

Exhibit No.:
Issue: Response to Staff Report
Witness: Brian A. File
Type of Exhibit: Surrebuttal Testimony
Sponsoring Party: Evergy Missouri Metro and Evergy
Missouri West
Case No.: EO-2023-0407 / 0408
Date Testimony Prepared: April 29, 2024

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CASE NOS.: EO-2023-0407 / 0408

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

BRIAN A. FILE

ON BEHALF OF

EVERGY MISSOURI METRO and EVERGY MISSOURI WEST

**Kansas City, Missouri
April 2024**

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OF

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Case Nos. EO-2023-0407 / 0408

1 **Q: Please state your name and business address.**

2 A: My name is Brian A. File. My business address is 1200 Main, Kansas City, Missouri
3 64105.

4 **Q: Are you the same Brian A. File who previously filed Direct testimony in this case on**
5 **February 27, 2024?**

6 A: Yes, I am.

7 **Q: On whose behalf are you testifying?**

8 A: I am testifying on behalf of Evergy Missouri Metro (“MO Metro”) and Evergy Missouri
9 West (“MO West”) (collectively referred to as “Company” or “Evergy”).

10 **Q: What is the purpose of your testimony?**

11 A: The purpose of my testimony is to respond to the Commission Staff (“Staff”) and Office
12 of the Public Counsel (“OPC”) rebuttal testimony proposing disallowances related to
13 relevant expenses to deliver MEEIA programs and proposed disallowances related to
14 Nucor-Sedalia’s Business Demand Response program participation.¹

15 **Q: Do you have a response to Ms. Conner’s argument that Implementation Contractor’s**
16 **expenses should be disallowed and could have happened without MEEIA?**

17 A: I appreciate and agree that there should be oversight of implementation contractors’ costs,
18 because in fact it is our fiscal responsibility to manage our MEEIA budgets (including all

¹ See Manzell M. Payne Rebuttal Testimony, p. 4, lns. 1-10. Disallowance discussed in this testimony is related to Nucor-Sedalia site.

1 costs) to the regulatory parameters set. The logic that we would have incurred the costs
2 from MEEIA program implementers without MEEIA does not make logical sense to me.
3 There is a clear tie that these contractors would not be working for Evergy in this capacity
4 without MEEIA, so we are abiding by the guiding principle agreed upon between Staff,
5 stakeholders and Evergy².

6 **Q: Mr. Hull asserts that Nucor-Sedalia’s demand savings are deemed³. Is that correct?**

7 A: No. The demand savings for Nucor-Sedalia were measured for each event using AMI data
8 specific to Nucor-Sedalia’s participation. The savings are not deemed. It is possible that
9 Mr. Hull is confusing the Technical Resource Manual use in the MEEIA EM&V construct
10 with how participation in the Business Demand Response program is measured. Business
11 Demand Response program impacts (in this case kW demand reduction) are measured by
12 a third-party contractor, which is then reviewed by Staff’s auditor, for each Business
13 Demand Response customer based on the events the customer participated using interval
14 meter data - specific to that customer.

15 **Q: How do you respond to Mr. Hull’s assertion that “Staff has not been provided any
16 real evidence showing how customer bills were inherently lowered by Nucor-Sedalia
17 being able to participate”⁴ in the Business Demand Response program?**

18 A: Staff’s statement seems to signal they are missing how DSM relates to Integrated Resource
19 Plan (“IRP”) planning. At a very basic level, the Business Demand Response program,
20 which is just one program within our MEEIA portfolio, is offered to our business customers
21 to reduce peak demand during the summer, which drives Evergy’s ability to defer new

²See, *Unanimous Partial Stipulation and Agreement*, MEEIA Cycle 2 Second Prudence Review Evergy Metro and West, p. 3 paragraph 4, File No. EO-2020-0227.

³ Jordan Hull Rebuttal testimony, p. 2, lns. 14-15.

⁴ Id., p. 2, lns. 10-11.

1 supply-side resources. Nucor-Sedalia reduced significant load through the Business
2 Demand Response program. Evergy's IRP evaluates many plans and scenarios – which
3 includes DSM and the Business Demand Response program. The IRP selects the plan that
4 minimizes the net present value of revenue requirements. Again, at a very basic level, the
5 selected plan is sought to be the plan that minimizes customer bill impact; aka how much
6 customers ultimately pay in the long run through their bill for said resources. I disagree
7 with Staff that they have not seen any evidence – they have indeed through our IRP
8 planning process.

9 **Q: Can we draw a direct line from that to Nucor-Sedalia's participation?**

10 A: Yes, let's keep playing out the Nucor situation to follow how benefits happen. The benefits
11 from demand reduction by Evergy's customers through MEEIA programs come through
12 resource adequacy planning with Southwest Power Pool. Those benefits develop as we
13 build both demand-side programs over time and evaluate supply-side resource needs. It is
14 important to recognize that demand-side programs must be developed before supply-side
15 needs are critical. It is not realistic for Staff to assume that benefits of DSM realized are
16 simultaneous with the incurrence of MEEIA costs. Otherwise, it would mean that we would
17 always be chasing capacity through the market or building more expensive supply-side
18 options (versus demand-side). I don't believe there is a utility operator, regulator or
19 customer who would find it to be prudent and reasonable to so closely tie supply and
20 demand for generation resources.

1 **Q: Isn't the avoided capacity cost used in the MEEIA process just a "theoretical benefit"**⁵
2 **though as Mr. Hull describes?**

3 A: Absolutely not. Again, I am surprised by this statement because Staff doesn't fully take
4 into account how DSM is used in the utility planning process and why it is relied upon as
5 a resource. Mr. Hull's comment undercuts the entire foundation of demand-side
6 management; it does not recognize the importance of benefit/cost tests; nor does it acclaim
7 MEEIA and prior Commission approvals on DSM. The avoided cost and benefit issue has
8 been presented to the Commission multiple times recently (KCP&L/GMO Cycle 2,
9 Ameren Cycle 2, Evergy Cycle 3, Ameren Cycle 3). In Evergy's MEEIA Cycle 3, the
10 Commission specifically ordered that the use of the avoided capacity costs of market prices
11 was the best to utilize in terms of **valuing** demand-side reductions⁶. To value means to
12 ascribe importance, worth or benefit. The standard approved by the Commission is exactly
13 how I demonstrated in my Direct testimony that Nucor-Sedalia's demand reduction was
14 beneficial to all customers using the avoided cost approved in MO West's MEEIA Cycle
15 3. Now, this value would be even greater if Evergy were to request a change to the SIL
16 tariff contract allowing Nucor-Sedalia to participate in future years.

17 **Q: What do you mean by your comment that the value is now greater if Nucor-Sedalia**
18 **were to participate?**

19 A: At the time of the Evergy MEEIA Cycle 3 Order (March 2020), the capacity position of SPP
20 and Evergy is different than of that in the short-term. As will likely be discussed in future
21 MEEIA cases, a few new drivers, (e.g., increased extreme weather risks, increased reserve

⁵ Jordan Hull Rebuttal testimony, p. 3, ln. 3.

⁶ *Amended Report and Order*, issued March 11, 2020, p. 26, paragraph 3, File Nos. EO-2019-0132/0133.

1 capacity needs, accreditation modeling, new large customer loads), have developed to
2 make capacity more valuable in the short- and medium- term.

3 **Q: Why should the Commission allow Evergy to earn an earnings opportunity for Nucor-**
4 **Sedalia's participation in the Business Demand Response program in this case if the**
5 **SIL tariff prohibited participation in the program?**

6 A: It should be evident to the Commission that Nucor-Sedalia's participation in the program
7 reduced overall system peak demand (net of other changes) and created value for all
8 customers as I addressed above. However, I will further elaborate on this point. Assuming
9 that we can all agree that the Nucor-Sedalia did in fact reduce demand during the review
10 period (which independent third-party evaluators analyzed from AMI data and Staff's
11 auditor reviewed), then the mechanism for Evergy to recover earnings opportunity still
12 exists in the earnings opportunity matrix approved by the Commission in this case. The
13 fact that Nucor-Sedalia created value for all customers from its demand reduction through
14 its participation in the Business Demand program should mean that the Company should
15 receive the earnings opportunity associated with their demand reduction.

16 **Q: If the Commission disallows Evergy's earnings opportunity associated with Nucor-**
17 **Sedalia's demand reduction through its participation in the Business Demand**
18 **program, how should the Commission handle the corresponding customer benefit**
19 **from the participation?**

20 A: It seems the Staff is advocating to "clear the slate" as if Nucor-Sedalia's Business Demand
21 Response program participation never happened thereby removing the portion of benefits
22 that all customers received from Nucor-Sedalia's participation. Following Staff's logic,
23 the Commission should also remove all the benefits that all customers received as part of

1 Nucor-Sedalia's participation. In this case we would have to charge back to customers the
2 cost of capacity that was approved by the Cycle 3 Order as Evergy would have had to
3 procure that instead. To be clear, I am not advocating for removal of customer benefits in
4 this case, but I am explaining how this line of thinking is illogical.

5 **Q: OPC witness Payne discusses the Commission's statutory penalty authority at pp. 8-**
6 **9 of his rebuttal testimony. Please respond.**

7 A: This topic is a legal matter. The Company will address in its briefs the Commission's
8 imposition of penalties in past cases. However, I would like to stress that in this case that
9 the Nucor-Sedalia's participation in the Business Demand Response program was not
10 detrimental to the public safety and had no detrimental impact on other customers. To the
11 contrary, all customers benefitted from Nucor-Sedalia's participation in the Business
12 Demand Response program. While the Company may have inadvertently allowed Nucor-
13 Sedalia to participate in the Business Demand Response program, there was no harm to
14 other customers, and instead the participation produced a system-wide benefit.

15 **Q: Do you agree with OPC's calculation of the maximum penalty (\$2,000 multiplied by**
16 **1,187 days equals \$2,374,000) that the Commission could order in this case?**

17 A: No. Aside from the fact that that kind of penalty would be completely inappropriate for
18 inadvertently permitting a customer to participate in DSM program, the number of potential
19 days of violation is grossly overstated by Mr. Payne. Nucor-Sedalia participated in
20 Business Demand Response on four days in 2021 and seven days in 2022 for a total of 11
21 days during the review period.

1 **Q: Do you agree that OPC’s calculation of the maximum penalty “should be a guide for**
2 **the Commission when evaluating a disallowance amount for Evergy Missouri West’s**
3 **next DSIM for violating its tariff and allowing Nucor-Sedalia to receive incentives?”**
4 **(p. 9, Manzell Rebuttal)**

5 A: No. Not only does the amount not provide any guidance for this case since the Company’s
6 actions were inadvertent, it is also not applicable for evaluating the Company’s next DSIM.

7 **Q: Does that conclude your testimony?**

8 A: Yes, it does.

