

Exhibit No. 106

Exhibit No.:
Issue(s): *Business Risk, Paygo,
AROs, Transmission Tracker*
Witness: *Kimberly K. Bolin*
Sponsoring Party: *MoPSC Staff*
Type of Exhibit: *Rebuttal Testimony*
Case No.: *ER-2021-0312*
Date Testimony Prepared: *December 20, 2021*

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

FINANCIAL & BUSINESS ANALYSIS DIVISION

AUDITING DEPARTMENT

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

KIMBERLY K. BOLIN

**THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY,
d/b/a Liberty**

CASE NO. ER-2021-0312

*Jefferson City, Missouri
December 2021*

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

**TABLE OF CONTENTS OF
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF**

KIMBERLY K. BOLIN

**THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY,
d/b/a Liberty**

CASE NO. ER-2021-0312

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1
BUSINESS RISK2
PAYGO.....12
ASSET RETIREMENT OBLIGATION13
TRANSMISSION TRACKER14

1 **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF**

2 **KIMBERLY K. BOLIN**

3 **THE EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC COMPANY,**

4 **d/b/a Liberty**

5 **CASE NO. ER-2021-0312**

6 Q. Please state your name and business address.

7 A. My name is Kimberly K. Bolin. My business address is P. O. Box 360,
8 Suite 440, Jefferson City, MO 65102.

9 Q. Are you the same Kimberly K. Bolin that contributed to the Missouri Public
10 Service Commission Staff’s (“Staff”) Costs of Service Report (“COS Report”) that was filed
11 on October 29, 2021 in this case?

12 A. Yes, I am.

13 **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

14 Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?

15 A. In this testimony, I address The Empire District Electric Company, d/b/a Liberty
16 (“Empire” or “Company”) witness John J. Reed’s direct testimony concerning business risk.
17 I also address Office of the Public Counsel (“OPC”) witness John S. Riley’s direct testimony
18 concerning Paygo revenues. I address both Empire and OPC direct testimony concerning the
19 inclusion of Asset Retirement Obligations (“ARO”) in rate base. Finally, I address Empire
20 witness Aaron J. Doll’s alternative proposal of a tracker for transmission revenues and expenses
21 if the Commission does not allow 100 percent of the transmission revenues and expenses to
22 flow through the Fuel Adjustment Clause (“FAC”).

1 **BUSINESS RISK**

2 Q. What is regulatory lag?

3 A. “Regulatory lag” is the lapse in time between when a utility experiences a
4 financial change and when that change can be reflected in its rate levels. Regulatory lag can be
5 either detrimental or beneficial to a utility’s earnings, and under either scenario, the existence
6 of this phenomenon serves as an important incentive on the utility to be as cost-conscious and
7 efficient over time as possible, in order to maintain its earnings levels.

8 Q. Does regulatory lag motivate a utility to act efficiently?

9 A. Yes. Regulators rely on regulatory lag as an important tool to provide an
10 incentive to a utility to act efficiently. An excessive use of tracking mechanisms and rate riders
11 reduces the incentive for the utility to seek out cost reductions because the utility is insulated
12 from changes in costs and thereby may be able to maintain the utility’s profits even when its
13 costs increase. The more that utilities are insulated from the impacts of increase costs through
14 riders and surcharges, the more business risk is shifted to utility customers. If a utility
15 experiences an increase in expense that is being tracked separately from typical costs authorized
16 by the Commission, its financial results will not be adversely impacted because the impacts are
17 captured on the balance sheet for deferral treatment, with likely recovery. In this instance, the
18 utility has less incentive to attempt to minimize any such costs increase for the tracked item. In
19 addition, if a utility experiences a reduction in an expense that is being tracked, the financial
20 result will not increase earnings because of the decreased cost level. Once again, the utility will
21 have less incentive to seek out ways to reduce costs. Utilities may even be dis-incentivized to
22 reduce costs if the benefits of those lower costs are quickly flowed to customers through special
23 regulatory mechanism outside of a general rate case.

1 Q. Generally speaking, what is “business risk” for a regulated utility?

2 A. “Business risk” refers to the uncertainty linked to the operating cash flows of the
3 utility. Business risk is multi-faceted and includes factors affecting revenues, expenses, and
4 investment costs that could reduce a utility’s profit level. In general, a utility with a certificated
5 service area that has the ability to request changes in rates to cover changes in costs and to
6 provide an opportunity to earn a fair return on investment has far less risk than a business or
7 industry that does not have such safeguards. For example, local and regionally owned grocery
8 stores must compete with other nearby nationwide discount retailers for a customer’s purchase
9 of groceries. Most price sensitive consumers will shop at the store that has the same products
10 but at lower prices. Likewise, if two nearby gas stations have different pricing for gasoline,
11 most price sensitive consumers who need to purchase gasoline will opt to fill their vehicles at
12 the filling station with the lowest price. On the other hand, a regulated utility’s customers are
13 captive customers that have, for the most part, no practical choice other than to accept utility
14 service and utility rates in the area in which they live or do business. Thus, most utility
15 customers are captive to one utility service provider in the area where they live.

16 Q. On page 64 of Empire witness John J. Reed’s direct testimony he cites four
17 factors affecting Empire’s business risk. What are the four factors he cites?

18 A. Mr. Reed cites the four factors as follows: (1) test year convention; (2) rate base
19 convention; (3) revenue decoupling; and (4) capital cost recovery.

20 Q. The first business risk factor, Mr. Reed cites is the test year convention.
21 He claims that 47 % of the utilities in his proxy group utilize a fully or partial future test year.
22 Has Missouri traditionally used a “historic test year?”

1 A. Yes. In Missouri, utility rates have traditionally been set using a historic test
2 year approach. Under this method, rate analysis begins with selection of a test year consisting
3 of twelve months of actual financial information, and for which the data is available for review
4 and analysis at the beginning of the rate case audit. During this audit, the test year data is
5 reviewed to determine what adjustments should be proposed in order to convert the historical
6 financial data into representative ongoing expense and revenue levels to include in prospective
7 rate levels. In every rate case, a number of “annualization” and “normalization” adjustments
8 are proposed for this purpose. Annualization adjustments are proposed to reflect the most
9 current trends evident for an individual expense or revenue item in setting utility rates.
10 Normalization adjustments are proposed to eliminate abnormally high or low individual
11 revenue and expense amounts incurred within the test year in order to reflect only normal and
12 ongoing levels of costs in setting prospective utility rates.

13 However, historic test year ratemaking in Missouri is not limited to reliance on
14 information contained within the twelve-month test year selected for the case. In all
15 major cases, financial information from a subsequent “test year update period” is used and,
16 in almost all cases, an even later “true-up” period is authorized as well to allow use of the
17 most updated expense, revenue, and rate base data possible in setting utility rates; this
18 practice has been referred to as a “modified” historic test year approach. Under Missouri’s
19 modified historic test year approach, rate base items are generally set equal to the update period
20 or true-up period ending level, again to reflect that the most current information available is
21 utilized to set customer rates while ensuring that actual expenditures made were prudently
22 incurred and in-service.

1 To summarize, use of a modified historic test year approach in Missouri has included a
2 number of features intended to reasonably ensure that utility rates are set to reflect the most
3 current trends in the company's revenue, expense, and capital results. However, in almost all
4 cases, ratemaking allowances have been restricted to those qualifying under the "known and
5 measurable" cost standard. The "known and measurable" standard requires that only the costs
6 associated with events that have actually occurred or are certain to occur, and for which the
7 financial impact can be accurately quantified, should be reflected in utility rates. If adhered to,
8 the known and measurable standard precludes the use of budgeted, projected, or forecasted
9 information in setting utility rates.

10 The Staff's position is that adherence to the known and measurable standard in setting
11 rates is an important customer protection.

12 Q. In this case, has Empire chosen to forgo use of a true-up period to set its rates?

13 A. Yes. At the very least, this position seems to reflect that Empire does not view
14 regulatory lag as being a major concern to it in this particular proceeding.

15 Q. The second business risk factor Mr. Reed briefly discusses is rate base
16 convention. Does this factor affect Empire's risk negatively?

17 A. No. As Mr. Reed cites, Empire recommends and the Commission has
18 universally adopted use in past cases of a year-end rate base. This approach provides a more
19 timely cost recovery of capital investments than for other utilities in other jurisdictions, which
20 may use an average rate base.

21 Q. On page 64 of Mr. Reed's direct testimony he states that 46 % of the utilities in
22 his proxy group have revenue decoupling mechanisms or weather normalization adjustment
23 clauses. Does Missouri offer a revenue decoupling options for electric utilities?

1 A. Yes. However, Empire is currently unable to utilize the mechanism because
2 Empire elected to utilize the Plant in Service Account (“PISA”) mechanism. Per Section
3 386.266(3) RSMo,¹ if a utility elects to use PISA then the utility is not allowed to use a
4 revenue adjustment rate (i.e., a revenue decoupling mechanism).

5 Q. Does Empire witness Mr. Reed assert that Empire is more risky than its peers
6 even with the implementation of PISA?

7 A. Yes Mr. Reed asserts on pages 65 through 66 that Empire’s implementation of
8 PISA does not make Empire less risky than its peers. Mr. Reed argues that despite the
9 implementation of PISA, Empire has a greater risk relative to his proxy group in terms of
10 regulatory treatment because Empire is unable to include Construction Work in Progress
11 (CWIP) in rate base. Mr. Reed’s other concerns about PISA is that PISA does not provide
12 immediate cash flow for new construction and that there is no tracking mechanism to recover
13 certain capital investments for generation capacity or generic infrastructure replacement that
14 are placed into service between rate cases.

15 Q. Does Staff agree with this reasoning?

16 A. No. It is Staff’s position that because Empire has implemented the PISA
17 recovery mechanism Empire’s business risk has certainly been reduced in absolute terms
18 compared to past rate cases, and has also very likely been reduced in relative terms compared
19 to other electric utilities that have not been granted the benefit of major new regulatory lag
20 mitigation measures in the time since Empire began using PISA. The PISA recovery mechanism

¹ Subject to the requirements of this section, any gas or electrical corporation may make an application to the commission to approve rate schedules authorizing periodic rate adjustments outside of general rate proceedings to adjust rates of customers in eligible customer classes to account for the impact on utility revenues of increases or decreases in residential and commercial customer usage due to variations in either weather, conservation, or both. No electrical corporation shall make an application to the commission under this subsection if such corporation has provided notice to the commission under subsection 5 of section 393.1400.

1 has reduced the impact of regulatory lag that exists by enabling Empire to defer and later
2 recover significant amounts of investment related costs associated with eligible
3 PISA investment.

4 Q. Should the Commission consider this reduced business risk in determining a
5 reasonable and appropriate rate of return for Empire?

6 A. Yes. Staff is not aware of any policy or statutory impediment to the Commission
7 doing so in relation to the impact of the recent incorporation of the PISA mechanism into
8 Empire's ratemaking.

9 Q. Have you assessed other aspects of Empire's business risk or conducted any
10 comparison of Empire with any of its peers?

11 A. No. Any questions regarding those matters should be referred to Staff witness
12 Peter Chari. My testimony will address Mr. Reed's statements only from an accounting
13 perspective. My rebuttal testimony focuses on my review of PISA. I also provide a brief
14 discussion of various other trackers and riders that are available to Empire.

15 Q. What is the impact of the PISA mechanism in this case?

16 A. For the period covering August 2020 through June 30, 2021, Empire deferred
17 \$12,597,366 of investment related costs associated with eligible PISA investment. During this
18 same period, Empire completed \$811,392,988 in total investment of which \$712,072,493 was
19 PISA eligible. Approximately 88% of Empire's plant investment was eligible for the prescribed
20 85% recovery of PISA investment related costs. The table below summarizes the "return of"
21 and "return on" the eligible PISA investment ending June 30, 2021.²

² Per Staff's Cost of Service Report filed on October 29, 2021 in Case No. ER-2021-0312.

Rebuttal Testimony of
Kimberly K. Bolin

1	PISA Depreciation Expense	\$ 3,860,686
2	PISA Debt Cost on Plant	\$ 3,165,641
3	PISA Equity Return on Plant	\$ 5,372,762
4	PISA Carrying Cost on Regulatory Asset	\$ 73,512
5	PISA Equity Return on Regulatory Asset	\$ 124,765
6	Total Deferral June 30, 2021	<u>\$12,597,366</u>
7	Amortization over 20 years	\$ 629,868
8	Return on Deferral ³	\$ 852,842
9	Tax Factor Up	\$ 196,519
10	Total Revenue Requirement Impact	<u>\$ 1,679,299</u>

11 Q. On page 65 of Mr. Reed's direct testimony he cites that 73% of the operating
12 groups in his proxy are able to include CWIP in rate base in between rate cases. What is CWIP?

13 A. In general, CWIP represents the costs of construction associated with projects
14 that are not yet in-service and therefore not capable of providing electric utility service to
15 customers during construction. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
16 Uniform System of Accounts prescribes the following accounting treatment in Account 107 for
17 these costs:

18 A. This account shall include the total of the balances of work orders for
19 electric plant in process of construction.

20 B. Work orders shall be cleared from this account as soon as practicable
21 after completion of the job. Further, if a project, such as a hydroelectric
22 project, a steam station or a transmission line, is designed to consist of
23 two or more units or circuits which any be placed in service at different
24 dates, any expenditures which are common to and which will be used in
25 the operation of the project as a whole shall be included in electric plant
26 in service upon the completion and readiness for service of the first unit.
27 Any expenditures which are identified exclusively with units of property
28 not yet in service shall be included in this account.

29 C. Expenditures on research, development, and demonstration projects
30 for construction of utility facilities are to be included in a separate
31 subdivision in this account. Records must be maintained to show
32 separately each project along with complete detail of the nature and

³ Using Staff's Midpoint Rate of Return filed in its Staff's Cost of Service Report.

1 purpose of the research, development, and demonstration project
2 together with the related costs.

3 Q. Have the citizens of Missouri passed a referendum prohibiting CWIP in
4 current rates?

5 A. Yes. In November 1976, Missouri passed a referendum prohibiting electric
6 utilities from including CWIP in customers' current rates. This law is commonly referred to as
7 "Proposition 1" and, in effect, does not allow electric utilities to receive cost recovery of CWIP
8 until such time that the plant or capital investment is fully operational and used for service.⁴
9 The intention of this law was to protect customers from being forced to pay for capital
10 investment that is not capable of providing utility service and therefore would not provide an
11 actual benefit to customers.

12 Q. In light of Proposition 1, do Missouri electric utilities ever recover CWIP
13 in rates?

14 A. Yes. While amounts booked to CWIP are not included in permanent rates in
15 Missouri, the accumulated CWIP balances are included in rate base when the construction is
16 completed and the amounts formerly booked to CWIP are transferred to plant in service
17 accounts and placed into service. Once plant is completed and customers start to benefit from
18 the system improvement, the related costs are included in the rate structure of the utility through
19 a rate request. While the costs of the newly completed plant are "deferred" during the time of
20 construction in Missouri, utilities are made whole for this cost over time through the accrual of
21 an allowance for funds used during construction ("AFUDC"). AFUDC represents a deferred

⁴ Section 393.135 RSMo (2016) Charges based on nonoperational property of electrical corporation prohibited. Any charges made or demanded by an electrical corporation for service, or in connection therewith, which is based on the costs of construction in progress upon any existing or new facility of the electrical corporation, or any other cost associated with owning, operating, maintaining, or financing any property before it is fully operational and used for service, is unjust and unreasonable, and is prohibited.

1 “return” mechanism recognizing the investors’ cost of money during the duration of the
2 construction project. The plant construction costs and the related AFUDC are included in the
3 final plant costs that are ultimately included in rate base as part of a general rate case once it is
4 fully operational and used for service.

5 Q. Would Staff be supportive of a utility’s attempt to recover CWIP in customer rates
6 before plant is placed in service?

7 A. No. Beyond the fact that legal counsel advises the recovery of CWIP in current
8 utility rates is not permitted, as determined by Missouri voters in 1976, allowing CWIP recovery
9 in rates would produce unfair results for customers because:

10 1. It is not appropriate to charge customers for investment costs for an item
11 such as an electric generating facility that is not capable of providing utility service
12 during the time the plant is being constructed. Customers should not have to pay for
13 plant that is not capable of providing utility service. Only when customers start
14 benefitting from use of the completed plant should rate recovery start;

15 2. Including CWIP in current rates prior to provides the utility an incentive
16 to complete plant that is determined to not be needed in providing utility service,
17 increasing the likelihood that a utility would construct unnecessary investment;

18 3. CWIP in rates can create intergenerational inequities. Intergenerational
19 inequity means that if CWIP were collected in current rates, the utility would get the
20 benefit of collecting the construction costs for investment that is not yet in service
21 today while at the same time the customers would be receiving no benefits until a
22 later time, if ever.

23 4. Including CWIP in current rates shifts the risk from the utility to its
24 customers by requiring customers to pay for plant that may never be completed.
25 Utilities are required to plan and build sufficient facilities to meet existing customer
26 needs, receiving a financial return for accepting this risk. By shifting the risk of
27 construction projects to utility customers, there is not typically a corresponding

1 reduction in the utility's expected and requested rate of return. Thus, utility
2 customers will likely pay more in rates for having to accept this additional risk.

3 Q. Are there other measures adopted by the Commission for Empire that have had
4 the impact of materially reducing its regulatory lag?

5 A. Yes. Frequently, utilities such as Empire request from the Commission what is
6 referred to as deferral accounting treatment of certain costs. Often circumstances warrant costs
7 that ordinarily would be charged currently to expense instead be deferred to balance sheet
8 accounts. Deferral authority, when granted by the Commission, allows the utility the
9 opportunity to recover such costs in later rate cases, thus mitigating regulatory lag.

10 Q. What kinds of costs does the Commission typically allow deferral treatment?

11 A. There are situation that may occur during the normal operations of the utility
12 where events happen causing costs to rise above normal levels and above what is currently in
13 rates. Most of the time in these situations whatever is causing the abnormally high costs is out
14 of the control of the utility. Storms, such as the Joplin tornado that occurred in 2011, are
15 examples of this phenomenon. In that particular situation, Empire was required to immediately
16 repair damage to the transmission and distribution infrastructure to restore power as soon as
17 possible. Empire was granted an Accounting Authority Order ("AAO") to recover repair and
18 restoration costs in future rate cases related to the tornado.

19 Q. Above you cite the tornado AAO. Are there any other deferrals that Empire has
20 been authorized to use by this Commission that are currently in rates?

21 A. Yes. The following is a listing of the approaches that Empire has employed to
22 mitigate regulatory lag impacts:

Rebuttal Testimony of
Kimberly K. Bolin

- 1 1. Fuel Adjustment Clause (“FAC”) Rider;
- 2 2. Pension and Other Post Retirement Employee Benefits (“OPEBs”) Tracker
- 3 3. Various Trackers – Regulatory Asset and Liability Deferrals and Amortizations
- 4 a. Vegetation Management Tracker Regulatory Asset
- 5 b. Iatan and Plum Point Carrying Costs Regulatory Asset
- 6 c. Riverton 12 Long-Term Maintenance Regulatory Asset

7 Q. Has Empire filed a notice of intent to seek a financing order that authorizes the
8 issuance of securitized utility tariff bonds regarding the extraordinary costs incurred during the
9 anomalous weather event of February 2021, sometimes referred to as Winter Storm Uri?

10 A. Yes. Empire filed a notice of intent in Case No. EO-2022-0040 to seek
11 securitized utility bonds for the extraordinary Winter Storm Uri costs.

12 **PAYGO**

13 Q. What is “Paygo?”

14 A. “Paygo” is additional contributions of cash by the wind farm tax equity partners
15 ultimately paid to Empire based on actual production in excess of a threshold amount of
16 Megawatt hours (MWhs). If the threshold production level is exceeded, then the tax equity
17 partner must begin making paygo payments.

18 Q. On page 6 of OPC witness John S. Riley’s direct testimony he recommends the
19 Commission include \$4 million in Paygo payments in Empire’s annual revenue requirement,
20 and track the difference between Empire’s actual paygo revenues against that \$4 million per
21 year, and address the difference when designing Empire’s rates in its next general rate case.
22 Does Staff agree with this recommendation?

23 A. Yes and no. Staff has proposed to include the paygo revenues in the FAC;
24 however if the Commission decides that the Paygo revenues should not be included in the FAC,
25 then the revenues should be included in the revenue requirement, and ongoing levels tracked

1 against the amount included in the revenue requirement. If the Commission decides to include
2 the paygo revenues in the FAC, the customers will automatically receive the benefits of the
3 paygo revenues and a tracker will not be needed.

4 **ASSET RETIREMENT OBLIGATION**

5 Q. What is an ARO?

6 A. An ARO is an obligation, legal or non-legal, associated with the retirement of a
7 tangible, long-lived asset for the cost of returning a piece of property to its original condition.
8 Retirement obligations can be recognized either when the asset is placed in service or during
9 the operational life when its removal obligation is incurred.

10 Q. What is an asset retirement cost (“ARC”)?

11 A. An ARC is the offsetting asset that Empire booked in its records when Empire
12 recognized the ARO.

13 Q. Did Empire include the ARO and the ARC in its rate base?

14 A. Yes. Empire included the ARC in plant in service in the amount of \$22,880,541,
15 but also included an offsetting liability for the ARO in the amount of \$23,593,959.⁵

16 Q. Is Empire requesting to amortize the ARC?

17 A. Yes. Empire has proposed to amortize the ARC in the amount of \$22,880,541
18 (Missouri jurisdictional) over 30 years, which results in an annual amortization of \$762,845.

19 Q. Has Staff included this amortization in its cost of service?

20 A. No. AROs represent one component of costs that are considered in determining
21 the cost of removal component of utility depreciation rates. Cost of removal is allowed to be
22 collected in rates on an ongoing basis in order for the utilities to recover over time the estimated

⁵ Both amounts are Missouri jurisdictional.

1 costs of “removing” assets once they are retired and no longer needed to provide service to
2 customers. Allowing rate treatment of AROs would result in double recovery in rates by the
3 utility of certain costs related to retirement of assets.

4 **TRANSMISSION TRACKER**

5 Q. On page 29 of Empire witness Aaron J. Doll’s direct testimony he proposes that
6 if the Commission does not allow transmission expense and revenues to flow through the FAC
7 at 100%, then in the alternative, he recommends a tracker be authorized for transmission
8 revenues and transmission expenses that are not allowed to flow through the FAC. Does Staff
9 recommend the Commission grant a tracker for transmission expense and revenues as an
10 alternative to including 100 % of the transmission revenues and expenses in the FAC?

11 A. No.

12 Q. In the past, has the Commission denied requests for a tracker for transmission
13 costs?

14 A. Yes. In Case Nos. ER-2012-0174 and ER-2014-0370, the Commission denied
15 Kansas City Power & Light Company (“KCPL”) and KCPL Greater Missouri Operations
16 Company (now Evergy Metro and Evergy Missouri West, respectively) requests for a tracker
17 for transmission costs.

18 The Commission stated on page 54 in its Report and Order in Case No. ER-2014-0370:

19 The evidence presented in this case showed that KCPL’s transmission
20 costs, while having increased in recent years, are normal, ordinary and
21 recurring operation costs. These recurring costs are not abnormal or
22 significantly different from the ordinary and typical activities of the
23 company, so they are not extraordinary, and therefore, not subject to
24 deferral under the USoA.

Rebuttal Testimony of
Kimberly K. Bolin

1 Q. Did Staff include a normalized level of transmission expenses and revenues
2 included in its cost of service?

3 A. Yes. In this case, Staff examined transmission revenues and expenses incurred
4 since October 2015, and determined that the twelve months ending June 30, 2021 level of
5 expenses and revenues incurred represented a normalized level.⁶

6 Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?

7 A. Yes.

⁶ Staff Cost of Service Report, page 86 in Case No. ER-2021-0312.

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of the Request of The Empire)
District Electric Company d/b/a Liberty for)
Authority to File Tariffs Increasing Rates for)
Electric Service Provided to Customers in its)
Missouri Service Area)

Case No. ER-2021-0312

AFFIDAVIT OF KIMBERLY K. BOLIN

STATE OF MISSOURI)
)
) ss.
COUNTY OF COLE)

COMES NOW KIMBERLY K. BOLIN, and on her oath declares that she is of sound mind and lawful age; that she contributed to the foregoing *Rebuttal Testimony of Kimberly K. Bolin*; and that the same is true and correct according to her best knowledge and belief.

Further the Affiant sayeth not.

Kimberly K. Bolin

KIMBERLY K. BOLIN

JURAT

Subscribed and sworn before me, a duly constituted and authorized Notary Public, in and for the County of Cole, State of Missouri, at my office in Jefferson City, on this 15th day of December, 2021.

DIANNA L. VAUGHT Notary Public - Notary Seal State of Missouri Commissioned for Cole County My Commission Expires: July 18, 2023 Commission Number: 15207377

Dianna L. Vaught

Notary Public