

Exhibit No.: _____
Issue(s): Administrative Costs/
Implementation Contractor Expenses/
Business Demand Response
Witness/Type of Exhibit: Payne/Rebuttal
Sponsoring Party: Public Counsel
Case No.: EO-2023-0407 & EO-2023-0408

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

MANZELL PAYNE

Submitted on Behalf of the Office of the Public Counsel

**EVERGY METRO, INC. D/B/A
EVERGY MISSOURI METRO
AND
EVERGY MISSOURI WEST, INC. D/B/A
EVERGY MISSOURI WEST**

CASE NO. EO-2023-0407 & EO-2023-0408

** _____ **
Denotes Confidential Information that has been redacted

March 29, 2024

PUBLIC

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REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

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MANZELL M PAYNE

**EVERGY METRO, INC., D/B/A EVERGY MISSOURI METRO and
EVERGY MISSOURI WEST, INC., D/B/A EVERGY MISSOURI WEST**

CASE NOS. EO-2023-0407 and EO-2023-0408

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Q. Please state your name, title, and business address.

A. Manzell Payne, Utility Regulatory Auditor, Office of the Public Counsel (“OPC” or “Public Counsel”), P.O. Box 2230, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102.

Q. Are you the same Manzell Payne who filed direct testimony for the Office of the Public Counsel (“OPC”) in this case?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?

A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to Evergy Metro, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri Metro (“Evergy Missouri Metro”) and Evergy Missouri West, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri West (“Evergy Missouri West,” and collectively with Evergy Missouri Metro, “Evergy” or the “Company”) witness, Brian File’s direct testimony concerning disallowances for administrative costs, implementation contractor costs, and the Business Demand Response Program (“BDR”).

ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS

Q. How does Company witness, Brian File respond to Staff’s concern that the Company included administrative costs that were not MEEIA related and therefore should be disallowed?

A. Mr. File’s direct testimony centers around the premise that all expenses were prudent and appropriate to MEEIA demand side management programs and should be recoverable through the MEEIA surcharge. He contends that Evergy’s sponsorship of the energy efficiency (“EE”) related organizations are relevant and therefore should not be disallowed.

1 He also insists that T-shirts with the generic Evergy logo were necessary for businesses and
2 customers to know that they were talking to Evergy employees.

3 **Q. How do you respond to Mr. File’s response regarding administrative costs?**

4 A. I do not agree with Mr. File that paying for a sponsorship while also paying for membership
5 dues is relevant and appropriate. EE-related sponsorships should not be allowed if the
6 Company is already a member and paying dues because it does not benefit customers.

7 I also do not agree that gift boxes sent to businesses are relevant to MEEIA. The gifts in these
8 boxes are an issue that cannot be overlooked. In addition to a letter describing expected
9 incentives for MEEIA Business Demand Response (“BDR”) Program participation, the gift
10 boxes included non-MEEIA specific gifts which provide no benefit to Evergy customers.
11 Letters explaining MEEIA should suffice and any additional gifts to persuade businesses to
12 participate are excessive.

13 T-shirts bearing a generic Evergy logo may be helpful to identify Evergy employees but that
14 does not make these t-shirts MEEIA related. For instance, these same employees could wear
15 these same t-shirts to other Evergy sponsored events that are not MEEIA related. Therefore,
16 these t-shirts do not provide a MEEIA-specific benefit to Evergy’s customers and the cost of
17 them should not be recovered through the MEEIA charge. Evergy can seek to recover the cost
18 of these generic Evergy t-shirts in a future rate case, where all parties can make arguments
19 regarding their recovery.

20 Finally, all costs that Staff could not verify through Company support and justification should
21 also be disallowed.

22 **Q. Has your recommendation to the Commission regarding administrative costs changed
23 since you filed direct testimony?**

24 A. Yes. Evergy has reclassified certain administrative costs as non-MEEIA, in the amounts of
25 \$526.31 for Evergy Missouri Metro and \$496.55 for Evergy Missouri West. The Company
26 has agreed with Staff that these amounts should not be included as administrative costs for
27 MEEIA Cycle 3. The contested amounts after the reclassification made by the Company are
28 \$70,154.17 plus interest for Evergy Missouri Metro and \$3,768.75 plus interest for Evergy
29 Missouri West. I now recommend that the Commission order an ordered adjustment (“OA”)
30 in the amount \$70,154.17 plus interest for Evergy Missouri Metro and \$3,768.75 plus interest

1 for Evergy Missouri West to be applied in the next demand-side programs investment
2 mechanism (“DSIM”) filing for both companies.

3 **IMPLEMENTATION CONTRACTOR EXPENSES**

4 **Q. How does Company witness Brian File respond to Staff’s concern that the Company**
5 **included implementation contractor expenses that were not MEEIA related and**
6 **therefore should be disallowed?**

7 A. Mr. File asserts that all implementation contractor expenses were relevant and appropriate for
8 Evergy to deploy MEEIA programs. These expenses include award ceremonies, gifts, t-shirts,
9 and compensation for a trade ally’s mistake.

10 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. File?**

11 A. No, I do not agree that all implementation contractor expenses were relevant and appropriate
12 for MEEIA Cycle 3. Evergy’s customers received no MEEIA specific benefit from the
13 Company having award ceremonies, giving gifts, having generic Evergy logo t-shirts, and
14 compensating a customer for a trade ally’s mistake. These items have no bearing on Evergy’s
15 ability to offer MEEIA demand-side management (“DSM”) programs. Compensating a
16 customer for a trade ally’s mistake should not fall on Evergy’s customers. Additionally, all
17 costs that cannot be verified through Company support and justification should be disallowed.

18 **Q. Has your recommendation to the Commission regarding implementation contractors**
19 **changed since you filed direct testimony?**

20 A. No. I still recommend that the Commission order an OA in the amount of \$6,549.15 plus
21 interest for Evergy Missouri Metro and \$13,121.19 plus interest for Evergy Missouri West to
22 be applied in the next DSIM filing for both companies.

23 **BUSINESS DEMAND RESPONSE**

24 **Q. What should the Commission disallow related to Evergy Missouri West’s Business**
25 **Demand Response Program to account for Evergy Missouri West’s tariff violation?**

26 A. \$1,137,780 plus \$5,871.18 in interest is the disallowance amount for BDR. This amount is
27 different from the \$1,176,264.18 stated in my direct testimony due to the initial number
28 including Nucor Maryville.

1 **Q. Why has your recommended MEEIA BDR disallowance amount changed since your**
2 **direct testimony?**

3 A. As the Company has stated in response to Staff Data Request No. 0035 and its direct
4 testimony, Nucor Maryville is separate from Nucor Sedalia and each entity takes service under
5 different tariff sheets. The tariff sheets that govern service to Nucor Maryville do not prohibit
6 Nucor Maryville from participating in MEEIA BDR programs.¹ Because Nucor Maryville is
7 not prohibited from participating in the MEEIA BDR Program, the amount I recommend the
8 Commission disallow has changed to remove the incentives paid to Nucor-Maryville. Nucor
9 Sedalia is the only Nucor location taking service under the Special Rate for Incremental Load
10 Service (“SIL”) tariff.

11 **Q. Mr. File suggests that all customers were not harmed by Nucor Sedalia participating in**
12 **the MEEIA BDR Program while also taking service under the SIL tariff sheet. Do you**
13 **agree?**

14 A. No. Mr. File fails to recognize that there are more factors at play when the Company violated
15 its SIL tariff.

16 Initially, the prudence standard employed by Staff does not say that there needs to be a
17 monetary value for customers to be harmed.² Here, though there are other harms that hold a
18 monetary value such as, but not limited to, increased earnings opportunity and unlawful
19 incentives paid to Nucor Sedalia due to Evergy Missouri West’s tariff violations.

20 **Q. Can you provide background as to the beginning of Evergy’s MEEIA Cycle 3 and the**
21 **SIL tariff?**

22 A. Yes. Evergy applied for MEEIA Cycle 3 in November of 2018. In doing so, it set a target for
23 its Business Demand Response Program at a certain level. This target could not have included
24 Nucor Sedalia participating in the BDR Program because it did not exist at the time. The
25 Report and Order regarding Evergy’s MEEIA Cycle 3 was filed in December of 2019.

26 Also in 2019, Evergy Missouri West became aware of Nucor Sedalia³. Then on **_____

27 ____ ⁴, Evergy Missouri West entered the SIL tariff agreement with Nucor Sedalia.

¹ EO-2023-0407 and EO-2023-0408, Brian File, Page 8, Lines 18-22.

² Page 5 of the “Second Prudence Review of Cycle 3 Costs” Staff Report – File No. EO-2023- 0408

³ See EO-2019-0244, Application. Attached as MMP-R-2 Confidential.

⁴ Contract Signed date from Response to Staff Data Request No. 34 titled “DR0034_CONF_2022 Nucor Sedalia Fully Executed Participation Agreement”, attached as Schedule MMP-R-1.

1 **Q. Can you explain how Evergy Missouri West’s Earnings Opportunity (“EO”) is relevant**
2 **for this review?**

3 A. Yes. The Earnings Opportunity is the incentive that is approved by the Commission in a
4 utility’s filing for demand-side programs. It is based on actual performance of the utility,
5 which is verified through EM&V in comparison to planned targets the utility expected to
6 meet.

7 Evergy Missouri West set their BDR Program target and it was approved by the Commission.⁵

8 The initial target could not have included Nucor Sedalia’s participation. If it had, the target
9 should have been set higher.

10 **Q. What does Nucor Sedalia’s inclusion in the MEEIA BDR Program mean for the**
11 **earnings opportunity that Evergy Missouri received?**

12 A. Since the MEEIA BDR Program was approved by the Commission with targets that were set
13 by the Company without consideration of Nucor Sedalia’s participation, the target was set
14 lower than it should have been. This also meant that Evergy Missouri West was hitting their
15 target for the BDR Program easier and receiving its earnings opportunity. A large portion of
16 the savings from Evergy Missouri West’s BDR Program came from Nucor Sedalia’s
17 participation.⁶ OPC is awaiting responses to Data Requests and will have a better picture for
18 Nucor Sedalia’s portion of the BDR target. I will update this accordingly in surrebuttal.

19 **Q. Can you explain further the unlawfulness of Nucor Sedalia’s participation in the**
20 **MEEIA BDR Program?**

21 A. Yes. The Company unlawfully paid Nucor Sedalia incentives for participating in the MEEIA
22 BDR Program. The unlawfulness comes from the language in the SIL tariff that states that
23 Nucor Sedalia cannot participate in MEEIA programs or any other demand response
24 programs while it takes service under the SIL tariff, without prior approval from the
25 Commission. Evergy Missouri West’s SIL tariff sheet states:

26 Service under this tariff may not be combined with service under an Economic
27 Development Rider, an Economic Redevelopment Rider, the Renewable
28 Energy Rider, Community Solar program, service as a Special Contract, or be
29 eligible for participation in programs offered pursuant to the Missouri Energy
30 Efficiency Investment Act (MEEIA), or for participation in programs related

⁵ Page 27 of the “Second Prudence Review of Cycle 3 Costs” Staff Report – File No. EO-2023- 0408.

⁶ EO-2023-0407 and EO-2023-0408, Brian File, Page 12, Line 3-5.

1 to demand response or off-peak discounts, unless otherwise ordered by the
2 Commission when approving a contract for service under this tariff.⁷

3 **Q. Did Evergy provide any historical background for the prohibition that exists in the SIL**
4 **tariff sheets?**

5 A. Yes, Company witness Bradley Lutz provides context for the language related to demand
6 response in the SIL tariff. In doing so, he points out that the SIL tariff is for establishing
7 incremental pricing for customers meeting special criteria. This ensures that revenues received
8 from these customers cover the costs to serve them.

9 In relation to the demand response programs, the BDR Program has the potential to impact
10 peak demand and customers' load. When a company participates in the BDR Program, it can
11 affect the incremental costs of serving new load.⁸

12 **Q. Why is it important that the SIL tariff included language that prevents Nucor Sedalia**
13 **from both taking service under the SIL tariff and participating in the MEEIA BDR**
14 **Program?**

15 A. Mr. Lutz provides an explanation for this in his direct testimony. He states:

16 The special rate provides for long term pricing up to ten years. Further, the
17 rate schedule is designed to recover no less than the incremental costs of
18 serving the new load. Since the rates are set near incremental cost based on
19 estimated customer loads, material changes in the customer consumption,
20 such as demand response program participation, could undermine the rate
21 design and expose the Company to under recovery of cost.⁹

22 Mr. Lutz recognizes that there is risk to under recovery of costs if Nucor Sedalia were to both
23 take service under the SIL tariff and participate in the MEEIA BDR Program at the same time.
24 Specifically, there is potential to destabilize the rate design the Commission approved. The
25 violation of the SIL tariff exposes customers and Nucor Sedalia to risk if Nucor Sedalia cannot
26 cover their incremental costs. The language in tariff Sheet No. 157 that those who take service
27 under the SIL tariff cannot participate in both the SIL tariff and MEEIA programs and demand
28 response programs without Commission approval is there to minimize risk.

⁷ MO PSC No. 1, Original Sheet No. 157, Special Rate for Incremental Load Service, Schedule SIL. Attached as MMP-R-3.

⁸ EO-2023-0407 and EO-2023-0408, Bradley Lutz, Page 4.

⁹ EO-2023-0407 and EO-2023-0408, Bradley Lutz, Page 4, Line 12.

1 **Q. Does Evergy Missouri West acknowledge that it violated its tariff agreement?**

2 A. Not exactly. Company witness Mr. File acknowledges in direct testimony, that the SIL tariff
3 included a provision restricting Nucor Sedalia from participating in MEEIA and/or demand
4 response programs without Commission approval.¹⁰ He later points out that Evergy Missouri
5 West has recognized the conflict and points to the Company's response to Staff Data Request
6 No. 31, which appears to recognize the violation of the tariff.¹¹ The response by the Company
7 for Staff Data Request No. 31 is as follows:

8 Nucor has been taking service under the Special Rate for Incremental Load
9 Service (SIL) tariff in 2019 and also participated in MEEIA Business Demand
10 Response (BDR) starting in 2020. After review of both the SIL tariff and the
11 BDR Program tariff, it appears the customer is eligible for both individually
12 but not both tariffs at the same time per the language cited in the data request.
13 The customer has been removed from the MEEIA BDR program effective in
14 September 2023.¹²

15 **Q. Mr. File argues there should be no disallowance because there was no harm to customers
16 and cites the prudence standard from Staff's Report that was used in this case. How
17 would you respond to Mr. File?**

18 A. While Mr. File argues that customers were not harmed, his argument does not mean the
19 Company acted prudently. Evergy had information available to them in 2019 that Nucor
20 Sedalia was not allowed to participate in the MEEIA BDR Program while taking service under
21 the SIL tariff sheet. The knowledge of this should have led the Company to not allow Nucor
22 Sedalia to participate in the MEEIA BDR Program.

23 **Q. Evergy Missouri West seems to want to overlook that they violated their tariff simply
24 due to the Company's view that no customers were harmed during the period of the
25 violation. Do you agree with this treatment of the tariff violation?**

26 A. As I previously pointed out, customers have been harmed by Evergy Missouri West allowing
27 Nucor Sedalia to participate in the MEEIA BDR Program through Evergy's increased
28 earnings opportunity and the violation of its tariff. Mr. File's suggestion that the avoided costs
29 outweigh the incentive costs and, therefore, no harm to customers exists is a way to excuse

¹⁰ EO-2023-0407 and EO-2023-0408, Brian File, Page 8, Line 7.

¹¹ EO-2023-0407 and EO-2023-0408, Brian File, Page 9, Line 7.

¹² Evergy Missouri West Response to Staff Data Request No. 0031, attached as Schedule MMP-D-3 to my Direct Testimony.

1 Evergy Missouri West’s violation of its SIL tariff sheet. If the Commission were to allow
2 Evergy to violate its tariff simply because in the Company’s view in this instance it did not
3 harm customers, that will necessarily have future impacts on the enforceability of tariffs. As
4 Mr. File points out, BDR programs have a risk of undermining the rate design established by
5 the SIL tariff. The Commission should hold Evergy Missouri West accountable to make sure
6 that this is not an ongoing practice.

7 Along with the violation, the increased earnings opportunity is harmful to customers. The
8 exact monetary value related to the earnings opportunity harm is unknown at this time, but
9 will be specified in my Surrebuttal Testimony.

10 **Q. What other information have you relied on in your evaluation of Evergy Missouri**
11 **West’s SIL tariff violation?**

12 A. I have reviewed § 386.570 RSMo., Missouri’s Violation of Orders statute and § 386.600
13 RSMo., Missouri’s Actions to Recover Penalties and Forfeitures statute.

14 **Q. What is your understanding of the effect of Missouri’s Violation of Orders statute?**

15 A. Though I am no lawyer, my understanding of § 386.570 RSMo., Missouri’s Violation of
16 Orders statute, is that it means that any corporation, person, or public utility that violates the
17 constitution of Missouri, any laws, or any ruling by the Commission, is subject to a penalty
18 of no less than one hundred dollars and no more than two thousand dollars for each offense.
19 Each offense, if continued, is deemed to be a separate offense for every day the corporation,
20 person or utility is in violation.¹³

21 **Q. In following the above statute, what should be the penalty to account for Evergy**
22 **Missouri West’s violation of its tariff?**

23 A. To reach this result, one must look to the number of days that Evergy Missouri West violated
24 its tariff. Evergy began violating its tariff on **_____**¹⁴ and stopped on, at best,
25 September 1, 2023¹⁵. The equates to, at least, 1,187 days in which it was in violation. Using

¹³ Section 386.570, RSMo.

¹⁴ Curtailment start date from Data Response 34 titled “DR0034_CONF_2022 Nucor Sedalia Fully Executed Participation Agreement”.

¹⁵ Data Request No. 31 response, “The customer has been removed from the MEEIA BDR program effective in September 2023.”

1 the highest amount provided for in the statute, the top end of any penalty under § 386.570
2 RSMo. should be \$2,374,000.¹⁶

3 **Q. Who does the penalty get paid to in this instance?**

4 A. Again, though I am no lawyer, my understanding of § 386.600 RSMo. is that all moneys
5 recovered as a penalty are to be paid to the public school fund of the state.¹⁷

6 **Q. Are you suggesting that the Commission impose the \$2,374,000 penalty on top of the
7 disallowance that you are recommending?**

8 A. No. I am simply suggesting that the \$2,374,000 be a guide for the Commission when
9 evaluating a disallowance amount for Evergy Missouri West's next DSIM for violating its
10 tariff and allowing Nucor Sedalia to receive incentives.

11 **Q. Can you summarize your position?**

12 A. Yes. Evergy Missouri West should be held accountable for violating their SIL tariff sheet.
13 The Commission should order an OA in the amount of \$1,137,780 plus \$5,871.18 in interest
14 for Evergy Missouri West's next DSIM filing to account for the unlawful incentives Nucor
15 Sedalia received from its participation in the BDR Program. Once outstanding data requests
16 are received, I will have additional recommendations for a disallowance related to the earnings
17 opportunity awarded to Evergy Missouri West due to Nucor Sedalia's participation. Both, the
18 § 386.570 RSMo., Missouri's Violation of Orders statute and § 386.600 RSMo., Missouri's
19 Actions to Recover Penalties and Forfeitures statute can be used as a guide for the
20 Commission when determining any disallowance for Evergy Missouri West's next DSIM
21 filing.

22 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

23 A. Yes, it does.

¹⁶ \$2,000 multiplied by 1,187 days equals \$2,374,000.

¹⁷ Section 386.600, RSMo.

