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Exhibit No. 21

Missouri-American Water Company – Exhibit 21 Testimony of Robert V. Mustich Rebuttal/Surrebuttal/Sur-Surrebuttal File No. WR-2024-0320 Exhibit No.: Issues: Witness: Exhibit Type: Sponsoring Party: Case No.: Date:

Compensation Robert V. Mustich Rebuttal/Surrebuttal/Sur-Surrebuttal Missouri-American Water Company WR-2024-0320 January 24, 2025

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CASE NO. WR-2024-0320

REBUTTAL/SURREBUTTAL/SUR-SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

ROBERT V. MUSTICH

ON BEHALF OF

MISSOURI-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

AFFIDAVIT

I, Robert V. Mustich, under penalty of perjury, and pursuant to Section 509.030, RSMo, state that I am the Managing Director and East Region Rewards Leader for Willis Towers Watson, that the accompanying testimony has been prepared by me or under my direction and supervision; that if inquiries were made as to the facts in said testimony, I would respond as therein set forth; and that the aforesaid testimony is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Robert Mustich

January 22, 2025 Dated

REBUTTAL/SURREBUTTAL/SUR-SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY ROBERT V. MUSTICH MISSOURI AMERICAN WATER COMPANY CASE NO.: WR-2024-0320

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REBUTTAL/SURREBUTTAL/SUR-SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

ROBERT V. MUSTICH

1		I. INTRODUCTION
2	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
3	A.	My name is Robert Mustich. I am Managing Director and East Region Rewards Business
4		Leader for Willis Towers Watson. My business address is 800 North Glebe Road,
5		Arlington, VA 22203
6		
7	Q.	Are you the same Robert Mustich who previously submitted Direct Testimony in this
8		proceeding?
9	A.	Yes.
10	Q.	On whose behalf are you submitting this testimony?
11	A.	Missouri-American Water Company ("MAWC" or the "Company"), a wholly owned
12		subsidiary of American Water Works Company Inc. ("AWK").
13	Q.	What is the purpose of your Rebuttal/Surrebuttal/Sur-Surrebuttal testimony?
14	А.	The purpose of my testimony is to rebut the testimony of Angela Schaben, who filed
15		testimony on behalf of the Office of the Public Counsel. I will demonstrate that her
16		argument against 100% recovery of both the Annual Performance Plan ("APP") and the
17		Long-term Performance Plan ("LTPP"), is based on a misunderstanding of the role of
18		performance compensation plans in employee total compensation. In addition, she
19		misinterprets my Direct Testimony and the supporting Willis Towers Watson report on
20		MAWC's total compensation.

1 **II. RESPONSE TO INTERVENORS** 2 What is incorrect about Ms. Schaben's understanding of employee total Q. compensation? 3 4 A. Referencing my Direct Testimony, she concludes in her testimony that if base salary is 5 competitive with median market base salary, then performance compensation is not necessary for employee total compensation to be competitive. She fails to recognize that 6 7 performance compensation is virtually universal and while base salary may be competitive on a standalone basis (-5% and -3% below median as shown in the tables below), without 8 9 performance compensation, employee total compensations is below the competitive range 10 in aggregate (-12% and -10%), also shown in the tables below:

Summary of <i>MAWC's Base Salary</i> Only vs. Market Median (National Market Perspective)					
Base Pay	Compensation	Compensation			
-5%	-11%	-12%			

11

Summary of <i>MAWC's Base Salary</i> Only vs. Market Median (Midwest Regional Market Perspective)					
Base Pay	Compensation	Compensation			
-3%	-9%	-10%			

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13 Q. Besides Ms. Schaben being incorrect that MAWC's compensation program is

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competitive if it only comprises base salary, what else is wrong with her testimony regarding performance compensation?

- A. She additionally argues that virtually all of the metrics (financial, operational, customer,
 DEI, etc.) in the performance compensation plans do not directly benefit customers and
 should not be recoverable.
- 6

Q. What is wrong with this argument?

7 A. She fails to recognize the purpose of these plans are to attract and retain a performanceoriented workforce that is provided tangible financial incentives in the form of variable 8 9 performance-based compensation, to improve productivity, efficiency and other desirable goals (such as safety, environmental compliance, customer satisfaction, etc.) that 10 management deems important to conducting a successful business. These plans send 11 powerful messages to employees because their compensation is contingent on these 12 important customer-oriented goals. In the case of the LTPP metrics, the goal is to reduce 13 14 the costs and disruptions associated with employee turnover by providing incentives to remain with the company and improve company performance. As noted in my Direct 15 Testimony, both of MAWC's performance compensation plans are quite common in 16 17 American business and are time-tested and successful ways to increase productivity, efficiency and employee performance while reducing the costs and inefficiencies of 18 employee turnover. In addition, employees expect to participate in such plans since they 19 20 are widely prevalent and the absence of them would make MAWC less competitive from a talent attraction perspective. 21

Q. Both Ms. Schaben and Staff witness Angela Niemeier argue that financial metrics
 primarily benefit shareholders and should not be recovered by the utility from

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ratepayers.¹ Why is this the wrong perspective?

Ms. Schaben argues that the Commission should deny full recovery of performance-based 2 A. compensation to MAWC and attempts to bolster her argument by citing an Illinois-3 American Water rate case ruling, and as discussed by MAWC witness Jody Carlson, Ms. 4 5 Niemeier cites Commission decisions from over 30 years ago. The problem with these 6 narrow viewpoints is that they fail to recognize that compensation programs and perspectives evolve over time and having holistic programs that align to customer, 7 employee and shareholder objectives are mutually beneficial and create sustainable, long 8 9 term positive performance.

Q. You mentioned that Ms. Schaben references an Illinois-American Water rate case
 that the Commerce Commission ruled against recovery of incentive compensation.
 What is your view of Ms. Schaben using this to reinforce her case that performance
 compensation should not be recovered?

A. She fails to mention that other American Water affiliates: West Virginia-American Water
 Company, Indiana-American Water Company, Pennsylvania-American Water Company,
 and Virginia-American Water Company all recover 100% of performance pay in rates.

Q. Do you have other examples where viewpoints on this topic have changed or that
 performance compensation has been accepted by a regulatory authority?

A. Yes. In 2015, the Public Service Commission of West Virginia acknowledged in a rate
 case filed by West Virginia-American Water Company that "[Annual Performance Plans]
 that tie some portion of an employee's compensation to an employee's actual performance
 are prevalent in the compensation packages for larger businesses and [have] become the

¹ Schaben DT/RT, p. 4; Niemeier DT/RT, p. 20.

'norm' for major utility companies." The Public Service Commission of West Virginia 1 further agreed that "the [Annual Performance Plan] is an integral part of the overall 2 compensation plan of [West Virginia-American Water Company] and that the total 3 compensation (the combination of base pay and incentive pay) to eligible employees is 4 5 intended to place that total compensation at or near the market rate for each particular job or salary band." In the 2015 case, the Commission also approved a portion of the 6 company's long-term performance plan costs. In 2021, the Public Service Commission of 7 West Virginia went further in allowing 100% of the demonstrated long-term performance 8 9 compensation in its revenue requirements after concluding that "[i]t is not reasonable to pick one expense and arbitrarily eliminate it or reduce it by 50% because it indirectly 10 benefits shareholders." This was reaffirmed by the Public Service Commission of West 11 Virginia in 2023. This is just one example of the evolution of regulatory acceptance of this 12 compensation methodology. 13

14 Q. Do you have another example of how viewpoints or regulations have changed?

Yes, legislation passed in Texas in 2023 related to the consideration of compensation and 15 A. benefits in establishing the rates of electric utilities. Employee compensation includes base 16 17 salary, wages and incentive compensation. It states: "when establishing an electric utility's rates, the regulatory authority shall presume that employee compensation and benefits 18 19 expenses are reasonable and necessary if the expenses are consistent with market 20 compensation studies issued not earlier than three years before the initiation of the proceeding to establish rates." There are certain items, not included in the term of 21 22 compensation and benefits, but overall total compensation (base salary, APP and LTPP) at 23 a utility for the vast majority of its employees is fully recoverable provided it is

competitively reasonable and consistent with peers, as determined through recent market
 studies. The Willis Towers Watson study of MAWC compensation sited in my Direct
 Testimony is a recent market study.

4Q.Would the recommendation from Ms. Schaben to remove the performance5compensation portion of MAWC's total market-based compensation because she6feels it does not benefit customers directly and is not necessary to provide a7competitive compensation structure impact the Company's compensation structure?

8 A. Yes. It could adversely impact it by encouraging the Company to take an all base salary 9 only approach which would require the Company to increase base salaries to be 10 competitive. It is hard to see how this would benefit customers.

11 Q. Does this conclude your Rebuttal/Surrebuttal/Sur-Surrebuttal Testimony?

12 A. Yes.