.30 |
| First Quarter 2018 | 5.40 |
| Second Quarter 2018 | 5.60 |
| 2018-2022 | 6.30 |
| 2023-2027 | 6.40 |
| Average |  |

(2) The average yield spread of Baa rated corporate bonds over A corporate bonds for the three months ending January 2017. To reflect the Baa1 average rating of the non-utility proxy group, the prosepctive yield on A corporate bonds must be adjusted by $2 / 3$ of the spread between A and Baa corporate bond yields as shown below:

|  | A Corp. Bond Yield |  | Corp. <br> Yield |  | Spread |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Jan-2017 | 4.16 | \% | 4.66 | \% | 0.50 |
| Dec-2016 | 4.28 |  | 4.83 |  | 0.55 |
| Nov-2016 | 4.11 |  | 4.71 |  | 0.60 |
| Average yield spread |  |  |  |  | 0.55 |
| 1/3 of spread |  |  |  |  | 0.18 |

(3) From page 5 of this Schedule.

LAC / MGE
Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for the
Proxy Group of Sixteen Non-Price-Regulated Companies of comparable risk to the Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies

|  | Moody's <br> Long-Term Issuer Rating January 2017 |  | Standard \& Poor's Long-Term Issuer Rating January 2017 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Proxy Group of Sixteen Non-Price-Regulated Companies | Long- <br> Term <br> Issuer <br> Rating | Numerical <br> Weighting <br> (1) | Long- <br> Term <br> Issuer <br> Rating | Numerical Weighting (1) |
| AmerisourceBergen | Baa2 | 9.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| AutoZone Inc. | Baa1 | 8.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Bard (C.R.) | Baa1 | 8.0 | A | 6.0 |
| Campbell Soup | A3 | 7.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Dr Pepper Snapple | Baa1 | 8.0 | BBB+ | 8.0 |
| Erie Indemnity | NA | -- | NA | -- |
| Lancaster Colony | NA | -- | NA | -- |
| Lilly (Eli) | A2 | 6.0 | AA- | 4.0 |
| Merck \& Co. | A1 | 5.0 | AA | 3.0 |
| Reynolds American | Baa3 | 10.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Smucker (J.M.) | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Stericycle Inc. | A | -- | NR | -- |
| Target Corp. | A2 | 6.0 | A | 6.0 |
| TJX Companies | A2 | 6.0 | A+ | 5.0 |
| Verisk Analytics | Baa3 | 10.0 | BBB- | 10.0 |
| Waste Connections | NA | -- | NR | -- |
| Average | Baa1 | 7.7 | A- | 7.0 |

Notes:
(1) From page 6 of Schedule PMA-D4.

Source of Information:
Bloomberg Professional Services

LAC / MGE
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach
Using the Beta for
Proxy Group of Sixteen Non-Price-Regulated Companies of comparable risk to the Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Companies

| Line No. | Equity Risk Premium Measure | Proxy Group of Sixteen Non-PriceRegulated Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1) | 5.52 \% |
| 2. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (2) | 6.38 |
| 3. | Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (3) | 7.40 |
| 4. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (3) | 4.60 |
| 5. | Equity Risk Premium Based on S\&P 500 Companies(4) | 8.40 |
| 6. | Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium (6) | 6.46 \% |
| 7. | Adjusted Beta (7) | 0.77 |
| 8. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium | 4.97 \% |

Notes: (1) From note 1 of page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4.
(2) From note 2 of page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4.
(3) From note 3 of page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4.
(4) From note 4 of page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4.
(5) From note 5 of page 8 of Schedule PMA-D4.
(6) Average of lines 1 through 5.
(7) Average of mean and median beta from page 6 of this Schedule.

Sources of Information:
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - Ibbotson® SBBI® 2016 Market Report, Morningstar, Inc., 2016 Chicago, IL.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, February 1, 2017 and December 1, 2016
Bloomberg Professional Services
Traditional CAPM and ECAPM Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to

| Proxy Group of Sixteen Non-Price-Regulated Companies | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] |  | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Value Line <br> Adjusted <br> Beta | Bloomberg <br> Beta | Average <br> Beta | Market Risk <br> Premium (1) |  | Risk-Free <br> Rate (2) | Traditional CAPM Cost Rate | ECAPM Cost Rate | Indicated <br> Common <br> Equity Cost <br> Rate (3) |
| AmerisourceBergen | 0.85 | 0.92 | 0.89 | 7.53 | \% | 3.65 \% | 10.35 \% | 10.56 \% | 10.46 \% |
| AutoZone Inc. | 0.75 | 0.77 | 0.76 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 9.37 | 9.82 | 9.60 |
| Bard (C.R.) | 0.80 | 0.70 | 0.75 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 9.30 | 9.77 | 9.53 |
| Campbell Soup | 0.70 | 0.63 | 0.66 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 8.62 | 9.26 | 8.94 |
| Dr Pepper Snapple | 0.75 | 0.67 | 0.71 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 9.00 | 9.54 | 9.27 |
| Erie Indemnity | 0.80 | 0.79 | 0.80 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 9.67 | 10.05 | 9.86 |
| Lancaster Colony | 0.80 | 0.67 | 0.74 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 9.22 | 9.71 | 9.47 |
| Lilly (Eli) | 0.75 | 0.72 | 0.74 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 9.22 | 9.71 | 9.47 |
| Merck \& Co. | 0.85 | 0.89 | 0.87 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 10.20 | 10.45 | 10.32 |
| Reynolds American | 0.65 | 0.69 | 0.67 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 8.70 | 9.32 | 9.01 |
| Smucker (J.M.) | 0.70 | 0.76 | 0.73 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 9.15 | 9.66 | 9.40 |
| Stericycle Inc. | 0.85 | 0.78 | 0.81 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 9.75 | 10.11 | 9.93 |
| Target Corp. | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 9.67 | 10.05 | 9.86 |
| TJX Companies | 0.85 | 0.90 | 0.87 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 10.20 | 10.45 | 10.32 |
| Verisk Analytics | 0.85 | 0.80 | 0.83 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 9.90 | 10.22 | 10.06 |
| Waste Connections | 0.80 | 0.60 | 0.70 | 7.53 |  | 3.65 | 8.92 | 9.49 | 9.20 |
| Mean |  |  | 0.77 |  |  |  | 9.45 \% | 9.88 \% | 9.67 \% |
| Median |  |  | 0.76 |  |  |  | 9.34 \% | 9.80 \% | 9.57 \% |
| Average of Mean and Median |  |  | 0.77 |  |  |  | 9.40 \% | 9.84 \% | 9.62 \% |
|  | From Sched From Sched Average of | PMA-D5, not PMA-D5, no M and ECAPM | st rates. |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Derivation of the Flotation Cost Adjustment to the Cost of Common Equity


LAC / MGE
Notes to Accompany the Derivation of the Flotation Cost Adjustment to the Cost of Common Equity
(1) Company-provided.
(2) Column 2 - Column 3.
(3) Column 2 - the sum of columns 4 and 5.
(4) Column 1 * Column 2.
(5) Column 1 * Column 6.
(6) Column 1 * (the sum of columns 4 and 5).
(7) (Column 7 - Column 8) divided by Column 7.
(8) Using the average growth rate from page 1 of Schedule PMA-D3.
(9) Adjustment for flotation costs based on adjusting the average DCF constant growth cost rate in accordance with the following:
$K=\frac{D(1+0.5 g)}{P(1-F)}+g$,
where $g$ is the growth factor and $F$ is the percentage of flotation costs.
(10) Flotation cost adjustment of $0.16 \%$ equals the difference between the flotation adjusted average DCF cost rate of $8.82 \%$ and the unadjusted average DCF cost rate of $8.66 \%$ of the proxy group of seven natural gas utilities.

Source of Information:
Company provided information

## द5W/JVT

Derivation of Investment Risk Adjustment Based upon
Ibbotson Associates' Size Premia for the Decile Portfolios of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ
LAC/MGE


# BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI 

In the Matter of Laclede Gas Company's ) Request to Increase its Revenues for Gas ) File No. GR-2017-0215 Service<br>In the Matter of Laclede Gas Company ) d/b/a Missouri Gas Energy's Request to<br>File No. GR-2017-0216<br>Increase its Revenues for Gas Service

## AFFIDAVIT

## STATE OF NEW JERSEY <br> CITY OF MARLTON

Pauline M. Ahern, of lawful age, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:

1. My name is Pauline M. Ahern. I am an Executive Director of ScottMadden, Inc. My business address is 1900 West Park Road, Suite 250, Westborough, MA 01581. My mailing address is 3000 Atrium Way, Suite 241, Mount Laurel, NJ 08054.
2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my direct testimony on behalf of Laclede Gas Company and MGE.
3. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.


Pauline M. Ahern



[^0]:    ${ }^{3}$ As discussed later in this testimony, currently, the application of the DCF model understates the required return on common equity by nearly 490 basis points due to currently significantly high market-to-book ratios. Accordingly, the results of that model should be given only very limited weight in deriving a reasonable return on equity in this proceeding.

[^1]:    ${ }^{4}$ Some firms also finance with preferred stock, which, like debt, has a contractual cost, i.e., dividend rate.
    ${ }^{5}$ And preferred stockholders.

[^2]:    ${ }^{6}$ Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance (Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006) 428-431.

[^3]:    ${ }^{7}$ Duff \& Phelps 2016 Valuation Handbook Guide to Cost of Capital - Market Results through 2015, Wiley 2016 4-1.

[^4]:    ${ }^{8}$ Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 18, Number 3, Summer 2004 25-43.
    ${ }^{9}$ Brealey, Richard A. and Myers, Stewart C., Principles of Corporate Finance (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1996) 204-205, 229.
    ${ }^{10}$ Brigham, Eugene F., Fundamentals of Financial Management, Fifth Edition (The Dryden Press, 1989) 623.

[^5]:    ${ }^{11}$ Morin 298-303.
    ${ }^{12}$ Morin 298.

[^6]:    ${ }^{13}$ Phillips, Charles F., The Regulation of Public Utilities - Theory and Practice (Public Utility Reports, Inc., 1993) 395.
    ${ }^{14}$ James C. Bonbright, Albert L. Danielsen and David R. Kamerschen, Principles of Public Utility Rates (Public Utilities Reports, Inc., 1988) 334.

[^7]:    ${ }^{15}$ Average DCF cost rate for the Natural Gas Proxy Group from page 1 of Schedule PMA-D3.

[^8]:    ${ }^{16}$ Average market price for the Natural Gas Proxy Group at January 30, 2017 from Column [4] on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D10.
    ${ }^{17}$ Average book value at year end 2015 for the Natural Gas Proxy Group from Column [1] on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D10.

[^9]:    18 "A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities", Pauline M. Ahern, Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D. The Journal of Regulatory Economics (December 2011), 40:261-278.

    19 "Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model ${ }^{\mathrm{TM}}$, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model", Pauline M. Ahern, Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, Dylan W. D'Ascendis, and Frank J. Hanley, The Electricity Journal (May, 2013).
    ${ }^{20}$ www.nobelprize.org

[^10]:    ${ }^{21}$ Illustrated in Columns [1] and [2] on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D4.
    ${ }^{22}$ Illustrated in Column [4] on page 2 of Schedule PMA-D4.
    ${ }^{23} 11.62 \%=(11.43 \%+11.81 \%) / 2$.

[^11]:    ${ }^{24}$ See pages 9 and 10 of Schedule PMA-D4.
    ${ }^{25}$ See page 4 of Schedule PMA-D4.
    ${ }^{26} 4.89 \%=4.68 \%+0.21 \%$.

[^12]:    ${ }^{27}$ Table A-1. Morningstar ${ }^{\circledR}$ SBBI ${ }^{\circledR}$ Appendix A Tables, Morningstar Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation | 1926-2015, ${ }^{\ominus}$ 2016. Morningstar has decided to stop publishing the Ibbotson Classic Yearbook, but has provided the Appendix A Tables.

[^13]:    ${ }^{29} 6.46 \%=((5.52 \%+6.38 \%+7.40 \%+4.60 \%+8.40 \%) / 5)$.

[^14]:    ${ }^{30}$ As shown on Line No. 3, on page 11 of Schedule PMA-D4.
    ${ }^{31}$ As shown on Line No. 4, on page 11 of Schedule PMA-D4.
    ${ }^{32}$ As shown on Line No. 5, on page 11 of Schedule PMA-D4.
    ${ }^{33} 4.26 \%=((3.85 \%+4.34 \%+5.50 \%+3.36 \%) / 4)$.

[^15]:    ${ }^{34}$ The implied equity risk premium is calculated by subtracting the prevailing yield on Moody's A rated public utility bonds from the authorized return on common equity for each case.
    ${ }^{35}$ Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, Estimating Shareholder Risk Premia Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts, Financial Management, Summer 1992 63-70; Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity, Financial Management, Spring 1985 33-45; and Farris M. Maddox, Donna T. Pippert, and Rodney N. Sullivan, An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Risk Premiums for the Electric Utility Industry, Financial Management, Autumn 1995 89-95.
    $\left.{ }^{36} 4.62 \%=(4.46 \%+4.26 \%+5.15 \%) / 3\right)$.

[^16]:    ${ }^{37} 10.57 \%=((11.62 \%+9.51 \%) / 2)$.

[^17]:    ${ }^{38}$ Morin 175, 190.

[^18]:    ${ }^{39}$ See pages 9 and 10 of Schedule PMA-D4.

[^19]:    ${ }^{40} 5.63 \%=9.28 \%-3.65 \%$.
    ${ }^{41}$ Morningstar - 2016 Appendix A Tables.
    ${ }^{42} 6.75 \%=11.95 \%-5.20 \%$.

[^20]:    ${ }^{43} 9.43 \%=13.08 \%-3.65 \%$,
    $44 \quad 7.53 \%=((5.63 \%+6.75 \%+7.20 \%+8.66 \%+9.43 \%) / 5)$.
    $45 \quad 9.11 \%=((9.14 \%+9.07 \%) / 2)$.

[^21]:    ${ }^{46}$ See pages 9 and 10 of Schedule PMA-D4.
    ${ }^{47}$ As shown on Line No. 2 and explained in Note 2 on page 4 of Schedule PMA-D7.
    ${ }^{48}$ Derived on page 5 of Schedule PMA-D7.
    $\left.{ }^{49} 9.62 \%=(9.67 \%+9.57 \%) / 2\right)$.

[^22]:    ${ }^{50}$ As discussed previously in this testimony, currently, the application of the DCF model understates the required return on common equity by nearly 490 basis points due to currently significantly high market-to-book ratios. Accordingly, the results of that model should be given only very limited weight in deriving a reasonable return on equity in this proceeding.

[^23]:    ${ }^{51}$ Morin, 321.

[^24]:    ${ }^{52}$ Eugene F. Brigham and Phillip R. Daves, Intermediate Financial Management, 9th Edition, Thomson/Southwestern 342.
    ${ }^{53}$ Morin 327-30.

[^25]:    ${ }^{54}$ Formerly The Laclede Group Inc.

[^26]:    ${ }^{55} 0.32 \%=1.56 \%-1.24 \%$

[^27]:    (A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30th. (B) Diluted Next egs. rpt. due early Feb.
    shrs. Excl. nonrec. items: '06, d18c;; '07, d2c; ; (C) Dividends historically paid in early March, (D) In millions. (E) Qtrs may not add due to change in shrs 09, 12c; '10, 5¢; '11, (1c). Excludes discontin- June, Sept., and Dec. - Div. reinvestment plan.

[^28]:    Company's Financial Strength Stock's Price Stability Price Growth Persistence
    Earnings Predictability
    Earnings Predictability

[^29]:    A) Diluted earnings per share. Excludes non- (B) Dividends historically paid in mid-February, $\quad$ (D) Includes intangibles. In 2015: \$370.7 milecurring items: '00, $\$ 0.11$; '06, ( $\$ 0.06$ ); '08, May, August, and November.
    \$0.03);' ${ }^{\circ} 9,6 ¢$; May not sum due to rounding. - Dividend reinvestment plan available.
    Next earnings report due in early February.
    (C) In millions.

[^30]:    A) Based on GAAP egs. through 2006, economic egs. thereafter. GAAP EPS: '07, \$1.05 08, \$1.29; '09, \$0.97: '10, \$1.11; '11, \$1.49; 12, \$1.49' '13, \$1.28;' '14, \$1.46; '15, \$1.52.

    | Excl. nonrecur. gain (loss): '01, $\$ 0.07$; '08, | $\begin{array}{l}\text { report due late February. (B) Div'ds paid early } \\ \$ 0.16 ; ' 09,(\$ 0.22) ; ~ ' 10, ~(\$ 0.24) ; ~ ' 11, ~ \$ 0.04 ; ~ ' 12, ~\end{array}$ |
    | :--- | :--- |
    | April, July, Oct., and late Dec. 1 Div. reinvest. |  |
    | (\$0.03); '13, (\$0.24); '14, (\$0.11); '15, $\$ 0.08$. | $\begin{array}{l}\text { plan avail. (C) Incl. reg. assets. In 2015: } \$ 521.0\end{array}$ |

    
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[^31]:    A) Diluted earnings. Excl. nonrec. gains (losses): '02, (10c); '05, (11c); '06, 7c. Nex egs. report due late February. (B) Dividends

[^32]:    A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30th. (B) Based on due late January. (C) Dividends historically
    diluted shares outstanding. Excludes nonrecur- paid in early January, April, July, and October. ring loss: ' $06,7 \mathrm{c}$. Excludes gain from discontin- - Dividend reinvestment plan available. (D) ued operations: '08, 94 . Next earnings report $\quad$ Incl. deferred charges. In '14: \$383.8 mill.,
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[^33]:    Value Line Investment Survey：
    www．reuters．com Downloaded
    www．reuters．com Downloaded on $01 / 31 / 2017$
    www．zacks．com Downloaded on $01 / 31 / 2017$ www．yahoo．com Downloaded on $01 / 31 / 2017$

