Exhibit No.:

Issue: Prudence: State Line

Construction

Witness: Mark L. Oligschlaeger

Sponsoring Party: MoPSC Staff

Type of Exhibit: Surrebuttal Testimony

Case No.: ER-2001-299

Date Testimony Prepared: May 17, 2001

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION UTILITY SERVICES DIVISION

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

MARK L. OLIGSCHLAEGER

THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY

CASE NO. ER-2001-299

Jefferson City, Missouri May 2001

1	SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY				
2	OF				
3	MARK L. OLIGSCHLAEGER				
4	THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY				
5	CASE NO. ER-2001-299				
6	Q. Please state your name and business address.				
7	A. Mark L. Oligschlaeger, P.O. Box 360, Suite 440, Jefferson City, MO				
8	65102.				
9	Q. Are you the same Mark L. Oligschlaeger who has previously filed direct				
10	testimony in this proceeding?				
11	A. Yes, I am.				
12	Q. What is the purpose of this surrebuttal testimony?				
13	A. The purpose of this testimony is to address the rebuttal testimony filed by				
14	The Empire District Electric Company's (Empire or Company) witnesses Brad P.				
15	Beecher, Natalie Rolph and Jim E. Wilson concerning the issue of State Line Combined				
16	Cycle (SLCC) unit costs.				
17	In particular, I will address the following points:				
18	1. The standard of prudence used by the Commission is intended for the				
19	protection of ratepayers and, accordingly, logically must apply to both				
20	Empire and its hired contractors on projects such as the SLCC unit.				
21	2. Use of "industry comparisons" does not and cannot demonstrate the				
22	prudence of Empire's or its contractor's management of the				
23	construction of the SLCC unit project or the unit's resulting costs.				

I will also briefly comment on some of the statements made by the Empire rebuttal witnesses attempting to contrast past Commission decisions concerning construction costs to issues involving the SLCC unit.

- Q. On page 16 of his rebuttal testimony, Empire witness Beecher states that "[n]one of the variances from the original estimate are the result of Empire making an improper or imprudent decision". Does the Staff agree that this is a crucial point in assigning responsibility between shareholders and ratepayers for cost overruns for the SLCC unit project for rate purposes?
- A. No. Staff witness Cary G. Featherstone does address Empire's decision-making as it involved Fru-Con Construction Corporation (Fru-Con), a major contractor on the SLCC unit project, in his surrebuttal testimony. However, regardless of each of Empire's decisions with respect to Fru-Con and the SLCC unit project, the Staff believes that the cost overruns associated with Fru-Con's scope of work on the SLCC unit project were incurred imprudently, and should not be assigned to Empire's customers for rate purposes.
- Q. Is it a requirement that the Commission find that Empire specifically acted in an imprudent manner before disallowing the cost overrun amounts at issue for SLCC in this case?
- A. No, not in the Staff's opinion. The Staff believes that the prudence standard should apply both to Empire and to its contractors on the SLCC unit project. This is because the risk of inadequate performance on a construction project causing cost overruns is properly placed on the utility, not its ratepayers. Further, this point should hold whether the inadequate performance was associated with the utility itself or its

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contractors. Otherwise, the result would be that customers would be protected from detrimental cost impacts of imprudent actions or decisions made by regulated utilities, but would be expected to pay in rates the adverse consequences of imprudent actions or decisions made by construction project contractors that are hired by regulated utilities and, in fact, are accountable only to the regulated utilities. Such a result is illogical.

- Q. Why should customers not be responsible for cost overruns associated with inadequate performance by contractors on major construction projects?
- It is entirely the responsibility of the utility to manage the construction A. project so that the generating plant is capable at providing a reliable supply of power at the least reasonable cost. Part of this overall responsibility consists of selecting qualified contractors and sub-contractors to assist in the design and the construction of the production facility, as well as entering into contractual agreements with the contractors and sub-contractors to define each parties' scope of work and responsibilities for the project, and setting forth penalty provisions to enforce sanctions if a party to a contract does not live up to its responsibilities under the contract. Including penalty provisions in contracts is obviously intended to attempt to shield Empire, and ultimately its customers, from detrimental impacts of inadequate performance by contractors. To the extent that Empire or other utilities fail to enter into contracts that serve to protect their and their customers' interests, or if Empire or other utilities fail to enforce the provisions in those contracts, it would be inappropriate to pass on the additional costs associated with those actions on to customers, who as a body have no responsibility for management of construction projects.

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Q. Did Empire enter into such contracts with its major contractors on the SLCC unit project?

A. Yes, it did. For example, the Company's contract with Fru-Con contained provisions allowing Empire to terminate Fru-Con for "default" or "convenience". It is my understanding that a termination for "default" would result from Fru-Con's inability or unwillingness to live up to its responsibilities under the contract, and that Fru-Con would be liable to Empire for all costs that it incurred for work that was within the scope of the Fru-Con/Empire contract. In contrast, it is my understanding that a termination for "convenience" would merely require that Empire decide that it no longer needed Fru-Con's services on the SLCC unit project. Such a decision would not require that Fru-Con had in any way materially violated the terms of the contract. In the event of a termination for "convenience", Fru-Con would be entitled to compensation from Empire for cancellation costs as set out in the contract, plus an additional fee of 8% of substantiated and unbilled costs to that point.

Q. Did Empire ultimately terminate Fru-Con for "default" on the SLCC unit project?

A. Empire notified Fru-Con that it was in "default" under the contract in April 2000. The direct testimony of Staff witness Cary G. Featherstone contains a narrative of the events that led to Fru-Con's termination. The Staff believes that it is very clear from Empire's correspondence with Fru-Con in March and April 2000 that Empire intended its termination to be for "default" under the Fru-Con contract, not for "convenience". Empire's decision to terminate Fru-Con is fully supported by the rebuttal testimony filed by Company witness Wilson in this proceeding. In that testimony,

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Mr. Wilson describes the myriad of problems Empire encountered with Fru-Con's assigned work on the SLCC unit project, and Mr. Wilson's perception that Fru-Con's continued participation in the project could have potentially resulted in unacceptable detrimental financial consequences to Empire, associated with increased construction costs and delays in the project schedule.

The Staff generally with **Empire** witness Wilson's concurs characterization of Fru-Con's performance on the SLCC unit project.

- Did Empire attempt to assign responsibility for cost overruns associated Q. with Fru-Con's performance on the SLCC unit project to Fru-Con following its termination?
- As referenced in the surrebuttal testimony of Staff witness Featherstone, A. Empire apparently initially assumed that it would receive recovery of the detrimental cost impacts of Fru-Con's performance under the SLCC unit contract from Fru-Con itself. However, Empire ultimately decided to enter into a settlement with Fru-Con, and pay it for the work it performed up to the time of termination on the SLCC unit project. The Staff believes this settlement was more indicative of the payment arrangements one might expect under a termination for "convenience".
- Why did Empire agree to give up its rights under the contract with Fru-Q. Con associated with a termination for "default"?
- Based upon the testimony of the Empire witnesses on this issue, Empire A. apparently believed it might not prevail in arbitration or judicial review of its claim against Fru-Con when Fru-Con challenged its termination for "default" made pursuant to the Fru-Con/Empire contract.

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Q. Does Empire's agreement to a settlement with Fru-Con form the basis for a legitimate claim that the cost overruns associated with Fru-Con's work on the SLCC unit project should be paid for by Empire's customers?

- A. No. The Staff believes that there can be no serious dispute of the following points as they involve Empire and Fru-Con:
 - Fru-Con's work on the SLCC unit project was not in conformance with the terms of its contract with Empire, and was unacceptable and imprudent by any reasonable standard; and
 - 2. Fru-Con's work on the SLCC unit project through April 2000, and Empire's decision to terminate Fru-Con, caused cost overruns on the project that would not have occurred if Fru-Con had met its contractual responsibilities on the SLCC unit project in an appropriate manner.

Given these points, it is irrelevant whether Empire subsequent decision to absolve Fru-Con of its responsibilities under the contract for termination for "default" was good or bad, prudent or unwise. Those cost overruns, by their very nature, should not be assigned to customers under reasonable regulatory principles.

- Q. Please explain.
- A. It is a fundamental axiom of utility regulation that customers, who do not have choices in utility service providers, should not pay for costs that are unnecessary to provision of utility service, or that were incurred imprudently by the utility supplier. This axiom is based upon a belief that the existence of competitive markets serves to protect consumers from unnecessary costs, or necessary but excessive costs associated with

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production of the competitive project. Regulation serves as the mechanism to replace the competitive market and protect customers from unnecessary and/or excessive cost levels when the product offered is of an essential nature to consumers and a natural monopoly.

The cost overruns on the SLCC unit project were by no stretch of the imagination inherent and/or unavoidable. They resulted either from a deliberate approach by Fru-Con not to meet its responsibilities to Empire on the SLCC unit project, or an inability of Fru-Con to successfully perform the work. The decision by Empire not to seek reimbursement for cost overruns from Fru-Con, and instead to seek recovery from its ratepayers for these costs, was a voluntary choice of the Company, as well. The costs at issue here are therefore not akin to "Acts of God" or natural disasters; they are instead the product of the failure of Fru-Con to live up to their contractual obligations for the SLCC unit project, and Empire's decision not to seek full reimbursement from Fru-Con for the detrimental impact. The costs at issue here also cannot be considered to be part of a "normal" construction process, where mistakes might happen, things may not proceed strictly according to plan and some unanticipated costs may be incurred. These "normal" types of events can be considered in the budgeting process for a construction project through a "contingency" amount. In contrast, the failure of a contractor to perform in an acceptable manner to the degree displayed by Fru-Con on the SLCC unit project is, from the Staff's experience, highly unusual.

For all of these reasons, the Fru-Con cost overruns at issue in this proceeding are inappropriate for inclusion in customer rates.

- Q. Your testimony so far has addressed only cost overruns associated with Fru-Con. Does this imply that the Staff is recommending rate recovery of the remaining SLCC unit cost overruns?
- A. No, not at this time. The Staff may recommend rate recovery of some or all of the remaining SLCC unit cost overruns at such time that Empire adequately explains the causes for and justifies the existence of the other cost overruns. This point is explained in the surrebuttal testimony of Staff witness Featherstone.
- Q. Do Empire witnesses in their surrebuttal testimony use "industry comparisons" in an attempt to justify inclusion of SLCC unit cost overruns in rates?
- A. Yes. Company witness Beecher offers a comparison of projected costs of other combined cycle units to the current projected cost of Empire's SLCC unit project. Empire witness Rolph compares the current SLCC unit cost projection (on a \$/kw basis) to a similar measurement of combined-cycle costs for other units. Both witnesses claim that these industry comparisons show the SLCC unit project in a favorable light.
- Q. Has the Commission rejected the use of industry comparisons in past construction cost cases to attempt to justify inclusion of cost overruns in customer rates?
- A. Yes, as conceded by Empire witness Beecher on page 5 of his rebuttal testimony. Nonetheless, Mr. Beecher states that such analyses can be used as a "tool" by the Commission to determine if SLCC unit costs are just and reasonable.
 - Q. Does the Staff agree with this statement?

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A. No. The Staff does not believe that data from industry comparisons constitute a legitimate means of determining whether construction costs should be reflected in rates.

Q. Why has the Commission rejected the use of industry comparisons in reviewing rate recovery of cost overruns in past rate proceedings?

A. In both the Union Electric Company (now AmerenUE) and Kansas City Power & Light Company (KCPL) nuclear generating rate cases in the 1980s, those companies attempted to justify the amount of cost overruns experienced at those generating units by making favorable comparisons between the total cost of their units to the costs experienced at other nuclear generating units around the country. Commission rejected these comparisons. At page 12 of its Report and Order in Case Nos. EO-85-160 and EO-85-17, Union Electric Company (UE), the Commission stated as follows:

> The Commission determines that no industry standard of prudence has been established by UE. Over 100 nuclear plants have been cancelled since 1972. Some have been fraught with problems while others have been relatively successful. Mr. Schnell's schedule showing nuclear plant costs, excluding AFUDC, range from \$1,121 per kilowatt to \$3,491 per kilowatt. The average plant does not exist. No evidence was produced to show prudent management at any of the plants used in the schedules showing industry averages. The Commission concludes that industry averages do not create an industry standard of prudence.

- Q. Does the above quote from the Commission also apply to the industry comparisons discussed by Mr. Beecher and Ms. Rolph?
- A. Yes. No evidence has been introduced in this proceeding as to what a comparable "average" combined cycle unit should cost, as a relevant comparison to the

specific projected costs of the SLCC unit project. This fact is particularly relevant in that Company witness Rolph in her rebuttal testimony discusses at pages 5-6 some factors that lead to different capital cost levels for combined cycle units. Furthermore, there has been no evidence introduced in this proceeding concerning the prudence, or the lack thereof, of the construction management and construction costs of the other combined cycle units cited by Mr. Beecher and Ms. Rolph. Even if it could be considered relevant to the Commission's consideration of the cost overruns incurred at the SLCC unit project, the bare bones industry comparison information provided by the Empire witnesses in their rebuttal testimony is wholly inadequate to providing the basis for any type of intelligent comparison between the facts and circumstances that led to the level of costs incurred at the SLCC unit project, and the facts and circumstances underlying the level of costs at the other combined cycle units.

Q. Are there circumstances in which a demonstration that the construction costs of a generating unit are less than an industry average would be an appropriate response to an allegation of imprudence?

A. I believe not. If it were satisfactorily shown that a utility has been imprudent in its management of some aspect of power plant construction, that fact would not somehow be negated by a favorable overall comparison of that unit's costs to an industry average. Seen in its best light, the utility's argument would seem to be that its imprudence in some aspect of the unit construction was offset by superior performance in another aspect or aspects of that construction. Even if that were a relevant point, in this proceeding Empire has certainly not pointed to any factors within its control that have

date for the SLCC unit.

costs, and totally unsubstantiated.

allegedly caused it to "outperform" the industry average in the construction costs for the SLCC unit.

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Q. Please comment on Ms. Rolph's specific industry comparison.

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A. In her rebuttal testimony, Company witness Rolph presents an expected range of "all-in" capital costs for a combined cycle unit coming on-line in the summer of 2001 of \$480 - \$560 per kw, and compares that to a forecasted cost of the SLCC unit of \$520 per kw. She further presents an alleged \$90/kW advantage for SLCC compared to combined cycle units coming on-line in the six months following the expected in-service

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There has been no support provided by Ms. Rolph in her testimony, or in workpapers that are normally provided concurrently with testimony, to support any of the

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estimates referenced in Ms. Rolph's testimony. Accordingly, Ms. Rolph's conclusions

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concerning the costs of the SLCC unit are both irrelevant concerning the prudence of the

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Q. Please comment on Mr. Beecher's use of industry comparisons in his

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rebuttal testimony.

A. Empire witness Beecher presents cost data concerning 17 combined cycle

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units scheduled to come on-line between 2000 and 2004. Mr. Beecher explains that the data concerning these units was obtained through a review of "press releases" issued by

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the plant owners. He asserts that the SLCC unit's cost compares favorably with the other

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17 units.

As discussed before, it is not clear from the information provided by Mr. Beecher how comparable these other combined cycle projects are to the SLCC unit.

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In particular, the Staff questions why SLCC should be compared to plants coming on-line as late as 2004. Both Empire witnesses Beecher and Rolph go into some detail as to the current rapidly escalating cost environment for combined cycle units. If this is accurate, it stands to reason that the SLCC project would cost less than similar plants coming online in 2002, 2003 and 2004. Under the terms of Mr. Beecher's analysis, what is not clear is why Empire should be given "credit" for the fact that its load growth required the addition of new generating capacity in 2001, compared to other constructors who plan to add generating capacity in later years, or why that "credit" should be thought to somehow offsets the additional costs associated with inadequate performance by Empire and/or its contractors on the SLCC unit site.

Mr. Beecher also did not provide workpapers or source documents to the Staff to support the industry comparison conclusions he reaches in his rebuttal testimony.

- Q. On pages 9-10 of his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Beecher attempts to contrast Empire's alleged aggressiveness with contractors on the SLCC unit project with the lack of aggressiveness of KCPL with its contractors concerning the Wolf Creek generating unit, which the Commission criticized in its Report and Order in Case Nos. EO-85-185 and EO-85-224. Is Mr. Beecher's point valid?
- A. No. Concerning the Wolf Creek project, KCPL was not the managing construction partner; Kansas Gas & Electric Company was. Therefore, KCPL's role in the Wolf Creek project was roughly analogous to that on the SLCC unit project of Westar Generating, Inc., the owner of 40% of SLCC's capacity. KCPL and Empire are not directly comparable in their roles in the construction of Wolf Creek and SLCC, respectively.

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Q. Is Empire's "aggressiveness" on the SLCC unit project the crux of this issue in any case, in the Staff's opinion?

A. No. Again, Empire's management of Fru-Con on the SLCC unit project is addressed in Staff witness Featherstone's surrebuttal testimony. In the hypothetical situation where a utility company is entirely blameless in contractor error or imprudence that resulted in material cost overruns, the Staff's position is that the cost of such errors or imprudence should be recovered from the party at fault. In the event that is not possible, or the utility voluntarily decides to forego recovery of the additional costs from its contractor, then the utility's shareholders should bear the additional costs associated with the errors or imprudence. A regulated utility's customers should only reimburse a utility in rates for prudent expenditures that are necessary to the provision of utility service.

- Q. Is there a settlement of SLCC unit project cost overrun issues between Empire, the Staff and the Office of the Public Counsel?
- Yes, tentatively. The parties expect that a stipulation and agreement A. resolving these issues will be filed by these parties shortly. The content of this tentative settlement is discussed in the surrebuttal testimony of Staff witness Featherstone.
 - Q. Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?
 - A. Yes, it does.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

	In the Matter of the Application of The Empire District Electric Company for a General Rate Increase.))	Case No. ER-2001-299
	AFFIDAVIT OF MA	.RK L. C	LIGSCHLAEGER
	STATE OF MISSOURI)) ss. COUNTY OF COLE)		
	Mark L. Oligschlaeger, of lawful age the preparation of the foregoing Surrebuted consisting of 13 pages to be present foregoing Surrebuttal Testimony were matters set forth in such answers; and that his knowledge and belief.	uttal Tented in the given by	he above case; that the answers in the y him; that he has knowledge of the
		Mark	MM 2 Olynlyn L. Oligschlaeger
	Subscribed and sworn to before me this	16 th day	y of May 2001.
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D SUZIE MANKIN NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF MISSOURI COLE COUNTY MY COMMISSION EXP. JUNE 21,2004