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**MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**CASE NO. ER-2007-0002**

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**PHILIP Q. HANSER**

**ON**

**BEHALF OF**

**UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY  
d/b/a AmerenUE**

St. Louis, Missouri  
February, 2007

AmerenUE Exhibit No. 24  
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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

I.	INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY .....	1
II.	TEN PERCENT RESIDENTIAL RATE CAP.....	3
III.	ESSENTIAL SERVICES RATE.....	5
IV.	INDUSTRIAL DEMAND RESPONSE PILOT.....	12



1           **Q.     Please summarize your conclusions.**

2           A.     I believe that the Missouri Public Service Commission (“Commission”)  
3 should reject the recommendations of Mr. Brubaker and Mr. Higgins to increase residential  
4 rates by substantially more than 10 percent. Neither of these witnesses provides a  
5 compelling rationale for rejecting AmerenUE’s proposal to cap the residential rate increase at  
6 10 percent. Nor have these witnesses undercut my contention that non-residential customers,  
7 on average, are better able to absorb electricity cost increases than residential customers.

8                     In addition, if the Commission ultimately approves a rate increase in an  
9 amount that does not require a 10% cap for residential customers, my understanding is that  
10 AmerenUE does agree it is appropriate to set rates closer to those supported by the Class  
11 Cost of Service Study (CCOS) presented by Company witness William Warwick.

12                    I also conclude that the Commission should reject Mr. Quinn’s proposal to  
13 establish an essential services rate for residential customers. There are several problems with  
14 Mr. Quinn’s proposal. First, he relies on assertions to demonstrate that additional low-  
15 income assistance is needed, without acknowledging the low-income programs already in  
16 place. Second, the absence of an income test means that high-income customers would  
17 receive an unnecessary benefit. Third, the inverted block rate resulting from Mr. Quinn’s  
18 proposal would reduce retail customers’ incentive to invest in energy efficiency (*e.g.*,  
19 insulation, efficient appliances) and would penalize low-income customers with high levels  
20 of electricity consumption.

21                    Finally, I conclude that the Commission should reject Ms. LaConte’s  
22 proposed changes to the industrial demand response pilot program. In particular, Ms.  
23 LaConte’s proposed increase in the credit provided to interruptible customers is not justified,

1 given the level of reliability and value to AmerenUE's system that will be provided by  
2 interruptible load.

3 **II. TEN PERCENT RESIDENTIAL RATE CAP**

4 **Q. What does Mr. Brubaker propose with respect to the residential rate**  
5 **increase?**

6 A. Mr. Brubaker does not propose a specific rate increase for the residential class  
7 but is critical of AmerenUE's proposal to cap the residential rate increase at 10 percent.  
8 According to Mr. Brubaker, AmerenUE's own cost-of-service study suggests that a 27  
9 percent increase for residential customers would be appropriate if the Company's overall rate  
10 increase of 18 percent were granted.

11 **Q. What is your response to this?**

12 A. Mr. William Warwick sponsors AmerenUE's cost of service study, and is  
13 available to discuss issues related to it. Notwithstanding the specific results of any cost of  
14 service analysis, there are mitigating factors that influence rate design, with the end result  
15 that often the rates that are finally adopted differ significantly from the cost of service results.  
16 Rate structures are often a complex mixture of cost of service and value of service  
17 considerations.

18 **Q. How do you respond to Mr. Brubaker's assertion that your rationales in**  
19 **support of the 10 percent residential rate increase are not generally accepted in the**  
20 **industry as the basis for rate design?**

21 A. Such considerations are widely recognized as affecting utilities' customer  
22 programs for energy efficiency, demand-side management and so on, and public utility  
23 commissions have taken such considerations into account in approving such programs. In its

1 Direct Testimony, Staff recommends varying from the CCOS because of the customer  
2 impact. "Because of the relative rate impacts, the Staff is not recommending a movement all  
3 the way to each class' cost of service." Direct Testimony of James A. Busch, December 29,  
4 2006, P.3, L. 19. I believe that customer impact may be one of the most important  
5 considerations typically utilized by Commissions as they balance the various interests in  
6 ratemaking proceedings.

7 **Q. What does Mr. Higgins propose with respect to the class revenue**  
8 **requirements and the residential rate cap?**

9 A. Mr. Higgins recommends that the Commission reject AmerenUE's proposed  
10 10 percent residential rate cap, claiming that it would result in large subsidies paid by the  
11 non-residential customer classes. Mr. Higgins proposes that revenue be apportioned such  
12 that, for any rate increase, the Residential class is moved midway between the jurisdictional  
13 average percentage increase and Residential cost-of-service based percentage increase. The  
14 remaining revenue shortfall would be made up by applying an equal percentage increase  
15 above cost-of-service to the remaining customer classes.

16 **Q. What is your response to Mr. Higgins' proposal?**

17 A. Mr. Higgins has not provided a rationale as to why this represents an  
18 appropriate rate increase for residential customers. He ignores the impact his rate design  
19 would have upon the residential class. However, as stated above, if the Commission grants a  
20 rate increase in a lower amount than the Company has requested, there may be less need to  
21 shield residential customers from the rate impact.



1           **Q.     What discount would Mr. Quinn provide under the essential services**  
2 **rate?**

3           A.     Mr. Quinn proposes that, if AmerenUE's rates are reduced as a result of this  
4 case, the *entire* reduction would be realized in the essential services rate, so that the savings  
5 would fall entirely on the first 600 kWh consumed by each residential customer per month  
6 (or whatever level is ultimately set). If AmerenUE's rates increase as a result of this case, all  
7 residential customers would be fully exempted from the increase for their first 600 kWh of  
8 consumption per month; *i.e.*, the rate increase, insofar as residential rates are concerned,  
9 would fall entirely on kWh consumed above the first 600 each month for each residential  
10 customer.

11           **Q.     Would the essential services rate be exempt from AmerenUE's proposed**  
12 **fuel adjustment clause?**

13           A.     Yes. The first 600 kWh of consumption would be exempt from prospective  
14 rate adjustments for changed fuel costs. Thus, under Mr. Quinn's proposal, residential rates  
15 would be frozen at their existing level (assuming that AmerenUE is granted a rate increase by  
16 the Commission), at least until the next rate case, for consumption subject to the essential  
17 services rate.

18           **Q.     Would the essential services rate be applied to all customers or just to**  
19 **low-income customers?**

20           A.     Mr. Quinn proposes to apply the essential services rate to *all* residential  
21 customers. He opposes a program targeted to low-income customers for two reasons. First,  
22 he claims that a targeted program would be administratively burdensome for AmerenUE and  
23 for low-income customers, who would have to document their income. Second, he asserts

1 that the income cut-off would be arbitrary and would exclude families of modest means who  
2 would not qualify for the special rate but nonetheless would struggle to pay their monthly  
3 bills.

4 **Q. Do you believe that the Commission should adopt the essential services**  
5 **rate proposed by Mr. Quinn?**

6 A. No. I have several concerns with the proposed essential services rate and  
7 believe that it should be rejected by the Commission.

8 **Q. What is your first concern with regard to Mr. Quinn's proposal?**

9 A. Mr. Quinn fails to substantiate the need for an essential services rate in  
10 AmerenUE's service area. His testimony includes no analysis of the number of customers in  
11 AmerenUE's service area who are unable to pay their electric bill (or have severe difficulty  
12 doing so) because of financial hardship. Moreover, Mr. Quinn entirely ignores the programs  
13 sponsored by the government and by AmerenUE that provide financial assistance to low-  
14 income persons to help them pay their energy bills.

15 **Q. What federal government program provides financial assistance to low-**  
16 **income residents to help them pay their energy bills?**

17 A. The federal government makes financial assistance available through the low-  
18 income heating and energy assistance program ("LIHEAP"). This program provides heating  
19 and cooling assistance to approximately 5 million low-income households across the U.S. In  
20 fiscal year 2003 (the last year for which data was available) \$40.7 million was appropriated  
21 to Missouri under the LIHEAP program. Almost 160,000 low-income households in Missouri  
22 received an average LIHEAP payment of \$188/year to help them pay their home heating  
23 costs. In Missouri, LIHEAP funding is administered by the Missouri Department of Public

1 Services, through the Energy Assistance/Regular Heating Program and the Energy Crisis  
2 Assistance Program.

3 **Q. What programs does AmerenUE offer to assist low-income customers?**

4 A. AmerenUE offers several programs, some in conjunction with other utilities  
5 and local agencies, which provide cash or other assistance to low-income residents to help  
6 them pay their electricity bills. One example is the "Dollar More" program, which provides  
7 low-income households cash payments toward their electricity, natural gas or other energy  
8 bills. AmerenUE also has weatherization and other programs designed to improve the energy  
9 efficiency of low-income households. In one such program, AmerenUE provides air  
10 conditioning units and minor weatherization under the auspices of Operation Weather  
11 Survival, a coalition of St. Louis city and county agencies, utilities, social service agencies  
12 and health organizations.

13 **Q. Is AmerenUE's ability to disconnect a residential customer's service**  
14 **during the winter restricted?**

15 A. Yes. During the winter months (November 1 through March 31) the PSC  
16 Cold Weather Rule is in effect and electric service cannot be disconnected when the  
17 temperature is forecasted to drop below 32 degrees. So a low-income household (or any  
18 household, for that matter) will not lose their electric service during the winter because of a  
19 failure to pay their electric bill.

1           **Q.     Are you claiming that the LIHEAP program, in combination with the**  
2 **programs offered by AmerenUE and local agencies, fully meet the energy assistance**  
3 **needs of low-income households in AmerenUE's service area?**

4           A.     No. Since I have not studied this issue, I cannot conclude that the existing  
5 array of government and utility programs fully meets the energy assistance needs of low-  
6 income households in the AmerenUE service area. However, the cash and other assistance  
7 available through these programs clearly must be taken into account when assessing the need  
8 for the essential services rate proposed by Mr. Quinn. The essential services rate would be  
9 an addition to the array of programs already in place to assist low-income households.

10          **Q.     What is your second concern with Mr. Quinn's proposal?**

11          A.     My second concern with Mr. Quinn's proposal is that it is not well targeted, in  
12 that natural gas is the primary fuel used by households for space heating in AmerenUE's  
13 service area. Only 21 percent of the homes in AmerenUE's service area are heated by  
14 electricity. Mr. Quinn implicitly recognizes that electricity is not widely used for space  
15 heating by AmerenUE customers when he suggests that the baseline kWh for the essential  
16 services rate be adjusted upward during the summer months, to account for the cooling  
17 season, but does not propose a similar adjustment for the winter. Thus, the essential services  
18 rate proposed by Mr. Quinn would not help most low-income customers with their heating  
19 bills. Heating bills significantly exceed electricity bills during the winter months (for  
20 customers with non-electric space heating), making the essential services rate a poorly  
21 targeted form of financial assistance.

1           **Q.     What is your third concern with Mr. Quinn's proposal?**

2           My third concern is that it subsidizes all residential customers, not just those in need.  
3 Under Mr. Quinn's proposal, affluent customers and other customers fully capable of paying  
4 their electricity bills would receive a subsidy on the first 600 kWh of electricity consumed  
5 per month. Subsidizing the electricity consumption of affluent customers is both  
6 unnecessary and poor policy because it reduces customers' incentive to invest in energy  
7 efficiency (*e.g.*, insulation, efficient appliances). Affluent customers, more than other  
8 customers, have the financial means to purchase energy-efficient appliances and equipment  
9 with higher initial costs but lower life-cycle costs (because of the energy savings). Such  
10 customers should not be dissuaded from making cost-effective energy investments.

11           **Q.     What is your fourth concern with Mr. Quinn's proposal?**

12           A.     Mr. Quinn's proposed essential service rate would lead to what is known in  
13 ratemaking as an inverted block rate—a rate structure in which the rate increases as  
14 consumption increases. A primary justification for an inverted block rate is that the cost of  
15 energy production increases as consumption goes up. Accordingly, pricing an initial block of  
16 consumption lower than the tail block arguably follows the system economics of a utility,  
17 setting low-income interests aside. While there is some merit to this view, the time pattern of  
18 consumption has a profound effect on the utility's cost of production. The cost of meeting  
19 incremental consumption during on-peak and even shoulder-peak hours can be much higher  
20 than the cost of meeting incremental production during off-peak hours. So the cost of energy  
21 production does not necessarily increase as consumption goes up.

1           **Q.     What is the primary drawback of an inverted block rate with respect to**  
2 **Mr. Quinn's goal of assisting low-income customers?**

3           A.     The primary drawback of an inverted block rate is that it could particularly  
4 hurt some of the households that Mr. Quinn wishes to help. Once consumption exceeds the  
5 threshold level, higher prices will apply, regardless of the customer's income level or the  
6 cause of the higher usage. While Mr. Quinn cites EIA data showing that low-income  
7 customers *on average* consume less than the residential population as a whole, there are low-  
8 income households with high consumption who will be hurt by inverted block rates. Low-  
9 income families with larger families and higher consumption, low-income households who  
10 live in all-electric and/or inefficient dwelling units will, for example, be hurt by inverted  
11 block rates. Indeed, some low-income households are likely to see their bills go up, not  
12 down, as a result of inverted block rates.

13                 Since the first 600 kWh of electricity would be sold at a reduced price to all  
14 residential customers, including affluent customers, the tail block could have a much higher  
15 rate than the initial block, depending on the results of this rate case. Thus, low-income  
16 customers with high levels of consumption would effectively be cross-subsidizing affluent  
17 residential customers with modest consumption (*e.g.*, consumption at a vacation home). This  
18 reinforces my conclusion that the proposed essential service rate is a poorly-targeted means  
19 of assisting low-income assistance.

1                    **IV.            INDUSTRIAL DEMAND RESPONSE PILOT**

2            **Q.            What concerns does Missouri Energy Group Witness LaConte raise with**  
3 **respect to AmerenUE's proposed industrial demand response pilot program?**

4            A.            Ms. LaConte raises three concerns with respect to this program. First, she  
5 argues that the credit should be larger. Second, she asserts that the proposed limit should be  
6 raised from 100 MW to 800 MW. Third, Ms. LaConte contends that the period for the pilot  
7 program is too short.

8            **Q.            What is Ms. LaConte's proposed credit for interruptible load?**

9            A.            Ms. LaConte argues that the credit for interruptible load should be in the range  
10 of \$3.15-\$3.55/kW/month, as opposed to AmerenUE's proposed credit of \$2/kW month.

11           **Q.            What rationale does Ms. LaConte offer in support of her proposed**  
12 **credit?**

13           A.            Ms. LaConte contends that the credit should be based on the cost of peaking  
14 capacity. Her proposed range reflects the capacity cost of a new combustion turbine ("CT")  
15 unit, based on estimates prepared by AmerenUE and other parties.

16           **Q.            What is your response to Ms. LaConte's contention that the credit should**  
17 **be based on the cost of peak generating capacity?**

18           A.            I agree, in principle, that the credit for interruptible load should be *based* on  
19 the cost of avoided peaking capacity, but I do not believe that—in the case of AmerenUE's  
20 pilot program—the credit should be *equal* to the estimated cost of a new CT. This is because  
21 interruptible demand, at least as defined in AmerenUE's proposed pilot program, does not  
22 provide the same level of reliability and security as a CT. One reason for this is that  
23 interruptible customers have the right to not reduce demand when requested to do so by

1 AmerenUE. In addition, there is a one-hour notice provision provided to interruptible  
2 customers. CTs, by contrast, can be up and running at full capacity within 10-30 minutes,  
3 depending on the technology. Also, customers only can be interrupted for a maximum of  
4 200 hours, whereas a CT could generate electricity during most of the year (if that were  
5 necessary). An interruptible rate program with no notice, no restrictions upon hours of  
6 interruption per incident, and ample ability to interrupt load frequently during peaking  
7 periods arguably would provide the equivalent reliability and security as a CT, but  
8 AmerenUE's proposed pilot program will not provide this type of service or value to its  
9 system. As a result, it is appropriate to set the credit equal to a percentage of a CT's capacity  
10 cost, rather than its full capacity cost.

11 **Q. What is your response to Ms. LaConte's proposal to raise the program**  
12 **limit from 100 MW to 800 MW?**

13 A. My understanding is that in AmerenUE's former interruptible load program,  
14 known as the Interruptible Power Rate (10M), only four customers with a total non-firm load  
15 of 47 MW were participating when the program was terminated in 1999. Given this, 100  
16 MW seems to be a reasonable limit for the purpose of a pilot program, though I have not  
17 studied the potential amount of curtailable load in AmerenUE's service area.

18 **Q. What is your response to Ms. LaConte's contention that the proposed**  
19 **pilot program is too short to justify any significant investment by customers?**

20 A. Ms. LaConte provides no evidence whatsoever to support her contention, so I  
21 cannot assess the validity of this claim. However, I think her concern likely is overstated for  
22 this reason: retail rate structures and tariffs are subject to the approval of the Commission.  
23 Apart from approved settlements, there are no "guarantees" with regard to rate levels or rate

1 structures—they can and do change over time. Industrial customers take these “risks” into  
2 account all the time when considering energy-related investments. For example, a  
3 customer’s decision to invest in energy-saving equipment will be based, in large part, on  
4 projections of future energy prices.

5           At the same time, industrial customers undoubtedly recognize that regulators  
6 across the U.S. have indicated interest in improving demand responsiveness in the electric  
7 power industry. Given the strong interest in improved demand responsiveness, I find it  
8 unlikely that the Commission would be unreceptive to making an interruptible demand  
9 program permanent if the results of the pilot are encouraging.

10           **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

11           **A. Yes.**

