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MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CASE NO.: ER-2026-0143

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

GEOFFREY LEY

ON BEHALF OF

EVERGY MISSOURI METRO

**Kansas City, Missouri
September 2026**

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1 terms for the benefit of its customers. Mr. Murray's capital structure and ROE
2 recommendations would produce a significantly lower overall rate of return. Dr. Won's
3 recommendations produce an overall rate of return of approximately 7.23%. While Dr.
4 Won is closer to the Company's position, his lower ROE recommendation results in a rate
5 of return that would not adequately compensate investors for the risks associated with
6 EMM's operations and capital program. Therefore, the Company's requested 7.6546%
7 rate of return properly reflects EMM's risk profile, nuclear ownership responsibilities, and
8 capital market conditions.

9 II. CAPITAL STRUCTURE

10 **Q: Mr. Murray recommends a capital structure of 45% common equity and 55% long-**
11 **term debt. Do you agree?**

12 **A:** No. EMM proposes a capital structure of 52.0749% common equity and 47.9251% long-
13 term debt, based on EMM's projected capital structure as of the June 30, 2026, true-up
14 date, which "Staff has no concerns with."¹ As discussed in my rebuttal, EMM's average
15 equity ratio for Q1 through Q4 of 2025 was approximately 52.87%, which is above the
16 Company's proposed equity.²

17 Mr. Murray's proposal of 45% equity, however, is markedly below the national
18 average. Dr. Won found Mr. Murray's recommendation to be "inconsistent with recent
19 regulatory practice" because the average equity ratios for vertically integrated regulated
20 electric utilities nationally ranged from 48.71% to 50.91% between 2024 through June
21 2026.³⁴

¹ See Won Rebuttal at 47.

² Id. at 51.

³ Id. at 51-52.

⁴ Id.

1 **Q: Mr. Murray’s recommendation is derived from Evergy, Inc.’s consolidated capital**
2 **structure. Is this common regulatory practice?**

3 A: No. As discussed in my rebuttal, Mr. Murray’s 45% common-equity and 55% long-term-
4 debt recommendation is incorrectly based on Evergy, Inc.’s consolidated capital structure.

5 EMM satisfies all four Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts
6 (“SURFA”) guidelines for using its own standalone capital structure: (1) it issues its own
7 long-term debt, (2) it has its own bond credit ratings, (3) it has a reasonable capital
8 structure, and (4) it has no evidence of double leverage.⁵

9 EMM is a separately organized and rated public utility. EMM issues its own long-
10 term debt and manages its capital structure independently. It also has its own credit ratings
11 — A- from Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) and Baa1 from Moody’s (“Moody’s”) — which
12 are superior to Evergy, Inc.’s ratings of BBB+ and Baa2, respectively.⁶

13 Further, Mr. Murray’s characterization of the Company’s structure as “leverage
14 arbitrage” is not supported. As I explained in my rebuttal testimony, my review of 109 rate
15 cases found no instance in which holding-company debt was attributed to a regulated
16 subsidiary in determining that subsidiary’s capital structure. EMM’s use of the money
17 pool is a standard, regulated practice governed by Generally Accepted Accounting
18 Principles (“GAAP”), by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) reporting
19 requirements, and by the rules of this Commission. Such practice does not constitute
20 double leverage.⁷

⁵ See Won Direct at 41 (citing Amended Report & Order at 84, In re Spire Request for Authority to Implement a General Rate Increase for Natural Gas Service, No. GR-2021-0108 (Nov. 12, 2021)); Won Rebuttal at 51-54.

⁶ See Ley Rebuttal at 4-5; Won Rebuttal at 51-54.

⁷ See Ley Rebuttal at 4-5.

1 Mr. Murray's recommendation is fundamentally inconsistent with the standalone
2 principle that utility commissions across the country, including this Commission and its
3 Staff, have consistently applied.⁸

4 III. RETURN ON EQUITY

5 **Q: Is Evergy Missouri Metro's requested ROE reasonable?**

6 A: Yes. EMM requests a 10.5% ROE. As explained in Ms. Bulkley's and my testimonies,
7 the current and anticipated capital market conditions, including elevated long-term treasury
8 yields and a correspondingly higher cost of capital, support the need for a forward-looking
9 ROE. EMM also faces moderately higher business and regulatory risks than many of its
10 peers because of significant capital expenditures, plant-in-service accounting, nuclear
11 power operations, and a 95% pass-through fuel adjustment clause.

12 Therefore, EMM's requested ROE, which is at the lower end of the 10.25% to
13 11.25% range supported by Ms. Bulkley's cost of equity analysis, is reasonable.

14 **Q: Is Mr. Murray's recommendation of 9.25% ROE reasonable?**

15 A: No. Mr. Murray's 9.25% recommendation is inadequate and would not allow EMM to
16 attract capital on reasonable terms in the current market environment.⁹ Mr. Murray's ROE
17 exceeds his cost of equity by only 125 basis points. However, his underlying cost of equity
18 estimate appears unreasonably low, given current capital market conditions, including
19 elevated interest rates, persistent inflation concerns, and increased demand for utility equity
20 capital to fund the generational capital investment cycle the industry is undertaking.

21 Moreover, Mr. Murray's recommended ROE of 9.25% is significantly below the
22 national average authorized ROE of 9.85% in the first half of 2026 for electric utility cases,

⁸ See Won Rebuttal at 52-54.

⁹ See Murray Rebuttal at 42, 49.

1 as well as the approximately 9.84% for all vertically integrated electric utility cases.¹⁰
2 Authorizing an ROE that far below the national average would send a negative signal to
3 investors regarding Missouri's regulatory environment and would likely increase EMM's
4 cost of capital over time.

5 **Q: Mr. Murray raises the argument in support of his lower ROE that the Evergy Kansas**
6 **Central's ("EKC") Unanimous Settlement Agreement implies a 9.7% ROE.¹¹ How**
7 **do you respond?**

8 A: Evergy Kansas Central's black-box settlement, regarding which Mr. Murray cited an article
9 that "implied" a 50/50 capital structure and 9.7% ROE, was a product of negotiation and
10 compromise among the parties. The Unanimous Settlement Agreement does not represent
11 a litigated determination of the appropriate ROE or capital structure. Settlements reflect
12 considerations beyond the merits of any single issue, so the implicit ROE derived from the
13 overall revenue requirement does not constitute evidence that 9.7%, or any other specific
14 figure, is the correct ROE for EMM, a completely different operating utility in this
15 proceeding.

16 **Q: Is Dr. Won's recommended ROE of 9.73% reasonable?**

17 A: No. While Dr. Won's 9.73% ROE is closer to the national average than Mr. Murray's
18 recommendation, it remains below the 10.5% that EMM requires. Dr. Won notes that no
19 authorized ROEs in the first half of 2026 fall within Ms. Bulkley's recommended range of
20 10.25% to 11.25%.¹² However, the appropriate ROE for a specific utility must reflect that

¹⁰ See Won Rebuttal at 4, 31.

¹¹ See Murray Rebuttal at 6-7.

¹² See Won Rebuttal at 7.

1 utility's specific risk profile, capital needs, and market conditions — not simply the
2 arithmetic average of all recent rate case outcomes nationally.

3 EMM faces a combination of risks that justify an ROE at the upper end of the
4 reasonable range: it co-owns and operates a nuclear generating facility (Wolf Creek), as
5 discussed below, it is in the midst of a substantial capital investment program, it is
6 experiencing rapid load growth from data center customers that brings both opportunities
7 and risks, and it must finance these investments in a capital market environment
8 characterized by elevated interest rates relative to historical norms. These factors
9 collectively support an ROE of 10.5%.

10 V. COST OF DEBT

11 **Q: What is EMM's proposed cost of long-term debt?**

12 A: EMM proposes an embedded cost of long-term debt of 4.5628%, projected as of the June
13 30, 2026, true-up date. “Staff has no major concerns” with EMM’s proposed long-term
14 debt because it “was computed based on the actual terms of EMM's existing and forecasted
15 long-term debt issuances that fund its regulated operations and reflects the embedded
16 weighted-average cost of long-term debt projected to be outstanding as of the June 30,
17 2026, true-up date.”¹³

18 VI. NUCLEAR ROE ANALYSIS

19 **Q: Does Evergy Missouri Metro own nuclear generation?**

20 A: Yes. Evergy Missouri Metro owns a 47% interest in Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating
21 Station (“Wolf Creek”), a 1,255 MW nuclear facility that has been operating since 1985.
22 This is a material ownership interest in a nuclear facility which contributes to EMM’s risk

¹³ See Won Rebuttal at 46.

1 profile. Wolf Creek's continued operation exposes EMM to nuclear-specific risks
2 including operational safety requirements, regulatory compliance costs, waste management
3 obligations, and potential decommissioning liabilities. These are ongoing business realities
4 that differentiate EMM from utilities that do not own nuclear generation.

5 **Q: Does the data support the conclusion that nuclear operations warrant an ROE**
6 **premium for EMM?**

7 A: Yes. As discussed in my direct testimony and as demonstrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2
8 therein, states with vertically integrated nuclear utilities have authorized an average ROE
9 of approximately 10.04%, compared to approximately 9.67% across all states — an
10 average 37 basis point premium in those states where electric utilities have nuclear
11 operations.¹⁴ The data confirm that individual vertically integrated utilities with nuclear
12 operations receive authorized ROEs at or above the national average. Dr. Won's attempt
13 to attribute this premium entirely to other risk factors does not withstand scrutiny, as other
14 risk factors are cumulative with nuclear risk, not a replacement for it.

15 EMM's requested ROE of 10.5% is consistent with the returns authorized for other
16 vertically integrated utilities with nuclear operations and is appropriate given EMM's risk
17 profile, including its 47% ownership interest in Wolf Creek.

18 **Q: What criticism does Dr. Won raise regarding your analysis of ROE for utilities with**
19 **nuclear operations?**

20 A: Dr. Won argues that my analysis of authorized ROEs for states with nuclear operations
21 reflects a "correlation versus causation" confusion.¹⁵ He contends that the higher

¹⁴ See Ley Direct at 4; EMM Response to Staff Data Request ("DR") No. 0134 (spreadsheet Q0134_S&P Past Rate Case Download - 2020-2024.xlsx, Graph Sourcing tab).

¹⁵ See Won Rebuttal at 38.

1 authorized ROEs observed in states with nuclear operations are attributable to other risk
2 factors, such as wildfires, hurricanes, population growth, and storm-hardening
3 requirements, rather than to nuclear operations themselves.¹⁶

4 **Q: How did you develop the nuclear ROE analysis presented in your direct testimony?**

5 A: As described in EMM's response to Staff Data Request No. 0134, the analysis followed a
6 two-step process. In Step 1, I used S&P Global Market Intelligence / Regulatory Research
7 Associates data for the period October 1, 2020, through September 24, 2024, which
8 provided authorized ROE data by state. In Step 2, I cross-referenced those states with
9 vertically integrated regulated utilities that have nuclear operations.¹⁷ The results showed
10 that the average authorized ROE for states with vertically integrated nuclear utilities was
11 approximately 10.04%, compared to approximately 9.67% across all states — a consistent
12 premium of 37 basis points.¹⁸

13 **Q: Does Dr. Won's state-by-state analysis disprove the nuclear premium?**

14 A: No. Dr. Won's state-by-state analysis actually conflates issues rather than resolving them.
15 He identifies various risk factors present in each state, such as wildfire liability in
16 California, hurricane exposure in Florida, population growth in Georgia and North
17 Carolina, and winter storms in Michigan,¹⁹ and attributes the higher ROEs in those states
18 entirely to those factors. However, these risk factors are cumulative, not mutually
19 exclusive. A state can have both hurricane risk and nuclear risk.

20 Critically, Dr. Won does not and cannot demonstrate that removing nuclear
21 operations from any of these states would result in the same authorized ROE. He identifies

¹⁶ See Won Rebuttal at 38-45.

¹⁷ See EMM Response to Staff Data Request No. 0134 attached as Schedule GL-3.

¹⁸ Id. (spreadsheet Q0134_S&P Past Rate Case Download - 2020-2024.xlsx, Graph Sourcing tab).

¹⁹ See Won Rebuttal at 38-45.

1 other risk factors that exist in those states, but he does not show that nuclear operations
2 contribute nothing to the risk profiles of the utilities in question. For example, Georgia
3 Power operates Plant Vogtle with four nuclear units, and faces hurricane risk and
4 population growth, but it also faces the operational, regulatory, and financial risks
5 associated with nuclear generation. These risks exist simultaneously and cumulatively.

6 **Q: Dr. Won points to Illinois as the number one nuclear-producing state with an ROE of**
7 **8.72-8.91%, well below the national average. How do you respond?**

8 A: Illinois is not relevant to my analysis because the interconnected utilities with nuclear
9 generation facilities — Commonwealth Edison and Ameren Illinois — are distribution-
10 only utilities.²⁰

11 The fact that distribution utilities in Illinois have lower ROEs does not disprove the
12 nuclear premium for vertically integrated utilities, such as EMM, that incur nuclear
13 operational risk. Distribution-only utilities face a fundamentally different risk profile than
14 vertically integrated utilities that own and operate nuclear generation.

15 **Q: Dr. Won argues that nuclear risks are already factored into credit ratings and**
16 **therefore should not warrant an ROE premium. Do you agree?**

17 A: No.²¹ Both credit ratings and authorized ROE are complementary, not substitute,
18 components of the overall rate of return framework. Credit ratings reflect the probability
19 of default and recovery, while ROE compensates equity investors for their incurred risk.
20 Simply because a rating agency has considered nuclear risk in evaluating a utility's

²⁰ See Schedule GL-3 (spreadsheet Q0134_S&P Past Rate Case Download - 2020-2024.xlsx, Graph Sourcing tab);
Won Rebuttal at 45.

²¹ See Won Rebuttal at 36-37.

1 creditworthiness does not eliminate equity investors' need for additional compensation to
2 bear that same risk.

3 Indeed, both Moody's and Standard & Poor's discuss nuclear-specific risk factors
4 in their ratings methodologies, including waste storage obligations, operational
5 complexity, decommissioning liabilities, and environmental compliance.²² A utility that
6 operates nuclear generation faces risks that a similarly rated utility without nuclear
7 operations does not. These are real risks borne by equity investors, and the ROE must
8 reflect them.

9 **VIII. CONCLUSION**

10 **Q: Please summarize your surrebuttal testimony.**

11 A: In summary, the Company's cost of capital request is just and reasonable, and is supported
12 by the evidence in this proceeding.

13 First, EMM's standalone capital structure of approximately 52% equity should be
14 used because EMM satisfies all four SURFA guidelines, issues its own debt, has its own
15 superior credit ratings, and there is no evidence of double leverage. Dr. Won agrees with
16 the standalone approach. Mr. Murray's recommendation of 45% equity, based on Evergy's
17 consolidated capital structure, is inconsistent with established regulatory practice and is
18 specifically rejected by Staff.

19 Second, an ROE of 10.5% is appropriate given current capital market conditions,
20 EMM's nuclear ownership, its substantial capital investment program, and the risks and
21 opportunities presented by large load growth. Both Mr. Murray's 9.25% and Dr. Won's

²² See Won Rebuttal at 36-37.

1 9.73% are insufficient to maintain EMM's financial integrity and attract capital on
2 reasonable terms.

3 Third, the overall rate of return of 7.6546% properly compensates investors for the
4 risks of investing in EMM while allowing the Company to continue providing safe and
5 reliable service to its customers.

6 **Q: Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?**

7 A: Yes, it does.

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

In the Matter of Evergy Metro, Inc. d/b/a Evergy)
Missouri Metro's Request for Authority to) Case No. ER-2026-0143
Implement A General Rate Increase for Electric)
Service)

AFFIDAVIT OF GEOFFREY LEY

STATE OF MISSOURI)
) ss
COUNTY OF JACKSON)

Geoffrey Ley, being first duly sworn on his oath, states:

1. My name is Geoffrey Ley. I work in Kansas City, Missouri and I am employed by Evergy Metro, Inc. as Senior Vice President, Corporate Planning and Treasurer.
2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my Surrebuttal Testimony on behalf of Evergy Missouri Metro consisting of eleven (11) pages, having been prepared in written form for introduction into evidence in the above-captioned docket.
3. I have knowledge of the matters set forth therein. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded, including any attachments thereto, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.



Geoffrey Ley

Subscribed and sworn before me this 10th day of September 2026.



Notary Public

My commission expires: April 26, 2029

