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SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

ANN E. BULKLEY

ON BEHALF OF

AMEREN MISSOURI

November 5, 2021

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1

I. INTRODUCTION

2 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

3 A. My name is Ann E. Bulkley. I am Senior Vice President of Concentric Energy Advisors,
4 Inc. ("Concentric"). My business address is 293 Boston Post Road West, Suite 500,
5 Marlborough, Massachusetts 01752.

6 **Q. On whose behalf are you submitting this testimony?**

7 A. I am submitting this testimony on behalf of Ameren Missouri (the "Company"), a wholly-
8 owned subsidiary of Ameren Corporation ("Ameren").

9 **Q. Did you previously provide Direct and Rebuttal testimonies in this proceeding?**

10 A. Yes. I filed Direct Testimony in this proceeding on March 31, 2021. I filed Rebuttal
11 Testimony on October 15, 2021.

12 **Q. What is the purpose of your Surrebuttal Testimony?**

13 A. The purpose of my Surrebuttal Testimony is to respond to the Rebuttal Testimony of the
14 Missouri Public Service Commission Staff ("Staff") witness Peter Chari relating to the
15 authorized return on equity ("ROE"), the Rebuttal Testimony of Staff witness John P.
16 Cassidy relating to the business risk of Ameren Missouri and the Rebuttal Testimony of
17 David Murray on behalf of the Missouri Office of Public Counsel ("OPC").

1 **Q. Are you sponsoring any schedules as part of your Surrebuttal Testimony?**

2 A. Yes, I am sponsoring Schedule AEB-S1, Attachments 1 through 5 to support my
3 Surrebuttal Testimony, which were prepared by me or under my direction.

4 **Q. Please briefly summarize your Surrebuttal Testimony and your key conclusions and**
5 **recommendations regarding the appropriate ROE for Ameren Missouri in this**
6 **proceeding.**

7 A. My key conclusions are as follows:

8 1. Both Mr. Chari and Mr. Murray dedicate many pages of their respective Rebuttal
9 Testimonies to disputing my application of the DCF and CAPM models. Their
10 criticisms should be viewed, however, in the context that neither Mr. Chari nor Mr.
11 Murray rely on the results of any of their own ROE estimation models. Their
12 respective 9.50 percent and 9.00 percent recommendations are not based on any
13 of the assumptions they used to establish their ROE analyses. Rather, each of
14 these witnesses comes to their recommendations by relying completely on
15 subjective analyses.

16 2. Mr. Murray is inconsistent in his interpretation of market conditions. Mr. Murray
17 opposes my conclusion that market conditions have affected the DCF model
18 results, understating ROEs because interest rates are low, influencing investors'
19 decisions. However, Mr. Murray and I have both acknowledged that utility share
20 prices and interest rates are inversely related. This would imply that if interest
21 rates increase over the near-term as expected the cost of equity as estimated by
22 the DCF model will also likely increase. As a result, to the extent that interest rates
23 are expected to increase, it is unreasonable for Mr. Murray to suggest that the
24 results of the DCF model are not currently underestimating the cost of equity in a

1 higher interest rate environment, such as the period that Ameren Missouri's rates
2 will be in effect. My recommended range of results considers the effect of this
3 change in market conditions. Mr. Murray's unwillingness to acknowledge this effect
4 on the DCF model results is in direct conflict with his assumption regarding the
5 relationship between interest rates and utility share prices.

6 3. Mr. Chari opposes my use of earnings per share ("EPS") growth rates in the
7 Constant Growth DCF model because, on average, the EPS growth rates exceed
8 his estimate of the long-term GDP growth rate of 3.70 percent. Mr. Chari contends
9 that a Company is unable to grow at a rate greater than GDP in perpetuity.
10 However, the validity of this critique is entirely based on the assumption that Mr.
11 Chari's estimate of the long-term growth in GDP is correct. Had Mr. Chari
12 estimated GDP using the methodology relied on by Dr. Morin, whom he cites as
13 support for the use of the GDP growth rate in the DCF model, he would have
14 estimated a GDP growth rate of approximately 5.49 percent. A long-term GDP
15 growth rate of 5.49 percent is entirely consistent with the proxy group average EPS
16 growth rates of 5.38 percent and 5.81 percent that I have relied on in my Direct
17 Testimony and Rebuttal Testimony, respectively.

18 4. Mr. Chari claims to rely on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
19 as the basis for his adjustment to the growth rate relied on in my Constant Growth
20 DCF analysis. However, the weightings that Mr. Chari applies are not consistent
21 with FERC's most recent methodology as determined in the Midcontinent
22 Independent System Operator, Inc. ("MISO") transmission owners' case. In
23 Opinion No. 569-A, the FERC adopted a growth rate that places 80 percent weight
24 on EPS growth rate estimates and 20 percent on the long-term GDP growth rate.
25 The FERC noted that this because current electric utility growth rates are closer to

1 estimates of GDP and investors are likely to view electric utility growth rates as
2 more sustainable than gas pipeline growth rates (where the weighting that Mr.
3 Chari relied on continues to be applied).¹ While I do not agree with the GDP growth
4 rate that Mr. Chari selected to develop his Two-Stage DCF Analysis, had Mr. Chari
5 applied the correct FERC weighting, he would have calculated an adjusted growth
6 rate of 5.04 percent² which is 22 basis points greater than the 4.82 percent growth
7 rate he calculated using the incorrect weighting of the short and long-term growth
8 rates.

9 5. In his criticism of my CAPM analysis, Mr. Chari again misrepresents the FERC
10 methodology. Had he applied that methodology correctly, the results of his
11 analyses would fully support the Company's requested ROE. In Opinion No. 569-
12 A, the FERC clearly supports the use of the Constant Growth DCF model with only
13 an estimate of short-term growth- in particular EPS growth rates. In contrast, Mr.
14 Chari applies a Two-Stage model that weights short and long-term growth rates. If
15 Mr. Chari had correctly applied the FERC methodology, he would have estimated
16 a market return of 12.11 percent which 268 basis points higher than the market
17 return of 9.43 percent calculated by Mr. Chari using the Two-Stage DCF analysis.
18 The adjusted market return of 12.11 percent resulted in updated CAPM results that
19 ranged from 9.43 percent to 11.11 percent, a range that supports the range
20 provided in my Direct Testimony and the Company's requested ROE of 9.90
21 percent.

¹ FERC Opinion No. 569-A at para 68.

² $5.38\%*(80\%) + 3.70\%*(20\%)$

- 1 6. Mr. Chari and Mr. Murray ignore historical market return data when they suggest
2 that the market return used in my CAPM analysis is overstated. In addition, Mr.
3 Murray ignores the market returns used in his own sources when he criticizes my
4 analyses. As shown in my Direct Testimony, the market return estimate I relied on
5 is 14.13 percent and the market return estimate using the FERC methodology is
6 12.11 percent. Reviewing historical arithmetic average returns for large company
7 stocks from 1926-2020 demonstrates that the market return has been as high or
8 higher than my estimate at least 50 percent of the years. Further, the Duff and
9 Phelps historical average return of 12.16 percent³ demonstrates that the market
10 return using the FERC approach is not unreasonable. Furthermore, Mr. Murray
11 references the Wilshire 5000 Index in his Rebuttal Testimony. However, it is
12 important to note that the Wilshire 5000 had a ten-year annualized total return as
13 of June 30, 2021, of 14.76⁴ which is consistent with my market return estimate of
14 14.13 percent and slightly higher than the 12.11 percent market return estimated
15 using the FERC approach.
- 16 7. Mr. Chari fails to consider the full range of results from the Bond Yield Risk
17 premium analysis when he concludes that the result from this model supports his
18 recommendation of 9.50 percent. As shown in Schedule AEB-R1, Attachment 7
19 to my Rebuttal Testimony, the low-end of the range of my risk premium analysis
20 based on the 30-day average of the 30-year Treasury Bond yield as of August 31,
21 2021 was 9.50 percent which is equivalent to Mr. Chari's recommendation of 9.50
22 percent. However, reviewing the scenarios that consider the expectation for rising
23 interest rates demonstrates that the Bond Yield Risk Premium analysis in my

³ Source: Duff & Phelps, Valuation Handbook: Guide to Cost of Capital, 2021.

⁴ FT Wilshire 5000 Index Fact Sheet as of June 30, 2021.

1 Rebuttal Testimony results in a range of returns as high as 10.17 percent, which
2 is slightly higher than the Company's 9.90 percent requested return. As a result,
3 my risk premium analysis provides support for the conclusion that Mr. Chari's
4 recommended ROE will understate the cost of equity as interest rates increase
5 and during the period that Ameren Missouri's rates will be in effect.

6 8. Finally, Mr. Chari, Mr. Cassidy and Mr. Murray have all concluded that Ameren
7 Missouri's business risk has been reduced due to Plant-In-Service Accounting
8 ("PISA") and the Renewable Energy Standard Rate Adjustment Mechanism
9 ("RESRAM"). All of these witnesses fail to recognize that the determination of the
10 ROE is based on a comparison of the subject company to a risk-comparable proxy
11 group, using the market data for that proxy group. Because the ROE estimation
12 process involves a comparison to the proxy group, it is necessary that the
13 comparison of risk be on that same basis. Therefore, by failing to consider the
14 relative risk of Ameren Missouri, including the PISA and the RESRAM as
15 compared to the proxy group companies, Mr. Chari, Mr. Cassidy and Mr. Murray
16 have all come to flawed conclusions about the risk of Ameren Missouri. The
17 question is not whether Ameren Missouri has more or less risk after the
18 implementation of the PISA and the RESRAM. The correct comparison is does the
19 Company have more or less risk than the proxy group as a result of the
20 implementation of these mechanisms.

21 Mr. Chari nor Mr. Cassidy nor Mr. Murray have reviewed the cost recovery
22 mechanisms available to the companies in their respective proxy groups to
23 determine the cost recovery risk of the proxy group relative to Ameren Missouri.
24 As a result, there is no basis for these witnesses to make a conclusion regarding
25 the relative risk of Ameren Missouri to the proxy group. Furthermore, as discussed

1 in my Direct Testimony, I provide a comparison of the proxy group companies and
2 Ameren Missouri across a number of risk factors including forecasted test years,
3 year-end rate base, decoupling mechanisms, formula-based rates, capital cost
4 recovery mechanisms, fuel adjustment clauses, and construction work in progress
5 (“CWIP”) allowances within rate base.⁵ When a proper analysis is conducted, as
6 was done in my Direct Testimony, the conclusions regarding Ameren Missouri’s
7 relative risk are contrary to the unsupported opinions of Mr. Chari, Mr. Cassidy and
8 Mr. Murray. Ameren Missouri has greater risk on average than the proxy group
9 warranting an ROE toward the higher end of the range of results.

10 **Q. How is the remainder of your Surrebuttal Testimony organized?**

11 A. The remainder of my Surrebuttal Testimony is organized as follows:

- 12 • In Section II, I respond to Staff witness Mr. Chari’s ROE analyses and
13 recommendations, OPC witness Mr. Murray’s ROE analyses and
14 recommendations and Staff witness Mr. Cassidy’s conclusions regarding Ameren
15 Missouri’s business risk.
- 16 • Finally, in Section III, I summarize my conclusions and recommendations.

17 II. **RETURN ON EQUITY**

18 A. **Proxy Group**

19 **Q. Please summarize Mr. Murray’s position with respect to the proxy group that you
20 relied on for Ameren Missouri.**

21 A. Mr. Murray suggests that I do not recognize or discuss that some of the companies
22 contained in my proxy group have “significant exposure” to unregulated operations.⁶

⁵ Direct Testimony of Ann Bulkley, at 65-66.

⁶ Rebuttal Testimony of David Murray, at 18.

1 Specifically, Mr. Murray notes that I have included Entergy Corporation, NextEra Energy
2 Inc., OGE Energy Corporation and Otter Tail Corporation in my proxy group, each of which
3 has substantial unregulated operations. Mr. Murray believes that companies with a higher
4 percentage of unregulated operations have greater risk than Ameren Missouri. Therefore,
5 Mr. Murray concludes that I have not accounted for the increased risk of unregulated
6 operations when comparing the business risk of Ameren Missouri to the proxy group.⁷

7 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Murray's position that unregulated operations result in**
8 **greater risk for the proxy group companies?**

9 A. No, I do not. First, as I discussed in my Direct Testimony, I applied a screening criterion
10 that required a company derive at least 60 percent of their operating income from
11 regulated operations.⁸ Thus, the companies included in my proxy group have substantial
12 regulated operations similar to Ameren Missouri. Mr. Murray's statement that my proxy
13 group contains companies with substantial unregulated operations is not correct. Second
14 as shown in Figure 1 below, I compared the 30-day average Constant Growth DCF
15 ("CGDCF") results as of August 31, 2021 contained in Schedule AEB-R1, Attachment 2
16 of my Rebuttal Testimony for the three companies (Entergy Corporation, NextEra Energy
17 Inc., and Otter Tail Corporation) noted by Mr. Murray as having substantial unregulated
18 operations to the remaining companies in my proxy group.⁹ As shown in Figure 1, the
19 average Constant Growth DCF result including Entergy Corporation, NextEra Energy Inc.,
20 and Otter Tail Corporation was 9.16 percent which is less than the average Constant
21 Growth DCF result excluding Entergy Corporation, NextEra Energy Inc., and Otter Tail

⁷ Rebuttal Testimony of David Murray, at 19.

⁸ Direct Testimony of Ann E. Bulkley, at 32.

⁹ Mr. Murray also noted that OG&E Corporation had substantial unregulated operations; however, this company was removed from my proxy group due to M&A activity and thus is not included in Figure 1.

1 Corporation of 9.18 percent. Further, it is important to note that the company with the
2 highest DCF result (Portland General Electric Company at 11.64 percent) has 100 percent
3 regulated electric operations. Therefore, there was no discernible difference in the
4 CGDCF results. This provides further support that the operating risks of the three
5 companies referenced by Mr. Murray are not perceived to be significantly greater than
6 those of the regulated companies in the proxy group.

7 **Figure 1: Comparison of 30-Day CGDCF Results as of August 31, 2021**

Company	Ticker	CGDCF Result
ALLETE, Inc.	ALE	9.24%
Alliant Energy Corporation	LNT	8.15%
American Electric Power Company, Inc.	AEP	9.51%
Duke Energy Corporation	DUK	9.75%
Entergy Corporation	ETR	6.32%
Evergy, Inc.	EVRG	9.79%
NextEra Energy, Inc.	NEE	10.96%
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE	8.12%
Otter Tail Corporation	OTTR	9.97%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	PNW	7.55%
Portland General Electric Company	POR	11.64%
Xcel Energy Inc.	XEL	8.87%
Mean Including ETR, NEE, and OTTR		9.16%
Mean Excluding ETR, NEE and OTTR		9.18%

8
9 **B. DCF – Market Conditions**

10 **Q. Please summarize Mr. Murray’s concern with your position on how market**
11 **conditions affect the results of the DCF model.**

12 **A.** Mr. Murray disagrees with my conclusion that the current valuations of utilities will decline
13 over the near term as interest rates increase. According to Mr. Murray, this assumption
14 violates the Efficient Market Hypothesis (“EMH”) which states that stock prices reflect all

1 current information.¹⁰ Mr. Murray believes that investors have factored in expected market
2 conditions into the current share prices of utilities. Further, Mr. Murray states that even if I
3 was correct and the valuations of utilities were expected to decline, this would not lead to
4 an increase in the cost of equity.¹¹ To support his conclusion, Mr. Murray references the
5 Grinold-Kroner DCF model which he states assumes that a decline in the valuation of a
6 utility as measured by the P/E ratio would result in a decline in the cost of equity.

7 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Murray that the market is always efficient?**

8 A. No, I do not. While the EMH is an important part of financial theory, it is critical to
9 understand that the theory relies on simplifying assumptions and is attempting to explain
10 complex financial markets. For example, in its strongest form, the EMH assumes that all
11 information is available equally to investors. However, information is not always available
12 equally. Some firms have greater resources and are able to receive and analyze
13 information more quickly and more completely than competitors. Additionally, the EMH
14 assumes that investors process the information and arrive at similar conclusions regarding
15 how the information impacts the valuation of a company. It is likely, however, that investors
16 have different views regarding how financial information impacts the valuation of a
17 company. It is also true that, as a group, investors may either underreact or overreact to
18 new financial information.

19 **Q. Have investors overreacted to information in the market in recent years?**

20 A. Yes, they have. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, volatility as measured
21 by the VIX was at its highest levels since the Great Recession of 2008/09.¹² During 2020,

¹⁰ Rebuttal Testimony of David Murray, at 21.

¹¹ Rebuttal Testimony of David Murray, at 22.

¹² Bloomberg Professional

1 investors were responding to information including the economic effects of the measures
2 used to contain COVID-19 and the additional policy measures implemented by Congress
3 and the Federal Reserve to stabilize the economy. The extreme volatility in 2020 shows
4 that investors were reacting differently to different news stories, which results in wide
5 swings in the market. This demonstrates that investors have overreacted to information in
6 the market, including changes in the policies of the Federal Reserve, as well as increased
7 uncertainty regarding the market and economic conditions in the U.S. and abroad.

8 **Q. Have academics and investors commented on the EMH?**

9 A. Yes, they have. In fact, Professor Aswath Damodaran and Warren Buffet, who Mr. Murray
10 references in his Rebuttal Testimony, have both commented on the EMH and concluded
11 that markets are not efficient. In an interview with Barron's, Professor Aswath Damodaran
12 noted the following regarding the efficient market assumption:

13 I'm not an academic. I'm a pragmatist. I don't believe that markets are
14 efficient, but I also don't believe that much of active investing, at least as
15 practiced now, has a prayer at finding and exploiting these inefficiencies
16 for profit. But I do think that markets always convey messages. And if you
17 ignore those messages, or you think you're bigger than the market, the
18 market's going to take you down several notches. So I think that is my
19 overriding message—get away from static to dynamic, from backward-
20 looking to forward-looking. And that scares people.¹³

21 Warren Buffet also recognized the inefficiencies in the market:

22 I'm convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-
23 and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price
24 and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a "herd" on Wall
25 Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the
26 greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the

¹³ Root, Al. "Buying Tesla at \$180 and Other Investing Nuggets From NYU Professor Aswath Damodaran." Barron's, 25 June 2020, www.barrons.com/articles/how-to-value-stocks-according-to-nyu-professor-aswath-damodaran-51593082800.

1 market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently
2 nonsensical.¹⁴

3 **Q. How does the fact that markets are not always efficient affect the ROE estimation**
4 **process for a utility?**

5 A. In general, investors use the DCF model to develop return estimates for a company as of
6 a specific date factoring in all the information available to them at the time of the
7 estimation. However, for a regulated utility like Ameren Missouri, the cost of equity is
8 being estimated for a future period when the utility's rates will be in effect. Therefore,
9 investors' current valuations may be different than the valuations investors would calculate
10 during the period that the Company's rates will be in effect. For this reason, it is important
11 to review current and prospective capital market conditions and to determine whether
12 current market conditions are expected to persist during the period that the Company's
13 rates will be in effect. If prospective market conditions are expected to be different than
14 current market conditions, the ROE models based on current market data will not produce
15 reasonable estimates of the cost of equity during the period that Ameren Missouri's rates
16 will be in effect.

17 As discussed in my Direct and Rebuttal Testimonies, the economy is in the recovery phase
18 of the business cycle thus interest rates are expected to increase, and the utility sector is
19 expected to underperform.¹⁵ If the utility sector underperforms over the near term and
20 share prices decline, then the dividend yields of those utilities will increase, resulting in
21 increases in the ROE estimate produced by the DCF model. Given that we are estimating
22 the cost of equity for the period that Ameren Missouri's rates will be in effect, this is an

¹⁴ Buffett, Warren. The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville. Columbia Business, 17 May 1984, www8.gsb.columbia.edu/articles/columbia-business/superinvestors.

¹⁵ Direct Testimony of Ann Bulkley, at 13-24. Rebuttal Testimony of Ann Bulkley, at 24-32

1 important factor that must be considered when relying on the results produced by the ROE
2 estimation models.

3 **Q. Does Mr. Murray agree that interest rates and the share prices of utilities are**
4 **inversely related.**

5 A. Yes, he does. Mr. Murray noted that the valuation levels of utility stocks are inversely
6 related to bond yields which means that the valuation levels of utilities will
7 decline(increase) as interest rate increase(decrease).¹⁶

8 **Q. Mr. Murray agrees that interest rates and utility share prices are inversely related.**
9 **Does this position conflict with his criticism of your conclusion that the valuations**
10 **of utilities will decline over the near term?**

11 A. Yes, it does. As discussed in my Rebuttal Testimony, interest rates are expected to
12 increase over the near term.¹⁷ In fact, in a recent article, Barron's conducted its Big Money
13 poll of professional investors regarding the outlook for the next twelve months.
14 Approximately 60 percent of respondents projected the yield on the 10-year Treasury
15 Bond will be 2.00 percent or greater at the end of the next twelve months which is an
16 increase from the current 30-day average 10-year Treasury Bond yield as of September
17 30, 2021 of 1.35 percent.¹⁸ Therefore, if interest rates increase as expected over the next
18 twelve months, the inverse relationship between interest rates and utility share prices
19 would indicate that the share prices of utilities will decline. This is most likely why the
20 investors surveyed by Barron's also selected the utility sector as the sector which will

¹⁶ Direct Testimony of David Murray, at 9.

¹⁷ Rebuttal Testimony of Ann Bulkley, at 24-32.

¹⁸ Jasinski, Nicholas. Stocks Are Still the Place to Be, Our Exclusive Big Money Poll Finds. Barron's, 16 Oct. 2021, <https://www.barrons.com/articles/stock-market-covid-economy-outlook-51634312012?mod=hpsubnav&tesla=y>.

1 perform the worst over the next twelve months.¹⁹ Thus, Mr. Murray's conclusion in his
2 Rebuttal Testimony that the Commission should rely on the DCF results calculated using
3 current valuations contradicts his position in his Direct Testimony that interest rates and
4 utility share prices are inversely related because interest rates are expected to increase.

5 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Murray's use of the Grinold-Kroner DCF model to note that a**
6 **decline in the valuation of a utility will decrease the cost of equity?**

7 A. No, I do not. Mr. Murray has misinterpreted my position. I have noted that the share
8 prices of utility stocks are expected to decline as interest rates increase over the near-
9 term. Therefore, if we estimated the DCF model at a point in time during the period that
10 Ameren Missouri rates will be in effect, the DCF results would likely be higher due to the
11 decline in share prices. Mr. Murray's use of the Grinold-Kroner model shows that if an
12 investor were to estimate the Grinold-Kroner DCF model today, the expected decline in
13 the P/E ratio over the near-term would reduce the return the investor would expect to earn
14 over the investment period. Therefore, Mr. Murray's use of the Grinold-Kroner model still
15 relies on current market data to estimate the cost of equity during the period Ameren
16 Missouri's rate will be in effect. This does not invalidate my point. In fact, it provides further
17 support. Because, if an investor expects a lower return over the near-term due to an
18 expected decline in the P/E ratio, they may not invest in the stock or sell the stock if the
19 investor is a current owner of the stock. This would result in a decline in the stock price.
20 As a result, it is likely that the results of the DCF model and the Grinold-Kroner model
21 would be greater during the period that Ameren Missouri's rates are in effect.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

1 **Q. Do you have any other observations regarding Mr. Murray's use of the Grinold-**
2 **Kroner model to determine the ROE for Ameren Missouri?**

3 A. While the Grinold-Kroner model may have some academic interest, I am unaware of any
4 regulatory commission that has relied on this methodology to establish the ROE for a
5 regulated utility company. Furthermore, this is yet another methodology proposed by Mr.
6 Murray that results in ROE estimates that would be both inconsistent with his own equity
7 cost recommendation and with the comparable return standard established in *Hope* and
8 *Bluefield*. Based on his application of this model to the DCF results presented in my Direct
9 Testimony, Mr. Murray suggests that the ROE for Ameren Missouri using the Grinold-
10 Kroner model would be 4.97 percent to 7.11 percent depending on the size of the decline
11 in the P/E ratios. While within the range of results of his multi-stage DCF analysis, since
12 Mr. Murray dismissed those results to support an ROE range of 8.50 percent to 9.25
13 percent and a point estimate of 9.00 percent, I would assume that he is also disregarding
14 the result of this model. Therefore, I am uncertain why Mr. Murray would suggest that this
15 model offers any probative value as to the appropriate ROE for Ameren Missouri.

16 **C. DCF – Growth Rates**

17 **Q. Please summarize Mr. Chari and Mr. Murray's criticism of the DCF analyses you**
18 **prepared in your Direct Testimony.**

19 A. Staff witness Chari and OPC witness Murray both object to the use of analysts' projected
20 earnings per share ("EPS") growth rates in the Constant Growth DCF model, suggesting
21 that the use of a constant growth form of the DCF model with projected EPS growth rates
22 will overstate the ROE.

1 **Q. How do you respond to these witnesses regarding the use of projected EPS growth**
2 **rate in the Constant Growth DCF model?**

3 A. First, as discussed in my Direct and Rebuttal Testimonies, I have not relied exclusively on
4 the results of the Constant Growth DCF model. Rather, I have considered the results of
5 multiple ROE estimation models in determining the range of ROEs that are appropriate to
6 consider for Ameren Missouri. Furthermore, while each of these witnesses criticizes the
7 use of analysts' projected EPS growth rates in the Constant Growth DCF model, their
8 preferred specification of the DCF model produced ROE estimates that were below any
9 recently authorized ROE for a vertically integrated electric utility that was not determined
10 as part of a formula rate plan and were abandoned in their own recommendations.
11 Specifically, Mr. Murray's Multi-Stage DCF model relied on a 3.0% perpetual growth rate
12 and resulted in a COE estimate for his electric proxy group of approximately 7.00
13 percent.²⁰ In contrast, Mr. Murray proposes a range for the Company's ROE of 8.50
14 percent to 9.25 percent, recommending an ROE of 9.00 percent which is 200 basis points
15 above the results of the DCF methodology that he suggests is more appropriate than the
16 use of the Constant Growth DCF model with analysts' projected EPS growth rates.

17 Mr. Chari relies on a Two-Stage DCF model using current market data and the Constant
18 Growth DCF model that Mr. Chari relied on in File No. ER-2019-0374 for the Empire
19 District Electric Company ("Empire") – not for the purposes of relying on the model
20 estimates, but rather to estimate a change in the cost of equity from 2019 to the current
21 market, which he then partially applies based on his judgement to the ROE of 9.25 percent
22 that was authorized in the 2019 rate case for Empire. In performing this benchmarking
23 exercise, Mr. Chari also elects not to rely specifically on the results of his Two-Stage DCF

²⁰ Direct Testimony of Mr. David Murray at 24.

1 model, which produced a result of 8.29 percent. Rather, Mr. Chari is recommending 9.50
2 percent, which is 120 basis points above the results of his model.

3 Considering that both of these witnesses demonstrate no confidence in the results of their
4 own DCF models, it is unreasonable to suggest that the use of their DCF models is a more
5 appropriate estimate of the ROE for Ameren Missouri than the Constant Growth DCF
6 model developed in my Direct Testimony.

7 **Q. Did you review the academic research Mr. Chari referenced to support the use of a**
8 **GDP growth rate in the DCF model?**

9 A. Yes. In support of the use of a GDP growth rate in the DCF model, Mr. Chari referenced
10 Dr. Roger A. Morin's *New Regulatory Finance* where Dr. Morin noted that all growth rates
11 eventually converge to a level consistent with the growth in GDP.²¹ However, Mr. Chari
12 fails to discuss and chooses not to rely on the methodology that Dr. Morin employs to
13 estimate the long-term growth in GDP that he advocates using in his Multi-Stage DCF
14 analysis. Dr. Morin estimates the long-term growth rate in nominal GDP by first calculating
15 the growth in real GDP and then adding the expected inflation rate.²² The growth rate in
16 real GDP is estimated by calculating the compound annual growth rate in real GDP from
17 1929 through the present. The expected inflation rate is estimated as the difference
18 between the yield on the 20-year Treasury Bond and the yield on the 20-year Treasury
19 Inflation Protected Bond. As Dr. Morin noted in *New Regulatory Finance*, this resulted in
20 a long-term GDP growth rate of 6.5 percent in 2006.²³

²¹ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 6.

²² Roger A. Morin, *New Regulatory Finance* (2006), page 311.

²³ *Ibid.*

1 **Q. Did Mr. Chari estimate his GDP growth rate consistent with the methodology**
2 **employed by Dr. Morin?**

3 A. No, he did not. Mr. Chari relied on the projected GDP growth rate of 3.70 percent reported
4 by the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) for the period of 2026-2031 as the estimate
5 of long-term growth in his Two-Stage DCF model.²⁴ Therefore, Mr. Chari is relying on a
6 long-term growth rate that only reflects growth for a five-year period.

7 **Q. Did you calculate a long-term GDP growth rate for a Multi-Stage DCF model in your**
8 **testimony in File No. GR-2021-0241 for Ameren Missouri’s natural gas operations?**

9 A. Yes, I did. I presented a Multi-Stage DCF analysis in my Direct and Rebuttal Testimonies
10 in File No. GR-2021-0241 for Ameren Missouri’s natural gas operations as an approach
11 to account for short-term growth rates that may not be considered sustainable in
12 perpetuity. For example, in my Direct Testimony, the growth rates for two companies in
13 my proxy group exceeded 15 percent.²⁵

14 **Q. How did you estimate the long-term GDP growth rate?**

15 A. I relied on a methodology similar to that of Dr. Morin which I discussed above. As shown
16 in Schedule AEB-R1, Attachment 5 to my Rebuttal Testimony in File No. GR-2021-0241,
17 I calculated a long-term growth rate of 5.49 percent based on a real GDP growth rate of
18 3.13 percent from 1929 through 2020, and a projected inflation rate of 2.28 percent. The
19 projected inflation rate is based on three measures: (1) the average long-term projected
20 growth rate in the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) of 2.20 percent;²⁶ (2) the compound

²⁴ Congressional Budget Office, “Additional Information About the Updated Budget and Economic Outlook: 2021 to 2031,” July 2021, at 27.

²⁵ File No. GR-2021-0241, Direct Testimony of Ann Bulkley, at 40-42.

²⁶ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 40, No. 6, June 1, 2021, at 14

1 annual growth rate of the CPI for all urban consumers for 2031-2050 of 2.27 percent as
2 projected by the Energy Information Administration (“EIA”); and (3) the compound annual
3 growth rate of the GDP chain-type price index for 2031-2050 of 2.37 percent, also reported
4 by the EIA.²⁷

5 **Q. How does your long-term GDP growth rate compare to the EPS growth rates you**
6 **relied on in your CGDCF model?**

7 A. As noted above, I calculated a long-term GDP growth rate of 5.49 percent. The proxy
8 group average EPS growth rate was 5.38 percent in my Direct Testimony as shown in
9 Schedule AEB-D2, Attachment 3 and, 5.81 percent in my Rebuttal Testimony as shown
10 in Schedule AEB-R1, Attachment 2. Therefore, my long-term GDP growth rate was
11 generally consistent with the proxy group average analysts’ projected EPS growth rate.
12 This is consistent with the FERC’s findings in Opinion No. 569-A when they moved to an
13 80 percent weighting on the EPS growth rates, indicating that EPS growth rates had
14 moved closer to GDP growth rates. It is also important to note that the approach employed
15 by me and Dr. Morin to calculate the long-term GDP growth rate results in a long-term
16 GDP growth rate that is approximately 180 basis points greater than the GDP growth rate
17 relied on by Mr. Chari.

18 **Q. Did Mr. Chari correctly apply the methodology relied on by FERC when he adjusted**
19 **the growth rate you relied on in your CGDCF model?**

20 A. No, he did not. Mr. Chari references FERC’s ROE methodology from Opinion No. 569,
21 which involved the MISO transmission owners as support for the use and weighting of the
22 short-term and long-term growth rate in a Two-Stage DCF analysis.²⁸ Mr. Chari contends

²⁷ Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2021 at Table 20, February 3, 2021.

²⁸ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 6.

1 that FERC applies a two-thirds weight to the short-term growth rate and a one-third weight
2 to the long-term growth rate. However, FERC adjusted its application of the two-stage
3 DCF model in Opinion No. 569-A. Specifically, FERC assigns 80 percent weight to the
4 short-term earnings per share growth rate and 20 percent weight to the long-term GDP
5 growth rate.²⁹ Therefore, Mr. Chari has not adjusted the growth rate in my Constant
6 Growth DCF analysis using the most recent precedent from FERC regarding the weighting
7 of the short-term and long-term growth rates. While I do not agree with the GDP growth
8 that Mr. Chari has selected to develop his Two-Stage DCF Analysis, had Mr. Chari applied
9 the correct FERC weighting, he would have calculated an adjusted growth rate of 5.04
10 percent³⁰ which is 22 basis points greater than the 4.82 percent growth rate he calculated
11 using the incorrect weighting of the short and long-term growth rates. Further, had he
12 used a GDP growth rate that was consistent with the approach Dr. Morin uses to estimate
13 GDP, the adjusted growth rate would be 5.40 percent (5.38% x 80% + 5.49%x 20%).

14 **D. CAPM – Market Risk Premium**

15 **Q. Please summarize Mr. Chari’s and Mr. Murray’s criticisms of your use of a projected**
16 **market risk premium in the CAPM.**

17 **A.** Mr. Chari contends that my CAPM analysis is based on unreasonably high market risk
18 premiums (“MRPs”) which are the result of my estimated market return of 14.13 percent.
19 Specifically, Mr. Chari suggests that my market return calculation has three “significant”
20 flaws: 1) I included companies in the calculation that do not pay a dividend; 2) I included
21 companies with growth rates that are negative and companies with growth rates that
22 exceed 20 percent; 3) I used only a short-term growth rate and did not also consider a

²⁹ FERC Opinion No. 569-A, issued May 21, 2020, at para 57.

³⁰ $5.38\%*(80\%) + 3.70\%*(20\%)$

1 long-term growth rate.³¹ As support for his recommended adjustments, Mr. Chari
2 references FERC and notes that FERC has outlined the “proper way” for estimating the
3 market return using the Constant Growth DCF model.³² Mr. Chari then calculates an
4 adjusted market return of 9.43 percent which he believes is more consistent with the
5 geometric average historical return for 1926-2020 of approximately 10.30 percent.³³
6 Finally, Mr. Chari argues that I have incorrectly compared my market return of 14.13
7 percent to the historical annual market returns for large company stocks from 1926
8 through 2019. According to Mr. Chari, it is not appropriate to review the individual historical
9 annual returns to determine if an estimated market return is reasonable, the more
10 appropriate comparison is to compare the estimated market return to the geometric
11 average return for the historical period.³⁴

12 Similarly, Mr. Murray criticizes the MRPs that I rely on in my CAPM analysis and contends
13 that they are double the MRPs relied on by utility analysts to estimate the fair value of
14 utility stocks.³⁵ Moreover, Mr. Murray indicates that he is unaware of any source which
15 calculates the market return using a Constant Growth DCF model with projected earnings
16 growth rates as the estimate of growth. According to Mr. Murray, the sources he reviewed
17 recommended using a growth rate no higher than the growth rate of GDP when estimating
18 the long-term return for the market.³⁶ Finally, Mr. Murray asserts that the Wilshire 5000,
19 which is an index of the value of all American stocks traded in the United States, would be

³¹ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 8-9.

³² Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 10.

³³ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 10.

³⁴ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 10-11.

³⁵ Rebuttal Testimony of David Murray, at 26.

³⁶ Rebuttal Testimony of David Murray, at 27.

1 about 100 times the value of GDP in 50 years if the index grew at the 12.45 percent
2 earnings growth rate that I relied on to calculate my market return.³⁷

3 **Q. Please explain why you disagree with Mr. Chari's contention that he has relied on**
4 **the FERC methodology.**

5 A. It is important to note that while Mr. Chari suggests he is following the methodology
6 outlined by the FERC in Opinion 569, none of the witnesses in this case have attempted
7 to rely on the methodology from that order or Opinion 569-B, which outlines the current
8 FERC methodology for estimating the appropriate cost of equity for Ameren Missouri. If
9 that were the intention, it would be necessary to weigh equally the results of the DCF, the
10 CAPM, and a Risk Premium approach. While Mr. Chari suggests he is relying on the FERC
11 in his calculation of the market return, he has misrepresented the FERC's approach.

12 **Q. Please explain in more detail the errors in Mr. Chari's calculation of the market**
13 **return used in the CAPM.**

14 A. Mr. Chari correctly noted than when calculating the market return using the Constant
15 Growth DCF model, FERC excludes: 1) companies that do not pay a dividend; 2)
16 companies with growth rates that are negative; and 3) companies with growth rates that
17 exceed 20 percent. However, Mr. Chari is incorrect in his application of a weighted long-
18 term growth rate in that calculation. Specifically, the FERC noted the following in support
19 of the use of the Constant Growth DCF model for the S&P 500 as opposed to the use of
20 a Two-Step DCF model with GDP growth:

21 [w]e also continue to find that the CAPM should use a one-step DCF for its
22 risk premium. This is because the rationale for using a two-step DCF
23 methodology for a specific group of utilities does not apply when conducting
24 a DCF study of the dividend-paying companies in the S&P 500, as the

³⁷ Rebuttal Testimony of David Murray, at 28.

1 Commission found in Opinion Nos. 531-B and 569.172 A long-term
2 component is unnecessary because of the regular updates to the S&P 500,
3 which allows it to continue to grow at a short-term growth rate and because
4 S&P 500 companies include stocks that are both new and mature, the latter
5 of which have a moderating effect on the short-term growth rates.³⁸

6 **Q. Have you performed a calculation that is consistent with the FERC methodology?**

7 A. Yes, I have. I recalculated the market return that I filed in Schedule AEB-D2, Attachment
8 7 to reflect the methodology relied on by FERC to estimate the market return. In this
9 calculation, I relied on the Constant Growth DCF model excluding companies that: 1) do
10 not pay a dividend; 2) have a growth rate less than 0 percent; and 3) have a growth rate
11 greater than 20 percent. As shown in Schedule AEB-S1, Attachment 4, I estimated a
12 market return of 12.11 percent using the FERC methodology which is 268 basis points
13 higher than the market return of 9.43 percent calculated by Mr. Chari who incorrectly
14 estimated the market return using the Two-Stage DCF Analysis.

15 **Q. Have you updated the CAPM results presented in your Direct Testimony to reflect**
16 **the FERC methodology for calculating the market return?**

17 A. Yes, I have. As shown in Figure 2 below, (see also Schedules AEB-S1, Attachment 1 and
18 Attachment 2), my traditional CAPM analysis produces a range of returns from 9.43
19 percent to 11.11 percent and my ECAPM analysis results range from 10.10 percent to
20 11.36 percent. Therefore, adjusting my estimate of the market return to reflect the
21 methodology employed by the FERC results in a range of returns that continue to support
22 the Company's requested ROE of 9.90 percent and my recommended range of 9.75
23 percent to 10.50 percent. Furthermore, the use of the FERC's methodology for calculating
24 the market return does not result in estimates of the ROE using the CAPM and ECAPM

³⁸ FERC Docket No. EL-14-12-004, Opinion No. 569-A (May 21, 2020), at para. 85.

1 that range from 8.00 percent to 8.89 percent as indicated by Mr. Chari. Mr. Chari's
2 misapplication of the FERC methodology for calculating the market return significantly
3 biases the results of the CAPM and ECAPM downward and therefore, should be given no
4 weight by the Commission.

5 **Figure 2: CAPM Results – FERC Methodology for Market Return**

	Risk-Free Rate as of January 31, 2021 (1.77%)	Q2 2021 – Q2 2022 Projected Risk-Free Rate (2.06%)	2022-2026 Projected Risk-Free Rate (2.80%)
CAPM			
Value Line Beta	11.00%	11.03%	11.11%
Bloomberg Beta	10.19%	10.24%	10.38%
Long-term Avg. Beta	9.43%	9.51%	9.70%
ECAPM			
Value Line Beta	11.28%	11.30%	11.36%
Bloomberg Beta	10.67%	10.71%	10.81%
Long-term Avg. Beta	10.10%	10.16%	10.30%

6
7 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Chari's comparison of your market return and the geometric**
8 **average historical market return?**

9 A. No, I do not. The geometric mean is the compound rate that equates a beginning value
10 to its ending value. It is used to determine the exact rate of compounded return between
11 a specific starting and ending point. The arithmetic mean is the simple average of single
12 period rates of return and best approximates the uncertainty associated with returns from
13 year to year. The important distinction between the two methods is that the arithmetic
14 mean assumes that each periodic return is an independent observation and, therefore,
15 incorporates uncertainty into the calculation of the long-term average. By contrast, the
16 geometric mean does not incorporate the same degree of uncertainty because it assumes
17 that returns remain constant from year to year. In his review of literature on the topic,
18 Cooper noted the following rationale for using the arithmetic mean:

1 Note that the arithmetic mean, not the geometric mean is the relevant value
2 for this purpose. The quantity desired is the rate of return that investors
3 expect over the next year for the random annual rate of return on the
4 market. The arithmetic mean, or simple average, is the unbiased measure
5 of the expected value of repeated observations of a random variable, not
6 the geometric mean. ...[The] geometric mean underestimates the
7 expected annual rate of return.³⁹

8 Furthermore, Pratt and Grabowski note the following in their review of the literature:

9 The choice between which average to use is a matter of disagreement
10 among practitioners. The arithmetic average receives the most support in
11 the literature, though other authors recommend a geometric average. The
12 use of the arithmetic average relies on the assumption that (1) market
13 returns are serially independent (not correlated) and (2) the distribution of
14 market returns is stable (not time-varying). Under these assumptions, an
15 arithmetic average gives an unbiased estimate of expected future returns
16 assuming expected conditions in the future are similar to conditions during
17 the observation period. Moreover, the more observations available, the
18 more accurate will be the estimate.⁴⁰

19 Therefore, the more appropriate comparison would be to compare the market return to the
20 arithmetic average return for 1926-2020.

21 **Q. Have you compared your market return to the arithmetic average historical return
22 for large company stocks?**

23 A. Yes. As reported by Duff and Phelps, the historical arithmetic average return for large
24 company stocks from 1926-2020 was 12.16 percent.⁴¹ This return is much higher than the
25 geometric average of 10.30 percent reported by Mr. Chari. In addition, the arithmetic
26 average return is much more consistent with my market return estimate of 14.13 percent
27 than the implied market return of 7.49 percent shown in Schedule PC-10 that Mr. Chari
28 relied on to estimate his CAPM. Furthermore, the historical arithmetic average return of

³⁹ Ian Cooper, *Arithmetic versus geometric mean estimators: Setting discount rates for capital budgeting*, *European Financial Management* 2.2, (1996): 158.

⁴⁰ Pratt, Shannon P., and Roger J. Grabowski. *Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples*. Wiley, 2008, at 96.

⁴¹ Source: Duff & Phelps, *Valuation Handbook: Guide to Cost of Capital*, 2021.

1 12.16 percent is slightly greater than the market return of 12.11 percent estimated using
2 the methodology relied on by FERC.

3 **Q. What is your response to Mr. Murray’s contention that he is not “aware of any**
4 **authoritative sources” that use your approach to estimating the market return?⁴²**

5 A. While I developed the estimate of the market return, the process I used to estimate the
6 market return relies on data published by Bloomberg and Value Line and a prominent cost
7 of equity model, the Constant Growth DCF. In addition to the FERC which I reference
8 above, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (“Minnesota PUC”) and the Maine
9 Public Utilities Commission (“Maine PUC”) have also relied on the Constant Growth DCF
10 model to estimate the market return.

11 In Docket No. G-004/GR-19-511 for Great Plains Natural Gas Company, the Department
12 of Commerce in Minnesota (“Minnesota DOC”) relied on a Constant Growth DCF analysis
13 for the S&P 500 to estimate the market return for the CAPM. Specifically, the Minnesota
14 DOC relied on the dividend yield reported by S&P for the S&P 500 and the three-five year
15 earnings growth estimate for the State Street Global Advisors S&P 500 exchange traded
16 fund (“ETF”) which resulted in a market return of 13.44 percent.⁴³ The Minnesota DOC
17 has historically relied on the Constant Growth DCF model to estimate the market return
18 for the CAPM, which has in turn been considered by the Minnesota PUC in prior
19 proceedings.⁴⁴

⁴² Rebuttal Testimony of David Murray, at 27.

⁴³ Docket No. G-004/GR-19-511, In the Matter of the Petition By Great Plains Natural Gas Co., a Division of Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., for Authority to Increase Natural Gas Rates in Minnesota (March 3, 2020), at Ex. DER-9, CMA-S-8.

⁴⁴ See Docket No. E017/GR-15-1033, Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order, May 1, 2017, at 54-56; and Docket No. E015/GR-16-664, Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order, March 12, 2018, at 60-61.

1 The Staff of the Maine PUC have also supported the forward-looking market risk premium.
2 In the Bench Analysis in Docket No. 2019-00092 for Northern Utilities, Inc., the Staff
3 calculated the market return using the Constant Growth DCF model excluding companies
4 that did not pay a dividend and companies that had a negative growth rate. This resulted
5 in a market return of 11.33 percent using Bloomberg data and 13.49 percent using Value
6 Line data.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the Maine PUC considered the CAPM results calculated by
7 Staff as a check on the reasonableness of the DCF results and did not dispute the use of
8 Constant Growth DCF model to calculate the market return.⁴⁶

9 **Q. How do you respond to Mr. Murray's comparison of the Wilshire 5000 Index to GDP?**

10 A. Mr. Murray contends that if the market grew at a compound annual growth rate of 12.45
11 percent, then the Wilshire 5000 would be approximately 100 times the value of GDP in 50
12 years assuming a 4 percent long-term growth rate in GDP. However, it is important to
13 note that the Wilshire 5000 had a ten-year annualized total return as of June 30, 2021, of
14 14.76 and a reported long-term EPS growth rate of 18.05 percent.⁴⁷ Therefore, the
15 Wilshire 5000 had a total return over the past 10 years that is greater than my market
16 return estimate of 14.13 percent. Finally, Mr. Murray's analysis is dependent on the
17 selection of the GDP growth rate which he assumes is 4 percent. This growth rate is
18 significantly below the long-term GDP growth rate of 5.49 percent that I have estimated
19 and discussed above.

⁴⁵ Northern Utilities, Inc. d/b/a Unitil Request for Approval of Rate Change, Docket No. 2019-00092, Bench Analysis, October 29, 2019, at 21.

⁴⁶ Northern Utilities, Inc. d/b/a Unitil Request for Approval of Rate Change, Docket No. 2019-00092, Order Part II, April 1, 2020, at 58.

⁴⁷ FT Wilshire 5000 Index Fact Sheet as of June 30, 2021.

1 **E. ECAPM**

2 **Q. Please summarize Mr. Chari's stated criticism of the Empirical CAPM analysis.**

3 A. Mr. Chari notes that the ECAPM analysis is based on the findings of Dr. Morin who
4 developed the model based on data between 1926 and 1984; therefore, Mr. Chari asserts
5 that I have simply inputted data into Dr. Morin's model which only reflects market data
6 through 1984.⁴⁸ Furthermore, Mr. Chari contends that Dr. Morin presented other studies
7 which produced estimates of alpha that ranged from -9.61 percent to 13.56 percent which
8 according to Mr. Chari means the CAPM overestimated the return in some instances.

9 **Q. Do you agree with how Mr. Chari presented the studies cited by Dr. Morin regarding**
10 **the appropriate Alpha for the ECAPM?**

11 A. No, I do not. Mr. Chari combined the estimates of Alpha from eight separate studies that
12 Dr. Morin cited into one combined range of Alpha. This is incorrect because the combined
13 range can result in the incorrect conclusion that the consensus among the studies is that
14 CAPM could equally overstate or understate the actual return. However, as shown in
15 Figure 3, six out of the eight studies estimated positive values of Alpha which would
16 indicate that the consensus among the studies is that the CAPM understates the observed
17 return. Additionally, among the six studies which estimate only positive values of Alpha
18 the range of Alpha was 1.63 percent to 13.56 percent. From this range, it is reasonable
19 to conclude that Dr. Morin's estimate of Alpha of 2 percent is somewhat conservative.
20 Finally, as I will discuss in more detail below, studies that I have reviewed which
21 specifically examined the utility industry have shown that the CAPM has historically
22 understated the returns of utilities.

⁴⁸ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 11-12.

1

Figure 3: Empirical Evidence on the Alpha Factor⁴⁹

Author	Range of Alpha
Fischer (1993)	-3.6% to 3.6%
Fischer, Jensen and Scholes (1972)	-9.61% to 12.24%
Fama and McBeth (1972)	4.08% to 9.36%
Fama and French (1992)	10.08% to 13.56%
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979)	5.32% to 8.17%
Litzenberger, Ramaswamy and Sosin (1980)	1.63% to 5.04%
Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur (1995)	4.6%
Morin (1989)	2.0%

2

3 **Q. Do any of the studies cited by Dr. Morin examine the ability of the CAPM to estimate**
4 **the return of utilities?**

5 A. Yes. Robert Litzenberger, Krishna Ramaswamy, and Howard Sosin published an article
6 titled “On the CAPM Approach to the Estimation of a Public Utility’s Cost of Equity Capital,”
7 which studied the ability of the CAPM to estimate the returns for utilities.⁵⁰ The authors
8 found that the CAPM tends to understate the return for stocks such as utilities, which have
9 a Beta less than 1.0. To develop the analysis, Litzenberger, et al. utilized both adjusted
10 and raw Beta. In both cases, the CAPM understated the return for utilities with Betas less
11 than 1.0.

12 **Q. Have more recent studies examined the ability of the CAPM and ECAPM to estimate**
13 **the return of utilities?**

14 A. Yes. Stephane Chretien and Frank Coggins published a study in 2011 titled “Cost of
15 Equity for Energy Utilities: Beyond the CAPM”, which studied the CAPM and its ability to

⁴⁹ Morin, Roger A., *New Regulatory Finance*, Public Utilities Report, Inc. (2006), at 190 (Table 6-2).

⁵⁰ Litzenberger, Robert, et al. “On the CAPM Approach to the Estimation of A Public Utility’s Cost of Equity Capital.” *The Journal of Finance*, vol. 35, no. 2, 1980, pp. 369–383.

1 estimate the risk premium for the utility industry in particular subgroups of utilities for a
2 data set that included market data through the end of 2006. The article considered the
3 CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model and a model similar to the ECAPM used in
4 my Direct Testimony. As Chretien and Coggins show, the ECAPM significantly
5 outperformed the traditional CAPM at predicting the observed risk premium for the various
6 utility subgroups.⁵¹

7 **F. Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium**

8 **Q. Please summarize Mr. Chari's and Mr. Murray's criticisms regarding the Risk**
9 **Premium analysis presented in your Direct Testimony.**

10 A. Mr. Chari indicates that he does not have any significant disagreements with my risk
11 premium analysis because the results of my analysis support his recommended ROE of
12 9.50 percent. However, Mr. Chari suggests that the use of authorized ROEs in my risk
13 premium analysis may not be appropriate because authorized ROEs are not market-
14 based and thus introduce circularity into ratemaking.⁵²

15 Mr. Murray expresses concern with the regression equation in my risk premium analysis
16 because it relies on regulatory commission actions, which he believes have not reduced
17 authorized ROEs by an amount commensurate with the reduction indicated by the low
18 interest rate environment. Mr. Murray contends that my risk premium analysis will not
19 allow for a decrease in the spread between authorized ROEs and the cost of equity

⁵¹ Chrétien, Stéphane, and Frank Coggins. "Cost Of Equity For Energy Utilities: Beyond The CAPM." Energy Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2011.

⁵² Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 12.

1 because my analysis relies on authorized ROEs and regulators have been hesitant to
2 reduce authorized ROEs by the amount indicated by lower interest rates.⁵³

3 **Q. How do you respond to Mr. Murray’s concern that your risk premium analysis**
4 **maintains the current wide spread between authorized ROEs and the cost of equity.**

5 A. As explained in my Direct Testimony, the regression equation was developed from
6 authorized ROEs from hundreds of rate case decisions since 1992 and the corresponding
7 Treasury yield at the time of the rate case decision.⁵⁴ Therefore, the estimated regression
8 coefficients take into consideration the different economic conditions that have occurred
9 over the past 30 years and their effect on the relationship between interest rates and
10 authorized ROEs. It is incorrect to conclude as Mr. Murray has that the risk premium
11 analysis only considers current economic conditions and maintains the current spread
12 between interest rates and authorized ROEs. I continue to believe that my Bond Yield
13 Plus Risk Premium analysis, which relies on the regression equation to predict future
14 return requirements based on the level of interest rates, is useful for the purpose of
15 corroborating the results of other ROE estimation models.

16 **Q. What is your response to Mr. Chari’s concern that your risk premium analysis is not**
17 **market-based because it relies on authorized ROEs?**

18 A. While my Risk Premium analysis is based on authorized ROEs and the corresponding
19 Treasury yields at the time the regulatory decisions were issued, I believe that investors
20 are informed by allowed ROEs from hundreds of rate case decisions to frame their return
21 expectations. As Mr. Chari observes, one of the fundamental principles in setting a just
22 and reasonable return is that the return must be comparable to returns available to

⁵³ Rebuttal Testimony of David Murray, at 29.

⁵⁴ Direct Testimony of Ann E. Bulkley, at 50.

1 investors in companies with similar risk. In that regard, the authorized returns for other
2 vertically integrated electric utilities are a relevant consideration for investors. My Risk
3 Premium analysis demonstrates how those returns relate to the risk-free rate, so that it is
4 possible to use historical returns to estimate future returns at various Treasury bond yields.

5 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Chari that your risk premium analysis supports his**
6 **recommended ROE?**

7 A. No, I do not. As shown in Schedule AEB-D2, Attachment 8 to my Direct Testimony, the
8 low-end of the range of my risk premium analysis was 9.44 percent based on the 30-day
9 average 30-year Treasury Bond yield as of January 31, 2021, of 1.77 percent. However,
10 interest rates have increased since the time-period used to develop the analyses in my
11 Direct Testimony. As shown in Schedule AEB-R1, Attachment 7 to my Rebuttal
12 Testimony, the low-end of the range of my risk premium analysis increased to 9.50 percent
13 based on the 30-day average 30-year Treasury Bond yield as of August 31, 2021, of 1.91
14 percent. The low-end of the range of my risk premium analysis included in my Rebuttal
15 Testimony is equal to Mr. Chari's recommendation of 9.50 percent. However, as I discuss
16 above and in my Rebuttal Testimony, investors expect interest rates to continue to
17 increase over the near-term. As shown in my Rebuttal Testimony, if investors'
18 expectations about interest rates are correct, the return that results from the Risk Premium
19 methodology will be in the range of 10.17 percent, which is greater than the Company's
20 proposed ROE of 9.90 percent.⁵⁵ Therefore, my risk premium analysis provides support
21 for the conclusion that Mr. Chari's recommended ROE will understate the cost of equity
22 during the period that Ameren Missouri's rates will be in effect.

⁵⁵ Rebuttal Testimony of Ann Bulkley, Schedule AEB-R1, Attachment 1.

1 **G. Authorized Returns in Other Jurisdictions**

2 **Q. Please summarize Mr. Chari's review of authorized ROEs for electric utilities.**

3 A. According to Mr. Chari, the average authorized ROE for electric utilities in fully litigated
4 rate cases in 2021 is 9.43 percent which is 47 basis points below the Company's
5 requested ROE of 9.90 percent.⁵⁶ Additionally, Mr. Chari notes that there were only three
6 fully litigated cases with an ROE greater than 9.60 percent which were limited issue rider
7 cases in Virginia.⁵⁷ Mr. Chari classifies these three cases as outliers which means that he
8 has ultimately concluded that there were no comparable ROEs awarded above 9.60
9 percent in 2021. As a result, Mr. Chari concludes that the Company's requested ROE of
10 9.90 percent is too high based on a review of authorized ROEs for electric utilities in 2021.

11 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Chari that the Company's requested ROE is too high based**
12 **on a review of authorized ROEs in 2021?**

13 A. No, I do not. Mr. Chari's review of authorized ROEs for electric utilities does not produce
14 a meaningful sample to be considered a credible analysis. For example, Mr. Chari
15 excludes settled rate cases from his review which means he has narrowed the number of
16 electric rate cases reviewed to 18. As shown in Schedule AEB-S1, Attachment 5, of the
17 18 fully litigated electric rate case he reviewed a majority of the rate cases were limited
18 issue rider cases (i.e., 12 out of 18). Limited issue rider cases are typically cases that set
19 the recovery of costs and returns for new generating assets. Because these are cases
20 that address only generation assets, and often the incremental construction risk, the
21 returns would not be comparable to a vertically integrated utility. In fact, it appears Mr.
22 Chari agrees since he concluded that the three limited issue rider cases on the high-end

⁵⁶ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 5.

⁵⁷ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 5.

1 of the range were outliers. Additionally, three of the cases were for distribution only electric
2 utilities; however, these cases should not be included either since vertically integrated
3 utilities may have greater risk than distribution-only companies due to the incremental risk
4 of generation. Thus, Mr. Chari's sample includes only three-fully litigated rate cases for
5 vertically integrated electric utilities in 2021. This sample size is not adequate to draw any
6 meaningful conclusions regarding the reasonableness of the Company's request ROE of
7 9.90 percent. As such, I recommend that the Commission not consider Mr. Chari's review
8 of authorized ROEs for electric utilities in 2021 in its determination of the authorized ROE
9 for Ameren Missouri.


10 **Q. Did you analyze the recently authorized return data to reflect cases that are more**
11 **comparable to Ameren Missouri?**

12 A. Yes, I did. As discussed in my Rebuttal Testimony, I compared the Company's requested
13 ROE of 9.90 percent, Mr. Chari's recommended ROE of 9.50 percent and Mr. Murray's
14 recommended ROE of 9.00 percent to authorized ROEs for electric utilities in other
15 jurisdictions from January 1, 2018 through August 31, 2021.⁵⁸ However, unlike the
16 comparison developed by Mr. Chari, I only included rate cases for vertically integrated
17 electric utilities, and I considered both settled and fully litigated rate cases. Finally, I also
18 excluded formula rate plan rate cases because the ROE is established using a formula,
19 as opposed to following an approach that is similar to what the Commission has typically
20 considered in setting the ROE. As shown in Figure 4 Below (see also Figure 3 of my
21 Rebuttal Testimony), the Company's requested ROE is well within the range of authorized
22 ROEs for vertically integrated electric utilities since 2018. Therefore, it is evident that the
23 Company's requested ROE of 9.90 percent is reasonable based on a comparison to

⁵⁸ Rebuttal Testimony of Ann Bulkley, at 19.

1 recently authorized ROEs and considering the relative risk of Ameren Missouri and current
2 capital market conditions.

3 **Figure 4: U.S. Authorized ROEs – Vertically Integrated Electric Utilities – January 2018**
4 **through August 2021⁵⁹**



5
6 **H. Business Risks**

7 **Q. Please summarize Mr. Chari's, Mr. Cassidy's and Mr. Murray's position regarding**
8 **the Company's business risk and the effect on Ameren Missouri's allowed ROE?**

9 **A.** Mr. Chari contends that Ameren does not have greater risk than the proxy group due to
10 Ameren Missouri utilizing cost recovery mechanisms such as Plant-In-Service Accounting
11 ("PISA"), the Renewable Energy Standard Rate Adjustment Mechanism ("RESRAM"), and

⁵⁹ Rebuttal Testimony of Ann Bulkley, at 19. Figure 3 provides authorized ROEs for vertically integrated electric utilities. This figure excludes the most recent decision for Green Mountain Power of 8.2 percent, because it was a formula rate plan and not a market determined cost of equity.

1 a fuel adjustment clause.⁶⁰ Furthermore, Mr. Chari notes that Ameren Missouri has a
2 business risk profile classified as “Excellent” by S&P which is S&P’s highest ranking.
3 Finally, Mr. Chari explains that Ameren’s P/E ratio is well above the average P/E ratio for
4 his proxy group which he states indicates superior performance relative to its peers.
5 According to Mr. Chari, the superior performance indicates that investors do not view
6 either Ameren or Ameren Missouri as having greater risk than their peers.⁶¹

7 Similarly, Mr. Cassidy testifies that Ameren Missouri’s use of PISA and the RESRAM
8 reduces the overall business risk of the Company and, according to Mr. Cassidy, the risk
9 of the Company “in relative terms compared to its utility peers.”⁶² Mr. Cassidy does not
10 develop a comparison of Ameren Missouri to Mr. Chari’s proxy group, he refers to Mr.
11 Chari for that analysis, the purpose of his testimony is to provide a review of the effect of
12 PISA and the RESRAM on the business risk of the Company from an accounting
13 perspective. Based on his review of the mechanics of the various cost recovery
14 mechanisms available to Ameren Missouri, Mr. Cassidy concludes that because the
15 Company has mechanisms such as the RESARM and PISA which allow for the timely
16 recovery of cost between rate cases, the overall business risk of the Company is reduced.

17 Mr. Murray disagrees with my assessment of the Company’s business risk and continues
18 to claim Ameren Missouri’s business risk has been reduced because PISA was approved
19 for the Company which allows for qualifying investments the deferral of 85 percent of the
20 depreciation and return on capital investment between rate cases.⁶³

⁶⁰ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 13.

⁶¹ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 14-15.

⁶² Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. John P. Cassidy, at 10.

⁶³ Rebuttal Testimony of David Murray, at 29-30.

1 **Q. What is your primary concern with Mr. Chari's, Mr. Cassidy's and Mr. Murray's**
2 **conclusions regarding Ameren Missouri's business risk?**

3 A. Mr. Chari, Mr. Cassidy and Mr. Murray have not made the relevant comparison to
4 determine how Ameren Missouri's business risk is affected by the PISA and RESRAM. In
5 this case, we are determining the authorized ROE for the Ameren Missouri based on
6 market data for a proxy group of publicly traded companies that are generally comparable
7 to the Company. Therefore, the appropriate approach to assess business risk in the
8 context of determining the authorized ROE is to compare the regulatory mechanisms
9 authorized for the Company to the regulatory mechanisms for the companies of the proxy
10 group being used to develop the ROE. The Company's overall risk is determined through
11 a comprehensive review of regulatory mechanisms that have been implemented by the
12 subject company (Ameren Missouri) and the proxy group companies. The final conclusion
13 of this analysis is a determination as to whether the subject is comparable, above or below
14 average risk, as compared with the proxy group that is being used to calculate the ROE
15 estimates. If the subject has greater risk than the proxy group, then an ROE towards the
16 higher end of the proxy group results may be warranted. This is because investors would
17 require a higher return for the subject than is estimated using the market data for the proxy
18 group companies if the subject has greater risk. None of the opposing witnesses in this
19 proceeding have conducted a review of the cost recovery mechanisms available to the
20 companies in their respective proxy groups to determine the relative cost recovery risk of
21 the proxy group and Ameren Missouri.⁶⁴ Instead, each of the witnesses viewed the
22 mechanisms available to Ameren Missouri in isolation. Absent a comparison to the proxy

⁶⁴ Mr. Chari and Mr. Cassidy each suggest in their testimony that the other witness will have performed such analysis and refer to each other to support their conclusions.

1 group, there is no basis to make a conclusion regarding the relative risk of Ameren
2 Missouri to the proxy group employed to set the ROE.

3 **Q. Do Staff witnesses Mr. Chari and Mr. Cassidy agree on the relative business risk of**
4 **Ameren Missouri to Mr. Chari's proxy group?**

5 A. No, they do not. While neither witness reviews the mechanisms available to the proxy
6 group, both develop conclusions regarding the relative risk of Ameren Missouri to the
7 proxy group. Mr. Chari concludes that there is no evidence that Ameren Missouri has
8 greater risk than the proxy group indicating he views the Company's business risk as being
9 similar to the proxy group⁶⁵ while Mr. Cassidy concludes that "Ameren Missouri's business
10 risk can reasonably be assumed to now be lower in relative terms compared to its utility
11 peers."⁶⁶ Although, Mr. Cassidy does state later in his testimony that he has not performed
12 an analysis of Ameren Missouri's business risk relative the proxy group and refers to Mr.
13 Chari.⁶⁷ Mr. Cassidy includes conflicting statements in his own testimony and therefore,
14 his position on the relative risk seems to be unclear.

15 **Q. Did you develop an analysis to evaluate the regulatory environment in Missouri as**
16 **compared to the jurisdictions in which the companies in your proxy group operate?**

17 A. Yes, I did. As discussed in my Direct Testimony, I considered the Regulatory Research
18 Associates ("RRA") ranking of regulatory jurisdictions which assigns a ranking for each
19 regulatory jurisdiction between "Above Average/1" to "Below Average/3," with nine total
20 rankings between these categories. While RRA did increase the regulatory ranking of
21 Missouri following the passage of Senate Bill 564 which established PISA, it is important

⁶⁵ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 14-15.

⁶⁶ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. John P. Cassidy, at 10.

⁶⁷ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. John P. Cassidy, at 10.

1 to note that Missouri's ranking only increased from "Below Average/1" to "Average/3".
2 Therefore, even considering the current cost recovery mechanisms available to the utilities
3 in Missouri, RRA noted that "Missouri regulation is somewhat more restrictive than
4 average from an investor perspective".⁶⁸ Furthermore, as shown in Schedule AEB-D2
5 Attachment 11 to my Direct Testimony, my proxy group had an average RRA ranking
6 between "Average/1" and "Average/2". Based on the RRA regulatory rankings, Ameren
7 Missouri would have greater business risk than the proxy group as a result of operating in
8 the state of Missouri. The RRA regulatory rankings show that while the implementation of
9 PISA reduced the risk associated with Missouri regulation, Ameren Missouri still faces
10 greater risk on average than the proxy group.

11 **Q. Did you conduct a detailed review of Ameren Missouri's cost recovery mechanisms**
12 **to the cost recovery mechanisms of the companies in your proxy group?**

13 A. Yes, I did. As shown in Schedule AEB-D2 Attachment 10 to my Direct Testimony, I
14 selected five mechanisms that are important to provide a regulated utility the opportunity
15 to earn its authorized ROE: 1) test year convention (i.e., forecast vs. historical); 2) method
16 for determining rate base (i.e., average vs. year-end); 3) use of either a revenue
17 decoupling mechanism or other clauses that mitigate volumetric risk; 4) prevalence of
18 capital cost recovery between rate cases; and 5) fuel cost recovery.⁶⁹ As discussed in my
19 Direct Testimony, based on my review of these five mechanisms, I concluded that many
20 of the companies in the proxy group had more timely cost recovery through forecasted
21 test years, year-end rate base, decoupling mechanisms, formula-based rates, capital cost
22 recovery mechanisms, fuel adjustment clauses, and construction work in progress

⁶⁸ Direct Testimony of Ann Bulkley, at 66-67.

1 (“CWIP”) allowances within rate base than Ameren Missouri had in Missouri.⁷⁰ For
2 example, while as noted by Mr. Chari, Mr. Murray and Mr. Cassidy, Ameren Missouri has
3 PISA and the RESRAM, 81.5 percent of the operating companies held by the proxy group
4 have some form of capital cost recovery mechanism and/or are allowed to include CWIP
5 in rate base; therefore the use of PISA and the RERAM results in Ameren Missouri being
6 more comparable to the group.

7 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Cassidy’s characterization of your conclusion regarding**
8 **Ameren Missouri’s fuel adjustment clause (“FAC”)?**

9 A. No, I do not. Mr. Cassidy indicates I concluded that Ameren Missouri’s FAC is a
10 comparable mechanism to the fuel adjustment clauses of the companies in my proxy
11 group. However, that is not consistent with my conclusion in my Direct Testimony. I did
12 conclude that FACs were prevalent in the proxy group and therefore the continuation of
13 the FAC for Ameren Missouri makes the Company more comparable to the proxy group.
14 However, Ameren Missouri’s FAC allows the Company to defer and recover 95 percent of
15 the difference between the actual net energy costs and net base energy costs. As a result,
16 the FAC does not fully mitigate the power cost risk for Ameren Missouri. This is important
17 to recognize because fuel and purchased power costs typically account for a significant
18 percentage of the total operating costs for a regulated utility. Moreover, according to S&P,
19 there are only seven states (i.e., Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, Oregon, Washington
20 and Wyoming) that have fuel cost recovery mechanisms with sharing bands.⁷¹ The
21 remaining 43 states either have restructured and the electric utilities do not own generation
22 or have fuel cost recovery mechanisms with a true-up between actual and forecasted fuel

⁷⁰ Direct Testimony of Ann Bulkley, at 65-66.

⁷¹ Source: SNL Financial, Commission Profiles as of October 22, 2021.

1 costs. As shown in Schedule AEB-D2 Attachment 10 to my Direct Testimony, 93.8 percent
2 of the operating companies in the proxy group are allowed to directly recover fuel costs
3 and purchased power costs from customers, without either a dead band or sharing band.
4 Therefore, Ameren Missouri has greater fuel cost recovery risk than the proxy group.

5 **Q. What did Mr. Cassidy conclude regarding CWIP in rate case base and forecasted**
6 **test years?**

7 A. Mr. Cassidy opposes both the inclusion of CWIP in rate base and the use of a forecasted
8 test year. According to Mr. Cassidy, the inclusion of CWIP in rate base is not a desirable
9 outcome for ratepayers because it would charge customers for the investments costs of
10 investments that are not yet providing service.⁷² Additionally, Mr. Cassidy concludes that
11 Missouri's approach of relying on a historical test year with known and measurable
12 changes through a true-up period represents "the most accurate form of ratemaking" and
13 "provides an appropriate forward looking focus".⁷³ Mr. Cassidy has only provided an
14 opinion on the inclusion of CWIP in rate base and forecasted test years; however, this
15 "accounting perspective" does not assess the effect of these mechanisms, which are used
16 by the proxy group, on the relative risk of Ameren Missouri to the proxy group.

17 **Q. Have you reviewed whether or not the proxy group companies can include CWIP in**
18 **rate base and use a forecasted test year?**

19 A. Yes. As I discuss in my Direct Testimony, the inclusion of CWIP in rate base and the use
20 of a forecasted test years reduces regulatory lag. The inclusion of CWIP in rate base
21 reduces regulatory lag associated with new construction, which can be very important
22 particularly when a company is undertaking a large capital investment plan while

⁷² Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. John P. Cassidy, at 23.

⁷³ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. John P. Cassidy, at 24.

1 forecasted test years produce cost estimates that are more reflective of future costs which
2 results in more accurate recovery of incurred costs and mitigates the regulatory lag
3 associated with historical test years. As shown in Schedule AEB-D2 Attachment 10 to my
4 Direct Testimony, 46.2 percent of the operating companies held by the proxy group
5 provide service in jurisdictions that use either a fully or partially forecasted test year while
6 67.7 percent provide service in jurisdictions that allow the inclusion of CWIP in rate base.
7 Given the prevalence of these mechanisms in the proxy group, it is clear that Ameren
8 Missouri faces increased cost recovery risk as compared to the proxy group due to the
9 use of an adjusted historical test year and the inability to include CWIP in rate base.

10 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Chari's analysis to compare the business risks of Ameren**
11 **Missouri to the companies in the proxy group?**

12 A. No, I do not. Mr. Chari compares the P/E ratio of Ameren to the companies in his proxy
13 group and concludes that because Ameren's P/E ratio is well above the proxy group
14 average that investors do not view either Ameren or Ameren Missouri as having more risk
15 than the companies in Mr. Chari's proxy group.⁷⁴ However, the stand-alone principle of
16 ratemaking holds that regulated rates should be based on the risks and benefits of the
17 regulated utility, not its investors, parent or affiliates.⁷⁵ Since the stand-alone principle
18 requires that Ameren Missouri's authorized cost of capital be based on the business and
19 financial risk of the Company individually, it is necessary to establish a group of companies
20 that are both publicly traded and comparable to Ameren Missouri certain fundamental
21 business and financial respects to serve as a "proxy" for determining the ROE. Mr. Chari's
22 consideration of the investor's views of Ameren should not be considered in determining

⁷⁴ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 15.

⁷⁵ *New Regulatory Finance*, Roger A. Morin Ph.D., Public Utility Reports, 2006, at 215-216.

1 the ROE. The ROE for Ameren Missouri should be based on the financial and business
2 risk of Ameren Missouri as a stand-alone entity. In fact, in his response to Mr. Murray
3 regarding the Company's capital structure, Mr. Chari noted the following:

4 Clearly, from the point of view that Ameren Corp. and Ameren Missouri
5 have different investment obligations, it is reasonable that their capital
6 structures would be different. Besides having different investment
7 obligations, Ameren Corp. and Ameren Missouri have different conditions
8 to fulfill to the rating agencies, in order to maintain their credit worthiness.⁷⁶

9 Therefore, Mr. Chari has clearly acknowledged that Ameren and Ameren Missouri are
10 different entities and are classified as such by the credit rating agencies. Therefore, Mr.
11 Chari's conclusion that Ameren Missouri has less risk than the proxy group as a result of
12 Ameren's P/E ratio is not appropriate.

13 III. **SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

14 **Q. Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations regarding the**
15 **appropriate ROE for Ameren Missouri in this proceeding.**

16 A. I continue to support the analyses and recommendation contained in my Direct and
17 Rebuttal Testimonies. Specifically, the range of reasonable ROE results for the proxy
18 group companies is between 9.75 percent and 10.50 percent. Therefore, the Company's
19 requested ROE of 9.90 percent is reasonable. Nothing in the other ROE witnesses'
20 rebuttal testimony has caused me to change my range of results or my support of the
21 Company's requested ROE. An authorized ROE of 9.90 percent balances the interests
22 of Ameren Missouri's customers and shareholders, is comparable to the authorized
23 returns for similarly-situated vertically integrated electric utilities, maintains the Company's

⁷⁶ Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Peter Chari, at 20.

1 financial integrity, and enables Ameren Missouri to attract capital on reasonable terms and
2 conditions.

3 **Q. Does this conclude your Surrebuttal Testimony?**

4 **A.** Yes, it does.

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL -- CURRENT RISK-FREE RATE & VL BETA

$$K = R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

$$K = R_f + 0.25 \times (R_m - R_f) + 0.75 \times \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

Company	Ticker	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
		Current 30-day average of 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield	Beta (β)	Market Return (Rm)	Market Risk Premium (Rm - Rf)	CAPM ROE (K)	ECAPM ROE (K)
ALLETE, Inc.	ALE	1.77%	0.85	12.11%	10.35%	10.56%	10.95%
Alliant Energy Corporation	LNT	1.77%	0.85	12.11%	10.35%	10.56%	10.95%
American Electric Power Company, Inc.	AEP	1.77%	0.75	12.11%	10.35%	9.53%	10.17%
Duke Energy Corporation	DUK	1.77%	0.85	12.11%	10.35%	10.56%	10.95%
Entergy Corporation	ETR	1.77%	0.95	12.11%	10.35%	11.60%	11.73%
Eergy, Inc.	EVRG	1.77%	1.00	12.11%	10.35%	12.11%	12.11%
NextEra Energy, Inc.	NEE	1.77%	0.90	12.11%	10.35%	11.08%	11.34%
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE	1.77%	0.95	12.11%	10.35%	11.60%	11.73%
OGE Energy Corporation	OGE	1.77%	1.10	12.11%	10.35%	13.15%	12.89%
Otter Tail Corporation	OTTR	1.77%	0.85	12.11%	10.35%	10.56%	10.95%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	PNW	1.77%	0.90	12.11%	10.35%	11.08%	11.34%
Portland General Electric Company	POR	1.77%	0.85	12.11%	10.35%	10.56%	10.95%
Xcel Energy Inc.	XEL	1.77%	0.80	12.11%	10.35%	10.05%	10.56%
Mean						11.00%	11.28%

Notes:

- [1] Source: Bloomberg Professional, as of January 31, 2021
- [2] Source: Value Line
- [3] Source: Schedule AEB-S1, Attachment 4
- [4] Equals [3] - [1]
- [5] Equals [1] + [2] x [4]
- [6] Equals [1] + 0.25 x ([4]) + 0.75 x ([2] x [4])

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL -- NEAR-TERM PROJECTED RISK-FREE RATE & VL BETA

$$K = R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

$$K = R_f + 0.25 \times (R_m - R_f) + 0.75 \times \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

Company	Ticker	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
		Near-term projected 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield (Q2 2021 - Q2 2022)	Beta (β)	Market Return (Rm)	Market Risk Premium (Rm - Rf)	CAPM ROE (K)	ECAPM ROE (K)
ALLETE, Inc.	ALE	2.06%	0.85	12.11%	10.05%	10.61%	10.98%
Alliant Energy Corporation	LNT	2.06%	0.85	12.11%	10.05%	10.61%	10.98%
American Electric Power Company, Inc.	AEP	2.06%	0.75	12.11%	10.05%	9.60%	10.23%
Duke Energy Corporation	DUK	2.06%	0.85	12.11%	10.05%	10.61%	10.98%
Entergy Corporation	ETR	2.06%	0.95	12.11%	10.05%	11.61%	11.74%
Eergy, Inc.	EVRG	2.06%	1.00	12.11%	10.05%	12.11%	12.11%
NextEra Energy, Inc.	NEE	2.06%	0.90	12.11%	10.05%	11.11%	11.36%
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE	2.06%	0.95	12.11%	10.05%	11.61%	11.74%
OGE Energy Corporation	OGE	2.06%	1.10	12.11%	10.05%	13.12%	12.87%
Otter Tail Corporation	OTTR	2.06%	0.85	12.11%	10.05%	10.61%	10.98%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	PNW	2.06%	0.90	12.11%	10.05%	11.11%	11.36%
Portland General Electric Company	POR	2.06%	0.85	12.11%	10.05%	10.61%	10.98%
Xcel Energy Inc.	XEL	2.06%	0.80	12.11%	10.05%	10.10%	10.61%
Mean						11.03%	11.30%

Notes:

- [1] Source: Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 40, No. 2, February 1, 2021, at 2
- [2] Source: Value Line
- [3] Source: Schedule AEB-S1, Attachment 4
- [4] Equals [3] - [1]
- [5] Equals [1] + [2] x [4]
- [6] Equals [1] + 0.25 x ([4]) + 0.75 x ([2] x [4])

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL -- LONG-TERM PROJECTED RISK-FREE RATE & VL BETA

$$K = R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

$$K = R_f + 0.25 \times (R_m - R_f) + 0.75 \times \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

		[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Company	Ticker	Projected 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield (2022 - 2026)	Beta (β)	Market Return (R_m)	Market Risk Premium ($R_m - R_f$)	CAPM ROE (K)	ECAPM ROE (K)
ALLETE, Inc.	ALE	2.80%	0.85	12.11%	9.31%	10.72%	11.07%
Alliant Energy Corporation	LNT	2.80%	0.85	12.11%	9.31%	10.72%	11.07%
American Electric Power Company, Inc.	AEP	2.80%	0.75	12.11%	9.31%	9.79%	10.37%
Duke Energy Corporation	DUK	2.80%	0.85	12.11%	9.31%	10.72%	11.07%
Entergy Corporation	ETR	2.80%	0.95	12.11%	9.31%	11.65%	11.77%
Eergy, Inc.	EVRG	2.80%	1.00	12.11%	9.31%	12.11%	12.11%
NextEra Energy, Inc.	NEE	2.80%	0.90	12.11%	9.31%	11.18%	11.42%
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE	2.80%	0.95	12.11%	9.31%	11.65%	11.77%
OGE Energy Corporation	OGE	2.80%	1.10	12.11%	9.31%	13.05%	12.81%
Otter Tail Corporation	OTTR	2.80%	0.85	12.11%	9.31%	10.72%	11.07%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	PNW	2.80%	0.90	12.11%	9.31%	11.18%	11.42%
Portland General Electric Company	POR	2.80%	0.85	12.11%	9.31%	10.72%	11.07%
Xcel Energy Inc.	XEL	2.80%	0.80	12.11%	9.31%	10.25%	10.72%
Mean						11.11%	11.36%

Notes:

- [1] Source: Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 39, No. 12, December 1, 2020, at 14
 [2] Source: Value Line
 [3] Source: Schedule AEB-S1, Attachment 4
 [4] Equals [3] - [1]
 [5] Equals [1] + [2] x [4]
 [6] Equals [1] + 0.25 x ([4]) + 0.75 x ([2] x [4])

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL -- CURRENT RISK-FREE RATE & BLOOMBERG BETA

$$K = R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

$$K = R_f + 0.25 \times (R_m - R_f) + 0.75 \times \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

		[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Company	Ticker	Current 30-day average of 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield	Beta (β)	Market Return (R_m)	Market Risk Premium ($R_m - R_f$)	CAPM ROE (K)	ECAPM ROE (K)
ALLETE, Inc.	ALE	1.77%	0.83	12.11%	10.35%	10.39%	10.82%
Alliant Energy Corporation	LNT	1.77%	0.80	12.11%	10.35%	10.00%	10.53%
American Electric Power Company, Inc.	AEP	1.77%	0.76	12.11%	10.35%	9.64%	10.26%
Duke Energy Corporation	DUK	1.77%	0.71	12.11%	10.35%	9.11%	9.86%
Entergy Corporation	ETR	1.77%	0.84	12.11%	10.35%	10.43%	10.85%
Eergy, Inc.	EVRG	1.77%	0.79	12.11%	10.35%	9.93%	10.47%
NextEra Energy, Inc.	NEE	1.77%	0.76	12.11%	10.35%	9.68%	10.29%
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE	1.77%	0.91	12.11%	10.35%	11.14%	11.38%
OGE Energy Corporation	OGE	1.77%	0.93	12.11%	10.35%	11.44%	11.61%
Otter Tail Corporation	OTTR	1.77%	0.87	12.11%	10.35%	10.77%	11.11%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	PNW	1.77%	0.83	12.11%	10.35%	10.39%	10.82%
Portland General Electric Company	POR	1.77%	0.81	12.11%	10.35%	10.16%	10.65%
Xcel Energy Inc.	XEL	1.77%	0.73	12.11%	10.35%	9.35%	10.04%
Mean						10.19%	10.67%

Notes:

- [1] Source: Bloomberg Professional, as of January 31, 2021
 [2] Source: Bloomberg Professional, as of January 31, 2021
 [3] Source: Schedule AEB-S1, Attachment 4
 [4] Equals [3] - [1]
 [5] Equals [1] + [2] x [4]
 [6] Equals [1] + 0.25 x ([4]) + 0.75 x ([2] x [4])

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL -- NEAR-TERM PROJECTED RISK-FREE RATE & BLOOMBERG BETA

$$K = R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

$$K = R_f + 0.25 \times (R_m - R_f) + 0.75 \times \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

		[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
		Near-term projected 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield (Q2 2021 - Q2 2022)					
Company	Ticker		Beta (β)	Market Return (Rm)	Market Risk Premium (Rm - Rf)	CAPM ROE (K)	ECAPM ROE (K)
ALLETE, Inc.	ALE	2.06%	0.83	12.11%	10.05%	10.44%	10.86%
Alliant Energy Corporation	LNT	2.06%	0.80	12.11%	10.05%	10.06%	10.58%
American Electric Power Company, Inc.	AEP	2.06%	0.76	12.11%	10.05%	9.71%	10.31%
Duke Energy Corporation	DUK	2.06%	0.71	12.11%	10.05%	9.19%	9.92%
Entergy Corporation	ETR	2.06%	0.84	12.11%	10.05%	10.47%	10.88%
Eergy, Inc.	EVRG	2.06%	0.79	12.11%	10.05%	9.99%	10.52%
NextEra Energy, Inc.	NEE	2.06%	0.76	12.11%	10.05%	9.75%	10.34%
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE	2.06%	0.91	12.11%	10.05%	11.17%	11.40%
OGE Energy Corporation	OGE	2.06%	0.93	12.11%	10.05%	11.46%	11.62%
Otter Tail Corporation	OTTR	2.06%	0.87	12.11%	10.05%	10.81%	11.14%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	PNW	2.06%	0.83	12.11%	10.05%	10.44%	10.86%
Portland General Electric Company	POR	2.06%	0.81	12.11%	10.05%	10.21%	10.69%
Xcel Energy Inc.	XEL	2.06%	0.73	12.11%	10.05%	9.43%	10.10%
Mean						10.24%	10.71%

Notes:

- [1] Source: Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 40, No. 2, February 1, 2021, at 2
 [2] Source: Bloomberg Professional, as of January 31, 2021
 [3] Source: Schedule AEB-S1, Attachment 4
 [4] Equals [3] - [1]
 [5] Equals [1] + [2] x [4]
 [6] Equals [1] + 0.25 x ([4]) + 0.75 x ([2] x [4])

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL -- LONG-TERM PROJECTED RISK-FREE RATE & BLOOMBERG BETA

$$K = R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

$$K = R_f + 0.25 \times (R_m - R_f) + 0.75 \times \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$

		[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
		Projected 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield (2022 - 2026)					
Company	Ticker		Beta (β)	Market Return (Rm)	Market Risk Premium (Rm - Rf)	CAPM ROE (K)	ECAPM ROE (K)
ALLETE, Inc.	ALE	2.80%	0.83	12.11%	9.31%	10.56%	10.95%
Alliant Energy Corporation	LNT	2.80%	0.80	12.11%	9.31%	10.21%	10.69%
American Electric Power Company, Inc.	AEP	2.80%	0.76	12.11%	9.31%	9.89%	10.44%
Duke Energy Corporation	DUK	2.80%	0.71	12.11%	9.31%	9.41%	10.08%
Entergy Corporation	ETR	2.80%	0.84	12.11%	9.31%	10.60%	10.98%
Eergy, Inc.	EVRG	2.80%	0.79	12.11%	9.31%	10.14%	10.64%
NextEra Energy, Inc.	NEE	2.80%	0.76	12.11%	9.31%	9.92%	10.47%
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE	2.80%	0.91	12.11%	9.31%	11.24%	11.46%
OGE Energy Corporation	OGE	2.80%	0.93	12.11%	9.31%	11.51%	11.66%
Otter Tail Corporation	OTTR	2.80%	0.87	12.11%	9.31%	10.91%	11.21%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	PNW	2.80%	0.83	12.11%	9.31%	10.57%	10.95%
Portland General Electric Company	POR	2.80%	0.81	12.11%	9.31%	10.35%	10.79%
Xcel Energy Inc.	XEL	2.80%	0.73	12.11%	9.31%	9.63%	10.25%
Mean						10.38%	10.81%

Notes:

- [1] Source: Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 39, No. 12, December 1, 2020, at 14
 [2] Source: Bloomberg Professional, as of January 31, 2021
 [3] Source: Schedule AEB-S1, Attachment 4
 [4] Equals [3] - [1]
 [5] Equals [1] + [2] x [4]
 [6] Equals [1] + 0.25 x ([4]) + 0.75 x ([2] x [4])

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL -- LONG-TERM AVERAGE BETA

$CAPM: K = R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f) / ECAPM: K = R_f + 0.25(R_m - R_f) + 0.75\beta (R_m - R_f)$

	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]
	Risk-Free Rate (R_f)	Beta (β)	Market Return (R_m)	Market Risk Premium ($R_m - R_f$)	CAPM (K)	ECAPM (K)
Current 30-day average of 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield [1]	1.77%	0.741	12.11%	10.35%	9.43%	10.10%
Near-term projected 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield (Q2 2021 - Q2 2022) [2]	2.06%	0.741	12.11%	10.05%	9.51%	10.16%
Projected 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield (2022 - 2026) [3]	2.80%	0.741	12.11%	9.31%	9.70%	10.30%
				Average:	9.55%	10.19%

Notes:

- [1] Source: Bloomberg Professional, as of January 31, 2021
 [2] Source: Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 40, No. 2, February 1, 2021, at 2
 [3] Source: Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 39, No. 12, December 1, 2020, at 14
 [4] See Notes [1], [2], and [3]
 [5] Source: Schedule AEB-S1, Attachment 3
 [6] Source: Schedule AEB-S1, Attachment 4
 [7] Equals [6] - [4]
 [8] Equals [4] + [5] x [7]
 [9] Equals [4] + 0.25 x ([7]) + 0.75 x ([5] x [7])

HISTORICAL BETA - 2011 - 2020

Company	Ticker	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]
ALLETE, Inc.	ALE	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.80	0.80	0.75	0.80	0.65	0.65	0.85	0.75
Alliant Energy Corporation	LNT	0.75	0.70	0.75	0.80	0.80	0.70	0.70	0.60	0.60	0.85	0.73
American Electric Power Company, Inc.	AEP	0.70	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.65	0.65	0.55	0.55	0.75	0.66
Duke Energy Corporation	DUK	0.65	0.60	0.65	0.60	0.65	0.60	0.60	0.50	0.50	0.85	0.62
Entergy Corporation	ETR	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.65	0.65	0.60	0.60	0.95	0.70
Evergy, Inc.	EVRG								NMF	NMF	1.00	1.00
NextEra Energy, Inc.	NEE	0.75	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.65	0.65	0.55	0.55	0.90	0.69
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE		0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.60	0.60	0.90	0.70
OGE Energy Corporation	OGE	0.80	0.75	0.85	0.90	0.95	0.90	0.95	0.85	0.75	1.10	0.88
Otter Tail Corporation	OTTR	0.90	0.90	0.95	0.90	0.85	0.85	0.90	0.75	0.70	0.85	0.86
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	PNW	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.70	0.70	0.60	0.55	0.85	0.70
Portland General Electric Company	POR	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.80	0.80	0.70	0.70	0.60	0.60	0.85	0.73
Xcel Energy Inc.	XEL	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.65	0.60	0.60	0.55	0.50	0.80	0.64
Mean		0.73	0.71	0.74	0.75	0.76	0.70	0.72	0.62	0.60	0.88	0.74

Notes:

- [1] Value Line, dated November 4, 2011, November 25, 2011, and December 23, 2011
- [2] Value Line, dated November 2, 2012, November 23, 2012, and December 21, 2012
- [3] Value Line, dated November 1, 2013, November 22, 2013, and December 20, 2013
- [4] Value Line, dated October 31, 2014, November 21, 2014, and December 19, 2014
- [5] Value Line, dated October 30, 2015, November 20, 2015, and December 18, 2015
- [6] Value Line, dated October 28, 2016, November 18, 2016, and December 16, 2016
- [7] Value Line, dated October 27, 2017, November 17, 2017, and December 15, 2017
- [8] Value Line, dated October 18, 2018, November 16, 2018, and December 14, 2018
- [9] Value Line, dated October 25, 2019, November 15, 2019, and December 13, 2019
- [10] Value Line, dated October 23, 2020, November 13, 2020, and December 11, 2020
- [11] Average ([1] - [10])

STANDARD AND POOR'S 500 INDEX

Name	Ticker	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]
		Shares Outst'g	Price	Market Capitalization	Weight in Index	Current Dividend Yield	Cap-Weighted Dividend Yield	Value Line Long-Term Growth Est.	Cap-Weighted Long-Term Growth Est.
Westrock Co	WRK	263.1	41.43	10,899.82	0.05%	1.93%	0.00%	6.50%	0.00%
IHS Markit Ltd	INFO	396.6	87.08	34,535.23	0.15%	0.92%	0.00%	12.00%	0.02%
Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corp	WAB	190.3	74.21	14,124.09	0.06%	0.65%	0.00%	10.50%	0.01%
Pool Corp	POOL	40.2	354.18	14,223.51	0.06%	0.66%	0.00%	17.50%	0.01%
Western Digital Corp	WDC	304.2	56.43	17,168.55		n/a		1.00%	
PepsiCo Inc	PEP	1382.0	136.57	188,733.73	0.84%	2.99%	0.03%	6.00%	0.05%
Diamondback Energy Inc	FANG	158.0	56.69	8,955.55	0.04%	2.65%	0.00%	0.50%	0.00%
Maxim Integrated Products Inc	MXIM	268.0	87.71	23,509.88		n/a		7.00%	
ServiceNow Inc	NOW	195.1	543.16	105,970.52		n/a		46.00%	
Church & Dwight Co Inc	CHD	248.5	84.43	20,976.63	0.09%	1.20%	0.00%	8.50%	0.01%
Duke Realty Corp	DRE	372.0	39.56	14,714.38		2.58%		-3.00%	
Federal Realty Investment Trust	FRT	75.6	87.56	6,623.65		4.84%		-0.50%	
MGM Resorts International	MGM	494.7	28.56	14,128.55		0.04%		25.00%	
American Electric Power Co Inc	AEP	496.4	80.91	40,162.91	0.18%	3.66%	0.01%	6.00%	0.01%
Vontier Corp	VNT	168.5	32.43	5,464.36		n/a		n/a	
JB Hunt Transport Services Inc	JBHT	105.7	134.66	14,230.73	0.06%	0.83%	0.00%	6.50%	0.00%
Lam Research Corp	LRCX	143.2	483.95	69,304.06	0.31%	1.07%	0.00%	12.50%	0.04%
Mohawk Industries Inc	MHK	71.2	143.6	10,224.18		n/a		-1.50%	
Pentair PLC	PNR	166.3	54.46	9,059.20	0.04%	1.47%	0.00%	5.50%	0.00%
Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc	VRTX	260.0	229.08	59,569.51		n/a		32.00%	
Amcor PLC	AMCR	1568.5	10.94	17,159.19		4.30%		n/a	
Facebook Inc	FB	2405.4	258.33	621,399.38		n/a		15.50%	
T-Mobile US Inc	TMUS	1241.2	126.08	156,488.86		n/a		9.50%	
United Rentals Inc	URI	72.2	243.01	17,545.08		n/a		7.00%	
Alexandria Real Estate Equities Inc	ARE	145.4	167.11	24,300.47	0.11%	2.61%	0.00%	7.00%	0.02%
ABIOMED Inc	ABMD	45.2	348.25	15,749.61		n/a		9.50%	
Delta Air Lines Inc	DAL	637.7	37.96	24,208.38		n/a		5.00%	
United Airlines Holdings Inc	UAL	311.8	39.99	12,470.68		n/a		2.00%	
News Corp	NWS	199.6	18.88	3,769.01		1.06%		n/a	
Centene Corp	CNC	579.8	60.3	34,961.82		n/a		13.00%	
Martin Marietta Materials Inc	MLM	62.3	287.41	17,898.17	0.08%	0.79%	0.00%	8.50%	0.01%
Teradyne Inc	TER	166.1	113.48	18,844.03	0.08%	0.35%	0.00%	14.50%	0.01%
PayPal Holdings Inc	PYPL	1171.7	234.31	274,539.15		n/a		19.00%	
Tesla Inc	TSLA	947.9	793.53	752,187.88		n/a		n/a	
DISH Network Corp	DISH	287.5	29.02	8,344.15		n/a		3.00%	
Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc	ALXN	218.7	153.33	33,536.49		n/a		19.50%	
Dow Inc	DOW	741.1	51.9	38,464.18		5.39%		n/a	
Everest Re Group Ltd	RE	40.0	211.08	8,436.02	0.04%	2.94%	0.00%	10.50%	0.00%
Teledyne Technologies Inc	TDY	37.0	357.01	13,192.59		n/a		8.00%	
News Corp	NWSA	391.0	19.4	7,584.53		1.03%		n/a	
Exelon Corp	EXC	973.9	41.56	40,476.53	0.18%	3.68%	0.01%	3.50%	0.01%
Global Payments Inc	GPN	299.3	176.52	52,838.97	0.23%	0.44%	0.00%	11.50%	0.03%
Crown Castle International Corp	CCI	431.3	159.26	68,688.52	0.31%	3.34%	0.01%	12.50%	0.04%
Aptiv PLC	APTIV	270.0	133.6	36,075.34		n/a		9.50%	
Advance Auto Parts Inc	AAP	67.9	149.14	10,119.89	0.04%	0.67%	0.00%	11.00%	0.00%
Align Technology Inc	ALGN	78.9	525.38	41,426.21		n/a		17.00%	
Illumina Inc	ILMN	146.0	426.44	62,260.24		n/a		9.50%	
LKQ Corp	LKQ	304.3	35.09	10,679.47		n/a		10.00%	
Nielsen Holdings PLC	NLSN	357.7	22.33	7,986.95		1.07%		n/a	
Garmin Ltd	GRMN	191.2	114.86	21,965.48	0.10%	2.12%	0.00%	10.50%	0.01%
Zoetis Inc	ZTS	475.3	154.25	73,310.09	0.33%	0.65%	0.00%	12.00%	0.04%
Digital Realty Trust Inc	DLR	280.2	143.95	40,329.75	0.18%	3.11%	0.01%	7.00%	0.01%
Equinix Inc	EQIX	89.1	739.96	65,931.92	0.29%	1.44%	0.00%	14.50%	0.04%
Las Vegas Sands Corp	LVS	763.8	48.09	36,732.49		n/a		5.50%	
Discovery Inc	DISCK	324.2	35.03	11,355.78		n/a		n/a	

Notes:
 [1] Equals Sum ([9])
 [2] Equals Sum ([11])
 [3] Equals (([1] x (1 + (0.5 x [2]))) + [2])
 [4] Source: Bloomberg Professional as of January 31, 2021
 [5] Source: Bloomberg Professional as of January 31, 2021
 [6] Equals [4] x [5]
 [7] Equals weight in S&P 500 based on market capitalization [6] if Pays Dividend and Growth Rate >0% and <20%
 [8] Source: Bloomberg Professional as of January 31, 2021
 [9] Equals [7] x [8]
 [10] Source: Value Line
 [11] Equals [7] x [10]

Electric Utility Authorized ROEs - January 1, 2021 - August 25, 2021 (Mr. Chari's Data Set)

State	Company	Docket	Rate Case Service Type	Case Type	Date	Decision Type	Return on Equity (%)
Kentucky	Kentucky Power Co.	C-2020-00174	Electric	Vertically Integrated	01/13/2021	Fully Litigated	9.30
New Mexico	El Paso Electric Co.	C-20-00104-UT	Electric	Vertically Integrated	06/23/2021	Fully Litigated	9.00
Wyoming	PacifiCorp	D-20000-578-ER-20	Electric	Vertically Integrated	05/18/2021	Fully Litigated	9.50
Virginia	Appalachian Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00251 (RAC-EE)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	07/29/2021	Fully Litigated	9.20
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00169 (Rider RGGI)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	08/04/2021	Fully Litigated	9.20
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-0134 (Rider CE)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	04/30/2021	Fully Litigated	9.20
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00230 (Rider BW)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	07/01/2021	Fully Litigated	10.20
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	PUR-2020-00231 (Rider US-2)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	07/01/2021	Fully Litigated	9.20
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00122 (Rider US-3)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	03/31/2021	Fully Litigated	9.20
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00123 (Rider US-4)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	03/31/2021	Fully Litigated	9.20
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00099 (Rider B)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	02/24/2021	Fully Litigated	9.20
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00100 (Rider GV)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	02/24/2021	Fully Litigated	9.20
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00101 (Rider R)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	02/24/2021	Fully Litigated	9.34
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00102 (Rider S)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	02/24/2021	Fully Litigated	10.20
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00103 (Rider W)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	02/24/2021	Fully Litigated	10.20
District of Columbia	Potomac Electric Power Co.	FC-1156	Electric	Distribution	06/04/2021	Fully Litigated	9.28
Delaware	Delmarva Power & Light Co.	D-20-0149	Electric	Distribution	08/05/2021	Fully Litigated	9.60
Maryland	Potomac Electric Power Co.	C-9655	Electric	Distribution	06/28/2021	Fully Litigated	9.55
Florida	Duke Energy Florida LLC	D-20210016-El	Electric	Vertically Integrated	05/04/2021	Settled	9.85
Kentucky	Kentucky Utilities Co.	C-2020-00349	Electric	Vertically Integrated	06/30/2021	Settled	9.43
Kentucky	Louisville Gas & Electric Co.	C-2020-00350 (elec.)	Electric	Vertically Integrated	06/30/2021	Settled	9.43
North Carolina	Duke Energy Carolinas LLC	D-E-7, Sub 1214	Electric	Vertically Integrated	03/31/2021	Settled	9.60
North Carolina	Duke Energy Progress LLC	D-E-2, Sub 1219	Electric	Vertically Integrated	04/16/2021	Settled	9.60
North Dakota	Northern States Power Co.	C-PU-20-441	Electric	Vertically Integrated	08/18/2021	Settled	9.50
South Carolina	Dominion Energy South Carolina	D-2020-125-E	Electric	Vertically Integrated	07/21/2021	Settled	9.50
Texas	Sharyland Utilities L.L.C.	D-51611	Electric	Transmission	07/15/2021	Settled	9.38
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00197 (Rider RBB)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	06/09/2021	Settled	9.20
Virginia	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	C-PUR-2020-00096 (Rider U)	Electric	Limited-Issue Rider	02/26/2021	Settled	9.20
New Jersey	Atlantic City Electric Co.	D-ER20120746	Electric	Distribution	07/14/2021	Settled	9.60

Source: S&P Capital IQ Pro.

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

In the Matter of Union Electric Company)
d/b/a Ameren Missouri's Tariffs to Adjust) Case No. ER-2021-0240
Its Revenues for Electric Service.)

AFFIDAVIT OF ANN E. BULKLEY

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS)
)**ss**
TOWN OF SHREWSBURY)

Ann E. Bulkley, being first duly sworn on her oath, states:

My name is Ann E. Bulkley, and on her oath declare that she is of sound mind and lawful age; that she has prepared the foregoing *Surrebuttall Testimony*; and further, under the penalty of perjury, that the same is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Ann E. Bulkley

Ann E. Bulkley

Sworn to me this 4th day of November, 2021.