**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**
**OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

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| In the Matter of Evergy Metro, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri Metro's Request for Authority to Implement a General Rate Increase for Electric Service | ) ) ) ) ) | Case No. ER-2026-0143 |

# REPLY BRIEF OF THE MIDWEST ENERGY CONSUMERS GROUP

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| In the Matter of Evergy Metro, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri Metro's Request for Authority to Implement a General Rate Increase for Electric Service | ) ) ) ) ) | Case No. ER-2026-0143 |

**REPLY BRIEF OF MECG**

COMES NOW the Midwest Energy Consumers Group ("MECG"), and for its Reply Brief respectfully states:

**Overview**

In this Reply Brief, MECG responds to several matters addressed in the initial briefs filed by other parties. Specifically, MECG addresses issues related to the new Large Load Power Service ("LLPS") customer base including MECG's support of the Commission adding $60 million to Evergy's revenues to reflect the additional revenue the company projects to receive from LLPS activity over 12 months. Additionally, MECG continues to advocate for the adoption of a two-way LLPS revenue tracker and opposes any earnings sharing mechanism that ties the prospect of revenue sharing to factors completely unrelated to the ramping and addition of new large loads. Regarding depreciation, MECG replies to the arguments that seek to minimize Evergy's determination to extend the retirement dates of Iatan 1, La Cygne 2, and La Cygne Common in its latest Integrated Resource Plan update. On rate design, MECG replies to Staff's testimony to clarify the key aspects of Evergy's rate design proposals that have some level of agreement from multiple parties involved in this case. Next, MECG addresses revenue apportionment to reply to

Staff's position in brief that there is no reliable cost of service study in this case. Finally, MECG responds to Staff's Critical Peak Rate proposal. Topics addressed:

1. Large Load Power Service (Issues 3 and 37)
2. Depreciation (Issue 17.A.)
3. Rate Design and Implementation (Issues 29 and 30)
4. Revenue Apportionment (Issue 32)
5. Critical Peak Rate (Issue 33)

## I. Large Load Power Service

**Issue 3.A. What is the appropriate level of net revenue to reflect in the cost of service and other models for Large Load Power Service ("LLPS") and other large customers?**

The Commission should adopt a $60 million adjustment to Evergy's revenue requirement to reflect LLPS revenues. The initial briefs filed by multiple parties request the Commission adjust the Company's revenues by some amount to impute LLPS revenues. MECG's Initial Brief supports the Commission making this determination based on the LLPS activity that exists now and is reasonably likely to exist over the next year paired with a tracking mechanism. OPC's proposes an amount of $117 million based on projected conditions that will exist in 2030.[1] Staff and Evergy both put forward calculations that consider a number of aspects of current LLPS load and varying projections of that load over a horizon of 12 months or less after the June 2026 true-up deadline in this case.[2] Evergy's and Staff's calculations result in a range of revenues that are generally in alignment.[3] MECG supports Evergy's proposed $60 million adjustment as it falls within that range. As explained in its Initial Brief, MECG's proposed two-way LLPS revenue tracker provides a

[1] OPC Br. pp. 20-21.
[2] Evergy Br. pp. 26-27.
[3] Staff Br. pp. 36-37, Highly Confidential.

simple mechanism that helps mitigate the scenario where LLPS revenues do not match that estimate.[4]

**Issue 37.A. Should the Commission implement a mechanism to review or share earnings attributable to Schedule LLPS customers, and if so, how should it be designed?**

The Commission should implement MECG's proposed two-way LLPS revenue tracker. As explained in MECG's Initial Brief the tracker would allow the isolation of the Company's net revenues received from LLPS activity.[5] Staff and Evergy propose adoption of an earnings review and sharing mechanism that would impose numerous conditions that must be met before Evergy shares any revenues with non-LLPS customers.[6] These conditions include Evergy's overall earnings exceeding the Company's authorized return on equity and that during such time the LLPS revenues exceed the LLPS revenue amount included in the revenue requirement in this case.[7] Although the proposals of Staff and Evergy differ in certain ways, they share the same key two-step prerequisite framework preceding any sharing. MECG's primary concern with Evergy's proposal is that it adopts a complex framework that is unlikely to ever result in actual benefits flowing to any party except Evergy. Consider, under the earnings sharing mechanism, Evergy's incentive to control costs and operate efficiently between rate cases is diminished because increases in a "bundled" earnings sharing mechanism may offset increased revenues to unduly reduce the benefits customers would otherwise realize. Such an outcome should not be left as a possibility when a tracker as proposed by MECG is, as the Staff testified, a simpler option.[8]

[4] MECG Br. pp. 7-8.
[5] MECG Br. pp. 6-7.
[6] Staff Br. pp. 125-127.
[7] Evergy Br. pp. 56-57.
[8] Ex.138, Sarah Lange Rebuttal, p. 14, ll. 21-22.

Evergy additionally argues in its brief that the Commission previously rejected the creation of an LLPS revenue tracker and endorsed the earnings review and sharing concept.[9] Evergy's arguments in this regard should be rejected. Evergy argues that the Commission reached these two decisions in the Company's LLPS tariff docket EO-2025-0154. First as to a revenue tracker: Evergy's brief quotes the Commission's order as rejecting the concept of a one-way revenue tracker as "inconsistent with balancing all parties' interests."[10] Importantly, MECG's current recommendation is for a two-way tracker, not one-way, so the Commission's statements do not bear on MECG's proposal.[11] Evergy criticized a one-way tracker MECG proposed in direct saying it wasn't a balanced.[12] The two-way tracker is imminently reasonable and balanced. Second, as to the Commission's position at that time regarding earnings sharing: It is true the Commission acknowledged its general ability to adopt measures in the face of extraordinary circumstances where positive regulatory lag is certain. However, the Commission did not provide any indication about the type of mechanism it would possibly favor in a future rate case, instead determining that "it is premature for the Commission to establish a regulatory mechanism at this time."[13]

Based on the foregoing, the Commission should adopt MECG's proposal for a two-way revenue tracker and reject proposals for an earnings sharing mechanism.

[9] Evergy Br. pp. 55-60.
[10] Evergy Br. p. 60 (quoting Large Load Order at p. 27).
[11] *See* Report & Order at p. 46, In re: Evergy Large Load Customer Tariff Filing, No. EO-2025-0154 *(Nov. 13, 2025) ("Large Load Order")*: "Staff's proposed **one-way revenue tracker** is also unreasonable." (Emphasis added).
[12] Ex. 22, Gunn Rebuttal, p. 8.
[13] Large Load Order at p. 44.

## II. Depreciation

**Issue 17.A. Which depreciation rates should be used?**

The Commission should adopt MECG's proposal that would extend the retirement dates of Iatan 1, La Cygne 2, and La Cygne Common based on Evergy's latest Integrated Resource Plan ("IRP") update. MECG's position, reflected in its Initial Brief, remains that the IRP update filed by Evergy demonstrates the company's determination—for planning and depreciation purposes—to delay the retirement dates of these units by at least five years, from 2040 to at least 2045.[14] This change equates to a $7.3 million annual reduction in depreciation expenses. Evergy's brief attempts to minimize the weight to be assigned to the Company's identification of retirement dates in its IRP documents. Evergy attempts to draw a distinction by arguing that the selection of a retirement date for depreciation purposes is a different process that is more fact-intensive and considers more factors and a certain degree of professional judgment.[15] The Commission should reject the concept that a utility is allowed to maintain two sets of retirement dates for the same units: one date for depreciation purposes and another for resource planning. MECG's Initial Brief explains how the law requires utilities to undertake resource planning, and that the resource planning process explicitly requires consideration of both resource additions and resource retirements. As raised in MECG's Initial Brief, Evergy seems more than willing to assign great weight to the resource additions it has identified through the IRP process when it inures to its benefit.[16] Undoubtedly, Evergy would reject any suggestion that the resource planning is unsupported by a fact-intensive review process that considered many factors and a certain degree of professional judgment. MECG

[14] MECG Br. pp. 3-6.
[15] Evergy Br. pp. 170-171.
[16] MECG Br. p. 4.

suggests it only equitable to assume the same review process underlies Evergy's selection of resource retirement dates for IRP purposes.

Staff's position on depreciation similarly argues that the selection of retirement dates considers numerous factors.[17] As with Evergy's briefing on this matter, Staff seems willing to ignore that Evergy's current resource planning outlook—a process the company is legally required to undertake[18] and in which the company is legally required to consider retirement dates[19] —made a specific change to the retirement dates of Iatan 1, La Cygne 2, and La Cygne Common.

MECG's argument on this topic does not hinge on a single reference that was retrieved from some vast expanse of documentation, rather this is the Company's own planning document—filed this calendar year—that now reflects a specific change to retirement dates the Company is now relying on for assessing its resource portfolio. The Commission should order Evergy to extend the planned retirement dates of Iatan 1, La Cygne 2, and La Cygne Common by at least five years until 2045 for purposes of depreciation calculations.

## III. Rate Design

**Issue 29 Should the rates of the non-residential non-lighting customers be restructured in this case?**
iv. Should EMM be ordered to promptly conduct a billing determinants and customer impact study?
B. Should the non-residential non-lighting opt-in time based rates proposed by EMM be implemented?

The Commission should adopt the non-residential rate redesigns as proposed by Evergy and modified within the Non-Unanimous Partial Settlement - Rate Design agreement between MECG and Evergy.[20] While parties objected to aspects of the Rate Design Agreement, the major

[17] Staff Br. pp. 64-66.
[18] 20 CSR 4240-22.080.
[19] 20 CSR 4240-22.020(53) Definition of Resource Planning.
[20] Ex. 554. *Non-Unanimous Partial Settlement - Rate Design*. ("Rate Design Agreement")

rate redesign components are generally not in controversy. The following table summarizes those matters:

| Rate issue | Not opposed by |
|---|---|
| **"Bright line" thresholds** | Evergy[21], Staff[22], MECG[23], Google |
| **Moving from 30-minute to 15-minute demand measurements** | Evergy, Staff, MECG, Google |
| **Elimination of hours use structure** | Evergy, Staff, MECG, Google |
| **Enactment of TOU rate** | Evergy, MECG, Google |

Staff opposes the optional TOU rate based on its claim that the framework is not cost-based and is poorly priced.[24] However, Staff did not quantify the amount of revenue it believes participants would avoid nor why it is detrimental to the system to offer a rate that results in a customer paying more to use energy in a peak period and less during a period of lower demand. As Evergy's brief points out, this is the exact result intended by offering this type of rate.[25] In addition, the proposal aligns with the rate that was approved in Kansas.[26] The Commission should approve the opt-in TOU rate as outlined in the Rate Design Agreement.[27]

**Issue 29.A.i. What are the appropriate periods for each time-related element?**

The Commission should adopt the time periods reflected in the positions of Evergy and MECG as embodied in the Rate Design Agreement. Specifically, that includes adopting a winter on-peak demand period that goes from 7:00 a.m.—7:00 p.m.

[21] *Id*.
[22] Staff Br. p. 95.
[23] Ex. 554. Rate Design Agreement.
[24] Staff Br. p. 102.
[25] Evergy Br. pp. 140-141.
[26] Ex. 302. York Direct pp 25-26
[27] Ex. 554. Rate Design Agreement.

**Issue 29.A.iii. What are the appropriate charges for each rate element for each class?**

The Commission should adopt the position of Evergy and MECG as embodied in the Rate Design Agreement that would adjust the relative amount of intraclass revenue collected from demand and energy charges for the LGS and LPS class. The proposal would allocate 1.25 times the class average percent increase to demand charges and 0.75 times to energy charges. MECG's Initial Brief explains how Evergy's current energy rates are recovering a significant portion of fixed demand-related costs—meaning the demand-related costs Evergy incurs to serve LGS and LPS customers are disproportionately collected through energy charges.[28] The Rate Design Agreement would provide a modest improvement in the alignment of rates and underlying costs and would operate entirely within the individual classes—no revenues would shift between classes.

Staff claims the proposal is arbitrary and could result in unreasonably low energy rates.[29] This is incorrect as energy rates would still increase under the Rate Design Agreement, just by a smaller percentage than the demand charge increase. In addition, the energy charges would remain well-above Evergy's variable cost of service for the LGS and LPS classes. Moreover, the proposal stems from Evergy's study that showed a large mismatch between the energy costs to Evergy compared to the energy revenues received.[30] If anything, it would be arbitrary to do nothing to the current framework. This approach has been implemented in the past and is supported by record evidence in this case. The Commission should adopt the position of Evergy and MECG.

**Issue 30 Other Rate Schedules**

A. How should all other applicable rates in this case be increased, including lighting, Large Load Power Service, Electric Vehicle Charging, and Time Related Pricing, if applicable?
i. Should the TRP (Time Related Pricing) rate schedule be eliminated?
ii. Should Schedule LLPS rates be increased in this proceeding, and if so, by how much?

[28] MECG Br. pp. 16-17.
[29] EFIS Item No. 322. *Staff Objection to Non-Unanimous Partial Settlement – Rate Design*.
[30] MECG Br. p. 16.

In its Initial Brief, the Commission Staff suggests the Commission's only option is to order an equal percentage increase to all rates because Staff argues—yet again—that Evergy's class cost of service study ("CCOS") is unreliable.[31] MECG disagrees with Staff's assessment of the CCOS and responds in detail in its reply on Issue 32 (Revenue Apportionment), below. The record evidence shows Evergy's CCOS study supports the movement made in rate design that is reflected in the position of Evergy and MECG in the Rate Design Agreement. In addition, the LLPS rates should be increased by the same amount as the LPS rates.

The TRP rate schedule should be frozen as agreed by Evergy and MECG in their Rate Design Agreement (and separately by the Staff in its testimony). The overall pricing components should be increased by 1.1 times the system average increase. Staff opposes the increase, in part, based on its assumption that the provision is being used avoid additional rate increases for LPS customers.[32] This is not accurate. The Company's brief points out that the TRP rate requires the above-average increase to bring it in alignment with TOU equivalent rates.[33] The Rate Design Agreement between Evergy and MECG serves to mitigate the excessive impact that these customers would otherwise see while making movement to ease the transition to a new rate if the TRP is eliminated in a future case.

## IV. Revenue Apportionment

**Issue 32.A. How should revenue responsibility, including any net revenues from LLPS customers and any reduction to revenues from any income-eligible customer discounts, be apportioned among the customer classes, if at all?**

**32.A.ii. What is the appropriate allocation of production-related cost of service for any class cost of service study relied upon in this case?**

[31] Staff Br. p. 103.
[32] Staff Br. p. 102.
[33] Evergy Br. pp. 143-144.

The Commission should adopt the revenue apportionment put forward by Evergy and MECG in the Rate Design Agreement related to non-residential rate design. That apportionment represents a negotiated settlement position that is based on the results of the Company's CCOS and within the range of litigation positions and CCOS scenarios presented in parties' testimony, including Staff's. Staff's position is that the CCOS is unreliable and therefore Staff opposes anything other than equal percentage increases to all classes.[34] OPC also disagrees with the CCOS utilizing the 4CP A&E method for allocating costs and proposes the use of the Probability of Dispatch ("POD") method.[35]

As explained in MECG's Initial Brief, Evergy conducted two CCOS studies in this case to demonstrate the relative earning of each rate class under the current structure and under the proposed rate structure following rate design changes that would shift some commercial customers between rate classes. Both studies showed the LPS and LGS classes as producing returns that are far above what the company earns from other classes are far above system average.[36] This means those classes are paying more than the cost to serve them. MECG generally agrees with the methodology and results of Evergy's studies which are supported by common practice and aligned with Missouri law. Section 393.1620 RSMo, states the Commission shall only consider CCOS studies that utilize "the average and excess method or one of the methods [contained in the NARUC manual]." In the Rate Design Agreement, Evergy and MECG agreed to the following apportionment as class-specific multipliers that would apply to the system average percentage increase determined by the Commission:[37]

[34] Staff Br. p. 118.
[35] OPC Br. pp. 50-52 and 64-65.
[36] MECG Br. pp. 9-13.
[37] Ex. 554. Rate Design Agreement.

| | Rev Shift |
|---|---|
| LPS * | 94.00% |
| LGS | 94.00% |
| SGS | 112.44% |
| MGS | 112.44% |
| RES | 100.00% |
| EV | 112.50% |
| Lighting ** | 112.50% |

*LLPS Included as an LPS subclass
**LED to receive 25% of the class increase rate with remaining lighting to recover the remaining revenue deficiency.

As noted, Staff opposed consideration of the CCOS results throughout the case. In its brief, Staff claims its rejection of the CCOS relates to deficiencies it deems to exist in the classification of distribution costs, allocation of production costs, and treatment of transmission expenses.[38] MECG and Evergy take the position in briefing that Staff's concerns about the CCOS, if true, go to the magnitude of differences shown in the results but do not completely nullify the general direction indicated—that the LGS and LPS classes produce the highest levels of return by class relative to Evergy's costs to serve.[39] The evidence shows the CCOS produced by Evergy is appropriate for setting cost-based rates in this case.

Furthermore, the Commission should reject OPC's proposal to utilize POD for allocating production and transmission costs. OPC did not produce a complete POD CCOS in this case for parties to review, and instead only presented comparisons of the POD allocation factor percentages by class to the Company's 4CP A&E allocation factors. As such there is no competent and substantial POD study (to the extent a POD could ever hypothetically be considered appropriate) for the Commission to consider. The POD allocation methodology is opposed by Staff, Evergy, MECG, and Google.[40] It has not been widely adopted and, in application, operates almost

[38] Staff Br. p. 118.
[39] MECG Br. p. 13.
[40] Ex. 305. York Surrebuttal. p. 3; Evergy Br. p. 151.

identically to a pure energy allocator which means the spread of system costs would be weighed heavily towards a classes' energy consumption without regard to how those classes consume that energy.[41] This ignores the fact that production plants are built in large part to meet the peak demand conditions of operating systems.[42] Adopting a POD methodology departs from conventional utility ratemaking principles that acknowledge the cost causation relationship between a system's peak demand and how customer usage contributes to those peaks.[43]

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission should, first, find the CCOS produced by Evergy is appropriate to use for setting rates in this case. Second, the Commission should find that the CCOS supports the modest movement towards cost allocation as agreed by MECG and Evergy and adopt the revenue apportionment contained in the Rate Design Agreement.

## V. Critical Peak Rate

**Issue 33.A. Should the Critical Peak Rate recommended by Staff be implemented?**

The Commission should reject Staff's proposal for the development of a Critical Peak Rate ("CPR") for the following reasons:

First, Staff quantified the impact of the CPR on residential customers but did not quantify it for commercial or industrial customers. For a large industrial customer, a $0.10 per kWh adder applied across six hours is a materially different order of magnitude than for a residential customer. Staff provided a few illustrative examples showing impacts on hypothetical LGS and LPS customers under Staff's CPR Option 2, which would apply an adder of $0.025 per kWh across all hours of an event day. This results in additional costs of $25 per event day and $2,500 per event day for the illustrated LGS and LPS customers, respectively. However, these estimates do not come

[41] Ex. 306. York Rebuttal. pp. 5, 9.
[42] Ex. 35. Jaynes Rebuttal. p. 11.
[43] *Id.*

near capturing the range of impacts on non-residential customers. Additionally, Staff did not provide information about how often the rate would be triggered, nor any sort of historical analysis identifying the number of operating days on which its recommended trigger would have been satisfied.[44]

Second, the rate as recommended contains no exemption, cap, opt-out, or curtailment alternative for commercial and industrial customers. Staff recommends exemptions for critical medical needs customers, customers with registered medical equipment, Economic Relief Pilot Program customers, and income-eligible customers. Staff has, therefore, recognized that a categorical application of the rate is inappropriate for customers who cannot reasonably respond to it. There is no corresponding provision recognizing that some industrial processes cannot be interrupted safely or economically on short notice, and Staff offers no reason for treating that circumstance differently. Staff confirms that it did not attempt to identify exemption categories for non-residential customers, and that it considered a cap on the charge but determined that one was unnecessary. Staff rests each determination on the range of bill impact it expects the rate to produce. That is the range Staff has not calculated for any actual commercial or industrial account.[45]

Third, the notice contemplated is inadequate for industrial load. Staff acknowledges that the event hours may be very early in the day and that the information may not be available to customers until nearly midnight of the preceding day. A manufacturer cannot reschedule a production shift, a batch process, or an inbound or outbound delivery on that notice. A price signal that customers cannot act on does not produce the load response the rate is intended to produce. It operates only as a charge. Further, Staff confirmed that it performed no analysis of the ability of

[44] Ex. 305. York Surrebuttal. p. 36.
[45] *Id.* at p. 37.

commercial and industrial customers to shift or curtail load on the notice that its recommended tariff language contemplates.[46]

Fourth, Staff acknowledges that detailed interval reads will be necessary to bill the rate accurately, that estimating usage in missing intervals is wholly inapplicable to a rate that may induce usage changes, and that the Company has issues obtaining accurate interval reads. Staff applied that same concern to residential time-based schedules and recommended that customers with three or more estimated months in a twelve-month period be removed from their selected rate. Staff did not apply the concern to its own CPR recommendation. Staff confirms that it was unable to quantify the frequency of estimated intervals for LGS and LPS accounts, and that it has not recommended any condition precedent regarding interval read accuracy before the rate would take effect. A rate that cannot be billed accurately should not be ordered.[47] Accordingly, the Commission should not order the implementation of Staff's proposed CPR.

## Conclusion

The Commission has significant decisions to make in this case related to the transitional status of Evergy's system receiving its first LLPS customer. Nevertheless, holding the *status quo* related to other important rate design and revenue decisions only serves to amplify the challenges for a future case.

The basis for setting rates and allocating costs to customers should start from proper cost causation principles and cost-based rates. The CCOS analysis provided by both MECG and Evergy show that certain classes are not paying appropriate cost-based rates. Based on the results of the CCOS in this case, then, for each class to reach cost of service movement is necessary. MECG witness Ms. Jessica York presented her analysis showing the increase (or decrease) needed for each

[46] *Id*. at p. 38.
[47] *Id.* at pp. 38-39.

class to reach cost of service at the Company's proposed revenue requirement. The table, JAY-4, is reproduced below:[48]

**TABLE JAY-4**

**Change Required to Achieve Equalized Rate of Return by Class**

| Line | Description | Current Class Structure[1] | Proposed Class Structure[2] |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | (1) | (2) |
| 1 | Residential | 52.30% | 52.30% |
| 2 | Small General Service | -1.30% | 9.20% |
| 3 | Medium General Service | -3.70% | 0.40% |
| 4 | Large General Service | -10.40% | -9.50% |
| 5 | Large Power Service | -23.40% | -26.90% |
| 6 | Lighting | 25.10% | 25.20% |
| 7 | CCN | 369.70% | 369.00% |
| 8 | Total | 15.19% | 15.19% |

**Sources:**

[1] Graham Jaynes' Direct Testimony, Table 8.

[2] Graham Jaynes' Direct Testimony, Table 9.

As shown, to achieve equalized rates of return, the LPS class (as currently structured) would need a revenue requirement decrease of 23.4%, and the LGS class would need a decrease of 10.4%. The Residential class would require an increase of 52.3% or about 3.4 times the system average increase to reach cost of service.

Compounding this inequity, the rate restructuring proposed by Evergy results in significant impacts to numerous commercial and industrial customers that, in some instances, equal and even exceed the additional overall rate increase sought by Evergy—meaning some customers are facing rate increases in excess of 30%. This stacked impact is not limited to only a few customers and

[48] MECG Br. p. 11.

amplifies the need for mitigation. Within this context the Commission should consider the impact on commercial and industrial customers that will result from the Company's proposed changes to rate design.

In total, the increase in this case will have a significant impact on Evergy's customers. The efforts by the parties have produced various partial stipulation and agreements seeking to balance the Company's need for an increase to support the provisions of service with the interest of customers in paying just and reasonable rates for that service. The provisions contained within the Rate Design Agreement between Evergy and MECG ensures that rates from this case make progress towards cost of service, progress towards rate design the reflects cost causation, and will result in just and reasonable rates. Importantly, the Rate Design Agreement between Evergy and MECG takes care to ensure that the residential class receives no more than the system-average increase, which is the same as was initially proposed by Evergy in its Direct case and supported by the Staff throughout. The Commission should adopt the positions and recommendations described herein, as well as in MECG's Initial Brief.

WHEREFORE, MECG submits this Reply Brief.

Respectfully,

**/s/ Danny Lyskowski**

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ATTORNEY FOR MIDWEST ENERGY CONSUMERS GROUP

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties listed on the official service list by email, this 18th day of November 2026.

**/s/ Danny Lyskowski**
Danny Lyskowski