Schedule No.:

Issues:

Joint Dispatch Agreement

System Support Agreement

Transmission Issues Market Power Issues Gas-related Issues

Witness:

Maureen A. Borkowski

Type of Exhibit:

Surrebuttal Testimony

Sponsoring Party: Union Electric Co.

Case No.:

EM-96-149

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

CASE NO. EM-96-149

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

MAUREEN A. BORKOWSKI

St. Louis, Missouri June 3, 1996

Dais 9-596 Case 16.Em-96-149 Reporter KS

MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

STATE OF MISSOURI

In the matter of the of Union Electric Colorder authorizing: (merger transactions Union Electric Compansfer of certain A Estate, Leased Propand Contractual Agrand Contractual Agrand Company; and (3) in therewith, certain of transactions.	ompany for an (1) certain involving pany; (2) the assets, Real perty, Easeme reements to ic Service n connection))) nts))	Case No. EM-96-149
	<u>AFFIDAVI</u>	OF MAURI	EEN A. BORKOWSKI
State of Missouri City of St. Louis)) SS.)		

Maureen A. Borkowski, being first duly swom on her oath, states:

- My name is Maureen A. Borkowski. I work in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, and I am Manager of the Energy Services Department at Union Electric Company.
- Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my Surrebuttal Testimony consisting of pages 1 through <u>30</u>, inclusive, all of which testimony has been prepared in written form for introduction into evidence in the above-referenced docket.
- I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached 3. testimony to the questions therein propounded are true and correct.

Maurean A. Borkowski

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3/5 day of

Notary Public

DEBORAH L. ANZALONE NOTARY PUBLIC—STATE OF MISSOURI ST. LOUIS COUNTY MY COMMISSION EXPIRES APR. 18, 1998

1		SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY
2 3		OF MAUREEN A. BORKOWSKI
4		
5		MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
6 7		Docket No. EM-96-149
8	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
9	A.	My name is Maureen A. Borkowski and my business address is
10	1901 Choute	eau Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri 63103.
11	Q.	Are you the same Maureen A. Borkowski who previously
12	submitted t	testimony in this proceeding?
13	A.	Yes, I am.
14	Q.	What is the purpose of your Surrebuttal Testimony?
15	Α.	The purpose of my Surrebuttal Testimony is to address issues
16	raised by th	ne MPSC Staff, the Public Counsel, the Missouri Industrial Energy
17	Consumers	, and TRIGEN-St. Louis Energy Corp., specifically with regard to the
18	Joint Dispat	tch Agreement (JDA) and the estimation of joint dispatch savings, the
19	System Sur	oport Agreement (SSA), transmission system access and operation
20	competition	and market power, and gas-related merger issues.
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22	JOIN.	T DISPATCH AGREEMENT AND JOINT DISPATCH SAVINGS
23	Q.	Can you provide a list of witnesses who addressed the JDA
24	and joint	dispatch savings in their testimonies and summarize their
25	conclusion	is?
26	Δ	Vas Stoff witness Daniel I Back addresses the IDA and

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- 1 concludes that the principles embodied in the JDA and the After-the-Fact
- 2 Resource Allocation contained therein are generally agreeable to Staff and,
- 3 presuming sufficient data are maintained for Commission audit and the JDA
- 4 principles properly applied, will result in a reasonable allocation of costs to each
- 5 utility. Mr. Beck recommends five conditions for approval of the JDA.
- 6 Staff witness Tom Y. Lin evaluated the joint dispatch savings calculated
- 7 by UE and performed his own calculation of joint dispatch savings. Staff witness
- 8 David W. Elliott developed purchased power prices and energy quantities for
- 9 use by Mr. Lin. Mr. Lin calculated joint dispatch savings of \$91 million versus
- the \$74 million estimated by UE. Mr. Lin concluded that, although the numerical
- values of joint dispatch savings are different, the conclusions are identical: the
- 12 JDA would result in significant fuel cost savings.
- Missouri Industrial Energy Consumers (MIEC) witness Maurice Brubaker
- testified that the UE joint dispatch analysis is incomplete based on its omission
- of interchange purchase and sales data and concludes that the effect is to
- overstate the joint dispatch savings. Public Counsel witness Ryan Kind also
- 17 questions the joint dispatch savings estimation, citing Mr. Brubaker's Illinois
- 18 Commerce Commission testimony regarding interchange energy, and concludes
- 19 that the savings may be underestimated. Mr. Kind also testifies that no capacity
- 20 deferral savings are included in merger savings estimate.
- 21 Q. Please respond to Mr. Beck's testimony regarding the JDA.
- A. Mr. Beck is generally supportive of the Joint Dispatch Agreement
- 23 and the associated After-the-Fact Resource Allocation method described

therein. I will therefore address only his five conditions for approval of the JDA

2 included in his Schedule 1.

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UE (and Ameren) have no objection to items 1, 2 and 5, requiring access 3 to data, records and employees. The Company does not object to including in 4 the JDA (or the SSA as noted on Schedule 1) a requirement to submit any 5 proposed change, amendment, modification or supplement to the agreement to 6 the Commission for approval. The Company does object to including further 7 language (the second sentence of Item 3) which appears to give the 8 9 Commission substantial jurisdiction where none exists today. The language would apparently allow the Commission to, in a new or future proceeding, 10 renege on approvals it had previously given to changes in the JDA, which were 11 subsequently filed and accepted by FERC, with no available recourse to the 12 Company. Further, the suggested language may leave the Company in the 13 untenable position of being subject to an order from this Commission regarding 14 changes to the JDA (or imposing specific terms and conditions on such 15 changes) which is inconsistent or perhaps in direct conflict with a FERC order 16 relating to the JDA. The Company believes that the condition to submit 17 proposed changes to this Commission for approval is sufficient to mitigate 18 Mr. Beck's and the Commission's concern on this matter without placing the 19 20 Company in an unnecessary regulatory dilemma.

Item 4 of Mr. Beck's conditions creates substantial concern for the Company. The language included in this item appears to require the inclusion of a regulatory "supremacy" clause in every wholesale energy or transmission

agreement entered into by UE, CIPS, Ameren or any other affiliate whether or not these agreements are between the affiliates. This would include all existing interchange or transmission agreements that either UE or CIPS has with other unaffiliated parties (e.g., UE and Kansas City Power & Light or CIPS and Commonwealth Edison). This condition would grant the Commission extremely broad authority where such authority does not exist today. The Commission's existing authority relative to such agreements is not affected by the merger and. therefore, no changes are required due to the merger.

The significance of the word "respecting" included in Item 4 is noteworthy.

Similar language proposed by Staff witnesses Michael J. Wallis, and included in Staff's Legal Memorandum uses the word "respecting". This appears to be designed to apply to agreements with unaffiliated companies.

Further, even if the language in Item 4 is clarified to apply only to agreements between the affiliated interests, the language is so onerous and punitive that the Company cannot accept it as written. The Legal Memorandum to be filed by the Company on or before June 7 will address this issue in more detail. However, relative to the JDA, such language would leave UE and CIPS in the untenable position of conducting joint dispatch under a JDA which it believes to be approved, but left with the uncertainty of some future determination by the Commission as to the "recovery, disallowance, deferral, or ratemaking treatment of any expense, charge, cost or allocation incurred," (Schedule 1) again with no recourse should such determination seem inequitable. UE would have no reasonable assurance of cost recovery for

- 1 expenses incurred under the JDA. The Company believes that the conditions in
- 2 Item 3, for submitting any proposed change to the JDA to the Commission for
- approval, and in Item 5, for submission of data, afford adequate opportunity for
- 4 the Commission to maintain its jurisdiction over dispatch related costs and
- 5 ensure proper cost assignment.
- 6 Q. Mr. Beck states that though the Staff agrees with many of the
- 7 principles of the JDA, they are only principles and do not guarantee
- 8 prudence or fairness for UE's customers. Do you agree?
- 9 A. No, I do not. While the After-the-Fact Resource Allocation
- discussion in the JDA refers to "principles," it is clear from a reading of these
- "principles" that they are extremely detailed and, in fact, form the basis for an
- algorithm to actually perform the allocation. In fact, this very description was
- provided to the engineers responsible for developing the necessary computer
- software to perform the allocation. While the software itself does not currently
- exist, the "principles" are sufficiently detailed to ensure prudence and fairness.
- 16 Q. Can you describe the analysis conducted by Staff witness
- 17 Mr. Lin?
- 18 A. Yes. Mr. Lin uses the production costing model, REAL TIME, to
- simulate the UE and CIPS system separately and then as a combined system.
- 20 He then computed joint dispatch savings of \$91 million based on the difference
- 21 in cost between the sum of the separate system modeling and the combined
- 22 system modeling.

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Q. Is the analysis conducted by Mr. Lin similar to that conducted by the Company?

The analysis is similar in that both Mr. Lin and the Company A. 3 4 estimated the savings by comparing production costs of the separate systems to 5 the combined system. Mr. Lin, however, used a more detailed hourly production cost model. (The Company used MIDAS, which is a resource planning tool 6 which includes monthly production costing capability.) Mr. Lin also used current 7 production costing input data, based on UE's and CIPS' most recent fuel 8 budgets. He also included more detail in his purchased power assumptions 9 (data provided by Staff witness David W. Elliott), addressing a concern raised by 10 Mr. Brubaker. 11

Q. What would you conclude from Mr. Lin's analysis?

A. While I have not had the opportunity to review Mr. Lin's data files in detail, I agree with Mr. Lin's conclusion that Staff's and UE's results are consistent. The JDA will result in tens of millions of dollars in fuel cost savings.

Q. Does Mr. Lin have any other conclusions?

A. Mr. Lin suggests that two conditions be imposed on UE/Ameren. First, that UE/Ameren annually submit historical hourly generation, purchase power and interchange sales data to the Commission in electronic format. UE is willing to comply with this condition with the exception that the hourly purchased power and interchange data does not currently exist in electronic format. We expect it to be available once the centralized control center completes modifications to the energy management computer system to accommodate joint

- dispatch. Hard copy data could be provided until such time as the modifications 1
- are complete. We are willing to accept the second condition for access to 2
- records and employees. 3
- Q. MIEC witness Mr. Brubaker and Public Counsel witness
- Mr. Kind also raised issues regarding joint dispatch savings. Can you 5
- respond to these issues? 6

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- A. Yes. As I noted in my summary above, Messrs. Brubaker and Kind 7 both note a lack of completeness in the Company's modeling of interchange 8 energy. Oddly, they reach divergent conclusions: Mr. Brubaker contends that 9 the incompleteness tends to overstate the savings, while Mr. Kind argues that 10 savings may be underestimated. 11
 - Is there any data to support these claims? Q.
- Neither Messrs. Brubaker nor Kind provided any specific data to Α. support their conclusions. In fact, it is very difficult to develop precise data for interchange purchases and sales due to the opportunity-driven nature of these transactions. The Company develops such data for budgeting purposes, but there is substantial uncertainty about the future amount and prices of interchange energy. However, Staff witness Mr. Elliott projected purchased power energy amounts and prices using UE and CIPS budget data and historical values. As I noted earlier, this data was used in Mr. Lin's analysis. As Mr. Lin's 20 resulting production cost savings were similar to the Company's estimate, I see 21 no basis to concluding that savings were overstated due to a lack of interchange 22 purchase data. 23

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In regard to interchange sales, the impact of including sales in the 1 calculation of joint dispatch savings can only enhance the level of savings. The 2 combined number of 28 interconnected companies affords significant opportunity 3 for new transactions. No savings were estimated relating to the increased numbers of interconnections due to the difficulty in projecting this market. I 5 believe, therefore, that as Mr. Kind suggests, joint dispatch savings estimates 6 are conservative. I would note that to the extent that more interchange sales are 7 made, the margin on these sales serves as a reduction to production cost for our 8 customers. 9

- Q. Mr. Brubaker mentions that the margin or "mark up" may be less in the future due to the combined system's transmission tariff. Can you explain?
- A. Mr. Brubaker's hypothetical example regarding "mark-up" is correct. However, it is unfounded in the context of the UE and CIPS transmission tariff. The tariff rate cap for both firm and non-firm service through the combined system exceeds the "mark-up" which the companies would typically charge today for sales. Therefore, there will be no negative impact on the joint dispatch savings.
 - Q. Mr. Kind also raises the issue that no capacity deferral benefits are included in the joint dispatch savings or elsewhere in the merger savings. Can you explain?
- A. It is important to recognize that joint dispatch is designed to cause

no harm to either CIPS or UE customers. The principles in the JDA are developed with this in mind. Staff witness Mr. Beck notes this on pages 19 and 25 of his testimony. If UE and CIPS were to include capacity deferral savings in the joint dispatch arrangement, as Mr. Kind suggests, any savings that may occur to UE customers are an equal and opposite cost to CIPS customers. To the extent that CIPS would make any long-term capacity available to UE at no cost or at any cost below a market price, CIPS customers would forego revenue that would otherwise have been available from other opportunities. For this reason, the Companies did not include capacity deferral savings in the joint dispatch or merger savings.

Q. What would you conclude about the joint dispatch savings and the JDA?

A. The Company is willing to agree to conditions 1, 2 and 5 as proposed by Mr. Beck, condition 3 with modification, and suggests the elimination of condition 4 as the jurisdictional issue it seeks to address is covered by conditions 3 and 5. The Company is also willing to agree to conditions 1 and 2 on page 9 of Mr. Lin's testimony. Further, Mr. Lin's analysis supports the Company's position that substantial savings will accrue due to joint dispatch, on the order of \$70 to \$100 million over a ten-year period. Therefore, I conclude that the Joint Dispatch Agreement should be approved by the Commission.

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SYSTEM SUPPORT AGREEMENT

Q. Can you summarize the testimony filed in regard to the System Support Agreement (SSA)?

Α. Yes. Staff witness Mr. Beck filed both Rebuttal and Supplemental 4 Rebuttal testimony regarding the SSA. In his rebuttal testimony, he correctly 5 states that some form of providing energy and capacity to transferred Illinois 6 jurisdiction customers must be devised to be fair to all interested parties. He 7 goes on to explore five possible options: Business As Usual, Transfer 8 Customers with a 30-Year SSA, Transfer Customers with a 10-Year SSA, 9 Transfer Customers and CIPS purchase of an Ownership Share of UE's Existing 10 Generation, and Transfer Customers but Not Generation. Mr. Beck concludes 11 that the fourth and fifth options, suggested by the Illinois Commerce Commission 12 Staff, are not viable at this time. 13

He included substantial discussion of the 30-Year SSA option. In his Supplemental Rebuttal testimony, Mr. Beck discusses comparisons of the 30-Year and 10-Year SSA. He concludes that he cannot recommend preapproval of the 10-Year SSA and the related capacity which would return to the Missouri jurisdiction during and after phase out of the 10-Year SSA.

Q. What was the basis for his conclusion?

A. Mr. Beck lists three reasons for his conclusion: that in reviewing electric resource plans, the Commission does not preapprove decisions to acquire resources; that preapproval amounts to using a five-year lead time to commit to peaking resources that require only a three-year lead time; and that

- 1 UE has not conducted a complete analysis of the risks involved with the 10-Year
- 2 SSA. However, Mr. Beck states that he might waive these concerns if the
- analysis of the 10-Year SSA indicates "overwhelming benefits" (p.10 of
- 4 Supplemental Rebuttal) to Missouri retail ratepayers.
- 5 Q. Did Mr. Beck perform a review of UE's analysis of the 10-Year

6 versus 30-Year SSA?

- 7 A. Yes, Mr. Beck confirms that, based on UE's analysis, "... the
- 8 Missouri jurisdiction will benefit from the 10-Year SSA plan by utilizing the
- 9 returned capacity instead of purchasing new combustion turbine (peaking)
- capacity." (p.3 of Supplemental Rebuttal). The amount of this benefit is in the
- range of \$30-50 million in Present Value of Revenue Requirements (PVRR)
- through the year 2010.

13 Q. Did Mr. Beck also perform his own analysis?

- A. Yes. Mr. Beck performed his own analysis using a 15 percent
- planning reserve margin rather than the 18 percent planning reserve margin
- 16 used by UE.

- Q. Why did Mr. Beck use 15 percent instead of 18 percent?
- A. As Mr. Beck notes, UE uses a 15 percent reserve margin for short-
- 19 term planning. Our III-Mo Pool agreement requires that UE maintain a 15
- 20 percent reserve margin and this is consistent with short-term planning studies
- conducted by the Mid-America Interconnected Network (MAIN), UE's regional
- reliability council. However, for long-term planning, MAIN policy states that
- members are urged to maintain a minimum reserve margin of 18 to 22 percent in

- 1 planning for the addition of new capacity. Mr. Beck expressed concern "... about
- committing to resources that will not be available for five to ten years..." (p.8 of
- 3 Supplemental Rebuttal) based on 18 percent, and therefore elected to use 15
- 4 percent.

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Q. Do you agree with Mr. Beck's position?

A. Mr. Beck has some discussion of the reserve margin issue in his

Supplemental Rebuttal testimony. I do not agree with all of his discussion, but

for purposes of evaluating the SSA options, I will not challenge his use of

15 percent versus 18 percent. It should be noted that use of 18 percent would

greatly enhance any expected benefits of the 10-Year SSA, as the capacity

returning to the Missouri jurisdiction would be needed sooner than with a

15 percent reserve requirement.

Q. Do you agree with the results of Mr. Beck's analysis?

A. No, I do not. In calculating the difference in PVRR for the 10-Year and 30-Year SSA plans, Mr. Beck modified the UE capacity addition schedule to achieve a 15 percent reserve margin. In doing so, he reduced the number of combustion turbines (CTs) needed by the system, but allowed the unidentified purchases in UE's 18 percent plan to remain. Mr. Beck erred in that he must either eliminate the unidentified purchases from the plan or include in his revenue requirement calculation some cost for these purchases. Eliminating the purchases would result in unacceptably low reserve margins (roughly 100 MW below the 15 percent target). By correcting this error, either by adding CTs to replace the unidentified purchases or including a peaking capacity cost for these

- purchases, Mr. Beck's results change dramatically. Rather than resulting in a
- \$30 million deficit, the 10-Year SSA results in a \$20 million benefit in PVRR
- through the year 2010.

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- Q. How does this correction alter Mr. Beck's conclusion?
- 5 A. Mr. Beck indicated that had the analysis shown overwhelming
- 6 benefits to the Missouri ratepayers, he might waive his other concerns and
- 7 recommend approval of the 10-Year SSA. The analyses performed by Staff and
- 8 UE result in benefits estimated in the \$20-50 million range. I would suggest that
- 9 these benefits are substantial and, therefore, warrant approval.
- 10 Q. Can you address Mr. Beck's other reasons for not recommending approval?
 - A. Yes. The three reasons related by Mr. Beck all involve practices normally used in the Commission's review of electric resource plans. I do not believe that the same practices are warranted here. The transfer of the UE Illinois properties and the associated SSA is a one-time opportunity presented by the proposed merger of UE and CIPS. If the 10-Year SSA is not approved, the property transfer will not be made, and the Missouri ratepayers will have forever foregone the opportunity for the savings presented here. That situation is quite distinct from a resource planning decision to build a CT or implement DSM or purchase capacity from an interconnected neighbor (although failure to purchase capacity when offered can likewise result in a lost opportunity), which decisions can be reevaluated year after year.
- Q. Mr. Beck mentions that a risk analysis should be performed.

1 Can you comment?

- 2 A. Mr. Beck's testimony includes some of the risk analysis he
- 3 suggests. He reviewed the sensitivity of the recommendation to CT prices and
- 4 concludes that CT prices will not go so low as to eliminate the benefits of the
- 5 10-Year SSA (p.5 of Supplemental Rebuttal).
- 6 Q. Did Mr. Beck mention any other concerns about the 10-Year
- 7 SSA?
- 8 A. In his Rebuttal Testimony, Mr. Beck mentioned three concerns
- 9 about the pricing of capacity and energy in the formula rates: nuclear
- decommissioning costs, the determination of return on common equity and the
- annual reconciliation of costs. In the case of nuclear decommissioning costs
- and the annual reconciliation, UE will commit to add minor conforming language
- to the SSA to clarify our intent and address Mr. Beck's concerns. The return on
- common equity is fixed for the first five years, and UE would agree to submit any
- proposed changes to the Commission for approval.
- Q. Did Mr. Beck have any other conditions, should the
- 17 Commission decide to approve the 10-Year SSA?
- 18 A. Yes. He recommended that the first four conditions I discussed
- 19 regarding the Joint Dispatch Agreement be applied to SSA approval.
- 20 Q. Do you agree with this?
- 21 A. UE (and Ameren) have no objection to conditions 1 and 2. As I
- 22 discussed in my JDA testimony, the Company can accept the first sentence of

- I condition 3. Consistent with my JDA testimony, the Company objects to the
- 2 second sentence of condition 3 and suggests that condition 4 be eliminated.
- 3 Since any proposed change to the SSA will be filed with the Commission for
- 4 approval, condition 4 is unnecessary. The Company's Legal Memorandum
- 5 address these issues in more detail.

- Q. Mr. Beck also discussed industry structure and stranded investment in his Supplemental Rebuttal testimony. Can you comment?
- A. Mr. Beck suggests that PVRR is no longer the appropriate mechanism for utility decision making due to changes in the industry. While we all recognize that the industry is changing, business goes on. The Commission has not rescinded the requirement for utilities to file 20-year resource plans using PVRR nor rejected its tradition of embedded cost ratemaking due to changes in the industry.
- Mr. Beck also discusses stranded costs and recommends that the Commission condition approval of the 10-Year SSA on holding Missouri ratepayers harmless for any stranded generation costs. This recommendation should be rejected. Mr. Beck seems to be suggesting that, although the 10-Year SSA has expected benefits to the Missouri ratepayers of \$20-50 million, they should have the right to all benefits, but be guaranteed complete insulation from any cost. Further, it is completely premature to address stranded generation costs, which may or may not exist at some date in the future, in this merger docket. The Company recommends that any such determination of stranded cost responsibility be left to such future date as such costs become relevant.

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TRANSMISSION SYSTEM ACCESS & OPERATION

Q. Several witnesses referenced transmission access and transmission system operations issues in their rebuttal testimony. Can you summarize their testimony?

Α TRIGEN witness Scott A. Spiewak describes his client's 5 desire and actions seeking transmission service from Union Electric. 6 7 recommends that the Commission explore whether the public interest demands that UE and CIPS turn over their transmission assets to an independent system 8 9 operator (ISO). Public Counsel witness Mr. Kind expresses concern about the possibility of UE and CIPS using their transmission ownership to hinder 10 competition in the electric utility industry. Staff witness Mark L. Oligschlaeger 11 discussed transmission rate "pancaking" and ISO's. He made no 12 recommendations on these issues. 13

Q. Can you respond to Mr. Spiewak?

A. Yes. Mr. Spiewak's major concern is that his client, TRIGEN, has sought firm transmission service from Union Electric "for six months" in order to deliver 57 MW of generation from the Ashley Power Plant (a former UE facility) to UE's interconnections with CIPS, with flexible non-firm service to other interconnections. UE provided Mr. Spiewak with an unexecuted agreement for such service on May 1, 1996. Therefore, his transmission concern has been resolved.

Q. Why did it take so long to provide the agreement?

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A. Mr. Spiewak's original request asked for 57 MW of network 1 service, both on a firm and non-firm basis and point-to-point service, firm and 2 non-firm, from Ashley Plant (1 Ashley Place) to UE's points of connection with 3 CIPS and with six other entities with whom UE has no interconnection 5 agreement. UE was understandably confused by this perplexing request, especially since our proposed merger had just been announced, and we 6 intended to shortly file a combined system open-access tariff which we expected to be available to meet TRIGEN's needs. Further, UE and TRIGEN were 8 currently involved in active litigation regarding a 50-year power agreement which 9 UE and TRIGEN's predecessor, Thermal Resources, had entered into at the 10 time that UE sold the Ashley Plant. This agreement required all steam-11 generated electrical energy from the Ashley Plant to be sold to UE, which would 12 have made TRIGEN's transmission service request for delivery to other parties a 13 violation of the power agreement. UE asked on several occasions to meet with 14 Mr. Spiewak and/or other TRIGEN representatives to clarify these issues, but 15 Mr. Spiewak steadfastly ignored our attempts to schedule even a conference 16 call. At one point in the exchange of correspondence, UE believed that TRIGEN 17 had allowed its request to languish. (Mr. Spiewak sent information by facsimile 18 which no one at UE has a record of receiving.) 19 20 Finally, on February 23, 1996, UE and TRIGEN reached a settlement agreement on the termination of the power agreement which was the subject of 21 the litigation. TRIGEN subsequently performed the required actions under the 22

settlement, and on April 8, 1996 UE conducted its inspection of the Ashley

- 1 facilities and the power contract was terminated. Once this threshold issue for
- 2 UE was no longer relevant, we tendered a transmission agreement to TRIGEN.
- 3 Q. Do you believe that UE in any way abused its market power
- through its treatment of TRIGEN's request or in any way demonstrated
- 5 "hostility toward the goal of robust competition" (p.10)?
- A. Absolutely not. Our actions were governed by two concerns; our
- 7 desire to enforce the existing power agreement and our request for clarification
- 8 from Mr. Spiewak to come to an understanding of what services he was
- 9 requesting.

- Q. Do you believe the Commission should take any action on
- 11 Mr. Spiewak's recommendation?
- 12 A. No. I will discuss the ISO concept in more detail later, but in any
- event, no action is required to address Mr. Spiewak's concern. I might add that
- in the interim time between our earlier correspondence with Mr. Spiewak and our
- settlement with TRIGEN, Mr. Spiewak filed on behalf of TRIGEN a Section 211
- 16 complaint under the Federal Power Act with the Federal Energy Regulatory
- 17 Commission (FERC) to compel UE to provide transmission service. Despite the
- 18 fact that UE has voluntarily provided a transmission agreement to Mr. Spiewak
- 19 as of May 1, this complaint docket is still open. Mr. Spiewak has all the
- 20 necessary recourse he may require at FERC.
- 21 Q. Mr. Kind has concerns related to the proposed merger's effect
- on competition. Can you address these concerns?

1	A. Yes. Mr. Kind expresses concern that, despite the combined
2	system open-access tariff, UE and CIPS may use their strategic location to limit
3	access and hinder competition. This concern is unfounded. Certainly, the
4	companies consider the increased number of transmission interconnections a
5	benefit of the merger. However, as I stated in my direct testimony (p.14), the
6	open-access tariff will enhance the interchange opportunities, not only for UE
7	and CIPS, but for other utilities and power marketers in the region. The same is
8	true for wholesale customers and, perhaps in the future, retail customers within
9	the combined UE and CIPS control area. They will now have access to a larger
10	number of potential suppliers for a single system rate.

Q. Mr. Kind mentions that procedures for addressing bottlenecks and determining cost allocations for new facilities need to be worked out.

Do you agree?

A. The open-access tariff filing addresses these issues. The tariff includes provisions for construction of new facilities to meet requests for service, and FERC has established pricing policies for allocating the costs associated with these facilities. Further, the recent FERC Order 888, requiring open-access tariffs for all public utilities, includes these provisions as well.

I would also add that, while the combined system is well-interconnected, its interconnections are not exclusive. Even without a regional grid-wide tariff, a transmission customer can easily seek alternate paths to suppliers and/or customers from utilities other than the merged company via those utilities' tariffs.

Q. Mr. Oligschlaeger also mentioned a regional grid-wide tariff.

Can you comment on his remarks?

A. Mr. Oligschlaeger refers to the practice of "pancaking" transmission rates and notes that the Commission has recommended that regional transmission pricing methods be investigated. As he notes, the combined system tariff of UE and CIPS will eliminate the pancaking effect that would otherwise have occurred for transactions across the UE and CIPS systems. He also notes that UE is participating in the development of the Midwest ISO, which lists among its principles the development of a regional transmission tariff. (I should add that CIPS is now also participating in the Midwest ISO. This fact was not known to Mr. Oligschlaeger at the time his testimony was submitted.)

Q. Should the Commission require UE and CIPS to participate either in an ISO or in a regional grid-wide tariff as a condition of the merger approval?

A. No. Such action would be unnecessary and premature. The Midwest ISO is in the developmental phase. It would be unwise to require participation in a group whose structure, requirements and obligations are so ill-defined. No other ISO currently exists. Requiring participation in a regional grid-wide tariff is fraught with the same problems: no appropriate region or tariff has as yet been defined. Further, given FERC Order 888, which requires retail customers who gain access to the competitive power markets to become eligible customers for the same tariffs as wholesale customers, UE, CIPS and the Commission must give serious consideration to the impact on remaining native

- 1 load customers before such participation could be contemplated. Mr.
- 2 Oligschlaeger expressed the Commission's desire for investigation of these
- 3 options. UE and CIPS are investigating the possibilities. Mr. Oligschlaeger did
- 4 not recommend any action or condition regarding these transmission issues. I
- 5 concur with this position.

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COMPETITION AND MARKET POWER

- Q. Can you summarize the testimony submitted by other parties
 regarding competition and market power issues?
 - A. TRIGEN witness Mr. Spiewak charges UE with past and present abuse of market power, based on his assessment of our response to TRIGEN's request for transmission service and our Rider E tariff. Public Counsel witness Mr. Kind expresses general concern over the possibility of transmission and generation market power hindering competition. Staff witness Mr. Oligschlaeger addresses market power in his discussion of transmission policy.
 - Q. Can you respond to the issues raised regarding market power?
 - A. Yes. First of all, I agree with Mr. Oligschlaeger that "...since any market power implications of the UE/CIPSCO transaction extend well beyond the Missouri jurisdiction, it seems appropriate for FERC to be the primary forum for the examination of these issues." (p.46). Nonetheless, Messrs. Spiewak's and Kind's concerns are unwarranted. Mr. Spiewak's charges of market power

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abuse stem from his dissatisfaction with UE's response to TRIGEN's request for 1 2 transmission service and his dislike of Rider E. I have earlier responded to Mr. Spiewak's contentions regarding the transmission request and Company 3 witness Richard J. Kovach addresses the Rider E issue in his Surrebuttal Testimony. The only remaining issue of Mr. Spiewak's is UE's interpretation of 5 the requirement to provide transmission service to Qualifying Facilities. This 6 7 issue is irrelevant to this merger docket and no longer meaningful since UE has offered an agreement for the requested service. (Note that the proffered 8 agreement includes the ancillary services requested by Mr. Spiewak.) The 9 Company testimony adequately demonstrates that UE has not shown "... past 10 abuse of market power...", does not have "... a stranglehold on transmission...". 11 has not shown "... a basic hostility toward the goal of robust competition..." and 12 has not sought "... to stifle competition." (All cites on p.10 of Mr. Spiewak's 13 Rebuttal.) Therefore, no remedy as sought by Mr. Spiewak from this 14 Commission is required. 15

Mr. Kind's concerns regarding possible transmission and generation market power are exactly the issues which FERC addresses in its review of the proposed merger. I have already addressed the transmission issues raised by Mr. Kind. Regarding generation market power, Mr. Kind is concerned that consolidation of UE and CIPS generating resources may result in a market where the combined system can influence the market clearing price by having a large amount of the region's low cost generating facilities under "single ownership umbrella" (p.56). In the testimony filed by UE and CIPS at FERC,

1	witness Rodney Frame (whose testimony is referenced by Mr. Kind at p.52)
2	analyzes the generation market power of the combined system and concludes
3	that, based on traditional market power measurements, generation market power
4	does not exist. By reviewing Mr. Kind's testimony (Schedule RK5-1), one can
5	see that the combined UE and CIPS system is surrounded by giants like
6	Commonwealth Edison, American Electric Power and Tennessee Valley
7	Authority as well as other smaller low-cost producers line CINergy, Kansas City
8	Power & Light and the Iowa Companies. Neither generation nor transmission
9	market power can be a valid concern.

No party has recommended a remedy to address market power (other than the possibility of ISO participation which I have already addressed), and no remedy is required.

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GAS-RELATED ISSUES

- Q. Do you have any response to the rebuttal testimony of Staff witness Michael J. Wallis?
- 17 A. Yes, I have comments regarding the three concerns expressed by
 18 Mr. Wallis about the proposed merger and the five conditions which he
 19 recommends that the Commission incorporate in its approval of the merger.
 - Q. What was the first concern mentioned by Mr. Wallis?
 - A. On pages 7 and 8 of his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Wallis states that he is concerned with "the sharing methodology which will be used by the combined UE/CIPSCO entity to distribute the gas merger savings to the

- ratepayers of Missouri and Illinois." In particular, he differentiates gas merger 1
- savings from electric merger savings and notes the lack of any existing gas 2
- savings sharing mechanism. Mr. Wallis testifies that the Staff, for the reasons 3
- set out in the rebuttal testimony of Staff witness Mr. Oligschlaeger, will oppose a 4
- gas savings sharing mechanism like that proposed for the electric merger 5
- savings. 6

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- What are your comments regarding this first concern of 7 Q. Mr. Wallis?
 - A. As stated in our response to Staff Data Request No. 4 included on page 8 of Mr. Wallis' rebuttal testimony, UE does intend to share gas related merger savings with its gas customers in a manner consistent with the sharing proposed for electric customers. The reasons supporting such sharing are set out in UE witness Rainwater's direct testimony. However, as indicated in our data request response and as noted by Mr. Wallis, UE's current gas rate design, including the PGA provisions, does not permit a sharing of gas related merger savings. UE will address this issue in a separate filing after the merger is completed.
 - Q. What was Mr. Wallis' second concern about the merger?
 - Mr. Wallis describes his second concern as "the manner in which A. Ameren Services Company (the affiliated service company which will perform the gas procurement function for the combined UE/CIPSCO entity) will allocate gas costs between Missouri and Illinois" (p. 7). He testifies (on pages 8 and 9 of his rebuttal testimony) that it is critical for the Staff to make certain that as gas

- supplies are jointly dispatched and used by UE and CIPS customers, the
- 2 ratepayers of Missouri and Illinois will be allocated their fair share of the gas
- costs. Mr. Wallis refers to our response to Staff Data Request No. 5020 that the
- 4 details of how gas costs will be allocated after the merger have not yet been
- 5 worked out.

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- 6 Q. Do you have comments concerning Mr. Wallis' second 7 concern?
 - A. Yes, the Company recognizes the importance of ensuring that the Staff has the ability to make certain that gas costs are fairly allocated to ratepayers in Missouri and Illinois. While the details of the allocation have not been determined, UE assures the Commission and its Staff that any allocation methodology will be submitted for approval either as a part of the ACA audit process as contemplated by Mr. Wallis (p. 10 of his rebuttal testimony) or possibly in a separate proceeding.
- 15 Q. Please describe the third concern testified to by Mr. Wallis.
 - A. At pages 7, 9 and 10 of his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Wallis states that he is concerned "whether or not the combined UE/CIPSCO entity will participate in the futures market." He describes UE's current Commission-approved pilot project entitled "Use of Financial Markets to Manage Gas Costs" and refers to CIPS' current nonparticipation in the natural gas futures market.
 - Q. What conclusion did Mr. Wallis reach with respect to the use of natural gas futures after the merger?

- A. He concluded that if the combined UE/CIPSCO entity does not continue to use the futures market, Missouri ratepayers may not realize possible savings to be derived from their use as price hedging tools. Mr. Wallis added that a failure to use futures may be considered by the Commission Procurement Analysis Staff as a basis for disallowing the recovery of gas costs in an ACA proceeding.
- Q. Do you have any response to this final concern of Mr. Wallis about the merger?
 - A. Yes, I do. Just as UE has always been, the combined UE/CIPSCO entity will be committed to considering every reasonable means of insuring the lowest gas costs to its customers including the use of financial markets to manage such costs. However, it must be recognized that the Company's authority to use futures, including the nature and degree of such use, is unclear beyond the termination of the pilot project in March 1997. The Commission in approving the project expressly limited its duration to not exceed two years and to date, it has issued no guidance as to the further use of futures by UE or by Missouri gas utilities in general. With this uncertainty, I ask the Commission not to accept Mr. Wallis' conclusion that a failure to use futures may be considered grounds for gas cost recovery disallowances in ACA proceedings.
 - Q. In his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Wallis also recommends that certain conditions be made a part of any Commission decision approving the merger. Are such conditions acceptable to Union Electric?

A. Three of the conditions are acceptable in the form recommended by Mr. Wallis. The other two conditions are acceptable in principle, but not specifically in the form that Mr. Wallis proposes. The Company's response to these conditions will be further addressed (and, to the extent necessary, clarified), in its Legal Memorandum to be filed on or about June 7, 1996.

Q. Please identify the conditions which are acceptable to UE.

A. Mr. Wallis, on page 11 of his rebuttal testimony, recommends that Commission approval of the merger be conditioned upon Ameren Corporation's and UE's acceptance of the provisions of the Stipulation and Agreement approved by the Commission in Case No. GR-93-106, particularly the documentation requirements set forth in Paragraph 4. On pages 12 and 13 of his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Wallis recommends two additional conditions which require our acknowledgment and agreement that (i) "the Commission may access and require without subpoena the production of all accounts, books, ... and officers and employees of Ameren Corporation and any affiliate or subsidiary of Ameren Corporation and (ii) "the Commission may require answers, and/or the appearance of officers or employees of Ameren Corporation and any affiliate or subsidiary of Ameren Corporation without subpoena to provide answers to questions ... ".

UE (and Ameren) find these conditions acceptable and commit to continue the documentation of its gas purchasing decisions currently performed by UE as well as the access to documents and employees presently provided.

The Company acknowledges the Staff's need for this access to adequate

- documentation and to personnel in order to evaluate the prudence of the gas
- 2 purchasing decisions. Please be assured that any decision to use an entity
- other than UE to purchase gas for UE's Missouri gas distribution system will be
- 4 done solely in the interest of maximizing benefits from the merger and not to
- 5 avoid regulatory review by this Commission or its Staff.

Q. What are UE's concerns regarding the other two conditions recommended by Mr. Wallis?

A. The remaining two conditions, discussed by Mr. Wallis on pages 12-14 of his rebuttal testimony, require UE and Ameren Corporation affiliates or subsidiaries to include certain language in specified types of contracts that are filed with and/or approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The stated objective of this language is to prevent Ameren Corporation and UE from asserting federal preemption to challenge the power of the Commission to make adjustments to the affiliate transactions of UE.

In principle, we do not oppose the objective of these conditions. The Company's use of an affiliate to engage in natural gas transactions is not being proposed in order to escape the jurisdiction of this Commission, but is intended only to maximize the merger benefits. We do, however, have problems with the specific manner and detail recommended by Mr. Wallis for achieving the Staff's objective, similar to the concerns discussed earlier with regard to Mr. Beck's testimony.

Q. Please discuss UE's problems with these two conditions.

A. Our problems will be addressed more fully in the Legal
Memorandum to be submitted on or before June 7 by counsel on behalf of UE. I
will only highlight some particular concerns that I have with respect to the Staff's
FERC-related preemption condition.

First, circumstances have occurred in the past where the federal preemption doctrine has been applied to prevent the Commission from barring recovery by gas utilities of FERC-approved charges. One prominent example involved FERC-approved take-or-pay charges billed to gas utilities by their interstate pipeline suppliers. Because similar situations will undoubtedly arise in the future, the Staff's proposed condition should not be in a form which will deprive UE of availing itself of the preemption doctrine merely because an affiliate is used to engage in natural gas transactions.

Second, the Staff's proposed condition seemingly requires its FERC-related preemption language to be included not only in gas supply, storage and transportation contracts between UE and its affiliates but also in contracts with non-affiliated third parties who provide such services. (We conclude this from the use of the word "respecting" in reference to FERC agreements in contrast with the use of "between" in the SEC-related agreements. See pages 12-13.) It will be virtually impossible for the Company to comply with this condition with respect to contracts with interstate pipelines for transportation and storage services. The forms of these contracts are standardized and typically filed as a part of the pipelines' FERC-approved tariffs. It will be extremely difficult to obtain the required agreement of an interstate pipeline to include the Staff's

- language in these contracts in light of FERC requirements. Adding to this
- 2 difficulty is the fact that each portion of UE's distribution system is physically
- 3 captive to one interstate pipeline supplier which severely limits our negotiating
- 4 leverage.
- 5 My final concern about the Staff's recommended preemption conditions is
- 6 the additional cost which may be extracted by non-affiliated third parties as
- 7 consideration for their agreement with the Staff's proposed contract language.
- 8 Such cost may in the form of higher prices or contractual concessions which will
- 9 ultimately be borne by our ratepayers.

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11 CONCLUSION

- 12 Q. Does this conclude your Surrebuttal Testimony?
- 13 A. Yes, it does.