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MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

FILE NO. EF-2024-0021

SUR-SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

MITCHELL J. LANSFORD

ON

BEHALF OF

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY

D/B/A AMEREN MISSOURI

St. Louis, Missouri April 2024

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SUR-SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

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1		I. INTRODUCTION
2	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
3	А.	My name is Mitchell Lansford. My business address is One Ameren Plaza,
4	1901 Choutea	au Ave., St. Louis, Missouri.
5	Q.	By whom are you employed and what is your position?
6	А.	I am employed by Ameren Services Company as Director of Financial
7	Reporting and	d Regulatory Accounting.
8	Q.	Are you the same Mitchell J. Lansford who submitted direct and
9	surrebuttal (testimony in this case?
10	А.	Yes, I am.
11		II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY
12	Q.	To what testimony or issues are you responding?
13	А.	I am responding to Office of Public Counsel ("OPC") witness David
14	Murray's surr	rebuttal testimony which disagrees with my direct testimony and its analysis
15	regarding the	net present value ("NPV") of benefits expected to result from securitization,
16	as compared	to traditional financing and recovery of the costs for which we seek
17	securitization	in this case.

1 III. **BENEFITS OF SECURTIZATION** 2 Please describe the NPV analyses performed by Mr. Murry in his **Q**. 3 surrebuttal testimony. 4 Mr. Murray produced new modeling in his surrebuttal testimony and A. 5 concludes that if the Company were allowed to finance and recover its remaining 6 investment in the Rush Island Energy Center at the Company's weighted-average-cost-of-7 capital ("WACC") (through a mix of debt and equity as the Company finances all of its 8 other long-term investments) there would be net present value benefits to customers 9 resulting instead from a securitization transaction. Mr. Murray goes on to take the position, 10 which he did not do in his rebuttal testimony, that the Company should not be allowed to

finance and recover its remaining investment at the Company's WACC and instead that financing rate should be limited to the Company's historical cost of debt as of December 31, 2023. Based on this assumption, Mr. Murray calculates that customers would not benefit (on a net present value basis) from the securitization of the Company's unrecovered investment in the Rush Island Energy Center.

Q. Practically speaking, could the Company finance and recover its remaining investment at the 4.05% historical cost of debt Mr. Murray suggests?

A. Absolutely not. As I explained in my rebuttal testimony and, as Mr. Murray appears to agree, the Company's existing investment is financed via a mix of debt and equity. Simply put, the Company's existing investment is financed at the Company's WACC. Without a time machine, the Company cannot refinance this investment as debt only, let alone at a blended *historical* debt rate.¹

¹ The Company's 4.05% debt rate utilized by Mr. Murray in his analysis is derived from approximately 20 debt issuances that have occurred over approximately the last 30 years.

1	Q. Is there any precedent where the Commission has ordered a utility to
2	recover over \$500 million of its remaining investment in an asset over a fifteen-year-
3	period while only recovering its cost of debt (as opposed to WACC) during that term?
4	A. Not to my knowledge. Mr. Murray references File No. ER-2022-0129
5	several times in support of his theory that financing and recovery through traditional
6	ratemaking must result in financing at a utility's historical debt rate and recovery of those
7	financing costs and the remaining balance, both over a 15-year-term. However, that case
8	involved an unrecovered investment that was far less and regarding the term of recovery
9	the Commission found the following:
10 11 12 13 14	[T]he question before the Commission is whether it is appropriate to make Evergy wait 17 to 20 years for a full return of its unrecovered investment absent any return on those amounts. The Commission does not find this result reasonable. Evergy should be allowed a return of these amounts as quickly as practicable.
15	The conclusion the Commission reached in this Evergy case is far less applicable than the
16	Commission's approval of the securitization of Liberty's Asbury plant, as I referenced in
17	my rebuttal testimony and as Mr. Murray has chosen to selectively ignore. Confronted with
18	facts quite similar to those present in this case, the Commission used Liberty's WACC for
19	the unrecovered Asbury Plant balance in determining that securitization of that balance
20	provided NPV benefits for customers as compared to traditional financing and recovery.
21	Q. What is the lowest interest rate the Company could refinance its
22	existing investment at?
23	A. The lowest rate available for such a refinance is the securitized interest rate
24	(estimated at 5.59% at the time of the Company's direct testimony in this case). The only

Sur-Surrebuttal Testimony of Mitchell J. Lansford

way the Company can achieve that lowest rate is through Commission approval in this
 case.

Q. What are the practical implications of accepting Mr. Murray's position that financing and recovery under traditional ratemaking must occur at the Company's historical debt rate instead of the Company's WACC?

6 A. No securitization could ever occur in a rising interest rate environment. 7 Assuming Mr. Murray's surrebuttal position, it is an intuitive conclusion that if the 8 securitized interest rate were to exceed a utility's historical debt rate, then unless a model 9 has a critical flaw, it should show that securitization is more costly than financing and 10 recovery through traditional ratemaking.²

Under Mr. Murray's traditional financing and recovery scenario, utilities would experience losses equal to the difference between actual carrying costs (its WACC) and his allowed debt return. Those losses would reduce funds from operations and erode utility credit metrics. Erosion of utility credit metrics can result in downgrades to creditworthiness, a higher future cost of debt, and greater costs to customers.³

Q. Is it reasonable to assume lawmakers intended to pass a law that allows
for securitization only when interest rates are *declining*?

18 A. No.

² File No. EF-2024-0021, David Murray Surrebuttal Testimony, p. 3, ll. 1-10 applied this same logic. ³ None of these factors have been considered in Mr. Murray's analyses. An adjustment to the Company's capital structure in a future rate review in acknowledgement of 100% debt financing of this asset would be necessary to address these factors. The result would be that all of the Company's other investments would be financed at a greater equity percentage and result in greater costs to customers, holding all other factors constant.

1

Q. Over the past few years have interest rates increased or decreased?

A. It is common knowledge that interest rates have increased over the past few years. In fact, when the securitization statute was enacted, interest rates were at historic lows and no rational lawmaker would have expected them to stay that low indefinitely into the future as the statute was to be applied. Additionally, and as the record in this case reflects, the Company's debt rate has increased over this period. This is reflective of the macro trend in interest rates.

8

Q. Do you have any other concerns about Mr. Murray's new modeling?

9 A. Yes. In the limited time afforded to review his six schedules there are 10 several causes for concern.

11 In every instance of his schedules labeled as "securitization revenue 12 requirement for early retirement" Mr. Murray has reflected Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes ("ADIT") in a manner that is inconsistent with the 13 14 securitization statute and any position of any party in this case (including OPC's own position). Mr. Murray has reduced energy transition costs by the full value 15 16 of ADIT, without regard for calculation of the net present value of tax benefits arising from ADIT.⁴ He's up front about how he considered ADIT in his 17 18 traditional financing and recovery ratemaking scenario, as can be viewed on 19 page 9 line 13 of his surrebuttal testimony, but noticeably silent on ADIT in 20 subsequent sections describing his assumptions as they relate to securitization.

⁴ For example, lines 19 and 20 of Schedule DM-S-5 rely on a calculation from line 12 and the totals in line 12 rely on the result from line 9. Line 9 reflects his calculation of rate base where the ADIT balance in line 8 has been subtracted from the net plant total in line 3.

1	•	In Schedules DM-S-6 and DM-S-7 Mr. Murray fails to consider the impact of
2		OPC's proposed \$34 million plant disallowance on ADIT, by calculating ADIT
3		before, or separate from, that proposed disallowance.

4

• Mr. Murray's schedules rely on an unsupported discount rate of 5%.

5 While there are potentially other issues that I have yet to identify, each of these 6 concerns contribute to biasing Mr. Murray's analyses against securitization when compared to Staff and the Company's calculations.⁵ Mr. Murray demonstrates this bias against 7 8 securitization himself through the results of his Schedule DM-S-2, where he calculates the 9 NPV benefits of securitization under his methods using the Company's inputs from my 10 direct testimony. Mr. Murray calculates NPV benefits of approximately \$70 million as 11 compared to the Company's calculations of approximately \$76 million of customer benefits 12 from securitization. This erosion of \$6 million of NPV demonstrates OPC's bias against securitization in its analyses.⁶ OPC has offered no rebuttal, surrebuttal, explanation, or 13 14 criticism of Staff's or the Company's calculations that would explain this difference.

15

IV. CONCLUSION

- 16 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
- 17 A. Yes, it does.

⁵ Staff's calculations are the same as the Company's but rely on slightly different inputs as described throughout its testimony in this case.

⁶ File No. EF-2024-0021, David Murray Surrebuttal Testimony, p. 5, l. 15 through p. 6, l. 12 This bias more than overcomes the counter effect Mr. Murray describes in his surrebuttal testimony resulting from declining rate base over time, as compared to levelized payments.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of the Petition of Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri for a Financing Order Authorizing the Issue of Securitized Utility Tariff Bonds for Energy Transition Costs related to Rush Island Energy Center.

EF-2024-0021

AFFIDAVIT OF MITCHELL J. LANSFORD

STATE OF MISSOURI)) ss CITY OF ST. LOUIS)

Mitchell J. Lansford, being first duly sworn on his oath, states:

My name is Mitchell J. Lansford, and hereby declare on oath that I am of sound mind and lawful age; that I have prepared the foregoing *Sur-Surrebuttal Testimony*; and further, under the penalty of perjury, that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

<u>/s/ Mitchell J. Lansford</u> Mitchell J. Lansford

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Sworn to me this <u>4th</u> day of <u>April</u> 2024.