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Witness: Brian A. File
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Sponsoring Party: Evergy Metro, Inc. and Evergy
Missouri West, Inc.
Case No.: EO-2020-0227 / 0228
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MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CASE NOS.: EO-2020-0227 / 0228

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

BRIAN A. FILE

ON BEHALF OF

EVERGY METRO, INC. and EVERGY MISSOURI WEST, INC.

**Kansas City, Missouri
September 2020**

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

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Case Nos. EO-2020-0227 / 0228

1 **Q: Please state your name and business address.**

2 A: My name is Brian A. File. My business address is 1200 Main, Kansas City, Missouri
3 64105.

4 **Q: By whom and in what capacity are you employed?**

5 A: I am employed by Evergy Metro, Inc. and serve as Director, Demand-Side Management
6 for Evergy Metro, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri Metro (“Evergy Missouri Metro) and Evergy
7 Missouri West, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri West (“Evergy Missouri West”).

8 **Q: On whose behalf are you testifying?**

9 A: I am testifying on behalf of Evergy Missouri Metro and Evergy Missouri West.

10 **Q: What are your responsibilities?**

11 A: My responsibilities include leading the demand-side management group (including energy
12 efficiency and demand response) at Evergy for all jurisdictions. This function includes the
13 Commission approved MEEIA programs. Additionally, I have responsibility for a team
14 focused on customer renewable energy programs and customer facing rates
15 implementation (e.g. Time of Use).

16 **Q: Please describe your education, experience and employment history.**

17 A: I earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of
18 Kansas and a Master of Business Administration from the University of Missouri-Kansas
19 City. Prior to Evergy, I worked in the petrochemical industry with Chevron Phillips

1 Chemical Company in marketing and technical field sales roles. I have been employed at
2 Evergy (and formerly KCP&L) since 2007 in roles varying from product management, key
3 account relationships and economic development. I have held responsibility over the
4 demand-side management team since 2013.

5 **Q: Have you previously testified in a proceeding before the Missouri Public Service**
6 **Commission (“Commission” or “MPSC”) or before any other utility regulatory**
7 **agency?**

8 A: Yes, I provided written testimony before the MPSC and the Corporation Commission for
9 the State of Kansas.

10 **Q: What is the purpose of your testimony?**

11 A: The purpose of my testimony is to respond to MPSC Staff’s (“Staff”) recommendation in
12 Evergy’s MEEIA Cycle 2 April 1, 2018 to December 31, 2019 prudence audit. This
13 testimony will outline a response to Staff’s recommendations and allegations by showing
14 that Evergy operated both the Programmable Thermostat and Demand Response Incentive
15 programs within the Commission approved tariffs, MEEIA rules and prudent managerial
16 business principles. Additionally, I will respond to various additional imprudence
17 recommendations related to program spends for the suite of Evergy’s energy efficiency and
18 demand response programs.

19 **Q: Can you please describe the outline of your testimony?**

20 A: Yes, I will cover these four areas:

- 21 ▪ Staff allegations outside of a MEEIA audit scope;
- 22 ▪ Response to Staff allegations outside of a MEEIA audit scope;
- 23 ▪ Response to Staff allegations regarding MEEIA programs; and

- 1 ▪ Response to Staff challenges of expenses during audit period.

2 **I. Staff Allegations Outside of MEEIA Audit Scope**

3 **Q: Are certain of Staff’s allegations outside the scope of a MEEIA program audit of the**
4 **management of demand response programs?**

5 A: Yes. The appropriate scope of the prudence review in this proceeding are costs that are
6 “subject to the DSIM” under 20 CSR 4240-20.093. Three specific issues raised by Staff
7 are not within the scope of a prudence review of the costs subject to the demand-side
8 investment mechanism (“DSIM”). The costs and imputed revenue that Staff seeks to
9 disallow and impute are not dollars that were spent on Evergy’s demand-side programs or
10 recovered through the DSIM rider. Staff witness Luebbert recommends three adjustments¹
11 which are not subject to the DSIM:

- 12 1) Evergy did not call demand response events to mitigate day-ahead
13 locational marginal pricing (“LMP”) fluctuations in the Southwest Power
14 Pool (“SPP”) marketplace;
- 15 2) Evergy did not call demand response events to mitigate costs associated
16 with SPP schedules 1-A and 11; and
- 17 3) Evergy did not enter into (hypothetical) non-affiliate capacity contracts.

18 Company witness John Carlson addresses Luebbert’s third allegation and the
19 calculation of these non-MEEIA audit adjustments in his Rebuttal Testimony. I will
20 address the first and second allegations in my testimony in terms of how Evergy designed
21 and implemented the programs according to the tariffs approved by the Commission.

¹ Luebbert, Direct, P. 3.

1 **Q: Please explain why these adjustments are beyond the appropriate scope of this**
2 **proceeding.**

3 A: These disallowances exceed the appropriate scope of a prudence review under 20 CSR
4 4240.20-090(11) since Evergy’s decision not to enter into any capacity sales contracts is
5 not in any way a “cost subject to the DSIM.” Capacity sales (or the lack thereof) are not a
6 cost that is collected through the DSIM as defined by Evergy Missouri Metro’s tariff
7 (Evergy Missouri Metro P.S.C. MO. No. 7 Sheet No. 49I (attached as **Schedule BAF-1**)).
8 Evergy’s DSIM includes net program costs, net throughput disincentive, and net earnings
9 opportunity. (Id.) Capacity sales costs and revenues are not collected through the DSIM,
10 are not subject to the DSIM in any way, and therefore should not be the subject of the
11 MEEIA prudence review in this proceeding.

12 Similarly, SPP expenses are not costs that are collected through the DSIM. (See
13 Evergy Missouri Metro P.S.C. MO. No. 7 Original Sheet No. 49I; Evergy Missouri West
14 P.S.C. MO. No. 1, 2nd Revised Sheet No. 138.2 (attached as **Schedule BAF-2**)). As
15 explained in the tariffs, Evergy’s DSIM includes net program costs, net throughput
16 disincentive, and net earnings opportunity. SPP expenses are not collected through the
17 DSIM, are not included in the DSIM, and should not be the subject of the MEEIA prudence
18 review in this proceeding.

19 **Q: Could Staff make its allegations in other MPSC proceedings to be decided by the**
20 **Commission?**

21 A: Yes, there are at least three opportunities where Staff could raise these allegations. It seems
22 the most applicable place for the three issues brought up to discuss “benefits not created”
23 or “costs not avoided” is the Fuel Adjustment Clause (“FAC”) prudence review process.

1 This process reviews the actual costs included in the FAC rider and determines if there
2 could have been savings or imprudent costs were incurred. SPP fee savings and LMP
3 impact benefits are included within that rider. The FAC review process is also where the
4 Commission considers the impact of the sale of capacity on the Company's fuel expenses.

5 Next, a general rate case could be a second place to review the generation capacity
6 management and Company decisions associated with those potential avoided costs or
7 benefits.

8 Lastly, if the Staff wanted to discuss the cost effectiveness of programs (or in this
9 case their claim that programs should have been more cost effective), the evaluation,
10 measurement and verification ("EM&V") process that is conducted annually for all
11 MEEIA approved programs is an appropriate place for that discussion. In that process, the
12 Company's programs are evaluated for benefits and costs by an independent contractor and
13 reviewed with stakeholders.

14 **II. Response to Staff Allegations Outside of MEEIA Audit Scope**

15
16 **Q: Despite the Company's stance on the correct place to make these allegations, will
17 you address these issues in this testimony?**

18 **A:** Yes, even though the FAC review, general rate cases and the EM&V process, would be the
19 proper place for review of these allegations, I will outline some key points in support of
20 the Company's decision making with respect to the issues of calling demand response
21 events to mitigate SPP monthly peaks and day-ahead LMPs. The supporting points can be
22 broken down into three categories:

- 1 a. The Programs operated effectively as designed and approved by
2 Commission;
- 3 b. The Commission should not impose penalties on cost effective programs;
4 and
- 5 c. Reasonableness standard in prudence reviews.
- 6 a. **The Programs Operated Effectively as Designed and Approved by the**
7 **Commission**
8

9 **Q: Please address Mr. Luebbert’s contention on p. 4 of his Direct Testimony that demand**
10 **response events can be called for a variety of reasons including reducing congestion,**
11 **reducing SPP costs, etc.**

12 A: While Staff witness Luebbert’s statement is true in the abstract, his statement does not
13 reflect how the Company’s demand response programs were designed, operated and
14 described in the Company’s tariffs and approved by the Commission. The programs’
15 primary benefit (and the only benefit claimed in the cost effectiveness testing) is the
16 reduction of system peak demand across the territory in the summer. As I will elaborate
17 below, the Company’s programs were not designed to reduce SPP fees or mitigate
18 locational marginal prices. The Commission approved Tariff² states that the DRI “program
19 is designed to reduce customer load during peak periods *to help defer future generation*
20 *capacity additions and provide for improvements in energy supply*” (italic emphasized). In
21 order to operate the programs as described by Staff witness Luebbert, key factors would
22 need to be adjusted in program design.

23 First, the number of events that Staff witness Luebbert describes that would be
24 needed to reduce SPP costs, reduce congestion and mitigate day ahead locational prices is

² Evergy MO Metro Tariff sheet 2.09.

1 significantly more than how the Company designed the DRI program and approved by the
2 Commission. In order to manage SPP fees associated with Schedules 1-A and 11, a
3 program would be best designed to call multiple times every month of the year as those
4 fees are associated with Evergy's peak load of every month. See **Schedule BAF-3** which
5 illustrates the top ten daily peak distribution for each of the summer months of the 2019
6 calendar year for each jurisdiction. In order to make sure the monthly peak is mitigated:
7 events would likely need to be called more than five times per month on average or 20 per
8 year. The programs were designed for 10 events maximum (DRI) and 15 events maximum
9 (thermostat).

10 Further, a program that requires Evergy to call significantly more events would
11 likely need a different program design, potentially a higher financial incentive for customer
12 participation, and would possibly be targeted to different customer types. The marketing
13 and customer recruitment process was developed based on the approved tariff to encourage
14 customers to participate in the event maximums described above.

15 b. **The Commission Should Not Impose Penalties on Cost Effective**
16 **Programs**

17 **Q: Please address Mr. Luebbert's contention that the Company should be disallowed**
18 **costs related to cost effective demand response programs.**

19 A: The Company's decision making is outlined further in this testimony and was aligned with
20 the tariffs, budgets, MEEIA statute and rules, and Commission approved parameters.
21 Despite this alignment and the lengthy stakeholder process that produced it, Mr. Luebbert
22 recommends a disallowance based on benefits (reduction of SPP fees) that the Company
23 did not claim or design programs to harvest for Cycle 2. Moreover, the DRI and thermostat

1 programs in question were deemed cost effective³ by the EM&V consultant and the Staff's
2 independent auditor.

3 Staff's adjustments seek to reduce program costs that have been recovered in the
4 DSIM due to the Company missing "opportunities to derive benefits for ratepayers"
5 (Luebbert Direct, p. 2) even though the MEEIA Cycle 2 programs were not designed to
6 capture these opportunities. To put some additional math behind Staff's suggestion, let's
7 look at the example of DRI in MO West. In the review period this program created ~\$7.5
8 million in utility cost test ("UCT") benefits for customers with an average \$1.57 of benefits
9 for every \$1 spent. Mr. Luebbert claims that programs should have benefited customers
10 \$1.66 per dollar spent and therefore, he suggests the Commission take away \$0.09 (\$1.66
11 minus \$1.57) worth of prudently spent costs. Staff's reasoning suggests that these
12 additional benefits should have been created with alternate decision making that would
13 have required 1) knowledge acquired in hindsight 2) program design different than what
14 was in place and approved by the Commission and 3) customer adoption of said different
15 program design. This approach is not rational. There is no precedent for a hindsight
16 prudence review scope, and the Company will show how the only way the additional
17 benefits would have been created is with perfect hindsight and a differently designed and
18 implemented MEEIA Cycle 2 program.

³ Except for one program year of the KCP&L thermostat program where the Company did not allow any more participation due to maximum participation targets already being achieved.

1 c. Reasonableness Standard in Prudence Reviews

2 **Q: Should the Commission judge the Company’s implementation and management of its**
3 **MEEIA Cycle 2 programs using the hindsight of historical peak-load data, historical**
4 **locational marginal price data or hypothetical capacity contracts?**

5 **A:** No. As cited in Staff’s Prudence Review⁴ in this case, the appropriate legal standard in a
6 prudence review is a “reasonableness standard: [T]he company’s conduct should be judged
7 by asking whether the conduct was reasonable at the time, under all the circumstances,
8 consider that the company to solve its problem prospectively rather than in reliance on
9 hindsight. In effect, our responsibility is to determine how reasonable people would have
10 performed the tasks that confronted the company.”

11 **Q: Does Staff base its argument on evidence of “reasonable” decision making or purely**
12 **on an analysis of historical data?**

13 **A:** Staff’s argument that Evergy acted imprudently is not based on evidence regarding a
14 reasonable decision “at the time, under all the circumstances” in which Evergy’s
15 management made decisions within the context of MEEIA Cycle 2, but is based entirely
16 on a backward looking analysis, and Staff’s apparent dislike of the Commission-approved
17 MEEIA Cycle 2 programs. Staff’s “hindsight” standard is particularly obvious with its
18 argument regarding Day Ahead Locational Marginal Prices (“DA LMP”), which requires
19 the Company to perfectly predict which days of the month will hit monthly load peaks in

⁴ See, Direct Testimony of Brad Fortson, Schedule BJF-d3, Second Prudence Review of Cycle 2 Costs Related to the Missouri Energy Efficiency Investment Act for the Electric Operations of Evergy Metro, Inc., April 1 through December 31, 2019, File No. EO-2020-0227, Pg. 7-8 (Quoting *State ex rel. Associated Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Com’n of state of Mo.*, 954 S.W.2d 520, 528-29 (Mo. 1App. W.D., 1997).

1 order to call demand response events. While weather forecasts and load prediction have
2 certainly advanced, Staff assumes a level of clairvoyance not yet in existence.

3 **Q: Is Staff's recommendation of imputed revenue from hypothetical capacity contracts**
4 **also based on hindsight?**

5 A: Yes. As discussed in more depth in the Rebuttal Testimony of Company witness John
6 Carlson, Staff makes no attempt to evidence the feasibility of its hypothetical capacity
7 contract with market data or analysis, let alone at the time Staff alleges the Company acted
8 imprudently by not entering into a hypothetical capacity contract. Staff simply makes the
9 inaccurate assumption that such capacity contracts: (1) would have had a buyer, (2) at a
10 particular price, (3) were not impacted by any transmission constraints, and (4) with
11 particular terms and conditions agreeable to both the buyer and seller. Staff's assumptions
12 upon which its recommendations are based regarding hypothetical capacity contracts do
13 not hold water even with historical data, let alone from a reasonable person standard at the
14 time.

15 **III. Response to Staff Allegations Regarding MEEIA Programs**

16 **Q: What demand response items are within the scope of a MEEIA program audit that**
17 **you will address?**

18 A: I respond to four issues raised by Staff witness Luebbert described on page 2-4 of his direct
19 testimony. These allegations of imprudent management decisions include:

- 20 1) Not calling a minimum of five events for the programmable thermostat
21 program as required by the MEEIA Cycle 2 extension stipulation in Case
22 No. EO-2019-0132;
- 23 2) Providing free thermostats to Direct Install customers;

- 1 3) Providing free thermostats to Do it Yourself customers who never installed
2 the thermostats and therefore did not participate in demand response events;
3 and
4 4) Entering into contracts for the DRI program that did not incentivize
5 meaningful participation, but financially rewarded customers that did not
6 participate meaningfully.

7 **IV. The Company Called the Events Required Under the Stipulation**

8 **Q: What is Evergy’s response to Staff’s allegation that the Company did not call the**
9 **agreed upon programmable thermostat demand response events in 2019?**

10 **A:** Contrary to Staff’s allegation (p. 4, Luebbert Direct) the Company did abide by the EO-
11 2019-0132 Stipulation and Agreement requirement to call five events in each jurisdiction.
12 The event calls were communicated to Staff in data request responses (11, 35 and 39) in
13 this case.

14 The Company called five programmable thermostat events during the 2019 demand
15 response season as follows:

- 16 Event #1 – July 18, 2019 (4-6 PM)
17 Event #2 – July 19, 2019 (4-6 PM)
18 Event #3 – Aug 6, 2019 (4-6 PM)
19 Event #4 – Aug 7, 2019 (2-4 PM)
20 Event #5 – Aug 12, 2019 (4-6 PM)

21 The 168 possible events for thermostat quoted by Staff is not correct⁵ as a maximum of 15
22 events per season is in line with the Evergy – Nest agreement for events. The agreement
23 was provided in response to data request 007 in this case.

⁵ Staff Direct Testimony (p. 29 of Evergy Missouri West report).

1 **V. The Company Prudently Managed its Programmable Thermostat Program**

2 **Q: What were the results of the programable thermostat program in MEEIA Cycle 2?**

3 A: The program was a tremendous success. Participation in the program was well above
4 targets and met maximums in the Missouri Metro territory during the Cycle 2 period. Per
5 their EM&V PY 2019 Report, Guidehouse (the third-party evaluator) stated that “together,
6 the thermostat programs and the DRI program deliver strong demand reductions and
7 demonstrate the value they provide as a flexible capacity resource”. In the Every Metro
8 territory, the Business Programmable Thermostat, and Residential Programmable
9 Thermostat programs achieved 86% and 104% of the MEEIA Cycle 2 energy savings
10 targets, respectively. Similarly, the Business Programmable Thermostat and Residential
11 Programmable Thermostat programs achieved 155% and 164% of the MEEIA Cycle 2
12 demand savings targets, respectively. In the Every Missouri West territory, the Business
13 Programmable Thermostat and Residential Programmable Thermostat programs achieved
14 151% and 83% of the MEEIA Cycle 2 energy savings targets, respectively. Likewise, the
15 Business Programmable Thermostat, and Residential Programmable Thermostat programs
16 achieved 322% and 143% of the MEEIA Cycle 2 demand savings targets, respectively.
17 The benefit cost tests for these programs also yielded favorable results and improvement
18 over time as recapped below (Table 1): Additionally, these results compare favorably to
19 Ameren Missouri PY2019 in which residential demand response results were 1.11 for both
20 the total resource cost (“TRC”) and UCT tests.

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Table 1
Programmable Thermostat Cost Tests

<u>Program</u>	<u>KCP&L/Metro</u>					
	MEEIA 2 PTD		PY 2019		PY 2018	
	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>
Business Programmable Thermostat	1.57	2.21	1.43	2.02	0.35	0.35
Residential Programmable Thermostat	1.92	2.92	1.89	2.71	0.34	0.30

<u>Program</u>	<u>GMOPS/MO West</u>					
	MEEIA 2 PTD		PY 2019		PY 2018	
	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>
Business Programmable Thermostat	1.60	2.36	1.54	2.15	1.18	1.63
Residential Programmable Thermostat	1.96	3.08	1.88	2.65	1.64	2.13

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As a quick refresher on the primary MEEIA cost effectiveness tests, any program with a Total Resource Cost “TRC” test value above “1.0” is a cost-effective program, meaning the benefits outweigh the costs of benefits from a total system perspective. The Utility Cost Test (“UCT”) value above “1.0” means that the benefits outweigh the costs from the utility perspective⁶.

Q: Why would Evergy select the higher cost Direct Installation option for programmable thermostats for a portion of the review period?

A: First, a little background. The Company provided customers with options to enter the Programmable Thermostat Program in order to reach the maximum number of customers. This included three different channels of entry: Direct Installation (“DI”), Do-It-Yourself (“DIY”), and Bring Your Own (“BYO”). DI and BYO have an 100% activation rate. The Commission approved budget for the thermostat program provided for a portion of the thermostats to be provided by each channel. The tariff allowed for flexibility of gaining

⁶ The utility perspective of the UCT is the test that most closely aligns with the minimization of long-run utility costs in the Integrated Resource Plan (“IRP”) in 20 CSR 4240-22.010(2)(B).

1 more participants while managing costs. The Company selected direct installation channel
2 only for a portion of the review period to allow only a known quantity of devices to be
3 enrolled in the program. By allowing the number of installation appointments dictate the
4 number of enrollees, the Company could manage the budget to not exceed portfolio
5 maximums on budget and participation maximums for the thermostat program as
6 prescribed in the Earnings Opportunity matrix for Cycle 2⁷.

7 The Company followed the Commission approved plan and managed the
8 thermostat program budget to the Commission approved level by controlling the number
9 of DIs being scheduled which held the total number of participants to a known level. While
10 DIs are more expensive than DIY, they have a higher activation rate than DIY (Direct
11 Installation is 100%) and provided the budget and participation management tool needed
12 for Program Year 3 of Cycle 2 for the thermostat program.

13 **Q: Why couldn't Evergy just change the DI program in the middle of Cycle 2 and not**
14 **provide a free thermostat?**

15 A: First, the Commission approved Programmable Thermostat Cycle 2 Tariff stated:
16 Participants will receive a free programmable thermostat that can be controlled via radio
17 or Wi-Fi signals sent to the unit by Company or its assignees⁸. Moreover, there are
18 development/infrastructure costs to implementing a customer co-payment. For the
19 Company to offer the devices with a co-payment (not free of charge), the program would
20 have incurred similar additional costs and been delayed for many months before that
21 functionality could be in place. As a proof point, Evergy did put in customer co-pay
22 functionality into place at the start of MEEIA Cycle 3 and the deployment cost took five

⁷ Case No. EO-2015-0240 Stipulation and Agreement – Appendix B – Earnings Opportunity Matrix.

⁸ Evergy Metro Missouri tariff sheet 2.32.

1 months (January 2020 to May 2020) to deploy. Additionally, changing the program rules,
2 delivery options, or adding co-payment requirements mid cycle causes discontinuity and
3 customer confusion. Furthermore, this was not necessary since the Company was able to
4 manage the budget within the MEEIA rules for Commission approved amounts by
5 emphasizing DIY and BYO installations.

6 **Q: The Staff states (Luebbert Direct, p.3) that Evergy provided thermostats to DIY**
7 **customers at no cost who ultimately did not participate in the program and therefore**
8 **was imprudent. How do you respond?**

9 A: First, the intent of the program is to offer customers different avenues to enter the program
10 including DI, DIY and BYO. The Commission approved budget and tariff for the
11 thermostat program provided that DIY customers will receive thermostats at no cost for
12 participating in the program. The DIY channel is meant to significantly increase
13 participation in the thermostat program and do so by providing an easy experience where
14 the customer can sign up and have a device delivered directly to their home for installation
15 on their own terms. Obviously, by taking out the need to schedule an appointment and be
16 present for third-party installation, friction is taken out of the participation process. As a
17 trade-off for this ease of participation, the customer has the responsibility to install and
18 activate the device once delivered to their home (the DIY part). In a small percentage of
19 cases (on average less than 10% across MEEIA Cycle 2), the customer does not fulfill their
20 part of the DIY and does not activate their device for participation. Potential reasons this
21 might happen include losing the thermostat once delivered or installing it but not
22 connecting it to Wi-Fi due to internet issues.

1 Even with the potential for customer non-install, the DIY program is cost-effective.
2 The evaluated cost effectiveness of the thermostat program reflects actual customer
3 participation (not those who didn't install the thermostat or connect to Wi-Fi) and actual
4 costs (including those thermostats paid for but not connected). Evergy's programmable
5 thermostat program was proven to be cost effective even considering the fact that some
6 customers did not fully complete the activation/participation process. The benefit cost tests
7 for the programmable thermostat programs yielded favorable results and improvement over
8 time as indicated in Table 1 above.

9 These facts show good managerial decision making and prudent spend of program
10 dollars. The Commission should not adopt Staff's disallowance of costs (\$116,665 in MO
11 West and \$108,080 in MO Metro) from a program that has been proven to be cost effective
12 using the Commission's own guidelines for cost effective testing.

13 **Q: Did you try to reach out to the customers who received the thermostat but had not**
14 **completed installation?**

15 A: Yes. While most all customers understand the offer and requirements for receiving their
16 device, there were a minority that still don't complete the process for possible reasons as
17 described above. These customers were a strong focus of our marketing and customer
18 outreach as early as 2017 in order to help encourage these customers to finish the process.
19 Across both jurisdictions, the Company sent over 15,000 emails, made almost 6,000 phone
20 calls and sent 3,200 mailers to customers. From these contacts, the Company was able to
21 convince over 5,700 customers to complete the thermostat installation. The Company's
22 multiple customer engagement tactics improved the activation rate of installations during
23 the Cycle from around 80% to over 93%. This superior DIY installation rate was

1 recognized by vendor partners as above industry average and in fact won an award at
2 Chartwell's EMACS 2018 Customer Experience Conference for the marketing campaign
3 used to best engage customers to prompt participation. As a point of reference, per Google
4 Nest representatives' other utilities see on average ~80% installation and activation rates,
5 showing that Evergy is well above average in encouraging every customer to install and
6 activate eligible devices.

7 **Q: Isn't Staff taking positions on both sides of the programmable thermostat issue?**

8 A: Yes, Staff's arguments are inconsistent and circular. On the one hand, Staff claims that
9 anything less than 100% DIY activation rate is not prudent (p. 26 in Evergy West Staff
10 report). As shown above, the program has a cheaper cost but cannot guarantee 100%
11 participation. On the other hand, Staff says that when the Company used the DI method,
12 which does have 100% participation, the Company could have "avoided the additional cost
13 of DI installations" (p. 25 of MO West Staff report) by not allowing this DI channel. These
14 are contradictory positions. Staff criticizes the high cost of DIs which have a 100%
15 activation rate but also criticizes the use of the DIY channel even though it is more cost
16 effective despite an activation rate less than 100%. In fact, the direct install path provides
17 more inclusive participation for those that might not feel comfortable or physically be able
18 to install a thermostat themselves. The Commission should reject Staff's attempt to claim
19 the Company is being impudent for using different strategies to get customers to participate
20 in the programmable thermostat program.

1 **VI. The Company Prudently Managed Its Demand Response Incentive Programs**

2 **Q: What were the results of the Demand Response Incentive programs program in**
 3 **MEEIA Cycle 2?**

4 **A:** The program continued to drive value for customers as evidenced by the cost effectiveness
 5 and willing participants in the program. As indicated above, per their EM&V PY 2019
 6 Report, Guidehouse stated that “together, the thermostat programs and the DRI program
 7 deliver strong demand reductions and demonstrate the value they provide as a flexible
 8 capacity resource”. In the Evergy Metro territory, the Demand Response Incentive
 9 program achieved 140% of the MEEIA Cycle 2 energy demand savings target. In the
 10 Evergy Missouri West territory, the Demand Response Incentive program achieved 58%
 11 of the MEEIA Cycle 2 energy demand savings targets. The benefit cost tests for this
 12 program also yielded favorable results and improvement over time as recapped Table 2
 13 below:

14 **Table 2**
 15 Demand Response Incentive Cost Tests

<u>Program</u>	<u>KCP&L/Metro</u>					
	MEEIA 2 PTD		PY 2019		PY 2018	
	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>
Demand Response Incentive	9.68	2.69	12.51	3.39	6.89	2.02

<u>Program</u>	<u>GMOPS/MO West</u>					
	MEEIA 2 PTD		PY 2019		PY 2018	
	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>	<u>TRC</u>	<u>UCT</u>
Demand Response Incentive	3.65	1.49	4.29	1.76	3.71	1.38

16

1 **Q: The Staff criticizes the way Evergy entered into Demand Response Incentive**
2 **contracts with customers who did not materially participate but received financial**
3 **incentives. Why is this criticism misplaced?**

4 A: First and foremost, Evergy operated the program as described in the Commission approved
5 tariff and associated program descriptions that accompanied the filing and stipulation for
6 MEEIA Cycle 2 and extension. Customers who entered agreements with Evergy to
7 participate in DRI received a significant upfront payment to be on call to perform and then
8 an incentive to perform during the events or a penalty if they do not perform. Customers
9 that did not participate in the DRI events were penalized, and those that performed to their
10 contracted amount were incentivized. For example, the penalty for non-performance is
11 calculated at 150% of the same hourly incentive for each hour that a customer does not
12 perform.⁹ This structure of the program including the levels of the upfront payments and
13 the event penalties were approved by the Commission and incorporated in the associated
14 tariff.

15 **Q: What do you make of Staff witness Luebbert’s criticism on p. 4 of his Direct**
16 **Testimony that the Company called minimal events despite the “front-loaded nature”**
17 **of the programs?**

18 A: The Company operated its program as it was designed and described in its approved tariff.
19 The nature of the program to incent customers to interrupt their businesses and operations
20 includes a trade-off in where customers see some benefit to be “on call” to curtail their
21 operations. This upfront payment represents the carrot to help drive initial sign up and
22 participation. The stick comes later if customers do not participate in DRI events and are

⁹ KCP&L Tariff sheet 2.13 Penalties section 2nd paragraph.

1 penalized for non-performance and ultimately removed from the program¹⁰. As I stated
2 earlier, the program design is focused primarily on the need to reduce system peak load in
3 the summer, so the purpose is to strive to reduce load during that peak hour. It is not to call
4 maximum events solely as Staff contends just because a tariff and the customer agreement
5 allows it.

6 **Q: Did Evergy attempt to deter customers from signing up with no interest in actually**
7 **participating?**

8 A: With the DRI program, Evergy’s incentives are aligned with our customers. Evergy does
9 not get credit or achieve demand savings towards MEEIA targets unless the customer
10 performs. Evergy engaged with customers who it expected to perform in order to meet the
11 program’s objectives and provide an incentive to the customer to do so, but in the end the
12 customer is responsible for performing. The customer enrollment process involved
13 multiple pre-contract touch points including a facility walkthrough as desired and a
14 curtailment plan to provide the customer the needed action steps in order to best achieve
15 the reduction in the agreement. After events are called there is also a feedback loop with
16 the customer to see what in the curtailment plan worked or what didn’t and adjust
17 accordingly. In fact, the third-party evaluator recognized this effort in their PY 2018
18 evaluation report by writing, “Navigant acknowledges that the EPD and CL calculations
19 have been modified for the Cycle 2 extension to better represent customer peak demand
20 and curtailment capabilities.” Evergy’s efforts to continually refine the expected kW
21 curtailment from the customer was shown in the improved results of realization rate during
22 the MEEIA Cycle 2.

¹⁰ Evergy Metro tariff sheet 2.13 Penalties section 3rd paragraph.

1 **Q: Can you tell me a little more about the feedback loop process and how you engaged**
2 **with customers during their agreement period? Did this result in any adjustments?**

3 A: Yes, and Yes. Evergy along with our implementation partner for this program,
4 CLEAResult, spend a significant amount of time reviewing the performance of every
5 customer from their early season “test” event to the actual events during the four summer
6 months. It’s a little like grading homework after teaching a class. The customer learns
7 about the program and best practices, then creates an individual curtailment plan but the
8 score is really how their actual electric load changed when they were called upon for a test
9 or actual event. This is when Evergy gathers hourly interval data and shares the results
10 with the customer to verify if the plan was working or what tweaks may need to happen,
11 or in extreme circumstances suggests if the program is not the right fit for a customer after
12 they’ve attempted to participate but failed. The best way to show this activity is the net
13 changes to curtailment kW for each customer that happened during the 2018-19 program
14 years. The below table 3 outlines that change.

15 **Table 3**
16 **DRI Contract changes**

DRI contract changes (MO Metro and West)	2019 vs 2018
# of customers w/ kW adjustments	81
Net curtailment load change from adjustments	-3,609 kW
# of customers removed	35
Net curtailable load lost from removals	16,512 kW

17
18 Lastly, Evergy and our implementers are incentivized on performance of participating
19 customers. It is in the Company’s best interest to manage the budget to gain all the

1 participation possible. Evergy does not create value and therefore does not create earnings
2 opportunity unless the customer curtails. Our implementer contractors have incentives
3 based on actual performance to align our interest. This can be shown by our focus on
4 getting realization rates improved during these years.

5 **Q: Do you have any specific examples of how this program has improved or compared**
6 **to others in realization rate?**

7 A: Yes, there are a couple good examples of improvement in realization from recent third-
8 party evaluation, measurement and verification reports. See Table 4 below.

9 **Table 4**
10 **DRI Realization Rates**

Evergy DRI Realization Rates per EM&V		
	<u>PY2018</u>	<u>PY2019</u>
MO Metro	82%	128%
MO West	62%	81%

11
12 As a point of comparison, in Ameren's PY2019 Final EM&V evaluation, the load reduction
13 represented 60% of the total nominated capacity from customers, among whom the events
14 were called. This compares similarly to the numbers in the above table for realization rate.

15 **Q: Were the Cycle 2 demand response programs designed to reduce transmission costs?**

16 A: No, the tariffs say nothing about using these programs to reduce monthly peak loads
17 associated with calculating the SPP Schedule 1A and 11 fees. While the Company agrees
18 that these demand response programs have the potential to create additional benefits for
19 customers in some cases (and stated so in the MEEIA Cycle 3 case surrebuttal testimony¹¹),
20 the Company did not claim any additional benefits for these potential additional savings
21 related to reduction of transmission costs and did not earn any additional throughput

¹¹ Case EO-2019-0132 /0133: KCPL-GMO surrebuttal report 9-16-2019 p 18-19, 22-24.

1 disincentive or earnings opportunity for the transmission cost reduction benefits of these
2 programs. Yet, Staff is acting as if this was a major feature of the program that the
3 Company ignored. As indicated above, the Cycle 2 demand response programs were not
4 designed to “chase” a monthly peak on which the SPP transmission costs are derived. For
5 example, in any given month, the next highest daily peak is only minimally lower than the
6 previous daily peak, and predicting such, especially early in the month, is quite difficult
7 and is heavily dependent on a reliable weather forecast. Thus, in order to try to mitigate the
8 highest day, the Company would need to call on numerous days of each month. The
9 programs simply weren’t designed to be called at such a high frequency. And while the
10 Company recognizes that program tariffs can be changed to allow for more event calls, the
11 customer offer, recruitment and contracting would have taken significant amount of time
12 to adjust and therefore not reasonable in the scope of PY3 & 4 of Cycle 2.

13 **Q: Should the Company be expected to utilize this program in a way which it was not**
14 **designed or compensated for in MEEIA Cycle 2?**

15 A: No. The programs were designed and approved as a capacity (vs energy or transmission
16 fee reduction) product that is factored in Evergy resource planning and SPP accredited
17 capacity. Only the capacity benefits for the program were factored in the cost effectiveness
18 calculations when the program was approved by the Commission. Please refer to EM&V
19 results including cost effectiveness discussed above, including 1 and Table 2. As a quick
20 reminder, the EM&V exercise looks at impacts from the programs and compares them to
21 costs that occur to generate those impacts. The benefits from these programs through the
22 primary testing lens (Total Resource Cost) showed beneficial program activity repeatedly
23 during the evaluation period.

1 **Q: What about Staff's adjustment (Luebbert Direct, p. 3) for not calling events to**
2 **minimize DA LMP? Does this make sense?**

3 A: No. Again, the MEEIA programs were not designed to minimize this SPP cost. The
4 programs would need to be designed with additional event call flexibility in order to
5 properly obtain benefit from day ahead LMP market changes. This would include adjusting
6 the program objectives and likely result in a different customer offer and target customer
7 segments. Additionally, Staff used a historical view of LMP price changes to pick the
8 highest price delta hours to call events. As discussed further in John Carlson's testimony,
9 the potential to make those calls perfectly is impossible. Additionally, while trying to time
10 the market there is also considerable risk to having a downside of the price fluctuation.

11 **Q: Is there anything else you would say related to these four demand response prudence**
12 **allegations from Staff?**

13 A: In summary, two points bring together why our programs were managed prudently.
14 1) The Programmable Thermostat and Demand Response Incentive programs
15 were operated according to their design and Commission approved tariffs
16 for providing customer benefits for being willing to help Evergy manage
17 summer peak load reduction effectively; and
18 2) The DRI program was deemed cost effective during both years of this
19 review period by a third-party evaluator that was reviewed by Staff and
20 Staff auditor and using Commission approved avoided costs. The
21 thermostat program was deemed cost effective by the same process in all
22 but the one year where participation was purposefully limited due to
23 stipulation limits.

1
2

Table 5
MO Metro Expense Disallowance Position

Evergy MO Metro EO-2020-0227	Staff Suggested	Company	
	DISALLOWED EXPENSES	Position	Company Response / Info Provided
CONFERENCES/MEETINGS	\$ 2,456.86	\$ -	MEEA, Nexant, PLMA, Chartwell - all industry/MEEIA related expenses w/ additional agenda & support material
CYCLE III EXPENSES	\$ 1,786.42	\$ 1,786.42	Expenses should be deferred to Cycle 3
MEMBERSHIPS/SPONSORSHIPS	\$ 14,559.00	\$ 300.00	Industry specific sponsorships of organizations driving energy efficiency activity (USGBC,MEEA,); Miscategorization of marketing activity for Metrowire media; Individual AEE certification removal (\$300)
OTHER EXPENSES	\$ 1,526.08	\$ -	All related to MEEIA activity w/ explanations in work papers
Total	\$ 20,328.36	\$ 2,086.42	
Interest	\$ 605.93	\$ 57.28	
Total + Interest	\$ 20,934.29	\$ 2,143.70	

3

4
5

Table 6
MO West Expense Disallowance Position

Evergy MO West EO-2020-0228	Staff Suggested	Company	
	DISALLOWED EXPENSES	Position	Company Response / Info Provided
CONFERENCES/MEETINGS	\$ 2,610.38	\$ -	MEEA, Nexant, PLMA, Chartwell, Energy Star - all industry/MEEIA related expenses w/ additional agenda & support material
CYCLE III EXPENSES	\$ 673.75	\$ 673.75	Expenses should be deferred to Cycle 3
MEMBERSHIPS/SPONSORSHIPS	\$ 7,059.00	\$ -	Industry specific sponsorships of organizations driving energy efficiency activity (USGBC,MEEA,BOC, St. Joe Construction, Metro Home Builders); Miscategorization of marketing activity for Metrowire media
OTHER EXPENSES	\$ 954.52	\$ 295.00	All related to MEEIA activity w/ explanations in work papers w/ Exception of Excel training - \$295
Total	\$ 11,297.65	\$ 968.75	
Interest	\$ 375.71	\$ 12.07	
Total + Interest	\$ 11,673.36	\$ 980.82	

6

7 **Q: What is Evergy’s response to the Cycle 3 expenses that are proposed to be disallowed**
8 **by Staff?**

9 A: Evergy agrees that costs which were incurred to help create and gain approval for MEEIA
10 Cycle 3 should have been deferred for recovery in Cycle 3. The net effect of these
11 adjustments within the DSIM Rider which recovers both Cycle 2 and Cycle 3 costs is the
12 interest carrying costs for the change in timing of recovery. The total value of this
13 adjustment would be \$1,786.42 in MO Metro and \$673.75 in MO West (before interest).

1 **Q: What is Evergy's response to the membership and sponsorships expenses that are**
2 **proposed to be disallowed by Staff?**

3 A: Most of the expenses in the membership and sponsorships are directly related to activity to
4 bring benefit to the MEEIA programs either through program awareness, best practice
5 gathering or industry relationship building. A high-level summary of the memberships and
6 organizations involved in is in Tables 5 & 6. One exception is the individual employee
7 certification in an industry association for a value of \$300.00 in Evergy MO Metro that is
8 the total value of the Company's position on the adjustment for this category. A detailed
9 breakout of these costs is provided Company workpapers.

10 **Q: What is Evergy's response to the other MEEIA expenses that are proposed to be**
11 **disallowed by Staff?**

12 A: Most of these other expenses either had a description for inclusion which is now included
13 where applicable and/or a valid reason for inclusion in the MEEIA DSIM. A high-level
14 summary of the descriptions and reasons is in Tables 5 & 6. One exception is an employee
15 specific Excel based training that results in an adjustment of \$295.00 in Evergy MO West
16 for this category. A detailed breakout of these costs is provided Company workpapers.

17 **Q: Does that conclude your testimony?**

18 A: Yes, it does.

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

In the Matter of the Second Prudence)
Review of the Missouri Energy Efficiency)
Investment Act (MEEIA) Cycle 2 Energy) **File No. EO-2020-0227**
Efficiency Programs of Evergy Metro, Inc.)
d/b/a Evergy Missouri Metro)


In the Matter of the Second Prudence)
Review of the Missouri Energy Efficiency)
Investment Act (MEEIA) Cycle 2 Energy) **File No. EO-2020-0228**
Efficiency Programs of Evergy Missouri)
West, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri West)

AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN A. FILE

STATE OF MISSOURI)
) ss
COUNTY OF JACKSON)


Brian A. File, being first duly sworn on his oath, states:

1. My name is Brian A. File I work in Kansas City, Missouri, and I am employed by Evergy Metro, Inc. and serve as Director, Demand-Side Management for Evergy Metro, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri Metro (“Evergy Missouri Metro) and Evergy Missouri West, Inc. d/b/a Evergy Missouri West (“Evergy Missouri West”).
2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my Rebuttal Testimony on behalf of Evergy Missouri Metro and Evergy Missouri West consisting of twenty-seven (27) pages, having been prepared in written form for introduction into evidence in the above-captioned docket.
3. I have knowledge of the matters set forth therein. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded, including any attachments thereto, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.




Brian A. File

Subscribed and sworn before me this 11th day of September 2020.



Notary Public

My commission expires: 4/26/2021



KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

P.S.C. MO. No. 7 Original Sheet No. 49I
 Revised
Cancelling P.S.C. MO. No. _____ Original Sheet No. _____
 Revised
For Missouri Retail Service Area

DEMAND SIDE INVESTMENT MECHANISM RIDER (CYCLE 2) Schedule DSIM (Continued)

DETERMINATION OF DSIM RATES:

The DSIM during each applicable EP is a dollar per kWh rate for each rate schedule calculated as follows:

$$DSIM = [NPC + NTD + NEO + NOA]/PE$$

Where:

NPC = Net Program Costs for the applicable EP as defined below,

$$NPC = PPC + PCR$$

PPC = Projected Program Costs is an amount equal to Program Costs projected by the Company to be incurred during the applicable EP, including any unrecovered Cycle 1 Program Cost that will utilize an amortization period as outlined in Stipulation & Agreement filed in Docket EO-2015-0240 .

PCR = Program Costs Reconciliation is equal to the cumulative difference between the PPC revenues billed resulting from the application of the DSIM through the end of the previous EP and the actual Program Costs incurred through the end of the previous EP (which will reflect projections through the end of the previous EP due to timing of adjustments). Such amounts shall include monthly interest on cumulative over- or under-balances at the Company's monthly Short-Term Borrowing Rate.

NTD = Net Throughput Disincentive for the applicable EP as defined below,

$$NTD = PTD + TDR$$

PTD = Projected Throughput Disincentive is the Company's TD projected by the Company to be incurred during the applicable EP, including any unrecovered TD-NSB that will utilize an amortization period as outlined in Stipulation & Agreement filed in Docket EO-2015-0240. For the detailed methodology for calculating the TD, see Sheet 49K.

TDR = Throughput Disincentive Reconciliation is equal to the cumulative difference, if any, between the PTD revenues billed during the previous EP resulting from the application of the DSIM and the Company's TD through the end of the previous EP calculated pursuant to the MEEIA Cycle 1 or 2 Application, as applicable (which will reflect projections through the end of the previous EP due to timing of adjustments). Such amounts shall include monthly interest on cumulative over- or under-balances at the Company's monthly Short-Term Borrowing Rate.

NEO = Net Earnings Opportunity for the applicable EP as defined below,

$$NEO = EO + EOR$$

April 1, 2016

DATE OF ISSUE: March 16, 2016 DATE EFFECTIVE: ~~April 15, 2016~~
ISSUED BY: Darrin R. Ives, Vice President 1200 Main, Kansas City, MO 64105

STATE OF MISSOURI, PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

P.S.C. MO. No. 1 2nd Revised Sheet No. 138.2
Canceling P.S.C. MO. No. 1 1st Revised Sheet No. 138.2
KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company For Territories Served as L&P and MPS
KANSAS CITY, MO

DEMAND SIDE INVESTMENT MECHANISM RIDER
Schedule DSIM (Continued)

DETERMINATION OF DSIM RATES:

The DSIM during each applicable EP is a dollar per kWh rate for each rate schedule calculated as

$$\text{follows: DSIM} = [\text{NPC} + \text{NTD} + \text{NEO} + \text{NOA}] / \text{PE}$$

Where:

NPC = Net Program Costs for the applicable EP as defined below,

$$\text{NPC} = \text{PPC} + \text{PCR}$$

PPC = Projected Program Costs is an amount equal to Program Costs projected by the Company to be incurred during the applicable EP, including any unrecovered Cycle 1 Program Costs that will utilize an amortization as outlined in Stipulation & Agreement filed in Docket EO-2015-0241.

PCR = Program Costs Reconciliation is equal to the cumulative difference, if any, between the PPC revenues billed resulting from the application of the DSIM through the end of the previous EP and the actual Program Costs incurred through the end of the previous EP (which will reflect projections through the end of the previous EP due to timing of adjustments). Such amounts shall include monthly interest on cumulative over- or under-balances at the Company's monthly Short- Term Borrowing Rate.

NTD = Net Throughput Disincentive for the applicable EP as defined below,

$$\text{NTD} = \text{PTD} + \text{TDR}$$

PTD = Projected Throughput Disincentive is the Company's TD projected by the Company to be incurred during the applicable EP, including any unrecovered Cycle 1 TD-NSB that will utilize an amortization as outlined in Stipulation & Agreement filed in Docket No. EO-2015-0241. For the detailed methodology for calculating the TD, see Sheet 138.4.

TDR = Throughput Disincentive Reconciliation is equal to the cumulative difference, if any, between the PTD revenues billed during the previous EP resulting from the application of the DSIM and the Company's TD through the end of the previous EP calculated pursuant to the MEEIA Cycle 1 or 2 application, as applicable (which will reflect projections through the end of the previous EP due to timing of adjustments). Such amounts shall include monthly interest on cumulative over- or under- balances at the Company's monthly Short-Term Borrowing Rate.

NEO = Net Earnings Opportunity for the applicable EP as defined below,



$$\text{NEO} = \text{EO} + \text{EOR}$$

EO = Earnings Opportunity is equal to the Earnings Opportunity Award monthly amortization multiplied by the number of billing months in the applicable EP.

The monthly amortization shall be determined by dividing the Earnings Opportunity Award by the number of billing months from the billing month of the first DSIM after the determination of the Earnings Opportunity Award and 24 calendar months following that first billing month.

Issued: June 14, 2019
Issued by: Darrin R. Ives, Vice President

Effective: ~~July 14, 2019~~
July 4, 2019



When describing the difficulty of calling events to mitigate monthly SPP Schedule 11 and 1-A fees, a graph of 2019 daily system peaks can illustrate how many events might need to be called each month. These Missouri Metro (KCP&L) and Missouri West (GMO) system load graphs compare daily peak loads to monthly peak loads. The four bars in the middle of the graph represent 10% of the monthly peak load (MW) for June, July, August and September. The four lines cutting across the graph are daily peaks loads for the same months. The graph demonstrates that a significant number of days hit within a threshold of 10% of the monthly peak load. In other words, these graphs show: 1) there is relatively minor deviation to peak load on a day-to-day basis, 2) monthly peak load is not reached in a predictable, linear way and 3) a substantial variation exists between jurisdictions and between months in order to find the exact event call to mitigate monthly peaks.