

Exhibit No.:  
Issue: Regulatory lag, acquisition detriments, tracker requests, merger transition costs, and ORVS program costs recovery, St. Joseph Landfill Gas Generating Plant  
Witness: Darrin R. Ives  
Type of Exhibit: Rebuttal Testimony  
Sponsoring Party: KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company  
Case No.: ER-2012-0175  
Date Testimony Prepared: September 12, 2012

**MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**CASE NO.: ER-2012-0175**

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**DARRIN R. IVES**

**ON BEHALF OF**

**KCP&L GREATER MISSOURI OPERATIONS COMPANY**

**Kansas City, Missouri  
September 2012**

GPO Exhibit No. 124  
Date 10-22-12 Reporter KF  
File No. ER-2012-0175

**REBUTTAL TESTIMONY**

**OF**

**DARRIN R. IVES**

**Case No. ER-2012-0175**

1 **Q: Please state your name and business address.**

2 A: My name is Darrin R. Ives. My business address is 1200 Main, Kansas City, Missouri  
3 64105.

4 **Q: Are you the same Darrin R. Ives who pre-filed Direct Testimony in this matter?**

5 A: Yes, I am.

6 **Q: On whose behalf are you testifying?**

7 A: I am testifying on behalf of KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company (“GMO” or  
8 the “Company”) for St. Joseph Light & Power (“L&P”) and Missouri Public Service  
9 (“MPS”) territories.

10 **Q: What is the purpose of your Rebuttal Testimony?**

11 A: I am providing Rebuttal Testimony for GMO in response to certain sections of the  
12 Missouri Public Service Commission Staff’s (“Staff”) Revenue Requirement and Cost of  
13 Service Report (“Report”). Specifically, I will be providing Rebuttal Testimony  
14 regarding implications to the Company’s on-going concerns regarding regulatory lag  
15 based upon the Direct Testimony filed by Staff. Additionally, I will primarily be  
16 addressing Staff testimony regarding acquisition detriments they assert in several cost  
17 areas, continued recovery of merger transition costs as ordered by the Commission in  
18 GMO’s last rate case (Case No. ER-2010-0356) (“2010 Rate Case”), deferral and  
19 recovery of costs incurred to implement Organizational Realignment and Voluntary

1 Separation Program (“ORVS”), and exclusion from their direct case of new trackers as  
2 requested by the Company in our direct filing in this case. In addition, I will address  
3 Staff testimony regarding the St. Joseph Landfill Gas Generating Station.

4 I will also be providing Rebuttal Testimony in response to the Direct Testimony  
5 of Missouri Industrial Energy Consumers and Midwest Energy Consumers Group  
6 (“MIEC/MECG”) witness Greg Meyer, who took the position that the Commission  
7 should not allow recovery of the costs incurred to implement the ORVS and his  
8 recommendations regarding trackers requested by the Company, specifically the  
9 Renewable Energy Standard (“RES”) tracker and the property tax tracker. I will also  
10 provide Rebuttal Testimony in response to MIEC/MECG witness James Dauphinais’  
11 position on GMO’s request for a transmission tracker.

#### 12 Regulatory Lag

13 **Q: You mention regulatory lag concerns. Please elaborate.**

14 **A:** As I mentioned in my Direct Testimony, over the last several years we have been  
15 experiencing extensive regulatory lag that prevents the Company from realizing an  
16 earned return on equity that is reasonable and expected based on the allowed return on  
17 equity authorized by this Commission in previous cases. While allowed returns do not  
18 represent a guarantee of a return, investors in our Company certainly have an expectation  
19 that earned returns will be reasonable in relation to the allowed returns. Investors  
20 understand the limitations of the regulatory framework caused by the use of historical test  
21 years and the lag that is inherent due to capital investments placed in-service between rate  
22 cases; however, our recent experience in earned returns has not been reflective of the

1 expected relationship between earned and allowed returns. Our return performance from  
 2 2007-2011 is provided:

<b>GMO Authorized vs. Actual Return on Equity 2007 through 2011</b>					
Source: Rate Orders and Missouri Surveillance Reports					
<b>Case No.</b>	<b>Date Rates Effective</b>	<b>Authorized ROE</b>	<b>Calendar Year</b>	<b>Earned ROE-MPS</b>	<b>Earned ROE-L&amp;P</b>
ER-2007-0004	5/31/2007	10.25%	2008	3.83%	4.24%
ER-2009-0090	9/1/2009	Settlement	2009 2010	4.75% 8.30%	0.34% 4.25%
ER-2010-0356	6/25/2011	10.00%	2011	8.54%	5.60%

3  
 4 The discrepancy shown in the table above between earned and allowed returns has  
 5 certainly been a contributor to the fact that GMO's parent company, Great Plains Energy  
 6 Incorporated ("GPE"), has lagged behind a majority of the Edison Electric Institute  
 7 ("EEI") member companies in regard to Total Shareholder Returns provided to its  
 8 investors over the last several years.

9 **Q: How has GPE ranked in comparison to the EEI peer group as compiled by EEI over  
 10 the past several years based on total shareholder returns?**

11 A: Based on the EEI Total Shareholder Returns information as provided in Schedule DRI-2,  
 12 GPE ranks 44 of 55 for the latest 2 year returns, 46 of 55 for the latest 3 year returns and  
 13 51 of 55 for the latest 5 year returns.

14 **Q: Is regulatory lag an issue isolated to GMO?**

15 A: No. While it is certainly an important issue for us in our current regulatory environment,  
 16 it is an issue impacting utilities across the industry. Regionally, I am aware that Union  
 17 Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Missouri in Missouri and Westar Energy in Kansas have  
 18 also been voicing concerns about the extent that regulatory lag is impacting their  
 19 companies. Over the last year or so, I have also attended a conference in Columbia,

1 Missouri, sponsored by Financial Research Institute (“FRI”) and multiple conferences  
2 sponsored by National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (“NARUC”)  
3 where regulatory lag concerns have been discussed at a broader, industry level.

4 **Q: What factors contribute to regulatory lag for GMO?**

5 A: There are several. First and foremost, the regulatory model in Missouri is built primarily  
6 on historical financial information. From a cost of service perspective, the process  
7 utilizes historical test year costs, updated or trued-up for known and measurable changes.  
8 Regardless of the update or true-up period, this model results in rates being set on  
9 historical costs that were incurred in a range anywhere from 5 months to 27 months prior  
10 to the date rates are effective. This model not only ignores cost increases that have  
11 occurred between the historical test year used and the date rates are effective, it also  
12 ignores the fact that in a rising cost environment, costs to serve our customers continue to  
13 increase from the date rates are effective, with little ability to synchronize recovery with  
14 costs incurred other than to initiate another expensive and time-consuming rate case.

15 In certain cost of service cost categories, costs can vary significantly from year-  
16 to-year and when such costs are a material cost of service component they can have a  
17 dramatic impact to the Company as a result of regulatory lag. In its direct filing in this  
18 case, in addition to its current pension/other post-employment benefits (“OPEB”) tracker  
19 and Iatan 2/Common operations & maintenance tracker, the Company identified other  
20 cost of service components it believes warrant tracker treatment including Missouri RES  
21 costs, transmission costs and property taxes. I will provide more Rebuttal Testimony  
22 regarding parties’ positions on requested trackers later in this testimony. In my Direct  
23 Testimony, I also discussed the need for the Commission approval of the rider for

1 demand side energy efficiency program costs requested in its December 2011 Missouri  
2 Energy Efficiency Investment Act (“MEEIA”) filing in Case No. EO-2012-0009 and for  
3 special accounting treatment for proposed significant infrastructure improvements in the  
4 Company’s L&P service territory. Approval of both of these requests would also result  
5 in reduced regulatory lag.

6 From a capital investment perspective, when a utility is in a substantial capital  
7 investment cycle, as is occurring across the country today, significant regulatory lag is  
8 produced. This lag is a result of the same historical model that I discussed regarding cost  
9 of service. Capital investments are generally reflected in a rate case based on assets  
10 placed in-service as of the update or true-up of the case. In this case, it means capital  
11 assets will be five months outdated at the time rates from this case are effective.  
12 Additionally, while utilities are allowed to record an Allowance for Funds Used During  
13 Construction (“AFUDC”) to recover financing costs associated with construction work in  
14 process, assets placed in-service subsequent to the update or true-up of the case, receive  
15 no financing cost recovery until the utility files another expensive and time-consuming  
16 rate case to reflect the assets in rate base. During the entire time the assets are in-service  
17 but not reflected in rates, the Company is recording depreciation expense for the  
18 utilization of the assets. Such depreciation expense is not reflected in rates and, except  
19 for specific, infrequent circumstances in which construction accounting authority has  
20 previously been provided for large generation investments, there is not currently a  
21 mechanism in Missouri to routinely recover that lost depreciation expense. These  
22 regulatory lag effects of capital investment are significant to GMO, and other similar

1 utilities, that are in a substantial capital investment cycle where annual capital additions  
2 significantly exceed the annual depreciation expense of the company.

3 **Q: What other factors contribute to regulatory lag for GMO?**

4 A: Another factor significantly contributing to regulatory lag for GMO is the continuing  
5 effect of the current economic recession. Historically, GMO, and other regional utilities  
6 have experienced load growth (increased kWh usage) in a range of 2% to 3% annually.  
7 In the historical-based regulatory model, this increased kWh usage on the Company's  
8 system sometimes resulted in revenues that exceeded the revenues that rates were based  
9 on. Utilities like GMO were able to utilize the increased revenue to offset cost of service  
10 and capital investment regulatory lag. Today, GMO is not experiencing load growth  
11 consistent with historical levels. In fact, as our direct case demonstrates, since rates were  
12 last set, GMO has experienced very little growth in its MPS territory and demand  
13 destruction (decreased kWh and kW usage) in its L&P jurisdiction. This lack of load  
14 growth adds to and exacerbates the cost of service and capital investment regulatory lag  
15 previously discussed.

16 **Q: Do you have any additional regulatory lag concerns based on the Report filed by**  
17 **Staff?**

18 A: Yes. Several positions by Staff in its cost of service are based on flawed theory and, if  
19 accepted by the Missouri Public Service Commission ("MPSC" or the "Commission"),  
20 will create additional regulatory lag in an environment that is already producing earned  
21 returns on equity well below those authorized by the Commission. In particular, I will  
22 address the following:

- 1           -       Acquisition detriment – cost of debt;
- 2           -       Acquisition detriment – general plant retirements;
- 3           -       Acquisition detriment – advanced coal credit;
- 4           -       No additional Company proposed trackers included;
- 5           -       Stoppage of authorized merger transition costs recovery; and
- 6           -       No recovery of ORVS program costs.

7   **Q:   Please summarize your regulatory lag Rebuttal Testimony.**

8   A:   In summary, as indicated in the Company’s direct filing in this case, we have significant  
9       concerns regarding the extensive regulatory lag we have been experiencing. We continue  
10      to believe that customers benefit from the services provided from a financially-stable  
11      utility. Customers benefit when the Company is able to attract investors willing to invest  
12      funds in our Company that can be used to maintain and update the significant capital  
13      infrastructure required to provide the reliable service that customers expect. We  
14      recognize that the return on equity authorized by this Commission is not guaranteed, but  
15      believe strongly in a ratemaking philosophy that is fair and reasonable. Such a  
16      philosophy provides us an opportunity to realize an earned return on equity that is fair  
17      and reasonable in relation to the authorized return, and is not only good for our investors  
18      but also provides us access to equity capital that can be used to invest in our systems in  
19      Missouri in order to sustain the levels of service reliability expected, and historically  
20      experienced, by our customers.

21                Therefore, I request that the Commission consider the effects of regulatory lag in  
22      making its decision in this case. Providing the expense trackers that we have requested  
23      will help to address regulatory lag associated with these areas of volatile expenses,



1 particularly for costs imposed on the Company which are largely outside of the  
2 Company's management discretion. Trackers for volatile and less manageable costs  
3 ensure that prudently-incurred costs are recovered appropriately. Trackers ensure full  
4 cost recovery but they also ensure that customers do not pay more than the actual cost  
5 incurred. Tracker recovery ensures that customers pay for the cost incurred by the utility  
6 for the specific expense – no more and no less. While trackers result in a delay in cash  
7 recovery for the utility in a rising cost environment, they are a mechanism available to  
8 this Commission that can mitigate the cost of service regulatory lag and corresponding  
9 earnings drag. I also request the Commission reject the arguments made by Staff  
10 regarding acquisition detriments, stoppage of merger transition costs recovery and ORVS  
11 cost recovery. Their arguments are flawed for the reasons discussed later in this Rebuttal  
12 Testimony and will only exacerbate regulatory lag experienced by GMO and widen the  
13 gap between our earned return on equity compared to the return on equity authorized by  
14 this Commission.

#### 15 Acquisition Detriments

16 **Q: In its Report in this case, Staff makes adjustments in its direct case for several**  
17 **acquisition detriments related to the merger of Aquila, Inc. (“Aquila”) with a**  
18 **special-purpose subsidiary of GPE. Didn't the Commission already approve this**  
19 **merger?**

20 **A:** Yes. I was quite surprised to not only see discussion of acquisition detriments by the  
21 Staff, but shocked to see specific adjustments for acquisition detriments in this case. The  
22 Commission approved this merger in a Report and Order in Case No. EM-2007-0374  
23 (“Merger Report and Order”) issued July 1, 2008 – over four years ago. I would also

1 note that Kansas City Power & Light Company (“KCP&L”) and GMO have each had  
2 two prior retail rate cases in Missouri since the Merger Report and Order, with the 2010  
3 rate cases (Case Nos. ER-2010-0355 and ER-2010-0356, respectively, with the latter  
4 being referred to hereinafter as the 2010 Rate Case”) having significant testimony and  
5 determinations made by this Commission regarding merger synergy savings. The  
6 Commission authorized the companies to recover merger transition costs over five years  
7 beginning with rates effective from the 2010 rate cases. The acquisition detriments  
8 asserted by the Staff appear to me to be an attempt to take another bite from a very old  
9 apple.

10 **Q: Can you please summarize the Commission’s ruling regarding the “Not Detrimental**  
11 **to the Public Interest” standard in the Merger Report and Order?**

12 A: Yes. On page 261 of the Merger Report and Order, the Commission provided a section  
13 titled, “Final Conclusions Regarding the Application of the “Not Detrimental to the  
14 Public Interest” Standard.” That section stated:

15 The Commission finds that approving the proposed merger, with the  
16 conditions that it plans to impose, is not detrimental to the public interest.  
17 The Commission concludes the Applicants met their burden of  
18 establishing that there is no detriment to the public interest if the  
19 Commission authorizes the proposed merger. The Commission shall  
20 authorize the proposed merger subject to the conditions already  
21 contemplated and will consider other conditions requested by various  
22 parties to this action in other sections of this Report and Order.

23 Additionally, the Commission observes that synergy savings compose  
24 only one factor in the multi-factor “not detrimental to the public interest”  
25 balancing test. *Given the number of positive benefits associated with the*  
26 *transaction, and the fact that no credible evidence establishes any*  
27 *negative effects from the merger (especially in light of the conditions*  
28 *imposed by the Commission as being necessary for approval), the*  
29 *Commission further concludes that even if it had not weighed the*  
30 *projected synergy savings when performing its balancing test, the*  
31 *Applicants still met their burden of proof that the proposed merger is not*  
32 *detrimental to the public interest.* (emphasis added)

1 **Q: Does it make sense at this juncture, or at any time, for the Staff to propose that the**  
2 **Company recognize in its financial records specific acquisition adjustments?**

3 A: No. As I just mentioned, the Commission in 2008 ruled that the merger was not  
4 detrimental to the public interest. It performed an analysis and balancing test of all  
5 evidence in the record in making their determination. Additionally, the Commission  
6 indicated that it would have determined that the merger was not detrimental to the public  
7 interest even if it had not weighed the projected synergy savings identified by the  
8 Company. Staff's acquisition arguments in this case are, quite simply, illogical.

9 **Q: Do you think acquisition detriments should be weighed, and reflected as**  
10 **adjustments to rates, on an issue by issue basis?**

11 A: Absolutely not. Mergers such as the one with Aquila are large and complex. Integration  
12 of activities is likewise very complicated. It is not likely that every single area and every  
13 single cost category will see synergy and benefit from the merger and integration.  
14 Therefore, much as the Commission looked at the transaction in total in concluding that  
15 there was no detriment to the public interest, acquisition detriments must be looked at in  
16 conjunction with synergy savings being unlocked by the merger (*i.e.*, net basis). It is  
17 nonsensical to suggest, as the Staff has done in its Report in its direct filing in this case,  
18 that the Company and its shareholders should be responsible for acquisition detriments in  
19 individual areas and cost categories, yet significant synergy savings should fully flow  
20 through to customers without consideration of these supposed acquisition detriments  
21 identified by Staff four years after the Commission's order approving this merger.

1 **Q: Do you agree with the individual acquisition detriments that Staff has asserted in**  
2 **their Report?**

3 A: No. In this Rebuttal Testimony, I discuss the legitimacy of the claimed acquisition  
4 detriments. I also respond to Staff's attempt to disallow amortization recovery of merger  
5 transition costs as ordered by this Commission in the Company's 2010 Rate Case. I will  
6 also demonstrate that even if the Commission concludes that all of the acquisition  
7 detriments identified by Staff should be considered in this case, the benefit of annual  
8 synergy savings to customer – net of the annual effect of the identified acquisition  
9 detriments – is still more than sufficient to cover the annual amortization of transition  
10 costs ordered by the Commission in the 2010 Rate Case. Demonstrating that net synergy  
11 savings to customers more than offsets the requested annual recovery of transition costs  
12 is the bottom line test ordered by the Commission in the Merger Report and Order.

13 **Q: Please address the first acquisition detriment listed earlier in this Rebuttal**  
14 **Testimony regarding the cost of debt.**

15 A: In this instance, Staff made an adjustment in this case to lower the debt cost for three  
16 issuances of debt by GPE to support the regulated utility operations. This is the first  
17 instance of Staff adjusting a specific area of costs under the guise of an acquisition  
18 detriment while allowing merger synergies to fully flow through to customers. Staff  
19 provides much testimony in this area. However, in summary Staff argues that because  
20 GPE guarantees the debt of GMO, and because GPE, which has a lower unsecured debt  
21 rating than KCP&L, issued these three tranches of debt, the rates charged to customers is  
22 higher than could have been achieved by issuing debt at the utility (KCP&L and GMO)  
23 level.

1           There are many incorrect assumptions underlying Staff's conclusion. Let's start  
2           though by remembering how we got here. Prior to 2007, Aquila experienced severe  
3           financial issues as a result of, among other reasons, significant losses in non-regulated  
4           business activities. Aquila's debt ratings, as accurately described by Staff, had fallen as  
5           low as CCC+, which was only one category above default. There was no debate at the  
6           time of the proposed merger in 2007, and related asset sales proposed by Aquila  
7           concurrently with the merger and prior to the merger, that Aquila was in significant  
8           financial distress. There were significant reasons that Aquila was pursuing asset sales  
9           and the acquisition by GPE of the remainder of the business, including Missouri  
10          regulated electric operations. There was no assurance at that time that Aquila could  
11          continue as a going concern – and certainly no assurance that Aquila could obtain an  
12          investment grade rating on its debt – without significant change to its corporate structure.

13           With that background, it is my belief that acquisition detriments should be a  
14          component of the balancing test utilized in determining no detriment to the public  
15          interest, not as a single event to be accounted for discreetly from the overall benefit of the  
16          merger transaction. Additionally, acquisition detriments should be evaluated considering  
17          effects after the merger as compared to effects that would have occurred had the merger  
18          not been consummated. As I describe above, and as provided in Staff's Report –  
19          Aquila's debt ratings were below investment grade prior to the transaction – and for  
20          anyone that followed the merger case in front of this Commission – there were no  
21          assurances that Aquila could recover investment grade status on a stand-alone basis.

1 **Q: Please discuss Staff's assertion on pages 37-38 of its Report that the Commission's**  
2 **Merger Report and Order should be considered in this area.**

3 A: Staff refers to the section of the Commission's order that states, "the Commission  
4 conditions its authorization of the transactions....upon a requirement that any post-  
5 merger financial effect of a credit downgrade of Great Plains Energy Incorporated,  
6 Kansas City Power & Light Company, and/or Aquila, Inc., that occurs as a result of the  
7 merger, shall be borne by the shareholders of said companies and not the ratepayers." In  
8 addressing this comment, it is important to review the credit ratings of the entities before  
9 the merger and currently.

10 As is shown in Schedule DRI-3, there have been credit downgrades by Moody's  
11 Investor Service ("Moody's) from pre-merger levels for GPE and KCP&L. GMO's  
12 credit ratings, as expected, have improved from pre-merger levels. While there have  
13 been downgrades, it is clear from the Moody's ratings action reports attached as  
14 Schedules DRI-4 and DRI-5, that the downgrades were made as a result of regional  
15 economic weakness, large construction project risks and a need for continued  
16 improvement in credit metrics. In the March 2010 Moody's ratings action report,  
17 Moody's also mentions their implementation of a widening of the notching between most  
18 senior secured debt and senior unsecured debt. While KCP&L's senior unsecured debt  
19 was downgraded, its senior secured rating did not change. As the merger is mentioned  
20 nowhere by Moody's in its ratings action reports, Staff's reference to the Commission's  
21 condition is irrelevant and there is no support for an adjustment to the cost of debt as a  
22 result of credit rating concerns. Company witness Kevin Bryant will be providing

1 additional cost of debt Rebuttal Testimony to address other Staff assertions in their  
2 Report.

3 In response to the Staff's assertion of an acquisition detriment related to the cost  
4 of debt, for the reasons provided above, the Commission should reject Staff's assertion.  
5 Further, in the event that there was a future credit downgrade, more than five years since  
6 the announcement of the proposed merger, I would argue that it would be virtually  
7 impossible from this point forward to affirmatively state that a credit downgrade could be  
8 attributed to the merger, without specific evidence to the contrary. The business  
9 environment is not static and much has happened in the region and industry over the last  
10 five years that goes well beyond the merger of these entities.

11 **Q: Please address the second acquisition detriment listed earlier in this Rebuttal**  
12 **Testimony regarding general plant unrecovered reserves.**

13 A: In this instance, Staff has asserted that a depreciation reserve shortfall of just under \$20.7  
14 million (Staff allocates this amount between jurisdictions as follows: MPS \$1.4 million,  
15 L&P \$0.5 million, ECORP Common \$18.7 million) exists in GMO's general plant  
16 accounts as a result of the acquisition of Aquila. They assert that this shortfall should be  
17 treated as an acquisition detriment. Their recommendation is an adjustment in this rate  
18 case to increase reserves in the general plant accounts by the approximate \$20.7 million.  
19 Consistent with my testimony above, this proposed treatment flies in the face of the  
20 overall balancing test that was conducted by the Commission in its 2008 approval in the  
21 Merger Report and Order. It similarly lacks symmetry in treatment, as the Staff proposes  
22 to penalize the Company and its shareholders for individual asserted acquisition

1           detriments, but Staff is comfortable flowing through gross annual synergy savings to  
2           customers.

3   **Q:   Please describe the plant retirements discussed by Staff that drive this unrecovered**  
4   **reserve.**

5   A:   The general plant retirements creating this approximate \$20.7 million unrecovered  
6   reserve balance represent assets that were retired in conjunction with consolidations of  
7   facilities that were made after close of the merger.  Additionally, after the merger, GPE  
8   made the decision to close and sell the former Aquila corporate headquarters and  
9   ultimately determined it should enter into a new lease for the combined companies'  
10   corporate headquarters in different office space than KCP&L and GPE occupied prior to  
11   the merger.

12   **Q:   Are synergies from building closures and facilities consolidations flowing through to**  
13   **customers today?**

14   A:   Yes, at this juncture the synergies derived from the closures and consolidations are  
15   flowing through to customers.  In the 2010 Rate Case, where the Commission evaluated  
16   merger synergies and approved amortization of merger transition costs, the annual  
17   synergies related to these activities estimated to be flowed through to customers with  
18   rates effective from the 2010 Rate Case were approximately \$7.0 million annually.

19   **Q:   How does this level of annual synergy savings relate to the annual depreciation**  
20   **effect of the related retired general plant assets?**

21   A:   Utilizing the Staff workpapers to analyze the approximately \$20.7 million reserve impact,  
22   the annualized depreciation impact had the retirements not been made would be  
23   approximately \$4.8 million.  Therefore, the annual depreciation impact of the retirements



1 (asserted acquisition detriment) is estimated to be \$2.2 million less than the related  
2 closure and consolidation synergies currently being flowed through to customers. This is  
3 calculated as an annual impact of depreciation for the assets retired assuming all assets  
4 would have remained in service over the full five years that synergies are evaluated. This  
5 is a very conservative view as it is likely that some assets would have been retired during  
6 the synergy period regardless of the building closures and consolidations.

7 **Q: Based on the analysis just described, do you believe there is any foundation for**  
8 **adopting Staff's adjustment to increase reserves in the general plant accounts for**  
9 **the \$20.7 million?**

10 A: Absolutely not. For the reasons provided earlier in my testimony, acquisition detriments  
11 should not be evaluated on an individual or cost category basis. Acquisition detriments  
12 should be evaluated as a component of the overall balancing test when determining  
13 whether there is no detriment to the public interest. As noted, there is no symmetry in  
14 penalizing the Company and its shareholders for individual cost category acquisition  
15 detriments, but flowing through gross synergy savings to customers. Finally, even when  
16 looking at this individual cost category, synergy savings provided to customers as a result  
17 of the facilities closures and consolidations exceed the acquisition detriment asserted by  
18 the Staff for general plant retirements. Therefore, in response to the Staff's assertion of  
19 an acquisition detriment related to general plant unrecovered reserves, for the reasons  
20 provided above, the Commission should reject Staff's assertion.

21 **Q: Is there anything else you would like to add on this topic?**

22 A: Yes. I would like to point out that the Company followed the FERC Code of Federal  
23 Regulations ("CFR") and Chart of Accounts in recording the retirements. Our treatment

1 on the books is fully consistent with mass asset accounting and generally accepted  
2 accounting principles.

3 **Q: Is there another way to look at recovery of these general plant retirement costs?**

4 A: Yes. While our treatment is consistent with the FERC CFR and generally accepted  
5 accounting principles, if the Staff asserts that these costs are related to the acquisition,  
6 and are part of the costs necessary to unlock synergies for customers as a result of the  
7 closures and consolidations, then these costs should be looked at not as acquisition  
8 detriments but as merger transition costs. If they were considered merger transition costs,  
9 these \$20.7 million in costs would be eligible to be recovered over five years from the  
10 effective date of rates from the 2010 Rate Case. I would point out that based upon the  
11 synergy tracker model results utilized in the Commission's approval of transition cost  
12 recovery in the 2010 Rate Case, annualized synergy savings to customers would continue  
13 to significantly exceed transition costs amortization, even after amortizing the \$20.7  
14 million over the remainder of the five-year amortization recovery period, which would  
15 amount to \$6.1 million annually.

16 **Q: Did Staff previously identify this general plant retirement issue in the 2010 rate  
17 case?**

18 A: Yes. In the 2010 rate case in support of his argument against the Company's request for  
19 general plant amortization, Staff witness Arthur Rice stated, "Staff believes retirements  
20 have been taken in some of these accounts which resulted from the Aquila acquisition  
21 that should be recorded to synergies accomplished due to the acquisition, and not to  
22 depreciation expense through early retirements in these accounts." As I have stated  
23 previously, if Staff believes these costs are associated with the acquisition and thus were

1 part of the costs to unlock the synergies realized for customers, then these costs would be  
2 considered merger transition costs and should be added to the annual transition cost  
3 amortization that was granted in the 2010 rate case.

4 **Q: Isn't it true that in the 2010 rate case the Staff identified significant excess reserves**  
5 **for MPS and L&P?**

6 A: In the 2010 rate case, Staff witness Arthur Rice identified an excess accumulated  
7 depreciation reserve on the order of \$167,000,000 associated with the MPS and L&P  
8 jurisdictions. This meant that the actual book reserve recorded on the books of MPS and  
9 L&P was \$167 million more than the theoretical reserve balance. This is completely the  
10 opposite situation from what Staff has identified with the \$20.7 million unrecovered  
11 general plant reserve identified above.

12 **Q: What is the financial impact to GMO and GPE if the Staff's position of an**  
13 **acquisition detriment for general plant unrecovered reserves is accepted by this**  
14 **Commission?**

15 A: GMO would have to immediately increase the reserve balance in the general plant  
16 accounts and write-off this amount to expense in the amount of \$20.7 million. This  
17 would have a significant impact on the earnings of GPE. As mentioned before, this  
18 would cherry pick an acquisition detriment to penalize the Company and its shareholders  
19 while continuing to flow through significant synergy savings to customers. Additionally,  
20 this would be despite the fact that in the 2010 rate case, as discussed above, the Staff  
21 identified a significant \$167 million excess depreciation reserve balance. This argument  
22 by the Staff is unbalanced at best and its results would be highly punitive to the  
23 Company.

1 **Q: Please address the third acquisition detriment listed earlier in this Rebuttal**  
2 **Testimony regarding the Iatan 2 Qualifying Advanced Coal Project Credits.**

3 A: In this third assertion by Staff of an acquisition detriment, the Staff asserts that “absent  
4 the acquisition, Aquila (GMO) would have been in a position to take part in the  
5 arbitration process and, more importantly, it would have requested a share of the Coal  
6 Credits when the IRS was requested to reallocate Coal Credits to Empire.” They go on to  
7 assert that GMO faced an acquisition detriment as a result of certain of the events  
8 surrounding the Coal Credits occurring after the acquisition of Aquila by GPE.

9 **Q: Is the Company rebutting the Staff’s assertions of imprudence regarding the Coal**  
10 **Credits and their recommendations for treatment in this case?**

11 A: Yes. The Company certainly disagrees with the Staff’s positions and recommended  
12 treatment for this issue. Company witness Melissa Hardesty addresses the Staff’s  
13 positions and assertions in her rebuttal testimony and Company witness Salvatore  
14 Montalbano addresses Staff’s recommended treatments in his Rebuttal Testimony. I will  
15 be addressing Staff’s assertion of an acquisition detriment regarding the Coal Credits.

16 **Q: Is Staff’s assertion of an acquisition detriment appropriate?**

17 A: No. For many of the reasons I provided earlier discussing asserted acquisition  
18 detriments, it is not. Staff’s treatment flies in the face of the Commission’s decision in  
19 the Merger Report and Order, where the Commission clearly determined that the merger  
20 was not detrimental to the public interest. Additionally, as I discussed earlier in this  
21 testimony, much as the Commission looked at the transaction in total in concluding that  
22 there was no detriment to the public interest, acquisition detriments must be looked at in  
23 conjunction with synergy savings being unlocked by the merger (*i.e.*, net basis).

1 **Q: Are there other points that you would like to make regarding Staff's assertion of**  
2 **acquisition detriment regarding the Coal Credits?**

3 A: Yes. First, KCP&L is currently eligible to utilize \$107.3 million of Coal Credits. If  
4 GMO would have received a proportionate share of the credits, GMO would have  
5 received \$26.6 million of Coal Credits with KCP&L's share reduced to \$80.7 million. In  
6 other words, the combined company would be eligible to utilize \$107.3 million of Coal  
7 Credits – the same level available to KCP&L today. This results in a jurisdictional  
8 difference depending on which Company is eligible to utilize the Coal Credits, but there  
9 is no reduction of Coal Credits for the combined company as a result of the acquisition –  
10 or in other words, no acquisition detriment.

11 Second, this Coal Credit dispute began before the acquisition, when KCP&L  
12 applied for and received the credits and neither Empire nor Aquila requested Coal  
13 Credits. Company witness Melissa Hardesty discusses the timeline and sequence of  
14 events in more detail in her Rebuttal Testimony. The point here, however, is the Coal  
15 Credit issue developed before the acquisition. While it is certainly an issue being  
16 discussed in the companies' last rate cases and again in this one – the fact that the issue  
17 pre-dates the acquisition, and that the credits available to the combined company are no  
18 different than pre-acquisition, makes it difficult to understand Staff's argument for this to  
19 be considered an acquisition detriment.

20 **Q: If Staff's assertion for the Coal Credits were supportable, would this detriment**  
21 **make the entire merger detrimental to the public interest?**

22 A: Absolutely not. In the first full year post-merger, 2009, the companies' proved an annual  
23 amount of synergy savings to regulated operations of \$48.5 million, all of which are

1 currently flowing through to customers. The \$48.5 million of annual savings determined  
2 utilizing the synergy tracking model ordered by the Commission to justify beginning  
3 amortization of transition costs in rates is comprised of many sustainable savings benefits  
4 to customers for years to come including employee and benefit cost reductions, savings  
5 from building closures and consolidations, etc. The \$48.5 million represents, on an  
6 annual basis, approximately 4 times the requested annual transition costs recovery.

7 As noted above, on a combined company basis, there is no difference in credits  
8 available to be utilized, \$107.3 million. However, if, for the sake of argument, you just  
9 isolate the proposed reallocation of credits to GMO, the GMO impact is \$26.6 million, to  
10 be provided to customers over the life of Iatan 2 of approximately 47 years, as computed  
11 for tax credit purposes. While the credits available to customers would not flow to  
12 customers on a straight-line basis, less are able to be utilized for the next several years,  
13 let's assume that all were available to be utilized in year 1 and would flow to customers  
14 over the 47 year life, computed for tax credit purposes, of Iatan 2. That would equate to  
15 less than \$0.6 million available to customers annually. While, this amount is not  
16 inconsequential, it does not jeopardize at all the significant amount of synergies being  
17 provided to customers as a result of the merger, nor does it jeopardize the companies'  
18 ability to demonstrate that synergies, net of asserted acquisition detriments, continue to  
19 significantly exceed the annual transition cost amortization.

**Tracker Requests**

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**Q: You stated earlier that Staff did not include Trackers in their Report consistent with the newly requested Trackers by the Company in its Direct case. Please explain.**

A: Yes, Staff did not provide testimony in its Report providing Trackers consistent with the newly requested Trackers by the Company in its Direct case. While Staff has not yet had to provide Rebuttal Testimony to the Company’s Direct filed case, it is telling that Staff has had the Company’s Direct filed case for over five months and did not provide for the newly requested Trackers in its Report.

**Q: You stated earlier that one purpose of your Rebuttal Testimony is to respond to Mr. Meyer regarding his Direct Testimony on the utilization of a property tax tracker. What was Mr. Meyer’s position regarding use of a tracker for property tax expense?**

A: Mr. Meyer did not support use of a tracker for property tax expense as he indicated that “the Company has significant control over when it begins construction projects and adds new plant to its base.”

**Q: Do you agree that the Company has control over its level of property taxes?**

A: No. While the Company may have some control over the timing of certain projects, this control would, at best, only impact for a short-term the timing of changes in the property tax liabilities. What is certain is that the Company has little control over the actual property tax valuations, the mill levy tax rates and thus the ultimate property taxes to be paid. Property taxes are determined on an annual basis and, due in part to budgetary issues of state and local governments such taxes, can and have changed significantly over

1 the past several years as noted in my Direct Testimony and the Direct Testimony of  
2 Company witness Harold "Steve" Smith.

3 **Q: Did Mr. Meyer suggest an alternative to the tracker for property tax expense?**

4 A: Yes, Mr. Meyer indicated that the Company can file a rate case and/or time its rate case  
5 filings to address significant changes in property tax expense or the Company could  
6 pursue an Accounting Authority Order ("AAO") to address such changes.

7 **Q: Please explain why these are not acceptable alternatives to the tracker for property  
8 tax expense.**

9 A: First, an AAO would not be an appropriate method for recovery of property tax expense.  
10 Such an Order is normally used for one-time, unusual or non-recurring items which  
11 normally would not include property taxes. As noted, property taxes are determined on  
12 an annual basis and can vary significantly from year to year.

13 Second, property taxes are a significant component of the Company's cost of  
14 service and as the level of such taxes can and has changed significantly from year to year  
15 with little control by the Company, it makes sense to address such recovery through a  
16 defined mechanism such as a tracker. This method would also assure that rate payers  
17 would receive the benefit of any decrease in property taxes as both tax increases and  
18 decreases would be appropriately tracked.

19 **Q: Mr. Meyer also addressed the Company's proposal to implement a RES tracker  
20 didn't he?**

21 A: Yes, he did. Regarding the RES tracker, Mr. Meyer recommended prudently incurred  
22 costs through March 31, 2012 be included in rate base and the operating expenses reflect  
23 a six-year amortization. He further recommends these amounts be trued-up as of August



1 31, 2012, and the normalized level of solar rebate costs allowed in the last rate case be  
2 discontinued. He recommends future costs be deferred and addressed in a future case,  
3 rather than allowing the use of a tracker.

4 **Q: Why is the Company requesting the use of a tracker rather than deferring the costs**  
5 **until the next rate case?**

6 A: While the Company received approval for the Commission for its requested AAO to  
7 defer RES costs for recovery consideration in this case, it is imperative that the Company  
8 not only receive a tracker for the RES costs but that a reasonable amount be established  
9 in rates in this case to be utilized as a base for the tracker. With the significant growth in  
10 RES costs being experienced by the Company as a result of the RES legislation and rules,  
11 deferral only, without a reasonable amount included in base rates in this case, will result  
12 in substantial cash regulatory lag for the Company that is unreasonable in light of the  
13 legislative mandate that is driving the need for the Company to incur these significant  
14 costs.

15 **Q: Did the Company propose a transmission tracker in this case?**

16 A: Yes it did.

17 **Q: Did MIEC/MECG witness Mr. Dauphinais provide Direct Testimony regarding this**  
18 **request?**

19 A: Yes, he did. He recommends the Commission deny KCP&L's request for a transmission  
20 tracker.

21 **Q: Why did the Company request a transmission tracker?**

22 A: Transmission expenses are one category of expenses that tends to be volatile and for the  
23 most part imposed on the Company and are largely outside of the Company's management

1 discretion. A tracker allows recovery of these volatile expenses with Customers paying no  
2 more or less than the actual cost the Company incurs. My Direct Testimony in this case  
3 and the Direct Testimony of Company witness John Carlson in this case both discuss the  
4 rationale for the Company's request for a transmission tracker in this case.

5 **Q: Have conditions changed for the Company since Direct Testimony was filed in this**  
6 **case regarding the necessity of a transmission tracker?**

7 A: They have not.

8 **Q: Please summarize your Rebuttal Testimony in regard to the parties' positions on**  
9 **trackers requested by the Company.**

10 A: While the Staff did not address the newly requested trackers in their Report and  
11 MIEC/MECG witnesses opposed the newly requested trackers in their filed cases, the  
12 Company continues to feel strongly that these trackers are necessary and appropriate to  
13 address regulatory lag impacts in these areas. The costs covered by these requested  
14 trackers are becoming significant impacts to the Company's cost of service, have been  
15 increasing in recent periods greater than annual inflation or customer load growth, and  
16 most importantly are costs largely outside of the Company's management discretion as  
17 they are costs imposed by third parties, legislative or regulatory actions.

18 The Company believes that in circumstances such as this, trackers are valuable  
19 tools. Use of trackers in these circumstances can help to mitigate the regulatory lag  
20 caused by these items on Company earnings. Use of a tracker also ensures that in the  
21 years between rate cases the utility does not under-recover or over-recover its costs in  
22 these areas. In other words, a tracker works to ensure that a dollar spent in these areas  
23 results in a dollar recovered, no more and no less. It should be noted that while a tracker

1 helps provide the Company an opportunity to earn closer to its authorized ROE, the  
2 Company still has a regulatory cash lag related to trackers due to the delay in recovery of  
3 costs through the tracker.

4 **Merger Transition Costs**

5 **Q: Can you summarize the testimony of Staff witness Keith A. Majors with regard to**  
6 **Transition Cost Recovery Mechanism?**

7 A. Yes, Mr. Majors recommends that the continued amortization of transition costs through  
8 GMO's cost of service, which was ordered in the 2010 Rate Case be discontinued in this  
9 case for the following reasons:

- 10 1. KCP&L, and therefore GMO, has not maintained the detailed synergy tracking  
11 model that was produced in the 2010 Rate Case,
- 12 2. Staff believes that KCP&L has some of the highest administrative and general  
13 ("A&G") expenses, a portion of which are allocated to GMO, in the region,
- 14 3. KCP&L and GMO have retained significant corporate synergy benefits without a  
15 comparable amount of regulated synergy benefits being flowed through to  
16 ratepayers, and
- 17 4. There were "significant acquisition detriments" that offset the benefits realized  
18 through the acquisition.

19 **Q: What else did Mr. Majors include in Staff's Report regarding transition cost**  
20 **recovery?**

21 A: Mr. Majors also argues that if the Commission authorizes the continued amortization of  
22 transition costs, they should:

- 1 1. Reduce the transition costs by any retained savings related to 2011 ORVS
- 2 program, and
- 3 2. The beginning date of the amortization should retroactively be changed to
- 4 September 1, 2009, the effective date of rates in Case No. ER-2009-0090.

5 **Q: What is your response to Staff's position?**

6 A: I strongly disagree with Staff's position presented in Mr. Majors' testimony. This issue  
7 was definitively decided by the Commission in the 2010 Rate Case in which the  
8 Company was granted a 5 year amortization of identified transition costs. Frankly, the  
9 Company is frustrated by the Staff's continued insistence on litigating transition cost  
10 recovery after the Commission has rendered a definitive decision on the issue.

11 **Q: Please explain the history of transition costs as discussed in the Merger Report and**  
12 **Order in Case No. EM-2007-0374.**

13 A: In paragraphs 167 and 168 of the Merger order, the Commission made a distinction  
14 between transaction costs and transition costs:

15 Examples of transaction costs include investment banker fees, consulting  
16 and legal fees associated with the evaluation, bid, negotiation and structure  
17 of the deal. Transition-related costs are comprised of the costs incurred to  
18 integrate Aquila into Great Plains. They are those costs necessary to  
19 ensure that the synergy savings are achieved and that the merger process is  
20 effective. These costs include severance and retention costs associated  
21 with process integration.

22 The Commission's Final Conclusion Regarding Transaction and Transition Cost  
23 Recovery from page 241 of the Merger order is as follows:

24 Substantial and competent evidence in the record as a whole supports the  
25 conclusions that: (1) the Applicants' calculation of transaction and  
26 transition costs are accurate and reasonable; (2) in this instance,  
27 establishing a mechanism to allow recovery of the transaction costs of the  
28 merger would have the same effect of artificially inflating rate base in the  
29 same way as allowing recovery of an acquisition premium; and (3) the  
30 uncontested recovery of transition costs is appropriate and justified. The

1 Commission further concludes that it is not a detriment to the public  
2 interest to deny recovery of the transaction costs associated with the  
3 merger and not a detriment to the public interest to allow recovery of  
4 transition costs of the merger.

5 If the Commission determines that it will approve the merger when it  
6 preforms its balancing test (in a later section in this Report and Order), the  
7 Commission will authorize KCPL and Aquila to defer transition costs to  
8 be amortized over five years.

9 Footnote 930 to this decision stated:

10 The Commission will give consideration to their recovery in future rate  
11 cases making an evaluation as to their reasonableness and prudence. At  
12 that time, the Commission will expect that KCPL and Aquila demonstrate  
13 that the synergy savings exceed the level of the amortized transition costs  
14 included in the test year cost of service expenses in future rate cases.

15 **Q: Did the Commission find that the synergy savings projected in the Merger**  
16 **application were accurate and reasonable?**

17 A: Yes, on page 238 of the Merger Report and Order, the Commission found that,

18 “the projected synergies are accurate, realistic and achievable at a very  
19 high level of confidence and probability,” and

20 “the synergies actually realized from the merger have a very high  
21 probability of exceeding the Applicants’ estimates”.

22 **Q: How were transition costs handled in the 2010 Rate Case?**

23 A: In that rate case, the Company presented a Synergy Tracking Model (Tracker), which the  
24 Commission noted on page 169, paragraph 469 of the Report and Order (“2010 Order”),

25 ... demonstrated that the merger synergy savings for non-fuel operations  
26 and maintenance expense exceed the amortization of merger transition  
27 costs.

28 In fact, the Tracker showed \$48.5 million of synergies compared to \$10.4 million annual  
29 amortization of transition costs in all jurisdictions (KCP&L Missouri and Kansas and  
30 GMO MPS and L&P). This demonstrated that in one year the amount of synergies  
31 retained were almost as great as the entire amount of transition costs to be anortized.

1           The Company also presented a synergy project charter database (Database) that  
2 tracked all synergies on a project-by-project basis for internal purposes. The  
3 Commission noted on page 169, paragraph 471 of the 2010 Order that,

4           Staff's analysis showed that the amount of synergies in the synergy project  
5 database exceeded those in the Commission-ordered tracking system.

6 This statement is true when you compare the amounts in the Database to the Tracker  
7 because the database contained ALL synergies from the merger, whereas the Tracker by  
8 design only analyzed non-fuel operations and maintenance ("NFOM") synergies. The  
9 amount of NFOM synergies in the Database exceeded synergies in the Tracker by \$8,000  
10 or less than .02%.

11           Additionally, the Company and Staff presented evidence that the Commission  
12 noted on page 169, paragraph 474 of the 2010 Order that,

13           KCP&L and GMO project that total synergy savings through 2013 will be  
14 \$344 million. Of that amount, KCP&L and GMO project that ratepayers  
15 will receive \$150 million.

16 As noted above, the Commission believed in the Merger Order that there was a high  
17 probability of the \$305 million of synergy benefits projected in the merger application  
18 being exceeded and this provided evidence to validate that belief.

19 **Q: Did any party to the 2010 Rate Case challenge the reasonableness or prudence of the**  
20 **merger transition costs?**

21 A: On page 170, paragraph 477, the Commission noted that,

22           No party challenged the reasonableness or prudence of incurring the  
23 merger transition costs. In addition, Staff's witness stated that the  
24 transition costs incurred by the company were not unreasonable or  
25 imprudent.

1 **Q: In the 2010 Rate Case, did the Commission find that the Company had complied**  
2 **with Merger Order as it related to recovery of merger transition costs?**

3 A. Yes, in the Conclusions of Law-Transition Cost Recovery, page 171, paragraph 57, the  
4 Commission stated,

5 The Companies accumulated all transition costs consistent with the  
6 Merger Order. The Commission concludes that the Companies have  
7 complied with the Merger Order as it relates to recovery of transition  
8 costs.

9 **Q: In the 2010 Rate Case, did the Commission give any credence to the Staff's**  
10 **arguments regarding regulatory lag in the context of transition cost recovery?**

11 A. No, the Commission did not. In fact, in the Commission's Decision-Transition Cost  
12 Recovery, page 172-173, it was stated,

13 No party to this proceeding has challenged the reasonableness and  
14 prudence of the claimed transition costs or challenged the amount of  
15 synergy savings. While true that the Companies' shareholders have  
16 enjoyed the benefit of regulatory lag in retaining synergy savings since the  
17 merger was consummated, the Commission finds that this outcome was  
18 specifically contemplated in its consideration of the appropriate treatment  
19 for synergy savings in the merger case and as set out in the Merger Order.  
20 The Commission also finds that it specifically contemplated that synergy  
21 savings would be higher than predicted.

22 **Q: In the 2010 Rate Case, did the Commission find that the Company had**  
23 **demonstrated that synergy savings exceeded transition costs?**

24 A. The Commission directly states on page 173 of the 2010 Order,

25 The Commission expected that recovery would only occur if the  
26 Companies incurred the costs prudently and reasonably and demonstrated  
27 that the synergy savings were more than the transition costs. **The**  
28 **Companies have done this.** (emphasis added)

1 **Q: In the 2010 Rate Case, did the Commission agree with Staff's argument that**  
2 **amortization of transition costs should have begun with the date rates were effective**  
3 **in the first rate case after the merger, i.e. September 1, 2009?**

4 A. No, the Commission did not. In fact, the Commission laid out its reasoning on page 173-  
5 174 of the 2010 Order as follows,

6 Staff also argues that the companies should have begun amortizing these  
7 costs in the previous rate cases per the Merger Order. At first glance, the  
8 Merger Order does imply that the five-year amortization will begin from  
9 the first rate case after the transaction is consummated. **However, that**  
10 **statement is just a restatement of what the Companies were**  
11 **proposing. The Commission never specifically orders that treatment.**  
12 Furthermore those rate cases were resolved through settlement and this  
13 issue was not addressed in that settlement so the issue never came before  
14 the Commission for consideration. **Thus, this is the first opportunity for**  
15 **the amortizations to begin and Commission determines they will be**  
16 **amortized over five years beginning with this rate case.** (emphasis  
17 added)

18 **Q: Based on these various conclusions drawn by the Commission, what was its final**  
19 **decision regarding recovery of merger transition costs?**

20 A: On page 174 of the 2010 Order, the Commission stated,  
21 The evidence in this case supports the Commission's original findings in  
22 the Merger Order that the Companies should be permitted to recover the  
23 merger transition costs in rates over five years beginning with rates  
24 effective from this case.

25 **Q: On page 253 of his Direct Testimony, Mr. Majors argues that "without the**  
26 **Commission Ordered Synergy Savings Tracking Model, Staff cannot determine**  
27 **whether the annual synergy savings . . . exceed the amortized transition costs." Did**  
28 **the Commission order that the Tracker be prepared in rate cases subsequent to the**  
29 **2010 Rate Case?**

30 A: Again, on page 174 of the 2010 Order, the Commission stated,



1           The evidence in this case supports the Commission's original findings in  
2           the Merger Order that the Companies should be permitted to recover the  
3           merger transition costs in rates over five years beginning with rates  
4           effective from this case.

5           It is the Company's position that the Commission could not have been any clearer in its  
6           ruling on this issue. The Commission believed that the Company had met all  
7           requirements to recover merger transition costs, ordered that they be recovered over five  
8           years beginning with the effective dates for rates in the 2010 Rate Case and did not order  
9           that the Tracker be completed in subsequent years in order to justify continuing  
10          amortization. If the Commission had intended that the Company complete the Tracker  
11          each year through 2016, the Company believes that it would have explicitly ordered this.  
12          Note, also, that had the Commission required this, the measurement period would have  
13          exceeded the five year period through June 30, 2013 contemplated in the Merger Order.

14   **Q: Has the Company stopped tracking synergies?**

15   A: No, it has not. In fact, Mr. Majors acknowledges on page 255 in his Direct Testimony  
16          that the Company has continued to track synergies through the preparation of the  
17          Database. The Company believes that it is important that it meet all synergy benefits  
18          promised in the merger application and continues to track all benefits to ensure that it is  
19          meeting its obligations.

20   **Q: Does the Company believe that it is still generating synergy benefits in excess of**  
21          **merger transition costs?**

22   A: Yes, without a doubt. The Company believes it is generating synergy benefits far in  
23          excess of merger transition costs. In fact, in this case the Company has not presented any  
24          new transition costs to be amortized that were not already ordered in the 2010 Rate Case.

1 **Q: What were the synergy savings that were proven in the 2010 Rate Case?**

2 A: As demonstrated in the previous case and accepted by Staff, in 2009 alone over \$48.5  
3 million of NFOM synergies were realized, according to the Tracker and Database. In  
4 other words, in one year, the Companies generated enough synergies to cover 93% of the  
5 \$52.0 million in total transition costs that are flowing through rates in all jurisdictions.

6 **Q: Does the Company believe that there are certain synergies that are subject to little  
7 debate, even without preparation of the Tracker?**

8 A: Yes, the Company believes that there are several such synergies. For instance, even if the  
9 Company were unable to prove any other synergy savings going forward, there should be  
10 little debate that headcount was reduced and has remained below pre-merger levels or  
11 that several buildings and service centers were consolidated and sold. The annual level  
12 of synergies related to these items proven in the 2010 Rate Case was \$15.0 million.  
13 Being conservative and assuming no inflation, for the period of 2010 through 6/30/13  
14 those synergies alone would total \$52.4 million. Combined with the 2009 synergies  
15 already accepted by Staff, the total of \$100.9 million would be almost double the total  
16 transition costs.

17 **Q: Does the Company believe that it demonstrated in the 2010 Rate Case that the  
18 Tracker and Database were highly correlated?**

19 A: As noted earlier, the Tracker presented in the 2010 Rate Case demonstrated \$48.5 million  
20 of synergies related to 2009 NFOM, while the Database was higher by only \$8,000. For  
21 2010 and 2011, the Database tabulated \$57.6 million and \$59.9 million of synergies,  
22 respectively for the NFOM projects that were highly correlated to the Tracker in the 2010  
23 Rate Case.

1 **Q: Does the high correlation between the Tracker and Database provide the Company**  
2 **and this Commission with comfort that it is still generating synergies in excess of**  
3 **merger transition costs?**

4 A. Based on the high correlation, the Company believes that any Tracker that would be  
5 produced would show synergies that were well in excess of the annual transition cost  
6 amortization and, in fact, would be higher in each year than the total transition costs of  
7 \$52.0 million.

8 **Q: Has the Company performed any other analysis that demonstrates that synergy**  
9 **savings still exceed transition costs?**

10 A: As noted above, in the 2010 Rate Case, the Commission and Staff noted that \$344  
11 million of regulated synergy savings was projected over 5 years, with \$150 million going  
12 to ratepayers. I noted in my Surrebuttal Testimony in the 2010 Rate Case on page 6, line  
13 18 that this Staff analysis was made using an ultra-conservative assumption that no  
14 synergy savings were realized by customers until rates were effective in the 2010 Rate  
15 Case. Using the same methodology through the March 31, 2012, Database provided to  
16 Staff in DR 196.1 of Case No. ER-2012-0174, the companion 2012 rate case for KCP&L,  
17 the Company now projects \$364 million of regulated synergy savings over 5 years, with  
18 \$168 million going to ratepayers.

1 **Q: What conclusions can be drawn from the correlation between the Tracker and**  
2 **Database, the current Database results and the updated analysis performed using**  
3 **Staff's methodology?**

4 A: As all methods noted have shown increased synergies from those presented in the 2010  
5 Rate Case, the Company believes that the only conclusion that can be drawn is that  
6 synergy savings still significantly exceed merger transition costs.

7 **Q: Mr. Majors states in his testimony (on page 256), "The fact is that KCPL and GMO,**  
8 **while enjoying significant corporate retained benefits, have not flowed a comparable**  
9 **amount of regulated synergy savings to its regulated electric utility operations." Is**  
10 **Mr. Majors' assertion relevant?**

11 A: No, it is not. As noted above, based on his own methodology, the Company is giving  
12 more synergies to ratepayers than was even contemplated in the 2010 Rate Case, when  
13 the Commission clearly stated on page 173 of the 2010 Order,

14 The Commission expected that recovery would only occur if the  
15 Companies incurred the costs prudently and reasonably and demonstrated  
16 that the synergy savings were more than the transition costs. The  
17 Companies have done this.

18 Additionally, on page 172 of the 2010 Order, the Commission states,

19 While true that the Companies' shareholders have enjoyed the benefit of  
20 regulatory lag in retaining synergy savings since the merger was  
21 consummated, the Commission finds that this outcome was specifically  
22 contemplated in its consideration of the appropriate treatment for synergy  
23 savings in the merger case and as set out in the Merger Order.

24 **Q: Did Mr. Majors make a similar argument regarding corporate retained synergy**  
25 **benefits in the 2010 Rate Case?**

26 A: Yes, in the 2010 Rate Case, he also argued that the Company had retained a significant  
27 amount of corporate benefits while not flowing a comparable amount to ratepayers.

1 **Q: Did the Commission address this argument in the 2010 Order?**

2 A: The Commission focused exclusively on the reasonableness and prudence of the  
3 transition costs incurred and whether or not regulated synergy savings exceeded these  
4 costs. It did not in any way address this argument.

5 **Q: Do you believe that the Commission should give any weight to this argument in the**  
6 **current case?**

7 A: No, I do not. As I argued on pages 9 and 10 of my Rebuttal Testimony in the 2010 Rate  
8 Case,

9 The amount of corporate retained synergies referenced by Staff witness  
10 Majors is accurate and consistent with projected amounts identified by the  
11 Applicants in the Merger case. However, an understanding of the  
12 transaction is necessary to understand corporate retained synergies.  
13 Synergies are determined by first looking at 2006 base year costs for  
14 Aquila and KCP&L. GPE acquired the legal entity Aquila, Inc. not just the  
15 regulated Missouri operations. In 2006, there were significant costs  
16 incurred by Aquila, Inc. that were either corporate retained costs (not  
17 allocable to any regulated jurisdictions) or costs that were allocated to  
18 regulated jurisdictions other than Missouri. These costs were not subject  
19 to recovery from Missouri ratepayers prior to the acquisition and would  
20 not be eligible to be recovered from Missouri ratepayers post-acquisition.  
21 Therefore, the risks of not realizing these synergy savings were fully borne  
22 by the Company and its shareholders and the resultant synergy savings  
23 achieved should similarly fully benefit the Company and its shareholders.  
24 It is inappropriate to view those savings as an offset to costs the  
25 Commission said the Company could recover.

26 **Q: Has there been any change in the nature of corporate retained synergies since the**  
27 **2010 Rate Case?**

28 A: No, there has not. My testimony is still accurate and applicable.

29 **Q: Is Mr. Majors omitting any other relevant information?**

30 A: Mr. Majors is also neglecting to take into account that once synergy benefits were taken  
31 into account in previous rate cases (both Case No. ER-2009-0090 and the 2010 Rate  
32 Case), they are perpetual benefits to the ratepayers with no further retention by the

1 Company and shareholders. Therefore, the Company and shareholders have already  
2 retained the maximum amount of synergy savings and all benefits are now flowing to  
3 ratepayers.

4 **Q: If the Commission had ordered continuation of the Tracker in the 2010 Rate Case,**  
5 **would you have had any concerns with its continued use?**

6 A: Yes, the Tracker does have one major inherent limitation. The business environment that  
7 the Company operates in is not static, as the Commission acknowledged in the Merger  
8 Report and Order on page 97, paragraph 244:

9 Tracking synergy savings with any degree of accuracy is problematic at  
10 best. Business operations are not conducted in a static environment, but  
11 rather under constant change, including customer growth, technological  
12 improvements, etc. Tracking will become more difficult each successive  
13 year after the merger.

14 As the Commission noted, the more time that passes from 2006, the more the model  
15 relies on management assumptions. As an example, the 2009 model that was accepted by  
16 Staff and the Commission contained over 30 separate adjustments to 2006 costs to make  
17 them comparable to 2009, including an adjustment to account for inflation. Additional  
18 adjustments that would be required in the 2010 or 2011 models would include operating  
19 costs for Iatan 2, Spearville 2 and ORVS program costs, among others. Each year that  
20 passes means more adjustments must be made to the Tracker in order to make the current  
21 period comparable to the business as it existed in 2006. In other words, each year out  
22 from 2006 entails more and more assumptions on the part of management.

23 **Q: In summary, what is the Company's position with regard to the Tracker?**

24 A: The Company believes that there was no requirement in the 2010 Order to continue  
25 preparing the Tracker. In any event, the Company believes that it has a responsibility to  
26 ensure that it is meeting its promised synergy targets and has prepared reasonable

1 documentation of synergies through its Synergy Tracker Database which has been  
2 provided to Staff and demonstrates a consistent amount of synergy savings as was  
3 contemplated in case number ER-2010-0356. Finally, the Company believes that the  
4 Tracker has an inherent limitation that limits its usefulness as each year after 2006 passes.  
5 Based on all of these beliefs, maintaining a Tracker model in addition to the Synergy  
6 Tracker Database was not required.

7 **Q: Did Staff make an argument in the 2010 Rate Case that KCP&L's A&G expenses, a**  
8 **portion of which are allocated to GMO, were high compared to other comparable**  
9 **utilities?**

10 A: Yes, Staff did.

11 **Q: Did the Commission find the Staff's position on A&G expenses persuasive?**

12 A: On page 173 of its 2010 Order, the Commission stated,

13 Staff also argues that the A&G expenses of the Companies were higher  
14 than average and attempted to make a connection to the transition costs  
15 being unreasonable. The Commission gives little weight to that argument  
16 since Staff's witness testified that these transition costs were not incurred  
17 unreasonably or imprudently.

18 **Q: Should an argument that KCP&L's A&G costs are high have any impact on the**  
19 **recovery of merger transition costs?**

20 A: Consistent with the Commission's decision in the 2010 Rate Case, it should not  
21 have any impact. As the Commission stated on page 173 of the 2010 Order the  
22 Company was required to demonstrate two things with regard to recovery of  
23 merger transition costs. The Commission expected that recovery would only  
24 occur if (1) the Companies incurred the costs prudently and reasonably and (2) the  
25 Companies demonstrated that the synergy savings were more than the transition  
26 costs. The Companies have done this.

1 **Q: Did Mr. Majors present any new evidence with regard to the beginning date of**  
2 **amortization in his Direct Testimony as compared to the 2010 Rate Case?**

3 A: No, he did not.

4 **Q: What did the Commission find in the 2010 Rate Case when presented with the same**  
5 **arguments that Staff is presenting in this case with regards to the beginning of**  
6 **amortization?**

7 A: Again, the Commission on page 173-174 of the 2010 Order stated,

8 Staff also argues that the companies should have begun amortizing these  
9 costs in the previous rate cases per the Merger Order. At first glance, the  
10 Merger Order does imply that the five-year amortization will begin from  
11 the first rate case after the transaction is consummated. However, that  
12 statement is just a restatement of what the Companies were proposing.  
13 The Commission never specifically orders that treatment. Furthermore  
14 those rate cases were resolved through settlement and this issue was not  
15 addressed in that settlement so the issue never came before the  
16 Commission for consideration. Thus, this is the first opportunity for the  
17 amortizations to begin and Commission determines they will be amortized  
18 over five years beginning with this rate case.

19 **Q: Please summarize the Company's position with regard to the beginning of**  
20 **amortization for transition costs.**

21 A: The Commission could not have spoken any more clearly on this issue. Again, why this  
22 issue is being raised by Staff without any new evidence or arguments to support a  
23 position that was clearly addressed by the Commission in the 2010 Rate Case is not clear.

24 **Q: Mr. Majors asserts that there are several "acquisition detriments" related to the**  
25 **Aquila acquisition. What is the Company's position with regard to these items?**

26 A: As stated previously in my testimony, the Company vigorously disagrees with the Staff's  
27 position that any of the asserted acquisition detriments are, in fact, detriments related to  
28 the merger.



1 **Q: While the Company’s position is clear that these items are not “acquisition**  
2 **detriments”, what would be the impact if an annual amortization was included to**  
3 **offset synergy benefits?**

4 A: If you add \$7.3 million on an annual basis for these “acquisition detriment” to the annual  
5 transition cost amortization of \$10.4 million, you still don’t even approach the annual  
6 synergy amount of \$48.5 million that was proven in the 2009 Tracker, let alone the  
7 increased synergy amounts for 2010 and 2011 included in the Database.

8 **Q: What did the Company promise in synergy benefits in the Merger Application?**

9 A: The Company promised \$305 million of synergies over 5 years while estimating it would  
10 incur \$58.9 million of transition costs to achieve those synergies.

11 **Q: What has the Company delivered through March 31, 2012 in synergy benefits?**

12 A: Through March 31, 2012, the Company has realized \$269.5 million of synergies and  
13 projects a total of \$364.7 million over five years, while incurring \$52.0 million of  
14 transition costs to achieve the synergies. In other words, the Company is on track to  
15 deliver almost 20% more synergies than promised at a cost that is almost 12% lower than  
16 originally estimated.

17 **Q: Is there anything else that the Commission should consider about synergies and**  
18 **recovery of merger transition costs?**

19 A: As stated above, while transition costs are amortized over five years, once synergy  
20 benefits were taken into account in previous rate cases (both the 2009 and 2010 cases),  
21 many are perpetual benefits to the customers with no further retention by the Company  
22 and shareholders.

1 **Q: Please summarize the Company's request on the transition cost issue.**

2 A: The Company believes that it has previously met all requirements to receive recovery of  
3 transition costs through amortization over five years beginning with rates effective in the  
4 2010 Rate Case. The Company's belief is based on the Commission's decision in that  
5 case's Report and Order. Given that there has been no change in the facts, we simply  
6 request that the Commission reject Staff's request for the stoppage of transition costs  
7 amortization recovery and reaffirm its previous decision that the Company has already  
8 demonstrated compliance with all transition cost requirements and should be allowed to  
9 continue to amortize and recover the costs over five years.

10 **Organizational Realignment and Voluntary Separation Cost Amortization**

11 **Q: You mentioned the Organizational Realignment and Voluntary Separation Program**  
12 **("ORVS") earlier in your testimony. What position did Staff and MIEC/MECG**  
13 **witness Greg Meyer take in their Direct Testimony?**

14 A: Staff and Mr. Meyer recommended removal of the costs associated with ORVS from  
15 GMO's revenue requirement.

16 **Q: What was the basis of their recommendations?**

17 A: Both argued that GMO will have already recovered these costs through regulatory lag by  
18 the time rates are in effect for this case.

19 **Q: Do you agree with this rationale?**

20 A: No I do not. Regulatory lag is the time interval between when a charge or credit  
21 originates and when it becomes a part of the charge for service approved by the  
22 regulatory agency, resulting in the inability to have rates adequately reflecting the current  
23 level of operating costs or throughput. Rates generally reflect costs incurred in a

1 historical test period. Regulatory lag can be positive or negative and can span all areas of  
2 cost of service. In other words, regulatory lag is purely the difference between actual  
3 results and amounts used in the determination of rates – mostly driven by changes from  
4 the historical-based test year utilized in the determination of rates. It is not appropriate to  
5 pick an area of positive regulatory lag and attempt to utilize it to cover specific costs;  
6 there are many other cost of service areas that experience negative regulatory lag. It can  
7 be seen from the comparison of earned returns to authorized returns provided earlier in  
8 my testimony that the Company has been impacted by negative regulatory lag over the  
9 prior five years by a much greater extent than it has benefitted from any areas of positive  
10 regulatory lag.

11 **Q: Has the Commission previously recognized positive regulatory lag?**

12 A: Yes. In particular, in its Report and Order in the 2010 Rate Case, in the Findings of Fact  
13 section of the Report, the Commission found in paragraph 462 the following:

14 As a result of regulatory lag, if a utility experiences a cost decrease, there  
15 is a lag in time until that reduced cost is reflected in rates. During that lag,  
16 *the Company shareholders reap, in the form of increased earnings, the*  
17 *entirety of the benefit associated with the reduced costs.* The Company  
18 shareholders also reap, in the form of decreased earnings, the entirety of  
19 the loss associated with the increased costs. (emphasis added)

20 **Q: Are the Staff and MIEC/MECG positions related to ORVS consistent with the**  
21 **above cited excerpt from the Commission’s Report and Order in the 2010 Rate**  
22 **Case?**

23 A: No, they are not. Their positions attempt to take the shareholder benefit from positive  
24 regulatory lag noted by the Commission and utilize that benefit to cover the one-time  
25 costs that were incurred to create the short-term benefits to shareholders and the long-

1 term, perpetual benefits to customers once the benefits are reflected in rates in this rate  
2 case.

3 **Q: Has the Staff provided recovery for any of the ORVS costs in their case?**

4 A: Yes, they have. While they have not provided recovery for any of the one-time program  
5 costs, they have held to their commitment in the Nonunanimous Stipulation and  
6 Agreement Regarding Pensions and Other Post-Employment Benefits entered into in the  
7 2010 Rate Case that provided for the deferral and recovery of pension settlement costs  
8 required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 88 ("FAS 88"). FAS 88  
9 requires immediate recognition of certain costs arising from settlements of defined  
10 benefit plans, such as that for ORVS, rather than the normal slower recognition of these  
11 pension costs over the employees' remaining service lives. The pension costs recognized  
12 immediately under FAS 88 are being amortized over five years beginning with the new  
13 rates in this case and the normal ongoing pension costs in this case have been reduced.

14 **Q: Under the companies' proposal, will the ORVS program provide substantial  
15 benefits to customers over the proposed five-year recovery of program costs?**

16 A: Yes, as demonstrated in the table below, assuming all employees departed on May 1,  
17 2011, and looking at benefits and costs from that point to the end of the proposed five-  
18 year recovery period, the benefits to customers are significant. In fact, the benefits to  
19 customers, net of FAS 88 and the amortization of one-time program costs, totals over \$74  
20 million, which is over 2 times the benefits retained by shareholders in the period prior to  
21 inclusion of the savings in rates. Further, the over \$74 million of net benefits to  
22 customers over the first five years included in rates is almost 3 times the requested cost  
23 recovery over the same period.

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total
	(in millions)							
<b>Shareholder Benefit Estimated</b>	15.5	20.2	17					52.9
<b>Customer Benefit: Gross</b>		15.5	20.2	20.2	20.2	20.2	20.2	137.5
<b>Less: ORVS Cost Amortization</b>		(2.5)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(17.5)
<b>Less: ORVS FAS 88 Impact</b>		(2.5)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(17.5)
<b>Customer Benefit: Net</b>		10.5	15.2	15.2	15.2	15.2	15.2	92.8

1

2 **Q: Are there any other points you would like to make regarding the ORVS program?**

3 **A:** Yes. It is clear from the table above and the Direct Testimony of Company witness Kelly  
4 Murphy that the ORVS program will provide substantial benefits to customers over the  
5 requested period of cost recovery. I would also note that once the costs are fully  
6 recovered, customers will see the full benefit for as long as the positions are not refilled,  
7 which the Company has no plans to do. The companies are merely requesting to recover,  
8 on a delayed basis, the one-time costs incurred to provide these substantial customer  
9 benefits. I would note to the Commission that the Company incurred these costs in 2011,  
10 and if its proposal is granted, the costs won't be fully recovered until 2017. Thus, while  
11 the companies' proposal addresses earnings regulatory lag, the companies will still  
12 experience several years of cash regulatory lag. Therefore, I request the Commission  
13 reject the ORVS arguments put forth by Staff and MIEC/MECG in their Direct  
14 Testimony.

15

**St. Joseph Landfill Gas Generating Plant**

16 **Q: Did you review the Staff Testimony concerning the Landfill Gas Generating Plant?**

17 **A:** Yes. Staff witness Michael E. Taylor indicated the generating unit has successfully met  
18 all of the in-service criteria and was fully operational and used for service by March 30,  
19 2012. Further, he notes that although this date is later than the end of the test year

1 (September 30, 2011) for this case, it is within the update period ending March 31, 2012  
2 and true-up period ending August 31, 2012.

3 **Q: Did any other parties offer testimony concerning the Landfill Gas Generating**  
4 **Plant?**

5 A: No.

6 **Q: What is your response to the testimony offered?**

7 A: I support the testimony offered by Staff. I recommend the Commission accept the  
8 Landfill Gas Generating Plant as being in-service and operating for the benefit of our  
9 customers.

10 **Q: Does that conclude your testimony?**

11 A: Yes, it does.

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

In the Matter of KCP&L Greater Missouri )  
Operations Company's Request for Authority to ) Case No. ER-2012-0175  
Implement General Rate Increase for Electric Service )

**AFFIDAVIT OF DARRIN R. IVES**


**STATE OF MISSOURI** )  
 ) ss  
**COUNTY OF JACKSON** )

Darrin R. Ives, being first duly sworn on his oath, states:


1. My name is Darrin R. Ives. I work in Kansas City, Missouri, and I am employed by Kansas City Power & Light Company as Senior Director – Regulatory Affairs.

2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes is my Rebuttal Testimony on behalf of KC&PL Greater Missouri Operations Company consisting of forty-five (45) pages, having been prepared in written form for introduction into evidence in the above-captioned docket.


3. I have knowledge of the matters set forth therein. I hereby swear and affirm that my answers contained in the attached testimony to the questions therein propounded, including any attachments thereto, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Darrin R. Ives

Subscribed and sworn before me this 12<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2012.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public

My commission expires: Feb. 4 2015



EEI Index Rankings for 1/1/2010 through 12/31/2011, 2-Year Total Return

Rank	Company	Return	Rank	Company	Return
1	CENTRAL VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE CO	81.7	29	NSTAR	39.0
2	EL PASO ELECTRIC CO	75.5	30	UNITIL CORP	38.5
3	NISOURCE INC	71.1	31	BLACK HILLS CORP	38.4
4	OGE ENERGY CORP	64.2	32	DTE ENERGY CO	37.2
5	ALLIANT ENERGY CORP	59.1	33	VECTREN CORP	35.9
6	PNM RESOURCES INC	54.9	34	PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC	35.6
7	CMS ENERGY CORP	53.5	35	PEPCO HOLDINGS INC	35.5
8	SOUTHERN CO	52.8	36	AMEREN CORP	32.2
9	PROGRESS ENERGY INC	52.3	37	SCANA CORP	31.7
10	CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC	52.1	38	AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO	30.9
11	NORTHWESTERN CORP	50.9	39	AVISTA CORP	30.8
12	CH ENERGY GROUP INC	50.3	40	TECO ENERGY INC	29.8
13	CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC	50.0	41	EDISON INTERNATIONAL	27.6
14	NORTHEAST UTILITIES	49.6	42	UNISOURCE ENERGY CORP	25.9
15	WISCONSIN ENERGY CORP	49.5	43	NEXTERA ENERGY INC	24.6
16	CLECO CORP	48.9	44	GREAT PLAINS ENERGY INC	22.3
17	DOMINION RESOURCES INC	48.4	45	EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC CO	21.9
18	WESTAR ENERGY INC	46.5	46	CONSTELLATION ENERGY GROUP INC	19.1
19	PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL CORP	45.6	47	PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISE GROUP INC	8.1
20	INTEGRYS ENERGY GROUP	43.9	48	FIRSTENERGY CORP	6.5
21	DUKE ENERGY CORP	42.3	49	SEMPRA ENERGY	5.0
22	XCEL ENERGY INC	42.0	50	PPL CORP	0.9
23	IDACORP INC	41.6	51	PG&E CORP	0.4
24	UIL HOLDINGS CORP	41.3	52	OTTER TAIL CORP	-0.7
25	NV ENERGY INC	41.2	53	EXELON CORP	-2.0
26	ALLETE INC	41.2	54	ENTERGY CORP	-2.2
27	MGE ENERGY INC	41.0	55	MDU RESOURCES GROUP INC	-3.2
28	HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC INDUSTRIES INC	40.6			



**EEl Index Rankings for 1/1/2009 through 12/31/2011, 3-year Total Return**

Rank	Company	Return	Rank	Company	Return
1	NISOURCE INC	158.3	29	ALLETE INC	51.5
2	CMS ENERGY CORP	147.1	30	PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC	49.1
3	OGE ENERGY CORP	146.4	31	SCANA CORP	47.3
4	PNM RESOURCES INC	103.8	32	NSTAR	46.8
5	EL PASO ELECTRIC CO	96.8	33	BLACK HILLS CORP	45.5
6	CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC	86.3	34	SOUTHERN CO	45.3
7	CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC	85.5	35	AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO	44.6
8	CLECO CORP	85.1	36	EDISON INTERNATIONAL	43.6
9	NV ENERGY INC	83.5	37	UNISOURCE ENERGY CORP	43.6
10	WISCONSIN ENERGY CORP	83.0	38	HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC INDUSTRIES INC	42.3
11	TECO ENERGY INC	81.2	39	SEMPRA ENERGY	42.2
12	DTE ENERGY CO	78.4	40	VECTREN CORP	42.1
13	PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL CORP	77.2	41	UIL HOLDINGS CORP	41.6
14	NORTHWESTERN CORP	77.1	42	EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC CO	39.9
15	ALLIANT ENERGY CORP	74.3	43	PEPCO HOLDINGS INC	38.5
16	DUKE ENERGY CORP	73.5	44	NEXTERA ENERGY INC	35.4
17	CONSTELLATION ENERGY GROUP INC	72.9	45	CH ENERGY GROUP INC	30.5
18	XCEL ENERGY INC	70.8	46	GREAT PLAINS ENERGY INC	29.1
19	DOMINION RESOURCES INC	69.6	47	PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISE GROUP	28.5
20	PROGRESS ENERGY INC	67.0	48	PG&E CORP	20.7
21	NORTHEAST UTILITIES	67.0	49	AMEREN CORP	18.1
22	CENTRAL VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE CORP	66.3	50	OTTER TAIL CORP	11.2
23	WESTAR ENERGY INC	65.1	51	PPL CORP	11.0
24	UNITIL CORP	64.3	52	MDU RESOURCES GROUP INC	9.2
25	IDACORP INC	60.5	53	FIRSTENERGY CORP	7.2
26	MGE ENERGY INC	59.3	54	ENTERGY CORP	0.1
27	INTEGRYS ENERGY GROUP	52.7	55	EXELON CORP	-10.1
28	AVISTA CORP	52.4			

### EEI Index Rankings for 1/1/2007 through 12/31/2011, 5-year Total Return

Rank	Company	Return	Rank	Company	Return
1	CENTRAL VERMONT PUBLIC SERVICE CORP	80.4	29	NORTHWESTERN CORP	29.5
2	CLECO CORP	80.2	30	HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC INDUSTRIES INC	28.6
3	OGE ENERGY CORP	72.8	31	PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL CORP	25.7
4	WISCONSIN ENERGY CORP	69.8	32	AVISTA CORP	24.0
5	NSTAR	68.9	33	UNISOURCE ENERGY CORP	22.8
6	CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC	67.0	34	AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO	22.1
7	SOUTHERN CO	59.5	35	PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISE GROUP INC	20.2
8	MGE ENERGY INC	56.2	36	BLACK HILLS CORP	14.9
9	DOMINION RESOURCES INC	55.9	37	PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC	14.7
10	CMS ENERGY CORP	55.7	38	ALLETE INC	13.9
11	CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC	55.2	39	SEMPRA ENERGY	13.5
12	NORTHEAST UTILITIES	51.4	40	EMPIRE DISTRICT ELECTRIC CO	12.6
13	PROGRESS ENERGY INC	51.3	41	NV ENERGY INC	12.3
14	XCEL ENERGY INC	50.1	42	UIL HOLDINGS CORP	12.1
15	UNITIL CORP	48.5	43	EDISON INTERNATIONAL	6.8
16	EL PASO ELECTRIC CO	46.1	44	PG&E CORP	6.1
17	DTE ENERGY CO	45.1	45	PEPCO HOLDINGS INC	3.0
18	ALLIANT ENERGY CORP	45.0	46	PPL CORP	1.0
19	DUKE ENERGY CORP	43.7	47	MDU RESOURCES GROUP INC	-4.1
20	WESTAR ENERGY INC	43.4	48	ENERGY CORP	-4.9
21	TECO ENERGY INC	42.9	49	FIRSTENERGY CORP	-7.8
22	SCANA CORP	41.6	50	OTTER TAIL CORP	-10.5
23	CH ENERGY GROUP INC	40.0	51	GREAT PLAINS ENERGY INC	-10.8
24	VECTREN CORP	37.8	52	EXELON CORP	-14.8
25	INTEGRYS ENERGY GROUP	34.9	53	AMEREN CORP	-18.1
26	NEXTERA ENERGY INC	32.7	54	PNM RESOURCES INC	-27.2
27	IDACORP INC	31.9	55	CONSTELLATION ENERGY GROUP INC	-32.5
28	NISOURCE INC	30.8			

Senior Unsecured Credit Ratings												
		Standard & Poor's				Moody's						
Date	GPE		KCPL		GMO (Aquila)		GPE		KCPL		GMO (Aquila)	
	Rating	Outlook	Rating	Outlook	Rating	Outlook	Rating	Outlook	Rating	Outlook	Rating	Outlook
As of 12/31/2006	No Rating	Stable	BBB	Stable	B	Positive	Baa2	Stable	A3	Stable	B1	Stable

Current Credit Rating    BBB-    Stable    BBB    Stable    BBB    Stable    Baa3    Stable    Baa2    Stable    Baa3    Stable



Moody's Investors Service

Global Credit Research  
Rating Action  
11 MAR 2009

**Rating Action: Great Plains Energy Incorporated**

**Moody's Downgrades Great Plains, KCPL, KCPL GMO; Affirms KCPL's P-2 CP Rating**

New York, March 11, 2009 – Moody's Investors Service today downgraded the long term ratings of Great Plains Energy Incorporated ("Great Plains") as well as the ratings of Great Plains' operating subsidiaries, Kansas City Power and Light Company ("KCPL") and KCPL GMO ("GMO"). At the same time Moody's affirmed KCPL's short-term commercial paper rating at P-2. The rating outlook for all entities remains negative.

The downgrades capture our concerns that the company's consolidated financial profile, recently weakened, may experience a prolonged period of soft credit metrics due to regional economic weakness along with regulatory, financial and operational challenges related to current and future construction projects. These risks will need to be carefully managed over the next 12-to-24 months in order to avoid any further rating action.

Ratings downgraded today include:

Great Plains senior unsecured rating to Baa3 from Baa2;

KCPL GMO (formerly Aquila, now guaranteed by Great Plains) senior unsecured rating to Baa3 from Baa2;

KCPL senior secured rating to A3 from A2; senior unsecured rating to Baa1 from A3

Ratings affirmed include:

KCPL's short-term rating for commercial paper at Prime-2

We note that Great Plains operating results in fiscal 2008 included only a partial year's contribution of cash flow from the former "Aquila" assets and while some improvement may be possible in 2009, increased negative headwinds could delay any meaningful changes. One key metric, consolidated CFO (pre-w/c) to adjusted debt is likely to remain in the low-teens percentage range over the next 12-18 months, a level considered soft for the Baa2 rating, particularly in a jurisdiction where regulatory lag is common. We expect KCPL to achieve only slightly better credit metrics on a stand-alone basis.

Moody's has continued to maintain the two-notch rating between Great Plains and KCPL due to the higher leverage associated with the debt at KCPL GMO (the rated obligations guaranteed by Great Plains following its acquisition of Aquila's Missouri electric operations). The incremental debt notwithstanding, we note there is little in the way of ring-fencing provisions for bondholders at the KCPL level and that with the recent inclusion of additional regulated electric generating assets under Great Plains ownership (KCPL GMO), the combined operations now come under common management and increasingly operate as a combined system; if not considered one for rate-making purposes. At December 31, 2008, KCPL's balance sheet debt of \$1.8 billion accounted for 55% of Great Plains consolidated debt.

Although affirmed, liquidity and financial flexibility will continue to be an area of concern for maintaining the P-2 short-term rating at KCPL. The company's \$600 million commercial paper program is fully backstopped by a \$600 million credit facility expiring in May 2011. It has been KCPL's strategy to borrow short-term to meet capital spending needs and refinance with periodic common equity infusions from Great Plains and the issuance of long-term debt. At year-end 2008 KCPL reported CP borrowings of \$380 million and the company has continued to rely on short-term borrowings to fund spending for new generation and environmental capex. Although Great Plains maintains a separate \$400 million credit line at the parent level and an additional \$400 million line at KCPL GMO, commercial paper borrowings at KCPL will need to be reduced with new long-term debt or new equity in order to maintain financial flexibility appropriate for the P-2 rating. The current negative outlook notwithstanding, recent bondholder friendly actions, including the recent

Schedule DRI-4  
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cut in common dividends and moderate planned scaling back of capital spending should help to conserve cash.

Downward pressure on Great Plains' rating could result if consolidated credit metrics deteriorate to a level where the company's CFO (pre w/c) to adjusted debt ratio declines below the low-teen percentage range for an extended period. The rating at KCPL could have similar pressure should this same metric weaken to below the mid-teen range for an extended period. Additionally, the successful inclusion of various capital projects into rate-base, particularly related to the latan facilities, will continue to be an important rating consideration going forward.

The last rating action on Great Plains, KCPL, and KCPL GMO was on July 15, 2008 when the ratings were affirmed with a negative outlook. The principal methodology used in rating these issuers was Global Regulated Electric Utilities, which can be found at [www.moody.com](http://www.moody.com) in the Credit Policy & Methodologies directory, in the Ratings Methodologies subdirectory. Other methodologies and factors that have been considered in the process of rating these issuers can also be found in the Credit Policy & Methodologies directory.

Headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri, Great Plains Energy is an electric utility holding company. Through its primary operating subsidiaries, Kansas City Power and Light Company, and KCPL GMO, it is primarily engaged in providing the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity to approximately 820,000 customers in Missouri and Kansas. Great Plains reported revenue of \$1.7 billion in 2008.

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Moody's Investors Service

**Rating Action: Moody's Downgrades KCPL; Affirms Ratings of Great Plains Energy and GMO;  
Outlook Stable**

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**Global Credit Research - 12 Mar 2010**

New York, March 12, 2010 -- Moody's Investors Service today downgraded the senior unsecured rating of Kansas City Power and Light (KCPL) one notch to Baa2 from Baa1, and affirmed KCPL's A3 senior secured rating, and Prime -2 short-term commercial paper rating. At the same time Moody's affirmed KCPL's parent, Great Plains Energy Incorporated (Great Plains) at Baa3 senior unsecured, and its operating subsidiary, KCPL Greater Missouri Operations (GMO) at Baa3 senior unsecured. The rating outlooks at Great Plains, KCPL, and GMO were all changed to stable from negative.

KCPL's operating results in 2009 were challenged by weakness in the Missouri economy as well as atypically cool summer weather. Although there was modest improvement in credit metrics during the year we believe the credit profile of KCPL looking prospectively is more reflective of the Baa2 rating category given the challenges the company has faced in executing its two later construction programs. The key issues in stabilizing the outlook for the ratings in our view, are related; successfully transition of later 2 to rate base, and continued improvement in the credit metrics.

At year-end 2009, Great Plains reported \$1.5 billion of construction work in progress on its balance sheet (18% of the company's total assets). A large component of that is attributable to KCPL, and principally related to the construction of later 2, an 850MW supercritical coal plant nearing completion in Weston, Missouri (Great Plains' electric operations own 73% of the project). Because the project's ultimate cost will be higher than its initial estimate and will likely be placed into service two months behind schedule the risk of some regulatory disallowance is heightened. Offsetting this risk to some extent is the fact that in 2005 Great Plains and the Missouri Public Service Commission agreed on a framework under which the prudence of construction would be viewed and that a modest portion of construction costs have already been recovered under the "additional amortization" component of rates.

Nevertheless, the regulatory lag associated with recovery of the sizable capital investment cited above continues to pressure credit metrics. With one key metric, CFO (pre-w/c) to debt, we would expect to see utility issuers in the "Baa" range demonstrate results between 12%-22%. In 2009, Great Plains and KCPL reported just 11% and 15%, respectively, which are levels considered soft for the ratings, particularly for KCPL. In affirming the ratings and stable outlook at this time we consider that in 2010 the company, on a consolidated basis, will receive a full year's benefit from approximately \$218 million of rate increases that became effective in Q3-2009, and that further improvement is possible in 2011 given reasonable outcomes of recent rate filings in Kansas and Missouri. The affirmation of KCPL's A3 senior secured rating is consistent with Moody's implementation of a widening of the notching between most senior secured debt ratings and the senior unsecured debt ratings or Issuer Ratings of investment grade regulated utilities to two notches from one previously last year. See Moody's press release dated August 3, 2009

In 2010 we expect negative free cash flow at both Great Plains and KCPL due to the continued elevated level of capital expenditures; however, we believe the company will maintain a comfortable level of external liquidity for meeting its needs in the near term. At December 31, 2009, Great Plains reported total company availability under its credit lines of \$902 million. We continue to maintain a Prime -2 short-term rating at KCPL where the company's \$600 million commercial paper program is fully backstopped by a \$600 million credit facility expiring in May 2011. Longer-term, we note the company has a series of large debt maturities to address from 2011-2012 (approximately \$984 million in total).

The last rating actions on Great Plains, KCPL, and KCPL GMO occurred on March 11, 2009, when the respective ratings for each of the entities were downgraded one notch with a negative outlook. The principal methodology used in rating these issuers is "Regulated Electric & Gas Utilities", published in August 2009, and available on [www.moody.com](http://www.moody.com) in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory under the Research & Ratings tab. Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website.

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